Social contract theories: a comparison of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau

History of social contract theories

Social contract theories have been around since the first forms of society arose in the ancient
world, one of the best known dialogues being Plato's De Res Publica, which sets out that the
principle of social contract is to establish convenants in order to enforce the mutual agreement
neither to inflict injustice, nor to suffer injustice.

Marsilius of Padua would develop a theory quite similar to modern-day social contract
theories. In his writing, Defensor Pacis (1324), he states that not the Church, but the prince
has autonomy and the right of jurisdiction within his territory, only to be bound by mandate of
the people and their consent, as the people are the source of all political power and
government. The prince has to carry out his obligations- if he fails to do so by violating the
law, he will be punished.

Common features of and differences between Social Contract Theories: a comparison

1. State of Nature
1.1. Hobbes
The original state is the State of Nature, in which men have no order, no law and no bodies to
enforce law. How the "State of Nature" is viewed by a social contract theorist, depends on the
context in which the author himself is placed: witnessing a series of civil wars, it is
understandable that Hobbes predicted life in a state of nature to be "brutish and short" and that
only absolutism would make an end of this actual state of war in the seventeenth century.

1.2. Locke
Although Locke's State of Nature, a pre-political state, is not considered devoid of morality-
on the contrary, the State of Nature is the state of liberty where people even recognize the
Law of Nature and therefore do not harm each other- the equality of men and a lack of
organization is what will amount to a rather insecure and unsafe state of being. Emphasizing
the individual right to "Life, Liberty and Estate", the right to Property, it should not surprise
that Locke has written his thesis in favor of the rising middle class in the spirit of the early
Age of Enlightenment. That is probably the main reason why Locke's conceptions of the
"State of Nature" and the social contract cannot be as unyielding as Hobbes' conceptions
were- but then again, Locke's writings were published after the Glorious Revolution (1688);
worlds apart from the English Civil War that has inspired Hobbes to writing his infamous
Leviathan (1651).

1.3. Rousseau
Rousseau spent his days in the French salons chatting about on intellectual topics, but it is
presumably Rousseau who marked the end of the 'Ancien Rgime' with his criticism of Louis
the Great and his successors until Louis Capet (XVI). His view of the "State of Nature" is
surprisingly positive: the State of Nature seemed like paradise, but the introduction of
property and civilian culture has made it impossible for man to stay in the State of Nature. In
that respect,
"Contrat social" (1780) is clear and concise on the importance of establishing society on a
"volont gnrale" rather than on a "volont de tous".

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General comments
I would go as far as to say that Hobbes' Leviathan accurately describes the world we live in,
whereas Locke seemed merely blinded by the favor of his audience: as life in the State of
Nature was all that perfect and men would, by nature, live up to their obligations, then it is
rather inconsistent to suppose that only the acquisition of property leads to unsafety and that a
simple increase in conflicts would amount to a state of war.

It seems to me that, behind his rhetoric, Locke makes a quite similar point. His State of
Nature may not be equal to a State of War like it is in Hobbes' view, but the State of Nature
will result in a State of War to the slightest somehow.
I would not say that an abolute sovereign is the solution to modern global troubles (on the
contrary), but it goes to show that on a global scale, the lack of effective government indeed
in the event results in a poor and brutish life, overall unsafety and insecurity- all because too
many people feel the need to suppress other people.

2. Pactum unionis and (subsequent) pactum subjectionis

Common to all social contract theories are either pactum unionis or pactum subjectionis, or a
simultaneous application of both pacta, sometimes referred to as the first being the "phase of
historical fact" and the latter being the "phase of legal reason" The pactum unionis implies
that men have passed from a State of Nature to a State of Society by means of a contract by
which they have imposed on themselves the obligation to respect each others rights, thus, a
pact with horizontal effect; the pactum subjectionis implies that people undertake to obey the
government, chosen by them
(W. Friedman, Natural Law and Social Contract, London 1967, p.118).

Comparing Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, it becomes clear that Hobbes has envisioned solely
a pactum subjectionis, for only an absolute sovereign could govern effectively; Locke
envisioned the pactum unionis and pactum subjectionis subsequently; in Rousseau's theory, as
the sovereign is inherent to "volont gnrale", as there is no higher authority or power, no
other pact than the pactum unionis is essential to his conception of social contract.

With regards to Locke, the subsequent conclusion of the pactum unionis and subjectionis is
stated clearly: "The great chief end of men's uniting into commonwealths and putting
themselves under government, is the preservation of their property (Life, Liberty and Estate).

3. Marking the end of the Ages of "divine law" and Medieval incorporate personality
One main feature that is common to all social contract theories, is that the source of all
political power lies within the people; this view distincts the early Ages of Enlightenment
from the Medieval Period, in which the idea of the existence of "divine law", granting
political authority to the sovereign, would govern the people.
According to Friedman, another common feature is the individualistic and "atomistic
conception" of society, in that the state is the legal creation of indivdual will, as opposed to
the organic view of society and incorporate personality as was applicable to society in the
Medieval.

4. Transfer of natural rights

In the Hobbesian view, natural reason dictates man to self-preservation. In pursuit of the
escape of this state of permanent insecurity, man transfers all of his rights to the sovereign.
The power of the ruler needs to be absolute, man should obey without any reservations. There
is no contractual right by which subjects could demand the fulfilment of obligations by the

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Leviathan. "Governments without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure man
at all."
Hobbes' thought construction is utilitarian, in the sense that nothing but self-interest has led
man to invoke the security of an absolute ruler who carries the sword on behalf of man.
(Friedman, 1967)

Unlike Hobbes, Locke's social contract is conditionally: government is regarded a party to the
contract and man is able to demand the fulfilment of obligations. Locke's social contract
serves to limit the power of government and secure the right of property. Man does not
transfer these fundamental rights of life, liberty and estate. Natural rights are transferred only
partially, solely on the purpose of not rendering the effect of the contract. These rights are the
right to self-preservation, which is transferred to Parliament, and the right to punish, which is
transferred to the executive.

A closer reading of Rousseau. Du Contrat Social ou Principles du droit

politique (1780)

1. Rousseau. Du Contrat social ou Principles du droit politique

In Chapitre deux, Rousseau illustrates "des premires socits": the ancient and only natural
of all forms of society is that of a family. Speaking of "a primitive community in which
people live in harmony with each other and in which they enjoy freedom and happiness",
Rousseau seems to be opposed to Hobbes and Locke in that the latter theorists stress the
egoistic character of the individual, stemming from his self-centered nature.

In the following chapters, Rousseau elaborates on the work of Grotius. Among the most
relevant chapters are Chapitre VI, Du pacte social, and Chapitre VII, Du souverain. I
paraphrased [re-wrote] the most important parts of Livre Premier and Livre Deux, the
underlined phrases show my personal interpretation of Rousseau's original manuscript.

1.1 Livre premier, Chapitre VI: Du pacte social

In Rousseau's view, the State of Nature prompts men to unite: "Je suppose que les hommes
parvenus ce point o les obstacles qui nuisent leur conservation dans l'tat de nature,
l'emportent par leur rsistance, sur les forces que chaque individu peut employer pour se
maintenir dans cet tat. Alors, cet l'Etat primitif ne peut plus subsister et le genre-humain
priroit s'il ne changeoit de manire d'tre".

Rousseau recognizes that mankind will cease to exist if it does not adjust its mode of
existence to the "obstacles" that have come to impede the State of Nature.

"..comme les hommes ne peuvent engendrer de nouvelles forces, mais seulement unir et
diriger celles qui existent, ils n'ont plus d'autre moyen pour se conserver, que de former [..]
une somme de forces. Cette somme de forces ne peut natre que du concours de plusieurs,
mais la force et la libert de chaque homme tant les premiers instruments de sa conservation,
comment les engagera-t-il sans se nuire?"

This difficulty can be reduced to the subject of his thesis:

"Trouver une forme d'association qui dfende et protge de toute la force commune la
personne et les biens de chaque associ et par laquelle chacun s'unissant tous, n'obisse
pourtant qu' lui-mme et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant? Tel est le problme fondamental

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dont le contrat social donne la solution".

A social contract is presented as the solution to this difficulty ("giving up initial freedom in
order to retain freedom by means of the social contract"). Once the social contract is
established, to what extent are its provisions binding upon its members? How tacit is such
agreement?

"Les clauses de ce contrat sont tellement dtermines par la nature de l'acte, que la moindre
modification les rendoit vaines et de nul effet. Elles sont par-tout tacitement admises et
reconnues, jusqu' ce que, le pacte social tant viol, chacun rentre alors dans ses premiers
droits et reprenne sa libert naturelle, en perdant la libert conventionelle pour laquelle il y
renona".

The social contract should entirely carry out the principle of reciprocity:

"Ce clauses se rduisent toutes une seule savoir, l'alination totale de chaque associ avec
tous ses droits toute la communaut:
[1] Car premirement, chacun se donnant tout entier, la condition tant gale par tous et la
condition tant gale par tous, nul n'a intrt de la rendre onreuse aux autres;
[2] De plus, l'alination se faisant sans rserve, l'union est aussi parfaite qu'elle peut l'tre, et
nul associ n'a plus rien rclamer. S'il restoit quelques droits aux particuliers, comme il n'y
auroit aucun suprieur commun qui pt prononcer entr'eux et le public, chacun, tant en
quelque point son propre juge, prtendroit bientt l'tre en tous, l'tat de nature subsisteroit et
l'association deviendroit ncessairement tyrannique ou vaine;
[3] Enfin, chacun se donnant tous, ne se donne personne et comme il n'y a pas un associ
sur lequel on n' acquire le mme droit qu'on lui cede sur foi, on gagne l'quivalent de tout ce
qu'on perd et plus de force conserver ce qu'on a".

Hence, the essence of the social contract is, according to Rousseau:

"Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute sa puissance sous la suprme direction
de la volont gnrale et nous recevons en corps chaque membre comme partie indivisible du
tout".

"A l'instant, au lieu de la personne particulire de chaque contractant, cet acte d'association
produit un Corps moral et collectif compos d'autant de membres que l'assemble a de voix".

1.2. Chapitre VII: Du Souverain

"Cette formule que l'acte d'association renferme un engagement rciproque du publie avec les
particuliers et que chaque individu contractant, pour ainsi dire, avec lui-mme, se trouve
engag sous un double rapport; savoir, comme membre du Souverain envers les
particuliers et comme membre de l'Etat envers le Souverain".

"On ne peut appliquer ici la maxime du droit civil, que nul n'est tenu aux engagements pris
avec lui-mme; car il y a bien de la diffrence entre s'obliger envers soi, ou envers un tout
dont on fait partie".

The relationship between the Sovereign and its members cannot give rise to conflicting
interests, as we understand the very character of the sovereign:

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"Or, le Souverain, n'tant form que les particuliers qui le composent, n'a, ni ne peut avoir,
d'intrt contraire au leur. Par consquent, la puissance souveraine n'a nul besoin de garant
envers les sujets; parce qu'il est impossible que le corps veuille nuire tous ses membres et
nous verrons ci-aprs qu'il ne peut nuire aucun en particulier. Le Souverain, par cela seul
qu'il est, est toujours tout ce qu'il doit tre".

Always keep in mind that the one and only interest of the Sovereign is the general will,
"volont gnrale", rather than the sum of all individual interests. The relationship between
the subjected individuals and the Sovereign (Rousseau has drawn a distinction between
subjects, civilians and members of the Sovereign), however, could give rise to conflicting
interests, which could eventually result in the destruction of the Corps politique, provided that
these subjects do not observe their obligations:

"Il n'en est pas ainsi que des sujets envers le Souverain, auquel malgr l'intrt commun, rien
ne rpondroit de leurs engagements, s'il ne trouvoit des moyens de s'assurer de leur fidlit.
En effet, chaque individu peut, comme homme avoir une volont particulire, contraire ou
dissemblable la volont gnrale qu'il a comme citoyen. Son existence absolue et
naturellement indpendante peut lui faire envisager ce qu'il doit la cause commune comme
une contribution gratuite, dont la perte sera moins nuisible aux autres que le payement n'en est
onreux pour lui".

The independency of the individual, inherent to his nature, might make him compare himself
to other and come to the conclusion that the social contract forces him to face a heavier
burden than other individuals do. This is why the state of nature puts society at risk.

"Afin donc que le pacte social ne soit pas un vain formulaire, il renferme tacitement cet
engagement qui seul peut donner de la force aux autres, que quiconque refusera d'obir la
volont gnrale y sera contraint par tout le corps; ce qui ne signifie autre chose, sinon qu'on
le forcera d'etr libre: car telle est la condition qui donnant chaque citoyen la patrie le
garantit de toute dpendance personnelle; condition qui fait l'artifice et le jeu de la machine
politique et qui seule rend lgitimes les engagements civils, lesquels sans cela seroient
absurdes, tyranniques et sujets aux plus normes abus".

1.3. Livre Deux. Chapitre premier. Que la Souverainet est inalinable

"La premire et plus importante consquence des principles ci-devant tablis est, que la
volont gnrale peut seule diriger les forces de l'Etat selon la fin de son institution, qui est le
bien commun: car si l'opposition des intrts particuliers a rendu ncessaire l'tablissement
des socits c'est l'accord de ces mmes intrts qui l'a rendu possible. C'est ce qu'il y a de
commun dans ces diffrens intrts qui forme le lien social et s'il n'y avoit pas quelque point
dans lequel tous les intrts s'accordent, nulle socit ne sauroit exister. Or c'est uniquement
sur cet intrt commun que la socit doit tre gouverne".

"Je dis donc que la souverainet n'tant que l'exercice de la volont gnrale, ne peut jamais
s'aliner et que le Souverain, qui n'est qu'un tre collectif, ne peut tre reprsent que par lui-
mme, le pouvoir peut bien se transmettre, mais non pas la volont".

1.4. Chapitre II. Que la Souverainet est indivisible

"Par la mme raison que la souverainet est inalinable, elle est indivisible. Car la volont est
gnrale, ou elle ne l'est pas; elle est celle du Corps du Peuple, ou seulement d'une partie.
Dans le premier cas, cette volont dclare est un acte de souverainet et fait loi. Dans le

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second, ce n'est qu'une volont particulire, ou un acte de magistrature; c'est un dcret tout au
plus".

1.5. Chapitre III. Si la volont gnrale peut errer

"Il s'ensuit de ce qui prcede que la volont gnrale est toujours droite et tend toujours
l'utilit publique: mais il ne s'ensuit pas que les dlibrations du peuple aient toujours la mme
rectitude. On veut toujours son bien, mais on ne le voit pois toujours: jamais on ne corrompt
le peuple, mais souvent on le trompe et c'est alors seulement qu'il parot vouloir ce qui est
mal". The general will and the sum of all individual wills are compared and contrasted, as
follows:

"Il y a souvent bien la diffrence entre la volont de tous et la volont gnrale: celle ci ne
regarde qu' la intrt commun, l'autre regarde l'intrt priv, n'est qu'une somme de
volonts particulires; mais tez de ses mmes volonts les plus et les moins qui s'entre-
dtruisent, reste pour somme des diffrences la volont gnrale".

"Si, quand le peuple suffisamment inform dlibre, les citoyens n'avoient aucune
communication entr'eux, du grand nombre de petites diffrences rsulteroit toujours la volont
gnrale et la dlibration seroit toujours bonne".

"Il importe donc, pour avoir bien l'nonc de la volont gnrale qu'il n'y ait pas de socit
partielle dans l'Etat et que chaque citoyen n'opine que d'aprs lui. Que s'il y a des socits
partielles, il en faut multiplier le nombre et en prvenir l'ingalit".

Rousseau borrows this idea from Lycurgus and inserts a statement made by Machiavelli; by
doing so, he emphasizes the similarities between the postulates of the classic Social Contract
theorists and those of himself.

Theories of Democracy: Schumpeter

Schumpeter, 'Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy' (1942)

Schumpeter defines the eighteenth-century theories on democracy as follows: it is the
'democratic method that is an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions,
which realizes common good by making people decide through the election of individuals
who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.'

The first objection to this generally accepted definition, according to Schumpeter, is that
"There is no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree on
or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument." This is due to the fundamental fact
that the common good has different meaning to different people and groups; irreducible
differences of ultimate values are faced.

The second objection is that, even if a sufficiently defined common good would be acceptable
to all, the answers to individual issues would not be definite as well: "Opinions on these might
differ to an important enough extent to produce [..] "fundamental" dissention about end
themselves."

Schumpeter's last objection reads that, as a consequence of both preceding arguments, the
particular concept of the will of the volont gnrale, that the utilitarians made their own,

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vanishes into thin air, for "that concept presupposes the existence of a uniquely determined
common good, discernible to all." The utilitarians derived their 'will of the people' from the
wills of individuals. Unless all individual wills will gravitate into a common good, we will not
get that particular type of 'natural' volont gnrale. This kind of an utilitarian volont
gnrale is gone as soon as the concept of common good itself fails to exist.

As Schumpeter concludes: "If results that prove in the long run satisfactory to the people at
large are made the test of government for the people, then government by the people, as
conceived by the classical doctrine of democracy, would often fail to meet it."

Thus, Schumpeter makes clear that:

1. There is no sufficiently defined "common good";
2. Opinions on the answers to individual issues would differ such that there will be
fundamental dissention about end themselves;
3. The utilitarian conception of volont gnrale as derived from the "wills of individuals"
proves to be a wrong conception, hence is why this kind of a general will is deemed to fail as
soon as the common good itself fails to exist.

Schumpeter develops an alternative theory of democracy. "It will be remembered that the
chief troubles about the classical theory is that "the people" hold a definite and rational
opinion about every individual question and that they give effect to this opinion by choosing
representatives to carry out that opinion."

This theory is replaced with Schumpeter's view: "The role of the people is to produce a
government, or else an intermediate body. And we define: the democratic method is that
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's voice."

Rawls' modern Contract Theory, Justice as fairness

Linking modern contract theories to classic contract theories

As a modern social contract theorist, Rawls seeks to refine the definition put forward by
classic social contract theorists such as Rousseau and Locke.
He does so by not thinking of the original contract as one to enter into a particular society.
Rather, the object of the original contract are the principles of justice for the basic structure of
society, provided that these principles would be accepted by free and rational persons in an
initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association.

Justice as fairness- the original position

Certain principles regulate all further agreements- they specify the kinds of social cooperation
that can be entered into and the forms of government to be established. This way of regarding
principles of justice is then to be called "Justice as fairness".

A purely hypothetical situation is introduced as "the original position". The original position
is often critized by contemporary theorists. It is the question, though, if Rawls' proposition of
a hypothetical position of equality among men, is understood within its context. Nowhere
seems to be made the claim that reality would meet the requirements of principles of justice as
set out by Rawls. Rawls is, ultimately, a theorist. His original position functions well as a
starting point before entering into any kind of a social contract and developing any conception
of justice. Rawls' conception of an ideal society is no more than a "thought experiment", like

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the classic social theories designed by his predecessors (from Plato to Rousseau). [ M.B.]

As Rawls himself puts it: "The choices which rational men would make in a hypothetical
situation of equal liberty determine the principles of justice. In justice as fairness, the original
position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in classic social contract theories. This
position is not a historical fact; it is understood as a purely hypothetical situation to lead to a
certain conception of justice."

An essential feature of the original position is that of a "veil of ignorance"- the initial status
quo appropriate to reach agreements as fair as possible. The veil of ignorance is that "no one
knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his
fortune in the natural distribution of assets like intelligence and strength. This implies that no
one is advantaged or disadvantaged, thus no one is able to design principles in his favor."

This concept serves to maintain that principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement. In
the social world, natural assets, such as intelligence and strength, are no more than arbitrary
from a moral point of view. Rawls explains that "justice as fairness" conveys the idea that the
principles of justice are agreed to under fair conditions. Hence is why Rawls' contract theory
can be described as one of "procedural justice" [M.B.].

To justify the original position, Rawls states that "The purpose of these conditions is to
represent equality between human beings as moral persons. The state of affairs I refer to as
reflective equilibrum."

In adopting principles, would the (commonly accepted) principle of utility be acknowledged?

"It hardly seems likely that persons who view themselves as equal, would agree to a principle
which may require lesser life prospects for the sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by
others. No one has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring
about a greater net balance of satisfaction. No rational man would accept a structure merely
because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages. The utility principle is incompatible
with the conception of social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage."

Rawls proposes to replace the utility principle with his two infamous principles of justice:

"The first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second
holds that social and economic inequalities are permissible, if only they result in
compensating benefits for everyone- in particular the least advantaged in society."

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Principles of Justice

1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic
liberties, compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others;

2. Both social and economic equalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
a. reasonably expected to be at everyone's advantage;
b. attached to positions and offices open for all.

1. Rawls lists the basic liberties as "political liberty and freedom of speech and assembly;
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; integrity of the person; the right to hold
personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest."

2. The second principle is referred to as the "difference principle": inequalities are admissible,
provided that they are at the advantage to the least advantaged.

A lexical order is presented: these principles are to be arranged so with the first principle of
basic liberties prior to the second. Infringement of the liberties protected by the first principle,
cannot be justified by the second. It is, however, important to note that none of these liberties
is absolute. If it be, an infringement would be imposed on the "right to property" in order to
reach an equality of econonomic resources.

Robert Nozick: Justice in Holdings (Libertarianism)

Nozick develops the "Entitlement theory" of "Justice in Holdings". According to Nozick,
"there is no distribution of goods we want to own, in a sense of these goods being "divided"
by a government. What each person gets, he gets from others in exchange for something, or as
a gift." In this view, Rawls seems to ignore the factor of reciprocity that leads man to obtain
goods.

"Justice in holdings" implies:

(a) that one can acquire an object along the principles of just acquisition [res nullius; mixing
one's labor with the object (Locke) M.B.];
(b) that one could obtain an object in accordance with the principles of just transfer.

The "justice" aspect is to point out that no one can justly own an object where the ownership
cannot be traced by the application of one/ both of these principles.

In "Anarchy, State and Utopia", Nozick proposes a "minimal state, limited to the function of
the protection of personal property. Any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not
to be forced and is not justified. Individuals have rights, and there are things that no person or
group may do to them without violating their rights. The state may not use its coercive
apparatus to get citizens to aid others [re-distribution of sources, M.B.], or in order to prohibit
activities to people for their own good."

Nozick takes into consideration the anarchist claim that a state using its coercive apparatus,
violates an individuals' rights and is therefore intrinsically immoral. Turning to the tradition of
social thought, utopian theory, Nozick states that "..what can be saved from this tradition is
precisely the structure of a minimal state."

Just like Rawls, the theory developed by Nozick is a thought experiment. On a closer reading,

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one will discover that nowhere the entitlement theory is presented as an absolute postulate.
Nozick's thought experiment seems to strike a balance between an anarchist view of the state
and Rawls' theory of distributive justice.

Recommended reading
Bix, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 2012;
Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 1974;
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971.

Legitimatietheorien strafecht: Retributivisme (Kant) vs. Utilisme (Beccaria)

Legitimatietheorien: van talio tot anarchisme

In de Klassieke Wereld werd talio (ius talionis/ lex talionis) als het meest rechtvaardige
principe beschouwd: de nadruk lag op de proportionaliteit van de straf tegenover de misdaad.
Proportionaliteit wordt in die zin niet bepaald door omstandigheden. De misdaad dient te
worden vereffend, "opdat de bloedschuld niet aan het volk blijft kleven".

1.1. Kant: retributivisme

Die opvatting wordt gedeeld door Immanuel Kant. Het door Kant geciteerde principe duidt op
eenzelfde proportionaliteitseis die wordt aangetroffen in de Codex Hammurabi (het
Babylonische recht). Kant reageert in zijn Metaphysik der Sitten op de moderne utilistische
visie van Beccaria. Anders dan de utilisten, stelt Kant dat effectiviteit (het nutsprincipe) de
oplegging van straf niet kan rechtvaardigen; straf kan uitsluitend worden opgelegd ter
vereffening. De vergelding is inherent aan het retributivisme.

Vanuit de theorie der deontologie beredeneert Kant, dat straf nimmer kan worden opgelegd
om n of ander voordeel te behalen; de mens mag niet worden gedegradeerd tot middel om
bepaalde doelen te verwezenlijken. Met het introduceren van het gelijkheidsbeginsel wordt de
parallel getrokken met het aloude talioprincipe: "..de weegschaal van het recht slaat noch naar
de ene, noch naar de andere kant door." Kant vervolgt zijn betoog: "Alleen ius talionis kan de
kwaliteit en kwantiteit van een straf precies bepalen. Alle andere beginselen zijn [te]
veranderlijk en kunnen [..] niet in overeenstemming zijn met de zuivere gerechtigheid." (Vert.
P.C. Westerman)

1.2. Categorische Imperatief in relatie tot vergelding

Kant construeert de koppeling van de vergelding aan het gelijkheidsbeginsel, aan de hand van
zijn (dogmatische) Categorische Imperatief:

"Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, da sie
allgemeines Gesetz werde."

1. Bij iedere handeling dient men zich af te vragen, welke (morele) regel aan die handeling
ten grondslag ligt (Maxime, Ausdruck der Vernunftstrebens nach Einheit und
Verallgemeinerung);
2. Vervolgens dient men zich af te vragen, of men wenst dat die regel universeel toegepast
wordt.

Werkt een dergelijke universele wet vernietigend, dan dient men af te zien van de handeling.
De strikte toepassing van de principes, duidt erop dat Kant een deontoloog bij uitstek is.

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

Kant acht de delinquent in staat om de Categorische Imperatief toe te passen, omdat ieder
mens is begiftigd met verstand. Als rationele persoon accepteert de delinquent de
geuniversaliseerde toepassing van zijn eigen 'Maxime'.

1.3. Kritiek op het utilisme van Beccaria

De voornaamste kritiek van Kant op Beccaria, is dat Beccaria geen onderscheid maakt tussen
homo phenomenon en homo noumenon. Slechts de redelijke mens, de noumenon, is in staat
om een sociaal contract te sluiten. Vgl. Rousseau: zelfwetgeving is slechts mogelijk als men
zich niet laat leiden door eigenbelang (homo phenomenon). Overheidsgezag en daarmee het
centraal gereguleerde strafrecht, is gelegitimeerd als zij het gevolg is van zelfwetgeving door
de rationele mens. Het normatieve element impliceert dat men wordt geacht redelijkerwijs
met de uitgevaardigde strafwetten te hebben ingestemd. De 'volont gnrale' impliceert dat
de homo noumenon, ten behoeve van effectieve vereniging van de burgers tot een volg, zijn
belangen ondergeschikt maakt aan het geheel. Alle (vrijheids)rechten zijn overgedragen aan
de soeverein, opdat men wilsvrijheid bereikt.

In 'Metafysik der Setten' drukt Kant zijn kritiek op Beccaria als volgt uit: "..Beccaria heeft
hiertegen ingebracht, dat zij [ de straf in kwestie ] onrechtmatig zou zijn, omdat zij geen deel
zou kunnen uitmaken van het maatschappelijk verdrag, aangezien iedereen dan in had moeten
stemmen met de consequenties. [echter:] Ik, als medewetgever, die de strafwet opstelt, kan
onmogelijk dezelfde persoon zijn als de onderdaan die door de wet wordt bestraft; als
misdadiger kan ik onmogelijk een stem hebben in de wetgeving (de wetgever is heilig)."

De legitieme uitvaardiging en toepassing van het strafrecht moet als volgt worden uitgelegd:
"Dus als ik een strafwet tegen mezelf, als misdadiger, zou uitvaardigen, dan doe ik dat
tengevolge van de zuivere wetgevende Rede (homo noumenon), die deel van mij uitmaakt.
Deze onderwerpt het deel van mij, tot misdaden in staat (homo phenomenon) aan de
strafwetten in de vereniging van burgers [..]. Met andere woorden: niet het volk (als
verzameling individuen [volont de tous] ), maar de openbare gerechtigheid (resultaat volont
gnrale) legt de straffen op." (vert. P.C. Westerman)

Beccaria stelt daarentegen de 'volont de tous' voorop. Volgens Beccaria drukt legitiem
strafrecht het nastreven van zelfbehoud door de natuurlijke mens (phenomenon) uit. Sommige
straffen zijn in deze opvatting nooit gerechtvaardigd, omdat zij conflicteren met dit
natuurlijke streven tot zelfbehoud door de homo phenomenon. Deze uiting van eigenbelang
komt geenszins overeen met de rationele constructie van Kant, in navolging van Rousseau.

De legitimatietheorie van Beccaria is duidelijk ontleend aan het contractsdenken van Locke:
burgers hebben (centraal) soeverein gezag gevestigd bij wijze van de overdracht van
minimale gedeelten van hun vrijheden. Het recht van de Staat is de optelsom van de
natuurlijke rechten van burgers (volont de tous als resultaat van de wil van alle individuen).
Het normatieve element van de 'volont gnrale' ontbreekt. De macht van de soeverein en
daarmee het recht tot straffen, wordt ingeperkt, omdat de homo phenomenon zijn
vrijheidsrechten niet onvoorwaardelijk en zonder voorbehoud heeft afgestaan.

2. Overzicht: verschillen tussen retributivisme en utilisme

1. In de retributivistische strafrechtstheorie staat vergelding centraal. Volgens het aloude
talioprincipe is er ultieme proportionaliteit tussen delict en straf; in tegenstelling tot de
moderne perceptie van proportionaliteit, gaat het om een bijna meetkundige symmetrie, die
ook werd aangetroffen in de Babylonische strafwetten ('Metaphysik' is niet zonder reden de

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

titel van de klassieker van Kant).

Aangezien volgens het utilisme, de speciale of generale preventie de toepassing van de straf
dient te rechtvaardigen, is de proportionaliteit tussen daad en straf van minder groot belang.

2. Met de splitsing tussen homo phenomenon en homo noumenon maken retributivisten

duidelijk, dat zij de delinquent in staat achten om rationele beslissingen te nemen. Een ieder is
in staat om een overweging te maken; uit dit indeterministische beeld volgt dat de delinquent
niet voor het beste alternatief heeft gekozen en op grond daarvan de consequenties heeft
willen aanvaarden (vgl. Categorische Imperatief).

Het utilisme past een deterministisch beeld toe. Aangezien de keuzevrijheid van de delinquent
is beperkt door bepaalde factoren, is de strafrechtelijke consequentie dat hij moet worden
behandeld op een manier die recidive voorkomt.

3. De zwakte van het retributivistische model: een beetje gedetermineerd?

Retributivisten ontkennen niet dat de mens in bepaalde mate is gedetermineerd. Kant kiest
duidelijk voor een rationele constructie die binnen zijn theorie past: omdat de mens volgens
het retributivisme slechts verantwoordelijk kan worden gehouden als hij keuzevrijheid had n
omdat vergelding volgens hem een noodzakelijk kwaad is, kan het niet zo zijn dat de mens
volledig wordt gedetermineerd door biologische factoren.

Hier wordt het indeterministische mensbeeld door Kant al enigszins afgezwakt. Hij riskeert
daarmee, dat dit beeld niet meer strookt met zijn stelling, 'dat de mens keuzevrijheid had'.
Daarom wordt weer het onderscheid tussen de homo phenomenon en noumenon toegepast: de
vrije mens, bepaald door zijn natuurlijke factoren, bestaat naast de mens die in staat is om de
Rede te gebruiken. In zijn hoedanigheid als homo noumenon is hij niet beperkt en in diezelfde
hoedanigheid wordt hij verantwoordelijk gehouden voor zijn handelen.

De achterliggende gedachte is, dat slechts de noumenon, rechtssubject kan zijn. Als homo
noumenon, als medewetgever in het sociaal contract, komen aan de mens alle civiele rechten
toe. Als noumenon heeft hij zijn rechten volledig heeft overgedragen ten behoeve van
bescherming van de volledige wilsvrijheid door de soeverein. De door biologische factoren
gedetermineerde mens kan niet dezelfde zijn als deze medewetgever, omdat de wet 'heilig' is.

De mens kan slechts in zijn hoedanigheid van noumenon worden geacht de strafwet bij wijze
van zelfwetgeving (via het centrale gezag, vgl. Rousseau), op zichzelf toe te passen. De
delinquent moet wel hebben gehandeld als vrije persoon, als noumenon; is dat niet het geval,
dan kan de retributivist de oplegging van de straf volgens zijn eigen theorie niet
rechtvaardigen. Daarmee is duidelijk wat de zwakte is van de rechtvaardigingstheorie van
Kant: de strenge retributivist moet zich in allerlei bochten wringen om de essentie van zijn
eigen theorie niet tegen te spreken.

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

Utilistische strafrechtstheorien: Beccaria en Bentham

Strafoplegging kan volgens het utilisme of utilitarisme uitsluitend worden gerechtvaardigd

door de preventieve werking die ervan uit zou gaan. Bentham en Beccaria hebben utilistische
strafrechtstheorien ontwikkeld die in de kern grote gelijkenis vertonen, al ligt de nadruk bij
Beccaria op de koppeling aan de verdragstheorie van Locke.

1. Beccaria
Revolutionair is Beccaria's stelling, dat straf een middel is, waarvan de effectiviteit ter
discussie staat. Hoe verhoudt zich nu het argument van Beccaria, dat straf uitsluitend kan
worden opgelegd ter speciale of generale preventie, tot de verdragstheorie van Locke?
De vestiging van de Staat is volgens Locke geen doel, maar een middel om de bescherming
van 'Property' (Life, Liberty, Estate) te garanderen.

Uit Beccaria's uiteenzetting in Dei delitti e delle pene blijkt, hoezeer hij is genspireerd door
de theorie van Locke:
"Geen enkel mens heeft een deel van zijn persoonlijke vrijheden afgestaan ten gunste van het
algemeen welzijn, zonder een tegenprestatie te eisen. Indien het mogelijk was, zou iedereen
zelfs willen, dat de maatschappelijke verplichtingen die wij op ons hebben genomen, wel op
anderen drukken, maar niet onszelf niet zouden verbinden. De som van alle kleine deeltjes
individuele vrijheid, afgestaan ten gunste van het algemeen welzijn, maakt de soevereiniteit
van de natie uit.
Er zijn tastbare middelen nodig om de mens te beletten, de gemeenschap in de vroegere
chaotische (natuur)staat terug te storten. Deze middelen zijn de straffen. Er moeten motieven
worden geschapen, die rechtstreeks de menselijke sensibiliteit weten te treffen. Alleen de
wetten kunnen de straffen bepalen [legaliteitsbeginsel, een novum van de hand van Beccaria].
Dit recht kan niemand anders bezitten dan de wetgever, die de gehele maatschappij,
verbonden in het sociaal contract, vertegenwoordigt.
Het is alleen omdat de mensen zich daartoe door omstandigheden genoodzaakt hebben
gezien, dat zij een minimaal deel van hun vrijheid als pand aan de gemeenschap hebben
gegeven (de burgers zijn niet tot n volk verenigd, als in de latere contractstheorie van
Rousseau, maar blijven als individuen met eigen, weliswaar voor een deel opgegeven
vrijheidsrechten, naast elkaar leven). De samenbundeling van alle minimale deeltjes maakt het
recht tot straffen uit. Alles wat er meer bij komt, is niet gerechtvaardigd." (vert. J.M.
Michiels)

De rechtvaardiging van overheidsgezag is dus onlosmakelijk verbonden met het recht tot
straffen. Het recht van de soeverein om te straffen reikt niet verder dan de optelsom van de
natuurlijke rechten die de mensen hebben overgedragen aan het soeverein gezag. De
voorwaardelijkheid van de overdracht van de natuurlijke rechten, maakt duidelijk dat de
overheid het recht tot strafoplegging slechts kan aanwenden, om het zelfbehoud van de
burgers te beschermen.

Op welke gronden pleit Beccaria voor de gematigdheid van straffen? De eis van de
effectiviteit wordt als volgt geformuleerd: "Het leed, dat de straf meebrengt, dient groter te
zijn dan het voordeel dat het plegen van het misdrijf oplevert. Tot dit overwicht dient ook de
overtuiging bij te dragen, dat men zijn straf niet kan ontlopen, alsook het verlies van de
voordelen, die het misdrijf zou hebben meegebracht. Alle strengheid die deze grenzen
overschrijdt, is overbodig en daarom tirannie."

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

Beccaria baseert zijn stelling, dat wrede straffen ineffectief zijn, op zijn observaties: "Hoe
wreder de straffen, des te ongevoeliger wordt het menselijk gemoed. De overdreven
wreedheid heeft zelfs een contradictoire werking: de delinquent zal een groter risico nemen
om zijn straf te ontlopen. Er zullen meerdere delicten worden gepleegd, om de straf voor n
enkel vergrijp te ontgaan."

Er wordt gewezen op twee andere nadelen, die het gevolg zijn van overdreven wrede straffen:
"In de eerste plaats is het niet eenvoudig, een fundamenteel juiste verhouding te vinden tussen
het begane misdrijf en de verdiende straf. Wanneer het uiterste punt van verzadiging is
bereikt, is het onmogelijk om voor wandaden die ng gevaarlijker zijn, een overeenkomstige
straf ter preventie te ontwikkelen. Het tweede nadeel is, dat de overdreven wreedheid van de
straffen, straffeloosheid met zich brengt. Een te wreed systeem wordt op de lange duur niet
meer toegepast, hetgeen erop neerkomt dat de wet zelf de straffeloosheid in de hand werkt."

2. Klassiek utilisme: Bentham (en Mill)

Centraal in de utilistische theorie, zoals deze is ontwikkeld door Jeremy Bentham, staat de
opvatting van de geluksmaximalisatie: "Whenever we have a choice between alternative
actions or social policies, we must choose the one that has the best overall consequences. The
purpose of the law is the same as morals: that is, to promote general welfare of all citizens.
The freedom of citizens should not be restricted any more than is necessary. Either approve or
disapprove actions that do augment or diminish the happiness of the party in question"

Door John Stuart Mill is het utilisme van Bentham 'verfijnd': Mill maakt een onderscheid in
de gradaties van geluk. Het gaat om kwaliteit. Bentham, daarentegen, hanteert slechts een
optelsom als maatstaf voor geluk. De essentie van het utilisme van Mill verschilt echter niet
van dat van Bentham:
"According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, the ultimate end is an existence exempt as
free as possible from pain- and rich in enjoyments."

Welbekend is de volgende passage uit zijn essay 'On Liberty':

"...the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for
which power can be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others [...] The only part for which he is amenable to society, is that which
concerns others. Over himself, his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."

Uit dit citaat blijkt impliciet, dat preventie de toepassing van straf rechtvaardigt. Daarbij moet
worden opgemerkt, dat Mill niet beoogt om de handelingsvrijheid van de burger, ter
voorkoming van schade aan anderen, in algemene zin te beperken. Een dergelijke inbreuk op
de autonomie van de burger, is slechts gerechtvaardigd, wanneer de overheid optreedt tegen
kinderen en geesteszieken. Deze categorien moeten tegen zichzelf in bescherming worden
genomen.

2.2. Punishment and Deterrence: the aims of punishment

De utilistische rechtvaardiging van straf wordt helder uiteengezet door Bentham in zijn boek
'The Principles of Penal Law'.
Onder paragraaf 2.1(a), 'The Aims of Punishment', presenteert hij de doelen van het strafrecht
als volgt:

"When an act has been committed which is followed, or threatens to be followed, two wishes

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

suggest themselves: first, to obviate the danger of the like mischief in future; secondly, to
compensate the mischief that has been done. The mischief likely to ensue from acts of the like
kind, may arise from either of two sources: the conduct of the party himself who has been the
author of the mischief already done, or the conduct of other persons as may have adequate
motives and sufficient opportunities to do the like."

"Hence the prevention of offences divises itself into two branches:

Particular prevention, which applies to the delinquent himself; and general prevention, which
is applicable to all, without exception."

De volgende passage spitst de karakteristieken van het klassieke utilisme ("pain and pleasure
are sovereign" en "subtracting the magnitude of pleasure and the magnitude of pain") van
Bentham toe op de preventieve functie van het strafrecht:

"Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human action. When a man perceives or supposes
pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted upon in such a manner, to withdraw him from
that act. If the apparent magnitude of that pain be greater than the apparent magnitude of the
pleasure he expects to be the consequence of that act, he will be absolutely prevented from
commiting the mischief."

2.3. The Quantum of Punishment

In de optiek van Bentham is preventie het enige legitieme doel van strafrecht (typisch
utilisme: straf is geen doel, maar een middel). Hoe kan het strafrecht effectief worden
toegepast?

Rule 1. The value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to
outweigh that of the profit of the offence.
If it be, the offence will sure be committed notwithstanding; the whole punishment will be
inefficacious. The strength of the tempation, ceteris paribus, is as the profit of the offence: the
quantum of the punishment must rise must rise with the profit of the offence- therefore, it
must rise with the strength of the temptation

Rule 2. The greater the mischief of the offence, the greater is the expense, which it may be
worth while to be at, in the way of punishment.

Rule 3. Where two offences come in competition, the punishment for the greater offence must
be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.
With this is meant, that a man must be induced to choose always the least mischievous of two
offences.

Rule 4. The punishment should be adjusted in such manner to each particular offence, that for
every part of the mischief there may be a motive to restrain the offender.
Has a man resolved upon a particular offence, he must be induced to do no more mischief
than is necessary for his purpose (applies to our society as well: manslaughter is more than
disproportionate when a delinquent allegedly was in search for his victim's wallet).

Rule 5. The punishment ought in no case to be more than what is necessary to bring it into
conformity with the rules here given.
Whatever mischief is guarded against, the object is to guard against it at as cheap rate as
possible.

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

Rule 6. The quantity actually inflicted on each individual offender may correspond to the
quantity intented for similar offenders in general, the several circumstances influencing
sensibility ought always to be taken into account.
Punishment which is the same in name will not always produce in two persons the same
degree of pain. Hence is why all circumstances influencing the sensibility of the offender
must be taken into account.

The first four rules set out the limits below which punishment ought not to be diminished; the
fifth rule presents the limit above which punishment is ought not to be increased. The sixth
rule is intented for guiding the judge.

John Locke. The second Treatise on Government (1680-1690)

Cited from: Two Treatises on Government, 1680-1690

1. Of the State of Nature

Book II, Chapter 2
To understand political aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all
men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom [..]. A state also of equality,
wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there
being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously
born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be
equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of
them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on
him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.

[..] A state of nature is not yet a state of license: though man in that state have an
uncontrolllable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy
himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare
preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges
every one.

[..] In the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER,
AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.

2. Of the Ends of Political Society and Government

Book II, Chapter 9

Para. 123.
If man in the state of nature be so free as has been said, if he be the absolute lord of his own
person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with his
freedom [..] and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power?

Though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and
constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he. The greater
part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of property he has in this state is
very unsafe. This makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

fears. It is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society for the
mutual preservation of life, liberty and estate- together property.

Hence, since men are equal- a characteristic of the state of nature- and since the state of nature
lacks any governmental body to observe equity of justice, this estate results in great
uncertainty and unsafety.

Para 124.
The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting
themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of
nature there are many things wanting.

First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common
consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all
controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all
rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of
study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their
particular cases.
Para 125.
Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to
determine all differences according to the established law: for every one in that state being
both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and
revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well
as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.

Para 126.
Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when
right, and to give it due execution, They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail,
where they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes
the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.

Para 128.
For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two
powers.
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and others within the
permission of the law of nature: by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of
mankind are one community, make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And were
it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any
other; no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and by
positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.
The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the crimes committed
against that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or
particular politic society, and incorporates into any common-wealth, separate from the
rest of mankind.
Para 129.
The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the preservation of himself, and
the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth
as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the
society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.
Para 130.
Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force,

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

(which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single
authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof
shall require: for being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from
the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection
from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for
himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require; which is not only
necessary, but just, since the other members of the society do the like.

Para 131.
But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive
power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed
of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an
intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no
rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse)
the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend
farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing
against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and
uneasy.

And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound to
govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by
extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by
those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such
laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads
and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public
good of the people.

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

The republican approach: rectification vs. retributivism and utilitarianism

The theory of rectification

The republican approach of penal law shares with utilitarianism its goal-oriented character,
but the former has retributivist features as well. Can the "rectification" theory be positioned
somewhere in between and what are the advantages?

Pettit and Braithwaite seek to find a theory that promotes personal dominion, a concept of
republican liberty. Among some of the topical issues are what procedures should be followed
in prosecution and adjudication and what sentences should be imposed for given offences.
Any initiative taken in one part of the criminal system affects other parts of the system, thus
creating "just deserts".

Retributivists have criticized that on the rectification approach, much like other goal-oriented
or consequentialist theories like utilism/ utilitarianism, "A court is provided with a licence (to
forward-looking and try to optimise results) to neglect the nature of the offence to which the
sentence is meant to be a response."

Two notions of republican liberty

The 19th century notion of liberty was one of being free to enjoy a status constituted by
protection and recognition of the law. This republican idea of liberty has evolved into thinking
that freedom would be compromised by any interference, be it by protective law: as an
isolated individual, one should enjoy perfect freedom [how realistic is this kind of thinking?
In our contemporary world, few people live entirely separated from some sort of community].

Pettit and Braithwaite argue that the ideal of dominion, however, should be understood as
"that non-interference should be enjoyed, not just a matter of contingent luck [ a kind of
thinking reminiscent of Mill, M.Bouter], but in virtue of the protection of the law. Second,
that it be salient to everyone in society, that the non-interference involved is of this resilient or
secure character."

Important to note is that "Someone who enjoys non-interference, but does not do so
resiliently, lives at the mercy of those who might choose to interfere." Pettit and Braithwaite
could not be any more clear. Those who enjoy freedom from any interference by government,
seem perfectly free, until others, similarly free from interference by (penal) laws, disrupt their
liberty.

Crime as a denial of dominion

In republican theory, Pettit and Braithwaite describe crime as "denial of dominion". "Crime
will always involve a negative challenge to the dominion status of the victim and to the
dispensation of dominion as it exists in the community at large. Dominion is a good whose
enjoyment by anyone is highly sensitive to evidence of its enjoyment by others." The authors
point out that the denial of a person's dominion involves both the flouting (nullifying) of his
status as a citizen protected and the destroyal of the victim's dominion.

The elements of rectification: recognition, recompense, reassuration

Thirst, the autors propose certain conditions in order to apply their theory of rectification:
"Given that crime represents a sort of damage to dominion, given that the damage is partly
remediable and given that the task of the system is to promote dominion, the sentencing job of
the courts is to try to rectify the damage caused by crime."

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

The elements of rectification are now presented: "In sentencing the convicted criminal, courts
ought to seek recognition by the offender of the dominion status of the victim, recompense
by the offender for the damage done and reassurance to community of a kind that may undo
the negative impact of crime on their dominion."

Recognition by the offender of the dominion status of its victim alone is not enough:
apologies for the act inflicted are just words. Although Pettit and Braithwaite discuss
rectification in practice, it does not become clear which requirements have to be met.
However, the authors do recognize that perfect rectification is not realistic.

Comparing the republican approach of rectification with utilitarianism

(consequentialism)
To point out some of the traits of utilitarianism that I have noticed while reading Pettit and
Braithwaite:

1. "For something to be criminalised, it must be the sort of challenge that can be

criminalised with profit: it must not be the sort of challenge whose criminalisation is
likely to do more harm than good."

This phrase obviously carries out a trait of utilitarianism: as one would have noticed, it is one
of Bentham's principles as presented in his book "The Principles of Penal Law" (Chapter
"Cases where punishment is unjustified");

2. "Measures will vary with different sorts of offences, depending on the relationship
between offender and victim and depending on the kind of offence. The offender may be
a hardened character in whom it is difficult to render any act of apology or
reconciliation, or any commitment not to offend again, credible."

To quite an extent, offences are to be categorized under retributivism. In applying the

principle of perfect proportionality, talio, offences must be answered alike: "An eye for an
eye". The measure thus depends on the sort of offence, but that is where the comparison
between retributivism and rectification stops at this point. As circumstances are to be taken in
consideration by the court, before imposing any penal measures, the republican/ rectification
theory gets closer to utilitarianism.

3. "In any case, both capital punishment and imprisonment, by the evidence of
criminology, are dubious means of securing the sort of reassurance sought. Because
prisons embitter offenders and introduce them to criminal values and skills, they
provide a false assurance."

As an example of the consequentialist approach, this statement could not be any more
concise. In presenting this utilitarian argument against capital punishment and imprisonment,
Pettit and Braithwaite do not seem to neglect the nature of any offence; rather, they question
whether punishment, in general, will succesfully outweigh crimes committed. The advantage
of the rectification model is that it pays attention to reality.

Similarities and differences between rectification approach and retributivism

Some authors have compared the republican theory with retributivism. Pettit and Braithwaite
themselves list one similarity and three main differences between rectification and

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

retributivism as follows:

One feature in common between republican theory and retributivism, is that they would each
have the courts look backwards to the offence in determining the sentence; they would each
reject the licence-to-optimise approach, where optimising is thought of as a forward-looking
activity. This common point leaves room for three major differences:

1. Retributivist theory cannot go deep in motivating the sort of response which it would
have the courts display. The crime cannot go unpunished and that is the end of the
matter. In the republican approach, there is no quick end of matter: the promotion of
dominion serves as an independent yardstick for the appropriateness of the court's
response.

2. Retributivists look in general for some way of repaying the offence, seeking a penalty
that is proportionate to it. Republican theorists look to what is required by way of
rectifying the offence. The point is not to repay the offence. Whereas the retributivist
concentrates on the offence in abstraction, the republican will look to the harm done to
victims and communities and will consider how best that harm may be put right in the
sentence imposed on the offender.

3. There is a great difference between the predisposition of the retributivist and the
republican when it comes to the question what kind of penalty and what degree of
penalty ought to be imposed. Retributivists generally look for hard treatment and seek
proportionality between the offence and punishment in how hard this treatment is
delivered. "Punishment consistis in hard treatment, in a manner that conveys
disapproval of the actor for his conduct".

Republicans acknowledge that the matter of what rectification requires, is dependent of the
case. They recognize that in many cases what is sufficient for rectification may fall well
below what is required on the account of retributivist metric of punishment.

Conclusion
From this, I draw the conclusion that the republican approach can be positioned between the
classic utilitarianism and retributivism approaches of penal law. It shares with utilism the
features of consequentialism; to some extent, the republican approach is forward-looking, in
that it takes the reality of capital punishment into consideration. Some of the arguments used
are even derived from Bentham' utilitarian principles.

With retributivists, the republicans have in common the feature of a backward-looking

approach, rejecting the licence-to-optimise approach that some authors have "convicted" Pettit
and Braithwaite of.

The advantage of the republican model is that it seeks to provide the courts with a rather non-
biased, independent yardstick in considering which punishment to impose on an offender;
moreover, it does not hold one from being aware of all circumstances involved.

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

Democratietheorien

Overzicht
1. Kelsen: partijenstaat;
2. Schumpeter: elitisme;
3. Dahl: pluralisme;
4. Ely: representatieve democratie volgens Madison's checks and balances;
5. Overeenkomsten en verschillen Ely en Dworkin;
6. Dworkin: constitutionele democratie

1. Kelsen (1920): partijenstaat

Typerend voor het relativisme van Kelsen is het onderscheid tussen politieke ideologie en
realiteit. Er bestaat in een democratie niet zoiets als de absolute waarheid; de autocratie wordt
daarentegen gekenmerkt door de claim over de absolute waarheid te beschikken.

Sommige auteurs menen in de theorie van Kelsen een contradictie te bespeuren: "een absolute
waarheid bestaat niet, dus de meerderheid dient te beslissen." Dit is een te ongenuanceerde
lezing van Kelsen. Mertens komt met een goede samenvatting van de gedachte van Kelsen:
"Je bent democraat als je bereid bent te aanvaarden dat de waarheid relatief is. Dat impliceert
de bereidheid om de mening van de ander te aanvaarden als rechtsregel, wanneer die mening
op democratische wijze een meerderheid achter zich heeft verzameld." (Mertens, 2012)

In Kelsens opvatting is de democratie een partijenstaat, gebaseerd op vrijheid. Dat beeld komt
overeen met de tijdgeest (1920): het ontstaan van politieke partijen kon niet langer worden
genegeerd door de toentertijd bestaande instituties. Het is duidelijk dat Kelsen de
integratiefunctie van de politieke partij als een positieve factor beschouwt voor het
ontwikkelen van een "gemeenschapswil". In het bestaande model is de volkswil niet meer dan
een compromis tussen de versnipperde belangen van individuen. De politieke partij kan
bovendien zelfs worden gezien als de aanzet om een daadwerkelijk "volk" te doen ontstaan:

"De onderverdeling van het volk in politieke partijen betekent in feite dat: de organisatorische
voorwaarde voor het tot stand komen van dergelijke compromissen, dat de mogelijkheid
daarvoor geschapen wordt, dat de gemeenschapswil zich beweegt in de richting van een in het
midden gelegen lijn. Juist omdat de democratie als partijenstaat de gemeenschapswil alleen
als resultante van de partij-willen wil laten ontstaan, kan zij afzien van de fictie van een boven
de partijen staande 'organische' algemene wil. De democratische ontwikkeling laat de massa
van individuen tot (constitutioneel verankerde) politieke partijen integreren en ontketent
daarmee sociale entiteiten die men als volk kan aanduiden."

Waarom is de parlementaire democratie niet voldoende om "democratisch" te heten? Omdat,

volgens Kelsen, de politieke vrijheid tot niet meer dan een stemrecht verwordt. De natuurlijke
vrijheid wordt ingeperkt tot politieke zelfbeschikking op basis van meerderheidsbesluiten, het
idele begrip van volk wordt gereduceerd tot diegenen die stemrecht hebben en hun stem ook
uitbrengen. Op die wijze wordt de sociale werkelijkheid die de democratie wordt genoemd,
niet daadwerkelijk gecreerd.

2. Schumpeter (1942): elitisme

Schumpeter richt zich tegen de klassieke SCT: er bestaat niet zoiets als de "volont gnrale"
of een gemeenschappelijke wil van de bevolking. Aangezien de besluitvorming door het volk
niet gericht is op het gemeenschappelijk belang, leidt de regering door het volk tot

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

onacceptabele uitkomsten.

In de opvatting van Schumpeter is democratie daadwerkelijk een concurrentiestrijd tussen

politieke elites, om de stem van het volk en daarmee een strijd om de macht.

3. Dahl (1956): pluralisme

De kritiek van Dahl op de procedures richt zich in eerste instantie op het Madisoniaanse
systeem van checks and balances. Het Madisoniaanse systeem van checks and balances
beoogt de democratie te bewaken tegen de "tirannie der meerderheid". Vanuit theoretisch
perspectief is het volgens Dahl niet duidelijk, waarom een meerderheid noodzakelijkerwijs
leidt tot tirannie. Vanuit het empirische perspectief kan niet worden verklaard, waarom het
model sterk geconcentreerd is rond instituties en niet ook rond sociale en democratische
aspecten.

Een ander punt van kritiek is dat de bescherming tegen de tirannie der meerderheid, nu juist
resulteert in de tirannie van de minderheid. Het populistisch model, waarin democratie wordt
beschouwd als de integratie van politieke gelijkheid, volkssoevereiniteit en regering door de
meerderheid, volstaat niet, omdat het zelden zo is dat de meerderheid regeert. De conclusie
van Dahl is dan ook, dat democratie in feite "regering door een minderheid" en "regering door
minderheden" is.

4. Ely: representatieve democratie, volgens Madison checks and balances

Ely neemt het bestaande Madisoniaanse systeem van checks and balances als uitgangspunt.
De procedure dient de representatieve democratie te bewaken. Daarbij moeten de visies en
belangen van alle betrokkenen worden meegewogen. De taak van de rechter is om de
grondrechten te beschermen, maar wel in beperkte mate: zo wordt de uitkomst van de
politieke besluitvorming niet materieel getoetst; slechts de grondrechten die onontbeerlijk zijn
voor de representatieve democratie, dienen te worden beschermd. Het door Ely als
fundamenteel beschouwde gelijkheidsbeginsel, betekent in de praktijk vooral formele
gelijkheid. De kritiek op Ely luidt dan ook, dat materile gelijkheid met zijn theorie niet zal
worden bereikt.

5. Overeenkomsten en verschillen Ely en Dworkin

Zowel Ely als Dworkin neemt de bestaande constituties (Madisonian checks and balances) tot
uitgangspunt van de door hen ontwikkelde democratietheorien; een andere belangrijke
overeenkomst tussen beide auteurs, is dat de rechter de grondrechten die van belang zijn voor
het functioneren van de democratie en de kwaliteit van het politieke proces, dient te
beschermen.

Dworkin heeft in het bijzonder de procedurele aard van Ely's visie bekritiseerd: "Whether the
value of the political opportunities a system provides is equal, will depend on whether the
legislation likely at the end of the procedure treats everyone as equals".

Het gelijkheidsbeginsel, "equal concern and respect", aldus Dworkin, heeft betrekking op de
materile uitkomst van het politieke proces (output); voor de input dient een andere maatstaf
te worden ontwikkeld. In de visie van Dworkin heeft de Supreme Court bovendien de taak om
lle grondrechten te beschermen, niet slechts de grondrechten die wezenlijk zijn voor het
waarborgen van de integriteit van democratische procedures.

6. Dworkin: constitutionele democratie

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/

Dworkin verwerpt de meerderheidslezing, de "majoritarian premise", die hij als volgt
omschrijft:

"The majoritarian premise insists that politcal procedures should be designed so, that the
decision that is reached, is the decision that a majority or plurality of citizens would favor, if it
had adequate information and enough time for reflection."

"People who assume that the majoritarian premise is the ultimate definition of democracy,
accept that on some occasions the majority should not govern. Though, it does insist that,
even if some derogation from majoritarian government is justified, something morally
regrettable has happened. The premise supposes, in other words, that it is always unfair when
a political majority is not allowed to have its way."

Vervolgens wordt de constitutionele opvatting van democratie voorgesteld:

"The constitutional conception of democracy takes the defining aim of democracy to be a

different one: that collective decisions be made by political institutions, whose structure,
composition and practices treat all members of the community, as individuals, with equal
concern and respect."

Uit de laatste zin, "Political institutions should treat individuals with equal concern and
respect", wordt het volgende afgeleid:
a. equal concern relates to "human beings are capable of suffering and frustration";
b. equal respect relates to "human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent
conceptions of how their lives should be lived".
c. equal concern and respect does not imply equal treatment; rather, it implies treatment as an
equal.

Uit deze kenschets van de constitutionele opvatting van democratie, "equal respect and
concern", vloeien de volgende criteria voort:
1. gelijke stem;
2. besluitvorming op basis van het meerderheidsprincipe (N.B. anders dan "majoritarian
premise"! Meerderheidsbeginsel wordt hier gelezen als n van de onderdelen van de
democratie (naast mensenrechten); eveneens gebaseerd op gelijkheidsbeginsel van gelijke
zorg en respect);
3. meerderheidsbeginsel aangevuld met bescherming van minderheden door grondrechten
(corrigerende factor op meerheidsprincipe);
4. bescherming van de grondrechten door Supreme Court.

Literatuur
Burg, W. van der, Het democratisch perspectief (1991);
Dworkin, The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise;
Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (1929)
Mertens, Eenieder heeft recht op deelname aan het bestuur (2012).

By Mercedes Bouter http://rechtenadvies.blogspot.nl/