Case Digest: Heirs of Marasigan v. IAC
The spouses Bazar, however, refused to
May 23, 2016
HEIRS OF MARIA MARASIGAN vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT et al.
G.R. No. L-69303 July 23, 1987
FACTS
In 1974, a deed of absolute sale was executed by Fe Bazar in
favor of Maria Marasigan. However, in 1975, Maria Marron was
declared the owner of the subject property in a land registration
case. She filed a motion for execution which was granted. The
spouses, Bazar, refused to surrender their title and to execute the
deed of sale in Marrons favor.
In 1978, when Marasigan had the title registered, the Register of
Deeds of Manila issued a TCT naming Maria Marasigan as the
new owner, the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated
by Marron on the Bazars title was carried over on the said new
title.
ISSUE
Whether the party who bought the property with a notice of lis
pendens annotated at the back of her title has a better right
over the party in whose favor the notice of lis pendens was
made.
RULING
No. The Court affirmed the ruling of the appellate court which
ruled in favor of the party how had the notice annotated and
who won the litigation over the property.
The Court reiterated the established rule that:
the filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a
notice of the particular litigation referred to therein and,
therefore, any right they may thereafter acquire on the property
is subject to the eventuality of the suit. The doctrine of lis
pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity,
the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the Court until the judgment or
decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive
alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall be
rendered abortive and impossible of execution. (Laroza v.
Guia, 134 SCRA 34 1)
Heirs of Marasigan v Intermediate Appellate Court & Maria
Marron
GR No. L-69303 (June 23, 1987)
Facts:
This case involves a disputed property identified as Lot
2-A, owned by Fe Springael-Bazar and Felicisimo Bazar.
On April 24, 1975, A civil case was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII by a certain Maria Marron
which seeks to compel the spouses Bazar to execute a
registrable Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the former. On
January 27, 1976, while the case was still pending, Maria Marron
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of
the Transfer Certificate of Title of the spouses Bazar. On February
24, 1976, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor
of Maria Marron.
After the judgment became final and executory, Maria
Marron filed a motion for execution which was likewise granted
by the same court. Thus a writ of execution was issued by the
court on July 12, 1976.
surrender their title to the property in question and to execute
the required Deed of Sale. As a result, the lower court ordered
the Clerk of Court to execute the Deed of Sale in behalf of the
spouses.
Prior to the civil case instituted by Maria Marron, on
December 18, 1974, a deed of absolute sale of Lot 2-A was
executed by Fe Bazar in favor of Maria Marasigan for the
amount of P15,000. However, it was only on July 5, 1977 that said
deed was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
Consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title of the spouses were
cancelled and a new title was issued in Marasigan's name and
likewise the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by
Marron was carried over to the new title.
Meanwhile on May 26, 1977, the Bazars filed a petition
for relief from judgment dated February 24, 1976 and while their
petition was pending, the spouses moved to set aside said
judgment on June 22, 1979 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, on February 24, 1979, Marron instituted a
Land Registration Court case against Maria Marasigan praying
that the Register of Deeds of Manila be required to register the
deed of sale executed by the Clerk of Court in behalf of the
spouses Bazar, but the case was dismissed on the ground that
the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction over the case.
On September 6, 1979, Marron filed another case in the
Court of First Instance of Manila which seeks to nullify Marasigan's
title over the subject lot. However the case was dismissed by the
lower court on the ground that Marron's complaint was
premature since the judgment rendered by CF Iof Manila,
Branch XIII had not yet become final and executory. On appeal,
the Intermediate Appellate Court ruled that Marron is entitled to
the subject property by virtue of the notice of lis pendens and
that the decision of CFI of Manila, Branch XIII had become final
and executory because the petition for relief from judgment of
the spouses Bazar was filed out of time.
Issue:
Who between Maria Marron and Maria Marasigan has
better right over the subject lot?
Ruling:
The Court ruled that Maria Marron has the better right
over the subject property.
It was shown that Maria Marasigan acquired the
subject property four months before Maria Marron filed a civil
case seeking to compel the spouses Bazar to execute a deed of
absolute sale in her favor. However, the transaction between
Marasigan and spouses Bazar became effective only as against
third persons on July 5, 1977 when it was registered with the
Registry of Deeds. Thus, there is no question that when the RoD
issued the new certificate of title to Marasigan, the notice of lis
pendens was carried over to such title.
A notice of lis pendens means that a certain property is
involved in a litigation and serves as a notice to the whole world
that one who buys the same does it at his own risk. Thus it was a
clear notice to Marasigan that there was a court case affecting
her rights to the property she purchased. It is an established rule
that the filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with
a notice of the particular litigation referred to therein and
therefore, any right they may thereafter acquire on the property
is subject to the eventuality of the suit. In the present case, Maria
Marron was granted with the right over Lot 2-A and as a result
thereof, Maria Marasigan lost her right over the subject property
because she was bound by the outcome of the litigation
between Marron and spouses Bazar.
The spouses Bazar failed to file an appeal from the
adverse judgment dated February 24, 1976. The 30-day period
under the old rule (Rule 41, section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court) within which the Bazars could have filed an appeal
started to run on May 12, 1976, when they were served with the
1
copy of said decision. Thus, on June 11, 1976, the decision of CFI
of Manila, Branch XIII became final and executory. At that point,
the spouses Bazar had no longer any right to alienate the
property subject of the litigation. Any transaction entered into
during the pendency of the case is subject to the risks in the
notice of lis pendens and to the outcome of the case.
Moreover, the petition for relief from judgment filed by
the spouses Bazar was also filed beyond the two periods
provided under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under said rule, a verified petition must be filed within sixty days
from notice of the judgment or order of the Court and not more
than six months after such judgment or order was entered into. In
the present case, the 60-day period must be reckoned from May
12. 1976, when the spouses were served with the copy of the
assailed decision. Thus, the 60-day period expired on July 11,
1976. A period of ten months had already elapsed when the
Bazars filed their petition for relief from judgment on May 26, 1977
and as a consequence, the heirs of Marasigan are now
precluded from questioning the effects of the final and
executory judgment rendered in favor of Marron.
Likewise, the heirs of Marasigan cannot raise the issues
of prescription and laches. It was the Bazars who were the
proper parties to raise such defenses either in a motion to dismiss
or in their answer. Since they did not do so, the same were
deemed waived.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100709. November 14, 1997.
Panganiban, J.
Doctrine: When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide
invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and
passed the realm of the public domain and accordingly cannot
be a subject of a free patent.
Facts: Josefina Morato, private respondent, applied sometime in
1972 a free patent on a parcel of land situated at Pinagtalleran,
Calauag, Quezon. On January 16, 1974, the patent was
approved and the Register of Deeds issued an Original
Certificate of Title in favor of Morato on February 4, 1974. Both
the free patent and the title specifically required that the land
shall not be alienated or encumbered within five years from the
date of the issuance of the patent. Upon reports that Morato
encumbered the said land, violating the 5-year prohibition of the
patent, the District Land Officer in Lucena City conducted an
investigation. The officer found out that Morato mortgaged the
said property to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan on October 24,
1974, who subsequently built a house on it. Two years later, or on
February 2, 1976, part of the property was also leased by Morato
to Perfecto Advincula where a warehouse was thereafter
constructed. Moreover it was found out that the said property
was a portion of the Calauag Bay, five to six feet deep under
water during high tide and two feet deep at low tide, and not
suitable to vegetation. Petitioner then filed a complaint for the
cancellation of the title and reversion of the parcel of land to the
public domain on the grounds that the land is a foreshore land
and was mortgaged and leased within the five-year prohibitory
period. The lower court dismissed the complaint ruling that there
was no violation of the five-year ban since Morato did not
encumber nor alienate the land as it was merely leased, and the
mortgage the latter entered into with Nenita Co and Antonio
Quilatan covered only the improvement and not the land itself.
Upon appeal, CA affirmed in toto the courts decision. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether the questioned land is a foreshore land and thus
must be reverted to the public domain.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court defined a foreshore land as that
parcel of land which is between high and low water and left dry
by the flux and reflux of the tides; it is that strip of land that lies
between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively
wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. From the factual
findings of the lower court, it was found out that years before the
issuance of the free patent to private respondent, the
questioned land was subjected to several natural calamities like
earthquakes and typhoons that caused severe erosion of the
land. Then private respondent introduced improvements and
developments to the land. At the time then of the issuance of
free patent of land to Morato, it was not covered by water but
due to the gradual sinking of the land caused by natural
calamities, the sea advances had permanently invaded a
portion of subject land. During high tide, at least half of the land
is 6 feet deep under water and three feet deep during low tide.
The Calauag Bay has extended up to a portion of the land. Thus,
uncontestedly, the land has become a foreshore land and is
now a part of the public domain pursuant to Article 420 of the
New Civil Code being part of the shores defined therein.
Accordingly, it cannot be disposed of by the government and
appropriated by a private individual, i.e. be a subject of a free
patent.
RP Vs. Heirs Of Felipe Alejaga Sr.
Socialize Us
Facts:
December 28, 1978: Respondent Felibe Alejaga Sr. filed with the
District Land Office of Roxas City a Free Patent Application of a
parcel of land. (.3899 hectares, Roxas City)
Efren Recio, Land Inspector, submitted the necessary report
regarding the application. (Investigation & Verification Report)
March 14, 1979: The District Land Officer (DLO) approved the
application and the issuance of a Free Patent to the applicant. It
was then forwarded to Register of Deeds for the registration and
issuance of a OCT.
Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title and a Free Patent No. (VI-
2) 3358 was issued to Alejaga.
April 4, 1979: The heirs of Ignacio Arrobang requested the
Director of Lands of Manial for the investigation of DLO
(conducted by Isagani Cartagena) in Roxas for the irregularities
in the issuance of a title of a foreshore land in favor of Alejaga.
After investigation, the Land Management Bureau of Manila
requested the Director of Lands to cancel the Free Patent and
the corresponding OCT.
In the meantime, Alejaga obtained a NACIDA loan. The loan
was secured by a real estate mortgage to PNB.
April 18, 1990: The government through the Solicitor General
instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and
Title and Reversion against respondent Alejaga, the PNB of Roxas
City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering
Free Patent Application of the land. While the case was
pending, Alejaga was substituted by his heirs.
RTC ruled against responding saying that the OCT and Patent
were obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. Hence, null
and void. CA reversed RTCs ruling.
Issues:
1. WON there was fraud in the issuance of the OCT and Free
Patent. YES
(Topic: PATENT)
2. WON the State has an imprescriptible right to cause the
reversion of a piece of property belonging to the public domain.
YES
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(Topic: NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTY AND DEALINGS WITH
UNREGISTERED LANDS)
Held:
ISSUE No. 1 PATENT:
Fraud attended the application of Free Patent
Republic (petitioner) has adduced a preponderance of
evidence before the trial court, showing manifest fraud in
procuring the patent. This Court agrees with the RTC that in
obtaining a free patent over the lot under scrutiny, petitioner
had resorted to misrepresentation or fraud, signs of which were
ignored by the Court of Appeals.
First reason: Issuance of the free patent was not made in
accordance with the law
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in
accordance with the procedure laid down by CA or the Public
Land Act. Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material
facts set out in the application are true.
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires
sufficient notice to the municipality and the barrio where the
land is located, in order to give adverse claimants the
opportunity to present their claims. Note that this notice and the
verification and investigation of the parcel of land are to be
conducted after an application for free patent has been filed
with the Bureau of Lands.
There was no proper investigation and verification of the
application
In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.s Application for Free
Patent was dated and filed on December 28, 1978. On the other
hand, the Investigation & Verification Report prepared by Land
Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the District Land Office of the Bureau
of Lands of Roxas City was dated December 27, 1978.
As correctly pointed out by the trial court, investigation and
verification should have been done only after the filing of the
application. Hence, it would have been highly anomalous for
Recio (Land Inspector) to conduct his own investigation and
verification on December 27, 1998, a day before Felipe Alejaga
Sr. filed the Application for Free Patent.
Second reason: The claim of the Alejagas that an actual
investigation was conducted is not sustained by the Verification
& Investigation Report itself, which bears no signature.
Their reliance on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty31 is thus misplaced. Since Recios
signature does not appear on the December 27, 1978 Report,
there can be no presumption that an investigation and
verification of the parcel of land was actually conducted.
Strangely, respondents do not proffer any explanation why the
Verification & Investigation Report was not signed by Recio. Even
more important and as will later on be explained, this alleged
presumption of regularity -- assuming it ever existed -- is
overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner.
Third reason: The the report of Special Investigator Isagani P.
Cartagena has not been successfully rebutted.
In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not
actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of
the parcel of land. Cartagenas statement on Recios alleged
admission may be considered as "independently relevant." A
witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person --
the latters knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith -- and the
formers statements may then be regarded as independently
relevant without violating the hearsay rule.
Doctrine of independently relevant statements
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may
be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they
were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such
statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the
existence of such fact.
Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the report of the
investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not hearsay
and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.
The Free Patent was void (The issuance of the Alejagas patent
and title was tainted with fraud)
There are several badges of frauds (check the list above). Thus,
the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void. Such fraud is
a ground for impugning the validity of the Certificate of Title. The
invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the
Certificate of Title issued in consequence thereof, since the latter
is merely evidence of the former.
Issue No. 2: NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTY AND DEALINGS WITH
UNREGISTERED LANDS
Titles obtained by fraud and misrepresentation are not
indefeasible; Patent does not vest title it merely confirmed
registrants existing one
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding
certificate of title issued, the land covered by them ceases to be
part of the public domain and becomes private property.
Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes
indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter.
However, this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles
secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Well-settled is the
doctrine that the registration of a patent under the Torrens
System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrants already existing one. Verily, registration under the
Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
The State may still bring an action for reversion even after the
lapse of one year
Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the
State -- even after the lapse of one year -- may still bring an
action for the reversion to the public domain of land that has
been fraudulently granted to private individuals. Further, this
indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State
as to how the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the
investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact been
committed in securing the title.
Prohibition Against Alienation or Encumbrance
Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas title was validly issued,
there is another basis for the cancellation of the grant and the
reversion of the land to the public domain. Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 14156 proscribes the encumbrance of a
parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead
within five years from its grant. The prohibition against any
alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso
attached to the approval of every application.
The mortgage of the land (granted under free patent) violated
Section118 of Public Land Act
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In the case at bar, Free Patent No. 335860 was approved and
issued on March 14, 1979. Corresponding Original Certificate of
Title No. P-1561 was issued on the same date. On August 18,
1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent, Felipe
Alejaga Sr. obtained from Respondent PNB a loan in the amount
of P100,000. Despite the statement on the title certificate itself
that the land granted under the free patent shall be inalienable
for five (5) years from the grant, a real estate mortgage was
nonetheless constituted on the parcel of land covered by OCT
No. P-15.
Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr.
falls squarely within the term encumbrance proscribed by
Section 118 of the Public Land Act. A mortgage constitutes a
legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of the
mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the property.
Reason for prohibition against encumbrance
"It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to
distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-
destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such
benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years
after the grant of the patent."
Mortgage over a parcel of land acquired through a free patent
grant nullifies the award and constitutes a cause for the
reversion of the property to the state
"SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or
other contract made or executed in violation of any of the
provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred
and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and
twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall
be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall
produce the effect of annulling and canceling the grant, title,
patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed,
actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the
property and its improvements to the State."
The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the
encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent
or homestead within five years from the grant of such patent.
Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the cancellation of
the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain.
Since Alejaga violated the condition of the free patent, the
property must revert back to the public domain
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent,
within five years from its issuance, Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not
have encumbered the parcel land granted to him. The
mortgage he made over the land violated that condition.
Hence, the property must necessarily revert to the public
domain, pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act.
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.,
393 SCRA 361
Facts:
On Dec. of 1978, Alejaga Sr. filed a Free Patent Application with
the District Land Office is Roxas City. On March of 1979, the free
patent was ordered to be issued to him. The Defendant (Register
of Deeds) also issued the OCT for the parcel of land.
On April of that same year, Ignacio Arrobang requested the
Director of Lands in manila, through a letter, to investigate for
irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in
favor of Alejaga Sr. The investigator, Isagani Cartagena
recommended to the Director to file a civil proceeding to
cancel the Free Patent issued to Alejaga Sr.
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General
instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and
Title and Reversion against Alejaga Sr. He died pending the
proceeding. He was substituted by his heirs.
The RTC declared Isaganis testimony as hearsay and the Patent
null and void, and the CA reversed the RTC brushing aside as
hearsay Isagani Cartagenas testimony that Land Inspector Efren
L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent
application of Felipe Alejaga Sr..
Issue:
Whether Isaganis testimony can be consider as hearsay hence
cannot be properly admitted in court?
Held:
No. The report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has
not been successfully rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly
admitted that he had not actually conducted an investigation
and ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagenas
statement on Recios alleged admission may be considered as
independently relevant. A witness may testify as to the state
of mind of another person -- the latters knowledge, belief, or
good or bad faith -- and the formers statements may then be
regarded as independently relevant without violating the
hearsay rule. Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand
and opened himself to cross-examination, the Investigation
Report he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands
constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions of the report that
consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and
conclusions are not hearsay. On the other hand, the part
referring to the statement made by Recio may be considered as
independently relevant.
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may
be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they
were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such
statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue [36] or (b) is circumstantially relevant to
the existence of such fact.
Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the report of the
investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not hearsay
and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.
BUREAU OF FORESTRY vs.COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO
GALLO
G.R. No. L-37995
August 31, 1987
FACTS:
In 1961, Mercedes Diago applied for the registration of 4 parcels
of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo containing an approximate
area of 30.5 hectares. She alleged she occupied said parcels of
land having bought them from the estate of the late Jose Ma.
Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from
Canuto Gustilo in 1934.
The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground
that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have
sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could be
registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said
lands for at least 30 years.
The Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that certain
portions of the lands, with an area of approximately 19.4
hectares are mangrove swamps and are within a Timberland
Block.
In 1965, Filomeno Gallo purchased the subject parcels of land
from Mercedes Diago, and moved to be substituted in place of
4
the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for
Registration of Title.
Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved to substitute
petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor, since supervision and
control of said portion have been transferred from the Bureau of
Forestry to the PFC.
In April 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the
registration of the 4 parcels of land in the name of Filomeno
Gallo. It ruled that although the controverted portion of 19.4
hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within a Timberland
Block, petitioners failed to submit convincing proof that these
lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural
purposes, and the presumption is that these are agricultural
lands.
ISSUE:
WON the classification of lands of public domain by the
Executive Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or
mineral can be changed or varied by the court.NO
HELD:
Admittedly, the controversial area is within a timberland block
classified and certified as such by the Director of Forestry in
1956.The lands are needed for forest purposes and hence they
are portions of the public domain which cannot be the subject
of registration proceedings.
Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for
the Director of Forestry to submit convincing proofs that the land
is more valuable for forest purposes than for agriculture.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the
classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department and not of the courts. With these rules,
there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court
which determines the classification of lands of the public domain
but the Executive Branch, through the Office of the President.
Furthermore, respondents cannot claim to have obtained their
title by prescription since the application filed by them
necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for are
part of the public domain and cannot be acquired by
prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law
that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.
BUREAU OF FORESTRY
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS andFILOMENO GALLO
G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987
FACTS:
In 1961, Mercedes Diago applied for the registration of 4
parcelsof land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo containing an
approximatearea of 30.5 hectares. She alleged she occupied
said parcels ofland having bought them from the estate of the
late Jose Ma.Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in
turn fromCanuto Gustilo in 1934. The Director of Lands opposed
the application on the groundthat neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest havesucient title over the lands
applied for, which could beregistered under the Torrens systems,
and that they have never been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the saidlands for at least 30 years. The
Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground thatcertain
portions of the lands, with an area of approximately19.4
hectares are mangrove swamps and are within a Timberland
Block.In 1965, Filomeno Gallo purchased the subject parcels of
landfrom Mercedes Diago, and moved to be substituted in
place ofthe latter, attaching to his motion an Amended
Application forRegistration of Title.Philippine Fisheries Commission
also moved to substitutepetitioner Bureau of Forestry as
oppositor, since supervisionand control of said portion have
been transferred from theBureau of Forestry to the PFC.In April
1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering theregistration
of the 4 parcels of land in the name of FilomenoGallo. It ruled
that although the controverted portion of 19.4hectares are
mangrove and nipa swamps within a TimberlandBlock,
petitioners failed to submit convincing proof that theselands are
more valuable for forestry than for agriculturalpurposes, and the
presumption is that these are agriculturallands.
ISSUE:
WON the classication of lands of public domain by
theExecutive Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest
ormineral can be changed or varied by the court.
NO
HELD:
Admittedly, the controversial area is within a timberland block
classied and certied as such by the Director of Forestryin 1956
. The lands are needed for forest purposes and hencethey are
portions of the public domain which cannot be thesubject of
registration proceedings.Clearly therefore the land is public land
and there is no need forthe Director of Forestry to submit
convincing proofs that theland is more valuable for forest
purposes than for agriculture. As provided for under Sec. 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, theclassication or reclassication
of public lands into alienable ordisposable, mineral or forest
lands is now a
prerogative of theExecutive Department
and not of the courts. With these rules,there should be no more
room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the
classication of lands of the publicdomain but the Executive
Branch, through the Oce of thePresident.Furthermore,
respondents cannot claim to have obtained theirtitle by
prescription since the application led by themnecessarily
implied an
admission
that the portions applied forare part of the public domain and
cannot be acquired byprescription, unless the law expressly
permits it. It is a rule oflaw that possession of forest lands,
however long, cannot ripeninto private ownership.
REPUBLIC vs VERA
1983
FACTS:
G.R. No. L-35778:
In 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower
court an application for registration of title under Act 496 of one
(1) parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Mariveles,
Bataan, containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or
less.
The Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to
the application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a
portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not
subject to private appropriation.
The Commissioner of Land Registration submitted a
report that the lot is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral
Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan
Luisito Martinez, 62 years old, alleged that he is the owner of the
land applied for, having inherited the same from his parents,
consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing
the land in 1938; that about 8 hectares of the land is planted to
palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that kamoteng
kahoy is also planted thereon; that he declared the land for
taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records were lost
5
during the war, and that possession was continuous, open,
undisturbed and in the concept of owner.
2 witnesses corroborated Luisitos claim.
G.R. No. L-35779:
On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed
an application for registration under Act No. 496 in the CFI of
Bataan two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya,
municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, containing an
area of 443,297 square meters, more or less, and 378,506 square
meters, more or less, respectively, and more particularly
described and Identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles
Cadastre.
The Chief Surveyor filed a report in the lower court,
stating that the parcels of land applied for registration "do not
appear to have been passed upon and approved by the
Director of Lands as required by Section 1858 of the Revised
Administrative Code." Neither does it appear to overlap with any
previously titled property under Act 496.
The provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the
Directors of Lands and of Forestry, alleging that the parcels of
land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private
appropriation.
Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing for the
government, submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 of
Leonides B. Rodriguez, District Forester of Balanga, Bataan which
states "that the tract of land situated at Barrio Camaya,
Mariveles, Bataan containing an approximate area of EIGHTY
TWO HECTARES more or less, as shown and described in the
attached photocopy of Plans in two sheets, as surveyed for
Thelma Tanalega, et al., was found to be within the Alienable
and Disposable Block, certified by the Director of Forestry as such
on February 16, 1972."
In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in
two separate decisions, dated October 9, 1972 and October 16,
1972, confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and
adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and
Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein.
The Solicitor General, argued that Lot 626, Mariveles
Cadastre was declared public land by the decision of the
Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937 and such being the
case, the lower court is without jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the application for voluntary registration under Act
496. Petitioner likewise stressed that the lands in question can no
longer be subject to registration by voluntary proceedings, for
they have already been subjected to compulsory registration
proceedings under the Cadastral Act.
ISSUE: Whether the lots may be registered. NO
RULING: It is noteworthy that as per the report of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, the land subject matter of
the instant proceedings "is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the
Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case
No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097"; that some portions of Lot No.
626 were decreed and titles were issued therefor; and that
"portion declared Public Land as per decision dated October 11,
1937."
In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any
interest in any part of the lands object of the petition is required
by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the
return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the
court, giving the details required by law.
In the instant cases, private respondents apparently
either did not file their answers in the aforesaid cadastral
proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the
portions they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the
portions subject of their respective claims would have been
issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have declared the
lands in question public lands, and its decision had already
become final and conclusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their
rights over the subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata. A
cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world.
Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the
same issues already determined by final judgment.
Even if it is not barred by res judicata, it is to be noted
that in the instant cases evidence for the respondents
themselves tend to show that only portions of the entire area
applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions
of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under
claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
The possession of public land however long the period thereof
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public
land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant
can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim
of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State. Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit
convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the
concept of owners of the entire area in question during the
period required by law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION INC.
FACTS:
The subject matter of these proceedings for declaration of nullity
of title are parcels of land with a total area of 39.99 hectares,
more or less, known as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort
Bonifacio where, military officers, both in the active and retired
services, and their respective families, have been occupying
housing units and facilities originally constructed by the AFP.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized
mostly by wives of AFP military officers. Records show that SHAI
was able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal a title Transfer Certificate of Title in its name to the bulk of,
if not the entire, JUSMAG area.
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991on the
basis of a notarized Deed of Sale purportedly executed on the
same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. of the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI.The total purchase
price as written in the conveying deed was P11,997,660.00 or
P30.00 per square meter
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by
the Department of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR,
a copy of the aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced
and eventually referred to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) for examination. The results of the examination undertaken
by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino reveals that the
puported signatures in the document are forgeries.
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V.Ramos issued
Memorandum Order No. 173 directing the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT
No. 15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village
Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the reservation.
A month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed
with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and
cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI,
purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are
no records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and
(ii) the alleged payment of the purchase price; and c) the
6
property in question is inalienable, being part of a military
reservation established under Proclamation No. 423.
On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later
offered in evidence)the Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as
its Exhibit "A,"and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B."Respondent, then
defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and B as its Exhibits "1"
and 2, respectively.
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI
Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI
QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the signature of Palad in
Exhibit A is a forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged his
signature appearing in the same document and denied ever
signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public holding
office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad
stated that he could not have had signed the conveying deed
involving as it did a reservation area which, apart from its being
outside of the LMBs jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place.
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert
witness in the person of Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon
who testified that Palads signature in Exhibit A is genuine. Mrs.
Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise testified, saying that
applications to purchase were signed and then filed with the
LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis, followed by the payment in full
of the contract price.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial court
rendered judgment dismissing the Republics complaint as it
considered the parcels covered by the deed in question as no
longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom, the Republic went on
appeal to the CA which affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
private respondent SHAI would categorically say that the
petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that subject
land is within military reservation,and even dared to state that
the JUSMAG area is the private property of the government and
therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se its
own evidence themselves belie its posture as their evidence
both the TCT and the Deed of Sale technically described the
property as situated in Jusmag area located at Fort Bonifacio
which is now renamed Fort Mckinley a declared a military
reservation.
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint,
invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably
invited attention to the proclamations specific area coverage
to prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title
embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and hence,
beyond the commerce of man.
The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by
Palad, assuming its authenticity, could not plausibly be the
requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a
disposable parcel. And private respondent SHAIs unyielding
stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the
transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is
unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not usually
estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or
agents.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private
respondent are, or at least at the time of the supposed
transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is
necessarily void ab initio.

Hence, this petition of the Republic.
ISSUE: Was the JUSMAG area, during the period material,
alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore,
can or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?
RULING:
Moreover, Article XII, Section 3[of the 1987 Constitution forbids
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain, except through lease for a limited period.
The interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences
deducible from the case, also cast doubt on the authenticity of
such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious.

Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the inalienable character of
the JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively been
separated from the military reservation and declared as
alienable and disposable.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by
proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as
reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or
for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of land thus
reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale
or other disposition until again declared alienable. Consistent
with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a
military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to
private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not
registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared
as disposable and alienable public land. And until a given
parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the
military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by
presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status
as part of a military reservation remains,even if incidentally it is
devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or for
defense. The same is true in this case.
There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area subject of the
questioned October 30, 1991sale formed part of the FBMR as
originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And while
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the
deed is a forgery. The NBI signature expert corroborated Palads
allegation on forgery.Respondent SHAIs expert witness from the
PNP, however, disputes the NBIs findings. In net effect, both
experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel each other out.
2.Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at
the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in
an official capacity, Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same
day to Pasig City to appear before the notarizing officer. The
deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry and there stamped
Received by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14
p.m. of October 30, 1991to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued.
In other words, the whole conveyance and registration process
was done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite
surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while in the
exercise of his functions as the bureaus authorized contracting
officer, has to repair to another city just to have a deed
notarized.
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land
application to purchase required under Section 89 of the Public
Land Act. There is also no record of the deed of sale and of
documents usually accompanying an application to purchase,
inclusive of the investigation report and the property valuation.
The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date
November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC,

7
Records Management Division of the LMB pursuant to a
subpoena issued by the trial court attest to this fact of absence
of records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and
Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at the
bureau record book, but found no entry pertaining to SHAI.

4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that

the deed of sale specifically meritorious Official Receipt No.
6030203 as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase
price An official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to
prove payment. While it kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its
evidence of the required payment, it failed to present and offer
the receipt in evidence. We can thus validly presume that no
such OR exists or, if it does, that its presentation would be
adverse to SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the
document as paid has, in fact, never been paid.

5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI,

paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the corresponding
amount apparently coming in a mix of P500 and P100
denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAIs witnesses account taxes
credulity to the limit.

TCT No. 15084 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis
of such Deed are declared void and cancelled