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The
two (2) cases were deemed submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon
the filing of the answer of respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and
RAMON A. GONZALES
the reply memorandum of respondent in L-28224.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR
GENERAL Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen,
a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class
G.R. No. L-28224 November 9, 1967 unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA) Although respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer denying
vs. the truth of this allegation, upon the ground that they have no knowledge or
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS information to form a belief as to the truth thereof, such denial would appear
to be a perfunctory one. In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor
General expressed himself in favor of a judicial determination of the merits of
the issued raised in said case.
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary
injunction.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of
law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act onslaughts from whatever source. Despite his aforementioned statement in L-
No. 4913, or from performing any act that will result in the holding of the 28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this Court
plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that
Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Philippines, the same is "merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator
approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing ballots, Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before the Commission on Elections and
pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from passing filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed to appear
in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said before this Court and objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that the
Republic Act No. 4913; and Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the petition, or to
pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of Representatives; b)
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void. that the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render in operational the
legislative department; and c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid
reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal effect of rendering illegal the
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and
of Representatives passed the following resolutions: void."
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be
period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is
submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election, in
dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that
which officers of the national and local governments such as the elections
Congress shall continue to function with the representative districts existing at
scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 will be chosen; and
the time of the expiration of said period.
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held
for amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held
in 1935. This theory assumes that an apportionment had to be made
under such conditions which, allegedly, do not exist as to give the people
necessarily before the first elections to be held after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938.19 The assumption, is, however,
unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public as distinguished from the officer
foretell when it would be made. Those who drafted and adopted the in question is concerned.21 Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with officers
Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore, that the three-year period, and employees of the Government would be entitled to demand from them
after the earliest possible enumeration, would expire after the elections in satisfactory proof of their title to the positions they hold, before dealing with
1938. them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even
if they should act within the limits of the authority vested in their respective
offices, positions or employments.22 One can imagine this great
What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution,
inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in the absence of the de
particularly those on the legislative department, were amended in 1940, by
facto doctrine.
establishing a bicameral Congress, those who drafted and adopted said
amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original Constitution
regarding the apportionment of the districts for representatives, must have As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed
known that the three-year period therefor would expire after the elections collaterally.23 It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto
scheduled to be held and actually held in 1941. proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the
ground that he is merely a de facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious: (1)
it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a
Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the
de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the
original Constitution in 1935 and of the amendment thereof in 1940 strongly
public is concerned.
indicate that the provision concerning said apportionment and the effect of
the failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions obtaining after
the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even after subsequent elections. It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because
the acts therein involved have not been completed and petitioners herein are
not third parties. This pretense is untenable. It is inconsistent with Tayko vs.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last
Capistrano.25 In that case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before Judge
enumeration was submitted to the President on November 30, 1960, it follows
Capistrano objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason that,
that the three-year period to make the apportionment did not expire until
meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement. This Court held that the
1963, or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question,
objection could not be entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de facto
therefore, that the Senate and the House of Representatives organized or
Judge, whose title can not be assailed collaterally. It should be noted that
constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that the
Tayko was not a third party insofar as the Judge was concerned. Tayko was
Members thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the theory of petitioners
one of the parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge Capistrano had
herein, upon expiration of said period of three years, or late in 1963, Congress
not, as yet, finished hearing the case, much less rendered decision therein. No
became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the House of
rights had vested in favor of the parties, in consequence of the acts of said
Representatives, became illegal holder of their respective offices, and were de
Judge. Yet, Tayko's objection was overruled. Needless to say, insofar as
facto officers.
Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein contested
and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has nothing else to do in
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without connection therewith.
a reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing the legal
provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives, and are
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under
not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such conclusion.
consideration is untenable.
Neither do they allege that the term of office of the members of said House
automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress,
upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political Available Alternatives to Congress
law, nor our law on public officers, in particular, supports the view that failure
to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either
in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.
propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose, but it can not do both, at the same time. This theory is based upon
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the
to the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed in disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other
consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment within circumstances and none has brought to our attention supporting the
three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes,
1965 were presumably held in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law
provisions creating Congress with a House of Representatives composed of warrants it.26
members elected by qualified voters of representative districts as they existed
at the time of said elections remained in force, we can not see how said
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the
Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers
constitutional provision on Congress, to be submitted to the people for
owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment
ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention
within the period aforementioned.
in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general.
In other words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of R
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed under R. B. H. Nos.
President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may
Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable violation of the Constitution,20 the be proposed by the constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again,
enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main although the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they were
function. This provision indicates that, despite the violation of such mandatory taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In other words,
duty, the title to their respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or they were not passed at the same time.
ouster pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with
Article IX of the Constitution. In short, the loss of office or the extinction of
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof
title thereto is not automatic.
anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve
the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in,
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are different sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And,
merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the contested resolutions and neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of
Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main reasons for the authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.
existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of
persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be,
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to reading into the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and can
propose amendments, why not let the whole thing be submitted to said not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should
convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be not be a matter of sheer speculation.
submitted for ratification before said convention is held? The force of this
argument must be conceded. but the same impugns the wisdom of the action
The majority view although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to
taken by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof
declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional as ably set forth in the
to permit Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the
opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.
constitutional convention and participate in the proceedings therein, without
forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or not this should be done is a
political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice. Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People
Violate the Spirit of the Constitution?
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the Court.
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March
16, 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a
practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in question.
General Election?
Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides:
The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days down acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending the confines set forth
prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a in the fundamental laws is not in derogation of the principle of separation of
conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial powers, pursuant to which each department is supreme within its own sphere.
government office building and in every polling place not later than The determination of the conditions under which the proposed amendments
February eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and shall shall be submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within the
remain posted therein until after the election. At least, ten copies legislative sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that
of the said amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913.
made available for examination by the qualified electors during Presumably, it could have done something better to enlighten the people on
election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native the subject-matter thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of human
languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be
shall also be kept in each polling place. constitutional and valid. Six (6) Members of this Court believe, however, said
Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution.
The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in
connection with the former proposals does not arise from the law enacted Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic
therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance that the major political Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions
parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs
except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage and, consequently, debated thereon therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
at some length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand, said ordered.
political parties have not seemingly made an issue on the amendments now
being contested and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing the same in
the current political campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have taken
place on a rather limited scale on the latest proposals for amendment,
have been due principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and
some militant members of our citizenry who have voiced their opinion
thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the failure of
certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality
or unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at
the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law
enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the
passage or approval of the law.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; PERSONAL ACTION IN On 4 April 1977, PADERANGA subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by
PERSONAM; DISTINGUISHED FROM ACTION IN REM. In the case before us, constructing a partition wall in between. He then took possession of the other
it is indubitable that the action instituted by private respondent against half, which repossession was said to have been undertaken with the
petitioner affects the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action acquiescence of the local manager of ELUMBA, 2 although private respondent
in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties maintains that this is not the case. 3 At any rate, the validity of the
properly impleaded. However, this does not automatically mean that the repossession is not here in issue.
action for damages and to fix the period of the lease contract is also a personal
action. For, a personal action may not necessarily be an action in personam
On 18 July 1977, private respondent instituted an action for damages 4 which,
and a real action may not at the same time be an action in rem. In Hernandez
at the same time, prayed for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years,
v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., we held thus In a personal action, the plaintiff
before the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte based in
seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the
Dipolog City. 5 Petitioner, a resident of Ozamiz City, moved for its dismissal
recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
contending that the action was a real action which should have been filed with
property, or, as indicated in Section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental stationed in Ozamiz City
affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition
where the property in question was situated.chanrobles law library
or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property. An action
in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability,
On 6 November 1978, respondent Judge Dimalanes B. Buissan denied the
while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against
Motion to Dismiss and held that Civil Case No. 2901 merely involved the
the person. Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in
enforcement of the contract of lease, and while affecting a portion of real
personam and not necessarily an action in rem.
property, there was no question of ownership raised. 6 Hence, venue was
properly laid.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT ON VENUE. Consequently, the distinction
between an action in personam and an action in rem for purposes of
determining venue is irrelevant. Instead, it is imperative to find out if the Petitioner pleaded for reconsideration of the order denying his Motion to
action filed is a personal action or a real action. After all, personal actions may Dismiss. He contended that while the action did not involve a question of
be instituted in the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) where ownership, it was nevertheless seeking recovery of possession; thus, it was a
the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the real action which, consequently, must be filed in Ozamiz City.
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. On the
other hand, real actions should be brought before the Regional Trial Court On 4 December 1978, respondent judge denied reconsideration. 8 While
having jurisdiction over the territory in which the subject property or part admitting that Civil Case No. 2901 did pray for recovery of possession, he
thereof lies. nonetheless ruled that this matter was not the main issue at hand; neither was
the question of ownership raised. Not satisfied, petitioner instituted the
present recourse
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING
BREACH OF LEASE CONTRACT; CASE AT BAR. While the instant action is for
damages arising from an alleged breach of the lease contract, it likewise prays PADERANGA argues that inasmuch as ELUMBA seeks to recover possession of
for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years. If found meritorious, the portion surrendered to him by the local manager of private respondent, as
private respondent will be entitled to remain not only as lessee for another well as to fix the period of lease at five (5) years, Dipolog City could not be the
five (5) years but also to the recovery of the portion earlier taken from him as proper venue of the action. It being a real action, venue is laid in the court
well. This is because the leased premises under the original contract was the having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies.
whole commercial space itself and not just the subdivided portion thereof.
While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery ELUMBA counters that the present action is chiefly for damages arising from
of possession, such is the necessary consequence thereof. The instant action an alleged breach in the lease contract; hence, the issue of recovery of
therefore does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective of possession is merely incidental. ELUMBA further argues that the action is one
the nature of the case which is to recover the one-half portion repossessed by in personam and not in rem. Therefore venue may be laid in the place where
the lessor, herein petitioner. Indeed, where the ultimate purpose of an action plaintiff or defendant resides at the option of plaintiff.
involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition or condemnation of,
or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, such an action must be deemed
a real action and must perforce be commenced and tried in the province Private respondent appears to be confused over the difference between
where the property or any part thereof lies. personal and real actions vis-a-vis actions in personam and in rem. The former
determines venue; the latter, the binding effect of a decision the court may
render over a party, whether impleaded or not.
DECISION
In the case before us, it is indubitable that the action instituted by private
BELLOSILLO, J.:
respondent against petitioner affects the parties alone, not the whole world.
Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is binding only
upon the parties properly impleaded. 9 However, this does not automatically
mean that the action for damages and to fix the period of the lease contract is
also a personal action. For, a personal action may not necessarily be an action
in personam and a real action may not at the same time be an action in rem.
In Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., 10 we held thus
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In a real action, the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of
Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the
recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
a mortgage on, real property.
While the instant action is for damages arising from an alleged breach of the
lease contract, it likewise prays for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5)
years. If found meritorious, private respondent will be entitled to remain not
only as lessee for another five (5) years but also to the recovery of the portion
earlier taken from him as well. This is because the leased premises under the
original contract was the whole commercial space itself and not just the
subdivided portion thereof.
While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery
of possession, such is the necessary consequence thereof. The instant action
therefore does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective of
the nature of the case which is to recover the one-half portion repossessed by
the lessor, herein petitioner. Indeed, where the ultimate purpose of an action
involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition or condemnation of,
or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, 15 such an action must be
deemed a real action and must perforce be commenced and tried in the
province where the property or any part thereof lies.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 92029-30: December 20, 1990.] 1% per Month (For 84
========
A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a
right to judicial interference in his behalf. 1 An action means an ordinary suit
in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the Copy of said letter is attached hereto as Annex A and
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prosecution or redress of a wrong. made an integral part hereof.
The cause of action must always consist of two elements: (1) the plaintiff's b. The claim of P568,541.00 is not due and owing from
primary right and the defendant's corresponding primary duty, whatever may the plaintiff to the defendant because, as already
be the subject to which they relate person, character, property or contract; stated, the amounts of the checks issued to defendant
and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the some more than (7) years ago, were either fully paid,
primary right and duty have been violated. 3 The cause of action is determined settled, extinguished or treated as condoned by
not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged. 4 agreement of the parties.
The term right of action is the right to commence and maintain an action. 5 In 6. In the said letter, Annex A hereof, defendant threatened to
the law on pleadings, right of action is distinguished from cause of action in "institute the proper action and hold (plaintiff liable for the
that the former is a remedial right belonging to some persons, while the latter consequence," in the following manner:
is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to such remedial . . . unfortunately, you had not heeded his (defendant's)
right. The former is a matter of right and depends on the substantive law, while request and so we hereby inform you that this shall
the latter is a matter of statement and is governed by the law of procedure. 6 definitely be our last letter to you on this matter and we
The right of action springs from the cause of action, but does not accrue until are giving you a final period of ten (10) days from
all the facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred. 7 When there receipts hereof to remit full payment of said sum of
is an invasion of primary rights, then and not until then does the adjective or P568,541.00, otherwise, without need of further advice
remedial law become operative, and under it arise rights of action. There can to you, we shall institute the proper action and hold you
be no right of action until there has been a wrong a violation of a legal right liable for the consequence.:-cralaw
and it is then given by the adjective law. 8 7. Defendant knows fully well that the sum of P568,541.00 is not
The herein petition for review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of wholly or partly due or owing to him from plaintiff particularly the
Appeals dated January 30, 1990 in CA G.R. No. 22481 9 puts into test the huge, fantastic, and unwarranted claim for alleged legal interests
sufficiency of the cause of action of a complaint filed in the Regional Trial Court in the sum of P235,956.00 which roughly accounts for 84% of the
of Manila. alleged principal amount being collected by defendant from
plaintiff under his ill-tenored Annex A hereof, and the unwarranted
The undisputed antecedents are that on September 15, 1988, petitioner filed claim for attorney's collection fees of P51,685.00.
a complaint for damages and other equitable reliefs in the trial court, the
relevant allegations of which are as follows: 8. Plaintiff is very reluctant to file the instant complaint against his
defendant friend but was gravely agitated to do so because of a
"3. Plaintiff and defendant have been friends and in the course of clearly perceived and palpable injury to him as unequivocally
this relationship, they have exchanged mutual favors and expressed in defendant's letter, Annex A hereof.
accommodations, including discounting of check for cash.
9. In the circumstances given, defendant has kept possession of the
4. More than seven (7) years ago, several checks were issued by alleged checks amounting to P280,900.00 at the expense of
plaintiff to defendant in exchange for cash which probably plaintiff and since the obligation thereunder has either been fully
amounted to P280,900.00. In due time, these checks were either or wholly paid, settled, extinguished, or condoned by agreement of
fully paid, settled, extinguished or condoned by agreement of the the parties, defendant holds them without just or legal ground and
parties, and for which reason, plaintiff did not anymore redeem the is bound to return them to plaintiff.
checks precisely because they have been close and mutual friends.
10. In writing the letter, Annex A hereof and demanding therein an
5.a. Lately, however, plaintiff received from defendant's obligation from plaintiff which is not due and owing from the latter,
lawyer a demand letter dated 1988 supposedly detailing defendant failed to act with justice, observe honesty and good
out therein the former's obligation to the latter, as faith.
follows:
11. To prosecute the instant action, plaintiff has incurred actual
expenses in the sum of at least P15,000.00.
Principal Amount P280,900.00
12. In the circumstances herein-above given, defendant acted in a
(Value of 66 dishonored checks) wanton, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Hence,
exemplary damages in the sum of P200,000.00 should be imposed
13. Nominal damages should be adjudicated against the defendant Contrary to the findings of the lower court and the appellate court that the
in order that the right of plaintiff which has been invaded by the complaint states no cause of action, this Court finds and so holds that it states
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the a sufficient cause of action.
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by the
It must be remembered that when a party files a motion to dismiss the
latter.
complaint for lack of cause of action he is deemed to hypothetically admit the
14. To prosecute the case herein, plaintiff has retained the services allegations thereof.
of counsel at the agreed attorney's fees of P75,000.00.
From the allegation of the complaint in this case it appears that, (1) petitioner
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after due hearing has a primary right, because of having paid his obligation to private
judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, respondent, to have the checks he issued to cover the amount returned to him
as follows: or otherwise cancelled by private respondent; and (2) the primary right of was
violated when private respondent demanded payment of a settled obligation
1. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of
relying on the very checks of petitioner he had not returned. Consequently, on
P15,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages;
account of such demand for payment for an obligation duly settled, the
2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the exemplary petitioner thereby suffered damages 13 and should be afforded such relief as
damages in the sum of P200,000.00; prayed for in the complaint.:-cralaw
3. Ordering defendant to return to plaintiff the several Contrary to the observation made by the appellate court, the cause of action
checks mentioned in Annex A of the complaint and had not prescribed. The cause of action accrued only on August 20, 1988 when
adjudicating nominal damages in favor of plaintiff and in a demand letter for payment private respondent thereby committed a
against the defendant; wrongful act against petitioner. The complaint was filed promptly on
September 15, 1988, well within the four (4) year prescriptive period of an
4. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of action of this nature. 14
P75,000.00 for and as attorney's fees; and
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the
5. Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of the suit.: Court of Appeals dated January 30, 1990 as well as the questioned orders of
nad the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated November 24, 1988 and March 17,
Plaintiff prays for other relief just and proper in the premises of the 1989, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be
case." 10 remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs against private
respondent.
On October 8, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of cause of action and prescription. An opposition thereto
SO ORDERED.
was filed by petitioner to which a reply was made by private respondent. After
a rejoinder was submitted by petitioner, on November 24, 1988 the trial court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 11
Hence, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and mandamus and other relief
in the Court of Appeals against said orders of the trial court. As earlier stated,
on January 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the
appeal with costs against petitioner.
Thus, the herein petition whereby petitioner alleges that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders dated
November 24, 1988 and March 17, 1989, and that the Court of Appeals did
likewise in dismissing the appeal of petitioner thereby disregarding a question
of substance not in accord with law.
A reading of the complaint shows that it is therein alleged that more than
seven (7) years ago, several checks were issued by petitioner to private
respondent in exchange for cash amounting to P280,900.00; that in due time,
said checks were "either fully paid, settled, extinguished or condoned by
agreement of the parties" so petitioner did not anymore redeem the checks
because of their friendship; that on August 30, 1988, private respondent's
lawyer sent a letter of demand to petitioner to pay said principal amount plus
interest and attorney's fees with a total amount due of P568,541.00, which
claim is not due and owing having been settled between the parties; that in
said letter threat of court action was made causing injury to petitioner; that
private respondent illegally withheld the petitioner's checks which should be
returned to petitioner; that for private respondent's act of demanding
payment for an obligation not due and for the former's failure to act with
justice, observe honesty and good faith, petitioner prays for relief by way of
actual, exemplary and nominal damages, and also prays that the private