Interpretation of Wills b.
All my shares consisting of one half
[G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997]
MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES,
DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE,
MARITES AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO,
and CELSA AGAPE, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO
VIVARES, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Unless legally flawed, a testators
intention in his last will and testament is its
life and soul which deserves reverential
observance.
The controversy before us deals with
such a case.
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G.
Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape,
Marites Agape, Estebana Galolo and
Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special
Proceedings No. 112 for the probate of the
will of Torcuato J. Reyes, assail in this
petition for review the decision of the Court
of Appeals[1] dated November 29, 1995,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
judgment appealed from allowing or
admitting the will of Torcuato J. Reyes to
probate and directing the issuance of
Letter Testamentary in favor of petitioner
Julio A. Vivares as executor without bond
is AFFIRMED but modified in that the
declaration that paragraph II of the
Torcuato Reyes' last will and testament,
including subparagraphs (a) and (b) are
null and void for being contrary to law is
hereby SET ASIDE, said paragraphs (a)
and (b) are declared VALID. Except as
above modified, the judgment appealed
from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."[2]
The antecedent facts:
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J.
Reyes executed his last will and testament
declaring therein in part, to wit:
xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion
Oning R. Reyes the following properties to
wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties
consisting among others of jewelries,
coins, antiques, statues, tablewares,
furnitures, fixtures and the building;
(1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in
common with my brother Jose, situated in
Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog,
Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin; real
estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan,
Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc,
Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines,
Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of
Misamis Oriental.[3]
The will consisted of two pages and
was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the
presence of three witnesses: Antonio
Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad
Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A.
Vivares was designated the executor and
in his default or incapacity, his son Roch
Alan S. Vivares.
Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on
May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a
petition for probate of the will before the
Regional Trial Court of Mambajao,
Camiguin. The petitioner was set for
hearing and the order was published in the
Mindanao Daily Post, a newspaper of
general circulation, once a week for three
consecutive weeks. Notices were likewise
sent to all the persons named in the
petition.
On July 21, 1992, the recognized
natural children of Torcuato Reyes with
Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila,
and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the
deceaseds natural children with Celsa
Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape,
filed an opposition with the following
allegations: a) that the last will and
testament of Reyes was not executed and
attested in accordance with the formalities
of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle
exerted undue and improper influence
upon the testator at the time of the
execution of the will. The opposition further
averred that Reyes was never married to
and could never marry Asuncion Reyes,
the woman he claimed to be his wife in the
will, because the latter was already
married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then
alive and their marriage was never
annulled. Thus Asuncion can not be a
compulsory heir for her open cohabitation
with Reyes was violative of public morals.
On July 22, 1992, the trial court
issued an ordering declaring that it had
acquired jurisdiction over the petition and,
therefore, allowed the presentation of
evidence. After the presentation of
evidence and submission of the respective
memoranda, the trial court issued its
decision on April 23, 1993.
The trial court declared that the will
was executed in accordance with the
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 1
formalities prescribed by law. It, however,
ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the
testimonies of the witnesses, was never
married to the deceased Reyes, and,
therefore, their relationship was an
adulterous one. Thus:
The admission in the will by the testator to
the illicit relationship between him and
ASUNCION REYES EBARLE who is
somebody elses, wife, is further bolstered,
strengthened, and confirmed by the direct
testimonies of the petitioner himself and
his two attesting witnesses during the trial.
In both cases, the common denominator is
the immoral meretrecious, adulterous and
adulterous and illicit relationship existing
between the testator and the devisee prior
to the death of the testator, which
constituted the sole and primary
consideration for the devise or legacy, thus
making the will intrinsically invalid.[4]
The will of Reyes was admitted to
probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b)
of the will which was declared null and void
for being contrary to law and
morals. Hence, Julio Vivares filed an
appeal before the Court of Appeals with
the allegation that the oppositors failed to
present any competent evidence that
Asuncion Reyes was legally married to
another person during the period of her
cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.
On November 29, 1995, the Court of
Appeals promulgated the assailed decision
which affirmed the trial courts decision
admitting the will for probate but the
modification that paragraph II including
subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared
valid. The appellee court stated:
Considering that the oppositors never
showed any competent, documentary or
otherwise during the trial to show that
Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the
testator was inexistent or void, either
because of a pre-existing marriage or
adulterous relationship, the trial court
gravely erred in striking down paragraph II
(a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and
Testament, as void for being contrary to
law and morals. Said declarations are not
sufficient to destroy the presumption of
marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the
very declaration of the testator that
Asuncion Reyes is his wife.[5]
Dissatisfied with the decision of the
Court of Appeals, the oppositors filed this
petition for review.
Petitioners contend that the findings
and conclusion of the Court of Appeals
was contrary to law, public policy and
evidence on record. Torcuato Reyes and
Asuncion Oning Reyes were collateral
relatives up to the fourth civil
degree. Witness Gloria Borromeo testified
that Oning Reyes was her cousin as her
mother and the latters father were sister
and brother. They were also nieces of the
late Torcuato Reyes. Thus, the purported
marriage of the deceased Reyes and
Oning Reyes was void ab initio as it was
against public policy pursuant to Article 38
(1) of the Family Code. Petitioners further
alleged that Oning Reyes was already
married to Lupo Ebarle at the time she was
cohabiting with the testator hence, she
could never contact any valid marriage
with the latter. Petitioners argued that the
testimonies of the witnesses as well as the
personal declaration of the testator,
himself, were sufficient to destroy the
presumption of marriage. To further
support their contention, petitioners
attached a copy of the marriage certificate
of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle.[6]
The petition is devoid of merit.
As a general rule, courts in probate
proceedings are limited to pass only upon
the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated.[7] Thus, the court merely inquires
on its due execution, whether or not it
complies with the formalities prescribed by
law, and the testamentary capacity of the
testator. It does not determine nor even by
implication prejudge the validity or efficacy
of the wills provisions.[8] The intrinsic
validity is not considered since the
consideration thereof usually comes only
after the will has been proved and
allowed. There are, however, notable
circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity
was first determined as when the defect of
the will is apparent on its face and the
probate of the will may become a useless
ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid.[9] The
intrinsic validity of a will may be passed
upon because practical considerations
demanded it as when there is preterition of
heirs or the testamentary provisions are
doubtful legality.[10] Where the parties
agree that the intrinsic validity be first
determined, the probate court may also do
so.[11] Parenthetically, the rule on probate
is not inflexible and absolute.Under
exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will.[12]
The case at bar arose from the
institution of the petition for the probate of
the will of the late Torcuato
Reyes.Perforce, the only issues to be
settled in the said proceeding were: (1)
whether or not the testator had animus
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 2
testandi; (2) whether or not vices of
consent attended the execution of the will;
and (3) whether or not the formalities of
the will had been complied with. Thus, the
lower court was not asked to rule upon the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will. As a result, the
declaration of the testator that Asuncion
Oning Reyes was his wife did not have to
be scrutinized during the probate
proceedings. The propriety of the
institution of Oning Reyes as one of the
devisees/legatees already involved inquiry
on the wills intrinsic validity and which
need not be inquired upon by the probate
court.
The lower court erroneously invoked
the ruling in Nepomuceno vs. Court of
Appeals (139 SCRA 206) in the instant
case. In the case aforesaid, the testator
himself, acknowledged his illicit
relationship with the devisee, to wit:
Art. IV. That since 1952, I have been living,
as man and wife, with one Sofia J.
Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to
be entitled to my love an [sic] affection, for
all the things which she has done for me,
now and in the past; that while Sofia J.
Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge
and consent, did comfort and represent
myself as her own husband, in truth and in
fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I
could not bind her to me in the holy bonds
of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage.
Thus, the very tenor of the will
invalidates the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing of the
properties to a person with whom he had
been living in concubinage.[13] To remand
the case would only be a waste of time
and money since the illegality or defect
was already patent. This case is different
from the Nepomuceno case. Testator
Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will
that he was bequeathing some of his
personal and real properties to his wife,
Asuncion Oning Reyes. There was never
an open admission of any illicit
relationship. In the case of Nepomuceno,
the testator admitted that he was already
previously married and that he had an
adulterous relationship with the devisee.
We agree with the Court of Appeals
that the trial court relied on uncorroborated
testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes
was still married to another during the time
she cohabited with the testator. The
testimonies of the witnesses were merely
hearsay and even uncertain as to the
whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle,
the supposed husband of Asuncion. Thus:
The foregoing testimony cannot go against
the declaration of the testator that
Asuncion Oning Reyes is his wife. In
Alvarado v. City Government of Tacloban
(supra) the Supreme Court stated that the
declaration of the husband is competent
evidence to show the fact of marriage.
Considering that the oppositors never
showed any competent evidence,
documentary or otherwise during the trial
to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes
marriage to the testator was inexistent or
void, either because of a pre-existing
marriage or adulterous relationship, the
trial court gravely erred in striking down
paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last
Will and Testament, as void for being
contrary to law and morals. Said
declarations are not sufficient to destroy
the presumption of marriage. Nor is it
enough to overcome the very declaration
of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his
wife.[14]
In the elegant language of Justice
Moreland written decades ago, he said-
A will is the testator speaking after
death. Its provisions have substantially the
same force and effect in the probate court
as if the testator stood before the court in
full life making the declarations by word of
mouth as they appear in the will. That was
the special purpose of the law in the
creation of the instrument known as the
last will and testament. Men wished to
speak after they were dead and the law, by
the creation of that instrument, permitted
them to do so. xxx All doubts must be
resolved in favor of the testators having
meant just what he said. (Santos vs.
Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
Petitioners tried to refute this
conclusion of the Court of Appeals by
presenting belatedly a copy of the
marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and
Lupo Ebarle. Their failure to present the
said certificate before the probate court to
support their position that Asuncion Reyes
had an existing marriage with Ebarle
constituted a waiver and the same
evidence can no longer be entertained on
appeal, much less in this petition for
review. This Court would no try the case a
new or settle factual issues since its
jurisdiction is confined to resolving
questions of law which have been passed
upon by the lower courts. The settled rule
is that the factual findings of the appellate
court will not be disturbed unless shown to
be contrary to the evidence on the record,
which petitioners have not shown in this
case.[15]
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 3
 Considering the foregoing premises,
we sustain the findings of the appellate
court it appearing that it did not commit a
reversible error in issuing the challenged
decision.
ACCORDINGLY, decision appealed
from dated November 29, 1995, is hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant petition for
review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR
JUGO ANG, CARMELITA
JUGO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside
that portion of the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals (now
intermediate Appellate Court) dated June
3, 1982, as amended by the resolution
dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null
and void the devise in favor of the
petitioner and the resolution dated
December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in
Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and
Testament duly signed by him at the end
of the Will on page three and on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the
presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C.
Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn,
affixed their signatures below the
attestation clause and on the left margin of
pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the
presence of the testator and of each other
and the Notary Public. The Will was
acknowledged before the Notary Public
Romeo Escareal by the testator and his
three attesting witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and
appointed herein petitioner Sofia J.
Nepomuceno as his sole and only
executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in
the Will that the testator was legally
married to a certain Rufina Gomez by
whom he had two legitimate children,
Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he
had been estranged from his lawfully
wedded wife and had been living with
petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on
December 5, 1952, the testator Martin
Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.
Nepomuceno were married in Victoria,
Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace.
The testator devised to his forced heirs,
namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and
his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire
estate and the free portion thereof to
herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal
heirs, namely: my aforementioned legal
wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar,
and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed
Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be
legally and properly entitled to inherit from
me; that while I have been estranged from
my above-named wife for so many years, I
cannot deny that I was legally married to
her or that we have been separated up to
the present for reasons and justifications
known fully well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been
living, as man and wife with one Sofia J.
Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to
be entitled to my love and affection, for all
the things which she has done for me, now
and in the past; that while Sofia J.
Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge
and consent, did comport and represent
myself as her own husband, in truth and in
fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I
could not bind her to me in the holy bonds
of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a
petition for the probate of the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the
issuance to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the
testator, Rufina Gomez and her children
filed an opposition alleging inter alia that
the execution of the Will was procured by
undue and improper influence on the part
of the petitioner; that at the time of the
execution of the Will, the testator was
already very sick and that petitioner having
admitted her living in concubinage with the
testator, she is wanting in integrity and
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 4
thus, letters testamentary should not be
issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court
denied the probate of the Will on the
ground that as the testator admitted in his
Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from
December 1952 until his death on July 16,
1974, the Will's admission to probate will
be an Idle exercise because on the face of
the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic
provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-
appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set
aside the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal denying the probate of
the will. The respondent court declared the
Will to be valid except that the devise in
favor of the petitioner is null and void
pursuant to Article 739 in relation with
Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is
hereby set aside, the will in question
declared valid except the devise in favor of
the appellant which is declared null and
void. The properties so devised are
instead passed on in intestacy to the
appellant in equal shares, without
pronouncement as to cost.
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina
Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for
Correction of Clerical Error" praying that
the word "appellant" in the last sentence of
the dispositive portion of the decision be
changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The
properties so devised are instead passed
on intestacy to the appellees in equal
shares, without pronouncement as to
costs." The motion was granted by the
respondent court on August 10, 1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration. This was
denied by the respondent court in a
resolution dated December 28, 1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is
whether or not the respondent court acted
in excess of its jurisdiction when after
declaring the last Will and Testament of
the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it
went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity
of the testamentary provision in favor of
herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of
the testamentary provision in her favor
cannot be passed upon and decided in the
probate proceedings but in some other
proceedings because the only purpose of
the probate of a Will is to establish
conclusively as against everyone that a
Will was executed with the formalities
required by law and that the testator has
the mental capacity to execute the same.
The petitioner further contends that even if
the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739
of the Civil Code of the Philippines were
applicable, the declaration of its nullity
could only be made by the proper court in
a separate action brought by the legal wife
for the specific purpose of obtaining a
declaration of the nullity of the
testamentary provision in the Will in favor
of the person with whom the testator was
allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand
contend that the fact that the last Will and
Testament itself expressly admits
indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and the
petitioner and the fact that petitioner
herself initiated the presentation of
evidence on her alleged ignorance of the
true civil status of the testator, which led
private respondents to present contrary
evidence, merits the application of the
doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix
Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix
Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et
al. (G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27, 1975).
Respondents also submit that the
admission of the testator of the illicit
relationship between him and the petitioner
put in issue the legality of the devise. We
agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its
jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to
be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon
the intrinsic validity of the Will and
declared the devise in favor of the
petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate
proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is
limited to an examination and resolution of
the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is
expressed thus:
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 5
xxx xxx xxx
... It is elementary that a probate decree
finally and definitively settles all questions
concerning capacity of the testator and the
proper execution and witnessing of his last
Will and testament, irrespective of whether
its provisions are valid and enforceable or
otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21
SCRA 428)
The petition below being for the probate of
a Will, the court's area of inquiry is limited
to the extrinsic validity thereof. The
testators testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the formal requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law are the only
questions presented for the resolution of
the court. Any inquiry into
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will or the legality of any
devise or legacy is premature.
xxx xxx xxx
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground
for the dismissal of the petition for probate.
Probate is one thing; the validity of the
testamentary provisions is another. The
first decides the execution of the document
and the testamentary capacity of the
testator; the second relates to descent and
distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21
SCRA 1369)
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against
everyone, and once for all, the facts that a
will was executed with the formalities
required by law and that the testator was in
a condition to make a will, is the only
purpose of the proceedings under the new
code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625).
The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing
more. In them the court has no power to
pass upon the validity of any provisions
made in the will. It can not decide, for
example, that a certain legacy is void and
another one valid. ... (Castaneda v.
Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and
absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited
by the trial court, the testator instituted the
petitioner as universal heir and completely
preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will
of this nature, no matter how valid it may
appear extrinsically, would be null and
void. Separate or latter proceedings to
determine the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions would be
superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity
of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v.
Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the
validity of its intrinsic provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we
stated:
The basic issue is whether the probate
court erred in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will, before ruling on its
allowance or formal validity, and in
declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of
certain unusual provisions of the will,
which are of dubious legality, and because
of the motion to withdraw the petition for
probate (which the lower court assumed to
have been filed with the petitioner's
authorization) the trial court acted correctly
in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity
even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might
become an Idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with
Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135,
December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369;
Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13
SCRA 693).
There appears to be no more dispute at
this time over the extrinsic validity of the
Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will
of Martin Jugo was executed with all the
formalities required by law and that the
testator had the mental capacity to execute
his Will. The petitioner states that she
completely agrees with the respondent
court when in resolving the question of
whether or not the probate court correctly
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 6
denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last
Will and Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly
drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex A of
Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray
for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals'
decision in toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction
of the respondent court to declare the
testamentary provision in favor of the
petitioner as null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's
jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid,
(supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be
remanded for probate of the will, nothing
will be gained. On the contrary, this
litigation will be protracted. And for aught
that appears in the record, in the record, in
the event of probate or if the court rejects
the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity
of the will. Result, waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added anxiety. These are
the practical considerations that induce us
to a belief that we might as well meet
head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. (Section
2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v.
Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all,
there exists a justiciable controversy crying
for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be
served if we remand the nullified provision
to the proper court in a separate action for
that purpose simply because, in the
probate of a will, the court does not
ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of
its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who
were guilty of adultery or concubinage at
the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found
guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his
wife, descendants and ascendants, by
reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action
for declaration of nullity may be brought by
the spouse of the donor or donee; and the
guilt of the donor and donee may be
proved by preponderance of evidence in
the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739,
concerning donations inter vivos shall
apply to testamentary provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed
on August 15, 1968, or almost six years
before the testator's death on July 16,
1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent
Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from
whom he had been estranged "for so many
years." He also declared that respondents
Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his
legitimate children. In Article IV, he stated
that he had been living as man and wife
with the petitioner since 1952. Testator
Jugo declared that the petitioner was
entitled to his love and affection. He stated
that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her
own husband but "in truth and in fact, as
well as in the eyes of the law, I could not
bind her to me in the holy bonds of
matrimony because of my aforementioned
previous marriage.
There is no question from the records
about the fact of a prior existing marriage
when Martin Jugo executed his Will. There
is also no dispute that the petitioner and
Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible
marital relationship for 22 years until his
death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952,
Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno
contracted a marriage before the Justice of
the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man
was then 51 years old while the woman
was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that
she acted in good faith for 22 years in the
belief that she was legally married to the
testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of
innocence or good faith. As argued by the
private respondents:
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 7
First. The last will and testament itself
expressly admits indubitably on its face the
meretricious relationship between the
testator and petitioner, the devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the
presentation of evidence on her alleged
ignorance of the true civil status of the
testator, which led private respondents to
present contrary evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on
the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in
the will to petitioner by the deceased
testator at the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that
testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived
with as man and wife, as already married,
was an important and specific issue
brought by the parties before the trial
court, and passed upon by the Court of
Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the
extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner
who opted to present evidence on her
alleged good faith in marrying the testator.
(Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of August 1,
1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).
Private respondents, naturally, presented
evidence that would refute the testimony of
petitioner on the point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the
deceased testator, testified at length on
the meretricious relationship of his brother
and petitioner. (TSN of August 18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by
option of the parties made a decisive issue
right at the inception of the case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court
had to make a ruling on the question.
When the court a quo held that the testator
Martin Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed
guilty of adultery or concubinage', it was a
finding that petitioner was not the innocent
woman she pretended to be.
xxx xxx xxx
3. If a review of the evidence must be
made nonetheless, then private
respondents respectfully offer the following
analysis:
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of
petitioner with the deceased testator in a
town in Tarlac where neither she nor the
testator ever resided. If there was nothing
to hide from, why the concealment' ? Of
course, it maybe argued that the marriage
of the deceased with private respondent
Rufina Gomez was likewise done in
secrecy. But it should be remembered that
Rufina Gomez was already in the family
way at that time and it would seem that the
parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of
the marriage so much so that an action in
court was brought concerning the
marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo,
TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)
SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of
the deceased testator when they were still
both single. That would be in 1922 as
Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina
Gomez on November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3).
Petitioner married the testator only on
December 5, 1952. There was a space of
about 30 years in between. During those
30 years, could it be believed that she did
not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not
marry her nor contact her anymore after
November, 1923 - facts that should impel
her to ask her groom before she married
him in secrecy, especially so when she
was already about 50 years old at the time
of marriage.
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off
from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself
conclusive demonstration that she new
that the man she had openly lived for 22
years as man and wife was a married man
with already two children.
FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew
the children of respondent Rufina Gomez,
is it possible that she would not have
asked Martin Jugo whether or not they
were his illegitimate or legitimate children
and by whom? That is un-Filipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the
residence of the parents of the deceased
testator, is it possible that she would not
have known that the mother of private
respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita
Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez,
considering that the houses of the parents
of Martin Jugo (where he had lived for
many years) and that of respondent Rufina
Gomez were just a few meters away?
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 8
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia
Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They are,
to say the least, inherently improbable, for
they are against the experience in
common life and the ordinary instincts and
promptings of human nature that a woman
would not bother at all to ask the man she
was going to marry whether or not he was
already married to another, knowing that
her groom had children. It would be a story
that would strain human credulity to the
limit if petitioner did not know that Martin
Jugo was already a married man in view of
the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his
marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that
led petitioner to break off with the
deceased during their younger years.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of
the Civil Code is against the making of a
donation between persons who are living
in adultery or concubinage. It is
the donation which becomes void. The
giver cannot give even assuming that the
recipient may receive. The very wordings
of the Will invalidate the legacy because
the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had
been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The decision of the Court
of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate
Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Nepomuceno v. CA
139 SCRA 206
FACTS:
Martin Jugo left a duly executed and
notarized Last Will and Testament before
he died. Petitioner was named as
sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will
that he was legally married to a certain
Rufina Gomez by whom he had
two legitimatechildren, but he had been
estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner
were married despite the subsisting first
marriage. The testator devised the free
portion of his estate to petitioner. On
August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a
petition for probate. On May 13, 1975,
Rufina Gomez and her children filed an
opposition alleging undue and improper
influence on the part of the petitioner; that
at the time of the execution of the Will, the
testator was already very sick and that
petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the
Will on the ground that as the testator
admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the
petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On
June 2, 1982, the respondent court set
aside the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal denying the probate of
the will. The respondent court declared the
Will to be valid except that
the devise in favor of the petitioner
is null and void.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when after declaring the last
Will and Testament of the deceased Martin
Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon
the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provision.
HELD:
No. The respondent court acted within its
jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to
be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon
the intrinsic validity of the Will and
declared the devise in favor of the
petitioner null and void. The general rule is
that in probate proceedings, the courts
area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of
the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible
and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v.
Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The
following donations shall be void: (1)
Those made between persons who were
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 9
time of the donation; and Article 1028. The
prohibitions mentioned in Article 739,
concerning donations inter vivos shall
apply to testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the records
about the fact of a prior existing marriage
when Martin Jugo executed his Will. The
very wordings of the Will invalidate the
legacy because the testator admitted he
was disposing the properties to a person
with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
[G.R. No. 1027. May 19, 1903. ]
RAMON DEL ROSARIO, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. CLEMENTE DEL
ROSARIO, Defendant-Appellant.
Lucas Gonzalez for Appellant.
Rodriguez & Foz for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; CONSTRUCTION. In the
interpretation and construction of
testamentary provisions the intention of the
testator controls.
2. ID.; ID.; DESCRIPTION OF
LEGATEES. Where legatees are
pointed out by name in the will the fact that
they are referred to as the natural sons of
a third person does not make the legacy
conditional upon proof of such relationship
but is descriptive merely.
3. ID.; ID.; ACCRETION. A legacy of a
certain sum to two nephews in equal
shares is payable in its entirety to the
survivor of them in case one dies before
the testator.
4. ID.; ID.; LEGACIES. The reservation
of property in a will to the children of the
legatee thereof in case of the latters death
must be regarded as a legacy if made so
by express words; otherwise the children
of the legatee take by inheritance.
5. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF LEGACIES.
Where the will authorizes the executor to
pay legacies, expressly or by natural
inference, action will lie by the legatee
against the executor to compel allowance
and payment thereof.
6. ID.; ID.; ID. In an action to compel
payment of legacies the defense that an
inventory is being formed or that creditors
have not been paid must be set up in the
answer in order to be availed of.
7. ID.; ID.; PARTITION OF ESTATE. An
executor who is also an heir is not qualified
to make partition of the estate, and a
legatee who seeks the payment of a
legacy involving a partition must sue all
persons interested in the estate.
8. ID.; ID. Where the executor of an
estate dies pending the determination of
an appeal from a judgment rendered
against him and in favor of a legatee, and
the latter succeeding as executor
dismisses the appeal, an order may be
granted permitting any interested party to
prosecute the appeal.
9. CIVIL PROCEDURE; ASSIGNMENT
OF ERROR ON APPEAL. Where the
appellant places his assignment of errors
in the bill of exceptions instead of in his
brief, and no objection is made at the
opportune time, the judgment will not be
affirmed upon the ground of this
nonprejudicial error.
DECISION
WILLARD, J. :
I. Don Nicolas del Rosario died in this city
on July 14, 1897, leaving a last will, the
eighth, ninth, eleventh, and eighteenth
clauses of which are as follows:
"Eighth. The testator declares that the
5,000 pesos which he brought to his
marriage he hereby bequeathes to his
nephews Enrique Gloria y Rosario and
Ramon del Rosario, natural children of his
brother Clemente del Rosario,
notwithstanding the fact that they purport
to be the issue of the marriage of
Escolastico Gloria and Rosendo del
Rosario, successively.
"Ninth. The testator declares that the said
sum of 5,000 pesos is to be divided, 3,000
pesos for the first named and 2,000 pesos
for the second named, the delivery of the
said sums to be effected by the wife of the
testator, provided that these young men
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 10
behave themselves as they have done up
to the present time, and do not cease to
study until taking the degree of bachelor of
arts, and then take a business course, if
their health will permit, their support to be
paid out of the testamentary estate and
they to live in the house of the widow.
"Eleventh. The testator declares that in
case the said young men should be still
engaged in study at the time of the death
of the testators wife, they shall continue to
be supported at the expense of the
testamentary estate, without deducting
such expenses from their legacies, if they
should desire to continue the same
studies.
"Eighteenth. The testator further states that
although his wife is at the present time
fifty-five years of age, and consequently is
not likely to marry again, as she herself
says, nevertheless it is possible that the
opposite of what she asserts might occur,
and, if so, then it is to be regarded as
sufficient reason to authorize the young
men Ramon and Enrique, so often referred
to, to separate from their aunt, in which
event they are to be supported by the
testamentary estate on a small allowance
of twenty-five pesos per month, provided
that they continue their studies or should
be in poor health, this without in any
respect reducing the amount of their
shares."
Don Ramon del Rosario, one of the
persons mentioned in these clauses,
brought this action in 1902 against Don
Clemente del Rosario, the then executor,
asking, among other things, that the said
executor pay him an allowance from the
death of the widow of the testator at the
rate of 75 pesos a month, and that the
executor allow him to live in the house in
which the widow was living at that time.
The widow of the testator, Doa Honorata
Valdez, died on July 7, 1900.
The court below ordered judgment in
respect to this allowance, and the right to
live in the house as prayed for by the
plaintiff. In this we think that the court
erred.
While by the eighth clause the support of
the plaintiff and of Don Enrique Gloria is
charged against the estate, yet the
eleventh clause makes it plain that this
unconditional right was to last only during
the lifetime of the widow. After her death
the right to this allowance is made to
depend on the continuance of their
studies. That this is the correct
construction of the will is made more plain
by the eighteenth clause above quoted. In
the case of their separation from their aunt
by her remarriage, they were entitled to the
specified allowance of 25 pesos a month
only on condition that they were pursuing,
their studies or were in poor health.
The court did not find that the plaintiff was
still pursuing his studies. On the contrary,
he found that the plaintiff had fulfilled the
condition by obtaining the degree of
bachelor of arts in 1898.
The right to live in the house of the widow
terminated at her death.
II. The seventh clause of the will of Don
Nicolas is as follows:
"Seventh. The testator states that in the
present condition of his affairs he has
acquired, during his married life, some
tens of thousands of dollars, of which one-
half belongs to his wife as her share of the
profits of the conjugal partnership, and the
other half belongs to him as his share of
such profits; but, in view of the agreement
entered into between the two spouses, the
property will not be partitioned, and upon
the death of the testator all the said
property will pass to his wife, in order that
she may enjoy the revenue therefrom
during her lifetime, but without authority to
convey any of such property, inasmuch as
she, being grateful for the benefit resulting,
to her, binds herself in turn to deliver said
property at her death to the testators
brothers, Don Clemente del Rosario and
Don Rosendo del Rosario, and his sister,
Doa Luisa del Rosario, who shall enjoy
the revenue from the said property during
their respective lives, and shall then, in
turn, transmit the same to their male
children, both those born in wedlock and
natural children who may be known."
This was later modified by a codicil, as
follows:
"That in the seventh clause of said
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 11
testament he desires and wills that in the
distribution of his property and that of his
wife among the male children of his
brothers, Clemente and Rosendo del
Rosario, and those of his sister, Luisa del
Rosario, in such distribution his nephews
Enrique Gloria and Ramon del Rosario
must be understood to be included, in
addition to the legacies mentioned in his
said testament."cralaw virtua1aw library
The thirteenth clause of his will was as
follows:
"The testator declares that in case Doa
Luisa del Rosario should die before or
after the wife of the testator, then the
legacy due her by virtue of this will shall
not pass in its entirety to her male children,
except as to the sum of 1,000 pesos, the
remainder to pass to Don Enrique Gloria
Rosario and Don Ramon del Rosario,
natural sons of Don Clemente del Rosario,
as already stated."
This was modified by the codicil as follows:
"That in the thirteenth clause the testator
provided that upon the death of his sister,
Luisa del Rosario, her male children were
to inherit from her up to the sum of 1,000
pesos, and this he rectifies, for better
understanding, to the effect that it is his will
that the remainder of all her portion should
be divided into equal parts, one-third to go
to his brother Don Clemente del Rosario
and the other two thirds to be divided
equally among his said nephews, Enrique
Gloria and Ramon del Rosario."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Doa Honorata Valdez made her will three
days after that of her husband. The
seventh clause is as follows:
"The testatrix declares that she institutes
her beloved husband, Don Nicolas del
Rosario y Alejo, as her heir to all the
property which she may have at her death,
and in the unexpected case of the death of
her said husband then she institutes as
heirs her brothers-in-law, Don Rosendo
and Don Clemente del Rosario y Alejo,
and her sister-in-law, Doa Luisa del
Rosario, who shall enjoy the usufruct
during their lifetime of all the revenue of
the said property. Upon the death of any of
them, then the property shall pass to the
male children of her said brothers-in-law
and sister-in-law, the issue of lawful
marriage or natural children who may be
known; but upon the death of her sister-in-
law, Doa Luisa, then her share shall not
pass in its entirety to her male children,
except the sum of 1,000 pesos, and the
remainder shall be paid to her nephews,
Don Enrique Gloria and Don Ramon del
Rosario, natural children of her brother-in-
law Don Clemente del Rosario."
Doa Luisa died one year after Don
Nicolas and two years before the death of
Doa Honorata, which, as has been said,
occurred on July 7, 1900.
Don Enrique Gloria died on July 6, 1900.
Don Ramon del Rosario claims in this
action that he is now entitled, by virtue of
both wills, to a certain part of the share of
the estates left to said Doa Luisa during
her life, and he asks that the defendant be
directed to render accounts and to proceed
to the partition of the said estates. The
controversy between the parties upon this
branch of the case is as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The defendant claims that the plaintiff is
entitled to nothing under the wills, because
the gift to him was conditional, the
condition being that he should be the
natural son of Don Clemente, recognized
by the latter as such in one of the ways
pointed out by the Civil Code; that he can
not prove such recognition, the parol
evidence presented at the trial being
prohibited by said Code, and that he has
therefore not complied with the condition.
The plaintiff claims that such evidence was
proper, that both wills state that Don
Ramon del Rosario is the natural son of
Don Clemente, and that in any event the
bequests are made to the plaintiff by
name.
The court below, holding the parol
evidence immaterial, ordered judgment for
the plaintiff as prayed for.
(1) So far as the disposition of that part of
the inheritance left in the aunts will to
Doa Luisa for life is concerned, the
question is free from doubt. It is distinctly
declared that Ramon del Rosario and
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 12
Enrique Gloria shall take certain parts of it
after 1,000 pesos have been deducted.
They are pointed out by name as the
legatees. It is true that they are called the
natural sons of Don Clemente. But this is
merely a further description of persons
already w ell identified, and, if false, can be
rejected in accordance with the provision
of article 773 of the Civil de, which by
article 789 is applicable to legatees.
(2) The ninth clause of the will of Doa
Honorata is as follows:
"The testatrix bequeaths the sum of 3,000
pesos to her nephews Enrique Gloria and
Ramon del Rosario in equal parts that
is, 1,500 pesos each."
The plaintiff was entitled to one-half of this
legacy in his own right. This has been paid
to him. Don Enrique Gloria died before the
testatrix. By the provisions of articles 982
and 983 of the Civil Code the right of
accretion exists as to the other half in favor
of the plaintiff and he is entitled to have it
paid to him.
(3) The will of Doa Honorata plainly
declares that, on the death of any one of
the life tenants, the male children of such
tenant shall inherit, and in respect to Doa
Luisa it is expressly declared that this shall
take place whether she dies before or after
the testatrix. The derecho de acrecer did
not therefore exist in favor of the other two
life tenants, Don Clemente and Don
Rosendo. "En la sucesion testada es ley
preferente la voluntad del testador, de
modo que este prohibiendo expresamente
el derecho de acrecer, nombrando
sustitutos, o marcando el destino especial
de cada porcion vacante, excluye la
aplicacion de los articulos que vamos a
examinar." (Manresa, Comentarios al
Codigo Civil, p. 276.)
This right does, however, exist in the share
of Doa Luisa in favor of the plaintiff, for
the reasons stated in connection with the
legacy of 3,000 pesos.
(4) We have passed upon the rights of the
plaintiff to the share of Doa Luisa under
the will of Doa Honorata, because the
interest is expressly left to him (en
concepto de legado) as a legacy. This is
controlling. (Manresa, 315.)
These or equivalent words are wanting in
the will of Don Nicolas. Applying article
668 of the Civil Code, we must hold that
any interest which the plaintiff may have
taken in the share of Doa Luisa under the
will of Don Nicolas he took as an heir and
not as a legatee.
The distinction between the two is
constantly maintained throughout the
Code, and their rights and obligations differ
materially. (Arts. 660, 668, 768, 790, 858,
891, 1003.)
(5) The legatee can demand his legacy
from the heir or from the executor, when
the latter is authorized to give it. (Art. 885.)
The powers given to the executors by the
will of Doa Honorata are contained in the
fourteenth clause, which is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The testatrix appoints as the executors of
her will, in the first place, her beloved
husband, Nicolas del Rosario y Alejo, in
the second place her brother-in-law
Clemente del Rosario, in the third place
her brother-in-law Rosendo del Rosario, in
the fourth place Don Ramon del Rosario
when he shall attain his majority, all of
them without bond and free from the
obligation of terminating the administration
within the legal term. At her death they
shall take possession of all such goods
and things as may be her property, and
are hereby authorized fully and as required
by law to prepare an inventory of said
property, and to effect the division and
partition of the estate among her heirs.
She also authorizes them to execute and
sign deeds of partition, sales with a
resolutory condition, cancellations,
receipts, acquittances, and such other
documents as may be necessary."
The twenty-first clause of the will of Don
Nicolas is substantially the same Each will
prohibited any judicial intervention in the
settlement of the estates.
The clause in the will of Doa Honorata
which is a copy of that in the will of Don
Nicolas is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The testatrix declares that she expressly
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 13
prohibits any judicial intervention in this her
will, although minors, absentees, or
persons under disability be interested
therein, as it is her wish and will that all the
proceedings be conducted extrajudicially,
and in case a family council should be
necessary, she designates the persons
who, in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code now in force, should form
such council, or else leaves their
appointment to the discretion of her
executors."
If the executor was not authorized to pay
these legacies, the heirs must pay them.
The life tenants and the heirs who take the
remainder under these wills are numerous.
If they did not pay the legacies and did not
agree upon an administrator, judicial
intervention would be necessary, the very
thing which the testators had expressly
prohibited. The important power of making
the partition was attempted to be given to
the executors. In view of these
considerations and a study of the whole
will, we hold that the executors are given
power to pay the legacies.
The action, therefore, was properly
directed against the executor so far as it
related to the allowance and the legacy of
3,000 pesos. As to these legacies, the
action may be supported also under article
902,2, which allows executors to pay
money legacies.
It was also properly directed against him,
so far as it related to the share to which
the plaintiff is entitled under the will of
Doa Honorata in the portion left to Doa
Luisa for life.
The provisions of articles 1025-1027 are
no obstacle to this suit. That an inventory
is being formed. or that the creditors have
not been paid, is a matter of defense which
should have been set up in the answer.
It was not properly directed against him in
so far as it related to the similar share left
to him by the will of Don Nicolas. He took
that as heir and not as legatee, and the
heir can maintain no such action against
the executor.
The fact that the plaintiff under the will of
Doa Honorata is a legatee of an aliquot
part of the estate, having become entitled
to receive one-third of it on the death of
Doa Luisa, does not prevent him from
maintaining this action against the
executor. Though such a legatee closely
resembles an heir, yet, like all other
legatees, he must seek his share from the
heir or executor. (6 Manresa, 561.)
(6) While in this action he has a right to
have his interest as legatee declared, yet it
can not be delivered to him without a
partition of the estate.
It remains to be considered whether the
executor has power to make the partition
such power is expressly given by the will.
This provision is, however, void under the
terms of article 1057 of the Civil Code,
which is as follows
"The testator may, be an act inter vivos or
causa mortis, intrust the mere power of
making the division after his death to any
person who is not one of the coheirs.
"The provisions of this and the foregoing
articles shall be observed even should
there be a minor or a person subject to
guardianship among the coheirs; but the
trustee must in such case make an
inventory of the property of the inheritance,
citing the coheirs, the creditors, and the
legatees."cralaw virtua1aw library
Don Clemente, the executor, against
whom the action was directed, was not
only an heir as a life tenant but also in fee
after the death of Don Rosendo if the latter
died without issue. Upon the death of the
widow, Doa Luisa then being dead, it
became his duty to divide the estate into
three parts, or at least to set off the third,
which was to pass to the plaintiff by the
death of the widow and Doa Luisa. In this
partition he was directly interested, for,
with his brother Don Rosendo, he had a
life interest in the part of the estate not set
off to the plaintiff Article 1057 prohibited all
heir from being contador for this very
reason, namely, that the partition should
be made impartially.
Although the executor has no power to
make the partition, the heirs can do so.
(Arts. 1058-1060, Civil Code.)
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 14
The plaintiff is not bound to remain a
coowner with the other heirs. Being a
legatee of an aliquot part, he has the same
right to seek a partition that an heir has. (7
Manresa, 578; art. 1051, Codigo Civil.) But
in so seeking it he must make parties to
his suit all persons interested in the estate
(7 Manresa, 577). This he has not done in
this suit, and he consequently is not
entitled to the partition ordered by the court
below.
(7) We have held that the only thing that
can be decided in this case is the rights of
the plaintiff as legatee.
The court below ordered the executor to
render accounts of his administration of
both estates.
As to the estate of Don Nicolas, the only
thing here in question is the right to the
allowance. As we hold that the plaintiff is
not entitled to it, he is not entitled to any
statement of accounts as such pretended
legatee.
As to the estate of Doa Honorata, he is
entitled to be paid a legacy of 1,500 pesos.
Article 907 requires the executor to render
accounts to the heir, not to the legatee;
and although by article 789 all of the
provisions of Chapter II (in which both
articles are found) relating to heirs are
made applicable to legatees, we can not
hold that this requires an executor to
submit his accounts to one who has no
interest in the estate except to a money
legacy when there is no suggestion that it
will not be paid when the right to it is
established.
In respect to the share of Doa Luisa,
there is reason for saying that a legatee of
an aliquot part is entitled to an accounting.
But, inasmuch as in this case there can be
no final determination of the rights of the
parties interested in the estate, because
they are not all parties to this suit, the
executor should not in this suit be ordered
to submit his accounts.
(8) The plaintiff in his complaint has limited
himself to claiming the allowance, his
rights to the share of Doa Luisa, and the
legacies left to him.
The question as to whether he would be
entitled to any part of the share of Don
Clemente upon the latters death, under
the seventh clause of the two wills, was
not presented by the complaint nor passed
upon by the court and is not before us for
decision.
(9) The result of the foregoing
considerations is:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. The plaintiff is not entitled to any
allowance under either will.
2. He is not entitled to live in the house No.
128 Calle Clavel.
3. He is entitled to be paid, under the ninth
clause of the will of Doa Honorata, the
sum of 1,500 pesos, in addition to the
1,500 pesos already received under that
clause.
4. He is entitled to the share of the estate
left by the will of Doa Honorata to Doa
Luisa during her life, after deducting 1,000
pesos.
5. This share can not be set off to him in
this suit, but only in a proceeding to which
all persons interested in the estate are
parties.
6. His interest in the share left to Doa
Luisa during her life by the will of Don
Nicolas can not be determine in this suit.
7. The executor can not be required to
render in this suit his accounts as such
executor.
8. The plaintiffs rights under the seventh
clause of the two wins, to the share left to
Don Clemente for life are not before us for
decision.
III. After judgment had been rendered in
the court below and a bill of exceptions
allowed, but before the record had been
sent to this court, Don Clemente del
Rosario, the defendant, died. After his
death Don Rosendo del Rosario, who was
named in both wins to succeed to the
executorship on the death of Don
Clemente, appeared in the court below
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 15
and withdrew the appeal and bill of
exceptions. Thereupon the widow of non
Clemente, for herself and in representation
of the minor son of her late husband,
asked and was granted leave to prosecute
the appeal.
This ruling was correct. According to the
Spanish authorities, anyone legally
affected by the judgment might appeal.
According to the American authorities, if a
trustee refuses to appeal, the beneficiary
may do so in his name.
That the son of Don Clemente has a direct
interest in the question of the allowance of
75 pesos a month to the plaintiff is plain.
We have held that in respect to this
allowance the executor represents the
estate and the judgment against him binds
it.
It would be manifestly unjust to allow an
executor, with perhaps only a slight
personal interest in an estate, by
withdrawing an appeal, to fasten upon the
estate a claim which, as we hold, it should
not bear.
IV. At the argument of this case on the
merits, after the appellant had closed, the
respondent made the point for the first time
that the appellants brief contained no
assignment of errors.
This is true. But a full assignment of errors
is found in the bill of exceptions at pages
14 and 15. The appellee answered the
brief of the appellant without making any
suggestion of this mistake. He has been in
no way prejudiced by it, and are can not
affirm the judgment on this ground.
The judgment of the court below is
reversed and the case remanded with
directions to the court below to enter
judgment in accordance with this opinion.
The costs of this instance will be equally
divided between the parties. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28,
1962
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE
VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as
Judicial Administrator of the testate
estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO,defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for
defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points
of law is the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-
2809, dismissing plaintiff-appellant's
complaint for the recovery of certain
properties that were originally owned by
the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor,
and which he granted to his widow, Doa
Fausta Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her
"su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se
case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On
October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a
wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales,
executed a will in Spanish in his own
handwriting, devising and bequeathing in
favor of his wife, Dona Fausta
Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and
personal properties, giving the other half to
his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of
heirs, reads as follows: .
SEXTO En virtud de las facultades que
me conceden las leyes, instituyo per mis
unicos y universales herederos de todos
mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D.
Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis
bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales
partes, para despues de mi muerte,
exceptuando las donaciones y legados
que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo
hago en la forma siguiente: .
SEPTIMO: Lego para dispues de mi
muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi amor y
carino, los bienes, alhajas y muebles que
a continuacion se expresan; .
OCTAVO: Que estos legades disfrutaria
mi referida esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno su uso y posesion mientras
viva y no se case en segundas nupcias, de
la contrario, pasara a ser propiedad estos
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 16
dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor
Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided,
however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof
would be deemed annulled from the
moment he bore any child with Doa
Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th
reads as follows: .
DUODECIMO: Quedan anulados las
parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que
tratan de institucion de herederos y los
legados que se haran despues de mi
muerte a favor de mi esposa, en el
momento que podre tener la dicha de
contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o
legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley
seran mis herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3,
1922, without begetting any child with his
wife Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter,
already a widow, thereupon instituted
Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of
First Instance of Zambales, for the
settlement of her husband's estate and in
that proceeding, she was appointed
judicial administratrix. In due course of
administration, she submitted a project of
partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of
November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C", the
probate court approved the project of
partition and declared the proceeding
closed. As the project of partition, Exhibit
"E", now shows Doa Fausta
Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof
the ownership and possession of a
considerable amount of real and personal
estate. By virtue also of the said project of
partition, she received the use and
possession of all the real and personal
properties mentioned and referred to in
Clause 7th of the will. The order approving
the project of partition (Exh. "C"), however,
expressly provided that approval thereof
was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la
clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas
Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doa Fausta
Nepomuceno died without having
contracted a second marriage, and without
having begotten any child with the
deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is
now being settled in Special Proceeding
No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the
defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly
appointed and qualified judicial
administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de
Villanueva is admitted to be the same
Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas
Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta
Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the
present action against the administrator of
the estate of the widow Fausta
Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958,
contending that upon the widow's death,
said plaintiff became vested with the
ownership of the real and personal
properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas
Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to
its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position,
adopted by the trial court, is that the title to
the properties aforesaid became
absolutely vested in the widow upon her
death, on account of the fact that she
never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain
desire and intent of the testator, as
manifested in clause 8 of his testament,
was to invest his widow with only a
usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the seventh clause, subject to
the further condition (admitted by the
appellee) that if the widow remarried, her
rights would thereupon cease, even during
her own lifetime. That the widow was
meant to have no more than a life interest
in those properties, even if she did not
remarry at all, is evident from the
expressions used by the deceased "uso y
posesion mientras viva" (use and
possession while alive) in which the first
half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead
of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the
second ("mientras viva"). The testator
plainly did not give his widow the full
ownership of these particular properties,
but only the right to their possession and
use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This
is in contrast with the remainder of the
estate in which she was instituted
universal heir together with the testator's
brother (clause 6). 1wph1.t
SEXTO: En virtud de las facultades que
me conceden las leyes, instituyo por mis
unicos y universales herederos de todos
mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D.
Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 17
Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis
bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales
partes, para despues de mi muerte,
exceptuando las donaciones y legados
que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo
hago en la forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the
appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary
legatee, could succeed to the properties
bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament
only in the event that the widow remarried,
has unwarrantedly discarded the
expression "mientras viva," and
considered the words "uso y posesion" as
equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so
doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as
section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of
Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to
every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes
of interpreting a will, that one is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to
give effect to all provisions. In the
construction of an instrument where there
are several provisions or particulars, such
a construction is, if possible, to be adopted
as will give effect to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the
testator in imposing the conditions
contained in clause 7 of his testament
should not be allowed to obscure the clear
and unambiguous meaning of his plain
words, which are over the primary source
in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note
that if the testator had intended to impose
as sole condition the non-remarriage of his
widow, the words "uso y posesion mientras
viva" would have been unnecessary, since
the widow could only remarry during her
own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article
675 of the Code of 1889), expressly
enjoins the following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be
taken in their ordinary and grammatical
sense, unless a clear intention to use them
in another sense can be gathered, and that
other can be ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in
their technical sense, unless the context
clearly indicates a contrary intention, or
unless it satisfactorily appears that the will
was drawn solely by the testator, and that
he was unacquainted with such technical
sense. (675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme
Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate
of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the
intention and wishes of the testator, when
clearly expressed in his will, constitute the
fixed law of interpretation, and all
questions raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be settled
in accordance therewith, following the plain
and literal meaning of the testator's words,
unless it clearly appears that his intention
was otherwise. The same rule is adopted
by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent.
20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril
1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y
constantemente expresada al ordenar su
ultimo voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y
obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir
fieldmente albaceas, legatarios y
heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa
voluntad patente, que no ha menester de
interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor
duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no ofrece la
menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun
otro criterio de alguna de los interesados,
ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal
Supremo of Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918) .
The American decisions invoked by
appellee in his brief inapplicable, because
they involve cases where the only
condition imposed on the legatee was that
she should remain a widow. As already
shown, the testament of Don Nicolas
Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided
that his widow should have the possession
and use of the legacies while alive and did
not remarry. It necessarily follows that by
the express provisions of the 8th clause of
his will, the legacies should pass to the
testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein,
upon the widow's death, even if the widow
never remarried in her lifetime.
Consequently, the widow had no right to
retain or dispose of the aforesaid
properties, and her estate is accountable
to the reversionary legatee for their return,
unless they had been lost due to fortuitous
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 18
event, or for their value should rights of
innocent third parties have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision
appealed from is reversed, and the
appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de
VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the
ownership and fruits of the properties
described in clause 7 of the will or
testament, from the date of the death of
Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. The records
are ordered remanded to the court of origin
for liquidation, accounting and further
proceedings conformably to this decision.
Costs against the Administrator-appellee.
VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO
4 SCRA 550
FACTS:
Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in
Spanish in his own handwriting, devising
and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona
Faustina of all his real and personal
properties giving the other half to his
brother Don Fausto.
Petitioner filed an action against the
administrator contending that upon the
widows death, she became vested with
the ownership of the properties
bequeathed under clause 7 pursuant to its
8th clause of the will.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner is entitled to
the ownership of the properties upon the
death of Dona Faustina.
HELD: The intention of the testator here
was to merely give usufructuary right to his
wife Doa Fausta because in his will he
provided that Doa Fausta shall forfeit the
properties if she fails to bear a child and
because she died without having begotten
any children with the deceased then it
means that Doa Fausta never acquired
ownership over the property. Upon her
death, because she never acquired
ownership over the property, the said
properties are not included in her
estate. Those properties actually belong
to Villaflor. That was the intention of the
testator. Otherwise, if the testator
wanted to give the properties to Doa
Fausta then he should have specifically
stated in his will that ownership should
belong to Doa Fausta without
mentioning any condition.
Extrinsic Validity of Wills
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the
deceased REVEREND SANCHO
ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET
AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-
appellants.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho
Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu,
executed a document purporting to be his
Last Will and Testament now marked
Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu,
he died on January 14, 1943, in the
municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where
he was an evacuee. He left properties
estimated at P8,000 in value. On October
2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the
legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for
its probate in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who
would inherit the estate of the deceased if
he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting
witnesses, the other two being dead,
testified without contradiction that in his
presence and in the presence of his co-
witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in
longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the
testator spoke and understood; that he
(testator) signed on he left hand margin of
the front page of each of the three folios or
sheets of which the document is
composed, and numbered the same with
Arabic numerals, and finally signed his
name at the end of his writing at the last
page, all this, in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses after telling that it was
his last will and that the said three
witnesses signed their names on the last
page after the attestation clause in his
presence and in the presence of each
other. The oppositors did not submit any
evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared
Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it
was in the handwriting of the testator and
that although at the time it was executed
and at the time of the testator's death,
holographic wills were not permitted by law
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 19
still, because at the time of the hearing and
when the case was to be decided the new
Civil Code was already in force, which
Code permitted the execution of
holographic wills, under a liberal view, and
to carry out the intention of the testator
which according to the trial court is the
controlling factor and may override any
defect in form, said trial court by order
dated January 24, 1952, admitted to
probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and
Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The
oppositors are appealing from that
decision; and because only questions of
law are involved in the appeal, the case
was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386)
under article 810 thereof provides that a
person may execute a holographic will
which must be entirely written, dated and
signed by the testator himself and need
not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that
at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in
1923 and at the time that Father Abadia
died in 1943, holographic wills were not
permitted, and the law at the time imposed
certain requirements for the execution of
wills, such as numbering correlatively each
page (not folio or sheet) in letters and
signing on the left hand margin by the
testator and by the three attesting
witnesses, requirements which were not
complied with in Exhibit "A" because the
back pages of the first two folios of the will
were not signed by any one, not even by
the testator and were not numbered, and
as to the three front pages, they were
signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement
this Court in the case of In re Estate of
Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to
the failure of the testator and his witnesses
to sign on the left hand margin of every
page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally
vitiates the testament. It is not enough that
the signatures guaranteeing authenticity
should appear upon two folios or leaves;
three pages having been written on, the
authenticity of all three of them should be
guaranteed by the signature of the alleged
testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46
Phil., 700, referring to the same
requirement, this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in
question, it appears that the left margins of
the six pages of the document are signed
only by Ventura Prieto. The
noncompliance with section 2 of Act No.
2645 by the attesting witnesses who
omitted to sign with the testator at the left
margin of each of the five pages of the
document alleged to be the will of Ventura
Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an
obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of
Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of
the new Civil Code which not allows
holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which
provisions were invoked by the appellee-
petitioner and applied by the lower court?
But article 795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a will
as to its form depends upon the
observance of the law in force at the time it
is made." The above provision is but an
expression or statement of the weight of
authority to the affect that the validity of a
will is to be judged not by the law enforce
at the time of the testator's death or at the
time the supposed will is presented in
court for probate or when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. One reason in
support of the rule is that although the will
operates upon and after the death of the
testator, the wishes of the testator about
the disposition of his estate among his
heirs and among the legatees is given
solemn expression at the time the will is
executed, and in reality, the legacy or
bequest then becomes a completed act.
This ruling has been laid down by this
court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39
Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and
should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the
intention of the testator should be the
ruling and controlling factor and that all
adequate remedies and interpretations
should be resorted to in order to carry out
said intention, and that when statutes
passed after the execution of the will and
after the death of the testator lessen the
formalities required by law for the
execution of wills, said subsequent
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 20
statutes should be applied so as to
validate wills defectively executed
according to the law in force at the time of
execution. However, we should not forget
that from the day of the death of the
testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the
legatees and devisees under it becomes a
vested right, protected under the due
process clause of the constitution against
a subsequent change in the statute adding
new legal requirements of execution of
wills which would invalidate such a will. By
parity of reasoning, when one executes a
will which is invalid for failure to observe
and follow the legal requirements at the
time of its execution then upon his death
he should be regarded and declared as
having died intestate, and his heirs will
then inherit by intestate succession, and
no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be
allowed to validate a defective will and
thereby divest the heirs of their vested
rights in the estate by intestate succession.
The general rule is that the Legislature can
not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills,
Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order
appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A"
is denied probate. With costs.
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased
REVEREND SANCHO
ABADIA.SEVERINA A. VDA. DE
ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. vs. MIGUEL ABADIA,
ET AL.G.R. No. L-7188August 9, 1954
Facts: Andres Enriquez, as one of the
legatees in a document purporting to be
the last will and testament of Father
Sancho Abadia, which was executed on
September 6, 1923, filed a petition for its
probate. Some cousins and nephews of
the deceased, who would inherit his estate
if he left no will, filed opposition. The trial
court ruled in favor of Enriquez, stating that
even if the said document is a holographic
will, one which is not permitted by law at
the time it was executed and at the time of
the testators death, such form of a will is
already allowed at the time of the hearing
of the case since the new Civil Code is
already enforced, and that to carry out the
intention of the testator which according to
the trial court is the controlling factor and
may override any defect in form. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether the reckoning period in
deciding the validity of the holographic will
of Rev. Sanchio, the time of the hearing of
the case shall be considered and not the
time of its execution
Held: No. The validity of a will is to be
judged not by the law enforce at the time
of the testator's death or at the time the
supposed will is presented in court for
probate or when the petition is decided by
the court but at the time the instrument
was execute, as supported by Art. 795 of
the new Civil Code. One reason in support
of the rule is that although the will operates
upon and after the death of the testator,
the wishes of the testator about the
disposition of his estate among his heirs
and among the legatees is given solemn
expression at the time the will is executed,
and in reality, the legacy or bequest then
becomes a completed act. When one
executes a will which is invalid for failure to
observe and follow the legal requirements
at the time of its execution then upon his
death he should be regarded and declared
as having died intestate, and his heirs will
then inherit by intestate succession, and
no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be
allowed to validate a defective will and
thereby divest the heirs of their vested
rights in the estate by intestate succession.
The general rule is that the Legislature
cannot validate void wills
. Hence, the trial courts decision was
reversed.
G.R. No. L-5064 February 27,
1953
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
ESPERANZA M. PO, defendant-appellant.
Quirico del Mar for appellant.
Daniel P. Tumulak and Conchita F. Miel
appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 21
This action commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of
sale conveying to the defendant, in
consideration of P1,700, one undivided
half of a parcel of land which previously
had been sold, along with the other half, by
the same vendor to the plaintiff's grantors.
judgment was against the plaintiff.
The case was submitted for decision upon
an agreed statement of facts, the pertinent
parts of which are thus summarized in the
appealed decision:
1st. That Leonard j. Winstanley and
Catalina Navarro were husband and wife,
the former having died on June 6, 1946
leaving heir the surviving spouse and
some minor children;
2nd. hat upon the death of L.J.
Winstanley, he left a parcel of land
described under Transfer Certificate of title
No. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Cebu;
3rd. That the above mentioned property
was a conjugal property;
4th. That on April 15, 1946, the
surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel of land to
the spouses Maria Canoy, alleging among
other things, that she needed money for
the support of her children;
5th. That on May 24, 1947, the spouses
Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy sold the
same parcel of land to the plaintiff in this
case named Bienvenido A. Ebarle;
6th. That the two deeds of sale referred
to above were not registered and have
never been registered up to the date;
7th. That on January 17, 1948 surviving
spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley, after her appointment as
guardian of her children by this court
(Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold one-
half of the land mentioned above to
Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant
case, which portion belongs to the children
of the above named spouses.
As stated by the trial Judge, the sole
question for determination is the validity of
the sale to Esperanza M. Po, the last
purchaser. This question in turn depends
upon the validity of the prior ale to Maria
Canoy and Roberto Canoy.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides:
"The rights to the succession of a person
are transmitted from the moment of his
death." in a slightly different language, this
article is incorporated in the new Civil
Code as article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of
the Civil Code of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining
factor when the heirs acquire a definite
right to the inheritance, whether such right
be pure or contingent. It is immaterial
whether a short or long period of time
lapses between the death of the
predecessor and the entry into possession
of the property of the inheritance because
the right is always deemed to be
retroactive from the moment of death. (5
Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make it
clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the
Canoy spouses, one-half of it already
belonged to the seller's children. No formal
or judicial declaration being needed to
confirm the children's title, it follows that
the first sale was null and void in so far as
it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the
defendant having been made by authority
of the competent court was undeniably
legal and effective. The fact that it has not
been recorded is of no consequence. If
registration were necessary, still the non-
registration would not avail the plaintiff
because it was due to no other cause than
his own opposition.
The decision will be affirmed subject to the
reservation, made in said decision, of the
right of the plaintitff and/or the Canoy
spouses to bring such action against
Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley as
may be appropriate for such damages as
they may have incurred by reason of the
voiding of the sale in their favor.
BIENVENIDO IBARLE vs. ESPERANZA
POGR No. L-
5064 February 27, 1953FACTS:
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 22
Winstanley and Navarro were husband
and wife. Winstanley died, leaving Navarro
and their minor children as heirs.
Winstanley left a parcel of land in Cebu,
which was conjugal property.
Subsequently, Navarro sold the land to
spouses Canoy. Canoy sold the land to
Ibarle.
The two deeds of the two sales above
were not registered.
Navarro, after being appointed guardian of
her minor children, sold one-half of the
subject land to Po.
The children alleged that they are the
rightful owners of the property and filed an
action to annul the sale.
ISSUE:
WON the sale of the property to Po was
valid? NO.
HELD:NO, the sale was void as it deprived
the children of their right to the inheritance,
which was transmitted upon the death of
Winstanley.
When Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the
Canoy spouses, one-half of it already
belonged to the seller's children.
No formal or judicial declaration being
needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void
in so far as it included the children's share.
It is immaterial whether a short or long
period of time lapses between the death of
the predecessor and the entry into
possession of the property of the
inheritance because the right is always
deemed to be retroactive from the moment
of death.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code
provides that the rights to the
succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death.
in a slightly different language, this article
is incorporated in the new Civil Code as
article 777.
The moment of death is the determining
factor when the heirs acquire a definite
right to the inheritance, whether such right
is pure or contingent.
On the other hand, the sale to Po having
been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective.
The fact that it has not been recorded is of
no consequence. If registration were
necessary, still the non-registration would
not avail in favor of Ibarle.
G.R. No. L-7385 May 19, 1955
QUIRICO L. SATURNINO, petitioner,
vs.
FELIZA LUZ PAULINO, MAXIMO
DALEJA, JUANA LUCAS, NEMESIO
LUCAS, DONATA GUILLERMO, and
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Domingo, Valenciano and Aguinaldo for
petitioner.
Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz and Ruiz for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from a
decision of the Court of Appeals. The
pertinent facts are:
Upon the death of Jaime Luz Paulino, on
February 10, 1937, he was survived by his
children Timoteo Esteban, Macario and
Feliza, all surnamed Luz Paulino and a
grandson-Quirico L. Saturnino, son of his
deceased daughter Antonia Luz Paulino.
Among the properties left by Jaime Luz
Paulino is a house and lot, situated in
Barrio No. 13, municipality of Laoag,
province of Ilocos Norte, and more
particularly known as Lot No. 11366 of the
Laoag Cadastre. On October 22, 1945, his
daughter Feliza Luz Paulino executed a
deed of absolute sale of said property in
favor of the spouses Maxima Daleja and
Juana Lucas and Nemesio Lucas and
Donata Guillermo, for the aggregate sum
of P1,200.00. In the language of a decision
of the Court of Appeals.
As said sale was made without the
knowledge or consent of Quirino L.
Saturnino who, according to him, learned
of it in the early morning of October 23,
1945 (Exhs. B and I), and being desirous
of exercising his right of subrogation as co-
heir of the vendor, on October 23, 1945,
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 23
and again on the 29th of the month, in the
presence and with the assistance of his
lawyer, offered verbally and in writing to
the vendees to return then and there to
them, in actual case, 4/5 of the purchase
price of said property, together with the
expenses incurred by them in the
preparation of the document, and tendered
to them in their respective houses in
Laoag, Ilocos Norte, written copies of the
offer and the money in actual cash,
Philippine currency, but defendants Juana
Lucas and Donato Guillermo, for
themselves and in representation of their
respective husbands who were absent,
refused acceptance thereof. For this
reason on the following day, October 30,
1945, Quirino L. Saturnino instituted this
action in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte against the defendants
mentioned in the captain hereof,
depositing with the Clerk of said Court the
sum of P960, Philippine currency, for
delivery to the defendant vendees by way
of reimbursement, together with the
amount of P50 Philippine currency, to
cover the expenses incurred in the
preparation of the deed of sale, and stating
that he was ready and willing to deposit
other additional sums that the court may
deem just and necessary. On these
averments plaintiff prayed in the complaint
that judgment be rendered in his favor and
against the defendants:
a. Declaring the sale made by defendant
Feliza Luz Paulino to her co-defendants
illegal with respect to one-fifth of the lot
and to declare said one-fifth undivided
share of the plaintiff;
b. To order the defendants Maximo Daleja,
Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donato
Guillermo to accept and receive from the
clerk of court the sum of P690
corresponding to reimbursement of the
price paid by them for four-fifths (4/5) of
the lot which their co-defendant Feliza Luz
Paulino could legally convey; and the
additional sum of P50 to cover their
expenses in the preparation of the deed of
sale;
c. Ordering the defendants Maximo Dalaja,
Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata
Guillermo to execute a deed of
reconveyance of what they could legally
buy from their co-defendant Feliza Luz
Paulino of the lot in question, in favor of
the herein plaintiff; and
d. Ordering the aforesaid defendants to
pay damages in the sum of P1,000
annually to plaintiff until the reconveyance
is effected, and an additional sum of
P1,000 as damages to be paid by all of the
defendants for their malicious acts, and
cost of the suit.
For such other remedies and relief just and
equitable in the premises.
On November 14, 1945, defendants
answered the complaint with counterclaim,
which was amended on December 12 of
the same year, wherein it is alleged,
among other things, that on April 25, 1937,
at the municipality of Laoag, province of
Ilocos Norte, all their inheritance from the
deceased Jaime Luz Paulino had been
divided in accordance with Section 596 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and the last
verbal wish of the decedent before his
death, giving the residential lot in question
together with the house of strong materials
constructed thereon to Feliza Luz Paulino
as her exclusive and only share, and
leaving her brothers, Timoteo, Esteban
and Macario, and their nephew Quirino
Saturnino to divide all the agricultural lands
among themselves, which division was
duly effected. Defendants Maximo Daleja,
Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata
Guillermo allege that they are engaged in
business and purposely bought said lot to
erect thereon a "camarin' for a rice mill and
for use as a warehouse of rice, "bagoong",
coconuts and other articles of commerce
and to deposit logs and lumber, and that
because of their inability to realize this plan
due to action of the plaintiff, they will suffer
damages in the sum of P3,000 yearly unit
this case is terminated. Wherefore all the
defendants pray the court:
1. To dismiss the complaint;
2. To declare Feliza Luz Paulino as the
exclusive owner of the whole lot in
question;
3. To declare the sale made by Feliza Luz
Paulino of the whole lot in question to her
co-defendants valid in full force and effect;
4. To order the plaintiff to pay three
thousand pesos (P3,000) annually until
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 24
this case is terminated and the further sum
of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the
malicious acts of the plaintiff and the costs
of this suit; and
5. Any other relief just and equitable. (Roll,
pp. 17-20)
This case was docketed as Civil Case No.
23 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte.
Meanwhile, or on November 19, 1945,
Quirino L. Saturnino had filed, with said
court, a petition, which was docketed as
Special Proceeding Case No. 37, for the
probate of the will and testament of Jaime
Luz Paulino. Although, at first, all of the
other heirs objected to said petition, on
June 30, 1949, they eventually withdrew
their opposition thereto, and the probate of
the will was allowed by an order dated July
6, 1949. Said will provided that the
property in dispute in Case No. 23, be
distributed, share and share alike among
the heirs of the testator.
On or about March 10, 1950, the
defendant in said Case No. 23
respondents herein filed a supplemental
answer alleging the plaintiff petitioner
herein has no legal capacity to sue,
because the property in litigation therein is
part of the estate which is the subject
matter of Case No. 37, in which an
administrator was appointed but no
adjudication had, as yet, been made. In
due course, a decision was rendered in
Case No. 23, on December 2, 1950, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the Court renders
judgment declaring the sale made by
defendant Feliza Luz Paulino to her co-
defendants null and void with respect to
one-fifth (1/5) of the lot in question and the
plaintiff is declared owner thereof as his
undivided share; that the defendants are
ordered to receive from the Clerk of Court
the sum of P960 corresponding to the
reimbursement of the price paid by them
for four-fifths (4/5) of the lot in question
which their co-defendant Feliza Luz
Paulino could legally convey to them, and
to execute a deed of reconveyance in
favor of the plaintiff. (Roll, pp. 20-21).
On appeal from this decision, that
defendants contended in the Court of
Appeals, that the lower court had erred:
1. In not dismissing the complaint in so far
as the recovery of one-fifth undivided
interest in the lot in question is concerned;
2. In not finding that there was an
agreement between the defendant Feliza
Luz Paulino on one hand and Esteban,
Timoteo and Macario Luz Paulino on the
other by virtue of which the house and lot
on question were given and delivered to
Feliza Luz Paulino;
3. In not finding the plaintiff-appellee fully
confirmed the abovementioned agreement;
4. In not upholding the validity of said
agreement duly confirmed by the plaintiff-
appellee and in not giving its effects and
efficacy;
5. In declaring the sale of the lot in
question invalid with respect to one-fifth
share of the appellee;
6. In holding that there exists co-ownership
in the lot between the appellee and
appellants-purchasers; and
7. In ordering the appellants-purchaser to
let redemption prayed for by the appellee.
(Roll, p. 21).
None of this questions was, however,
decided by the Court of Appeals, which
found it necessary to pass instead, upon
what it regarded a "prejudicial question."
Said of the Court of Appeals:
Before delving into the merits of the
appeal, we have first to pass upon a
prejudicial question. There is no dispute in
this case that the properties left by the late
Jaime Luz Paulino are in custodia legis, for
they are subject to testate proceedings in
said Civil Case No. 37 which is still
pending in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte. Although the will of the
testator had been allowed, no settlement
of accounts has been effected, no partition
of the properties left by the decedent has
been made, and the heirs have not legally
received or been adjudicated or assigned
any particular piece of the mass of their
inheritance. This being the case, and
pending such partition, adjudication or
assignment to the heirs of the residue of
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 25
the estate of the testator Jaime Luz
Paulino, none of his heirs can properly
allege or claim to have inherited any
portion of said residue, if there may be
any, because of his or her right of
inheritance remains to be in the nature of
hope. Consequently, neither Feliza Luz
Paulino, nor any of her co-heirs, can
legally represent the estate of the
decedent, or dispose as his or hers of the
property involved in this case, included as
item No. 20 of the inventory (Exh. 4), or
institute any case in court to demand any
part of such estate as his own, or claim
any right of legal redemption as co-heir in
the sale of any piece of the mass of the
inheritance that may have been disposed
of by any of the heirs. In the case at bar,
even if it were true that by agreement of
the heirs the property involved herein had
been assigned to Feliza Luz Paulino as
her share, that agreement and subsequent
sale are of no legal effect without the
sanction or approval of the court before
which Civil Case No. 37 is pending.
The foregoing conclusion relieves Us from
considering the other points raised in the
present controversy.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
is hereby reversed and the complaint
dismissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Roll, pp. 21-23.)
The present petition for review
by certiorari filed by Quirico L. Saturnino, is
directed against this decision of the Court
of Appeals. It is clear, to our mind, that
said petition must be granted. Pending
"partition, adjudication or assignment to
the heirs" of a deceased estator, their
"right of inheritance" is not merely" in the
nature of hope," for pursuant to Article
657 of the Civil Code of Spain, which was
in force in the Philippines at the time of the
death of Jaime Luz Paulino "the rights
to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death"
and the heirs pursuant to Article 661 of
the same Code "succeed to the
deceased in all his rights and obligations
by the mere fact of his death." In other
words, the person concerned is an heir
and he may exercise his rights as such,
from the very moment of the death of the
decedent. One of those rights is that of
redemption under Article 1067 of the
aforesaid code (Article 1088 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines). What is more,
this right of redemption may be
exercised only before partition, for said
provision declares explicitly:
If either of the heirs should sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of his co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the purchase price,
provided it be done within the period of
one month, to be counted from the time
they were informed thereof. (Emphasis
supplied.)
With reference to the adjudication, which
the Court of Appeals seemingly considers
essential to the enjoyment of the right of
redemption among co-heirs, it should be
noted that a property may be adjudicated
either to one heir only or to several heirs
pro-indiviso. In the first case, the
adjudication partakes, at the same time, of
the nature of a partition. Hence, if the
property is sold by the heir to whom it was
adjudicated, the other heirs are not entitled
to redeem the property, for, as regards, the
same, they are neither co-heirs nor co-
owners. In the second case, the heirs to
whom the property was adjudicated pro-
indiviso are, thereafter, no longer co-heirs,
but merely co-owners. Consequently,
neither may assert the right of redemption
conferred to co-heirs, although, in proper
cases, they may redeem as co-owners,
under Article 1522 of the Civil Code of
Spain (Article 1620, Civil Code of the
Philippines. Hence, commenting on said
Article 1067, Manresa says:
La venta del derecho hereditario ha de
hacerse antes de que sepractique la
particion. Esto es evidente, porque
despues al derecho hereditario en
abstracto sustituyen las cosas o derechos
determinados comprendidos en la
respectiva adjudicacion, cesa la
comunidad en la herencia, y podra
proceder otro retracto, mas no el retracto
especiala que el art. 1067 se refiere. (7
Manresa [6th ed. Revised] p. 719.)
Again, the house and lot involved in the
case at bar are not in custodia legis. Said
property was sold by Feliza Luz Paulino to
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 26
Maximo Daleja, Juana Lucas, Nemesio
Lucas and Donata Guillermo on October
22, 1945, or almost a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
month before Special Proceeding Case
No. 37 was instituted (November 19,
1945). At that time, the buyers of said
property were in possession thereof. They
still held it when the judicial administrator
was appointed in Case No. 37, and this
must have taken place after the probate of
the will on July 6, 1949 (Rule 78, section 4,
Rule 79, sections 4 and 6, and Rule 80,
section 5, Rules of Court). Up to the
present, said buyers remain in possession
of the property in litigation. Neither the
court, taking cognizance of Case No. 37,
nor the judicial administrator therein
appointed, has even tried to divest them of
said possession. In fact, if they were as
they are unwilling to yield it and the
administrator wished to take the property
under his custody, it would be necessary
for him to institute a separate civil action
therefor.
In view of the foregoing, and considering
that the Court of Appeals has not passed
upon the issues raised therein by
respondents herein and that the decision
of said court does not state the facts
essential to the determination of those
issues, said decision is hereby reversed,
and let the records of this case be
remanded to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings, not inconsistent with
this decision. Respondents, except the
Court of Appeals, shall pay the costs of
this instance. It is so ordered.
Intrinsic Validity of Wills
G.R. No. L-46364 April 6, 1990
SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO
MATIAS, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ and TEODORA
GRADO, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review
on certiorari of the following Decision 1 and
Resolution 2 of the Honorable Court of
Appeals: (1) Decision, dated March 1,
1977 in C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled
"Sulpicia Jimenez, et al., v. Vicente
Fernandez, et al." affirming in toto the
Pangasinan, Third Judicial District in Civil
Case No. 14802-I between the same
parties and (2) Resolution dated June 3,
1977 denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion
for reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the factual
background of this case is as follows:
The land in question is the Eastern portion
with an area of Four Hundred Thirty Six
(436) square meters of that parcel of
residential land situated in Barrio Dulig
(now Magsaysay), Municipality of
Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275
(Exhibit A) issued in the name of Sulpicia
Jimenez.
The entire parcel of land with an area of
2,932 square meters, formerly belonged to
Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez has two
(2) sons named Fortunato and Carlos
Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who
predeceased his father has only one child,
the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez. After the
death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel
of land was registered under Act 496 in the
name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia
Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares
pro-indiviso. As a result of the registration
case Original Certificate of Title No. 50933
(Exhibit 8) was issued on February 28,
1933, in the names of Carlos Jimenez and
Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-
indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and
his illegitimate daughter, Melecia
Cayabyab, also known as Melecia
Jimenez, took possession of the eastern
portion of the property consisting of 436
square meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez
sold said 436 square meter-portion of the
property to Edilberto Cagampan and
defendant Teodora Grado executed a
contract entitled "Exchange of Real
Properties" whereby the former transferred
said 436 square meter-portion to the latter,
who has been in occupation since.
On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia
Jimenez executed an affidavit adjudicating
unto herself the other half of the property
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 27
appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon
manifestation that she is the only heir of
her deceased uncle. Consequently
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 was
issued on October 1, 1969 in petitioner's
name alone over the entire 2,932 square
meter property.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined
by her husband, instituted the present
action for the recovery of the eastern
portion of the property consisting of 436
square meters occupied by defendant
Teodora Grado and her son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court
rendered judgment, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby
rendered dismissing the complaint and
holding the defendant, Teodora Grado, the
absolute owner of the land in question;
ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the
defendant the amount of P500.00 as
damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20)
Petitioner appealed the above judgment to
the respondent Court of Appeals and on
March 1, 1977, respondent Court of
Appeals rendered a decision affirming the
same in toto. Said decision was rendered
by a special division of five (5) justices,
with the Hon. Lourdes San Diego,
dissenting.
Petitioners within the reglementary period
granted by the Honorable Court of
Appeals, filed therewith a motion for
reconsideration. But said motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution dated June 3,
1977.
In their appeal to the respondent Court of
Appeals from the aforequoted decision of
the trial court, herein petitioner raised the
following assignments of error to wit:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I 31, 1968, WHICH CASE IS NOT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT MELECIA
CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA
JIMENEZ, IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF
CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT MELECIA
CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA
JIMENEZ, HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL THE
LAND IN QUESTION TO EDILBERTO
CAGAMPAN.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT EDILBERTO
CAGAMPAN DID NOT BECOME THE
OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION
BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE
(EXH. "1") EXECUTED BY MELECIA
CAYABYAB, ALIAS MELECIA JIMENEZ,
IN HIS FAVOR.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT TEODORA GRADO
DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE
LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE
DEED OF EXCHANGE (EXH. "7")
EXECUTED BY HER AND EDILBERTO
CAGAMPAN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF
APPELLANT SULPICIA JIMENEZ OVER
THE LAND IN QUESTION CAN NOT BE
DEFEATED BY THE ADVERSE OPEN
AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF
APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE APPELLEE
TEODORA GRADO IS THE ABSOLUTE
OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN
THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF
LOURDES ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA
APARIS AND CASIANO PURAY, G.R.
NO. L-23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
VII
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 28
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND
ORDERING THE APPELLANTS TO PAY
THE APPELLEES THE SUM OF P500.00
AS ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS THE
COSTS.
From the foregoing, this petition for review
was filed.
We find merit in the petition.
From the start the respondent court erred
in not declaring that Melecia Jimenez
Cayabyab also known as Melecia
Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos
Jimenez and therefore, had no right over
the property in question. Respondents
failed to present concrete evidence to
prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really
the daughter of Carlos Jimenez.
Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of
argument that Melecia Cayabyab was the
illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez
there can be no question that Melecia
Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the
estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not
have validly acquired, nor legally
transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that
portion of the property subject of this
petition.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the
rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the
decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code). Moreover,
Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as
follows:
Rights to the inheritance of a person who
died with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed
by the Civil Code of 1889, by other
previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . .
. (Rollo, p. 17)
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-
half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of
land then covered by Original Certificate of
title No. 50933, died on July 9, 1936
(Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
successional rights pertaining to his estate
must be determined in accordance with the
Civil Code of 1889.
Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24
SCRA 434) wherein this Court
categorically held that:
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code
of 1889 (which was the law in force when
Carlos Jimenez died and which should be
the governing law in so far as the right to
inherit from his estate was concerned), a
child must be either a child legitimate,
legitimated, or adopted, or else an
acknowledged natural child for
illegitimate not natural are disqualified to
inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935)
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab
was born out of the common-law-
relationship between her mother (Maria
Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could
not even be considered an acknowledged
natural child because Carlos Jimenez was
then legally married to Susana Abalos and
therefore not qualified to marry Maria
Cayabyab and consequently Melecia
Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious
child and not entitled to any successional
rights in so far as the estate of Carlos
Jimenez was concerned.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any
voluntary conveyance to her by Carlos
Jimenez or Sulpicia Jimenez of the
litigated portion of the land could not even
legally transfer the parcel of land to
Edilberto Cagampan who accordingly,
could not also legally transfer the same to
herein private respondents.
Analyzing the case before Us in this
manner, We can immediately discern
another error in the decision of the
respondent court, which is that the said
court sustained and made applicable to the
case at bar the ruling in the case of
Arcuino, et al., v. Aparis and Puray, No. L-
23424, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 407,
wherein We held that:
. . . it is true that the lands registered under
the Torrens System may not be acquired
by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not
the registered owners. They merely claim
to have acquired by succession, their
alleged title or interest in lot No. 355. At
any rate plaintiffs herein are guilty of
laches.
The respondent court relying on the
Arcuino case, concluded that respondents
had acquired the property under litigation
by prescription. We cannot agree with
such conclusion, because there is one
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 29
very marked and important difference
between the case at bar and that of the
Arcuino case, and that is, that since 1933
petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez was a title
holder, the property then being registered
in her and her uncle Carlos Jimenez'
name. In the Arcuino case, this Supreme
Court held. "(I)t is true that lands registered
under the Torrens System may not be
acquired by prescription but plaintiffs
herein are not the registered owners."
(Rollo, p. 38) Even in the said cited case
the principle of imprescriptibility of Torrens
Titles was respected.
Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her
predecessors-in-interest would be
unavailing against the petitioner Sulpicia
Jimenez who was the holder pro-indiviso
with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens
Certificate of Title covering a tract of land
which includes the portion now in question,
from February 28, 1933, when the Original
Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8)
was issued.
No possession by any person of any
portion of the land covered by said original
certificate of titles, could defeat the title of
the registered owner of the land covered
by the certificate of title. (Benin v. Tuason,
L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531)
Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided
property remained good and continued to
be good when she segregated it into a new
title (T.C.T No. 82275, Exhibit "A") in 1969.
Sulpicia's ownership over her one-half of
the land and which is the land in dispute
was always covered by a Torrens title, and
therefore, no amount of possession thereof
by the respondents, could ever defeat her
proprietary rights thereon. It is apparent,
that the right of plaintiff (now petitioner) to
institute this action to recover possession
of the portion of the land in question based
on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez,
T.C.T. No. 82275 (Exhibit "A") is
imprescriptible and not barred under the
doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason & Co. v.
Macalindong, L-15398, December 29,
1962, Francisco v. Cruz, et al., 43 O.G.
5105) Rollo, p. 39)
The respondent Court of Appeals declared
the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez guilty of
laches and citing the ruling in the case of
Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan (65
SCRA 605), held that, since petitioner
Sulpicia Jimenez executed her Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication only in 1969, she lost the
right to recover possession of the parcel of
land subject of the litigation.
In this instance, again We rule for the
petitioner. There is no absolute rule as to
what constitutes laches or staleness of
demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances.
The question of laches is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and since
laches is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to
defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and
injustice. It would be rank injustice and
patently inequitous to deprive the lawful
heirs of their rightful inheritance.
Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to
the relief prayed for, declaring her to be
the sole and absolute owner of the land in
question with right to its possession and
enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos
Jimenez died in 1936, his pro-indiviso
share in the properties then owned in co-
ownership with his niece Sulpicia
descended by intestacy to Sulpicia
Jimenez alone because Carlos died
without any issue or other heirs.
After all, the professed objective of Act No.
496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act or the law which
established the Torrens System of Land
Registration in the Philippines is that the
stability of the landholding system in the
Philippines depends on the confidence of
the people in the titles covering the
properties. And to this end, this Court has
invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the
Torrens Title and in, among others, J.M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Macalindong (6
SCRA 938), held that "the right of the
appellee to file an action to recover
possession based on its Torrens Title
is imprescriptible and not barred under the
doctrine of laches.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution dated March 1, 1977 and June
3, 1977 in CA G.R. No. L-49178-R are
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 30
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31,
1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE
ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and
LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-
appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga
for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special
Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated
September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor,
directing the executor to reimburse Maria
Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia
as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime,
and in case of death without issue, one-
half of said residue to be payable to Mrs.
Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will
of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The
will was executed in Manila on March 5,
1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1)
child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no
living ascendants, and no descendants
except my above named daughter, MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA
HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of
age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
she was baptized Christensen, is not in
any way related to me, nor has she been
at any time adopted by me, and who, from
all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency
the same to be deposited in trust for the
said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the Philippine National
Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal
thereof as well as any interest which may
have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath,
unto my well-beloved daughter, the said
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY
(Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as
aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all
the income from the rest, remainder, and
residue of my property and estate, real,
personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind
or character, and wheresoever situated, of
which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any
source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted
provisions that the executor in his final
account and project of partition ratified the
payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of
partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of
her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in
G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution
should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it
denies to Helen Christensen, one of two
acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification
of the above grounds it was alleged that
the law that should govern the estate of
the deceased Christensen should not be
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 31
the internal law of California alone, but the
entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is
the Philippines and even if the case were
decided in California, Section 946 of the
California Civil Code, which requires that
the domicile of the decedent should apply,
should be applicable. It was also alleged
that Maria Helen Christensen having been
declared an acknowledged natural child of
the decedent, she is deemed for all
purposes legitimate from the time of her
birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E.
Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the
time of his death, the successional rights
and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his
will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a
testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because
the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable (In re
McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877,
176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117
Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179,
Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen
Christensen, through counsel, filed various
motions for reconsideration, but these
were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error
are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT
HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST
SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY
UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE
GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED
TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN
FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E.
Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the
time of his death. But there is also no
question that at the time of his death he
was domiciled in the Philippines, as
witness the following facts admitted by the
executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will
to probate, the facts of record show that
the deceased Edward E. Christensen was
born on November 29, 1875 in New York
City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the
Philippines, as an appointed school
teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the
U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port
of Embarkation as the City of San
Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A.
He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen
returned to the United States and stayed
there for the following nine years until
1913, during which time he resided in, and
was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the
Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 32
However, in 1928, he again departed the
Philippines for the United States and came
back here the following year, 1929. Some
nine years later, in 1938, he again returned
to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray
that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their
case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t acquiring another. This conclusion is in
Being an American citizen, Mr.
Christensen was interned by the Japanese
Military Forces in the Philippines during
World War II. Upon liberation, in April
1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December,
1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6",
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits
"AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM",
"MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n.,
July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen
returned once more to California shortly
after the making of his last will and
testament (now in question herein) which
he executed at his lawyers' offices in
Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the
St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on
April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the
domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact
that he was born in New York, migrated to
California and resided there for nine years,
and since he came to the Philippines in
1913 he returned to California very rarely
and only for short visits (perhaps to
relatives), and considering that he appears
never to have owned or acquired a home
or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon
the Philippines and make home in the
State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with
many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is
used to denote something more than mere
physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of
Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that
the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento,
California from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the
latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased
appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when
he executed his will in 1951 he declared
that he was a citizen of that State; so that
he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by
accordance with the following principle
expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile"
might well be taken to mean the same
thing, a place of permanent abode. But
domicile, as has been shown, has
acquired a technical meaning. Thus one
may be domiciled in a place where he has
never been. And he may reside in a place
where he has no domicile. The man with
two homes, between which he divides his
time, certainly resides in each one, while
living in it. But if he went on business
which would require his presence for
several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient
connection with the place to be called a
resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only
for the particular business in hand, not
giving up his former "home," he could not
be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of
a domicile of choice requires the exercise
of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily
presence of an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it
one's domicile." Residence, however, is a
term used with many shades of meaning,
from the merest temporary presence to the
most permanent abode, and it is not safe
to insist that any one use et the only
proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his
testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 33
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country
where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at
bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term "national law"is used
therein.
There is no single American law governing
the validity of testamentary provisions in
the United States, each state of the Union
having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the
state. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted
can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply
to any general American law. So it can
refer to no other than the private law of the
State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in
California governing the disposition of
personal property? The decision of the
court below, sustains the contention of the
executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of
his property by will in the form and manner
he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d
952. But appellant invokes the provisions
of Article 946 of the Civil Code of
California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the
place where personal property is situated,
it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in
appellant's opposition and is not denied.
We have checked it in the California Civil
Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the
decision and testified to by a witness.
(Only the case of Kaufman is correctly
cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf
that as the deceased Christensen was a
citizen of the State of California, the
internal law thereof, which is that given in
the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's
will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a
citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,
insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the
question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent's domicile,
which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been
defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way:
"When the Conflict of Laws rule of the
forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law
for decision, is the reference to the purely
internal rules of law of the foreign system;
i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus
its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one.
The Michigan court chose to accept the
renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws
rule of Illinois which referred the matter
back to Michigan law. But once having
determined the the Conflict of Laws
principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult
to see why the reference back should not
have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws.
This would have resulted in the "endless
chain of references" which has so often
been criticized be legal writers. The
opponents of the renvoi would have looked
merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus
rejecting the renvoi or the reference back.
Yet there seems no compelling logical
reason why the original reference should
be the internal law rather than to the
Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a
solution avoids going on a merry-go-round,
but those who have accepted
the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying
internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for
they look always to internal law as the rule
of reference.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 34
Strangely enough, both the advocates for
and the objectors to the renvoi plead that
greater uniformity will result from adoption
of their respective views. And still more
strange is the fact that the only way to
achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law
problem is if in the dispute the two states
whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both
reject, or both accept the doctrine, the
result of the litigation will vary with the
choice of the forum. In the case stated
above, had the Michigan court rejected
the renvoi, judgment would have been
against the woman; if the suit had been
brought in the Illinois courts, and they too
rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for
the woman. The same result would
happen, though the courts would switch
with respect to which would hold liability, if
both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts
the renvoi theory in two instances: where
the title to land is in question, and where
the validity of a decree of divorce is
challenged. In these cases the Conflict of
Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the
domicile of the parties in the divorce case,
is applied by the forum, but any further
reference goes only to the internal law.
Thus, a person's title to land, recognized
by the situs, will be recognized by every
court; and every divorce, valid by the
domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies
intestate, domiciled in France, leaving
movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises
as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a
Massachusetts court. There the rule of the
conflict of laws as to intestate succession
to movables calls for an application of the
law of the deceased's last domicile. Since
by hypothesis X's last domicile was
France, the natural thing for the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn
to French statute of distributions, or
whatever corresponds thereto in French
law, and decree a distribution accordingly.
An examination of French law, however,
would show that if a French court were
called upon to determine how this property
should be distributed, it would refer the
distribution to the national law of the
deceased, thus applying the
Massachusetts statute of distributions. So
on the surface of things the Massachusetts
court has open to it alternative course of
action: (a) either to apply the French law is
to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve
itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on
the assumption that this is what a French
court would do. If it accepts the so-
called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter
course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is
presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of
the forum refers to a foreign law, the
conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers
the matter back again to the law of the
forum. This is renvoi in the narrower
sense. The German term for this judicial
process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard
Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a
foreign law is to be resorted to as
governing a particular case, the further
question may arise: Are the rules as to the
conflict of laws contained in such foreign
law also to be resorted to? This is a
question which, while it has been
considered by the courts in but a few
instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists;
and the doctrine involved has been
descriptively designated by them as the
"Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative
answer to the question postulated and the
operation of the adoption of the foreign law
in toto would in many cases result in
returning the main controversy to be
decided according to the law of the forum.
... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine
of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory
of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of
the forum, in determining the question
before it, must take into account the whole
law of the other jurisdiction, but also its
rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply
the law to the actual question which the
rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 35
This may be the law of the forum. The
doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2
Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also
been defined and the reasons for its
application in a country explained by Prof.
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531.
The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory
implies that the rules of the conflict of laws
are to be understood as incorporating not
only the ordinary or internal law of the
foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this
theory 'the law of a country' means the
whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the
meeting of the Institute of International
Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of
the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its
country as regards the application of
foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to
the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which
disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute,
and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile,
or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign
systems of law, provided it be certain that
one of them is necessarily competent,
which agree in attributing the
determination of a question to the same
system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its
judge to distribute the personal estate of
an Englishman who has died domiciled in
Belgium in accordance with the law of his
domicile, he must first inquire whether the
law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with
the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality
that is the English law he must accept
this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California
Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra,
its internal law. If the law on succession
and the conflict of laws rules of California
are to be enforced jointly, each in its own
intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply
to citizens living in the State, but Article
946 should apply to such of its citizens as
are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign
element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of
the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal
property in one or more states, and leaves
a will directing the manner of distribution of
the property, the law of the state where he
was domiciled at the time of his death will
be looked to in deciding legal questions
about the will, almost as completely as the
law of situs is consulted in questions about
the devise of land. It is logical that, since
the domiciliary rules control devolution of
the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should
determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property.
Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has
effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile
are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property,
and the reason for the recognition as in the
case of intestate succession, is the general
convenience of the doctrine. The New
York court has said on the point: 'The
general principle that a dispostiton of a
personal property, valid at the domicile of
the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the
universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of
the first fruits of civilization, and it this age,
when business intercourse and the
process of accumulating property take but
little notice of boundary lines, the practical
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 36
wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of
California. But as above explained the
laws of California have prescribed two sets
of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in
other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws
rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If
we must enforce the law of California as in
comity we are bound to go, as so declared
in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we
must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply
the internal law for residents therein, and
its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled
abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the
clause "if there is no law to the contrary in
the place where the property is situated" in
Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers
to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary
in the Philippines is the provision in said
Article 16 that the national law of the
deceased should govern. This contention
can not be sustained. As explained in the
various authorities cited above the national
law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946,
which authorizes the reference or return of
the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to
the law of his domicile, the Philippines in
the case at bar. The court of the domicile
can not and should not refer the case back
to California; such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination because
the case will then be like a football, tossed
back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent
was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply
its own law as directed in the conflict of
laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as
the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children
while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and
894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of
Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli,
40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider
Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by
appellees to support the decision can not
possibly apply in the case at bar, for two
important reasons, i.e., the subject in each
case does not appear to be a citizen of a
state in the United States but with domicile
in the Philippines, and it does not appear
in each case that there exists in the state
of which the subject is a citizen, a law
similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the
California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of
the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of
the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant,
should be governed by the Philippine Law,
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the
Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
is hereby reversed and the case returned
to the lower court with instructions that the
partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides. Judgment reversed,
with costs against appellees.
Facts:
Edward S. Christensen, though
born in New York, migrated to California
where he resided and consequently was
considered a California Citizen for a period
of nine years to 1913. He came to the
Philippines where he became a domiciliary
until the time of his death. However, during
the entire period of his residence in this
country, he had always considered himself
as a citizen of California.
In his will, executed on March 5,
1951, he instituted an acknowledged
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 37
natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
as his only heir but left a legacy of some
money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the
Supreme Court had been declared as an
acknowledged natural daughter of his.
Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16
(2) of the civil code, California law should
be applied, the matter is returned back to
the law of domicile, that Philippine law is
ultimately applicable, that the share of
Helen must be increased in view of
successional rights of illegitimate children
under Philippine laws. On the other hand,
counsel for daughter Maria , in as much
that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew
Civil Code, the national of the deceased
must apply, our courts must apply internal
law of California on the matter. Under
California law, there are no compulsory
heirs and consequently a testator should
dispose any property possessed by him in
absolute dominion.
Issue:
Whether Philippine Law or
California Law should apply.
Held:
The Supreme Court deciding to
grant more successional rights to Helen
Christensen Garcia said in effect that there
be two rules in California on the matter.
1. The conflict rule which
should apply to Californians
outside the California, and
2. The internal Law which
should apply to California
domiciles in califronia.
The California conflict rule, found
on Art. 946 of the California Civil code
States that if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the decree of its owner and is governed by
the law of the domicile.
Christensen being domiciled
outside california, the law of his domicile,
the Philippines is ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed
is reversed and case is remanded
to the lower court with instructions
that partition be made as that of
the Philippine law provides.
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1,
1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo,
JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the
deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question
in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate
filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved
it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant
assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of
partition; (2) denial of his participation in
the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion
for reconsideration of the order approving
the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of
transfer of said business; and (5) the
declaration that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the
scheme of partition and the delivery of the
deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until
the receipt of the depositions requested in
reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the
fact that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's
will which are not in accordance with the
laws of his Turkish nationality, for which
reason they are void as being in violation
or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may
be the nature of the property or the country
in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not
prove that said testimentary dispositions
are not in accordance with the Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any
evidence showing what the Turkish laws
are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed
to be the same as those of the Philippines.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 38
(Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these
proceedings what the Turkish laws are.
He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to
present evidence on this point; so much so
that he assigns as an error of the court in
not having deferred the approval of the
scheme of partition until the receipt of
certain testimony requested regarding the
Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another
opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with
the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was
granted ample opportunity to introduce
competent evidence, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence
in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in
the testamentary dispositions in question
which, not being contrary to our laws in
force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of
partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error
which deals with the exclusion of the
herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as
he is one of the persons designated as
such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based
on the last part of the second clause of the
will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although
by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this
citizenship having been conferred upon me
by conquest and not by free choice, nor by
nationality and, on the other hand, having
resided for a considerable length of time in
the Philippine Islands where I succeeded
in acquiring all of the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that the distribution
of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting
all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand
whatever disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or persons who fail
to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is
conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not
in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws
of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were
legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor
who, by his attitude in these proceedings
has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving
his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said
condition is void, being contrary to law, for
article 792 of the civil Code provides the
following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary
to law or good morals shall be considered
as not imposed and shall not prejudice the
heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law
because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10
of the civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal
provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in
said will is unconditional and consequently
valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
It results from all this that the second
clause of the will regarding the law which
shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and
void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will
with all their dispositions and requests are
perfectly valid and effective it not
appearing that said clauses are contrary to
the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are
modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such
a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
FACTS: Juan Miciano, judicial
administrator of the estate in question, filed
a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of
the brothers of the deceased (Joseph
Brimo) opposed Micianos participation in
the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish
citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine
law will be the basis on the distribution of
Joseph Brimos estates.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 39
HELD: Though the last part of the second
clause of the will expressly said that it be
made and disposed of in accordance with
the laws in force in the Philippine Island,
this condition, described as impossible
conditions, shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
should the testator otherwise
provide. Impossible conditions are further
defined as those contrary to law or good
morals. Thus, national law of the testator
shall govern in his testamentary
dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator, in
such manner as to include Andre Brimo,
as one of the legatees.
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the
decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] modifying that of the Regional
Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35,
Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F.
Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia),
as co-owners of whatever property she
and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente
(hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may
have acquired during the twenty-five (25)
years that they lived together as husband
and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an
enlisted serviceman of the United States
Navy from March 10, 1927 to September
30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and
petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter
referred to as Paula) were married before
a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in
Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War,
Lorenzo departed for the United States
and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in
barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was
admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816
was issued in his favor by the United
States District Court, Southern District of
New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by
the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was
granted an accrued leave by the U. S.
Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife
Paula was pregnant and was living in and
having an adulterous relationship with his
brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to
a boy registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente,
with the certificate stating that the child
was not legitimate and the line for the
fathers name was left blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live
with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the
couple drew a written agreement to the
effect that (1) all the family allowances
allotted by the United States Navy as part
of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations
for Paulas daily maintenance and support
would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance
with judicial proceedings; (3) they would
make a separate agreement regarding
their conjugal property acquired during
their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not
prosecute Paula for her adulterous act
since she voluntarily admitted her fault and
agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully. The agreement was signed by
both Lorenzo and Paula and was
witnessed by Paulas father and
stepmother. The agreement was notarized
by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and
on November 16, 1951 filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of
San Diego. Paula was represented by
counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings. On
November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of
the State of California, for the County of
San Diego found all factual allegations to
be true and issued an interlocutory
judgment of divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree
became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the
Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married
Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently,
Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same
town as Paula, who did not oppose the
marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia
lived together as husband and
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 40
wife.[15] Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a
Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M.
Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with
attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo,
Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the
will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to
Alicia and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA
R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential
house and lot, located at San Francisco,
Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines,
including ALL the personal properties and
other movables or belongings that may be
found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my
wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children,
Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and
Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my
real properties whatsoever and
wheresoever located, specifically my real
properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay
Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon,
Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath
exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno
and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente,
Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in
equal shares, my real properties located in
Quezon City Philippines, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652;
and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal,
Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of
the Registry of Deeds of the province of
Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the
above-mentioned properties, whether real
or personal properties, shall not be
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to
any other persons, but could only be sold,
ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and
among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R.
FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this
my Last Will and Testament, and in her
default or incapacity of the latter to act, any
of my children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named
herein or her lawful substitute should
served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other
wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions
heretofore executed, signed, or published,
by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I
die, no relatives of mine in any degree in
the Llorentes Side should ever bother and
disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife
Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with
respect to any real or personal properties I
gave and bequeathed respectively to each
one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament.[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines
Sur, a petition for the probate and
allowance of his last will and testament
wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be
appointed Special Administratrix of his
estate.[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied
the motion for the reason that the testator
Lorenzo was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will
was duly executed, the trial court admitted
the will to probate.[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings
could be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the
same court a petition[22] for letters of
administration over Lorenzos estate in her
favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the
various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed
of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and
1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the
testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755),
a petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating
the testate proceedings, the trial court
gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp.
Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the
order was published in the newspaper
Bicol Star.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court
issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has
so found that the divorce decree granted to
the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore
the marriage he contracted with Alicia
Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
likewise void. This being so the petition of
Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is
not entitled to receive any share from the
estate even if the will especially said so
her relationship with Lorenzo having
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 41
gained the status of paramour which is
under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the
petition of Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente
dated March 13, 1981 as void and
declares her entitled as conjugal partner
and entitled to one-half of their conjugal
properties, and as primary compulsory
heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to
one-third of the estate and then one-third
should go to the illegitimate children, Raul,
Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic)
Llorente, for them to partition in equal
shares and also entitled to the remaining
free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed
legal administrator of the estate of the
deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let
the corresponding letters of administration
issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in
the amount (sic) of P100,000.00
conditioned for her to make a return to the
court within three (3) months a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels,
rights, and credits, and estate which shall
at any time come to her possession or to
the possession of any other person for her,
and from the proceeds to pay and
discharge all debts, legacies and charges
on the same, or such dividends thereon as
shall be decreed or required by this court;
to render a true and just account of her
administration to the court within one (1)
year, and at any other time when required
by the court and to perform all orders of
this court by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in
respective petitions for want of evidence
could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a
motion for reconsideration of the
aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court
denied Alicias motion for reconsideration
but modified its earlier decision, stating
that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children
legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since
they were not legally adopted by
him.[29] Amending its decision of May 18,
1987, the trial court declared Beverly
Llorente as the only illegitimate child of
Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of
the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free
portion of the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court
in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as
co-owner of whatever properties she and
the deceased may have acquired during
the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with
the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of
Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of
merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and
sorting through the various arguments
raised,[36] the issue is simple.Who are
entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the
Court of Appeals. We remand the case to
the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic
validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente
became an American citizen long before
and at the time of: (1) his divorce from
Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution
of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these
incidents are necessarily governed by
foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary
succession, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be
found. (emphasis ours)
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 42
True, foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was
pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not
admit the foreign law. The Court of
Appeals and the trial court called to the
fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case
was referred back to the law of the
decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine
law.
We note that while the trial court stated
that the law of New York was not
sufficiently proven, in the same breath it
made the categorical, albeit equally
unproven statement that American law
follows the domiciliary theory hence,
Philippine law applies when determining
the validity of Lorenzos will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one
American law. The "national law" indicated
in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot
possibly apply to general American
law. There is no such law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States. Each State of the union has
its own law applicable to its citizens and in
force only within the State. It can therefore
refer to no other than the law of the State
of which the decedent was a the trial court.
resident.[39]Second, there is no showing
that the application of the renvoi doctrine is
called for or required by New York State
law.
The trial court held that the will was
intrinsically invalid since it contained
dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the
trial courts opinion was a executed.
mere paramour. The trial court threw the
will out, leaving Alice, and her two children,
Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the
will. It declared Alice entitled to one half
(1/2) of whatever property she and
Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation,
applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and
the complete disregard of the will, already
probated as duly executed in accordance
with the formalities of Philippine law, is
fatal, especially in light of the factual
and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that
owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces, the same
being considered contrary to our concept
of public policy and morality. In the same
case, the Court ruled that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, provided they are
valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held
in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once
proven that respondent was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the
divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized
the divorce obtained by the respondent in
his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. There, we stated that divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the
decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his
first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now,
the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent)
are matters best left to the determination of
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are
When the acts referred to are executed
before the diplomatic or consular officials
of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution. (underscoring
ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his
property to his second wife and children by
her is glaringly shown in the will he
executed. We do not wish to frustrate his
wishes, since he was a foreigner, not
covered by our laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition and legal
capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and
who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues
best proved by foreign law which must be
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 43
referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will
was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should
note that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress did not intend to
extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals.Congress specifically left
the amount of successional rights to the
decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary
to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET
ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the
decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of
divorce granted in favor of the deceased
Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court
of the State of California in and for the
County of San Diego, made final on
December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to
the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will
and determination of the parties
successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law with instructions that the trial
court shall proceed with all deliberate
dispatch to settle the estate of the
deceased within the framework of the
Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner
Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the
Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted
serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he
left for the US where through
naturalization, he became a US Citizen.
Upon his visitation of his wife, he
discovered that she was living with his
brother and a child was born. The child
was registered as legitimate but the name
of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a
divorce in California, which later on
became final. He married Alicia and they
lived together for 25 years bringing 3
children. He made his last will and
testament stating that all his properties will
be given to his second marriage. He filed a
petition of probate that made or appointed
Alicia his special administrator of his
estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo
died. Paula filed a letter of administration
over Llorentes estate. The trial granted the
letter and denied the motion for
reconsideration. An appeal was made to
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and
modified the judgment of the Trial Court
that she be declared co-owner of whatever
properties, she and the deceased, may
have acquired during their 25 years of
cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall
apply.
RULING: Lorenzo Llorente was already an
American citizen when he divorced Paula.
Such was also the situation when he
married Alicia and executed his will. As
stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, provided that
they are validly required in their National
Law. Thus the divorce obtained by
Llorente is valid because the law that
governs him is not Philippine Law but his
National Law since the divorce was
contracted after he became an American
citizen. Furthermore, his National Law
allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of
origin for determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo Llorentes will and
determination of the parties successional
rights allowing proof of foreign law.
[G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999]
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D.
QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-
in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and
JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to
probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executory
still be given effect? This is the issue that
arose from the following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate
children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her
estate being settled. Alejandro died
thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after
Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims to
have taken care of Alejandro before he
died, filed a special proceeding for the
probate of the latters last will and
testament. In 1981, the court issued an
order admitting Alejandros will to
probate. Private respondents did not
appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed
a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 44
Void. The trial court granted the motion
and issued an order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes
Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro
Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and
testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as
intrinsically void, and declaring the
oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose
Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as
the only heirs of the late spouses
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes,
whose respective estates shall be
liquidated and distributed according to the
laws on intestacy upon payment of estate
and other taxes due to the government.[1]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration
arguing that she is entitled to some
compensation since she took care of
Alejandro prior to his death although she
admitted that they were not married to
each other. Upon denial of her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed for failure to file appellants brief
within the extended period granted.[2] This
dismissal became final and executory on
February 3, 1989 and a corresponding
entry of judgment was forthwith issued by
the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A
writ of execution was issued by the lower
court to implement the final and executory
Order. Consequently, private respondents
filed several motions including a motion to
compel petitioner to surrender to them the
Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT)
covering the properties of the late
Alejandro.When petitioner refused to
surrender the TCTs, private respondents
filed a motion for cancellation of said titles
and for issuance of new titles in their
names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29,
1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside
the final and executory Order dated
January 30, 1986, as well as the Order
directing the issuance of the writ of
execution, on the ground that the order
was merely interlocutory, hence not final in
character. The court added that the
dispositive portion of the said Order even
directs the distribution of the estate of the
deceased spouses. Private respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied in an Order dated February 1,
1991. Thus, private respondents filed a
petition before the Court of Appeals, which
nullified the two assailed Orders dated
November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition
for review arguing that the case filed by
private respondents before the Court of
Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that
in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge
Angas cannot be said to have no
jurisdiction because he was particularly
designated to hear the case. Petitioner
likewise assails the Order of the Court of
Appeals upholding the validity of the
January 30, 1986 Order which declared
the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that
was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate
her as executrix of the estate of the late
Alejandro and to maintain the status quoor
lease of the premises thereon to third
parties.[3] Private respondents opposed the
motion on the ground that petitioner has no
interest in the estate since she is not the
lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and
executory decision or order can no longer
be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be. In setting aside the
January 30, 1986 Order that has attained
finality, the trial court in effect nullified the
entry of judgment made by the Court of
Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court
cannot reverse or set aside decisions or
orders of a superior court, for to do so
would be to negate the hierarchy of courts
and nullify the essence of review. It has
been ruled that a final judgment on
probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding
on the whole world.[4]
It has been consistently held that if no
appeal is taken in due time from a
judgment or order of the trial court, the
same attains finality by mere lapse of
time. Thus, the order allowing the will
became final and the question determined
by the court in such order can no longer be
raised anew, either in the same
proceedings or in a different motion. The
matters of due execution of the will and the
capacity of the testator acquired the
character of res judicata and cannot again
be brought into question, all juridical
questions in connection therewith being for
once and forever closed.[5] Such final order
makes the will conclusive against the
whole world as to its extrinsic validity and
due execution.[6]
It should be noted that probate
proceedings deals generally with the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated,[7]particularly on three aspects:
whether the will submitted is indeed, the
decedents last will and testament;
compliance with the prescribed formalities
for the execution of wills;
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 45
the testamentary capacity of the testator;[8]
and the due execution of the last will and
testament.[9]
Under the Civil Code, due execution
includes a determination of whether the
testator was of sound and disposing mind
at the time of its execution, that he had
freely executed the will and was not acting
under duress, fraud, menace or undue
influence and that the will is genuine and
not a forgery,[10] that he was of the proper
testamentary age and that he is a person
not expressly prohibited by law from
making a will.[11]
The intrinsic validity is another matter and
questions regarding the same may still be
raised even after the will has been
authenticated.[12] Thus, it does not
necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid
last will and testament is always
intrinsically valid. Even if the will was
validly executed, if the testator provides for
dispositions that deprives or impairs the
lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful
inheritance according to the laws on
succession,[13] the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be
given effect. This is specially so when the
courts had already determined in a final
and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void. Such determination
having attained that character of finality is
binding on this Court which will no longer
be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the
will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final
and executory decision of which the party
had the opportunity to challenge before the
higher tribunals must stand and should no
longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of
the remedies provided by law constitutes
waiver. And if the party does not avail of
other remedies despite its belief that it was
aggrieved by a decision or court action,
then it is deemed to have fully agreed and
is satisfied with the decision or order. As
early as 1918, it has been declared that
public policy and sound practice demand
that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts must at some point of
time fixed by law[14] become final otherwise
there will be no end to litigation.Interes rei
publicae ut finis sit litium - the very object
of which the courts were constituted was to
put an end to controversies.[15] To fulfill this
purpose and to do so speedily, certain time
limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be
set up to spur on the slothful.[16]The only
instance where a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out
by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence
not imputable to negligence,[17] which
circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for
the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of
the will, as she precisely appealed from an
unfavorable order therefrom. Although the
final and executory Order of January 30,
1986 wherein private respondents were
declared as the only heirs do not bind
those who are not parties thereto such as
the alleged illegitimate son of the testator,
the same constitutes res judicata with
respect to those who were parties to the
probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot
again raise those matters anew for
relitigation otherwise that would amount to
forum-shopping. It should be remembered
that forum shopping also occurs when the
same issue had already been resolved
adversely by some other court.[18] It is clear
from the executory order that the estates
of Alejandro and his spouse should be
distributed according to the laws of
intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986
Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can
still be set aside by the trial court. In
support thereof, petitioner argues that an
order merely declaring who are heirs and
the shares to which set of heirs is entitled
cannot be the basis of execution to require
delivery of shares from one person to
another particularly when no project of
partition has been filed.[19] The trial court
declared in the January 30, 1986 Order
that petitioner is not the legal wife of
Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three
legitimate children (petitioners herein), and
at the same time it nullified the will. But it
should be noted that in the same Order,
the trial court also said that the estate of
the late spouses be distributed according
to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has
no option but to implement that order of
intestate distribution and not to reopen and
again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of
the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of
the Civil Code, on the law of successional
rights that testacy is preferred to
intestacy.[20] But before there could be
testate distribution, the will must pass the
scrutinizing test and safeguards provided
by law considering that the deceased
testator is no longer available to prove the
voluntariness of his actions, aside from the
fact that the transfer of the estate is usually
onerous in nature and that no one is
presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur
donare.[21] No intestate distribution of the
estate can be done until and unless the will
had failed to pass both its extrinsic and
intrinsic validity.If the will is extrinsically
void, the rules of intestacy apply
regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If
it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 46
determine its intrinsic validity that is
whether the provisions of the will are valid
according to the laws of succession. In this
case, the court had ruled that the will of
Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the
intrinsic provisions thereof were
void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as
correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his
will of the alleged share in the conjugal
properties of his late spouse, whom he
described as his only beloved wife, is not a
valid reason to reverse a final and
executory order. Testamentary
dispositions of properties not belonging
exclusively to the testator or properties
which are part of the conjugal regime
cannot be given effect.Matters with respect
to who owns the properties that were
disposed of by Alejandro in the void will
may still be properly ventilated and
determined in the intestate proceedings for
the settlement of his and that of his late
spouses estate.
Petitioners motion for appointment as
administratrix is rendered moot
considering that she was not married to
the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an
heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and
the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her
estate being settled. Thereafter, her
husband Alejandro also died. In 1977,
Lourdes Dorotheo filed a special
proceeding for the probate of Alejandros
last will and testament. The children of
spouses filed their opposition. The RTC
ruled that Lourdes being not the wife of
Alejandro the will is intrinsically void; the
oppositors are the only heir entitled to the
estate. Lourdes filed a Motion
for Consideration arguing that she
is entitled to some compensationsince she
took care of Alejandro prior to his
death although they were not legally
married to each other. This was denied by
the trial court. The CA dismissed her
appeal for her failure to wile the same
within the extended period.
ISSUE:
May a last will and testament admitted to
probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final
and executor still be given effect?
RULING:
No. A final and executor decision or order
can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will of
Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof are void.
Alejandro gave all the property to the
concubine. Such is invalid because one
cannot dispose what he does not own. In
this case, the whole property is
the conjugal property of Alejandro and
Aniceta. Such has become final
and executor. The only instance where a
party interested in probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when
he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence
with circumstances do not concur herein.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G.
BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST
COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM
PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-
appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a
question purely of law, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated
April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case
No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a
citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis
and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second
wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he
had three legitimate children: Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis;
and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis
executed a will in the Philippines, in which
he directed that after all taxes, obligations,
and expenses of administration are paid
for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 47
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis,
or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the
foregoing two items have been satisfied,
the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second
wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1wph1.t Their
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G.
Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as
executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock
to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3)
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each
in satisfaction of their respective legacies,
or a total of P120,000.00, which it released
from time to time according as the lower
court approved and allowed the various
motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing
its administration, the executor submitted
and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of
Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the
satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen
by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor pursuant to the "Twelfth"
clause of the testator's Last Will and
Testament divided the residuary estate
into seven equal portions for the benefit of
the testator's seven legitimate children by
his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs
of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition
despite notice to him, proof of service of
which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1
After the parties filed their respective
memoranda and other pertinent pleadings,
the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued
an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
respective motions for
reconsideration having been denied by the
lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise
the issue of which law must apply
Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the
case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31,
1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and
a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has
a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile)
should govern, the same would not result
in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence, however, of proof as to the
conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from
ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not
rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated,
they never invoked nor even mentioned it
in their arguments. Rather, they argue that
their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article
17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil
Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a)
the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 48
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is
governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art.
17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2
of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the
phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when
they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code,
while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of
the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It
must have been their purpose to make the
second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in
testate and intestate succession. As
further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public
policy or good customs may be involved in
our System of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the
decedent executed two wills one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate arguing from this that
he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter
the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano
v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not
with his national law, is illegal and void, for
his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10
now Article 16 of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos
G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court
is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen
of the State of Texas and of the United
States. He had 5 legitimate children with
his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had
divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd
wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3
illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a
will in the Philippines in which his
distributable estate should be divided in
trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at
P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving
children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal
shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident
of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was
admitted to probate in the Philippines. The
Peoples Bank and Trust Company, an
executor of the will, paid the entire bequest
therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration,
the executor submitted and filed its
Executors Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition
where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction
of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares
of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered
to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate
children in the amount of P40,000 each or
a total of P120,000. In the project partition,
the executor divided the residuary estate
into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate
children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari
Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 49
respective opposition to the project
partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate
children.
The lower court denied their respective
motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law
must apply.
RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was
both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death. So that
even assuming Texan has a conflict of law
rule providing that the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine Law, but would still refer to
Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence, however of proofs as to
the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from our
appellants, position is therefore not rested
on the doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos
Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
USA and that under the Laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimates.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights has to be determined
under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on
legitimates can not be applied to the
testate of Amos Bellis.
Testamentary Capacity and Intent
G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912
JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
Salas and Kalaw for appellants.
Jose Santiago for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the
Court of First Instance of the Province of
Bataan, admitting to probate a document
which was offered as the last will and
testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro.
The will purports to have been executed in
the pueblo of Pilar, Province of Bataan, on
the 19th day of April, 1908. The testator
died on the 28th of September, 1909, a
year and five months following the date of
the execution of the will. The will was
propounded by the executrix, Juliana
Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the
opponents are a son and several
grandchildren by a former marriage, the
latter being the children of a deceased
daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the
probation of the will is that the same was
not executed according to the formalities
and requirements of the law touching wills,
and further that the testator was not in the
full of enjoyment and use of his mental
faculties and was without the mental
capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
The record shows that the testator,
Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of
fifteen years prior to the time of his death
suffered from a paralysis of the left side of
his body; that a few years prior to his death
his hearing became impaired and that he
lost the power of speech. Owing to the
paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to
one side, and saliva ran from his mouth.
He retained the use of his right hand,
however, and was able to write fairly well.
Through the medium of signs he was able
to indicate his wishes to his wife and to
other members of his family.
At the time of the execution of the will
there were present the four testamentary
witnesses, Agustin Paguio, Anacleto
Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney,
Seor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos.
Anacleto Paguio and the attorney have
since died, and consequently their
testimony was not available upon the trial
of the case in the lower court. The other
three testamentary witnesses and the
witness Florentino Ramos testified as to
the manner in which the will was executed.
According to the uncontroverted testimony
of these witnesses the will was executed in
the following manner:
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out
on pieces of paper notes and items
relating to the disposition of his property,
and these notes were in turn delivered to
Seor Marco, who transcribed them and
put them in form. The witnesses testify that
the pieces of paper upon which the notes
were written are delivered to attorney by
the testator; that the attorney read them to
the testator asking if they were his
testamentary dispositions; that the testator
assented each time with an affirmative
movement of his head; that after the will as
a whole had been thus written by the
attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the
presence of the testator and the witnesses;
that Seor Marco gave the document to
the testator; that the latter, after looking
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 50
over it, signed it in the presence of the four
subscribing witnesses; and that they in
turn signed it in the presence of the
testator and each other.
These are the facts of record with
reference to the execution of the will and
we are in perfect accord with the judgment
of the lower court that the formalities of the
Code of Civil Procedure have been fully
complied with.
This brings us now to a consideration of
appellants' second assignment of error,
viz, the testator's alleged mental incapacity
at the time of the execution of the will.
Upon this point considerable evidence was
adduced at the trial. One of the attesting
witnesses testified that at the time of the
execution of the will the testator was in his
right mind, and that although he was
seriously ill, he indicated by movements of
his head what his wishes were. Another of
the attesting witnesses stated that he was
not able to say whether decedent had the
full use of his mental faculties or not,
because he had been ill for some years,
and that he (the witnesses) was not a
physician. The other subscribing witness,
Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court
as a witness for the opponents. He was
unable to state whether or not the will was
the wish of the testator. The only reasons
he gave for his statement were the infirmity
and advanced age of the testator and the
fact that he was unable to speak. The
witness stated that the testator signed the
will, and he verified his own signature as a
subscribing witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an
attesting witness, stated that he was
present when the will was executed and
his testimony was cumulative in
corroboration of the manner in which the
will was executed and as to the fact that
the testator signed the will. This witness
also stated that he had frequently
transacted matters of business for the
decedent and had written letters and made
inventories of his property at his request,
and that immediately before and after the
execution of the will he had performed
offices of his character. He stated that the
decedent was able to communicate his
thoughts by writing. The testimony of this
witness clearly indicates the presence of
mental capacity on the part of the testator.
Among other witnesses for the opponents
were two physician, Doctor Basa and
Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he
had attended the testator some four or five
years prior to his death and that the latter
had suffered from a cerebral congestion
from which the paralysis resulted. The
following question was propounded to
Doctor Basa:
Q. Referring to mental condition in
which you found him the last time you
attended him, do you think he was in his
right mind?
A. I can not say exactly whether he
was in his right mind, but I noted some
mental disorder, because when I spoke to
him he did not answer me.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but
the substance of his testimony is that the
testator had suffered a paralysis and that
he had noticed some mental disorder. He
does not say that the testator was not in
his right mind at the time of the execution
of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion
that he was without the necessary mental
capacity to make a valid will. He did not
state in what way this mental disorder had
manifested itself other than that he had
noticed that the testator did not reply to
him on one occasion when he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have
never seen the testator, but his answer
was in reply to a hypothetical question as
to what be the mental condition of a
person who was 79 years old and who had
suffered from a malady such as the
testator was supposed to have had
according to the testimony of Doctor Basa,
whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard.
He replied and discussed at some length
the symptoms and consequences of the
decease from which the testator had
suffered; he read in support of his
statements from a work by a German
Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer,
however, to a direct question, he stated
that he would be unable to certify to the
mental condition of a person who was
suffering from such a disease.
We do not think that the testimony of these
two physicians in any way strengthens the
contention of the appellants. Their
testimony only confirms the fact that the
testator had been for a number of years
prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in
consequence of which his physician and
mental strength was greatly impaired.
Neither of them attempted to state what
was the mental condition of the testator at
the time he executed the will in question.
There can be no doubt that the testator's
infirmities were of a very serious character,
and it is quite evident that his mind was not
as active as it had been in the earlier years
of his life. However, we can not include
from this that he wanting in the necessary
mental capacity to dispose of his property
by will.
The courts have been called upon
frequently to nullify wills executed under
such circumstances, but the weight of the
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 51
authority is in support if the principle that it
is only when those seeking to overthrow
the will have clearly established the charge
of mental incapacity that the courts will
intervene to set aside a testamentary
document of this character. In the case
of Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil. Rep., 163),
the question of testamentary capacity was
discussed by this court. The numerous
citations there given from the decisions of
the United States courts are especially
applicable to the case at bar and have our
approval. In this jurisdiction the
presumption of law is in favor of the mental
capacity of the testator and the burden is
upon the contestants of the will to prove
the lack of testamentary capacity. (In the
matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil.
Rep., 463; in the matter of the will of
Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27;
Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep., 689.)
The rule of law relating to the presumption
of mental soundness is well established,
and the testator in the case at bar never
having been adjudged insane by a court of
competent jurisdiction, this presumption
continues, and it is therefore incumbent
upon the opponents to overcome this legal
presumption by proper evidence. This we
think they have failed to do. There are
many cases and authorities which we
might cite to show that the courts have
repeatedly held that mere weakness of
mind and body, induced by age and
disease do not render a person incapable
of making a will. The law does not require
that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical
and mental powers in order to execute a
valid will. If such were the legal standard,
few indeed would be the number of wills
that could meet such exacting
requirements. The authorities, both
medical and legal, are universal in
statement that the question of mental
capacity is one of degree, and that there
are many gradations from the highest
degree of mental soundness to the lowest
conditions of diseased mentality which are
denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The right to dispose of property by
testamentary disposition is as sacred as
any other right which a person may
exercise and this right should not be
nullified unless mental incapacity is
established in a positive and conclusive
manner. In discussing the question of
testamentary capacity, it is stated in
volume 28, 70, of the American and
English Encyclopedia of Law, that
Contrary to the very prevalent lay
impression, perfect soundness of mind is
not essential to testamentary capacity. A
testator may be afflicted with a variety of
mental weaknesses, disorders, or
peculiarities and still be capable in law of
executing a valid will. (See the numerous
cases there cited in support of this
statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity
is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section
365, and quoted with approval in Campbell
vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind,
it is not necessary that the mind shall be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease or otherwise, or
that the testator should be in the full
possession of his reasoning faculties.
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is
thus stated:
The question is not so much, that was the
degree of memory possessed by the
testator, as, had he a disposing memory?
Was he able to remember the property he
was about to bequeath, the manner of
disturbing it, and the objects of his bounty?
In a word, were his mind and memory
sufficiently sound to enable him to know
and understand the business in which he
was engaged at the time when he
executed his will. (See authorities there
cited.)
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the
following facts appeared upon the trial of
the case: The testator died at the age of
nearly 102 years. In his early years he was
an intelligent and well informed man.
About seven years prior to his death he
suffered a paralytic stroke and from that
time his mind and memory were mush
enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing
and in consequence of the shrinking of his
brain he was affected with senile cataract
causing total blindness. He became filthy
and obscene in his habits, although
formerly he was observant of the
properties of life. The court, in commenting
upon the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme
distress, nor debility of body will affect the
capacity to make a will, if sufficient
intelligence remains. The failure of
memory is not sufficient to create the
incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to
his immediate family or property. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Dougal (the testator) had lived over one
hundred years before he made the will,
and his physical and mental weakness and
defective memory were in striking contrast
with their strength in the meridian of his
life. He was blind; not deaf, but hearing
impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was
forgetful or recent events, especially of
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 52
names, and repeated questions in
conversation; and sometimes, when
aroused for sleep or slumber, would seem
bewildered. It is not singular that some of
those who had known him when he was
remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are
of the opinion that his reason was so far
gone that he was incapable of making a
will, although they never heard him utter
an irrational expression.
In the above case the will was sustained.
In the case at bar we might draw the same
contrast as was pictured by the court in the
case just quoted. The striking change in
the physical and mental vigor of the
testator during the last years of his life may
have led some of those who knew him in
his earlier days to entertain doubts as to
his mental capacity to make a will, yet we
think that the statements of the witnesses
to the execution of the will and statements
of the conduct of the testator at that time
all indicate that he unquestionably had
mental capacity and that he exercised it on
this occasion. At the time of the execution
of the will it does not appear that his
conduct was irrational in any particular. He
seems to have comprehended clearly what
the nature of the business was in which he
was engaged. The evidence show that the
writing and execution of the will occupied a
period several hours and that the testator
was present during all this time, taking an
active part in all the proceedings. Again,
the will in the case at bar is perfectly
reasonable and its dispositions are those
of a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order
probating the will should be and the same
is hereby affirmed, with costs of this
instance against the appellants.
Baltazar vs Laxa
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the
probate of a will to clearly establish that
the decedent was not of sound and
disposing mind at the time of the execution
of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-
bound to give full effect to the wishes of
the testator to distribute his estate in the
manner provided in his will so long as it is
legally tenable.[1]
Before us is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari[2] of the June 15, 2006
Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the
September 30, 2003 Decision[4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52,
Guagua, Pampanga in Special
Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA
Decision granted the petition for probate of
the notarial will of Paciencia Regala
(Paciencia), to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
finding the appeal to be impressed with
merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-
1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby
SET ASIDE and a new one entered
GRANTING the petition for the probate of
the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Also assailed herein is the August 31,
2006 CA Resolution[6] which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration thereto.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CAs
assailed Decision and instead affirm the
Decision of the RTC which disallowed the
notarial will of Paciencia.
Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when
she made her last will and testament
entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento
Miss Paciencia Regala[7] (Will) in the
Pampango dialect on September 13,
1981. The Will, executed in the house of
retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge
Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After
which, Paciencia expressed in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses
that the document is her last will and
testament. She thereafter affixed her
signature at the end of the said document
on page 3[8] and then on the left margin of
pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.[9]
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria
Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco
Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R.
Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to
the Wills due execution by affixing their
signatures below its attestation
clause[10] and on the left margin of pages
1, 2 and 4 thereof,[11] in the presence of
Paciencia and of one another and of Judge
Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or
sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa
(Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa
and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and
Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
xxxx
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable
services to me since then up to the present
by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and
CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby
BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my
properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5
unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 53
CORAZON F. LAXA and their children,
LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE
LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa
and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age,
Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta.
Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their
children, LUNA LORELLA and
KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still
not of legal age and living with their
parents who would decide to bequeath
since they are the children of the spouses;
xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine
may be discovered aside from the
properties mentioned in this last will and
testament, I am also bequeathing and
giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R.
Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two
children and I also command them to offer
masses yearly for the repose of my soul
and that of D[]a Nicomeda Regala,
Epifania Regala and their spouses and
with respect to the fishpond situated at
San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill
the wishes of D[]a Nicomeda Regala in
accordance with her testament as stated in
my testament. x x x[12]
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with
Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is
Paciencias nephew whom she treated as
her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to
know and treated Paciencia as his own
mother.[13]Paciencia lived with Lorenzos
family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was
she who raised and cared for Lorenzo
since his birth. Six days after the execution
of the Will or on September 19, 1981,
Paciencia left for the United States of
America (USA). There, she resided with
Lorenzo and his family until her death on
January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the
custody of Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of
Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo
filed a petition[14] with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of
Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters
of Administration in his favor, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
There being no opposition to the petition
after its due publication, the RTC issued
an Order on June 13, 2000[15] allowing
Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22,
2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified
that she was one of the instrumental
witnesses in the execution of the last will
and testament of Paciencia on September
13, 1981.[16] The Will was executed in her
fathers (Judge Limpin) home office, in her
presence and of two other witnesses,
Francisco and Faustino.[17] Dra. Limpin
positively identified the Will and her
signatures on all its four pages.[18]She
likewise positively identified the signature
of her father appearing
thereon.[19] Questioned by the prosecutor
regarding Judge Limpins present mental
fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father
had a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo
brain surgery.[20] The judge can walk but
can no longer talk and remember her
name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated
that her father can no longer testify in
court.[21]
The following day or on June 23, 2000,
petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed
an opposition[22] to Lorenzos
petition. Antonio averred that the
properties subject of Paciencias Will
belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan,
his predecessor-in-interest; hence,
Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to
Lorenzo.[23]
Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000,
Antonio, now joined by petitioners
Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr.,
Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael
Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio
L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental
Opposition[24] contending that Paciencias
Will was null and void because ownership
of the properties had not been transferred
and/or titled to Paciencia before her death
pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of
the Civil Code.[25] Petitioners also opposed
the issuance of Letters of Administration in
Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo was
disqualified to be appointed as such, he
being a citizen and resident of
the USA.[26] Petitioners prayed that Letters
of Administration be instead issued in favor
of Antonio.[27]
Later still on September 26, 2000,
petitioners filed an Amended
Opposition[28] asking the RTC to deny the
probate of Paciencias Will on the following
grounds: the Will was not executed and
attested to in accordance with the
requirements of the law; that Paciencia
was mentally incapable to make a Will at
the time of its execution; that she was
forced to execute the Will under duress or
influence of fear or threats; that the
execution of the Will had been procured by
undue and improper pressure and
influence by Lorenzo or by some other
persons for his benefit; that the signature
of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that
assuming the signature to be genuine, it
was obtained through fraud or trickery;
and, that Paciencia did not intend the
document to be her Will. Simultaneously,
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 54
petitioners filed an Opposition and
Recommendation[29] reiterating their
opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo
as administrator of the properties and
requesting for the appointment of Antonio
in his stead.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an
Order[30] denying the requests of both
Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed
administrator since the former is a citizen
and resident of the USA while the latters
claim as a co-owner of the properties
subject of the Will has not yet been
established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for
the probate of the Will continued. Dra.
Limpin was recalled for cross-examination
by the petitioners. She testified as to the
age of her father at the time the latter
notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living
arrangements of Paciencia at the time of
the execution of the Will; and the lack of
photographs when the event took place. [31]
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo
and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took
the witness stand. Monico, son of
Faustino, testified on his fathers
condition. According to him his father can
no longer talk and express himself due to
brain damage. A medical certificate was
presented to the court to support this
allegation. [32]
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from
1944 until his departure for the USA in
April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan,
Pampanga with his family and his aunt,
Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the
USA and lived with him and his family until
her death in January 1996; the relationship
between him and Paciencia was like that
of a mother and child since Paciencia took
care of him since birth and took him in as
an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster
without children, and without brothers and
sisters; at the time of Paciencias death,
she did not suffer from any mental disorder
and was of sound mind, was not blind,
deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of
Judge Limpin and was only given to him
after Paciencias death through Faustino;
and he was already residing in the USA
when the Will was executed.[33] Lorenzo
positively identified the signature of
Paciencia in three different documents and
in the Will itself and stated that he was
familiar with Paciencias signature because
he accompanied her in her
transactions.[34] Further, Lorenzo belied
and denied having used force, intimidation,
violence, coercion or trickery upon
Paciencia to execute the Will as he was
not in the Philippines when the same was
executed.[35] On cross-examination,
Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed
him about the Will shortly after her arrival
in the USA but that he saw a copy of the
Will only after her death.[36]
As to Francisco, he could no longer be
presented in court as he already died on
May 21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her
mother and Paciencia were first
cousins.[37] She claimed to have helped in
the household chores in the house of
Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay
therein from morning until evening and that
during the period of her service in the said
household, Lorenzos wife and his children
were staying in the same house.[38] She
served in the said household from 1980
until Paciencias departure for the USA on
September 19, 1981.[39]
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed
that she saw Faustino bring something for
Paciencia to sign at the latters
house.[40] Rosie admitted, though, that she
did not see what that something was as
same was placed inside an
envelope.[41] However, she remembered
Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look
for money before she signs them.[42] A few
days after or on September 16, 1981,
Paciencia went to the house of Antonios
mother and brought with her the said
envelope.[43] Upon going home, however,
the envelope was no longer with
Paciencia.[44] Rosie further testified that
Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or
forgetful because she would sometimes
leave her wallet in the kitchen then start
looking for it moments later.[45] On cross
examination, it was established that Rosie
was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that
her conclusion that Paciencia
was magulyan was based on her personal
assessment,[46] and that it was Antonio
who requested her to testify in court.[47]
In his direct examination, Antonio stated
that Paciencia was his aunt.[48] He
identified the Will and testified that he had
seen the said document before because
Paciencia brought the same to his mothers
house and showed it to him along with
another document on September 16,
1981.[49] Antonio alleged that when the
documents were shown to him, the same
were still unsigned.[50] According to him,
Paciencia thought that the documents
pertained to a lease of one of her rice
lands,[51] and it was he who explained that
the documents were actually a special
power of attorney to lease and sell her
fishpond and other properties upon her
departure for the USA, and a Will which
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 55
would transfer her properties to Lorenzo
and his family upon her death.[52] Upon
hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered
the following words: Why will I never
[return], why will I sell all my
properties? Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only
[son] of God? I have other relatives [who
should] benefit from my properties. Why
should I die already?[53]Thereafter, Antonio
advised Paciencia not to sign the
documents if she does not want to, to
which the latter purportedly replied, I know
nothing about those, throw them away or it
is up to you. The more I will not sign
them.[54] After which, Paciencia left the
documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the
unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to
Faustino on September 18, 1981.[55]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 30, 2003, the RTC
rendered its Decision[56] denying the
petition thus:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a)
denies the petition dated April 24, 2000;
and (b) disallows the notarized will dated
September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.[57]
The trial court gave considerable weight to
the testimony of Rosie and concluded that
at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she
was no longer possessed of sufficient
reason or strength of mind to have
testamentary capacity.[58]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC
Decision and granted the probate of the
Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did
not agree with the RTCs conclusion that
Paciencia was of unsound mind when she
executed the Will. It ratiocinated that the
state of being magulyan does not make a
person mentally unsound so [as] to render
[Paciencia] unfit for executing a Section
Will.[59] Moreover, the oppositors in the
probate proceedings were not able to
overcome the presumption that every
person is of sound mind. Further, no
concrete circumstances or events were
given to prove the allegation that Paciencia
was tricked or forced into signing the
Will.[60]
Petitioners moved for
reconsideration[61] but the motion was
denied by the CA in its Resolution[62] dated
August 31, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners come before this Court by way
of Petition for Review
on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the
following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF
PACIENCIAS WILL DESPITE
RESPONDENTS UTTER FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76
OF THE RULES OF COURT;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING
CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE
THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND
MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS
ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED[63]
The pivotal issue is whether the
authenticity and due execution of the
notarial Will was sufficiently established to
warrant its allowance for probate.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
Faithful compliance with the formalities
laid down by law is apparent from the face
of the Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing
more than the extrinsic validity of a
Will in probate proceedings.[64] This is
expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section
1 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Rule 75
PRODUCTION OF WILL. ALLOWANCE
OF WILL NECESSARY.
1. Allowance necessary.
Conclusive as to execution. No will shall
pass either real or personal estate unless it
is proved and allowed in the proper court.
Subject to the right of appeal, such
allowance of the will shall be conclusive as
to its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic
validity pertains to whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law.[65] These formalities are
enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 56

Art. 805. Every will, other than a
holographic will, must be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one
another.
The testator or the person requested by
him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof,
except the last, on the left margin, and all
the pages shall be numbered correlatively
in letters placed on the upper part of each
page.
The attestation shall state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some
other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language
not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. The notary public shall not
be required to retain a copy of the will, or
file another with the Office of the Clerk of
Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of
the Will shows faithful compliance with the
formalities laid down by law. The
signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her
instrumental witnesses and the notary
public, are all present and evident on the
Will. Further, the attestation clause
explicitly states the critical requirement that
the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses signed the Will in the presence
of one another and that the witnesses
attested and subscribed to the Will in the
presence of the testator and of one
another. In fact, even the petitioners
acceded that the signature of Paciencia in
the Will may be authentic although they
question her state of mind when she
signed the same as well as the voluntary
nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of
unsound mind at the time of the execution
of the will lies on the shoulders of the
petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie,
claim that Paciencia was magulyan or
forgetful so much so that it effectively
stripped her of testamentary capacity.
They likewise claimed in their Motion for
Reconsideration[66] filed with the CA that
Paciencia was not only magulyan but was
actually suffering from paranoia.[67]
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that
the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally
unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a Will.[68] Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound
mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil
Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not
necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or
that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able
at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of
Rosie pertaining to Paciencias
forgetfulness, there is no substantial
evidence, medical or otherwise, that would
show that Paciencia was of unsound mind
at the time of the execution of the Will. On
the other hand, we find more worthy of
credence Dra. Limpins testimony as to the
soundness of mind of Paciencia when the
latter went to Judge Limpins house and
voluntarily executed the Will. The
testimony of subscribing witnesses to a
Will concerning the testators mental
condition is entitled to great weight where
they are truthful and intelligent.[69] More
importantly, a testator is presumed to be of
sound mind at the time of the execution of
the Will and the burden to prove otherwise
lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the
New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every
person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was
not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes
the probate of the will; but if the testator,
one month, or less, before making his will
was publicly known to be insane, the
person who maintains the validity of the
will must prove that the testator made it
during a lucid interval.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 57
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia
was publicly known to be insane one
month or less before the making of the
Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that
Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon
the shoulders of petitioners. However and
as earlier mentioned, no substantial
evidence was presented by them to prove
the same, thereby warranting the CAs
finding that petitioners failed to discharge
such burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that
Paciencia was aware of the nature of her
estate to be disposed of, the proper
objects of her bounty and the character of
the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out
by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that
[Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the
document she executed. She specially
requested that the customs of her faith be
observed upon her death. She was well
aware of how she acquired the properties
from her parents and the properties she is
bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife
CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A
third child was born after the execution of
the will and was not included therein as
devisee.[70]
Bare allegations of duress or influence of
fear or threats, undue and improper
influence and pressure, fraud and trickery
cannot be used as basis to deny the
probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the
Will is the willingness of the testator or
testatrix to execute the document that will
distribute his/her earthly possessions upon
his/her death. Petitioners claim that
Paciencia was forced to execute the Will
under duress or influence of fear or
threats; that the execution of the Will had
been procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by
some other persons for his benefit; and
that assuming Paciencias signature to be
genuine, it was obtained through fraud or
trickery. These are grounded on the
alleged conversation between Paciencia
and Antonio on September 16, 1981
wherein the former purportedly repudiated
the Will and left it unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted
fact that Paciencia loved and treated
Lorenzo as her own son and that love
even extended to Lorenzos wife and
children. This kind of relationship is not
unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our
culture for old maids or spinsters to care
for and raise their nephews and nieces
and treat them as their own children. Such
is a prevalent and accepted cultural
practice that has resulted in many family
discords between those favored by the
testamentary disposition of a testator and
those who stand to benefit in case of
intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the
acknowledged fact that Paciencias
relationship with Lorenzo and his family is
different from her relationship with
petitioners. The very fact that she cared for
and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both
here and abroad, even if the latter was
already married and already has children,
highlights the special bond between them.
This unquestioned relationship between
Paciencia and the devisees tends to
support the authenticity of the said
document as against petitioners
allegations of duress, influence of fear or
threats, undue and improper influence,
pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside
from being factual in nature, are not
supported by concrete, substantial and
credible evidence on record. It is worth
stressing that bare arguments, no matter
how forceful, if not based on concrete and
substantial evidence cannot suffice to
move the Court to uphold said
allegations.[71]Furthermore, a purported will
is not [to be] denied legalization on
dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very
institution of testamentary succession will
be shaken to its foundation, for even if a
will has been duly executed in fact,
whether x x x it will be probated would
have to depend largely on the attitude of
those interested in [the estate of the
deceased].[72]
Court should be convinced by the
evidence presented before it that the Will
was duly executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of
Paciencias Will on the ground that Section
11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was
not complied with. It provides:
RULE 76
ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF
WILL
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses
produced or accounted for where will
contested. If the will is contested, all the
subscribing witnesses, and the notary in
the case of wills executed under the Civil
Code of the Philippines, if present in the
Philippines and not insane, must be
produced and examined, and the death,
absence, or insanity of any of them must
be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or
some of such witnesses are present in
the Philippines but outside the province
where the will has been filed, their
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 58
deposition must be taken. If any or all of
them testify against the due execution of
the will, or do not remember having
attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful
credibility, the will may nevertheless, be
allowed if the court is satisfied from the
testimony of other witnesses and from all
the evidence presented that the will was
executed and attested in the manner
required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same
shall be allowed if at least three (3)
witnesses who know the handwriting of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator; in the absence of any competent
witnesses, and if the court deem it
necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses
and the notary public should have been
presented in court since all but one
witness, Francisco, are still living.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
We note that the inability of Faustino and
Judge Limpin to appear and testify before
the court was satisfactorily
explained during the probate proceedings.
As testified to by his son, Faustino had a
heart attack, was already bedridden and
could no longer talk and express himself
due to brain damage. To prove this, said
witness presented the corresponding
medical certificate. For her part, Dra.
Limpin testified that her father, Judge
Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had
to undergo brain surgery. At that time,
Judge Limpin could no longer talk and
could not even remember his daughters
name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given
such condition, her father could no longer
testify. It is well to note that at that point,
despite ample opportunity, petitioners
neither interposed any objections to the
testimonies of said witnesses nor
challenged the same on cross
examination. We thus hold that for all
intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to
satisfactorily account for the incapacity and
failure of the said subscribing witness and
of the notary public to testify in
court. Because of this the probate of
Paciencias Will may be allowed on the
basis of Dra. Limpins testimony proving
her sanity and the due execution of the
Will, as well as on the proof of her
handwriting. It is an established rule that
[a] testament may not be disallowed just
because the attesting witnesses declare
against its due execution; neither does it
have to be necessarily allowed just
because all the attesting witnesses declare
in favor of its legalization; what is decisive
is that the court is convinced by evidence
before it, not necessarily from the attesting
witnesses, although they must testify, that
the will was or was not duly executed in
the manner required by law.[73]
Moreover, it bears stressing that
[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of
the parties as regards the authenticity and
due execution of the will x x x in question,
it is the mandate of the law that it is the
evidence before the court and/or [evidence
that] ought to be before it that is
controlling.[74] The very existence of [the
Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the
supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her]
estate be distributed in the manner therein
provided, and it is incumbent upon the
state that, if legally tenable, such desire be
given full effect independent of the attitude
of the parties affected thereby.[75] This,
coupled with Lorenzos established
relationship with Paciencia, the evidence
and the testimonies of disinterested
witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of
evidence presented by petitioners apart
from their self-serving testimonies,
constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of
the authenticity of the Will and its
allowance for probate.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15,
2006 and the Resolution dated August 31,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
BALTAZAR vs. LAXA | G.R. No. 174489 |
April 11, 2012 | Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster
when she made her last will and testament
in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13,
1981. The will, executed in the house of
retired Judge Limpin, was read to
Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia
expressed in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses that the document
is her last will and testament. She
thereafter affixed her signature at the end
of the said document on page 3 and then
on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or
sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa
and his wife Corazon Laza and their
children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is
Paciencias nephew whom she treated as
her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to
know and treated Paciencia as his own
mother.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 59
Six days after the execution of the Will
(Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA.
There, she resided with Lorenzo and his
family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In
the interim, the Will remained in the
custody of Judge Limpin.
More than 4 years after the death of
Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo
filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of
Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters
of Administration in his favor.
On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners,
Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to
Lorenzos petition. Antonio averred that the
properties subject of Paciencias Will
belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his
predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia
had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie Mateo
testified that Paciencia is in the state of
being mangulyan or forgetful making her
unfit for executing a will and that the
execution of the will had been procured by
undue and improper pressure and
influence.
Petitioners also opposed the issuance of
the Letters of Administration in Lorenzos
favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified
to be appointed as such, he being a citizen
and resident of the USA. Petitioners
prayed that Letters of Administration be
instead issued in favor of Antonio.
RTC denies the petition for probate of the
will and concluded that when Paciencia
signed the will, she was no longer
possessed of the sufficient reason or
strength of mind to have the testamentary
capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the
decision of the RTC and granted the
probate of the will. The petitioner went up
to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due
execution of the will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for
probate.
HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the
face of the Will shows faithful compliance
with the formalities laid down by law. The
signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her
instrumental witnesses and the notary
public, are all present and evident on the
Will. Further, the attestation clause
explicitly states the critical requirement that
the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses attested and subscribed to the
Will in the presence of the testator and of
one another. In fact, even the petitioners
acceded that the signature of Paciencia in
the Will may be authentic although they
question of her state of mind when she
signed the same as well as the voluntary
nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of
unsound mind at the time of the execution
of the will lies on the shoulders of the
petitioners. The SC agree with the position
of the CA that the state of being forgetful
does not necessarily make a person
mentally unsound so as to render him unfit
to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind.
Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states: To
be of unsound mind, it is not necessary
that the testator be in full possession of all
his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease, injury or other
cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator
was able at the time of making the Will to
know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.
G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006
FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA
CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G.
CASTILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The core of this petition is a highly
defective notarial will, purportedly
executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent),
who died on 16 December 1982 at the age
of 80. In refusing to give legal recognition
to the due execution of this document, the
Court is provided the opportunity to assert
a few important doctrinal rules in the
execution of notarial wills, all self-evident
in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil
Code.
A will whose attestation clause does
not contain the number of pages on
which the will is written is fatally
defective. A will whose attestation
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 60
clause is not signed by the instrumental
witnesses is fatally defective. And
perhaps most importantly, a will which
does not contain an acknowledgment,
but a mere jurat, is fatally defective.
Any one of these defects is sufficient to
deny probate. A notarial will with all
three defects is just aching for judicial
rejection.
There is a distinct and consequential
reason the Civil Code provides a
comprehensive catalog of imperatives for
the proper execution of a notarial will. Full
and faithful compliance with all the detailed
requisites under Article 805 of the Code
leave little room for doubt as to the validity
in the due execution of the notarial will.
Article 806 likewise imposes another
safeguard to the validity of notarial wills
that they be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. A
notarial will executed with indifference to
these two codal provisions opens itself to
nagging questions as to its legitimacy.
The case stems from a petition for probate
filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition
filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to
admit to probate the notarial will of
Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on
10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the
cousin of the decedent.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and
written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in
full:
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E.
IGSOLO
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa
500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila,
pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa
hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria
ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling
habilin at testamento, at binabali wala ko
lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o
testamento:
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa
Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-
ayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng
simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat
(Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng
bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng
aking pamilya at kaibigan;
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at
isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking
pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang
nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon,
yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote
numero 28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa
Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din
ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan sa
bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote,
numero 43, Block 24 na pag-aari ng
Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob
kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa
bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St.,
Lot 42, Block 24, Sampaloc, Manila kay
Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito
ay walang pasubalit at kondiciones;
Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART
PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling
habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi
na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng
piyansiya.
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito
dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.
(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
(Tagapagmana)
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____
dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na
ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo,
tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling
Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay
nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa
ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon,
sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at
kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa
harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa
harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa
ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon
ng kasulatan ito.
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-
37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-
458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 61
LAMBERTO C. LEAO
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona,
Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981
JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko
ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa
Lungsod ng Maynila.
(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81
The three named witnesses to the will
affixed their signatures on the left-hand
margin of both pages of the will, but not at
the bottom of the attestation clause.
The probate petition adverted to only two
(2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the
decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and
one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to
have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed
that the will be allowed, and that letters
testamentary be issued to the designated
executor, Vart Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida
Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who
represented herself as the attorney-in-fact
of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the
decedent.2 Geralda Castillo claimed that
the will is a forgery, and that the true
purpose of its emergence was so it could
be utilized as a defense in several court
cases filed by oppositor against petitioner,
particularly for forcible entry and
usurpation of real property, all centering on
petitioners right to occupy the properties
of the decedent.3 It also asserted that
contrary to the representations of
petitioner, the decedent was actually
survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her
grandchildren, who were then residing
abroad. Per records, it was subsequently
alleged that decedent was the widow of
Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965,4 and
the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion
E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by
three (3) months.5
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued
that the will was not executed and attested
to in accordance with law. She pointed out
that decedents signature did not appear
on the second page of the will, and the will
was not properly acknowledged. These
twin arguments are among the central
matters to this petition.
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to
probate, in an Order dated 10 August
1992.6 The RTC favorably took into
account the testimony of the three (3)
witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava,
Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The
RTC also called to fore "the modern
tendency in respect to the formalities in the
execution of a will x x x with the end in
view of giving the testator more freedom in
expressing his last wishes;"7 and from this
perspective, rebutted oppositors
arguments that the will was not properly
executed and attested to in accordance
with law.
After a careful examination of the will and
consideration of the testimonies of the
subscribing and attesting witnesses, and
having in mind the modern tendency in
respect to the formalities in the execution
of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the
interpretation of the law on the formal
requirements of a will with the end in view
of giving the testator more freedom in
expressing his last wishes, this Court is
persuaded to rule that the will in question
is authentic and had been executed by the
testatrix in accordance with law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement,
this Court has noted that at the end of the
will after the signature of the testatrix, the
following statement is made under the sub-
title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi":
"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____
dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na
ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N. Igsolo,
tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling
Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981,
ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana
sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon,
sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at
kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa
harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa
harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa
ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon
ng kasulatan ito."
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 62
The aforequoted declaration comprises the
attestation clause and the
acknowledgement and is considered by
this Court as a substantial compliance with
the requirements of the law.
On the oppositors contention that the
attestation clause was not signed by the
subscribing witnesses at the bottom
thereof, this Court is of the view that the
signing by the subscribing witnesses on
the left margin of the second page of the
will containing the attestation clause and
acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom
thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose
of identification and attestation of the will.
With regard to the oppositors argument
that the will was not numbered
correlatively in letters placed on upper part
of each page and that the attestation did
not state the number of pages thereof, it is
worthy to note that the will is composed of
only two pages. The first page contains the
entire text of the testamentary dispositions,
and the second page contains the last
portion of the attestation clause and
acknowledgement. Such being so, the
defects are not of a serious nature as to
invalidate the will. For the same reason,
the failure of the testatrix to affix her
signature on the left margin of the second
page, which contains only the last portion
of the attestation clause and
acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositors assertion that
the signature of the testatrix on the will is a
forgery, the testimonies of the three
subscribing witnesses to the will are
convincing enough to establish the
genuineness of the signature of the
testatrix and the due execution of the will.8
The Order was appealed to the Court of
Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had
substituted his since deceased mother-in-
law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated
17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of the petition for probate.9 The
Court of Appeals noted that the attestation
clause failed to state the number of pages
used in the will, thus rendering the will void
and undeserving of probate.10
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues that the requirement
under Article 805 of the Civil Code that
"the number of pages used in a notarial will
be stated in the attestation clause" is
merely directory, rather than mandatory,
and thus susceptible to what he termed as
"the substantial compliance rule."11
The solution to this case calls for the
application of Articles 805 and 806 of the
Civil Code, which we replicate in full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a
holographic will, must be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one
another.
The testator or the person requested by
him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof,
except the last, on the left margin, and all
the pages shall be numbered correlatively
in letters placed on the upper part of each
page.
The attestation shall state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some
other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language
not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. The notary public shall not
be required to retain a copy of the will, or
file another with the office of the Clerk of
Court.
The appellate court, in its Decision,
considered only one defect, the failure of
the attestation clause to state the number
of pages of the will. But an examination of
the will itself reveals several more
deficiencies.
As admitted by petitioner himself, the
attestation clause fails to state the number
of pages of the will.12 There was an
incomplete attempt to comply with this
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 63
requisite, a space having been allotted for
the insertion of the number of pages in the
attestation clause. Yet the blank was never
filled in; hence, the requisite was left
uncomplied with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this
defect in reversing the trial court, citing in
the process Uy Coque v. Navas L.
Sioca13 and In re: Will of Andrada.14 In Uy
Coque, the Court noted that among the
defects of the will in question was the
failure of the attestation clause to state the
number of pages contained in the will.15 In
ruling that the will could not be admitted to
probate, the Court made the following
consideration which remains highly
relevant to this day: "The purpose of
requiring the number of sheets to be stated
in the attestation clause is obvious; the
document might easily be so prepared
that the removal of a sheet would
completely change the testamentary
dispositions of the will and in the
absence of a statement of the total
number of sheets such removal might
be effected by taking out the sheet and
changing the numbers at the top of the
following sheets or pages. If, on the
other hand, the total number of sheets is
stated in the attestation clause the
falsification of the document will involve
the inserting of new pages and the forging
of the signatures of the testator and
witnesses in the margin, a matter attended
with much greater difficulty."16
The case of In re Will of
Andrada concerned a will the attestation
clause of which failed to state the number
of sheets or pages used. This
consideration alone was sufficient for the
Court to declare "unanim[ity] upon the
point that the defect pointed out in the
attesting clause is fatal."17 It was further
observed that "it cannot be denied that the
x x x requirement affords additional
security against the danger that the will
may be tampered with; and as the
Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this
requirement, it must be considered
material."18
Against these cited cases, petitioner
cites Singson v. Florentino19 and Taboada
v. Hon. Rosal,20 wherein the Court allowed
probate to the wills concerned therein
despite the fact that the attestation clause
did not state the number of pages of the
will. Yet the appellate court itself
considered the import of these two cases,
and made the following distinction which
petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we
adopt with approval:
Even a cursory examination of the Will
(Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the
attestation does not state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written.
Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of
probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of
the Supreme Court in "Manuel Singson
versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil.
161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon.
Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195," to
the effect that a will may still be valid even
if the attestation does not contain the
number of pages used upon which the Will
is written. However, the Decisions of the
Supreme Court are not applicable in the
aforementioned appeal at bench. This is
so because, in the case of "Manuel
Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al.,
supra," although the attestation in the
subject Will did not state the number of
pages used in the will, however, the same
was found in the last part of the body of
the Will:
"x x x
The law referred to is article 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by
Act No. 2645, which requires that the
attestation clause shall state the number of
pages or sheets upon which the will is
written, which requirement has been held
to be mandatory as an effective safeguard
against the possibility of interpolation or
omission of some of the pages of the will
to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the
property is intended to be bequeathed (In
re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque
vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban
vs. Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata,
54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66
Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these
cases seems to be that the attestation
clause must contain a statement of the
number of sheets or pages composing the
will and that if this is missing or is omitted,
it will have the effect of invalidating the will
if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by
evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or
examination of the will itself. But here the
situation is different. While the attestation
clause does not state the number of
sheets or pages upon which the will is
written, however, the last part of the body
of the will contains a statement that it is
composed of eight pages, which
circumstance in our opinion takes this case
out of the rigid rule of construction and
places it within the realm of similar cases
where a broad and more liberal view has
been adopted to prevent the will of the
testator from being defeated by purely
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 64
technical considerations." (page 165-165,
supra) (Underscoring supplied)
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino
Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial
acknowledgement in the Will states the
number of pages used in the:
"x x x
We have examined the will in question and
noticed that the attestation clause failed to
state the number of pages used in writing
the will. This would have been a fatal
defect were it not for the fact that, in this
case, it is discernible from the entire will
that it is really and actually composed of
only two pages duly signed by the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier
stated, the first page which contains the
entirety of the testamentary dispositions is
signed by the testatrix at the end or at the
bottom while the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin. The other page
which is marked as "Pagina dos"
comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment
itself states that "this Last Will and
Testament consists of two pages including
this page" (pages 200-201, supra)
(Underscoring supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the
number of pages used in the will is not
stated in any part of the Will. The will does
not even contain any notarial
acknowledgment wherein the number of
pages of the will should be stated.21
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided
prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in
1950, at a time when the statutory
provision governing the formal requirement
of wills was Section
618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases
remains apropos, considering that the
requirement that the attestation state the
number of pages of the will is extant from
Section 618.23 However, the enactment of
the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a
rule of interpretation of the requirements of
wills, at least insofar as the attestation
clause is concerned, that may vary from
the philosophy that governed these two
cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states:
"In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or
fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the
form of attestation or in the language used
therein shall not render the will invalid if it
is proved that the will was in fact executed
and attested in substantial compliance with
all the requirements of article 805."
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report
of the Civil Code Commission, which
stated that "the underlying and
fundamental objective permeating the
provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this
project consists in the [liberalization] of the
manner of their execution with the end in
view of giving the testator more [freedom]
in [expressing] his last wishes. This
objective is in accord with the [modern
tendency] in respect to the formalities in
the execution of wills."24 However,
petitioner conveniently omits the
qualification offered by the Code
Commission in the very same paragraph
he cites from their report, that such
liberalization be "but with sufficient
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of
undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the testator."25
Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an
extensive discussion made by Justice
Regalado, speaking for the Court on the
conflicting views on the manner of
interpretation of the legal formalities
required in the execution of the attestation
clause in wills.27 Uy
Coque and Andrada are cited therein,
along with several other cases, as
examples of the application of the rule of
strict construction.28 However, the Code
Commission opted to recommend a more
liberal construction through the "substantial
compliance rule" under Article 809. A
cautionary note was struck though by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809
should be applied:
x x x The rule must be limited to
disregarding those defects that can be
supplied by an examination of the will
itself: whether all the pages are
consecutively numbered; whether the
signatures appear in each and every page;
whether the subscribing witnesses are
three or the will was notarized. All these
are facts that the will itself can reveal, and
defects or even omissions concerning
them in the attestation clause can be
safely disregarded. But the total number
of pages, and whether all persons
required to sign did so in the presence
of each other must substantially appear
in the attestation clause, being the only
check against perjury in the probate
proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 65
The Court of Appeals did cite these
comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its
assailed decision, considering that the
failure to state the number of pages of the
will in the attestation clause is one of the
defects which cannot be simply
disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court
refused to allow the probate of a will
whose attestation clause failed to state
that the witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the
presence of the testator and of each
other,30 the other omission cited by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation
cannot be lightly disregarded.
Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be
stated that the rule, as it now stands, is
that omission which can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the
need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will
not be fatal and, correspondingly, would
not obstruct the allowance to probate of
the will being assailed. However, those
omissions which cannot be supplied
except by evidence aliunde would result in
the invalidation of the attestation clause
and ultimately, of the will itself."31 Thus, a
failure by the attestation clause to state
that the testator signed every page can be
liberally construed, since that fact can be
checked by a visual examination; while a
failure by the attestation clause to state
that the witnesses signed in one anothers
presence should be considered a fatal flaw
since the attestation is the only textual
guarantee of compliance.32
The failure of the attestation clause to
state the number of pages on which the
will was written remains a fatal flaw,
despite Article 809. The purpose of the law
in requiring the clause to state the number
of pages on which the will is written is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and
to prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages.33 The failure to state the number of
pages equates with the absence of an
averment on the part of the instrumental
witnesses as to how many pages
consisted the will, the execution of which
they had ostensibly just witnessed and
subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is
substantial compliance with this
requirement if the will states elsewhere in it
how many pages it is comprised of, as was
the situation in Singson and Taboada.
However, in this case, there could have
been no substantial compliance with the
requirements under Article 805 since there
is no statement in the attestation clause or
anywhere in the will itself as to the number
of pages which comprise the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not
deviate from the need to comply with the
formal requirements as enumerated under
Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of
the members of the Code Commission in
incorporating Article 805, the fact remains
that they saw fit to prescribe substantially
the same formal requisites as enumerated
in Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, convinced that these remained
effective safeguards against the forgery or
intercalation of notarial wills.34 Compliance
with these requirements, however
picayune in impression, affords the public
a high degree of comfort that the testator
himself or herself had decided to convey
property post mortem in the manner
established in the will.35 The transcendent
legislative intent, even as expressed in
the cited comments of the Code
Commission, is for the fruition of the
testators incontestable desires, and
not for the indulgent admission of wills
to probate.
The Court could thus end here and affirm
the Court of Appeals. However, an
examination of the will itself reveals a
couple of even more critical defects that
should necessarily lead to its rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not
signed by the instrumental
witnesses. While the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses appear on the left-
hand margin of the will, they do not appear
at the bottom of the attestation clause
which after all consists of their averments
before the notary public.
Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point.
As in this case, "the signatures of the three
witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although
the page containing the same is signed by
the witnesses on the left-hand
margin."37 While three (3)
Justices38 considered the signature
requirement had been substantially
complied with, a majority of six (6),
speaking through Chief Justice Paras,
ruled that the attestation clause had not
been duly signed, rendering the will fatally
defective.
There is no question that the signatures of
the three witnesses to the will do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation
clause, although the page containing the
same is signed by the witnesses on the
left-hand margin.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 66
We are of the opinion that the position
taken by the appellant is correct. The
attestation clause is "a memorandum of
the facts attending the execution of the
will" required by law to be made by the
attesting witnesses, and it must
necessarily bear their signatures. An
unsigned attestation clause cannot be
considered as an act of the witnesses,
since the omission of their signatures at
the bottom thereof negatives their
participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that
signatures of the three witnesses on the
left-hand margin conform substantially to
the law and may be deemed as their
signatures to the attestation clause. This is
untenable, because said signatures are in
compliance with the legal mandate that the
will be signed on the left-hand margin of all
its pages. If an attestation clause not
signed by the three witnesses at the
bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it
would be easy to add such clause to a will
on a subsequent occasion and in the
absence of the testator and any or all of
the witnesses.39
The Court today reiterates the continued
efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly
segregates the requirement that the
instrumental witnesses sign each page of
the will, from the requisite that the will be
"attested and subscribed by [the
instrumental witnesses]." The respective
intents behind these two classes of
signature are distinct from each other. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every
page signify, among others, that the
witnesses are aware that the page they
are signing forms part of the will. On the
other hand, the signatures to the
attestation clause establish that the
witnesses are referring to the statements
contained in the attestation clause itself.
Indeed, the attestation clause is separate
and apart from the disposition of the will.
An unsigned attestation clause results in
an unattested will. Even if the instrumental
witnesses signed the left-hand margin of
the page containing the unsigned
attestation clause, such signatures cannot
demonstrate these witnesses
undertakings in the clause, since the
signatures that do appear on the page
were directed towards a wholly different
avowal.
The Court may be more charitably
disposed had the witnesses in this case
signed the attestation clause itself, but not
the left-hand margin of the page containing
such clause. Without diminishing the value
of the instrumental witnesses signatures
on each and every page, the fact must be
noted that it is the attestation clause which
contains the utterances reduced into
writing of the testamentary witnesses
themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the
testator, who are required under Article
805 to state the number of pages used
upon which the will is written; the fact that
the testator had signed the will and every
page thereof; and that they witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one
another. The only proof in the will that the
witnesses have stated these elemental
facts would be their signatures on the
attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be
considered to have been validly attested to
by the instrumental witnesses, as they
failed to sign the attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will
on which the denial of this petition should
also hinge. The requirement under Article
806 that "every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses" has also not been complied
with. The importance of this requirement is
highlighted by the fact that it had been
segregated from the other requirements
under Article 805 and entrusted into a
separate provision, Article 806. The non-
observance of Article 806 in this case is
equally as critical as the other cited flaws
in compliance with Article 805, and should
be treated as of equivalent import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary
public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote
"Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko
ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito
sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner
of contemplation can those words be
construed as an acknowledgment. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it
to be his act or deed.41 It involves an extra
step undertaken whereby the signor
actually declares to the notary that the
executor of a document has attested to the
notary that the same is his/her own free
act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the
averment as a jurat, even though it does
not hew to the usual language thereof.
A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the
notary certifies that before him/her, the
document was subscribed and sworn to by
the executor.42 Ordinarily, the language of
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 67
the jurat should avow that the document
was subscribed and sworn before the
notary public, while in this case, the notary
public averred that he himself "signed and
notarized" the document. Possibly though,
the word "ninotario" or "notarized"
encompasses the signing of and swearing
in of the executors of the document, which
in this case would involve the decedent
and the instrumental witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed
by the notary public as a jurat, the will
would nonetheless remain invalid, as the
express requirement of Article 806 is that
the will be "acknowledged", and not merely
subscribed and sworn to. The will does not
present any textual proof, much less one
under oath, that the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses executed or signed
the will as their own free act or deed. The
acknowledgment made in a will provides
for another all-important legal safeguard
against spurious wills or those made
beyond the free consent of the testator. An
acknowledgement is not an empty
meaningless act.43 The acknowledgment
coerces the testator and the instrumental
witnesses to declare before an officer of
the law that they had executed and
subscribed to the will as their own free act
or deed. Such declaration is under oath
and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for
the criminal prosecution of persons who
participate in the execution of spurious
wills, or those executed without the free
consent of the testator. It also provides a
further degree of assurance that the
testator is of certain mindset in making the
testamentary dispositions to those persons
he/she had designated in the will.
It may not have been said before, but we
can assert the rule, self-evident as it is
under Article 806. A notarial will that is
not acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses
is fatally defective, even if it is
subscribed and sworn to before a
notary public.
There are two other requirements under
Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by
the will in question. We need not discuss
them at length, as they are no longer
material to the
disposition of this case. The provision
requires that the testator and the
instrumental witnesses sign each and
every page of the will on the left margin,
except the last; and that all the pages shall
be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of each page. In this
case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses,
failed to sign both pages of the will on the
left margin, her only signature appearing at
the so-called "logical end"44 of the will on
its first page. Also, the will itself is not
numbered correlatively in letters on each
page, but instead numbered with Arabic
numerals. There is a line of thought that
has disabused the notion that these two
requirements be construed as
45
mandatory. Taken in isolation, these
omissions, by themselves, may not be
sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet
even as these omissions are not decisive
to the adjudication of this case, they need
not be dwelt on, though indicative as they
may be of a general lack of due regard for
the requirements under Article 805 by
whoever executed the will.
All told, the string of mortal defects which
the will in question suffers from makes the
probate denial inexorable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Ortega Vs Valmonte
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The law favors the probate of a will.
Upon those who oppose it rests the
burden of showing why it should not be
allowed. In the present case, petitioner has
failed to discharge this burden
satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court
cannot attribute any reversible error on the
part of the appellate tribunal that allowed
the probate of the will.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for
Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the
December 12, 2002 Decision[2] and the
March 7, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED,
and the Decision appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its
place judgment is rendered approving and
allowing probate to the said last will and
testament of Placido Valmonte and
ordering the issuance of letters
testamentary to the petitioner Josefina
Valmonte. Let this case be remanded to
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 68
the court a quo for further and concomitant
proceedings.[4]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized in the assailed
Decision of the CA, as follows:
x x x: Like so many others before him,
Placido toiled and lived for a long time in
the United States until he finally reached
retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came
home to stay in the Philippines, and he
lived in the house and lot located at #9200
Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati,
which he owned in common with his sister
Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names
in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival
from the United States and at the age of
80 he wed Josefina who was then 28
years old, in a ceremony solemnized by
Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5,
1982. But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8,
1984 of a cause written down as COR
PULMONALE.
Placido executed a notarial last will and
testament written in English and consisting
of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983
but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983.
The first page contains the entire
testamentary dispositions and a part of the
attestation clause, and was signed at the
end or bottom of that page by the testator
and on the left hand margin by the three
instrumental witnesses. The second page
contains the continuation of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment, and was
signed by the witnesses at the end of the
attestation clause and again on the left
hand margin. It provides in the body that:
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF
THE LORD AMEN:
I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age,
married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte,
and a resident of 9200 Catmon Street,
Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and
being of sound and disposing mind and
memory, do hereby declare this to be my
last will and testament:
1. It is my will that I be buried in the
Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of
the Catholic Church in accordance with the
rites and said Church and that a suitable
monument to be erected and provided my
by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my
memory in the minds of my family and
friends;
2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my
loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE,
one half (1/2) portion of the follow-
described properties, which belongs to me
as [co-owner]:
a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan
Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in
Makati, Metro Manila, described and
covered by TCT No. 123468 of the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila
registered jointly as co-owners with my
deceased sister (Ciriaca Valmonte), having
share and share alike;
b. 2-storey building standing on the
above-described property, made of strong
and mixed materials used as my residence
and my wife and located at No. 9200
Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila also
covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-
00482, Makati, Metro-Manila, jointly in the
name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca
Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share
and share alike or equal co-owners
thereof;
3. All the rest, residue and remainder of
my real and personal properties, including
my savings account bank book in USA
which is in the possession of my nephew,
and all others whatsoever and wherever
found, I give, devise and bequeath to my
said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte;
4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C.
Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will
and testament, and it is my will that said
executrix be exempt from filing a bond;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto
set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in
Quezon City, Philippines.
The allowance to probate of this will was
opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:
1. Petitioner failed to
allege all assets of the testator, especially
those found in the USA;
2. Petitioner failed to
state the names, ages, and residences of
the heirs of the testator; or to give them
proper notice pursuant to law;
3. Will was not executed and attested as
required by law and legal solemnities and
formalities were not complied with;
4. Testator was mentally incapable to
make a will at the time of the alleged
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 69
execution he being in an advance sate of
senility;
5. Will was executed under duress, or
the influence of fear or threats;
6. Will was procured by undue and
improper influence and pressure on the
part of the petitioner and/or her agents
and/or assistants; and/or
7. Signature of testator was procured
by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that
the instrument should be his will at the
time of affixing his signature thereto;
and she also opposed the appointment as
Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of
understanding and integrity.
At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina
testified and called as witnesses the notary
public Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared
and notarized the will, and the instrumental
witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr.
and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For
the opposition, the oppositor Leticia and
her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.
According to Josefina after her marriage
with the testator they lived in her parents
house at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union
but they came to Manila every month to
get his $366.00 monthly pension and
stayed at the said Makati residence. There
were times though when to shave off on
expenses, the testator would travel alone.
And it was in one of his travels by his
lonesome self when the notarial will was
made. The will was witnessed by the
spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who
were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie
Collado. Josefina said she had no
knowledge of the existence of the last will
and testament of her husband, but just
serendipitously found it in his attache case
after his death. It was only then that she
learned that the testator bequeathed to her
his properties and she was named the
executrix in the said will. To her estimate,
the value of property both real and
personal left by the testator is worth more
or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too
that the testator never suffered mental
infirmity because despite his old age he
went alone to the market which is two to
three kilometers from their home cooked
and cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if
she could not accompany him, even
traveled to Manila alone to claim his
monthly pension. Josefina also asserts
that her husband was in good health and
that he was hospitalized only because of a
cold but which eventually resulted in his
death.
Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary
public who notarized the testators will,
testified that it was in the first week of June
1983 when the testator together with the
three witnesses of the will went to his
house cum law office and requested him to
prepare his last will and testament. After
the testator instructed him on the terms
and dispositions he wanted on the will, the
notary public told them to come back on
June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare
it. After he had prepared the will the notary
public kept it safely hidden and locked in
his drawer. The testator and his witnesses
returned on the appointed date but the
notary public was out of town so they were
instructed by his wife to come back on
August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before
the testator and his witnesses signed the
prepared will, the notary public explained
to them each and every term thereof in
Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke
and understood. He likewise explained that
though it appears that the will was signed
by the testator and his witnesses on June
15, 1983, the day when it should have
been executed had he not gone out of
town, the formal execution was actually on
August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no
longer changed the typewritten date of
June 15, 1983 because he did not like the
document to appear dirty. The notary
public also testified that to his observation
the testator was physically and mentally
capable at the time he affixed his signature
on the will.
The attesting witnesses to the will
corroborated the testimony of the notary
public, and testified that the testator went
alone to the house of spouses Eugenio
and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village,
Quezon City and requested them to
accompany him to the house of Atty. Floro
Sarmiento purposely for his intended will;
that after giving his instructions to Atty.
Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return
on June 15, 1983; that they returned on
June 15, 1983 for the execution of the will
but were asked to come back instead on
August 9, 1983 because of the absence of
the notary public; that the testator
executed the will in question in their
presence while he was of sound and
disposing mind and that he was strong and
in good health; that the contents of the will
was explained by the notary public in the
Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of
them as witnesses attested and signed the
will in the presence of the testator and of
each other. And that during the execution,
the testators wife, Josefina was not with
them.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 70

The oppositor Leticia declared that
Josefina should not inherit alone because
aside from her there are other children
from the siblings of Placido who are just as
entitled to inherit from him. She attacked
the mental capacity of the testator,
declaring that at the time of the execution
of the notarial will the testator was already
83 years old and was no longer of sound
mind. She knew whereof she spoke
because in 1983 Placido lived in the
Makati residence and asked Leticias family
to live with him and they took care of him.
During that time, the testators physical and
mental condition showed deterioration,
aberrations and senility. This was
corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane
Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and
wanted to marry.
Sifting through the evidence, the court a
quo held that [t]he evidence adduced,
reduces the opposition to two grounds,
namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal
solemnities and formalities in the execution
and attestation of the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at
the time of the execution of the will as he
was then in an advanced state of senility
It then found these grounds extant and
proven, and accordingly disallowed
probate.[5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the trial court, the appellate
court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte
to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of
the notary public and the subscribing
witnesses who had acknowledged the due
execution of the will. Moreover, it held that
the testator had testamentary capacity at
the time of the execution of the will. It
added that his sexual exhibitionism and
unhygienic, crude and impolite ways[6] did
not make him a person of unsound mind.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for
our consideration:
I. Whether or not the findings of the
probate court are entitled to great respect.
II. Whether or not the signature of Placido
Valmonte in the subject will was procured
by fraud or trickery, and that Placido
Valmonte never intended that the
instrument should be his last will and
testament.
III. Whether or not Placido Valmonte has
testamentary capacity at the time he
allegedly executed the subject will.[8]
In short, petitioner assails the CAs
allowance of the probate of the will of
Placido Valmonte.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Probate of a Will
At the outset, we stress that only questions
of law may be raised in a Petition for
Review under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. As an exception, however,
the evidence presented during the trial
may be examined and the factual matters
resolved by this Court when, as in the
instant case, the findings of fact of the
appellate court differ from those of the trial
court.[9]
The fact that public policy favors the
probate of a will does not necessarily
mean that every will presented for probate
should be allowed. The law lays down the
procedures and requisites that must be
satisfied for the probate of a will.[10] Verily,
Article 839 of the Civil Code states the
instances when a will may be disallowed,
as follows:
Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in
any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law
have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or
otherwise mentally incapable of making a
will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or
under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence, on the
part of the beneficiary or of some other
person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or
did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time of
affixing his signature thereto.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 71
In the present case, petitioner assails the
validity of Placido Valmontes will by
imputing fraud in its execution and
challenging the testators state of mind at
the time.
Existence of Fraud in the Execution of a
Will
Petitioner does not dispute the due
observance of the formalities in the
execution of the will, but maintains that the
circumstances surrounding it are indicative
of the existence of fraud. Particularly, she
alleges that respondent, who is the
testators wife and sole beneficiary,
conspired with the notary public and the
three attesting witnesses in deceiving
Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly
reflected in the varying dates of the
execution and the attestation of the will.
Petitioner contends that it was highly
dubious for a woman at the prime of her
young life [to] almost immediately plunge
into marriage with a man who [was] thrice
her age x x x and who happened to be [a]
Fil-American pensionado,[11] thus casting
doubt on the intention of respondent in
seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it
supposedly defies human reason, logic
and common experience[12] for an old man
with a severe psychological condition to
have willingly signed a last will and
testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick,
secret device, false statement, or
pretense, by which the subject of it is
cheated. It may be of such character that
the testator is misled or deceived as to the
nature or contents of the document which
he executes, or it may relate to some
extrinsic fact, in consequence of the
deception regarding which the testator is
led to make a certain will which, but for the
fraud, he would not have made.[13]
We stress that the party challenging the
will bears the burden of proving the
existence of fraud at the time of its
execution.[14] The burden to show
otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will
only upon a showing of credible evidence
of fraud.[15] Unfortunately in this case,
other than the self-serving allegations of
petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever
presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of
some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will.[16] That the testator was
tricked into signing it was not sufficiently
established by the fact that he had
instituted his wife, who was more than fifty
years his junior, as the sole beneficiary;
and disregarded petitioner and her family,
who were the ones who had taken the
cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in
his twilight years.[17]
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the
appellate court, the conflict between the
dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, because the law
does not even require that a [notarial] will x
x x be executed and acknowledged on the
same occasion.[18] More important, the will
must be subscribed by the testator, as well
as by three or more credible witnesses
who must also attest to it in the presence
of the testator and of one
another.[19] Furthermore, the testator and
the witnesses must acknowledge the will
before a notary public.[20] In any event, we
agree with the CA that the variance in the
dates of the will as to its supposed
execution and attestation was satisfactorily
and persuasively explained by the notary
public and the instrumental witnesses.[21]
The pertinent transcript of stenographic
notes taken on June 11, 1985, November
25, 1985, October 13, 1986, and October
21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are
reproduced respectively as follows:
Atty. Floro Sarmiento:
Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the
date June 15 when the testator and his witnesses were
supposed to be in your office?
A Yes sir.
Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses
come to your house?
A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out
of town.
xxxxxxxxx
Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9,
1983 as per acknowledgement appearing therein. Was
this the actual date when the document was
acknowledged?
A Yes sir.
Q What about the date when the testator and the three
witnesses affixed their respective signature on the first
and second pages of exhibit C?
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged,
August 9, 1983.
Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on
the date appearing on the body of the document as well
as the attestation clause?
A Because I do not like anymore to make some
alterations so I put it in my own handwriting August 9,
1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp.
8-10)
Eugenio Gomez:
Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated
June 15, 1983, whereas in the acknowledgement it is
dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and
tell us this discrepancy in the date?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido
Valmonte and the two witnesses; that was first week of
June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of
June but when we returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not
there.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 72
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15,
1983, did you again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.
Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where
you signed, who were your companions?
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn,
November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)
Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:
Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro
Sarmiento, three times?
xxxxxxxxx
A The reason why we went there three
times is that, the first week of June was out
first time. We went there to talk to Atty.
Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the
last will and testament. After that what they
have talked what will be placed in the
testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was
that he will go back on the 15th of June.
When we returned on June 15, Atty.
Sarmiento was not there so we were not
able to sign it, the will. That is why, for the
third time we went there on August 9 and
that was the time we affixed our signature.
(tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)
Josie Collado:
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in
his house on June 15, 1983, what
transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that
we will be back on August 9, 1983.
Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house
of Atty. Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.
Q For what purpose?
A Our purpose is just to sign the will.
Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?
A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)[22]
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate
her claim of a grand conspiracy in the
commission of a fraud. There was no
showing that the witnesses of the
proponent stood to receive any benefit
from the allowance of the will. The
testimonies of the three subscribing
witnesses and the notary are credible
evidence of its due execution.[23] Their
testimony favoring it and the finding that it
was executed in accordance with the
formalities required by law should be
affirmed, absent any showing of ill
motives.[24]
Capacity to Make a Will
In determining the capacity of the testator
to make a will, the Civil Code gives the
following guidelines:
Article 798. In order to make a will it is
essential that the testator be of sound
mind at the time of its execution.
Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not
necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or
that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury
or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able
at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.
Article 800. The law presumes that every
person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was
not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes
the probate of the will; but if the testator,
one month, or less, before making his will
was publicly known to be insane, the
person who maintains the validity of the
will must prove that the testator made it
during a lucid interval.
According to Article 799, the three things
that the testator must have the ability to
know to be considered of sound mind are
as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to
be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of
the testators bounty, and (3) the character
of the testamentary act. Applying this test
to the present case, we find that the
appellate court was correct in holding that
Placido had testamentary capacity at the
time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced
age, he was still able to identify accurately
the kinds of property he owned, the extent
of his shares in them and even their
locations. As regards the proper objects of
his bounty, it was sufficient that he
identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As
we have stated earlier, the omission of
some relatives from the will did not affect
its formal validity. There being no showing
of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness
of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,[25] which held
thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness
of mind and memory which unquestionably
carries with it full testamentary capacity,
and that degrees of mental aberration
generally known as insanity or idiocy, there
are numberless degrees of mental
capacity or incapacity and while on one
hand it has been held that mere weakness
of mind, or partial imbecility from disease
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 73
of body, or from age, will not render a
person incapable of making a will; a weak
or feebleminded person may make a valid
will, provided he has understanding and
memory sufficient to enable him to know
what he is about to do and how or to whom
he is disposing of his property. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is
not necessary that the mind be unbroken
or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or
otherwise. It has been held that
testamentary incapacity does not
necessarily require that a person shall
actually be insane or of unsound mind."[26]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED,
and the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from
the United States and at the age of 80 he
wed Josefina who was then 28 years old.
But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido
executed a notarial last will and testament
written in English and consisting of 2
pages, and dated 15 June 1983but
acknowledged only on 9 August 1983.
The allowance to probate of this will was
opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister.
According to the notary public who
notarized the testators will, after the
testator instructed him on the terms and
dispositions he wanted on the will, the
notary public told them to come back on
15 August 1983 to give him time to
prepare. The testator and his witnesses
returned on the appointed date but the
notary public was out of town so they were
instructed by his wife to come back on 9
August 1983. The formal execution was
actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned
he no longer changed the typewritten date
of 15 June 1983 because he did not like
the document to appear dirty. Petitioners
argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the
notarial will Placido was already 83 years
old and was no longer of sound mind. 2.
Josefina conspired with the notary public
and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving
Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly
reflected in the varying dates of the
execution and the attestation of the will.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity
at the time he allegedly executed the will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will
was procured by fraud or trickery.
HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he
was still able to identify accurately the
kinds of property he owned, the extent of
his shares in them and even their location.
As regards the proper objects of his
bounty, it was sufficient that he identified
his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission
of some relatives from the will did not
affect its formal validity. There being no
showing of fraud in its execution, intent in
its disposition becomes irrelevant. 2. NO.
Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false
statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such
character that the testator is misled or
deceived as to the nature or contents of
the document which he executes, or it may
relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding
which the testator is led to make a certain
will which, but for fraud, he would not have
made. The party challenging the will bears
the burden of proving the existence of
fraud at the time of its execution. The
burden to show otherwise shifts to the
proponent of the will only upon a showing
of credible evidence of fraud. Omission of
some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict
between the dates appearing on the will
does not invalidate the document,
because the law does not even require
that a notarial will be executed and
acknowledged on the same occasion. The
variance in the dates of the will as to its
supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained
by the notary public and instrumental
witnesses.
G.R. No. 1641 January 19, 1906
GERMAN JABONETA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 74
RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL., defendants-
appellees.
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos for
appellant.
Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher for appellees.
CARSON, J.:
In these proceedings probate was denied
the last will and testament of Macario
Jaboneta, deceased, because the lower
court was of the opinion from the evidence
adduced at the hearing that Julio
Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not
attach his signature thereto in the
presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the
witnesses, as required by the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The following is a copy of the evidence
which appears of record on this particular
point, being a part of the testimony of the
said Isabeo Jena:
Q. 1641 Who first signed the will?
A. 1641 I signed it first, and
afterwards Aniceto and the others.
Q. 1641 Who were those others to
whom you have just referred?
A. 1641 After the witness Aniceto
signed the will I left the house, because I
was in a hurry, and at the moment when I
was leaving I saw Julio Javellana with the
pen in his hand in position ready to sign
(en actitud de firmar). I believe he signed,
because he was at the table. . . .
Q. 1641 State positively whether
Julio Javellana did or did not sign as a
witness to the will.
A. 1641 I can't say certainly,
because as I was leaving the house I saw
Julio Javellana with the pen in his hand, in
position ready to sign. I believe he signed.
Q. 1641 Why do you believe Julio
Javellana signed?
A. 1641 Because he had the pen in
his hand, which was resting on the paper,
though I did not actually see him sign.
Q. 1641 Explain this contradictory
statement.
A. 1641 After I signed I asked
permission to leave, because I was in a
hurry, and while I was leaving Julio had
already taken the pen in his hand, as it
appeared, for the purpose of signing, and
when I was near the door I happened to
turn my face and I saw that he had his
hand with the pen resting on the will,
moving it as if for the purpose of signing.
Q. 1641 State positively whether
Julio moved his hand with the pen as if for
the purpose of signing, or whether he was
signing
A. I believe he was signing.
The truth and accuracy of the testimony of
this witness does not seem to have been
questioned by any of the parties to the
proceedings, but the court, nevertheless,
found the following facts:
On the 26th day of December, 1901,
Macario Jaboneta executed under the
following circumstances the document in
question, which has been presented for
probate as his will:
Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in
Jaro, in this province, he ordered that the
document in question be written, and
calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena,
and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed
the said document as his will. They were
all together, and were in the room where
Jaboneta was, and were present when he
signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing
afterwards as a witness, at his request,
and in his presence and in the presence of
the other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena
then signed as a witness in the presence
of the testator, and in the presence of the
other two persons who signed as
witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena,
being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and
left the room. As he was leaving the house
Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand
and put himself in position to sign the will
as a witness, but did not sign in the
presence of Isabelo Jena; but
nevertheless, after Jena had left the room
the said Julio Javellana signed as a
witness in the presence of the testator and
of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.
We can not agree with so much of the
above finding of facts as holds that the
signature of Javellana was not signed in
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 75
the presence of Jena, in compliance with
the provisions of section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. The fact that Jena was
still in the room when he saw Javellana
moving his hand and pen in the act of
affixing his signature to the will, taken
together with the testimony of the
remaining witnesses which shows that
Javellana did in fact there and then sign
his name to the will, convinces us that the
signature was affixed in the presence of
Jena. The fact that he was in the act of
leaving, and that his back was turned while
a portion of the name of the witness was
being written, is of no importance. He, with
the other witnesses and the testator, had
assembled for the purpose of executing
the testament, and were together in the
same room for that purpose, and at the
moment when the witness Javellana
signed the document he was actually and
physically present and in such position
with relation to Javellana that he could see
everything which took place by merely
casting his eyes in the proper direction,
and without any physical obstruction to
prevent his doing so, therefore we are of
opinion that the document was in fact
signed before he finally left the room.
The purpose of a statutory requirement
that the witness sign in the presence of the
testator is said to be that the testator may
have ocular evidence of the identity of the
instrument subscribed by the witness and
himself, and the generally accepted tests
of presence are vision and mental
apprehension. (See Am. & Eng. Enc. of
Law, vol. 30, p. 599, and cases there
cited.)
In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.),
328) it was held that it is sufficient if the
witnesses are together for the purpose of
witnessing the execution of the will, and in
a position to actually see the testator write,
if they choose to do so; and there are
many cases which lay down the rule that
the true test of vision is not whether the
testator actually saw the witness sign, but
whether he might have seen him sign,
considering his mental and physical
condition and position at the time of the
subscription. (Spoonemore vs. Cables, 66
Mo., 579.)
The principles on which these cases rest
and the tests of presence as between the
testator and the witnesses are equally
applicable in determining whether the
witnesses signed the instrument in the
presence of each other, as required by the
statute, and applying them to the facts
proven in these proceedings we are of
opinion that the statutory requisites as to
the execution of the instrument were
complied with, and that the lower court
erred in denying probate to the will on the
ground stated in the ruling appealed from.
We are of opinion from the evidence of
record that the instrument propounded in
these proceedings was satisfactorily
proven to be the last will and testament of
Macario Jaboneta, deceased, and that it
should therefore be admitted to probate.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed,
without especial condemnation of costs,
and after twenty days the record will be
returned to the court form whence it came,
where the proper orders will be entered in
conformance herewith. So ordered.
G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993
TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA
CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN
CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO,
OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO,
SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO
CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA,
MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA,
RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein
by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA *
ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO
CANEDA, represented herein by his
heirs, JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD
CANEDA and ARTURO
CANEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Mateo
Caballero, respondents.
Palma, Palma & Associates for petitioners.
Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private
respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 76
Presented for resolution by this Court in
the present petition for review
on certiorari is the issue of whether or not
the attestation clause contained in the last
will and testament of the late Mateo
Caballero complies with the requirements
of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of
the Civil Code.
The records show that on December 5,
1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without
any children and already in the twilight
years of his life, executed a last will and
testament at his residence in Talisay,
Cebu before three attesting witnesses,
namely, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio
Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. The said
testator was duly assisted by his lawyer,
Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public,
Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of
that last will. 1 It was declared therein,
among other things, that the testator was
leaving by way of legacies and devises his
real and personal properties to
Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo,
Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo,
Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa
Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be
related to the testator. 2
Four months later, or on April 4, 1979,
Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3899-
R before Branch II of the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate
of his last will and testament. The probate
court set the petition for hearing on August
20, 1979 but the same and subsequent
scheduled hearings were postponed for
one reason to another. On May 29, 1980,
the testator passed away before his
petition could finally be heard by the
probate court. 3 On February 25, 1981,
Benoni Cabrera, on of the legatees named
in the will, sough his appointment as
special administrator of the testator's
estate, the estimated value of which was
P24,000.00, and he was so appointed by
the probate court in its order of March 6,
1981. 4
Thereafter, herein petitioners, claiming to
be nephews and nieces of the testator,
instituted a second petition, entitled "In the
Matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo
Caballero" and docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 3965-R, before Branch IX
of the aforesaid Court of First Instance of
Cebu. On October 18, 1982, herein
petitioners had their said petition intestate
proceeding consolidated with Special
Proceeding No. 3899-R in Branch II of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu and
opposed thereat the probate of the
Testator's will and the appointment of a
special administrator for his estate. 5
Benoni Cabrera died on February 8, 1982
hence the probate court, now known as
Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, appointed William Cabrera as
special administrator on June 21, 1983.
Thereafter, on July 20, 1983, it issued an
order for the return of the records of
Special Proceeding No. 3965-R to the
archives since the testate proceeding for
the probate of the will had to be heard and
resolved first. On March 26, 1984 the case
was reraffled and eventually assigned to
Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu where it remained until the
conclusion of the probate proceedings. 6
In the course of the hearing in Special
Proceeding No. 3899-R, herein petitioners
appeared as oppositors and objected to
the allowance of the testator's will on the
ground that on the alleged date of its
execution, the testator was already in the
poor state of health such that he could not
have possibly executed the same.
Petitioners likewise reiterated the issue as
to the genuineness of the signature of the
testator therein. 7
On the other hand, one of the attesting
witnesses, Cipriano Labuca, and the
notary public Atty. Filoteo Manigos,
testified that the testator executed the will
in question in their presence while he was
of sound and disposing mind and that,
contrary to the assertions of the
oppositors, Mateo Caballero was in good
health and was not unduly influenced in
any way in the execution of his will.
Labuca also testified that he and the other
witnesses attested and signed the will in
the presence of the testator and of each
other. The other two attesting witnesses
were not presented in the probate hearing
as the had died by then. 8
On April 5, 1988, the probate court
rendered a decision declaring the will in
question as the last will and testament of
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 77
the late Mateo Caballero, on the
ratiocination that:
. . . The self-serving testimony of the two
witnesses of the oppositors cannot
overcome the positive testimonies of Atty.
Filoteo Manigos and Cipriano Labuca who
clearly told the Court that indeed Mateo
Caballero executed the Last Will and
Testament now marked Exhibit "C" on
December 5, 1978. Moreover, the fact that
it was Mateo Caballero who initiated the
probate of his Will during his lifetime when
he caused the filing of the original petition
now marked Exhibit "D" clearly
underscores the fact that this was indeed
his Last Will. At the start, counsel for the
oppositors manifested that he would want
the signature of Mateo Caballero in Exhibit
"C" examined by a handwriting expert of
the NBI but it would seem that despite their
avowal and intention for the examination of
this signature of Mateo Caballero in Exhibit
"C", nothing came out of it because they
abandoned the idea and instead presented
Aurea Caballero and Helen Caballero
Campo as witnesses for the oppositors.
All told, it is the finding of this Court that
Exhibit "C" is the Last Will and Testament
of Mateo Caballero and that it was
executed in accordance with all the
requisites of the law. 9
Undaunted by the said judgment of the
probate court, petitioners elevated the
case in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 19669. They asserted therein that
the will in question is null and void for the
reason that its attestation clause is fatally
defective since it fails to specifically state
that the instrumental witnesses to the will
witnessed the testator signing the will in
their presence and that they also signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one
another.
On October 15, 1991, respondent court
promulgated its decision 10 affirming that of
the trial court, and ruling that the
attestation clause in the last will of Mateo
Caballero substantially complies with
Article 805 of the Civil Code, thus:
The question therefore is whether the
attestation clause in question may be
considered as having substantialy
complied with the requirements of Art. 805
of the Civil Code. What appears in the
attestation clause which the oppositors
claim to be defective is "we do certify that
the testament was read by him and the
attestator, Mateo Caballero, has published
unto us the foregoing will consisting of
THREE PAGES, including the
acknowledgment, each page numbered
correlatively in letters of the upper part of
each page, as his Last Will and
Testament, and he has signed the same
and every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left
hand margin in the presence of the said
testator and in the presence of each and
all of us (emphasis supplied).
To our thinking, this is sufficient
compliance and no evidence need be
presented to indicate the meaning that the
said will was signed by the testator and by
them (the witnesses) in the presence of all
of them and of one another. Or as the
language of the law would have it that the
testator signed the will "in the presence of
the instrumental witnesses, and that the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another." If not
completely or ideally perfect in accordance
with the wordings of Art. 805 but (sic) the
phrase as formulated is in substantial
compliance with the requirement of the
law." 11
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration
of the said ruling of respondent court, but
the same was denied in the latter's
resolution of January 14, 1992, 12 hence
this appeal now before us. Petitioners
assert that respondent court has ruled
upon said issue in a manner not in accord
with the law and settled jurisprudence on
the matter and are now questioning once
more, on the same ground as that raised
before respondent court, the validity of the
attestation clause in the last will of Mateo
Caballero.
We find the present petition to be
meritorious, as we shall shortly hereafter,
after some prefatory observations which
we feel should be made in aid of the
rationale for our resolution of the
controversy.
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 78
1. A will has been defined as a species of
conveyance whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed
by law, to control to a certain degree the
disposition of his estate after his
death. 13 Under the Civil Code, there are
two kinds of wills which a testator may
execute. 14 the first kind is the ordinary or
attested will, the execution of which is
governed by Articles 804 to 809 of the
Code. Article 805 requires that:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a
holographic will, must be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one
another.
The testator or the person requested by
him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof,
except the last, on the left margin, and all
the pages shall be numbered correlatively
in letters placed on the upper part of each
page.
The attestation should state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some
other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language
not known to the witness, it shall be
interpreted to them.
In addition, the ordinary will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by a
testator and the attesting witness. 15hence
it is likewise known as notarial will. Where
the attestator is deaf or deaf-mute, Article
807 requires that he must personally read
the will, if able to do so. Otherwise, he
should designate two persons who would
read the will and communicate its contents
to him in a practicable manner. On the
other hand, if the testator is blind, the will
should be read to him twice; once, by
anyone of the witnesses thereto, and then
again, by the notary public before whom it
is acknowledged. 16
The other kind of will is the holographic
will, which Article 810 defines as one that
is entirely written, dated, and signed by the
testator himself. This kind of will, unlike the
ordinary type, requires no attestation by
witnesses. A common requirement in both
kinds of will is that they should be in writing
and must have been executed in a
language or dialect known to the
testator. 17
However, in the case of an ordinary or
attested will, its attestation clause need not
be written in a language or dialect known
to the testator since it does not form part of
the testamentary disposition. Furthermore,
the language used in the attestation clause
likewise need not even be known to the
attesting witnesses. 18 The last paragraph
of Article 805 merely requires that, in such
a case, the attestation clause shall be
interpreted to said witnesses.
An attestation clause refers to that part of
an ordinary will whereby the attesting
witnesses certify that the instrument has
been executed before them and to the
manner of the execution the same. 19 It is a
separate memorandum or record of the
facts surrounding the conduct of execution
and once signed by the witnesses, it gives
affirmation to the fact that compliance with
the essential formalities required by law
has been observed. 20 It is made for the
purpose of preserving in a permanent form
a record of the facts that attended the
execution of a particular will, so that in
case of failure of the memory of the
attesting witnesses, or other casualty, such
facts may still be proved. 21
Under the third paragraph of Article 805,
such a clause, the complete lack of which
would result in the invalidity of the
will, 22 should state (1) the number of the
pages used upon which the will is written;
(2) that the testator signed, or expressly
caused another to sign, the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the
attesting witnesses; and (3) that
the attesting witnesses witnessed the
signing by the testator of the will and all its
pages, and that said witnesses also signed
the will and every page thereof in the
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 79
presence of the testator and of one
another.
The purpose of the law in requiring the
clause to state the number of pages on
which the will is written is to safeguard
against possible interpolation or omission
of one or some of its pages and to prevent
any increase or decrease in the
pages; 23 whereas the subscription of the
signature of the testator and the attesting
witnesses is made for the purpose of
authentication and identification, and thus
indicates that the will is the very same
instrument executed by the testator and
attested to by the witnesses. 24
Further, by attesting and subscribing to the
will, the witnesses thereby declare the due
execution of the will as embodied in the
attestation clause. 25 The attestation
clause, therefore, provide strong legal
guaranties for the due execution of a will
and to insure the authenticity thereof. 26 As
it appertains only to the witnesses and not
to the testator, it need be signed only by
them. 27 Where it is left unsigned, it would
result in the invalidation of the will as it
would be possible and easy to add the
clause on a subsequent occasion in the
absence of the testator and its
witnesses. 28
In its report, the Code Commission
commented on the reasons of the law for
requiring the formalities to be followed in
the execution of wills, in the following
manner:
The underlying and fundamental objectives
permeating the provisions on the law on
wills in this Project consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their
execution with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his
last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards
and restrictions to prevent the commission
of fraud and the exercise of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the
testator.
This objective is in accord with the modern
tendency with respect to the formalities in
the execution of wills. . . . 29
2. An examination of the last will and
testament of Mateo Caballero shows that it
is comprised of three sheets all of which
have been numbered correlatively, with the
left margin of each page thereof bearing
the respective signatures of the testator
and the three attesting witnesses. The part
of the will containing the testamentary
dispositions is expressed in the Cebuano-
Visayan dialect and is signed at the foot
thereof by the testator. The attestation
clause in question, on the other hand, is
recited in the English language and is
likewise signed at the end thereof by the
three attesting witnesses hereto. 30 Since it
is the proverbial bone of contention, we
reproduce it again for facility of reference:
We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses,
whose Residences and postal addresses
appear on the Opposite of our respective
names, we do hereby certify that the
Testament was read by him and the
testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has
published unto us the foregoing Will
consisting of THREE PAGES, including
the Acknowledgment, each page
numbered correlatively in the letters on the
upper part of each page, as his Last Will
and Testament and he has the same and
every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left
hand margin, in the presence of the said
testator and in the presence of each and
all of us.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires
that the witness should both attest and
subscribe to the will in the presence of the
testator and of one another. "Attestation"
and "subscription" differ in meaning.
Attestation is the act of senses, while
subscription is the act of the hand. The
former is mental, the latter mechanical,
and to attest a will is to know that it was
published as such, and to certify the facts
required to constitute an actual and legal
publication; but to subscribe a paper
published as a will is only to write on the
same paper the names of the witnesses,
for the sole purpose of identification. 31
In Taboada vs. Rizal, 32 we clarified that
attestation consists in witnessing the
testator's execution of the will in order to
see and take note mentally that those
things are done which the statute requires
for the execution of a will and that the
signature of the testator exists as a fact.
On the other hand, subscription is the
signing of the witnesses' names upon the
same paper for the purpose of
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 80
identification of such paper as the will
which was executed by the testator. As it
involves a mental act, there would be no
means, therefore, of ascertaining by a
physical examination of the will whether
the witnesses had indeed signed in the
presence of the testator and of each other
unless this is substantially expressed in
the attestation.
It is contended by petitioners that the
aforequoted attestation clause, in
contravention of the express requirements
of the third paragraph of Article 805 of the
Civil Code for attestation clauses, fails to
specifically state the fact that the attesting
witnesses the testator sign the will and all
its pages in their presence and that they,
the witnesses, likewise signed the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other. We agree.
What is fairly apparent upon a careful
reading of the attestation clause herein
assailed is the fact that while it recites that
the testator indeed signed the will and all
its pages in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses and states as well the
number of pages that were used, the same
does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to
the will in the presence of the testator and
of each other.
The phrase "and he has signed the same
and every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left
hand margin," obviously refers to the
testator and not the instrumental witnesses
as it is immediately preceded by the words
"as his Last Will and Testament." On the
other hand, although the words "in the
presence of the testator and in the
presence of each and all of us" may, at
first blush, appear to likewise signify and
refer to the witnesses, it must, however, be
interpreted as referring only to the testator
signing in the presence of the witnesses
since said phrase immediately follows the
words "he has signed the same and every
page thereof, on the spaces provided
for his signature and on the left hand
margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the
final logical analysis , is the statement that
the witnesses signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
It is our considered view that the absence
of that statement required by law is a fatal
defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of
the will that is here sought to be admitted
to probate. Petitioners are correct in
pointing out that the aforestated defect in
the attestation clause obviously cannot be
characterized as merely involving the form
of the will or the language used therein
which would warrant the application of the
substantial compliance rule, as
contemplated in the pertinent provision
thereon in the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith,
forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper
pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or
in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is not proved that
the will was in fact executed and attested
in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of article 805" (Emphasis
supplied.)
While it may be true that the attestation
clause is indeed subscribed at the end
thereof and at the left margin of each page
by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly
cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom
that the said witness affixed their
respective signatures in the presence of
the testator and of each other since, as
petitioners correctly observed, the
presence of said signatures only
establishes the fact that it was indeed
signed, but it does not prove that the
attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will
in the presence of the testator and of each
other. The execution of a will is supposed
to be one act so that where the testator
and the witnesses sign on various days or
occasions and in various combinations, the
will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur
of effectivity. 33
We believe that the further comment of
former Justice J.B.L. Reyes 34 regarding
Article 809, wherein he urged caution in
the application of the substantial
compliance rule therein, is correct and
should be applied in the case under
consideration, as well as to future cases
with similar questions:
. . . The rule must be limited to
disregarding those defects that can be
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 81
supplied by an examination of the will
itself: whether all the pages are
consecutively numbered; whether the
signatures appear in each and every page;
whether the subscribing witnesses are
three or the will was notarized. All theses
are facts that the will itself can reveal, and
defects or even omissions concerning
them in the attestation clause can be
safely disregarded. But the total number of
pages, and whether all persons required to
sign did so in the presence of each other
must substantially appear in the attestation
clause, being the only check against
perjury in the probate proceedings.
(Emphasis ours.)
3. We stress once more that under Article
809, the defects and imperfections must
only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed
therein. Such defects or imperfections
would not render a will invalid should it be
proved that the will was really executed
and attested in compliance with Article
805. In this regard, however, the manner
of proving the due execution and
attestation has been held to be limited to
merely an examination of the will itself
without resorting to evidence aliunde,
whether oral or written.
The foregoing considerations do not apply
where the attestation clause totally omits
the fact that the attesting witnesses signed
each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each
other. 35 In such a situation, the defect is
not only in the form or language of the
attestation clause but the total absence of
a specific element required by Article 805
to be specifically stated in the attestation
clause of a will. That is precisely the defect
complained of in the present case since
there is no plausible way by which we can
read into the questioned attestation clause
statement, or an implication thereof, that
the attesting witness did actually bear
witness to the signing by the testator of the
will and all of its pages and that said
instrumental witnesses also signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
Furthermore, the rule on substantial
compliance in Article 809 cannot be
revoked or relied on by respondents since
it presupposes that the defects in the
attestation clause can be cured or supplied
by the text of the will or a consideration of
matters apparent therefrom which would
provide the data not expressed in the
attestation clause or from which it may
necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred
that the acts not stated in the omitted
textual requirements were actually
complied within the execution of the will. In
other words, defects must be remedied by
intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself.
In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the
acts required to have been performed by
the attesting witnesses can be supplied by
only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an
overall appreciation of the contents of the
will yields no basis whatsoever from with
such facts may be plausibly deduced.
What private respondent insists on are the
testimonies of his witnesses alleging that
they saw the compliance with such
requirements by the instrumental
witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he is
thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence to
prove the same and would accordingly be
doing by the indirection what in law he
cannot do directly.
4. Prior to the advent of the Civil Code on
August 30, 1950, there was a divergence
of views as to which manner of
interpretation should be followed in
resolving issues centering on compliance
with the legal formalities required in the
execution of wills. The formal requirements
were at that time embodied primarily in
Section 618 of Act No. 190, the Code of
Civil Procedure. Said section was later
amended by Act No. 2645, but the
provisions respecting said formalities
found in Act. No. 190 and the amendment
thereto were practically reproduced and
adopted in the Civil Code.
One view advance the liberal or substantial
compliance rule. This was first laid down in
the case of Abangan vs.
Abangan, 36 where it was held that the
object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to
guarantee their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should
be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. Nonetheless, it was
also emphasized that one must not lose
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 82
sight of the fact that it is not the object of
the law to restrain and curtail the exercise
of the right to make a will, hence when an
interpretation already given assures such
ends, any other interpretation whatsoever
that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless
and frustrative of the testator's last will,
must be disregarded. The subsequent
cases of Avera vs. Garcia, 37 Aldaba vs.
Roque, 38 Unson vs. Abella, 39 Pecson vs.
Coronel, 40 Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios,
et al., 41 and Nayve vs. Mojal, et al. 42 all
adhered to this position.
The other view which advocated the rule
that statutes which prescribe the
formalities that should be observed in the
execution of wills are mandatory in nature
and are to be strictly construed was
followed in the subsequent cases of In the
Matter of the Estate of Saguinsin, 43 In re
Will of Andrada, 44 Uy Coque vs.
Sioca, 45 In re Estate of
46
Neumark, and Sano vs. Quintana. 47
Gumban vs. Gorecho, et al., 48 provided
the Court with the occasion to clarify the
seemingly conflicting decisions in the
aforementioned cases. In said case
of Gumban, the attestation clause had
failed to state that the witnesses signed
the will and each and every page thereof
on the left margin in the presence of the
testator. The will in question was
disallowed, with these reasons therefor:
In support of their argument on the
assignment of error above-mentioned,
appellants rely on a series of cases of this
court beginning with (I)n the Matter of the
(E)state of Saguinsin ([1920], 41 Phil.,
875), continuing with In re Will of Andrada
[1921], 42 Phil., 180), Uy Coque vs. Navas
L. Sioca [1922], 43 Phil., 405), and In
re Estate of Neumark ([1923], 46 Phil.,
841), and ending with Sano vs.
Quintana ([1925], 48 Phil., 506). Appellee
counters with the citation of a series of
cases beginning with Abangan vs.
Abangan ([1919], 40 Phil., 476), continuing
through Aldaba vs. Roque ([1922], 43
Phil., 378), and Fernandez vs. Vergel de
Dios ([1924], 46 Phil., 922), and
culminating in Nayve vs. Mojal and
Aguilar ([1924], 47 Phil., 152). In its last
analysis, our task is to contrast and, if
possible, conciliate the last two decisions
cited by opposing counsel, namely, those
of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, and Nayve
vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra.
In the case of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, it
was decided that an attestation clause
which does not recite that the witnesses
signed the will and each and every page
thereof on the left margin in the presence
of the testator is defective, and such a
defect annuls the will. The case of Uy
Coque vs. Sioca, supra, was cited, but the
case of Nayve vs. Mojal and
Aguilar, supra, was not mentioned. In
contrast, is the decision in Nayve vs. Mojal
and Aguilar, supra, wherein it was held
that the attestation clause must estate the
fact that the testator and the witnesses
reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for
such an act cannot be proved by the mere
exhibition of the will, if it is not stated
therein. It was also held that the fact that
the testator and the witnesses signed each
and every page of the will can be proved
also by the mere examination of the
signatures appearing on the document
itself, and the omission to state such
evident facts does not invalidate the will.
It is a habit of courts to reaffirm or
distinguish previous cases; seldom do they
admit inconsistency in doctrine. Yet here,
unless aided impossible to reconcile the
Mojal and Quintana decisions. They are
fundamentally at variance. If we rely on
one, we affirm. If we rely on the other, we
reverse.
In resolving this puzzling question of
authority, three outstanding points may be
mentioned. In the first place, the Mojal,
decision was concurred in by only four
members of the court, less than a majority,
with two strong dissenting opinions; the
Quintana decision was concurred in by
seven members of the court, a clear
majority, with one formal dissent. In the
second place, the Mojal decision was
promulgated in December, 1924, while the
Quintana decision was promulgated in
December, 1925; the Quintana decision
was thus subsequent in point of time. And
in the third place, the Quintana decision is
believed more nearly to conform to the
applicable provisions of the law.
The right to dispose of property by will is
governed entirely by statute. The law of
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 83
the case is here found in section 61 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by
Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of the
same Code, as unamended. It is in part
provided in section 61, as amended that
"No will . . . shall be valid . . . unless . . .." It
is further provided in the same section that
"The attestation shall state the number of
sheets or pages used, upon which the will
is written, and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all
pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other." Codal section
634 provides that "The will shall be
disallowed in either of the following case:
1. If not executed and attested as in this
Act provided." The law not alone carefully
makes use of the imperative, but
cautiously goes further and makes use of
the negative, to enforce legislative
intention. It is not within the province of the
courts to disregard the legislative purpose
so emphatically and clearly expressed.
We adopt and reaffirm the decision in the
case of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, and, to
the extent necessary, modify the decision
in the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and
Aguilar, supra. (Emphases in the original
text).
But after the Gumban clarificatory
pronouncement, there were decisions of
the Court that once more appeared to
revive the seeming diversity of views that
was earlier threshed out therein. The
cases of Quinto vs. Morata, 49Rodriguez
vs. Alcala, 50 Enchevarria vs.
Sarmiento, 51 and Testate Estate of
52
Toray went the way of the ruling as
restated in Gumban. But De Gala vs.
Gonzales, et al., 53 Rey vs.
Cartagena, De 54
Ticson vs. De
Gorostiza, 55 Sebastian vs.
Panganiban, 56 Rodriguez vs. Yap, 57 Grey
vs. Fabia, 58 Leynez vs. Leynez, 59 Martir
vs. Martir, 60 Alcala vs. De Villa, 61Sabado
vs.
Fernandez, 62 Mendoza vs.
Pilapil, 63 and Lopez vs. Liboro, 64 veered
away from the strict interpretation rule and
established a trend toward an application
of the liberal view.
The Code Commission, cognizant of such
a conflicting welter of views and of the
undeniable inclination towards a liberal
construction, recommended the
codification of the substantial compliance
rule, as it believed this rule to be in accord
with the modern tendency to give a liberal
approach to the interpretation of wills. Said
rule thus became what is now Article 809
of the Civil Code, with this explanation of
the Code Commission:
The present law provides for only one form
of executing a will, and that is, in
accordance with the formalities prescribed
by Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines had
previously upheld the strict compliance
with the legal formalities and had even
said that the provisions of Section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended
regarding the contents of the attestation
clause were mandatory, and non-
compliance therewith invalidated the will
(Uy Coque vs. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405). These
decisions necessarily restrained the
freedom of the testator in disposing of his
property.
However, in recent years the Supreme
Court changed its attitude and has become
more liberal in the interpretation of the
formalities in the execution of wills. This
liberal view is enunciated in the cases
of Rodriguez vs. Yap, G.R. No. 45924,
May 18, 1939; Leynez vs. Leynez, G.R.
No. 46097, October 18, 1939; Martir vs.
Martir, G.R. No. 46995, June 21, 1940;
and Alcala vs. Villa, G.R. No. 47351, April
18, 1941.
In the above mentioned decisions of our
Supreme Court, it has practically gone
back to the original provisions of Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure before
its amendment by Act No. 2645 in the year
1916. To turn this attitude into a legislative
declaration and to attain the main objective
of the proposed Code in the liberalization
of the manner of executing wills, article
829 of the Project is recommended, which
reads:
"Art. 829. In the absence of bad faith,
forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper
pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or
Succession 2nd batch/ full&digests | 84
in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the
will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the
requirements of article 829." 65

The so-called liberal rule, the Court said

in Gil vs. Murciano, 66 "does not offer any
puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the
door to serious consequences. The later
decisions do tell us when and where to
stop; they draw the dividing line with
precision. They do not allow
evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of
the document or supply missing details
that should appear in the will itself. They
only permit a probe into the will, an
exploration into its confines, to ascertain its
meaning or to determine the existence or
absence of the requisite formalities of law.
This clear, sharp limitation eliminates
uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of
dire results."

It may thus be stated that the rule, as it

now stands, is that omissions which can
be supplied by an examination of the will
itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and,
correspondingly, would not obstruct the
allowance to probate of the will being
assailed. However, those omissions which
cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the
invalidation of the attestation clause and
ultimately, of the will itself. 67

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby

GRANTED and the impugned decision of
respondent court is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is
accordingly directed to forthwith DISMISS
its Special Proceeding No. 3899-R
(Petition for the Probate of the Last Will
and Testament of Mateo Caballero) and to
REVIVE Special Proceeding No. 3965-R
(In the matter of the Intestate Estate of
Mateo Caballero) as an active case and
thereafter duly proceed with the settlement
of the estate of the said decedent.

SO ORDERED.

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