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SQ Solves
1NC- SQ Solves
SQ solvesmultiple warrants
Rashid 15 - the best-selling author of several books about Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia, most
recently Pakistan on the Brink (Ahmed, "China's power play in Afghanistan", The Exchange, 1/13/15,

With American troops pulling out of Afghanistan as part of a wider long term US retreat from south and
central Asia, China is waiting to fill the vacuum. It has brought regional countries together to encourage
peace, invested in mineral and oil extraction in a country where hardly anyone else will invest a penny,
and put pressure on its ally, Pakistan, to stop helping the Taliban. According to the Wall Street Journal,
China even hosted a delegation of Afghan Taliban officials in December, to discuss the possibility of
opening talks with the Afghan government. This is important for the west, which is in the middle of a
strategic retreat from the region even though international terrorism is still a threat. China has never
played such a diplomatic role outside its borders before and success in Afghanistan could conceivably
encourage Beijing to play a more positive role with North Korea. But does China have the incentive and
the stamina for such a difficult role outside its borders one that has in our lifetimes defeated the
former Soviet Union and the US? According to Sun Yuxi, Chinas special representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, China is not lacking in ambition. Afghanistan is facing a critical period, he told me
recently in London. We are ready to do more, we want to play a bigger role. We would welcome the
Taliban in any neutral venue such as in China. We will make negotiations happen but the process must
be Afghan-owned and Afghan-led. Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistans president, visited Beijing in late October
and asked China to play just such a role, saying in a speech: We count on the active engagement of the
Peoples Republic of China in promoting peace, prosperity, and stability in Afghanistan and in the
region. The hope is that where the US has failed, China will have the influence to persuade Pakistan to
come on board and force the Pakistan-based Taliban leadership to open talks with Kabul. China has
been building support for a regional consensus on Afghanistan through a slew of group meetings,
establishing a trilateral talking shop between China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and another one with the
US. US officials say that Washington is not averse to a larger role for China in Afghanistan, if it can broker
peace, keep out terrorists and help Afghanistans economy. In these respects, Beijing has interests that
directly coincide with Washington. Of particular concern to China is the national security threat in its
northwestern autonomous region of Xinjiang, which has seen a recent surge in riots and terrorist
attacks. Some Islamic radicals belonging to the Uighur ethnic group have trained with the Taliban in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Beijing would like to ensure that such militants gain neither training nor
protection within Taliban-controlled territory in the future. The mineral and energy resources of
Afghanistan are also a strong pull. Identified by the US, these went largely untapped due to the
continuing civil war there. The larger strategy for Beijing is around economic development including
the construction of the Silk Road. China is investing billions of dollars in a road and rail transportation
network stretching from western China to Germany, crossing dozens of countries. It wants to build a
railway in Afghanistan to carry minerals to China and a four lane highway from Gwadar port on the
Arabian Gulf crossing the length of Pakistan and arriving on the Chinese border. Pakistans prime
minister Nawaz Sharif has already signed up to economic corridor projects with China amounting to
$45bn over a decade. This could change the map of the region, but it also implies that the Pakistan army
is ready to clamp down on jihadist groups fighting in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Economic aid and money
is the ultimate lure for both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it is this that gives China a fighting chance of
settling a region that has seen nothing but war since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The US
failed to build a sustainable economy in Afghanistan or convince Pakistans army to stop backing
extremism. Chinas own economic plans and demand for raw materials could finally give Afghanistan
and Pakistan a financial bonanza and provide the incentive to end state support for extremist violence in
both countries. For any fragile nation state its a once in a lifetime opportunity. Whether both nations
will grasp it is still an open question.
2NC- Ext.- SQ Solves
Status quo solves Xi Jingpings State Visit confirms US-China cooperation for
reconstruction and stability in Afghanistan
The White House, 15 Office of the Press Secretary (FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinpings State Visit
to the United States, 7-25-16, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-

On September 24-25, 2015, President Barack Obama hosted President Xi Jinping of China for a State
visit. The two heads of state exchanged views on a range of global, regional, and bilateral subjects.
President Obama and President Xi agreed to work together to constructively manage our differences
and decided to expand and deepen cooperation in the following areas: Addressing Global and Regional
Challenges Afghanistan- The United States and China decided to maintain communication and
cooperation with one another on Afghanistan to support peaceful reconstruction and economic
development in Afghanistan, support an Afghan led, Afghan owned reconciliation process, and
promote trilateral dialogue among the United States, China, and Afghanistan. Together with
Afghanistan, the United States and China will co-chair a high-level event on Afghanistans reconstruction
and development on the margins of the UN General Assembly on September 26. This event will convene
Afghanistans neighbors and the international community to discuss the importance of continuing
robust regional and international support for the Afghan government and regional economic
cooperation. The United States and China jointly renew their call on the Taliban to enter into direct talks
with the Government of Afghanistan. The United States and China also noted their mutual interests in
supporting peace, stability, and prosperity in neighboring countries of Afghanistan, and to working in
partnership with these countries to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region.

Australian cooperation solves

Kenny 16, Colonel Stuart Kenny graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon in 1991. Colonel
Kenny is a graduate of the UKs Joint Services Command and Staff College 2003/04. He attended the
Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the
Australian Defence College, graduating with a Master of Arts (Strategic Studies) from Deakin University.
(Suart, Australian Defense College April 2016 Instability in Afghanistan: Why Afghanistan matters and
what Australia can do to address the causes of instability
http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Kenny%20Afghanistan%20IPSP.pdf) //eb

Despite its ongoing instability, Afghanistan remains globally and regionally significant. Afghanistan is a
key element of the regional security dynamic and has the potential to adversely affect the security of
other regional states, including India, with which Australia seeks closer political and economic relations.
Through an examination of the ongoing and future threats to Afghanistan and the way in which the US
and NATO are responding to the deteriorating security situation, it has been argued in this paper that
action needs to be taken to continue assisting Afghanistan to address the sources of its instability. To
that end, the paper has proposed two policy initiatives to contribute to Australias efforts in supporting
the Afghan Government. The first addresses the immediate concerns of instability and is broken into
two sub-components; namely, that Australia should maintain its current train, advise and assist
commitment to the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in response to the US decision to extend its
commitment into 2017, and that Australia should expand its current Special Forces commitment by the
provision of a Special Forces training team to support the US counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan.
These initiatives would support the Afghan Government in countering the Taliban-led insurgency, in
accordance with Australias commitment to its Comprehensive Long-Term Partnership with Afghanistan.
They also reflect Australias national interest in ensuring that Afghanistan does not become a
transnational terrorism safe-haven, as well as support to the USAustralia alliance. The second policy
initiative proposes a strategy to address the influence of regional external actors, particularly Pakistan
and India, on the long-term stability of Afghanistan. The policy recommends that Australia employ its
bilateral relationships with each nation and its involvement in multilateral forums, such as the Istanbul
Process, to influence the behaviour of Pakistan and India. Specifically, it proposes that Australia should
develop a strategy to convince Pakistan to do more to close the terrorist safe havens along the Pakistan-
Afghan frontier. It should also work with Pakistan and India to temper their competition for influence on
Afghanistan, which leads to a proxy war in Afghanistan. The policy should also promote economic
benefits through a cooperative approach to trade and development within Afghanistan. However, this
policy cannot be achieved by Australia alone and would require the support of the US, NATO nations
and regional stakeholders such as China. Australia cannot view Afghanistan in isolation but rather must
see it as part of a wider South Asia geopolitical construct. In promoting new initiatives to support
Afghanistan, Australia will need to work as part of a US-led coalition while engaging key regional
stakeholders. The policy initiatives suggested in this paper would protect Australias national security,
economic and political interests in Afghanistan and South Asia, and would strengthen Australias ability
to exploit the economic opportunities that are emerging in South Asia.
Alt Causes
1NC- Alt causes

Status Quo solves- China and Pakistan alliance is sufficient to improve infrastructure in
Siddique 15, Siddique is a journalist specializing in coverage of Afghanistan and Pakistan. He has spent
the past fifteen years researching and writing about security, political, humanitarian and cultural issues
in Afghanistan. In addition to his reporting, Siddique has spoken at Western think tanks and has
contributed articles, chapters and research papers to a range of publications.
(Abubakar, New Chinese Grand Strategy To Help Afghanistan Gandhara 10/29/15

Successive Afghan leaders have dreamed of turning their country into a "land bridge" or a
"roundabout" of regional trade and cooperation. Instead, their country -- metaphorically called
"the heart of Asia" for its location at the center of Asia's landmass -- has attracted terrorists and
covert wars clouding the country's future and raising questions over its very survival as a nation
state. A series of Chinese-financed infrastructure, energy, and transport projects has now raised
hopes that the investments will help in establishing lasting peace in Afghanistan. The ambitious
projects spanning oceans and continents are collectively called "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR).
And they are being billed as creating an opportunity to transform the economic and political
and economic landscape across Asia. While none of the major OBOR investments is planned for
Afghanistan, a new study by a New York-based think tank says its effect on Afghanistan will be
transformative. "The OBOR initiative has the potential to integrate Afghanistan into the
regional economy in ways the U.S. has sought to do for years," observed the report, called The
New Silk Roads: China, the U.S. and the Future of Central Asia. Thomas Zimmerman, a
researcher at New York University's Center on International Cooperation, spent six month at
Shanghai's Academy of Social Sciences this year to explain China's grand strategy for turning its
restive Western Xinjiang region into a hub of regional trade and transport by investing
hundreds of billions of dollars in more than 20 countries spread across Eurasia from Indonesia
to Denmark. "China has an interest in building stronger relations with its neighbors. The scale of
investment Beijing is currently discussing could have an immensely positive impact in a number
of underdeveloped economies," Zimmerman wrote. "This is particularly true in Afghanistan." In
recent years, Beijing has clearly moved to play a bigger role in Afghanistan by backing its
investments and economic aid with support for the Afghan peace process and even extending
security cooperation to Kabul. "Chinese experts also emphasize that while there is concern over
the current security situation, China remains interested in Afghanistan as a longer-term
investment opportunity," Zimmerman wrote. A key demonstration of this willingness is China's
move toward crafting an Afghanistan policy independent of its long-term alliance with Pakistan.
In recent years, Beijing has hosted talks between Afghan officials and Taliban representatives
and has encouraged Islamabad to adopt a more positive approach toward Afghanistan by
pushing the hard-line Taliban leaders hiding inside Pakistan to join negotiations with Kabul.
"Beijing is implicitly tying its promise of investments to the expectation that Pakistan will play a
constructive role in promoting political reconciliation and stability in Afghanistan," the study
observed. After signing $46 billion commitments as part of the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor in April, visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping called on Islamabad to gear toward a
more positive role in Afghanistan. "China will work with Pakistan to advance the reconciliation
process and smooth transition in Afghanistan and work together to build a new type of
international relations of win-win cooperation," Xi told Pakistani lawmakers.

Alt causelack of US military support

Yasmeh 16 - Staff writer for The Daily Wire (Joshua, "We Spent Billions Training Afghan Soliders. Now
They're Defecting To The Taliban", The Daily Wire, 4/12/16, www.dailywire.com/news/4848/we-spent-

Scores of US-trained Afghan soldiers have deserted their posts and joined the Taliban, according to an
exclusive report by CNN Senior International Correspondent Nick Paton Walsh. Understaffed and under
resourced, the Afghan military is finding it difficult to retain troops. Death is not the only reason the
Afghan army is losing troops: Desertion is rife within the ranks, explains Walsh. As the Taliban makes
headway and regains territory in southern Afghanistan, an unstable government in Kabul continues to
lose ground. The Taliban control or influence as much as 20% of Afghanistan, its highest levels of
control since 2001, notes CNN. Despite abstract assurances by the White House, Afghanistan is falling.
While the Talibans aims are grounded in political Islam, many Afghan soldiers are defecting for practical
reasons. Walsh reports: CNN met two deserters in Helmand whose stories show the breadth of the
problem, who have taken their skills -- months of U.S. taxpayer-funded training -- to the Taliban. "I did
18 months of army training and took an oath to serve this country," one deserter said. "But the situation
changed. The army let us down, so we had to come to the Taliban, who treat us like guests." The two
men still had their old uniforms, army IDs, and even the bank cards they used to withdraw their official
wages. "I decided to leave the army when my dead and injured comrades lay in our base, and nobody
took them to hospital. My army training is very useful now, as I am training Taliban fighters with the
same knowledge." Heres Walshs full report: Perhaps its cowardice. Or maybe its a simple cost-benefit
decision based on rational self-interests and the sheer impulse to survive. Without a stable US military
presence on the ground, Afghan soldiers have been dropping like flies. 2015 may have been the worst
year since the beginning of the US invasion. Consider this: According to CNN, U.S. officials estimate that
5,500 Afghan security force members died that year alone, far more than the 3,500 NATO lost in its
entire decade long campaign. And 2016 may be much worse." "Afghanistan is at an inflection point;
2016 may be "no better and possibly worse than 2015, stated Americas top commander in the
country, Army Gen. John Campbell. "Now, more than ever, the United States should not waver in
Afghanistan." Campbell added: Afghanistan has not achieved an enduring level of security and stability
that justifies a reduction of our support in 2016." "Close air support has been the one resource and
capability that the Afghans have asked me for every single day," asserted the US commander. "Those
who serve in Afghanistan understand it's worth the investment. The Afghan army needs close US
support. In December General Campbell confessed that ISIS had infiltrated Afghanistan posing a major
threat to troops and allies on the ground. There could be 3,000 or 4,000 or 5,000 ISIS men who are now
trying to consolidate links to their mothership in Iraq and Syria,reports Independent. ISIS wants to
establish its pre-Afghan Khorasan Province in Afghanistans Nangarhar province. Unfortunately,
President Obama and his amateur national security team have made a habit of ignoring our military
tacticians. As the region devolved into anarchy and social strife, Obama shifted his Afghanistan policy
several times. In October, President Obama announced his plan to leave nearly 5,500 U.S. troops in
Afghanistan until early 2017. The plan will maintain the current levels of armed forces until shortly after
the end of Obamas presidency, kicking the can down the road for the next president. Thanks to
President Obamas politically expedient decision to prematurely label combat operations in Afghanistan
over, more Afghans are dying. Soldiers are defecting. And the government in Kabul is losing territory
faster than it ever has. Obamas reckless and abrupt end-all-wars campaign has cost countless lives.
Since we are technically not at war, the US military operators have to abide by very narrow rules of
engagement. The rise of ISIS in Afghanistan places President Obamas schizophrenic (anti)war strategy in
stark relief. The latest developments in the war-torn terrorist hotbed directly undermine the
administration's narrative of a stabilized Afghanistan. This president ran as the anti-Bush pacifist, an
agent of change that would end all wars. Instead, Obamas reign as president has wrought nothing but
bloodshed in a region mired in geopolitical instability.
2NC- Ext.- Alt Causes
Cant Solve
1NC- Cant Solve
Multiple factors prevent successful US-Sino cooperation over Afghanistan
Yuqun 14 - Director of Center for American Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (Shao,
"Possibility and Limit of Sino-US Cooperation on the Afghanistan Issue", 1/28/14, China Us Focus,

Restrictive Factors It must be admitted, however, Sino-US cooperation on the Afghanistan issue will
remain limited due to the following restrictive factors: First, the United States maintains an ill image in
central and south Asia due to the erroneous policy adopted by the junior Bush Administration and
continuation of part of this policy by the Obama Administration, leading to the continuous rise of anti-
US sentiment in some countries in this region. During their course of cooperation, China and the United
States should follow an independent and impartial policy stand on the Afghanistan issue, base their
efforts on the stand upheld by Afghanistan and other countries in this region, and take the interests of
these countries into closer consideration when mapping out pertinent policies. This, however, may lead
to some conflicts between China and the United States during their course of cooperation. Second, the
United States, anxious to pull out of Afghanistan, has kept stressing cooperation with regional countries
including China. Due to its geopolitical considerations and ideological traditions, however, it has
remained unfriendly to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and suspicious of investment by Chinas
State-owned enterprises in Afghanistan. Nor, is it inclined to give up interference in the internal affairs
of other countries. All these will obstruct its long-term cooperation with China on the Afghanistan issue.
Another factor is the double standards applied by the United States to anti-terrorist operations, a fact
that will greatly dampen its cooperation with China on the Afghanistan issue. On June 26, 2013, a violent
terrorist attack hit Shanshan in Chinas Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. A US State Department
spokesperson, however, took the chance to criticize Chinas ethnic and religious policies. Yet another
repetition of its similar stand by the United States on Chinas core interests and key concerns including
policies on minority areas including Xinjiang, this has once again showed the double standards followed
by the United States on anti-terrorist efforts, a stand that will greatly hinder its cooperation with China
in anti-terrorist operations. A deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan after 2014 will
definitely impact security and stability in Chinas western areas. If the United States keeps to its double
standards, Sino-US security cooperation involving Afghanistan will hardly get ahead.
1NC- Cant Solve instability
Aff cant solve instability geography, Pakistan, and resistance to change
Kfir, 10 - Schusterman Visiting Scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship/Institute for National
Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), College of Law, Syracuse University (Isaac, IS THERE ANY HOPE
FOR PEACEBUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN?, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), 7-5-10,
Vol. 14 Issue 3 p45-64., ProQuest)//JH

UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN Afghanistan's geographical location has made it one of the most
important countries in the world,42 yet its topography has made it one of the hardest to govern. The
country's rough terrain-high mountains, isolating fertile valleys, deserts, and wild rivers-has led to
ethnically diverse pockets of population and isolation between groups. In addition to the geography, the
harsh climate (brutal winters and very hot summers) requires groups keep within their settlements.43
This has led to strong internal loyalties within communities, which enables them to withstand these
conditions and protects the group from any invaders seeking to take control of the area the group
resides in.44 So limited is access to the outside world, that Nancy Hatch Dupree has argued individuals
in Afghanistan live and die in their home valleys, unaware of what is around them.45 When globalization
and modernization came to Afghanistan, they created many problems for a society that fostered
traditionalism by challenging the communal codes the society lived under. For example, modernization
allowed young men to leave the village to work in the towns, where they could earn more money. Upon
their return, their new status undermined the position of the elders.46 Linked to Afghanistan's
population and its dispersion are the country's borders, another core reason for Afghan instability. In
the northern part of the country there are Turkic, Tajik, and Uzbek people who have more in common
with Central Asia than with their southern brethren. They used to live as part of a single province known
as Turkistan, but in 1967, the Afghan government introduced reforms that created smaller provinces
(Balkh, Jawzjan, Samangan, and Farya) to weaken the non-Pashtun people.47 In the West, Afghanistan
shares a border with Iran and inhabitants of the area speak the same Farsi dialect as those living in
eastern Iran. The Baluchs spread across three states-southern Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan-while in
the east and southeast there is a heavy concentration of Pashtun, although they are far from
homogenous, as intra-Pashtun tensions often undermine their cohesion.48 Afghanistan has a powerful
neighbor, Pakistan, which is responsible for much of the instability.49 Pakistanis see Afghanistan as
offering "strategic depth" against India. Islamabad has always striven to have a pliable or pro-Pakistani
government in Kabul, in case India launches an attack against Pakistan. A pro-Islamabad government in
Kabul means Pakistan will be able to use Afghanistan to launch a counter-offensive against India.50 In
other words, Pakistan's surreptitious intercession in Afghanistan stems from a Pakistani sense of
insecurity that comes from the nature of the Pakistani state, which sees India as the biggest threat to its
survival.51 Since 2001, Pakistan has come under tremendous scrutiny regarding its involvement in
Afghanistan, including its role in establishing and sponsoring the Taliban and other militant Islamists in
Afghanistan.52 Yet this has not stopped Pakistani meddling in Afghan affairs, because it is seen as vital
to Pakistan's survival, raising the question as to whether Pakistan would it stop meddling in Afghan
affairs if it were no longer feared. The second issue facilitating and provoking Pakistani intervention in
Afghan affairs stems from the Durand Line, the controversial border drawn in the 1890s between the
two countries (at the time it divided Afghanistan and British India), splitting the Pashtuns of Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Afghans historically have sought to have the border renegotiated.53 The large Afghan
refugee community in Pakistan has added to tension between the two countries, as problems for
Pakistan include the establishment of illegal settlements (katchi abadis) on state land and tensions with
the indigenous population since refugees are willing to work for less.54 The presence of a large Pashtun
(Pakistani-born) community that continues to demand a Pashtun state55 has created concern for
Pakistani policymakers, because there is a large community within Pakistan whose allegiances lie with a
foreign body or with an idea that will break up Pakistan.56 Fear of secession is very real for Pakistan,
itself the product of the 1947 secession from India and the defection of the country's eastern section in
1971 to become Bangladesh.57 The Pakistani leader Zia al-Haq was interested in linking Pashtuns on
both sides of the 2,400 kilometer-long Afghan- Pakistan border into a Pakistani-controlled area.58 Zia's
Islamist orientation encouraged the Islamization of the Pashtun tribes challenging traditional leaders. As
young men fighting the Soviets became powerful, they undermined the elders and advocated a more
dogmatic form of Wahhabi or Deobandi Islam.59 This did not challenge Pashtun identity, which has
remained an important force in Afghan politics,60 but created new tensions and gulfs within a society
where it does not take much to cause a conflict.61 Afghanistan has major ethnic and religious cleavages
undermining unity and Afghan nationalism, leading the noted British academic Anthony Hyman to
declare, "The Afghans are neither one people nor one political community, while the state itself is
broken-backed and the country divided between two rival governments: a Taliban ruled state competes
for control of northern regions under mutually rival warlords. Ethnic, tribal, and sectarian divisions have
worsened and further fragmented the country."62 This state of affairs is a result of the way Ahmed Shah
Durrani created the Afghan "state" through conquest and guile. However, incessant intra-dynastic feuds
coupled with the rise of Sikh power under Ranjit Sikh-not to mention British penetration into the
subcontinent leading to the "Great Game"-left Afghanistan even more divided and perpetually weak as
Britain and Russia courted Afghan leaders and provided them with stipends.63 This did not encourage
Afghan leaders to develop a viable, legitimate Afghan state that could survive on its own, as they opted
to use the money to fight off challengers, buy challengers off, or simply live a life of luxury.64 When
Afghanistan became independent in 1921, the "Great Game" legacy remained as Afghan leaders
continued to rely on either Britain or the Soviet Union to survive-seen with the treaty Afghanistan
signed with the British following the end of the Third Afghan War (1919) and the 1921 Treaty of
Friendship with the Soviet Union.65The internal tensions that had existed in Afghanistan throughout the
twentieth century were exacerbated by the Afghan jihad, as the mujahidin were divided along ethnic
lines, which meant that the factions often fought one another and not only the Soviets and the Afghan
communist government.66 Today, the Pashtuns dominate Afghanistan making up around 40 percent of
the population. The other key ethnic groups in Afghanistan are the Tajiks, Hazaras, and the Uzbeks.
Pashtun dominance is such that even the names of the Afghan parliament are Pashtu-Wolesi Jirga
(Council of the People) and Meshrano Jirga (Council of the Elders). However, the Pashtun are
heterogeneous, with long historical roots (Herodotus refers to them as Partika).67 Their lives are
governed by Pashtunwalli, laws that emphasize honor (nang) and revenge (badal) on anything perceived
by an individual to challenge his honor.68 Linked to the Pashtunwalli is the Pashtun commitment to self-
rule, heightened by their warrior-like nature that craves independence, for which they are willing to
fight and die if necessary.69 In addition to Pashtunwalli, what makes the modern Pashtun such a potent
force is Islam, with many adopting dogmatic and uncompromising views coupled with a desire to attain
martyrdom raising their fighting potential.70 Pashtun trace their adoption of Islam to Qais bin Rashid of
Ghor, who they claim was converted to Islam by the prophet himself. Yet historically while the Pashtuns
were conservative Muslims, they were not dogmatic nor did they practice Deobandi or Whabbi Islam.71
Donald Wilber, an experienced traveler in Muslim states, upon visiting Afghanistan in the early 1950s,
noted: "Prayer is an important feature of daily life. Buses and trucks halt along the road at times of
prayer; and the sunset prayer, when all the passengers align themselves in rows.... The manufacture,
sale, and use of alcohol are forbidden: violators are severely punished by law, and in a country famed for
its countless varieties of grapes no wine is made."72 The importance of Islam in Afghan society has
arguably increased because as the state fails to provide basic security, Afghans turn to Islamic practices
such as zakat (alms giving) and the qadis (judges) as solutions to their hard existence.73 Put simply, the
Islamization of Afghanistan has made an already conservative Muslim population far more resistant to
change and foreign ideas, especially when these ideas are seen as corrupting (fasid).74 This attitude
explains opposition to some of the changes demanded by the international community though that
basic attitude is not in itself new.75
1NC- Peace doesnt solve
Peacebuilding fails plan cant solve the structural problems in Afghanistan
Kfir, 10 - Schusterman Visiting Scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship/Institute for National
Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), College of Law, Syracuse University (Isaac, IS THERE ANY HOPE
FOR PEACEBUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN?, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), 7-5-10,
Vol. 14 Issue 3 p45-64., ProQuest)//JH

CONCLUSION In many respects, peacebuilding in Afghanistan is a doomed project. Although there has
been some substantive change in the infrastructure-in the political (election of parliament, adoption of a
constitution) or social and economic sphere (building schools, hospitals, sewage as well road
construction and electricity), the reality remains that despite billions of dollars in assistance and an
escalating international presence, security continues to elude Afghanistan.99 In 2010, the Afghan
government is unable to exercise power in about two-thirds of the country; the Afghan army and police
are heavily dependent on coalition forces;100 corruption pervades all aspects of Afghan society; and
opium production, which appears on the wane in 2010, is still a major cash-crop for Afghans.101 A core
problem with the peacebuilding operation in the Afghanistan is that Afghan leadership, which speaks to
two different audiences-domestic and foreign-severely impedes the peacebuilding process. For
example, Hamid Karzai appears to supports a Western interpretation of human rights as well as gender
equality.102 However, to obtain needed votes, Karzai, despite Western protests, adopted the Shi'a
Family Law that seemed to make Hazara women the property of their husbands.103 Afghan leaders
have always had to compromise and make deals in order to survive.104 Incidents of corruption such as
the 2009 presidential election or the scandal surrounding the Kabul Bank make it difficult to determine
what Afghan leaders stand for besides protecting their own interests. This makes it hard for the
international community to devise a strategy for reconstruction, especially when it has pinned hopes on
the current leadership, which not only fails to deliver, but arguably benefits by Afghanistan's lack of
progress since that guarantees the international presents and aid.105 The leadership is untrustworthy,
fickle, and divisive. Put simply, Hamid Karzai may have been the best choice in 2001, but in 2010 he
clearly is the problem. He refuses to implement reform and lead by example; if anything he is guilty of
doing the opposite. Second, it is clear that the Afghan political system developed by the Bonn Process is
corrupt and inept.106 In August 2010, Hamid Karzai fired Fazel Ahmed Faqiryar as deputy attorney-
general apparently because he was looking into the activities of Mohammed Zia Salehi, head of the
Afghan National Security Council, which meant he was untouchable.107 Moreover, dissonance between
the center and periphery makes any attempt at meaningful reform next to impossible. Those living in
the countryside (the majority) reject the Kabul government, which they see as corrupt, inept, and
Western-dominated. This is why the insurgency is more than simply Taliban-led but a reaction to the
ineffectiveness of the central government. Ultimately, conditions, including the level of insurgency, vary
among provinces.108 Thus, the ISAF has sought to change its tactics. One way to deal with the
insurgency is to devolve power, not only to the provinces but also sub-province level.109 Third, as most
commentators agree, economic poverty and poor social conditions are a root cause of the Afghan
insurgency.110 Due to the high-level of corruption, Afghans often do not receive the international aid
that has been allocated to them. This is exacerbated by the lack of security, which also prevents aid from
being fully distributed in locations where the insurgency is raging. Moreover, if aid is delivered,
insurgents often seize or destroy it. Ordinary Afghans may appreciate the challenge of distributing aid,
but ultimately their view is that ISAF and USFOR-A, as well as the hundreds of NGOs, have been in the
country for almost a decade and their conditions have not improved. Thus, they are weary of the
intervention. Real reconstruction in Afghanistan requires a debate regarding Pakistan's role and a vital
conduit for the development of an Afghan economy. Pakistan must change some of its policies to ensure
effective reconstruction in Afghanistan, as Afghan dependency on Pakistan stems from its geography-it
is landlocked. This will also benefit Pakistan, as the two are interlinked in that when a problem affects
one country it impacts the other. For example, in the 1950s, when there were tensions between
Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Durand Line, Pakistan simply closed the border. This had a huge
impact on the Afghan economy. This situation is true today as much as it was in the 1950s, as seen for
example when NATO conveys are attacked in Pakistan thus affecting the campaign in Afghanistan. Thus,
the Afghan-Pakistan trade Agreement of June 2010111 was a positive development, but as long as
Afghanistan lacks basic infrastructure, the benefits of the agreement will not be felt by many Afghans. It
also discourages the millions of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan from returning, as they would rather
live in the squalor of Peshawar or Karachi than the insecurity of Helmand or Kandahar. The final issue
affecting the peacebuilding effort in Afghanistan from the domestic perspective is human rights.112 In
2010, Afghanistan's human rights record remains one of the world's worst. Many officials have
participated in gross human rights violations. While it is unlikely and unrealistic for Afghanistan to place
all those individuals on trial, the violations need to be addressed. The international community excuses
such violations despite the talk of a need for protecting and developing universal human rights norms.
On the international front, the peacebuilding process has been undermined by many shortcomings. The
ISAF is trying to do too much and faces conflicting tasks. Consequently, security conditions have
deteriorated while coalition troops seem to suffer from low morale.113 Afghan support or the effort has
also declined. Whereas in 2001, coalition forces were liberators, increasingly they are seen as occupiers
to Afghans who want to evict them, as happened with the Soviets and the British. Ultimately, the
approach of the international community has suffered from typical post-Cold War "liberal peace"
arrogance, misunderstanding, lack of an appreciation of the challenge, and poor allocation of resources.
Unless this is remedied, the program will continue to provide very little return on investment and reason
to hope for an improved situation in Afghanistan.
2NC- Cant Solve

Plan cant solve- no country can stabilize Afghanistan until there are peace talks and
Pakistan support
Rashid 14, Rashid (Urdu: ; born 1948) is a former Pakistani militant, a journalist and best-
selling foreign policy author of several books about Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. (Ahmed,
Viewpoint: Can China bring peace to Afghanistan? BBC 12/1/14
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30273431) //eb
China is emerging from the shadows to pledge to play a major role in peacemaking in Afghanistan as
foreign troops prepare to withdraw at the end of the month, writes guest columnist Ahmed Rashid.
Beijing's efforts include an invitation for the Taliban to visit China. Yet sceptics may well ask
whether China, which has never played such a mediating role outside its borders before, can succeed
where the US, Nato and Afghanistan's neighbours have so far failed. ''For the past 13 years the US and
Nato have been playing a major role in Afghanistan and we made a contribution and gave them support
- but now with the US leaving, Afghanistan is facing a critical period,'' Ambassador Sun Yuxi, China's
special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, told the BBC. In his first interview to Western
media, Ambassador Sun said: ''We are ready to do more, we want to play a bigger role. "We would
welcome the Taliban in any neutral venue such as in China. We will make negotiations happen but the
process must be Afghan-owned and Afghan-led - the agenda must be proposed by President Ashraf
Ghani,'' he added. Facilitating talks President Ghani has already visited Beijing to ask the Chinese
to play just such a mediating role and to put pressure on Pakistan, which is a close ally of China,
to let the Afghan government meet with Taliban leaders living in Pakistan. Islamabad's powerful
military, which takes all major foreign policy decisions, has indicated it is willing to consider a
peace process once the Afghans come up with one. Ambassador Sun said that China had
already established several forums for discussion on how to bring in neighbouring states and
others to support reconciliation in Afghanistan. ''One tripod involves talks between China,
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the second is a group of regional countries called 'six plus one', which involves
US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran and the one being Afghanistan. This group has already met
twice,'' said Mr Sun. Another 'tripod' group that Western diplomats say has held several meetings, but
which the Chinese are reluctant to talk about, is China, US and Afghanistan. This grouping is seen to be
especially vital as the US withdraws from Afghanistan. The Chinese have said they will never deploy
troops in Afghanistan, but they are certain to become the major power in the region. The US, which is
undergoing a strategic shift away from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, is not averse to a larger Chinese
role if it involves keeping the peace and keeping out the militants. 'Terrorism' threat The international
forums being sponsored by the Chinese are trying to achieve multiple aims - to support reconciliation in
Afghanistan, but to bring countries like India and Pakistan and Iran and Pakistan to the table to iron out
their mutual rivalries which have stymied every peace process in Afghanistan since the 1980s. The
appointment of Sun Yuxi, 63, who has specialised in Afghanistan since 1981 when as a young
diplomat he helped provide Chinese arms to the Afghan mujahideen fighting the Soviets, is a
strong signal that China is serious. Fluent in English, articulate and friendly Mr Sun is clearly
equipped with extraordinary powers from his leaders to make things happen. The reasons for
this diplomatic outing by China, when it has never helped mediate an international conflict
before, is the risks it faces from the south. Cheap Afghan opium is flooding China while Uighur
Islamic extremists from Xinjiang have been accused of carrying out acts of terrorism. Hundreds of them
are based in the badlands of Pakistan and Afghanistan and are supported by the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
In fact China faces an increasing national security threat if militant groups continue to find sanctuary in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. ''We support a peace process because we are also victims of terrorism,'' says
Mr Sun. Rebuilding north-south corridor ''Our larger strategy is also economic development - the
construction of the Silk Road which includes Pakistan and Afghanistan,'' said Ambassador Sun. China is
investing billions of dollars in a road and rail transportation network that will stretch from western China
to Germany crossing dozens of countries. Afghanistan, rich in minerals and oil that China is keen to
exploit, is a critical part of that network. China wants to build a north-south economic corridor through
Pakistan that would carry energy from the Gulf to the Chinese border nearly 2,000 miles in the north.
China's funding of such mammoth projects could become a huge lure for Pakistan, Afghanistan and the
Taliban to come to the peace table. Diplomats describe it as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to
kick-start the two redundant economies of Pakistan and Afghanistan. More than $100bn
(64bn) will be involved in building the Afghan and Pakistani spurs of the Silk Route. China
wants to exploit the mineral deposits of Afghanistan and is prepared to build a railway from
Kabul to Xinjiang in China, while similar mammoth schemes are being prepared for Pakistan. But
nothing will happen until the numerous wars in the region come to an end. That includes the insurgency
in Balochistan, the violence in Karachi and the Taliban insurrections in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Much
will depend on whether the Pakistan army is prepared to seize the moment and push the Afghan Taliban
to the peace table. Diplomatic sources say the Chinese have already established their own
contacts with the Taliban. However, China is unlikely to get itself involved in the nitty-gritty gritty of
peace talks between President Ghani and the Taliban. It wants to make the introductions, provide a
neutral venue and let the two sides get on with it, which is why China is now anxiously waiting for a
peace plan from Ashraf Ghani and support from Pakistan's military.
2NC- Plan Fails
Afghan Railway Fails; Aff cant overcome these risks
Pleis et al, 14 Chief of the Strategy and Policy Office in the Directorate of Logistics and Engineering
at U.S. Central Command (Lawrence, The Afghanistan National Railway: A Plan of Opportunity,
National Defense University Press, 7-30-14,

Risk Assessment Though there is substantial support for expansion of Afghanistans current, single rail
line, there are challenges in developing and operating a national rail system. The planning team
evaluated risk associated with the preferred design scenario through a broad assessment that weighed
37 risk factors organized in 7 risk categories to account for these challenges and the assumptions used
for planning (see table 4). 1. Investment and Funding. As GIRoA does not have the required resources to
finance the construction of the national railway on its own, sufficient financing is essential from both the
international financial community and private sector. To encourage investment by financiers, GIRoA
must ensure that capital and operating cost estimates for projects are accurate; the appropriate laws,
policies, and regulations are in place; and an overall project manager is appointed to plan and manage
initial development. Land grants could also serve as a means to finance national railway construction. 2.
Political (Internal to Afghanistan). GIRoA instability following the drawdown of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization forces in 2014 could halt the development of railway and mining operations. National,
regional, and local governments are encouraged to work collectively to ensure a sufficient level of
governance during and after foreign troop withdrawal. 3. Security. Insufficient security measures could
lead to theft, vandalism, and/or terrorist attacks on railway and mining property, infrastructure,
equipment, and personnel, resulting in schedule delays and loss of railway and mining revenues. GIRoA
should work with regional and local governments and tribes to develop and implement a security plan
that encourages regional and local governments and tribes to participate in, and support, security
operations. Local employment for security forces, land grants, and revenue sharing could be leveraged
as incentives. 4. Operations. Due to a lack of experience, industry experts must be recruited for the
startup of operations and to train local labor. GIRoA should also consider sending some people to train
on neighboring railways and explore opportunities in railway management education offered at the
university level. Afghanistan rail operations must be coordinated closely with neighboring countries to
ensure efficient interchange of operations and traffic. Safety and operating standards for equipment,
track, and personnel must be developed and promulgated to ensure safe, reliable, and efficient
operations. 5. Development. Failure to achieve sufficient project management, acquire and retain
technical staff, receive building permits, maintain sufficient water and energy delivery to mining sites,
and sustain an adequate labor force could jeopardize expansion of Afghanistans rail system.
Professional project management and recruitment of the staff needed for construction and for railway
and mining operations must be achieved for these mutually reliant sectors. Land use agreements,
potential land grant arrangements, and building permits must be both properly negotiated and legally
binding to enable railway construction to proceed. Customs arrangements with neighboring countries
must also be expedited to ensure railway construction materials and equipment as well as rolling stock
and control systems equipment can be imported in a timely manner. 6. Political (External to
Afghanistan). Afghanistans relations with neighboring countries and their respective railways will have a
major impact on the success of the Afghanistan railway. Relations with Iran and Pakistan are crucial to
efficient transport of iron ore to port for onward sealift to South and East Asian markets. Negotiations
with those countries and their railway programs are a high priority and are essential to revenue
generation. Continued negotiations with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are encouraged to
determine procedures for freight originating, terminating, and transiting between the countries. 7. Legal
and Regulatory. Afghanistan will need a viable legal and regulatory framework for both the railway and
mining sectors permitting and enforcing property rights and the contractual agreements. The ARA will
also need sufficient resources and capabilities to develop appropriate economic and safety regulations
for the railway. Establishment and enforcement of safety regulations should enable a safe environment
for railway personnel and communities near the railway and encourage a more efficient railway,
resulting in fewer accidents. Overall, the preferred national railway design presents medium risk based
on key ANRP stakeholder input and is consistent with other large-scale capital investment projects in
Afghanistan. Recommendations to GIRoA: Develop and implement a comprehensive railway risk
management process to identify and manage risk throughout development and operation of the
railway. Assign the ARA chief executive director as the risk management functional lead and provide
sufficient resources to the ARA for execution of risk management responsibilities. Require formal
approval of project risk mitigation/avoidance plans prior to project funding approval.
China Says No
1NC- China says no
China says noempirics prove they dont like to get involved in Afghanistan
Godehardt and Shim 14 Nadine, research fellow at the German Institute for International Sand
Security Affairs specializing in Chinas foreign policy, particularly regional challenges in Asia and David,
assistant professor in the Department of International relations and International Organization at the
University of Groningen, Netherlands, and associate research fellow at the GIGA Institute of Asian
Studies, Hamburg, "Post-2014 Afghanistan and Its Impact on Northeast Asia," Asian Perspective,
October-December 2014 http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1628232817?pq-

Afghanistan has not been a top priority in China's diplomacy. In crucial moments of modem Afghan
history, such as during the Soviet occupation (1979-1989), the coming to power of the Tal- iban in 1996, and the new
war led by the United States and its NATO allies since 2001, China took a low-profile stand on Afghanistan. As Zhao Huasheng
(2012, 2) rightly argues, China has only "very limited goals in Afghanistan" and is not interested in getting militarily

involved there. Since Chinese leaders still espouse the principle of nonintervention, they do not see China's main task as rebuilding
Afghanistan politically. In addition, China's economic interests are rather specific and tightly focused on
exploitation of energy resources and rare earths.
OBOR Fails
1NC- OBOR fails
OBOR faces significant challenges low interest and little benefits discourage
Rudolf, 15 - Research Associate, Mercator Institute for China Studies (Moritz, Chinas Silk Road
Initiative Is at Risk of Failure, The Diplomat, 9/24, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/chinas-silk-road-

The Silk Road Initiative is the major project for Chinese President Xi Jinping. On every state visit and
within every diplomatic forum, he has promoted his idea of One Belt, One Road (OBOR). Beijing wants
to create China-centered infrastructure networks in order to expand its own economic and political
influence in Eurasia. But the time when the country was able to make economically unprofitable
investments on the basis of political motives is long gone. Beijing had intended to invest more than $900
billion in infrastructure expansion in Eurasia. However, the money is now needed to stabilize its
stagnating economy and nervous financial markets. Chinas currency reserves decreased drastically in
August. Due to financing difficulties a number of infrastructure projects have come to a standstill. For
example, the gas pipeline known as Power of Siberia, the subject of an agreement signed by Russia
and China in May last year, is in danger of flopping. In addition to this, the release of funds for the
construction of the Altai gas pipeline to connect western Siberia and China has been delayed
indefinitely. At a more basic level, the OBOR represents an economic step backwards: instead of placing
more emphasis on domestic demand, Beijing is speculating on new export markets in unstable regions
such as Pakistan. The overcapacity of Chinese state-owned enterprises are not addressed but simply
exported abroad. In this way the leadership is hampering its own ability to overcome the structural crisis
of the Chinese growth model. For the time being, OBOR remains a speculative bubble. Part of the
initiative is to create around 20 cross-border Special Economic Zones. Khorgos, on the border with
Kazakhstan, serves as a cautionary example: two years after the go-ahead China has built a city
consisting of a number of multi-story shopping centers in the desert. In one of those buildings, for
example, there are roughly one hundred shops, each one of them selling exactly the same product: fur
coats. By way of contrast, on the Kazak side stands only a yurt and a couple of plastic camels. Inside the
yurt, where one can buy German sweets and Russian beer; there is no sign of any customers. At the
same time, there is a lack of partners for the OBOR initiative: China is virtually on its own. The Chinese
leadership has until now only been able to reach a handful of vague cooperation agreements, such as
those with Russia and Hungary. But none of those states (and maybe not even China itself) know what
OBOR really means. Xi Jinping wants to promote the idea of a community of common destiny. He has,
however, not been able to convey what this term signifies and he has failed to convince other states
why the OBOR should be attractive for other countries. While Xi promises win-win situations, the
biggest winner would be China. This is because Beijing is at once the projects architect, financier, and
builder. The suspicion towards OBOR is also fueled by Chinas increasingly aggressive foreign policy. By
following a more assertive approach in the South China Sea territorial disputes or more recently, by
displaying modern military hardware during the World War II commemoration military parade in Beijing,
the Chinese leadership risks losing the very thing it most needs from neighboring countries to make
OBOR become a reality: trust. In addition to this is the problem of unfortunate timing, a problem which
could result in the collapse of Xis grand plan. In the light of the crisis in Ukraine, the prospects for a joint
Chinese-Russian-European project have never looked worse. Moreover, ISIS threatens to spread to the
very Central Asian regions that are key to the success of OBOR. Despite these obstacles, the Chinese
Silk Road PR is in full swing. Berlin and Brussels should exercise restraint and should not allow
themselves to be dazzled by this PR offensive. Individual projects should only be considered if they are
in the direct interest of Europe and are economically viable.
2NC- Ext.- OBOR fails
Lack area studies and expertise doom the OBOR
Chen, 15 - assistant professor of Government and Public Administration, University of Macau
(Dingding, One Belt, One Road, One Frenzied Debate, The Diplomat, 6/24,

Ever since Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward the idea of One Belt, One Road (OBOR) in 2013,
Chinese scholars have pursued the idea with unprecedented interest and energy. Numerous
conferences have been organized to discuss various aspects of the various OBOR initiatives and there
already have been some tangible results. However, overall the situation of OBOR research is not healthy
as too many scholars who are poorly trained to study OBOR in detail have used the initiative to advance
their other academic or non-academic interests. This situation must be changed, otherwise it will
jeopardize Chinas OBOR initiatives in the long run. Specifically, there are three main problems with the
current frenzied discussion on OBOR. First, there is simply a lack of academic expertise on most
developing countries in China. Unlike the U.S., area studies as a discipline has never been seriously
treated by the government and the result is that very few scholars in China are respectable experts in
regions like South America and the Middle East. Many of Chinas so-called experts on the Middle East
simply dont speak Arabic languages and cannot read Arabic texts. And many of Chinas Africa experts
have never traveled to Africa to do field research. How can you give sound advice to the Chinese
government if the experts themselves are not knowledgeable about their respective regions? This is a
huge problem in China. But we cannot entirely blame everything on the experts, though they must bear
some responsibility. The main reason is still institutional: the government has neglected area studies for
a long time, sometimes with good reasons. When China was still weak and poor, what would have been
the use of studying other poor developing countries? Valuable resources were instead focused on
studying more advanced countries like the U.S., Japan, and the member states of the European Union. It
was only about ten years ago that Chinese companies and individuals started to explore business
opportunities in Africa and the Middle East. Educational institutions are not known for adjusting to
realities quickly hence Chinas lack of experts in these areas. Second, for whatever reason, Chinese
scholars tend to praise OBOR initiatives, without every seriously discussing the risks involved. The reality
is simply that all sorts of risks, particularly political risks, are very serious problems in some countries like
Myanmar and Pakistan. If the Chinese government does not pay serious attention to such factors, many
of Chinas big investment projects might fail. Already, we have examples of failed projects in Myanmar
due to political reasons. As even powerful states like the United States know, smaller countries can hurt
the interests of powerful and large companies through nationalization. Why should we expect politically
unstable countries then to treat China differently? So far the Chinese government has realized the
potential dangers, but no serious studies have been launched by Chinese scholars to address such
issues. Again, this might be a result of a lack of expertise. Still, Chinese scholars and think tanks should
pay attention to all kinds of social, political, and economic risks associated with Chinas investment.
Third, Chinese scholars should downplay the strategic implications of Chinas OBOR initiatives. Right
now too many Chinese scholars like to enthusiastically discuss the potential strategic benefits, as if
China is going to overtake the U.S. as the worlds new hegemon. This is not only flat out wrong, but also
strategically unwise. The U.S. is already very suspicious of Chinas long-term strategic intentions in the
South China Sea and many European countries are also uneasy about Chinas expanding influence into
the EU. Why should Chinese scholars give hawks in the U.S., Japan, and Europe more ammunition to fuel
their China threat theories? This is simply shortsighted. Moreover, the OBOR initiatives are not
guaranteed to succeed and in many ways they might actually fail if the Chinese government does not
play its cards right. And there is some evidence that the government might not be handling its cards
right at the moment. All in all, the Chinese government should try to cool down the current unhealthy
status of the OBOR debate in China before it is too late. And Chinese scholars should put in serious
effort to understand the regions along the OBOR route before they give poorly considered advice to the
government. Otherwise, we might soon witness the fall of the OBOR intiatives.
1NC- Relations high
Relations are high and inevitable --- no risk of conflict
Chen 15 - PhD, Associate Research Fellow for the Institute for International Strategic Studies at the
Party School of Central Committee of C.P.C.

(Jimin, Risks Manageable for China-U.S. Relations, June, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-


On May 16 and 17, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry

paid his fifth visit to China, becoming the highest-level U.S. official to visit
China so far this year. According to the information released by the U.S. Department of State, the
main purpose of this trip was to
advance U.S. priorities ahead of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue this summer and the planned visit
to the United States of President Xi Jinping this fall. However, U.S. officials revealed that Kerrys visit would put pressure on Chinas
behavior, especially on the issue of South China Sea. For example, U.S. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel said in
prepared testimony for a U.S. Senate hearing on May 13 that the United States was committed to maintaining freedom of navigation and
overflight in the South China Sea. During Kerrys visit to Beijing this weekend, the United States would clearly demonstrate the determination to
push for respect for the rules and push back on unilateral actions to change the status quo. Moreover, both U.S. politics and academia are
now filled with a tough argument on China, which might plunge Sino-US relations into a crisis. For example, a recent Wall Street Journal report,
citing anonymous U.S. military officials, said the Pentagon was considering sending Navy surveillance aircraft as well as ships within 12 nautical
miles to reefs and islands claimed by China in the South China Sea, taking practical actions to demonstrate the U.S. will and ability to protect its
advocated freedom of navigation. In addition, the U.S. think tanks have also published reports on U.S. China policy. The Council on Foreign
Relations in early March published one such report entitled Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, which recommended that the United
States needs to restore a hard-line China policy, noting thatWashington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing
the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy. There are also
some people suggesting the
emergence of two confrontation groups in the region. Since the year of 2014, the U.S.-Japan alliance has strengthened in
unprecedented ways. Not long ago, Japans Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the United States, winning a high-profile reception. The two sides
revised The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, which promoted Japan to play a more active security role on a global scale. It also
advanced the US-Japan alliance up to a new stage, that is, the United States continues to provide security guarantee for Japan, and Japan also
provides more support to U.S. security. Meanwhile, from May 8-10, President Xi Jinping attended the Victory Day Parade in Moscow to
commemorate the 70th anniversary of the victory of the worlds anti-fascist war and paid his fourth visit to Russia since taking office. The two
parties issued a joint statement to deepen the comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, which was the third one since the
establishment of Chinas new administration two years ago. In the joint statement, the two countries have emphasized mutually firm support
and assistance on issues concerning core interests such as the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security. It gives the outside world
an impression that China and Russia increasingly move toward alliance, or have formed a quasi-alliance relationship. In
current China-U.S. relations are hardly as bad as it might seem on the surface. Kerrys visit reflects that Sino-US
relationship is still on the right track, and the differences between the countries are manageable.
Kerrys visit to China shows that both sides attach great importance to the relationship. Despite the
contradictions and differences, the will of the top leaders of both countries to develop bilateral relations is
strong and consistent. From Sunnylands in 2013 to Zhongnanhai in 2014, the two heads of state have formed a high
degree of consensus on this point. Kerrys visit also indicates that high-level Sino-US communication channels are
open and effective. At present, the two countries have established more than 90 kinds of communication
mechanisms, including the important Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange.
These channels provide the foundation for managing disagreements and risks. In November 2014, the
two sides established two mutual-trust mechanisms, namely, Notification of Major Military Activities [and]
Confidence Building Measures Mechanism and Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime
Encounters. Such mechanisms and rules are extremely helpful and beneficial for both sides to reduce
the chance of conflicts or confrontations.
2NC- Ext.- Relations Resilient
Relations are resilient---the last three decades prove they can compete and cooperate
at once
Russel 14 - Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
(Daniel, The Future of U.S.-China Relations, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Lexis)

Overall Bilateral Relations

This year marks the 35th anniversary of the establishment of official diplomatic relations between the
United States and China. We have made remarkable progress since the era of back-channel messaging and secret trips. The scope
of todays U.S.-China relationship was unimaginable when President Nixon made his historic visit in 1972
to China. Yet there is still enormous potential for progress in the U.S.-China relationship. Progress that will yield benefits to the citizens of both countries, our neighbors, and the world.
To realize this progress and these benefits, we seek to ensure that the relationship is not defined by strategic rivalry, but by fair and healthy competition, by practical cooperation on priority

constructive management of our differences and disagreements. Where interests overlap, we will seek to expand cooperation with China. These areas
issues, and by

include economic prosperity, a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue, and a reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases. Where they

diverge and we have significant and well-known areas of disagreement we will work to ensure that
our differences are constructively managed. Mr. Chairman, there are those who argue that cold war-like
rivalry is inevitable and that the United States and China are condemned to a zero-sum struggle for
supremacy, if not conflict. I reject such mechanistic thinking. As anyone who has served in government can tell you, this deterministic analysis
overlooks the role of leaders who have the ability to set policy and to shape relationships. It gives
short shrift to the fact that our two economies are becoming increasingly intertwined, which increases
each sides stake in the success of the other. It undervalues the fact that leaders in Washington and
Beijing are fully cognizant of the risk of unintended strategic rivalry between an emerging power and an
established power and have agreed to take deliberate actions to prevent such an outcome. And it
ignores the reality of the past 35 years that, in spite of our differences, U.S.-China relations have
steadily grown deeper and stronger and in doing so, we have built a very resilient relationship.

This resilience will extend into the future---its in mutual interest

Dingli 15 PhD, professor and Vice Dean at the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University. He
is also the founder and director of Chinas first non-government-based Program on Arms Control and
Regional Security at Fudan University

(Shen, Maturing China-U.S. Ties to Breed Breakthroughs, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-


Such is the current China-US relationship. Contradictions accompany development, development

overcomes contradictions; competition stimulates progress, progress facilitates equality. China-US
relationship is such a gradually maturing new type of relations. The two countries will find more
challenges in their face in the next few decades. But since they cant afford the consequences of
confrontation, dialogue and cooperation will be their common choice. There will be more cooperation
as both parties mature in mindset.
1NC-U.S. Bad for Privacy
OBOR key to Internet connectivity avoiding the U.S. solves privacy concerns
Rolland, 15 Senior Project Director for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian
Research (Nadge, A Fiber-Optic Silk Road, The Diplomat, 4/2, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/a-

Not even two years into what will be a ten-year tenure at Chinas helm, Xi Jinping has already made his
mark on Chinas foreign policy, in particular with the launch of the One Belt, One Road initiative, also
known as the New Silk Road. This initiative will manifest in a vast network of transportation, energy and
communication projects, all of which are supposed to boost intraregional trade and ultimately give
China and its neighbors a sense of common destiny. Although not as well publicized, the planned
improvements in telecommunications infrastructure are as critical to business and economic
development as the railroad projects that are to be technically and financially supported by China
through its New Silk Road initiative. The virtual cloud of cyberspace relies on a physical infrastructure
that constitutes the sinews of the Internet. Because cables can be laid easily along rail lines, the future
Eurasian fiber optic backbones will benefit from the transportation infrastructure that will soon stretch
along the Silk Road. For landlocked countries such as the Central Asian Republics, this will mean greater
access to international data networks, at a cost averaging a tenth that of satellite communications and
with a bandwidth significantly enhanced by fiber optic technology. A number of projects are already
underway. In 2006 the telecom giant ZTE was commissioned by Afghanistan to establish the countrys
first fiber optic cable network, the same year that Huawei, another Chinese firm, received a contract
from the government of Tajikistan. China and Russia have also partnered in building major terrestrial
telecommunication links across the Eurasian continent, including the worlds longest terrestrial cable
link, the Trans-Europe Asia (TEA), in addition to the Europe-Russia-Mongolia-China network, the
TransEurasian Information Superhighway (TASIM), and the Diverse Route for European and Asian
Markets (DREAM). The last of these is an ambitious Eurasian fiber optic communication land line whose
launch was announced by Russias MegaFon in October 2013; it will be built with equipment supplied by
Chinas Huawei. While domestic networks are mostly terrestrial, underwater fiber optic cables carry the
vast majority of international data traffic. Thus Asia and Europe are currently digitally connected, via the
Suez Canal thanks, among other things, to the worlds longest submarine cable, the 39,000 km SEA-ME-
WE 3 system. Digital packets transmitted from Western Europe to Japan either have to traverse Europe,
the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and the China Seas, or ride through the Atlantic, the U.S., and then
the Pacific Ocean. The global undersea system experiences several hundred disruptions per year,
especially at heavily trafficked choke points such as the Strait of Malacca or the Suez Canal, where too
many cables pass through a narrow maritime passage. Regular disruptions occur when ships drag their
anchors across cables lying on the ocean floor. In addition to increasing the connectivity of landlocked
countries that stretch along the Silk Road, the envisioned terrestrial trans-Eurasian networks will
alleviate the possible risks of disruption to maritime cables and add redundancy: Terrestrial cables also
face disruptions, but they are easier to repair and maintain than the ones that lie 8,000 meters
underwater. The land digital highways will also increase the speed of data exchanges between Europe
and Asia, a major challenge that telecommunication companies are racing to meet. Investors are willing
to spend several hundreds of millions of dollars to gain a few milliseconds in highly profitable high
frequency trading a system where computers buy and sell automatically and electronically. By some
estimates, a one millisecond advantage could be worth up to $100 million a year for hedge fund
companies. Shorter routes are therefore the key to speed and profit. The melting of the Arctic ice cap
has created the possibility of opening new routes linking Asia to Europe and Trans-Arctic Ocean
submarine cables are now being installed, with the aim of reducing by 30 percent the time a packet
takes to travel from Tokyo to London. But maintaining the cables remains an obvious challenge and the
Silk Road routes offer a sound alternative for customers looking for increased speed and reliability. In
addition to commercial motivations, the new fiber optic Silk Road could also have geopolitical and
strategic implications. Russia and China evidently share a desire to shield themselves from U.S. and
other Western intelligence agencies and probably believe that their own communications both with
one another and to and from Europe will be better protected if cables run across their own territory
rather than through the Indian Ocean or the U.S. The same motivation explains the announced Telebras
cable, which will connect Brazil to Portugal without any U.S. technology, and the BRICS cable project,
which will link Vladivostok to Brazil, via China, India and South Africa. There is a growing wariness among
these countries that when their data traffic goes through hubs in Europe or the U.S., it incurs a greater
risk of potential interception of critical financial and security information by non-BRICS entities,
according to Andrew Mthembu, a South African businessman who is promoting the BRICS cable.
Together with planned roads, rail and pipelines, the fiber optic Silk Road will tie the Central Asian
states more closely to China and Russia. These countries may also hope that the new cables will
circumvent NSA attempts to eavesdrop on the data sent through U.S. IT companies. But they may well
find themselves subjected to increased electronic surveillance by Beijing or Moscow, or both. Russia and
Chinas perceived security risks, reinforced by Edward Snowdens revelations about the electronic
surveillance carried out by the U.S. government through digital channels, will lead to more alternative
routes provided by non-American companies, conceivably making it easier to seal off the global network
if deemed necessary. Paradoxically, the emergence of alternative networks could eventually increase
the digital balkanization of some parts of the world.
1NC- OBOR hurts econ

Chinas OBOR hurts their economy- costs and low return

Zhou, Hallding, and Han 15, Jiayi Zhou is a research and program assistant at the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute and a WSD-Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. Karl Hallding is
senior fellow at the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), and Guoyi Han is a research fellow at SEI.
(The Trouble With China's 'One Belt One Road' Strategy The Diplomat 6/26/15
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-trouble-with-the-chinese-marshall-plan-strategy/) //eb
In 2009, former deputy director of Chinas State Administration of Taxation Xu Shanda
submitted to the Ministry of Commerce a proposal titled the Chinese Marshall Plan. In the
wake of the global financial crisis, slumping exports, and extensive internal discussions on how
to create demand, Xus strategy concept suggested utilizing Chinas vast foreign reserves to
offer loans to developing countries, which would then contract Chinese enterprises for major
projects of infrastructure and construction. In short, this so-called Marshall Plan would be a
roundabout subsidy, keeping Chinese industry and production robust, employment in place,
and GDP growth high. Such projects would literally and figuratively pave the roads for Chinese
goods and services to enter new markets, as one of the explicit goals of Xus strategy was also
to find outlets for Chinas excess production capacity. This vision, or an iteration of it, has
largely been borne out under the Xi Jinping administration. Since it was first announced in 2013,
China has pulled out all stops to bring its massive One Road One Belt initiative to fruition, committing
money not only into the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), but also the New Silk Road
Fund (NSRF) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as bilateral arrangements with
countries. These investments, loans, and grants will be dispersed to create a network of infrastructure
including roads and rail lines, energy pipelines, power stations, and coastal ports that is envisioned
to extend west to Europe via the Silk Road Economic Belt, and downwards into Southeast Asia via the
21st Century Maritime Silk Road. This large-scale outpouring of capital, enterprises, and projects
to foreign lands has been hailed as Chinas great coming-out: a historical tipping point in the
geopolitical balance, as China finally turns its relatively muted economic clout into more
grandiose global power and leadership. But while there are a multitude of factors driving China
towards this path, at core a major issue remains the need to create demand to address overcapacity
and structural weaknesses in the Chinese economy. The Problem of Overcapacity Prior to the global
financial crisis, China was already facing the issue of overcapacity in many of its production
sectors. But when threatened with negative spillovers of the Wests economic slump in 2008, Chinas
response at the time was to inject the equivalent of half a trillion dollars in a stimulus for public
infrastructure, rail, urban housing, construction boosting precisely those sectors where inefficiencies
were high but demand was slumping. As a short-term solution, the stimulus worked: China escaped the
turbulent years relatively unscathed. However, in many cases this credit-fueled production was not
commensurate with the organic demand to absorb it. Researchers from the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC) have published ascathing review of the waste and
inefficiencies that have resulted from these de facto subsidies. Far from being market-based, these
types of credit-based, supply-driven projects have so far only encouraged continued lack of
accountability in addition to tremendously distorting Chinas so-called capitalist economy. Today,
Chinas steel sector idle capacity alone is double that of Americas steel production, with iron, cement,
aluminum, glass, coal, shipbuilding, solar panels, and other industries all facing similarly slumping
demand and profit losses. That OBOR is seen as a quick solution to the problem of overcapacity in
China is no secret. Chinese analysts have been very openly discussing the OBOR in these terms.
For example, He Yafei, currently vice minister for foreign affairs, penned an opinion article last
year in which he explicitly mentioned the opportunity to use Chinas excess steel and iron for
OBOR infrastructure building. For now, though, it is still not entirely clear to what degree
domestic low-end industrial production will be used to support the initiative. Challenges in that
regard include the difficulties and expenses of transporting bulky and heavy materials abroad.
Furthermore, the newly released Action Plan for the OBOR states that efforts should be made to
promote green and low-carbon infrastructure construction. Chinas war on pollution, if it is taken
seriously, still commits the country to painful domestic readjustments no matter what companies
operating overseas may be involved in. However, a large part of the OBOR will in fact be internally
focused. Major infrastructure projects are being planned to connect some of the Chinas more
remote regions to the wider national and international markets. And while positive in some
respects, this again amounts to yet another massive stimulus package for hard industry, and which will
only delay the shift to a balanced economy that still needs to take place. Domestic Restructuring and
Social Implications Economic restructuring away from export-oriented production and manufacturing
would (or will) be painful. Years of artificially supported and credit-fueled growth have entrenched local
government interests, revenue channels, jobs, and industries in a way that could be very destabilizing to
remedy. Cutting down overcapacity would involve slashing jobs, shutting down plants, and closing
factories. And for a country renowned for its long-term thinking, social stability is always the foremost
and immediate priority. Statements that slower growth (the new normal) is acceptable may largely be
about managing expectations; to the extent that it impacts jobs, boosting growth is still of paramount
concern to Chinese leaders. And, to be clear, it does impact jobs: the China Labor Bulletin reported
earlier this year that worker strikes and labor unrest increased significantly in 2014 compared to the
previous year, with the increase linked to the economic slowdown. Given the vast amount of people
employed in export-related industries, as well as in hard industrial and infrastructural
production (the construction sector alone accounts for over 30 million jobs), boosting export
figures and/or buying crucial time for these jobs and livelihoods to be transferred is still of
paramount concern to Chinese leaders. In detailing the OBOR, China has in fact clearly stated
that it is buying time for domestic consumption to increase at a natural pace. Consumer-led
growth will be a long time coming; progress on that front remains too little and too slow for Chinas
economy to depend on it anytime soon. More than kicking the can down the road, though, the OBOR
could make problems worse. That is, while it may buy time, this would be at the cost of further
subsidizing inefficient (and energy-intensive, high-polluting) SOEs and companies that should have
either shrunk or gone under long ago under normal market conditions. Of course, even if one accepts
that the OBOR is a Band-Aid or painkiller for a problem that will require full-scale surgery, the initiative
does have an economic logic as well. The OBOR, insofar as it utilizes Chinas otherwise unproductive and
restless capital, may be an easy gamble in terms of its financial risk to the Chinese economy a whole.
And overseas demand does exist. The Asian Development Bank estimates that there is an $800
billion annual shortfall for infrastructure needs in Asia-Pacific countries, a need that China is
clearly well placed to provide through the AIIB and other means. However, there are yet again risks to
take into account in meeting that demand. Low Investment Return For one, many of the
developing countries along the Belt and Road are politically volatile and economically vulnerable. While
financial assistance will be provided to countries of the OBOR through AIIB and other mechanisms,
capital cannot provide the stability or security necessary to see these projects through, nor guarantee
that counterparts will hold on to their end of the bargain. Moreover, it cannot control for public opinion:
Chinese projects in some cases have even galvanized populations against more easily bought off
governments. Chinese companies using Chinese labor are not always welcomed with open arms, and the
flooding of Chinese goods and exports likewise can become a source of local disgruntlement and
resentment. Developing countries are littered with cases of failed, stalled, or at least troubled Chinese
projects due to local opposition, corruption, regulatory issues, and legal problems. Secondly, so
far, upwards of 90 percent of Chinas foreign investment has been done through state channels and
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Since SOEs answer to government shareholders and enjoy state
financial support, there has been little incentive for these Chinese companies to carefully assess cost,
benefits, and risks. As a result, investment returns have been low. For instance, the head of
Chinas mining association in 2013 estimated that up to 80 percent of Chinas mining ventures
overseas had failed. China has stated that the OBOR will give play to the decisive role of the
market. In reality, it is more likely that projects will continue to go to big players and state-affiliated
enterprises. OBOR may very well look in practice like Chinas Going Out policy on steroids. So far there
are no strong indications it will be a different animal, though the international stake in the new AIIB is in
this regard a highly positive development. Conclusion Overall, overcapacity of course is just one among
a plethora of economic and geopolitical motives for China, some of which include the
internationalization of the yuan, creating alternative options in international financial system in need of
reform, shaping a more pliable regional security and political environment for itself, and finding
alternatives shipping routes. In these aims, the OBOR could very well prove to very successful in
enhancing Chinas regional and geopolitical clout. But as far as direct economic gains go, the
benefits may be ironically both too shortsighted with regards to shedding capacity, and too long-sighted
in terms of investment return. The devil of course lies in the details, and the majority of the road ahead
will be bumpy. The West, which has reacted with variations of support, alarm, and suspicion to
Chinas grand chess move, must take into account that it is motivated not only by certain
geopolitical calculations, but also domestic economic vulnerabilities that are quite severe. On
the Chinese side, however, overly simplistic views of the OBOR as a solution to oversupply and
overproduction glosses over the deeper reforms that still need to take place, as well as the tremendous
risks that China will face in meeting (or creating) so-called market demand.
1NC- U.S. interventionism bad
American intervention in Afghanistan creates more violence and instabilityturns

Daalder 15 - writer at the AC Voice (Marc, "14 Years After the US Invasion, the War in Afghanistan is
Impossible to Justify", In These Times, 10/7/15, inthesetimes.com/article/18481/afghanistan-war-

Fourteen years ago today, the United States and its allies launched a war in Afghanistan. Though it
began with airstrikes that then-President Bush insisted were carefully targeted, he also emphasized
that this was merely phase one of the War on Terror, and that today we focus on Afghanistan, but
the battle is broader. But we never truly completed that first phase, let alone our operations elsewhere
and the War on Terror as a whole. On October 3, the United States bombed a hospital in the Afghan
town of Kunduz, killing 12 Doctors Without Borders staff and 10 patients, including three children. This
was, presumably, just as carefully targeted as the thousands of coalition airstrikes and military actions
that have left more than 7,260 Afghan civilians dead in the years since 2001. Looking back on the
decisions that led us to invade Afghanistan, we must see that war as a failure. In our post-9/11 fear, we
allowed ourselves to lash out at the worldand in so doing dealt much more harm than we had
originally suffered while creating a whole new set of enemies for ourselves. Yet the war in Afghanistan
still has the support of the vast majority of politicians in the United States. Across party lines and
ideological differences, this war is seen as a justified conflict. Even Bernie Sanders, the leftmost
candidate for the U.S. presidency, states on his website that we entered [the Afghan] war with
significant clarity of purpose and moral authority. While the original purpose of the war may have been
clearto unseat the Taliban, but also to spread counterterror efforts throughout the worldwe have
since lost the way. Though the commonly cited date of the defeat of the Taliban is November 22, 2001,
we still fight on. The invasion began with almost a month of airstrikes, of bombardments that alone
killed hundreds of Afghan civilians. Following the ground invasion, U.S. forces were regularly cited for
human rights abuses, including the torture and inhumane treatment of suspected insurgentsmany of
whom turned out to be innocent. The war also led to the establishment of the Guantanamo Bay
detention camp, where the United States subjected Afghans to even more brutal methods of
interrogation while sharply eroding whatever moral stature and post-9/11 sympathy we still held in the
world. Of course, the various Afghan warlords (as well as the Northern Alliance) who received military
and financial support from the United States in their fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda committed
atrocities of their own, according to Human Rights Watch. Some of these warlords even went on to work
with the Taliban against the new Afghan government. And according to a Brown University study, the
war might be directly and indirectly responsible for as many as 360,000 deaths. Fourteen years on, the
realization that we made a massive mistake may seem too little, too late. But understanding the U.S.s
failures in Afghanistan is integral to ensuring we dont commit similar errors and atrocities in the future.
When examining the sordid past of U.S. military endeavors, a pattern quickly becomes apparent:
unwanted interventions result in unexpected consequencesand often new, bloody quagmires. The
examples are legion. U.S. involvement in Iran helped to trigger the 1979 Revolution, turning the regional
power into the fiercely anti-American authoritarian theocracy we are struggling to deal with. American
arming of the mujahedeen against the Soviet Unions 1979 invasion of Afghanistan also backfired, as the
insurgent group later splintered apart into a series of organizations, including the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Of course, these latter groups would attack the United States on 9/11which would then, in turn,
provoke Americas invasion of Afghanistan to root out the very same forces they once supported. For
decades, the United States has sown the seeds for the new enemies again and again. This can also be
seen in Syria today, where the power vacuum left in the region by the unseating of Saddam Hussein led
to the rise of ISIS, a far graver threat than either al-Qaeda or the Taliban. But still, the US continues to
arm and fund rebel groups and despotic regimes across the world, including in Syria. Just last month,
Syrian rebels who had just graduated from American military training gave a quarter of their weapons to
the al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Rarely have U.S. interventions around the globe
succeeded. But if you were to ask American politicians what our most recent success was, they would
point to Afghanistan. On the campaign trail, Hillary Clintonwho supported the 30,000 troop surge to
Afghanistan in 2009praised the gains that have been made there in the last 13 years. President
Obama himself said he has always thought that we did the right thing in Afghanistan. More recently,
Obama argued that the Afghan war had succeeded. Afghanistan has a chance to rebuild its own
country, he said. We are safer [and Afghanistan is] not going to be a source of terrorist attacks again.
But even that promise, made in December 2014 when coalition forces officially ended the mission in
Afghanistan, has not come to pass. Taliban activity is on the rise, as can be seen in the recent seizing of
Kunduz that led to the Doctors Without Borders hospital strike. Even though only a few thousand U.S.
troops remain in the country, it seems we are unable to avoid committing atrocities. Perhaps worse than
the renewed violence is the likely American response to it: delaying the final extraction of U.S. soldiers.
Originally, only 5,500 soldiers would remain in Afghanistan by the end of 2015, down from the current
9,800. By the time Obama leaves office, there were supposed to be only 1,000 U.S. troops in the
country. Yet now, according to CNN, the president may leave at least one military base open, stocked
with as many as 6,000 soldiers. Of course, this would be the second two-term president in a row to hand
off the Afghan war to his successora war that officially ended on December 28, 2014. The longest war
in American history just keeps growing longer, with no real end in sight.
Terrorists lack the motivation to get the bomb even if they did, theyd never pull off
an attack
Weiss 2015 (Leonard [visiting scholar at Stanford Universitys Center for International Security and
Cooperation]; On fear and nuclear terror; Mar 3; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(2) 75

A recent paper (Friedman and Lewis, 2014) postulates a scenario by which terrorists might seize nuclear
materials in Pakistan for fashioning a weapon. While jihadist sympathizers are known to have worked
within the Pakistani nuclear establishment, there is little to no evidence that terrorist groups in or
outside the region are seriously trying to obtain a nuclear capability. And Pakistan has been operating a
uranium enrichment plant for its weapons program for nearly 30 years with no credible reports of
diversion of HEU from the plant. There is one stark example of a terrorist organization that actually
started a nuclear effort: the Aum Shinrikyo group. At its peak, this religious cult had a membership
estimated in the tens of thousands spread over a variety of countries, including Japan; its members had
scientific expertise in many areas; and the group was well funded. Aum Shinrikyo obtained access to
natural uranium supplies, but the nuclear weapon effort stalled and was abandoned. The group was also
interested in chemical weapons and did produce sarin nerve gas with which they attacked the Tokyo
subway system, killing 13 persons. AumShinrikyo is now a small organization under continuing close
surveillance. What about highly organized groups, designated appropriately as terrorist, that have
acquired enough territory to enable them to operate in a quasigovernmental fashion, like the Islamic
State (IS)? Such organizations are certainly dangerous, but how would nuclear terrorism fit in with a
program for building and sustaining a new caliphate that would restore past glories of Islamic society,
especially since, like any organized government, the Islamic State would itself be vulnerable to nuclear
attack? Building a new Islamic state out of radioactive ashes is an unlikely ambition for such groups.
However, now that it has become notorious, apocalyptic pronouncements in Western media may begin
at any time, warning of the possible acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by IS. Even if a terror group
were to achieve technical nuclear proficiency, the time, money, and infrastructure needed to build
nuclear weapons creates significant risks of discovery that would put the group at risk of attack. Given
the ease of obtaining conventional explosives and the ability to deploy them, a terrorist group is unlikely
to exchange a big part of its operational program to engage in a risky nuclear development effort with
such doubtful prospects. And, of course, 9/11 has heightened sensitivity to the need for protection,
lowering further the probability of a successful effort.

Terror attacks in the sq should have already triggered the impact

Julienne et al. 15 - Marc Julienne is a Visiting Academic Fellow at the Mercator Institute for China
Studies (MERICS), Berlin. Moritz Rudolf and Johannes Buckow are Research Associates at MERICS. (Marc,
Moritz, Johannes, "The Terrorist Threat in China", The Diplomat, 5/26/15,

Beijing, Kunming, Urumqi: between 2013 and 2014, these three cities located in the northeast, south
and west of China were the targets of major and extremely violent terrorist attacks. In less than eight
months, 72 people died and 356 were injured in separate attacks using suicide car bombs, bladed
weapons, and/or explosives (see the interactive map below for more details). While the international
media did cover these events, there is still little knowledge in the West about the changing face of
terrorism in China. Going beyond widespread preconceptions, it is necessary to identify the facts of the
threat, its geographical expansion and transnational linkages, and how this issue shapes Chinese politics.
Interactive map of terrorism in China (2010-2015) Image Credit: Mercator Institute for China Studies In
recent years, Chinas anti-terrorism policy has evolved rapidly from a rather reactive defense against
terror to a proactive war on terror, along with permanent crisis management. Today, Beijings anti-
terrorism efforts are becoming more comprehensive, sophisticated, and high-tech, with an
unprecedented reach into affected regions and into society. As a domestic and transnational issue,
terrorism is also a major priority for Chinas international agenda, particularly its economic development
strategy toward the West and its growing interests abroad. Beijing is likely to expand its international
anti-terror efforts via bilateral cooperation and multilateral forums. In fact, China could become one of
the major stake-holders in international efforts to combat terrorism. Enjoying this article? Click here to
subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. The main terrorism threats in China originate from the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the northwest of the country. For roughly three decades, the
region has been rocked by social unrest involving the indigenous populations consisting mainly of
Uyghurs and Han Chinese, the ethnic majority of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), but also of Tajiks,
Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Mongols, and Hui. Among the local groups opposing Beijings authority some more
radical factions have emerged. Xinjiang today is caught in a vicious circle. On the one hand, there are
violent separatist and extremist groups among the Turkic-speaking Muslim Uyghurs, although the vast
majority simply seek to freely practice their religion and customs. On the other hand, over the years
Beijing has become more and more obsessed with stability. The central government has increasingly
responded to social unrest with repression and has heightened the presence of its security apparatus in
the region. This policy has alienated many Uyghurs from Beijing and nourished anti-Han Chinese
sentiments among the Uyghur population. The current tensions have a long history. Since Chinas
western expansion in the 18th century and the annexation of Xinjiang, the region and the central
government have had a troubled relationship. The Uyghurs have long been fighting for the preservation
of their culture against the perceived Han invasion. After a decade of resurgent expression of Uyghur
culture and religion, 1989 marked a turning point for both Chinese authorities and the Uyghur
population, as well as a new rise of separatist ideas. From Beijings perspective, the Tiananmen Square
incident and the increasing local (student) protests reinforced the need for tighter control of the
population and the crucial establishment of stability. From the Xinjiang separatists perspective, the
defeat of the Soviet Union by the mujaheddin in Afghanistan was a source of hope and fueled radical
Islamism in Xinjiang. Nevertheless, it is crucial to distinguish between the general Uyghur population
(Uyghurs who are politically active in favour of more autonomy) and others who would go so far as to
take part in terrorist activities. Although Western countries have been very reticent to talk about
terrorism in China, facts show that in recent years the PRC has been facing a genuine terrorism threat.
However, it remains difficult to ascertain the nature and source of all alleged terror incidents that occur
in Xinjiang. Very little official information is released and there are very few independent journalists on
the ground. Moreover, information relayed by Chinese media and officials statements provide hardly
any evidence or verifiable figures. It is therefore a fundamental challenge to differentiate between acts
of social insurgency, state repression, and terrorism within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In
fact, the overall social and ethnic situation in Chinas Western region blends into a broader conflict
between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research even
labeled the situation in Xinjiang a limited war in 2014. Still, it is indisputable that major terrorist
attacks have occurred recently in Xinjiang (Urumqi 2014) and elsewhere in China (Beijing 2013, Kunming
2014). The current terrorist threat appears to be caused by scattered local unconnected groups rather
than a single well-organized network with a clear chain of command. Yet the PRC government constantly
blames the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as being behind most terrorist attacks and insurgencies.
This organization, however, seems to have been replaced by the Turkestan Islamic Party, or partly
absorbed into the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The Turkestan Islamic Party did claim the attacks
against buses in Shanghai and Kunming in 2008, as well as the Urumqi railway station attack in April
2014. The vast majority of the attacks, though, remain unclaimed by any organization.

Uighur threat overhyped

Poh 15 [Angela - Angela Poh is a PhD Candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
Nanyang Technological University, Uyghur Terrorism: A Misnomer?, July 28, 2015, The Diplomat,
Thailands recent deportation to China of more than 100 Uyghurs the majority ethnic group in Chinas
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region drew a rebuke from the United Nations. It also prompted a strong public
reaction within Turkey, which led to the Turkish government reiterating its determination to receive Turkic-speaking Uyghurs fleeing China. In
response, Beijing published a report on home-grown terrorism, claiming that police in Chinas Yunnan
Province have shot dead four violent terrorists and arrested 553 extremists attempting to leave
China for foreign warzones like Syria and Iraq since 2014. While not making direct reference to the
Xinjiang Uyghurs, the subtext to such pronouncements is that the Uyghurs attempting to leave China
have strong links with global terrorism, and pose a genuine security threat. The Problem of Xinjiang Few people
outside China knew about Xinjiang or the Uyghurs before news of Uyghur fighters joining the Islamic
State started being reported internationally. This is in stark contrast to Tibet, which many view as a historically independent
region, and where Chinas authoritarian approach has regularly found itself in the international spotlight. The international medias
focus on the Islamic States Uyghurs has had the unfortunate effect of shoehorning perceptions of
Uyghurs into the global grand narrative of culture clash, terrorism, and Islamic threat. The reality is much
more complex. For a start, the movement both legal and illegal of Uyghurs between China and its
Central Asian neighbors like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has long preceded the global focus on
international terrorism. The Uyghurs are a Turkic people. Their history, language, culture, religion and
lifestyle far more closely resemble the Turkic peoples of Central Asia than the Han Chinese who
comprise 92 percent of Chinas population. This sense of ethnic difference has to a large extent formed the basis of
longstanding anti-Han sentiment among the Xinjiang Uyghurs. The Chinese leadership has also for decades perceived
these sentiments as the presence of a separatist movement in Xinjiang. The Uyghurs situation is
complicated by the fact that Xinjiang a vast oil- and gas-rich swathe of territory in Chinas northwest
occupying one-sixth of the countrys area is of great strategic value. Perceived Religious and Cultural Suppression
The Chinese government has repeatedly emphasized the importance of interethnic harmony in Xinjiang
and rapid integration of the Uyghurs into the Han-dominated Chinese society. Yet, many Uyghurs see
policies intended to promote these goals as attempts to suppress their culture and religion. Compared to the
Hui Muslim communities of central and eastern China, Uyghurs face many more restrictions on their religious
expression and way of life. While Xinjiang houses many distinctive mosques, women, students, and
public servants face significant restrictions on entering them. Praying in schools, wearing headscarves to
work, and fasting during Ramadan are also severely circumscribed. The study of the Quran and Arabic is
tightly controlled. Even the Uyghur language is being gradually phased out in most educational
institutions in Xinjiang. The increasing security presence in the region, whether in the form of re-
educating religious leaders or the installation of surveillance cameras and sharp increases in inspection
routes, serve to ensure that religious institutions do not advocate Islamic values that are not endorsed
by the Chinese state. Migration and Economic Disparity The migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang and the significant Han-Uyghur
economic disparity are also major sources of unhappiness among the Uyghurs. Government-sponsored immigration of Han
Chinese into Xinjiang has always been a central component of the Communist Party of Chinas policy in
Xinjiang. The proportion of Han Chinese living in the region rose from about 5 percent in the 1940s to
about 40 percent today. There is large-scale unemployment among the Uyghurs, including young
university graduates. Han Chinese are also over-represented in local government jobs. Beijing has
asserted that the quality of life for Uyghurs has improved significantly. Yet deep-seated resentment
among the Uyghurs remains, resulting in significant ethnic tensions in Xinjiang. This culminated in the
series of violent riots in Xinjiangs capital, Urumqi, in 2009. This inter-ethnic violence in Xinjiang remains
a significant problem today. Risks of Conflation It may not be the place of other countries to interfere in
Chinas domestic policies. It may also be debatable whether countries like Thailand have an obligation to open their doors to asylum
seekers such as the Xinjiang Uyghurs. However, it is critical for both Beijing and the international community to
recognize that the uneasy coexistence between the Uyghurs and Chinas Han majority is a deep-rooted
socio-economic problem. Chinas Uyghur problem was not created by the September 11 attacks or the
rise of the Islamic State. Ethnic tensions and violence in Xinjiang stem from decades worth of
discrimination, perceived religious and cultural suppression, and economic disparities. Conflating
domestic protest with international terrorism which both Beijing and the international media are
guilty of in the case of the Uyghurs is unhelpful for two reasons. First, it is a distraction. It reduces the
pressure for governments to resolve domestic problems and tensions. This could result in further
resentment and alienation among groups marginalized by state policies, and increase the allure of a
violent but radically different world such as that promised by the Islamic State. Second, as Brian Jenkins from
the RAND Corporation suggested: Some governments are prone to label as terrorism all violent acts committed
by their political opponents . what is called terrorism thus seems to depend on ones point of view.
Overly broad definitions of terrorism can allow governments to label and punish dissenters as terrorists.
Governments may therefore be tempted by a ready-made narrative to back up the claim that domestic
unrest derives from outside influences rather than from authentic local concerns. This carries the risk of
undermining the legitimacy of genuine international counter-terrorism efforts.

No risk of nuclear terrorism---too many obstacles

John J. Mearsheimer 14, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at
the University of Chicago, America Unhinged, January 2, nationalinterest.org/article/america-

Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United
States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September
11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is
highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a
terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorismmost of it
arising from domestic groupswas a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers

were toppled. What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence

would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to

supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that
weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but
the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency. Terrorists might also
try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well:
there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a
bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no
terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear
attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the
extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.
Chinas economy is in shamblesforeign infrastructure investment is not going to
save it
Li 3/6 - Energy Economist of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). He
specializes in energy markets, energy policy, and economics of technological change, serving the
interests of both academic and public sectors (Dr. Yanfei, Can New Keynesianism Save the Chinese
Economy? Why national capitalism will not be enough to keep China out of trouble, The Diplomat,
3/6/2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/can-new-keynesianism-save-the-chinese-economy/)//ET

Clearly, the Chinese economy has problems, and now appears to be tumbling rather rapidly down along
its so-called soft-landing path. Overcapacity began to emerge from around 2013 in the infrastructure sector as
well as in numerous manufacturing industries such as shipbuilding, solar cells and wind turbines. The
ability of both the public and private sectors to pay back their debt (local government loans and other debt due to
massive investment in urban expansion and the foreign debt of several industries experiencing overcapacity, such as construction, real estate,
cement, metal materials, and other infrastructure and real estate-related sectors) is
now questionable. Most critically, an over-
priced real estate sector has been sucking the economys wealth and purchasing power dry. On top of all
this, an aging population and shrinking labor force are pushing up the cost of labor, before most
industries have managed to build competitiveness through continuous productivity improvements
based on sound management, high quality control, attractive design and branding, and technical
innovation. In fact, recent economic policies in China appear to have overlooked productivity the essence of economic growth entirely
and focused instead on encouraging the sale of more houses and apartments at steadily rising prices. In line with this spirit of economic
governance, monetary policy has been extremely aggressive. Data show that from January 2008 to October 2015, Chinas M2 measure of
money increased 2.25 times, implying annual increases of 16 percent. During the same period, Chinas economy expanded at a rate less than
half that. Domestic inflation as well as expectations of inflation, although never acknowledged by the statistics bureau, has been high since
2008, when China announced its four trillion yuan stimulus plan. The state also manipulates the supply of land for housing. Combined with
strong expectations of inflation, and the depreciation of the value of the yuan as the outcome of aggressive monetary policy, property prices
have been rocketing higher. The Chinese government relies on property-related taxes and sales for some 40-60 percent of its financing. So it is
not just individual and institutional investors who are addicted to the property bubble, but also all levels of government. Local government
together with infrastructure-related industries have also accumulated tremendous debt due to the aggressive and excessive expansion of cities
and towns. The fate of commercial banks, needless to say, is tied to ever-higher property prices. The Danger of Currency Depreciation For all of
these reasons, the
value of the yuan in terms of its purchasing power no longer justifies its current exchange
rates against other major currencies. However, allowing a drastic depreciation of the yuan is equivalent to
deflating the domestic property bubble, as investors may rush to dump their inventory of properties and
exchange their money into foreign currency. Banks, local governments, and infrastructure-related
industries may simply collapse. Such is the danger of currency depreciation. However, the Chinese economy still
has some cards it can play to avoid a systematic meltdown. First, the state could impose capital controls and literarily close the offshore RMB
market, reversing decades of progress in financial sector reform. Second, it could pump massive liquidity into the economy and create high
inflation. Knowing that the real estate sector has been sucking up liquidity, the state could simply increase the source flow printing more
money to maintain the circulation in the economy. Higher inflation could also gradually absorb the spiraling property prices. Third, it could ease
financial regulations devised to prevent risk in housing mortgages and provide further tax and interest incentives for the purchase of properties,
extending even to low-income groups. Yes, these measures are tantamount to drinking poison to quench your thirst. Yet, these are the short-
term policies being chosen by Chinese state government. However, the authorities do also have their eye on some long-term remedies. On the
one hand, the Chinese government is calling for a nationwide effort on technological innovation and entrepreneurship for high-tech and high
value-added start-up companies. On the other, the state has nominated several high-tech industries for technological catch-up, investing public
money in R&D, patent acquisition, and bids for high-tech companies in developed countries. These industries include electronic chipsets, CPUs,
robotics, new materials such as carbon fiber, and aviation engines. The initiative should boost productivity growth over the medium to long
terms. But we need to pay attention to the business models being used in this effort. National Capitalism National capitalism has been shown to
work in leapfrogging technologies. In China, examples can be found in defense, space, supercomputers, nuclear energy, high-speed rail, and
mega-infrastructure (including deep water drilling platforms). This method of catching up is fast and effective. Basically, you simply need to
have an economy of sufficient size combined with the means to harvest social wealth (such as through monopolistic state-owned enterprises or
the sale of land rights in a prospering property market). Almost any technology can be acquired from the global markets if you have a trillion
dollars ready to spend. However, when it comes to technologies that are developed in competitive market environments through continuous
investment in R&D over a span of decades, Chinese industries typically struggle to bridge the gap. This can be attributed to an economic system
that gives extraordinarily high returns to rent-seeking behaviors for instance, monopolizing markets through administrative and even
legislative means, bribing authorities to bypass labor regulations, quality regulations and environmental regulations, or pirating patents and
design for free rather than aiming for high returns on investment in R&D and continuous improvement in process, design, and quality. The
automobile industry, the precision instrument industry, machine tools industry, computer chips and CPUs, and special steel manufacturing
industry are examples of major failures. Only a few industries, which can maintain a competitive advantage achieved with new technologies
through intrinsic economies of scale or trade secrets, rather than the strict protection of patents and design, manage to develop leading
technologies in competitive markets, examples being the dotcom industry and communications equipment industry. Unfortunately, this can
only happen in a few industries whose markets or technologies have the requisite characteristics. Therefore, if the Chinese government does
not improve its legislative, regulatory, and tax systems, while clamping down on excessive monopolistic power, distorted incentives for
investment in moving up along the global value chain will remain. As a result, state-driven catching up will not create internationally
competitive high-tech industries. In a broader sense, if the Chinese economy cannot improve its micro-level efficiency, Chinese industries are
unlikely to be more innovative than they are now to prepare for future competition further up the global value chain. This issue will be even
starker as the Pacific rim enters the TPP era. In recent decades, the Chinese economys strength has been rooted in the business model of mass
producing products and services using technologies that have matured and require only low to midlevel skills in labor, design, management,
and marketing. These mass-produced high-tech products and services have quickly flooded domestic and global markets, benefiting the
majority of people, as they are usually very cheap. In that sense, China has not only achieved economic growth, but contributed to global
poverty relief. Historically, national capitalism has played a solid complementary role to this unique Chinese economy advantage, again because
of the sheer size of the economy. High-speed rail, third-generation nuclear power technology, the TD-SCDMA version of 4G
telecommunications technology, and ultra-high-voltage (UHV) power transmission technology are perhaps the best examples of this business
model. The New Keynesianism To conclude, national capitalism, which aims to help the Chinese economy move up the global value chain
through technological catching up, can be considered part of the essence of the new Keynesianism in other words, the Chinese approach to
intervention in the current economic downturn. It will certainly continue to make significant progress in certain well-targeted areas, given
enough time. However, there are two key dimensions to measuring how successful the strategy will be. One is the timeline: how long it takes
for such efforts to be translated into significant productivity gains for the whole economy. Second, whether or not these selected areas,
especially AI and robotics, can bring about a major productivity boost as seen with the IT boom in the 1990s and early 2000s. In addition,
national capitalism, a centralized strategy, is an intrinsically high-risk approach to technological development. Even with well-informed
decisions, such as the case of Japan in developing HDTV, there are always surprises. The Chinese government can only hope that it has chosen
the right technologies to pursue. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the other part of Chinas New Keynsianism, namely the One Belt One
Road initiative, which is about exporting the products and services of over-capacity, infrastructure-related industries overseas, also seems
riskier than usual. Put another way, if these proposed infrastructure projects in targeted developing countries
were attractive and low risk, they would have been financed and done. The fact that they are not itself
implies higher risks are involved. At this point, policymakers must look inward: They must identify and
implement all necessary reforms to improve the micro-level efficiency of the Chinese economy. And this
always implies the importance of truly open, competitive, transparent and fair markets for all industries. That is a vastly superior approach to
the Ponzi game of emphasizing ways to manipulate the property market to keep prices climbing ever higher.
India-Relations Disad
1NC Shell- U.S.-India Relations
US-India relations stable now
Nye, 2015 distinguished service professor at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and a
member of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on the Future of Government (Joseph S.
Nye, Whats the future of US-India relations?, World Economic Forum, August 11, 2016,
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/whats-the-future-of-us-india-relations/)//CM When Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi invited US President Barack Obama to attend his countrys Republic Day
ceremonies earlier this year, it signaled an important change in relations between the worlds two
biggest democracies. Ever since the 1990s, three American administrations have tried to improve
bilateral relations, with mixed results. While annual trade between the countries has soared during this
period, from $20 billion to more than $100 billion, annual US-China trade is worth six times more, and
the political relationship has had ups and downs. The two countries have a long history of confusing
each other. By definition, any alliance with a superpower is unequal; so efforts to establish close ties
with the United States have long run up against Indias tradition of strategic autonomy. But Americans
do not view democratic India as a threat. On the contrary, Indias success is an important US interest,
and several factors promise a brighter future for the bilateral relationship. The most important factor is
the acceleration in Indias economic growth, which the International Monetary Fund projects will exceed
7.5% through 2020. For decades, India suffered from what some called the Hindu rate of economic
growth: a little more than 1% per year. It might more properly have been called a 1930s British socialist
rate of growth. After independence in 1947, India adopted an inward-looking planning system that
focused on heavy industry. Market-oriented reforms in the early 1990s changed that pattern, and
annual growth accelerated to 7% under the Congress party, before slumping to 5%. Since the 2014
general election brought Modis Bharatiya Janata Party to power, the government has reversed the
slowdown. And prospects for continued growth are strong. India has an emerging middle class of several
hundred million, and English is an official language spoken by some 50 to 100 million. Building on that
base, Indian information industries are able to play a major global role. Moreover, with a population of
1.2 billion people, India is four times larger than the US, and likely to surpass China by 2025. Its sheer
scale will be increasingly important not only to the global economy, but also to balancing Chinas
influence in Asia and managing global issues such as climate change, public health, and cyber security.
India also has significant military power, with an estimated 90-100 nuclear weapons, intermediate-range
missiles, 1.3 million military personnel, and annual military expenditure of nearly $50 billion (3% of the
world total). And, in terms of soft power, India has an established democracy, an influential diaspora,
and a vibrant popular culture with transnational influence. Bollywood produces more films every year
than any other country, out-competing Hollywood in parts of Asia and the Middle East. But one should
not underestimate Indias problems. Population alone is not a source of power unless those human
resources are developed, and India has lagged well behind China in terms of literacy and economic
growth. Despite its progress, around a third of Indias population lives in conditions of acute poverty,
making the country home to a third of the worlds poor. Indias $2 trillion GDP is only a fifth of Chinas
$10 trillion, and a ninth of Americas $17.5 trillion (measured at market exchange rates). Likewise,
Indias annual per capita income of $1,760 is just one-fifth that of China. Even more striking, while 95%
of the Chinese population is literate, the proportion for India is only 74% and only 65% for women. A
symptom of this problem is Indias poor performance in international comparisons of universities, with
none ranked among the worlds top 100. Indias high-tech exports are only 5% of its total exports
compared to 30% for China. India is unlikely to develop the power to become a global challenger to the
US in the first half of this century. Indeed, even in terms of soft power, a recent study by the Portland
Consultancy in London placed India outside the top 30 countries. China ranked 30th, and the US came in
third, behind the United Kingdom and Germany. Nonetheless, India has considerable assets that already
affect the balance of power in Asia. While India and China signed agreements in 1993 and 1996 that
promised a peaceful settlement of the border dispute that led them to war in l962, the issue has heated
up again, following Chinese actions in recent years.

Lack of trust ensure no India-China coop over Afghanistan

Schwark, 2014 Research Fellow in Asia Studies at the Royal United Services Institute (Edward
Schwark, Can China and India Cooperate in Afghanistan?, The Diplomat, October 1, 2014,

Limits on Cooperation Deep mistrust between China and India which dates back to the 1962 border
war is the most obvious impediment to a functional relationship on Afghanistan. Progress has been
made recently in bilateral economic ties and in multilateral institutions such as BRICS. Yet ongoing
border clashes including a nasty recent spat between Chinese and Indian troops in Ladakh and
Indias attempt to forge closer military links with Beijings adversaries in Japan and Vietnam (which Modi
and his foreign minister visited respectively in September) suggests that there are limits to China-India
bonhomie. Further, while cooperation on security in Afghanistan would seem obvious because of the
shared threat from Islamist extremism, it may actually be the area with the least potential for
cooperation. Chinas Five Principles particularly that of non-interference continue to shape Beijings
foreign policy on its western frontier, and it will be loathe to take actions alone or in conjunction with
others that suck it into the same morass that has trapped NATO for well over a decade. Indeed, China
has indicated that it is unwilling to commit troops post-2014, and while it has contributed to training
Afghanistans police force, Beijing has remained silent on the problem of Afghan National Army (ANA)
funding, which still faces a shortfall of $2.5 billion and requires assistance in key areas such as air
support and battlefield intelligence to sustain it post-ISAF withdrawal. By comparison, India has offered
more on security, but is also sidestepping the issue of ANA funding, and is instead hedging against the
worst-case scenario of state collapse. Delhi recently partially acceded to former President Hamid
Karzais longstanding request for heavy weaponry by agreeing to pay for Russian military equipment to
be supplied to Afghan forces from the north (thereby bypassing Pakistan), and may be trying to revive its
forward presence in Tajikistan once Indias backdoor to supply the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.
India is also working with Russia on refurbishing a Soviet-era armaments factory outside Kabul, and is
running training programs for Afghan officers and Special Forces on Indian soil.

Indian Prime Minister pushing for economic reform but has to convince other
politicians controversy of the plan hinders that
Kaye et al, 2015 co-chief executive officer of private equity firm Warburg Pincus and former
chairman of the U.S.-India Business Council (Charles R. Kaye, How the US should respond to the rise of
India, Fortune, November 11, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/11/12/india-narendra-modi-tpp/)//CM

India is at a unique moment in which the right choices could make it a more significant contributor to
global gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the decades ahead, and give it the wherewithal to
become a stronger strategic partner to Washington. Our new report identifies sustained high rates of
growth as the most important factor for Indias global rise and calls on the U.S. government to more
actively support the growth of the Indian economy. Indias economic growth created opportunities
within India, for Indian citizens and Indian companies, and for American corporations and investors as
well. In the process, Indias growth created new American constituents invested in Indias success. The
U.S.-India Business Council, for example, grew from an anemic 60-some members in the late 1990s to
more than 200 by 2008, and around 330 today. U.S.-India bilateral trade has crossed $100 billion in
goods and servicesa five-fold increase from $19 billion in 2000. But to put it in a global context, that
$100 billion is only around one-sixth of U.S.-China trade. This contrast, though potentially disheartening,
points to the opportunity ahead. India has long been a country of tremendous promise, but it has not
yet been able to translate that potential into the global power that its leadersacross partieshope it
will someday become. Economic reform, begun in 1991, has advanced in fits and starts, but more work
remains. The Indian economy is now among the worlds ten largest, but it is only one-fifth the size of
Chinas. India has lifted more than 130 million people out of abject poverty over the past decade, but is
still home to the worlds largest number of poor due to sheer scale. India has become South Asias
regional power, but has some distance to go before it can play a more ambitious role on the global
stage. Today, however, India has a window of opportunity for significant change. Prime Minister
Narendra Modi has prioritized job creation and economic growth without the baggage of welfare
promises typically offered up in Indian politics. During his first 18 months in office, he has sought to
revitalize Indian foreign policy, and signaled a desire for a stronger relationship with the United States.
Deepening ties will necessitate placing a higher priority on transforming the prickly economic dialogue
between Washington and New Delhijust as the civil nuclear deal transformed strategic ties over the
past decade. Washington will need to shift gears in the way it approaches trade and other economic
matters with India. First and foremost, the United States should be much more ambitious in its trade
and investment ties with India. India remains outside the major Asian trade initiativethe Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP)led by the United States. It is true India has adopted famously difficult negotiating
stances in trade talksbut having no joint ambition will do little to change the status quo. Instead of
waiting for India to meet a threshold determined by the United States, Washington and New Delhi
should craft a roadmap together toward some larger trade commitment. That goal might be a free trade
agreement or membership in a future expanded TPP; with a commitment to reach the goal at a future
date, the roadmap should then specify steps both can take along the way. Active support for Indian
membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, a nonbinding organization India seeks to
join, would be a good start, as would discussions about sectoral agreements such as in services. And
Washington possesses important technical expertise in matters that could be helpful to Indias reforms,
like bank restructuring, infrastructure financing, or vocational skills training. Of course, India harbors
ambivalence about opening its economy further, but it risks being left behind by the strengthening
networks of commerce growing up around it. To that end, Indian politiciansin government as well as
in oppositionshould build domestic constituencies across parties for a more open, market-oriented
approach, all geared toward helping the Indian economy grow. A more open India will be able to draw
upon the external resources needed to develop a larger manufacturing sector, create jobs, build
infrastructure, and raise more people out of povertyall top priorities for successive Indian
governments, and central to the Modi agenda. None of this will be easy, as the recent history of U.S.-
India relations illustrates, and it will certainly not be fast. But in a world in which authoritarianism poses
new threats to the interests of the United States and its allies, a stronger Indiathe worlds largest
democracywill be of even greater importance to U.S. interests.
Increased international trade is key to Indias economy
Bergsten et al 2015 Senior Fellow and Director Emeritus, Peterson Institute for International
Economics (C. Fred Bergsten, Assessing the Future of U.S.-India Relations, Council on Foreign
Relations, November 17, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/india/assessing-future-us-india-

The task force, quite rightly I think, put a huge emphasis on the economic side of the relationship. Just
picking up on what Joe said, India could become a world power if it could emulate over the next 20
years anything like the economic growth that China experienced over the past 20 to 30 years. What
made China a great power was not nuclear weapons, not having a population of a billion people; it was
10 percent growth for 30 years. India could do it. We in the task force felt it. I, from studies Ive done on
the economics of it, feel that India could do it. The question is, will it adopt the policies necessary? And
so, in the report, what we advocate is strong U.S. support for economic reforms in India, both domestic
and international, that would enable India to do that. The countrys probably going to grow at 7, 7
percent anyway. But, in order to achieve the prime ministers goals of cutting unemployment, reducing
poverty further, theyre going to have to up that and get up into the 8 to 10 percent range. Thats their
stated goal. To do it, they have to carry out the prime ministers domestic reforms and they have to add
an international dimension. India has been losing international competitiveness. It has been left out of
the big international trade agreements, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership just announced. For India to
achieve 8 to 10 percent growth, its going to have to experience a big increase in its exports, a big
increase in the globalization of its economy. No countryrepeat, no countryhas ever achieved growth
of 8 percent or more on a sustained basis without expanding greatly its international engagement and
having a big trade dimension to its economic performance. So the challenge for India, in addition to
carrying out its domestic reforms which underlie everything else, is to become much more active on the
international trade and economic side. An initial step to achieve that would be for India to come into
APEC. That would be a stepping stone to trade agreements down the road. It would begin to enable
India to take advantage of trade facilitation agreements, a culture of trade opening up. We hope that
thats something that can happen in the near future. Itll depend largely on India in the first place
showing that it wants to do it. But then of course the United Statesand that goes to our report
should, in our view, strongly support such an initiative and help India to move in that direction.
BUMILLER: Alyssa, what has Prime Minister Modis record been so far on the economic reforms he
promised? Or Fred, whoever wants to jump in. (Laughs.) BERGSTEN: No. Alyssa, you two go ahead.
AYRES: Well, I wanted to just follow up something that Fred just said, and Id be happy to answer that in
a second. BUMILLER: OK. AYRES: But I did want to note that the way the task force places economic
growth as its top priority for U.S.-India partnership actually is something new and different from the way
the United States has been focusing on its approach toward India. We have reformed our security ties
with India. Its been at transformation over the course of the past decade. And so, in this report, I think
it was the consensus of everyone in the task force that we really need to do the same on the economic
side because that is the secret to Indias rise to power, Indias growth, and what will be greater
prosperity for the world that the United States can also benefit from. So I just wanted to emphasize this
is actually something new. And it sounds obvious, but in fact, that has not been U.S. policy.
Economic downturn in India causes nuclear escalation from interstate conflict
Bouton, 2010 President of Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs (Marshall M. Bouton, Americas
Interests in India, Center for New American Security, October 2010,

In South Asia, the most immediately compelling U.S. interest is preventing terrorist attacks on the U.S.
homeland originating in or facilitated by actors in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To
avert that possibility, the United States also has an interest in the stability and development of both
countries. At the same time, the United States has a vital interest in preventing conflict between
Pakistan and India, immediately because such a conflict would do great damage to U.S. efforts in
Afghanistan and Pakistan (such as the diversion of Pakistani military attention away from the
insurgency) and because it would pose the severe risk of nuclear escalation. Finally, the United States
has an interest in peace and stability in South Asia as a whole. Instability and violence in nearly every
one of Indias neighbors, not to mention in India itself, could, if unchecked, undermine economic and
political progress, potentially destabilizing the entire region. At present, a South Asia dominated by a
politically stable and economically dynamic India is a hugely important counterweight to the prevalent
instability and conflict all around Indias periphery. Imagining the counterfactual scenario, a South Asian
region, including India, that is failing economically and stumbling politically, is to imagine instability
on a scale that would have global consequences, including damage to the global economy, huge
dislocations of people and humanitarian crisis, increasing extremism and terrorism, and much greater
potential for unchecked interstate and civil conflict.

In pursuing peace and stability in South Asia the United States must deal with conflicting near and
medium-term priorities and approaches. For instance, the near-term need for the United States to
counter instability and terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in particular to secure the cooperation
of the Pakistani army for that purpose, has complicated the effort to advance U.S.-India security
cooperation. These conflicts are not, however, a reason for inaction in strengthening security ties with
India. To the contrary, it is very much in the interest of the United States at this time to advance security
cooperation with India in South Asia, precisely because the differences over South Asian security have so
bedeviled the relationship in the past and because active Indian support and cooperation is so essential
to the outcomes the United States seeks.
2NC- Ext.- Uniqueness
US-India relations strong on Chinas rise and Afghanistan now, but there is possibility
for change
Ladwig, 2015 Department of War Studies Lecturer at Kings College London (Walter C. Ladwig III,
Relations between the US and India look better today, The Telegraph, January 24, 2015,

Or glass half full (and getting fuller)? Like any pair of countries, the US and India have differing policy
priorities in a number of key areas. However there are equally, if not more powerful factors pulling the
two sides together. On a range of issues, such as the rise of China, the future of Afghanistan and
international terrorism, New Delhi and Washington are increasingly on the same page. First and
foremost, long-time South Asia watchers see shared concerns about Chinas rise as a cornerstone of
Indo-US strategic partnership. There is a noteworthy similarity between Washingtons and New Delhis
objectives vis--vis Beijing. Both nations have adopted congagement strategies that seek to gain from
economic exchange with China while maintaining sufficient military power to deter threats to their key
strategic interests posed by Chinas rising power. As a result, India has worked to deepen its ties with US
allies in the Asia-Pacific, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia as well as countries like Vietnam that
are of growing importance to Washington. America and India have also both supported the Afghan
government and opposed the spread of the Taliban. India desires to see a continued American military
presence in the country and the US is increasingly aware of the role that India can play in contributing to
stability in that fragile state. Finally, both India and the United States share a concern about terrorist
attacks against their homeland or interests overseas. Cooperation between the US and India on counter-
terrorism issues has deepened significantly since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and is characterised by
frequent exchange visits and intelligence sharing. Convergence of policy priorities is matched by an
institutionalisation of defense cooperation. Since 2002, India has conducted more joint military
exercises with the United States than any other country. A defence pact signed in 2005 has facilitated
the training of military personnel, missile defense collaboration and arms sales, as well as opening the
door to joint weapons production. Consequently, in 2013, the US displaced Russia as Indias top
weapons suppler. Forward together? Next weeks summit may be short on tangible accomplishments,
but the Modi-Obama relationship appears to have given new energy and new purpose to a strategic
partnership that had been characterisd by a state of malaise for the past three years. There are still
many question marks ahead: Mr Modi has yet to lay out his vision for the Indo-American relationship
and Mr Obamas foreign policy team is far from the best and the brightest. Nevertheless, the
prospects of a meaningful expansion of Indo-US relations appear to be better today than at any point in
the recent past.

US-Indian relations improving now

Biswal, 5/24 Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (Nisha Desai Biswal,
U.S.-India Relations: Balancing Progress and Managing Expectations,
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2016/257665.htm, US Department of State, May 24, 2016)//CM

Underpinning all elements of our relationship are our people-to-people ties, which have grown stronger
than ever throughout this Administration. Our efforts to promote tourism have paid off handsomely,
with the number of Indian visitors to the United States going from less than 550,000 in 2009 to over
960,000 in 2014, while their spending nearly tripled over the same period, to $9.5 billion. The number of
Indian students studying in the United States increased over 30 percent from 2009 to 2015, reaching
over 130,000 and bringing an estimated $3.6 billion into the U.S. economy. The Fulbright-Nehru
exchange program, which builds life-long bridges among our young scholars and academics, has tripled
in size since 2009. And through the Indo-U.S. 21st Century Knowledge Initiative, launched in 2012, we
have built 32 new partnerships between our institutes of higher education, ranging from efforts to
improve mental health care to developing more sustainable aquaculture systems. Overall, our long-
running U.S. government exchange programs have graduated over 15,000 alumni from India, including
six current and former heads of state, 35 members of parliament, 11 chief ministers, and other leaders
in business, civil society, academia, and the arts. In his speech last year at Siri Fort, New Delhi, President
Obama said that our nations are strongest when we uphold the equality of all our people. To build
that strength, we have a range of dialogues, engagements, and private conversations about human
rights with Indias government. Our U.S.-India Global Issues Forum, led earlier this year by Under
Secretary of State Sarah Sewall, focused on a wide range of issues including transparency and
governance, countering violent extremism, migration and refugees, trafficking, and LGBTI rights. Our
Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Susan Coppedge, just returned
from India, where she had a fruitful exchange with the government on how it combats trafficking, and
also shared U.S. efforts on prosecution, protection, and prevention. And we are always looking for new
ways to partner with India to advance human rights, strengthen democratic institutions, and support
societies that are more inclusive, secular, and tolerant. Taken together, the progress we have made over
the past eight years in our strategic, economic, defense and security, and energy and environment ties
has truly ushered in a new era of relations between the United States and India, strengthening the
foundation of a partnership that will help ensure that the Indo-Pacific region and the world is a more
peaceful and prosperous place. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Relations strong now increased cooperation on military and diplomatic issues

Mehta and Gould, 6/5 Senior Pentagon correspondent at Defense News and writer featured in
The New York Times, The Washington Post, Politico and CNN; and congressional reporter at Defense
News (Aaron Mehta and Joe Gould, Modi Visit Underlines Changed India-US Relationship, Defense
News, June 5, 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/2016/06/05/modi-visit-
underlines-changed-india-us-relationship/85188894/ )//CM

WASHINGTON When Indian prime minister Narendra Modi addresses a joint session of Congress on
Wednesday, he will find a warm reception from lawmakers something nearly unthinkable 15 years
ago, when India still proudly existed as a non-allied state with the US. But while Modis appearance on
the Hill will garner headlines, the biggest change in the relationship between the two nations has been
happening at the executive level. The Obama administration has made strengthening ties with India a
priority, something highlighted by the focus Defense Secretary Ash Carter has had on the South Asian
nation. Carter has visited India twice, and repeatedly expressed his appreciation for both India generally
and Minister of Defense Manohar Parrikar specifically. Ashley Tellis, a former State Department official
now with the Carnegie Endowment, calls the Modi visit a culmination of what Obama has tried to do
since he came into office, adding that executive branch to executive branch that is a dramatic
transformation where the US today sees India as a security partner of choice in the broader Indo-Pacific
region. Once chilly over India's nuclear tests, the US-India defense relationship now features
technology exchanges, joint military exercises and, of late, an intensified maritime security dialogue
undoubtedly meant to send a signal to China. Frank Wisner, an ambassador to India under President
Clinton, said for all these reasons, the barriers to the relationship are no longer political, but based only
on bureaucracy for the US and defense budgets for India. "This is one of the biggest, fastest moving
defense relationships in the world, period," said Wisner, now with the international law firm Squire
Patton Boggs, adding later: "We have an interest in an India that is robustly armed. India is not a
predatory power, and she is big enough and important enough that she helps anchor the balance of
power in Asia. A good relationship with India is part of a good relationship with China." As with
everything in the Pacific, the focus comes down to China. The US is concerned that China is becoming a
true peer competitor, with Pentagon officials often referring to China and Russia as driving a return to
Great Power competition. For India, Chinas expansion into the South China Sea threatens its maritime
security, turning China from a threat isolated in the Himalayan region to an existential one. Indian
interests and American interests fundamentally converge with respect to China, Tellis said. Obama
understands China is really the big game the US has to get right, and I think its in that context that the
relationship in India is viewed today. And that will outlast President Obama whomever the next
president is wont be able to avoid the China problem. Given that focus, it is no surprise that the
Pentagon has grown increasingly open to technological development programs with India. The core of
the technology relationship between the two nations is the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative
(DTTI), a specialized program
2NC- Ext.- Links
India disapproves of One Belt, One Road so the plan angers them
Madan, 2016 fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program
at the Brookings Institution, and director of The India Project (Tanvi Madan, What India think about
Chinas One Belt, One Road initiative (but doesn't explicitly say), Brookings Institute, March 14, 2016,

The connectivity initiatives that China and other Asian countries are pursuing across Asia and the Indian
Ocean regionbuilding new infrastructure, institutions, and interlinkagesis arguably redrawing the
continents map. That has not just economic implications, but geopolitical ones. India has been relatively
silent on perhaps the most talked-about of the initiatives, Chinas One Belt, One Road (OBOR). But, at
the inaugural Raisina Dialogue, hosted in New Delhi in early March by the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs and the think tank Observer Research Foundation, the Indian government signaled Delhis
concern about Beijings approach toward connectivity and the region more broadly. In three speeches
over three days, Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, Minister of State for External Affairs (or
deputy foreign minister) V.K. Singh, and Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar provided the clearest exposition
yet of Indias official perspective on and approach toward connectivity at home and in the region. Along
the lines of policymakers and analysts comments for decades, there was talk of how connectivity can
bring countries together and be mutually beneficial. But there was not much talkas there might have
once been in the regionof such relationships alleviating rivalries. Indeed, a recurring theme in the
speeches was about the interplay of geopolitics and connectivity, and how much the latter could either
make or break regional stability. Connectivity, once seen as helping countries transcend geopolitics, was
instead identified by the foreign secretary as having emerged as a theater of present day geopolitics.
Connectivity, once seen as helping countries transcend geopolitics, was instead identified by the foreign
secretary as having emerged as a theater of present day geopolitics. The C word Without once
naming China, the Indian officials at the dialogue laid out Delhis perception of that countrys
connectivity initiatives and contrasted the Chinese and Indian approaches to connectivity and the
region. In her speech, the foreign minister outlined the importance of Asian connectivity and the
opportunities and challenges it presents for India. She stressed, notably: We bring to bear a
cooperative rather than unilateral approach and believe that creating an environment of trust and
confidence is the pre-requisite for a more inter-connected world. (emphasis added) In the past, India
has indicated that it sees Chinas OBOR as a national Chinese initiative. In Singapore last year, the
Indian foreign secretary, when asked about OBOR, noted that it was not incumbent on other countries
to necessarily buy into such unilateral initiatives: "Because a national initiative is devised with national
interest, and an international or regional initiative has other interests, which are reconciled into that. So,
where we stand is that if this is something on which they want a larger buy in, then they need to have
larger discussions and those havent happened." And flipping the idea that economic cooperation and
connectivity would have a palliative effect on the China and Indias political relationship, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi has asserted in the past that the former is a pre-requisite, contingent on the latter: If the
two countries achieved a climate of mutual trust and confidence; respect for each others sensitivities
and concerns; and, peace and stability in our relations and along our borders then we can reinforce
each others economic growth. Some Indian analysts and a former national security adviser have called
for Delhi to see the opportunities that OBOR presents as well, and use the infrastructure and
institutions that are being created to further Indias transformation. India is arguably already using
some of the infrastructure like Sri Lankan ports developed by China and institutions like the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which it is helping shape as a founding member. But were
unlikely to see a formal endorsement of OBOR as a whole. For one, the Indian government has particular
concerns about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that is part of OBOR and that includes projects in
territory that India claims. This is a crucial reason why India pushed for a provision in the charter of AIIB
(that is expected to fund some OBOR projects) that requires project financing in disputed territory to
have the agreement of the disputants. In addition, there is clearly also concern about the way China is
pursuing OBOR, the motivations behind it, and particularly the kind of influence that Beijing might be
seeking through it. The foreign secretary elaborated on this at the Raisina Dialogue and also had a
message for China, which has sought global multipolarity: "The key issue is whether we will build our
connectivity through consultative processes or more unilateral decisions. Our preference is for the
formerBut we cannot be impervious to the reality that others may see connectivity as an exercise in
hard-wiring that influences choices. This should be discouraged, because particularly in the absence of
an agreed security architecture in Asia, it could give rise to unnecessary competitiveness. Connectivity
should diffuse national rivalries, not add to regional tensions Indeed, if we seek a multi-polar world,
the right way to begin is to create a multi-polar Asia. Nothing could foster that more than an open
minded consultation on the future of connectivity." The foreign secretarys remarks suggested that Delhi
did not object to doing business with Beijing per se, but rather its way of doing business. Giving the
example of the AIIB, he noted that when there was a consultative process toward an initiative, India
would respond positively. The deputy foreign minister refined this further, noting the preference for
such consultation to be from the conception stage itself.

Indias interests in the Indian Ocean threatened by OBOR plan angers them
Taneja 16 [ Kabir Consultant at the World Energy Policy Summit and previously Guest Scholar Fridtjof
Nansen Institute, Why India is worried about Chinas ambitious One Belt One Road initiative, May 28,
2016, Scroll.in, http://scroll.in/article/805632/why-india-is-worried-about-chinas-ambitious-one-belt-

Chinas much talked about One Belt One Road or OBOR initiative is causing some unease in the power
corridors of New Delhi as Beijings ambitious $1 trillion project starts to take shape. Announced in 2013
by Chinese president Xi Jinping, the OBOR project, which will bolster Chinas economic and geopolitical
footprint, has challenged India on two fronts the first in the form of large Chinese investments
announced for Pakistan, and second, a fast increasing strategic and economic presence in the Indian
Ocean. This includes Chinese money being pumped into port projects in neighbouring countries like Sri
Lanka and Bangladesh. Indias concerns Other than the natural instinct of such a huge capital building
initiative by an adversary in the region, the main point of contention for India is the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor or CPEC, which is also part of OBOR. The port of Gwadar, not far from Karachi, where
the Arabian Sea meets the Persian Gulf, is today completely handled by China. Both Islamabad and
Beijing announced $46 billion developmental programmes that included Chinese money being pumped
into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which in effect cements the strategic ties between the two nations
even further. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridors mandate includes the development of energy
infrastructure, roads and railways. Its influence ends in Gwadar, which is fast becoming a de facto
Chinese staging post in the Persian Gulf area. The development of more projects such as Gwadar could
significantly trouble Indias current dominance in its backyard the Indian Ocean region. External Affairs
Minister Sushma Swaraj said in May 2015 that Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during his visit to China,
had very strongly raised the issue of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor going through Pakistan-
occupied Kashmir. This, along with Chinas growing clout in the Indian Ocean, remain the two main
concern spots for New Delhi to give any sort of precedence to OBOR in its own foreign policy narrative.
Last week, reports surfaced suggesting that troops from Chinas Peoples Liberation Army had been
sighted on the other side of the Line of Control in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. It is being suggested that
the Chinese troops are there to build infrastructure to protect and aid commercial Chinese projects.
Similar reports had surfaced last year as well. For New Delhi, OBOR may be a potential economic
opportunity but it also threatens Indias interests. Indias former foreign secretary Shyam Saran recently
wrote that if China indeed succeeded in the economic and geopolitical aims behind OBOR, India may get
consigned to the margins of both land and maritime Asia. As of today, OBOR is perhaps the biggest
programme for China. It is a huge undertaking with an ambitious plan to connect major Eurasian
economies using tools of infrastructure development, facilitation of trade, infusion of big investments in
areas such as road and rail development, oil and gas and special economic zones. The bedrock of the
OBOR programmes is rooted in two historical trade routes, with the first being the ancient Silk Road that
traversed through the central Asian region, peaking during the period of Chinas Tang Dynasty (618 CE-
906 CE). The second is the Maritime Silk Route, sketched roughly on historical Chinese maritime trade
routes through the South China Sea and beyond, touching as far as East Africa and Mediterranean
Europe via ports such as Kolkata, Colombo and Karachi in South Asia. Funding for OBOR, which is now
one of the worlds largest inclusive international development initiatives, is supposed to come via a host
of financial initiatives by Chinese institutions. The much-touted Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
that was proposed on the sidelines of the OBOR project itself in 2013, for which India is a founding
member, is pitching to invest a big part of its $100 billion corpus to OBOR-related activities. In May last
year, it was reported that the China Development Bank separately is preparing to invest more than $890
billion for over 900 projects involving 60 countries as part of the belt over a 15-year time frame. The
sheer magnitude of OBOR is something that puts Indias own interests at significant unease, while
having no counter to offer for it.
2NC- Ext.- Internal Links
The plan sends a signal that Washington is abandoning India crushes cooperation
that is key to balancing China and securing peaceful stability in the region
Madan, 2015 fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program
at the Brookings Institution, and director of The India Project (Tanvi Madan, The U.S.-India Relationship
and China, Brookings Institute, January 20, 2015,

Each also recognizes that Chinaespecially uncertainty about its behavioris partly what is driving the
India-U.S. partnership. Arguably, there have been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust
relationship with India and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise
of China; economic interest; and shared democratic values. Indian policymakers recognize that
American concerns about the nature of Chinas rise are responsible for some of the interest in India.
New Delhis own China strategy involves strengthening India both security-wise and economically
(internal balancing) and building a range of partnerships (external balancing)and it envisions a key role
for the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight another benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing
takes Delhi more seriously because Washington does. But India and the U.S. also have concerns about
the other when it comes to China. Both sides remain uncertain about the others willingness and
capacity to play a role in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, Indian policymakers worry both about a China-
U.S. condominium (or G-2) and a China-U.S. crisis or conflict. There is concern about the reliability of the
U.S., with the sense that the U.S. will end up choosing China because of the more interdependent Sino-
American economic relationship and/or leave India in the lurch. Some in the U.S. also have reliability
concerns about India. They question whether the quest for strategic autonomy will allow India to
develop a truly strategic partnership with the U.S. There are also worries about the gap between Indian
potential and performance. Part of the rationale for supporting Indias rise is to help demonstrate that
democracy and development arent mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this rationaleand
Indias importancefades away. As things stand, neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others
relationship with China being too hot or too coldthe Goldilocks view. For New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-
U.S. relationship is seen as freezing India out and impinging on its interests. It would also eliminate one
of Washingtons rationales for a stronger relationship with India. A China-U.S. crisis or conflict, on the
other hand, is seen as potentially destabilizing the region and forcing India to choose between the two
countries. From the U.S. perspective, any deterioration in Sino-Indian relations might create instability in
the region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much Sino-Indian bonhomie, on the other hand,
would potentially create complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres.
However, both India and the U.S. do share an interest in managing Chinas rise. Neither would like to see
what some have outlined as President Xi Jinpings vision of Asia, with a dominant China and the U.S.
playing a minimal role. India and the U.S. recognize that China will play a crucial role in Asiait is the
nature of that role that concerns both countries. Their anxiety has been more evident since 2009,
leading the two sides to discuss Chinaand the Asia-Pacific broadlymore willingly. They have an East
Asia dialogue in place. There is also a trilateral dialogue with Japan and talk of upgrading it to ministerial
level and including Japan on a more regular basis in India-U.S maritime exercises. The Obama
administration has also repeatedly stated that it sees India as part of its rebalance strategy. In
November 2014, President Obama, speaking in Australia, stressed that the U.S. support[ed] a greater
role in the Asia Pacific for India. The Modi government, in turn, has made the region a foreign policy
priority. Prime Minister Modi has implicitly criticized Chinese behavior in the region (and potentially in
the Indian Ocean), with his admonition about countries with expansionist mindsets that encroach on
others lands and seas. In a departure from its predecessor, his government has shown a willingness to
express its support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in joint statements with Vietnam
and the U.S. In an op-ed, the prime minister also stated that the India-U.S. partnership will be of great
value in advancing peace, security and stability in the Asia and Pacific regions and, in September,
President Obama and he reaffirm[ed] their shared interest in preserving regional peace and stability,
which are critical to the Asia Pacific region's continued prosperity.
2NC- Ext.- Impacts
India key to balancing China challenges them in Asia
Bergsten et al 2015 Senior Fellow and Director Emeritus, Peterson Institute for International
Economics (C. Fred Bergsten, Assessing the Future of U.S.-India Relations, Council on Foreign
Relations, November 17, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/india/assessing-future-us-india-

BUMILLER: Let me just move quickly to geopolitics and ask Joe this question. You talk in the report about
how India can advance American interests. Is that code for having India serve as a counterweight to
China in the region? NYE: Well, I dont know whether its a code. Its aits a fact. BUMILLER: (Laughs.)
OK. OK. (Laughter.) NYE: No, but I mean, the reports very BUMILLER: Youre notyoure not in the
government, I see. NYE: Thats right. (Laughs, laughter.) The reports very careful to say this is not
designed for an anti-China alliance. I mean, we have a lot of agenda items with China, some of them
positive, some of them negative. What we are showing is that if you look at the rise of China, which Fred
aptly described, how China behaves will depend greatly on the balance of power in East Asia, which will
depend upon Japan and IndiaBill Emmott described this in the book the Rivals 10 years agoas well
as smaller countries like Vietnam and South Korea and others. The chances of making China behave as a
responsible stakeholder, to use Bob Zoellicks term, depends on shaping the environment so that, as
China faces options, it sees that some are costly and some are less costly, and it would be led to the less-
costly onesthe more cooperative ones. So the fact that India and the United States and Japan and
other countries have an interest in shaping the environment to encourage China to be responsible, that
strikes me as not an alliance against China; its a fact. This is what I mean by structural realignment. Its
notits not that were trying to get a new Cold War to contain China. Its we can shape the
environment, and thats what were trying to do.

Economic growth in India allows them to balance China due to investments in military
Bergenwall, 2015 researcher at Swedish Defense Agency (Samuel Bergenwall, Indias strategic
importance is growing with the countrys economy, Swedish Defense Research Agency, August 23,
2015, http://www.foi.se/en/Top-menu/Pressroom/News/2015/Indias-strategic-importance-is-growing-

Within five years India will probably have the worlds sixth largest economy and the fourth largest
defence budget covering an increased nuclear capability and a modernised oceangoing navy. The FOI
Memo Indiens vxande ekonomiska och strategiska betydelse [Indias growing economic and strategic
importance] reports the International Monetary Funds assessment that in the next few years India will
become the worlds fastest growing economy, due to factors such as the improved business climate, the
rising level of education, tax reforms and a reduction in corruption. It foresees further development that
by 2020 will make India the worlds sixth largest economy and by 2025 the third largest after China
and the United States. Improvements in Indias economy provide headroom for increased spending on
defence which in turn results in extensive investment in a modern oceangoing navy capable, for
example, of counterbalancing the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. It also means that India will
soon possess, in common with the United Sates, Russia and China, a nuclear triad consisting of strategic
bombers, intercontinental missiles and strategic submarines. At the same time, the report stresses that
Indias non-alignment could well lead to closer relations with many countries, for example the United
States, the EU and Russia, and quite possibly with the Arab states and Israel. Such developments would
give India generous room for manoeuvre in global politics. Indias close relations with Moscow have
deepened over the last decade. For example, India has not condemned Russias actions in Crimea and
Ukraine. At the same time we see a shift in Indias defence industry relations with more equipment
being purchased from the United States and less from Russia, says the reports author Samuel
Bergenwall who has recently returned home after six months as a guest researcher at the Indian
research institute IDSA, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The Memo notes that Indias
new role as an emergent economic great power has meant that the countrys historic focus on South
Asia has now expanded to embrace an area stretching from East Africa and the Gulf region in the west
to East Asia in the east, and from Central Asia in the north to the Indian Ocean archipelago in the south.
Meanwhile, however, relations with neighbouring Pakistan, and indeed with China, still remain
somewhat strained. Indias relations with Pakistan tend to fluctuate. But most Indian security experts
do not see Pakistan as the greatest problem. They are more concerned about Chinas actions and the
Chinese support for Pakistan. At the same time, however, trade between India and China has never
been greater than it is today, says Samuel Bergenwall.

Strong US-India relations are key to the US economy, regional stability, fighting
terrorism , and balancing China
Mead, 6/9 James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and
previously taught American foreign policy at Yale University (Walter Russel Mead, Thanks, Obama!
(And Bush, and Modi), The American Interest, June 9, 2016, http://www.the-american-

Thanks, Obama! (And Bush, and Modi) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is wrapping up his state
visit in Washington, and when he returns to India he will be bringing home some serious bacon: a
nuclear deal that promises construction of six new nuclear reactors. The WSJ reports: Under the new
atomic-power agreement, Nuclear Power Corporation of India and Westinghouse Electric Co., a U.S. unit
of Toshiba Corp., will begin engineering and site-design work for the reactors, though the final contract
wont be completed until June 2017, White House officials said. The deal marked a significant step in
resolving obstacles to the sale of nuclear reactors and fuel to India. Culminating a decade of
partnership on civil nuclear issues, the leaders welcomed the start of preparatory work on-site in India
for six AP 1000 reactors to be built by Westinghouse and noted the intention of India and the U.S.
Export-Import Bank to work together toward a competitive financing package for the project, the
White House said in a statement. This news speaks to a similarity between Bush and Obama: both had
Middle East policies that went badly wrong, both saw a weakening of the transatlantic alliancebut
both got India right. Moving forward on this important relationship is and needs to be a major
component of American foreign policy, and Obama, like his predecessor, has steadily and patiently
worked to advance the U.S.-India relationship. Todays deal fulfills the promise of the 2008 deal that the
Bush administration, with Democratic support, got through Congress in a difficult year. Obama also has
been able to insulate the India relationship from partisanship, and the GOP has helped. This, for younger
readers who may not have seen many other examples, is how the American system is supposed to work.
Better U.S.-India relations are good for the U.S. economy, good for stabilizing the balance of power in
the Indian Ocean region, good for countering terrorism, good for democracy, and good for helping to
persuade China that the path of international confrontation ultimately wont work. It is the result of
effortsdating back to the Clinton yearsof diplomats, military officials, legislators and Presidents of
both parties, liberal and conservative, who have seen the important national interests bound up in U.S.-
India relations and have worked to build ties. It hasnt always been easy; India is not the easiest partner
to work with sometimes, and there have been lots of difficulties to surmount and costs to pay.
Nevertheless, President Obama, the State Department, and the many people from both parties who
have worked to get us to this point for many years deserve the thanks of the nation and the world. At a
time when bad news for Pax Americana seems to be coming thick and fast, here at least is something
The Peoples Republic of China should
- Facilitate peace talks between pressure groups
- Stop relying on Pakistan on the Sino-Afghan border
- Invest in Afghanistans infrastructure development with the intent of gaining
access to a land bridge
- Assist Afghanistan in creating an indigenous manufacturing industry

CP solves case
Asey 15, Asey is an independent researcher and writer based in Kabul and has served as a senio r
adviser to the Afghan government.
(Tamim, China: Afghanistans New Hope Foreign Policy 4/8/15
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/08/china -afghanistans -new-hope/)//eb

With the recent surge in direct diplomacy and high level visits between China and Afghanistan there is
an emerging hope amongst Afghans that China can be counted on as an honest partner, broker, and
good neighbor. An increased economic and security interest in China by former Afghan President Hamid
Karzai during his last months in office and the current president, Ashraf Ghani, with his first foreign trip
to Beijing are all indicators of a great rebalancing act by Kabul to reach out to China after decades of
tepid relations. But this new hope of a partnership should go beyond diplomatic niceties and be based
on a strong foundation of mutual interests. Afghanistan needs Chinese financial, economic, and
technical resources and its political leverage at the international stage whereas Afghanistan is the
missing link in Chinas regional diplomacy and geopolitics. As a rising power, China cannot and should
not tolerate an unstable Afghanistan in its neighborhood. A troubled and unstable neighborhood
infested with extremists and regional proxy terrorist groups is probably the biggest impediment to
Chinas rise to a peaceful and responsible power. History is filled with examples, such as the Byzantine,
Ottoman, and Khmer Empires, where rising powers eventually fell or disintegrated due to instability in
their neighborhood. Both China and Afghanistan have suffered from imperial conquests and fell
prey to various geopolitical games. These empires were mostly supported by outside powers,
and today, while China has managed to throw off the influence of those powers and
strengthened internally, Afghanistan is still fighting its battle for a united, prosperous, and
peaceful Afghanistan. China has international diplomatic clout, influence in the region, and is an
economic powerhouse, all of which can help to facilitate talks with and pressure groups and states to
achieve regional stability. While China might have legitimate security and geostrategic concerns over
engaging itself in such a controversial international and regional issue (and potentially a never-ending
insurgency in Afghanistan), the costs of staying indifferent will be much higher. A neighborhood
engulfed in terrorism, the drug trade, extremism, and proxy wars is the biggest threat to the national
security and rise of China. On the other hand, China should stop relying on Pakistan when dealing with
Sino-Afghan border issues, particularly when it comes to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. The time
has come for China to end its passivity with Afghanistan, directly engage with the Afghan government,
and help support build a strong, national government for Afghanistan to serve as a credible partner for
China in its neighborhood. Afghanistan has natural and human resources as well as a prime geographic
location that are ripe for Chinese picking. The World Bank has termed Afghanistan as a country with
huge potential to serve as a resource corridor between South and Central Asia. China one of the
biggest consumers of raw material and energy inputs has some of the worlds biggest construction,
railway, and road companies. They are efficient, experienced, and highly competent companies who
have been building infrastructures across the globe from China to Africa to South Asia. Afghanistan,
however, has one of the most underdeveloped infrastructures in the world, barely even tapping into its
full resource potential. China should invest in Afghanistans infrastructure development to gain access to
Afghanistans resources and create a land bridge, better connecting China to Central Asia and the
Middle East. Furthermore, Afghanistan is the backyard of the Persian Gulf, and given that the
majority of Chinese oil supply passes through the Gulf, it is of vital national security interest for
China to expand its economic and political influence in Afghanistan. With some much of Chinas
energy imports passing through Afghanistans sphere, the security of the Chinese energy
supplies depends on the stability of Afghanistan. China has some of the best vocational training
institutes and higher education institutions in the region. According to the recent Times Education
ranking, Chinese universities and institutes rank among the worlds 100 best universities and institutes.
Meanwhile China has also over the years accumulated valuable assembly and manufacturing experience
for the international market. China can assist Afghanistan in creating an indigenous manufacturing
industry in the country. Afghanistan a country where much of the population is still illiterate can
greatly benefit from Chinese education and manufacturing prowess. Chinese business interests and
products have mainly been rerouted and exported to Afghanistan via Pakistan because Afghan roadways
from China cannot accommodate the demands of the mountainous border between the two countries.
The Afghan business communities have a keen interest for partner with Chinese firms and factories.
Chinese state-owned companies such as the China National Petroleum Corporation International and
China Metallurgical Group Corporation have invested in Amu Darya oil river basinand Aynak copper
mine in Afghanistan, though the experience with the two projects has not been encouraging so far. The
contractual obligations have either been not met or were asked to be renegotiated. Despite Chinas
issues in following through and delivery in Afghanistan, Afghanistan has much to learn from the
Chinese economic model. Afghanistan needs to move away from an aid dependent economy
move towards a trade and export oriented economy. Chinas economic policies have a lot to
offer in terms of models and examples. China has successfully used a state capitalism economic
model mixed with special economic zones, assembly lines, and export oriented trade to
become one of the worlds biggest economies. In the long run, the benefits of Chinese engagement
and influence in building a stable and peaceful Afghanistan far outweigh the costs. China can exert its
diplomatic status to bring parties to the negotiating table and use its powerful economy to support
mutually beneficial infrastructure development programs in Afghanistan. A stable and peaceful
Afghanistan can be both a reliable trading partner with China and bring needed stability to the region.
Instability in a country breeds instability in the region, and China cannot afford such a liability. China will
have to engage in Afghanistan for its own national and economic security.
Advantage CPs
U.S.-China relations
The United States federal government should formally invite the Peoples Republic of
China to participate in the 2016 RIMPAC

Solves U.S China relations

Dingding Chen 15, Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of Government and Public Administration
at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin,
Germany. He is also the Founding Director of Intellisia Institute, a newly
established independent think tank focusing on international affairs in China. His research interests
include: Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights. (The Diplomat 5/8/15,
3 Reasons the United States Should Invite China to RIMPAC 2016 http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/3-
reasons-the-united-states-should-invite-china-to-rimpac-2016/) //eb

RIMPAC is a prestigious event that will certainly benefit China, the exercise is not ultimately
To start with, although

something that China needs to participate in. After all, it is only a naval exercise with the overarching
purpose of displaying symbolic unity in the spirit of multilateral naval cooperation. Thus, by excluding
China from RIMPAC 2016, the U.S. cannot really hurt China in a meaningful way (not to mention Chinas behavior in the South
China Sea). If the U.S. is serious about punishing China, then it should focus on more tangible targets, like stopping some of the trading or investment relationships with China. Then again
such sanctions are always a double-edged sword as they can hurt both parties. In that sense, all the punishing China mentality is understandable from an emotional perspective, but such
talks are not consistent with rational decision-making. Of course, it is possible that whoever talks about punishing China might be principally targeting Americas domestic audience,

, Chinas participation in RIMPAC is a true win-win situation.

especially as the 2016 presidential election looms on the horizon. Secondly

Even though Chinas participation in RIMPAC 2014 was a success for Beijing, it was also a success for the
United States. It is reasonable for people to be skeptical about the real utility of such an event in
building mutual trust between China and the U.S., but the truth is that building trust is always a long
process and we must start with baby steps. RIMPAC, by all means, is one such small step. Arguably,
military-to-military relations are the weakest point in an already tenuous U.S.-China relationship. It
follows then that anything, no matter how small, that can improve this military-to-military relationship
should be supported, not opposed. Excluding China from RIMPAC would only be counterproductive to
U.S.-China relations, regardless of what the gains might be for the U.S. and its allies in Asia. Lastly, it is
understandable that the United States is now frustrated with Chinas increasingly seemingly assertive
behavior in the South China Sea and Chinas overall foreign policy in recent years. This U.S. frustration is
the larger context within which we must analyze the RIMPAC 2016 invitation issue. The dilemma facing
the U.S. is this: how can the U.S. maintain an effective relationship with China and continue to enjoy the
benefits made possible by Chinas rise without giving up its predominant position in Asia? According to
some recent U.S. reports (here and here), China is determined to throw the U.S. out of Asia as it gets
stronger and richer every day. This is a big myth, partly motivated by domestic interest groups in the
United States. As I have argued elsewhere, China does not have the capability or intentions to push the
U.S. out of Asia. It is indeed very puzzling why such a myth is so deeply rooted in the minds of many
intelligent U.S. strategists. A recent paper by Chinese scholar Wang Dong also makes the same point: China is not trying to push the U.S.
out of East Asia, period. Thus, a confident and secure United States should not worry about Chinas
participation in RIMPAC. It is not a reward for China in the first place, and it will not be a punishment for Beijing should no invitation be extended. It is merely a
normal confidence and trust-building activity, made all the more necessary due to the already tenuous
U.S.-China relationship. There is no need to hype the importance of RIMPAC; just let the two militaries
do their jobs.
India Counterplan
CP text: The United States federal government should increase its diplomatic and/or
economic engagement with India by cooperating on infrastructure investment in

CP solves (Also doesnt cause Indo-Pak war)

Pyatt 11 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs American
Chamber of Commerce in India( Geoffrey, The Importance of U.S.-India Business and Economic
Relations, US Department of State, 6/24/11,

I. Why Does India Matter to the United States? I certainly dont need to remind this audience that our business ties represent one of the
most vibrant features of the U.S.-India partnership. In many ways, our business-to-business and people-to-people ties will increasingly
come to define the U.S.-India relationship. I also dont need to cite for this crowd the statistics showing how fast Indias economy is growing and how far this growth
will take it. What I would like to share with you at the outset is the U.S. government perspective on India and why we view it, as President Obama has said, as

an indispensable partner for the 21st Century. People often ask why a country like India is so important to our interests in a time
where domestic issues from unemployment to rising energy costs tend to dominate the headlines. The answer is simple: Indias values, systems,

and core strengths mirror our own. Our relationship with India is particularly notable, due to the
intangible assets that power our strategic partnership: democratic values, entrepreneurial vigor, diverse
societies, a strong and independent judiciary, and a passion for innovation. These are the key ingredients
of a knowledge-driven economy and of the knowledge-based partnership that we share. As the largest
democracy in the world, India has extraordinary people power, with a population that laudably pins
great value to social issues and democratic ideals. A recently released report cites India as having over 3 million popularly-elected
politicians across national, state, and local constituencies, with over one million of those officials being women. That amazing figure not only demonstrates the
sheer size of Indias political system, but also shows the extent of power that the voting public wields in India. With
its democratic values, recent
efforts to fight graft, and the adoption five years ago of the Right to Information Act (RTI) reportedly the most utilized law in the world
the so-called India model extends far beyond growth, innovation, and management gurus. It is a model for how a

country will rise with, and not in spite of its citizens, in the 21st century. India is on track to have the largest population on the

planet by 2030, and might have the largest economy by 2050. Indias rise is fueled by a young, optimistic, dynamic, educated
population. In addition to our shared values, Indias market offers tremendous opportunity to U.S. exporters of goods and

services. India has a market of 1.2 billion of the worlds consumers. These consumers have growing aspirations, and the disposable

income to act on their aspirations. This is a powerful combination. The complementary strengths we share with India offer a

great platform with which to leverage these unprecedented market opportunities. The potential for
innovative solutions that can arise from partnering world-class American technology with Indian
corporate local know-how is virtually limitless. These opportunities span across multiple sectors. Just as Norman Borlaugs agriculture
innovation and his collaboration with Indian scientist M.S. Swaminathan helped to spark the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970, the U.S. and India

are again collaborating to transform food security in India as part of an Evergreen Revolution. Our experts
are developing, testing, and replicating transformative agriculture technologies, our scientists are collaborating on monsoon forecasting, and our businesses are
investing in food processing infrastructure to help India improve farm-to-market linkages. The
boundless potential for e-commerce,
telecommunications, social media, and endless other business ideas that will arise from enhanced
connectivity is staggering. According to a recent Wall Street Journal article, the current internet penetration in India is in the range of only 80-100
million, less than 10 percent of the population. On infrastructure, too, the opportunities are enormous.. According to McKinsey Global Institute, 80 percent of the
India of 2030 has yet to be built. U.S. companies want to provide the goods and services needed to upgrade and build Indias railroads, airports, power plants, and
fiber optic cables. India will need to invest $143 billion in health care, $392 billion in transportation infrastructure, and $1.25 trillion in energy production by 2030 to
support its rapidly expanding population. But how do we best penetrate this complex market? For one, the U.S. government through Treasurys U.S.-Economic
and Financial Partnership with India is working to help develop financial instruments and public-private partnership models to mobilize the significant private capital
that will be needed to build the India of tomorrow. India, as the President noted during his watershed trip to India in November, is not simply emerging; India has
emerged. However, the U.S.-India story still contains untapped potential and unrealized gains. In the private sector,
businesses would like to be able to move faster. India is in the process of embarking upon a major period of infrastructure upgrades, which, once completed will
lower the costs of doing business, including in crucial Indian growth areas like manufacturing. In addition to infrastructure, India has energy security concerns. As a
recent report by Standard Chartered has suggested, India faces commercial energy consumption growth to rise at least 6% a year for the next several decades. As
the Indian government itself acknowledges, growth presents its own challenges. Managing growth in a way that includes all segments of society is a top focus of the
Indian government. I know your businesses, too, understand that truly sustainable economic growth is best achieved by cultivating a broad base of support for
market-driven approaches. Indeed, I know many American businesses are spearheading innovative strategies that dont just sell goods and services in a vacuum, but
also help enable the local ecosystems within which they work. Why? Because you understand that activities like strengthening supply chains and training workers
have multiple long-term payoffs. You know that enabling ecosystems will enhance the labor pool, build stronger suppliers, and create millions of new consumers!
We are also working hard to address these concerns, partnering with the Indians on everything from clean energy to education. The challenges are real, but we

confident that with more strategic cooperation will come great benefits. II. Regional Economic Integration for the Future
The opportunities flowing from a stronger partnership exist not only in the U.S.-India corridor, but
across the globe. Id like to turn now to what has become the topic de jour amongst India watchers in Washington, which is how the United States can
promote regional integration and expanded commercial ties between India and its neighbors. The world is
moving from a transatlantic century to a transpacific century, in which future economic growth, development, and the promise of innovation will come to define the
rise of Asia. The
pace of economic integration in the Asia Pacific region over the last two decades was unprecedented and serves as
an example for other regions. It should,
and I believe it can, be replicated in South Asia as well. At the moment, South Asia is one
of the least economically integrated regions in the world. While accounting for nearly 23 percent of the worlds total population,
the regions share of global GDP is less than 3 percent. India-Pakistan In the United States engagement with the countries of South Asia, one of our overarching
objectives is to facilitate new linkages and opportunities for ALL the nations in the region. Reinvigorating trade and commerce between India and Pakistan, for
instance, can provide extensive benefits to both countries and the vibrant societies that seek to flourish within them. Increased
openness across South Asia, including between India and Pakistan, will generate new economic opportunities for one
of the worlds youngest and most vibrant populations. Just as the private sector did in ASEAN, trade associations such as the
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) can play a significant role in improving trade
relations between India and Pakistan. Recently, FICCI set up two Made in Pakistan business and product exhibits in India, which were well-received. FICCI now
plans to organize similar Made in India exhibitions in Pakistan for which it is closely working with the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
Clearly, there is pent up demand for trade between Indian and Pakistan, as demonstrated by the volume of trade that transits third countries to avoid restrictions or
endures the cumbersome offloading and reloading that occurs at the land border. Some analysts estimate that trade between India and Pakistan could be ten times
what it is currently if both Governments work together to relax economic restrictions on cross-border trade. And to provide context, official bilateral trade between
India and Pakistan reached $2.75 billion in 2009 from $215 million in 2001. Ladies and gentleman, those numbers will only grow as Indias consumer class balloons.
This is clearly something Indians and Pakistanis want. As a Pew Research Center poll noted this week, although India
and Pakistan publics are admittedly
distrustful of each other, both sides strongly desire an improvement in relations. Their motivation stems from a

desire for greater economic opportunity and prosperity, which will undoubtedly lead to peace,
stability, and a better quality of life for both Indians and Pakistanis. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put it best,
when he said in 2007, "I earnestly hope that relations between our two countries become so friendly and we generate such an atmosphere of trust between each
other that the two nations would be able to agree on a treaty of peace, security and friendship. I dream of a day, while retaining our respective identities, one can
have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore and dinner in Kabul. That is how my forefathers lived. That is how I want our grandchildren to live. In fact, we see
enormous potential in Indias critical role as part of a New Silk Road, concept based upon the
revitalization of trade and transit linkages between the South, Central, and West Asia. Frankly, at the State
Department, we feel like weve been ahead of the curve on this. In 2006, through reorganization we combined the separate South Asian and Central Asian bureaus
to create SCA, or the Bureau for South and Central Asian Affairs. This has enabled us think more broadly about the region as a whole, allowing us to streamline
initiatives and ideas that would have been otherwise subject to stove-piping. Were going to review the
potential for further for
infrastructure investment and related capacity necessary to enable Afghanistans future sustained
economic growth. Our priority projects in fields like energy, road and rail infrastructure, and trade/border
management will help infuse new economic life into this critical region. Intensified engagement is
needed to solidify this regional approach. Our hope is to build Central Asia commercial connections for
these projects, and to link Afghanistan to India and other South Asian markets. These projects, particularly
in energy and transportation, could have multiplier effects on the regional economy and may be the
future key drivers of GDP and employment. With India as an anchor, U.S. government and businesses
alike can pursue greater stability and prosperity throughout South Asia and beyond. III. Whats Next? So, whats
next? We in government are absolutely committed to doing everything we can to open new opportunities for trade and investment. Government cant create or run
businesses, but we can act as a facilitator. We can help create the regulatory and incentive framework that promotes innovation and economic growth. We have a
variety of mechanisms for doing so. Finance Minister Mukherjee will visit Washington at the end of June to continue the U.S.-India Economic and Financial
Partnership talks with his counterpart Treasury Secretary Geithner. And Indian Commerce Minister Anand Sharma is here in Washington right now, to meet with
U.S. Government officials and business leaders. There are also specific fora that are designed to address the technical ways that we can improve our trade
cooperation. The High Technology Cooperation Group, which has enabled both governments to significantly reduce barriers to trade in sensitive, cutting-edge high
technology, will meet in mid-July in New Delhi. Other ongoing forums include the U.S. Trade Representatives Trade Policy Forum, which encompasses a number of
sector-specific dialogues; and the Department of Commerces Commercial Dialogue, which facilitates an open dialogue about trade. We are also expanding our
cooperation in science and technology. The establishment of a new $30 million Science and Technology Endowment Fund will fund promising research and
development projects in India. Such initiatives enhance our knowledge-based partnership, and reinforce the need for pro-entrepreneur policies including strong
intellectual property laws, robust links between industry and academia, and greater access to capital. Next month, the Secretary of State will travel to New Delhi for
the second U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue. The SD as it is called by India watchers in Washington and Delhi alike will provide an ideal opportunity to discuss with
the Government of India how we can proceed with our many bilateral commercial and strategic aspirations. Id like to close this morning by issuing all of you a
challenge: You have a unique opportunity before you. Through
your work and your continued engagement with both our
governments, you can help shape and nurture the economic destiny of a nation, of a region, and one of
the most consequential bilateral relationships that the United States enjoys. Together, lets continue
working to further leverage opportunities for partnership, trade and investment. Together, I am
confident we can lift the U.S.-India global strategic partnership to reach its boundless potential. With that, Id
like to turn it over to my friend Kurt Amend. Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions later in the session.

Engaging with India is key

Kumar 5/10CSSR Doctoral Fellow at the UGC Centre for Southern Asian Studies, Pondicherry
University (Sumit, How Modi changed the India- US relationship, East Asia Forum, 5/10/16,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/10/how-modi-changed-the-india-us-relationship/) // ET

In the first two years of the Modi government, India

and the United States have taken calibrated efforts at the highest
political level to transform bilateral relations. It was in this context that the visit of United States Defense Secretary Ash Carter
to India on 1013 April assumed huge significance. His visit symbolised the deepening defence ties between the two countries, with the Modi
government agreeing in principle to sign three ground-breaking agreements. US Defense Secretary Ash Carter and Indian Defence Minister
Manohar Parrikar greet each other during a joint news conference in New Delhi, India, 12 April 2016. (Photo: AAP). The current era of USIndia
relations began after the Clinton administrations containment policies failed to isolate India following its 1998 nuclear tests. India emerged
from these sanctions a resurgent country under the leadership of prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The United States then adopted
policy of accommodation towards India, with the two countries transforming their estranged relations
into a strategic partnership. When Modi came to power, he did not allow his personal differences with the
United States to dictate bilateral ties. Instead, Modi decided to redirect efforts to sustain and deepen ties. This quickly
became evident when Modi made a state visit to the United States in September 2014 on the invitation of President Obama. Subsequently,
Obama became the first US president to be the chief guest at the Republic Day Parade in New Delhi in January 2015. Defence
cooperation has been a pillar of the two countries burgeoning relationship. There is a growing
sentiment among US security officials and experts that, given its economic slowdown as well as security
crises in the Asia Pacific, the Middle East and other regions, it is not possible for the United States alone
to ensure peace and security. It needs to engage rising powers like India. As the Modi government has accelerated
the process of military modernisation, buoyed by increased foreign direct investment in the defence sector, Washington sees economic
opportunities in deepening defence ties with New Delhi. The
rise of China and its assertive posturing in the South China
Sea is another reason for the United States to expand security and military relations with India. India is
concerned by Chinas position on disputed territories and by the growing nexus between Beijing and
Islamabad. New Delhi feels that the presence of the United States in South Asia would help maintain the
balance of power in its favour. The Modi government also knows it cannot aggressively pursue military modernisation without
access to advanced US weaponry and technology. Modis ambitious Make in India initiative would also not be successful without the active
participation of the American defence industry, given its expertise in the field. Isolating Pakistan internationally for failing to adequately address
terrorism also requires New Delhi to sustain security talks and military exercises with Washington. Unlike the previous United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) government, the Modi government has shown a desire to work with the United States in ensuring
freedom of navigation and flight throughout the region, including in the South China Sea. This shift in Indias
stance is critical as it reflects the governments determination to take a firm stance on China. This understanding has been reinforced by the
Modi governments special attention to developing triangular and quadrilateral coalitions with the United States, Japan and Australia as a part
of its regional security strategy. Both
the United States and India have made significant progress on the Defense
Technology and Trade Initiative, an undertaking aimed at reducing the barriers to defence technology
cooperation and trade. The countries are also holding talks on the supply of F-16 and F/A-18 fighter jets for the Indian Air Force. These
defence deals would give a significant boost to the Make in India program. The Modi government has also pursued three crucial bilateral
agreements the Logistic Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMA), the Communication and Information Security Memorandum
(CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). The previous UPA government opposed these three agreements as they
argued that they would undermine Indias strategic autonomy and its policy of nonalignment. But in light of emerging security threats, the
Modi government has agreed in principle to all three. LEMA will allow both countries to access fuel and supplies from each others bases,
making it easier to coordinate military activities. The agreement would help India in carrying out operations in the Indian Ocean and expanding
its maritime reach in the Asia Pacific. CISMOA will enable the countries to share confidential intelligence in both peacetime and war using
advanced encryption technology. BECA would provide India with topographical and aeronautical data as well as products aiding navigation and
targeting. Some concerns have been raised about the possible downsides of signing these agreements. For instance, CISMOA would enable the
United States to listen to highly confidential defence conversations within India. There are also fears that under LEMA the United States would
pressure India into allotting portions of its land bases for exclusive military use. It is for these reasons that India has only agreed to sign these
agreements in principle. The Modi government has asked the United States to modify the agreements so that Indias security and sovereignty
are not compromised. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar has made it clear that LEMA does not mention the stationing of American troops on
Indian soil. Indias apprehension implies that, while it seeks close defence ties with the United States, the Indian government does not want to
unnecessarily draw itself into a tussle between the United States and China. With the introduction of the USIndia Defence Technology and
Partnership Act this March and an expected visit by Modi to Washington to address a joint session of the US Congress, the future of the
bilateral relationship looks bright. One hopes that this kind of engagement will continue, forging the way for a stronger
IndiaUS relationship.

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