Compaero,Correligionario,Comprovinciano

Initialnotesonthenationalizationoflegislativecollaboration



ErnestoCalvo MarceloLeiras
UniversityofMaryland UniversidaddeSanAndres
ecalvo@gvpt.umd.edu mleiras@udesa.edu.ar



Version0.1
VeryRoughDraft


Abstract: This paper analyzes the nationalization of collaborative policy efforts
among lawmakers. In doing so, we distinguish the nationalization of electoral
competition and the nationalization of legislators policy intent. To measure the
nationalization of legislative efforts, we assess the degree to which legislators
collaboratewithmembersoftheirdistrictdelegationsandcompareittothelevelof
intrapartyandinterpartycollaborationwithmembersfromotherdistricts.Though
conceptually independent, electoral and legislative nationalization are theoretically
related. Declining electoral nationalization may lead representatives to draft
territorially targeted legislation and thus to cooperate more frequently with their
peerselectedinthesamedistrict.Weinterpretthedensityofcosponsorhipnetworks
asindicativeoflegislativecooperation.Exponentialrandomgraphmodelsallowusto
identify and compare the determinants of this density. A study of 50,825 legislative
initiatives proposed to the Argentine Congress in the period 19842007 provides
support for our hypothesis: provincial comembership has become a stronger
predictorofcosponsorhipaselectoralnationalizationdeclined.


Preparedtobepresentedatthe106 MeetingoftheAmericanPoliticalScience
th

Association,WashingtonDC,September25,2010

Introduction

Theanalysisofpartysystemnationalization,usuallyconceivedasadimension

of wider modernization processes, motivated several classical studies in political

sciencesuchasBendix(1977).Theresurfacingofnationalistpoliticalmovementsthat

followed the erosion communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the third wave of

democratization, spurred interest in the subjective dimension of this phenomenon

and inspired a large literature in which Andersons (1983), Gellners (1983) and

Smiths (1995) contributions stand out. In the more strictly political realm,

nationalization was the main subject of the protracted and fertile partisan

realignment debate in the US (elegantly discussed in Mayhew 2000). More recently,

the desire to produce a more complete theoretical specification of the effect of

majoritarian electoral rules on party system fragmentation, motivated a series of

studiesonthedeterminantsandempiricalmanifestationsofpartyandpartysystem

nationalization(ChhibberandKollman1998;Cox1999;JonesandMainwaring2003;

Caramani2004;ChhibberandKollman2004;Leiras2006;AlemnandKellam2008;

Morgenstern,Swindleetal.2009;Rodden2010).

While the presumption of a national orientation of the parties policymaking

intent was an integral component of most prior research (Stepan 2004), empirical

analyses of nationalization have singlemindedly focused on the electoral

nationalization of parties and party systems. Empirically, prior research has

concentrated on measuring the degree of nationalization as reflected by common

sociodemographic features of voters across regions or exploring the relative

uniformityofdistrictlevelvotes.Considerablelessattention,consequently,hasbeen

given to the level of nationalization of the legislative goals of a party or the level of

nationalization of lawmakers collaborative networks. In this paper we explicitly

address this gap in the literature, and concentrate on exploring party system

nationalizationasreflectedbythebehavioroflawmakersinCongress.

In measuring the nationalization of collaborative policy efforts among

lawmakers, we concentrate on the legislative networks that are responsible for the

drafting of initiatives.We focus on the decision to coauthor or cosponsor bills as an

indicatorofthecoordinationeffortslegislatorsmakewhileinoffice(Crisp,Kanthaket

al.2004;Alemn2009).Toexplorethenationalorientationof legislativeefforts,we

consider the degree to which legislators collaborate with like members of their

provincialdelegationasitcomparestoothercollaborativestrategieswithmembersof

their own party at large or members of other parties. Moving beyond the

nationalization of the electorates preferences and the nationalization of a partys

vote, consequently, we delve into the determinants of the nationalization of

lawmakingcoordinationefforts.

To understand legislative nationalization, we build upon a bourgeoning

literaturethatinthelastfewyearshassoughttounderstandcosponsorshipnetworks

as expressions of public joint stances of policy preferences (Fowler 2006; Alemn

2009; Cranmer and Desmarais 2009; Alemn and Calvo 2010; Tam Cho and Fowler

2010). We consider cosponsorship networks as reflective of the policy intent of

lawmakers, whom connect with peers that share similar interests in policy areas or

jurisdictions(AlemnandCalvo2010);andmeasurethenationalizationoflegislators

policy intent as a function of the probability of coauthoring or cosponsoring

legislationinCongress.Tomeasuretheleveloflegislativenationalization,weestimate

exponential random graph models (ERGM) of legislative collaboration over twenty

fiveyearsofcongressionalpoliticsinArgentina,anddistinguishnationalanddistrict

levelpartisaneffects.

Results show that recent denationalization in party competition, and among

voters in Argentina, has been accompanied by an increase in district level

collaboration in Congress. We find that partisan collaboration within districts

outpaced collaboration across districts for all major parties in Argentina. Since

democratizationin1983,theeffectofcomembershipinprovincialpartydelegations

hasbecomeakeydeterminantoflegislativecollaboration.Resultsprovideawindow

into the process of legislative denationalization, in concert with the increased

territorialization of party politics that has been well documented in the Argentine

literature (Levitsky 2003; Calvo and Escolar 2005; Gibson and SurezCao 2007;

Leiras2007;Gervasoni2010).

NationalizedElectoralCompetitionandLegislativeCollaboration

What is a nationalized political party? So far, the literature offers two broad

setsofanswerstothisquestion.Thefirstonefocusesontherelativehomogeneityof

votersbehavioracrossdistrictsandovertime.Accordingtothesetheories,likevoters

behave alike, with nationalized electorates supporting or abandoning parties in

concert.Thusanationalizedpartyisonethatineverydistrictcaterstoandreceives

votes from constituencies that share similar socioeconomic traits and political

preferences. A nationalized electorate, consequently, is one that swings in similar

direction and magnitude across districts and between elections (Kawato 1987;

Mayhew2000;MorgensternandSwindle2005;AlemnandKellam2008).

Asecondresearchtraditionstresseshomogeneityofpartiesvotesharesacross

districts. Significantly, this result is possible even if the sociodemographic

characteristics of voters differ. Party nationalization, it is argued, could result from

parties that either represent homogeneous electorates or from parties that offer

differentmenusofpoliciestodissimilardistrictlevelvoterstomaintainorexpandthe

voteshareofitscandidates.Nationalizedparties,thusdefined,gatherroughlysimilar

votesharesacrossdistrictswhileofferingdissimilarpoliciestotheirlocalsupporters

(JonesandMainwaring2003;ChhibberandKollman2004).

Both approaches seek to capture nationalization of the party system in the

electoral arena resulting from a nationalized constituency or nationalized electoral

performances,butthelegislativeimplicationsofeachlineofresearchdiffer.Ineffect,

while a nationalized electorate should be expected to strengthen the national

orientation of the legislators activities and the nationalization of its collaborative

efforts with fellow lawmakers; comparable electoral performance across

heterogeneousdistrictsrequireslegislatorstocatertheirpoliciestodifferenttypesof

votersacross districtsand, consequently, todenationalize its collaborativeefforts in

Congress.Becausetheprotectionofthepartylabelremainsaprimeconcernforparty

members (Cox and McCubbins 2005), strategies that maximize vote across

heterogeneousdistrictswouldresultinamodeloflegislativepoliticswerelawmakers

votetogetherbutcoauthorandcosponsorbillswithamorerestrictedgroupoffellow

partymembers.

 These two views of electoral nationalization yield divergent predictions of

legislativenationalization.Withhomogeneousconstituencies,lawmakerscollaborate

with fellow partisans regardless of their district origins, as should be the case in

unitary countries with party centered electoral rules. In the case of homogeneous

electoral performance, legislative denationalization is possible and would be

expressed in lawmakers having a higher propensity to collaborate with fellow

membersoftheirowndistrictorregionaldelegations,asweshouldexpectinfederal

politieswithmorecandidatecentricordistrictorientedelectoralrules.1

Notice that electoral nationalization and the nationalization of legislative

collaboration describe dimensions that are both empirically and substantively

distinct.Table1summarizesalternativescenariosthatcombinethesetwodimensions

of party nationalization. The first dimension, electoral nationalization, indicates that

parties electoral performances are homogeneous across districts. The second

dimension, legislative nationalization, describes rates of acrossdistrict collaboration

thatarelowerorequaltowithindistrictcollaboration.

The first row and column describes high electoral and legislative

nationalization, as expected in the standard responsible party model. Under the

responsible party framework, representatives cultivate programmatic party labels

that target sociodemographic categories of voters, irrespective of their territorial

origin. Policy content with clear ideological markers that target nationalized

electorates,inturn,resultsincosponsoringandcoauthoringofbillswithfellowparty

1 A recent paper comparing regional and district level effects on cosponsorship networks shows that

territorial effects are more pronounced in Argentina than in Chile (Alemn and Calvo, 2010). In this
paper we extend prior research to analyze changes in the level of nationalization of cosponsorship
networksovertime.

members irrespective of their district membership. Common policy affinity with

fellow representatives, therefore, should result in party factions that are organized

aroundprogrammaticpolicyagendasofanationalscope.Theselegislativeproposals

maybeconsistentwiththedeliveryofexcludableornonexcludablegoods,butthey

areexpectedtotargetvotersaccordingtofunctionalratherthanterritorialcriteria.

Table1:PartyNationalizationinElectoralandLegislativeArenas
ElectoralNationalization
High Low
NationalizationofParties
UnevenElectoral
ElectoratesandNational
PerformancewithNational
OrientationCollaboration
LegislativeNationalization

OrientationofCollaborative
amongLegislators
High Efforts
(responsibleparty
(segmentedpartymodel)
model)


Nationalizationof
UnevenElectoral
ElectoralPerformance
PerformanceandParochial
withParochialLegislative
Low OrientationofLegislative
Incentives
Incentives
(gainsfromexchange
(spoilsmodel)
model)

Alternatively, a party may effectively compete across districts in which

different policy preferences predominate and, thus, be electorally nationalized but

denationalizedatthelegislativelevel.MembersofCongressareexpectedtodraftbills

thatreflectthepartisandistributionofpreferencesintheirdistricts,withfellowparty

memberselectedinotherdistrictsgainingfewelectoralbenefitsfrompositiontaking

or credit claiming on issues that are of interest among voters of other districts.

Instead, they would be inclined to present targeted legislation and hope to gain

plenarysupportfromtheircopartisanswhentheydoso.Therefore,legislatorswould

exchange votes in committees, support each other on the plenary floor, but would

havelittleinterestincoauthoringorcosponsoringinitiativeswitheachother.

Legislativepartyblocs,consequently,actasacoordinatingapprovaldevicethat

facilitates exchanges between party members across districts, as described by the

gains from exchange model (Weingast 1989; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1994). Policy

initiatives are then marshaled by party leaders charged with the responsibility of

coordinatinglegislativeactivitiesamongpartnerswithdissimilarpolicyinterests.Asa

result, the cosponsoring and coauthoring of bills would be denationalized even as

partymemberscoordinatetheircommitteeandfloorbehavior.

The second column of table 1 presents two scenarios of low electoral

nationalization. The first one, in the top row, represents a case in which

representativesofdifferentdistrictscooperateindraftinglegislationeventhoughthe

party does not perform equally well across districts. This is a common outcome if

partiesfailtoachievenationalrepresentation,duringperiodsofelectoralrealignment,

orinheavilycontestedelectoralenvironments.Inthosecases,whileapartymaycater

to district level groups with similar policy preferences, ideological orientations or

identities; voters partisan attachments and electoral success vary across regions.

Under these circumstances the party faces a choice between targeting strategies: it

may target resources to constituencies in their district of residence or it could

advance a programmatic agenda and allocate policy benefits according to functional

or other social distinctions, regardless of place of residence. The second strategy

shouldbemoreefficientwhenprogrammaticlinkagespredominateoverclientelistic

ones (Kitschelt 2000). As territorial concerns lose relevance, party representatives

wouldbewillingtodraftlegislationwithcopartisanselectedinotherdistricts,with

linkagesthatreflecttheresponsiblepartymodelinterritoriallyheterogeneouspolities.

Given that party constituents are unevenly distributed across districts, the electoral

performanceofthepartyseemsdenationalized.However,legislativebehaviorshows

that representatives are not more likely to cooperate with fellow party members of

theirdistrictthanwiththosethatareelectedinotherdistrictswherethepartyhasan

electoralpresence.Forthisreason,welabelthisscenariothesegmentedpartymodel

ofnationalization.

The last scenario combines low electoral nationalization and parochial

orientation of electoral incentives. Denationalized parties, both in performance and

intent,targetdifferentcategoriesofdistrictlevelvoters.Asinthegainsfromexchange

model, acrossdistrict incentive to collaborate in the drafting and sponsoring of law

initiatives is weak and electoral performance uneven, heavily dependent on the

delivery of private and club goods to voters (e.g. the spoils model of legislative

denationalization).

ElectoraldenationalizationasObservedfromCongress

Electoral and legislative party nationalization describe, we propose, different

butrelatedphenomena.Asthepreviousdiscussionindicates,differentcombinations

amongthesedimensionsareconceivable.However,notallofthesecombinationsare

equally likely. If parties are driven to maximize district level votes, and propose

policiesorientedtowardstheirowndistrict,theymayshelterthemselvesfromnation

wideswings(Gibson2005).Theincreasedrelevanceoflocalmedianvotersthatdiffer

fromtheirnationalcounterpartmayalsoinfluencelegislativebehavior.Therefore,we

expectelectoraldenationalizationtoworkagainstlegislativenationalization.

Gains from exchange, with parties targeting different district level voters, are

difficult to materialize. Coordination difficulties may hinder effective logrolling and,

more importantly, different preference distributions across districts may leadto the

predominance of clientelistic linkages in some regions and, in other regions,

programmaticones.Additionally,whenagendasettingpowersresidewithexecutives,

as they do in Latin American democracies, presidents may exploit the parochial

orientation of legislators, buying the legislative votes of representatives of low

maintenance constituencies (Gibson, Calvo et al. 2004) without compromising the

integrity of their policy programs (Cox and Morgenstern 2002). This would bias the

distributionofexcludablegoodstosomeregionsandthusconspireagainsttheability

of the party to simultaneously satisfy the particularistic needs of different districts.

Under these circumstances we expect to observe that a decline in electoral

nationalizationleadstoareductioninlegislativenationalization.

As several works document (Calvo and Escolar 2005; Gibson and SurezCao

2007;Leiras2007),theArgentinepartysystemhasrecentlyexperiencedaprocessof

denationalization at the electoral level. Varying distributions of policy preferences

acrossdistricts(CalvoandMurillo2004)andbiasedallocationofresourcesfromthe

national government (Gibson 1997) have been documented to characterize the

ArgentineelectoralarenaandthestrategiesofArgentinegovernments.Ananalysisof

10

thiscasemaythenbesuitabletotestourhypothesisandexplorethewiderpolitical

implicationsofthiselectoralphenomenon.

Our approach considers the collaborative efforts of lawmakers and seeks to

distinguish national or district level content of Congressional networks.2 As already

stated, we consider legislative nationalization to be separate from electoral

nationalization, and consider that different institutional and electoral mechanisms

drive political systems to nationalize in each domain. Our view highlights these

different mechanisms, understanding that effective political parties must solve

collectiveactionproblemsandreducetransactioncostsamongitsmembers.Because

electoral and legislative coordination pose different challenges to politicians, we

expect nationalized legislative parties and nationalized electoral parties to require

different types of political investment. Hence, a nationalized legislative party is one

that promotes cooperation among legislators regardless of the constituencies they

represent.

LegislativeNetworksandtheNationalizationofthePoliticalSystem

Ouranalysisofthelegislativecollaboration,tomeasurelegislativenationalization,

uses cosponsorship data from the democratic period initiated in Argentina in 1983.

We include 50,825 legislative initiatives proposed by 1,047 House members to the

ArgentineCongressintheperiod19842007.Themeannumberofcosponsorsis4.63

withamedianof4.AsshowninTable1,over91%oflegislativeinitiativeshavefewer

than9cosponsors.

2JuanPabloMicozzi(2010)analyzesthelocalornationalorientationoflegislatorsinArgentinabut,

ratherthanmeasurelawmakingcollaborationheinsteadfocusesonpolicytargets.

11

 Table 2: Number of Cosponsors per Bill, Argentine

House, 1984-2007
Numberof
Frequency Percent Cummulative
Cosponsors
2 14,658 28.82 28.82
3 9,482 18.65 47.47
4 6,969 13.7 61.18
5 5,414 10.65 71.82
6 3,858 7.59 79.41
7 2,751 5.41 84.82
8 2,033 4 88.82
9 1,476 2.9 91.72
10 1,139 2.24 93.96
11 846 1.66 95.62
12 621 1.22 96.84
13 511 1 97.85
14 460 0.9 98.75
>15 632 1.23 99.83
Total 50,852 100 100
Note: Data from the Secretaria de Informacin
Paralmentaria, Argentine Congress.

CosponsorshipinformationcanbeusedtographpolicynetworksinCongressand

measure its properties (Fowler 2006; Alemn and Saiegh 2007; Cranmer and

Desmarais 2009). The average density of Argentinas cosponsorship networks e.g.

theproportionofactualtiesoverallpossibletieswas0.296duringthisperiod;witha

minimumof0.14duringthefirstCongressafterdemocratizationandamaximumof

0.4duringthe19971999Congress.

Interestingly, results show a constant increase in the density of legislative

networksfrom1984until2001,accompanyingasignificantincreaseinthenumberof

yearlybillsproposedtoCongress,andfollowedbyadeclinesincethe2001political

12

crisis(Figure2).Thedeclineoflegislativecollaborationafter2003isconsistentwith

changesinlegislativebehaviorbythenewPeronistadministrationofNestorKirchner,

characterizedbyamorecentralizedandconfrontationallegislativeblocpolicyinan

attempt to secure control of the party and accompanied by significant legislative

fragmentationamongoppositionparties.

Figure 2: Density of the Cosponsorship Networks in the Argentine

Congress from Democratization in 1983 until the end of Nestor
Kirchners administration in 2007.

Cosponsorship Network Density, 1984-2007

0.6
0.45
Density

0.3
0.15

1983-1985

1985-1987

1987-1989

1989-1991

1991-1993

1993-1995

1995-1997

1997-1999

1999-2001

2001-2003

2003-2005

2005-2007
0

Congressional Period

InordertomeasurethenationalizationofcollaborativenetworksintheArgentine

Congress, we take advantage of recent statistical advances to model complex

13

relational data. We assess the determinants of collaborative networks using

exponentialrandomgraphmodels(ERGM),whichallowsustotestforourvariablesof

interest without the unrealistic independence assumption of earlier statistical

approaches, which failed to account for local clustering among actors (Handcock,

Hunteretal.2003;Robins,Pattisonetal.2007).

The dependent variable of our analyses is the observed ties or relations (edges)

betweeneachpairofactorsorlegislators(nodes).3Foreachdistinctpairofmembersi

andj,therandomvariableyijtakesthevalueof1ifthereisatieand0otherwise.The

probabilityofobservingatieis:

,
exp

whereXisamatrixofattributesassociatedwiththeactors(nodes)orties(edges)in

thenetwork; , isavectorofnetworkstatistics, isavectorofcoefficients,and

is a normalizing constant.4 Unlike other types of relational data such as

friendshipor group membership, cosponsorship networks provide information both

about the existence of a relationship and the relative frequency of such relationship

(AlemnandCalvo2010).Thatis,cosponsorshipdataprovidesinformationaboutthe

existence and frequency of ties between each pair of legislators. Because the counts

observed in cosponsorship data are meaningful, it is important to take advantage of

suchdataratherthanjustassumeawaydifferencesbyreducingallcountstoasingle

value expressing a tie. Following Aleman and Calvo (2010), therefore, we take

3ThissummaryofERGMmodelingisbasedonRobinsetal.(2007)andHandcocketal.(2008)

4SeeGoodreauetal.(2008,pp.78).

14

advantage of this extrainformation by augmenting the original agreement matrix

using random network draws and bootstrapping all ERGM estimates, with

probabilitiesdrawnfromtheoriginaldata.5

Consequently,thedependentvariableinouranalysisisthevaluedcosponsorship

network,reportingcountsoftiesbetweeneachpairoflegislators,foreachoftwelve

differentCongressesbetween1984and2007.

Weincludeanumberofedgeandnodecovariates,aspredictorsofcosponsorship

in the Argentine Congress, such as party membership, government/opposition

membership, district membership, and committee membership. An interaction term

ofthedistrictandpartyvariablesallowsustoassesswithinandacrossdistrictparty

collaboration.ThepartyvariableidentifieslegislatorsasmembersofthePeronistPJ,

theUCR,andotherthirdparties.

Results

ResultsarepresentedinTable3,whichreportsbootsprappedcoefficientsforeach

ofthetwelveCongressesafterdemocratization,inaccordancetothemodeldescribed

before. Results consistently show party and provincial memberships as important

determinantsoflegislativecollaboration.

Inparticular,PeronistcomembershipincreasescollaborationinallCongressional

periodsbutone,19841985,whenamajorsplitbetweentheoldpartyguardandthe

Renovadoresledtoasharpalignmentamongelites.Similarly,UCRcomembership

increases collaboration among lawmakers in all periods but one, 19901991, the

5ForreferencesseeCalvoandAleman(2010).

15

aftermathofthehyperinflationarycrisisthatledtotheresignationofthenPresident

RaulR.Alfonsn.Anintenselypartisanperiodalsoseemstoemergeintheaftermathof

the2001crisis,withsharedmembershipinthePJandtheUCRleadingtosignificantly

moreintensecollaboration.

16

Table 3: Exponential Random Graph Models, Argentine Cosponsorship Networks, 1984-2007

Congress 19841985 19861987 19881989 19901991 19921993 19941995 19961997 19981999 20002001 20022003 20042005 20062007

-1.46*** -1.39*** -1.93*** -2.32*** -2.4*** -2.43*** -2.38*** -2.98*** -2.84*** -2.56*** -2.41*** -2.6***
Edges
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.41*** 0 0.23*** 0.16** 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.61*** 0.46*** 0.42*** 0.55*** 0.42***
SharedProvince
(0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
SharedPartyand 0.24** 0.16* 0.16* 0.44*** 0.24** 0.29*** 0.16 0.29** 0.09 0.13 0.26** 0.32***
Province (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
-0.23*** 0.07** 0.31*** 0.39*** 0.46*** 0.58*** 0.44*** 0.68*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.38*** 0.47***
PJ
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.51*** 0.33*** 0.17*** 0.07 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.62*** 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.69*** 0.61*** 0.66***
UCR
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
0.25 0.33** -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.22 0.33** 0.24* 0.42*** 0.27** 0.21* 0.25**
Others
(0.26) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Contiguos -0.42*** -0.19*** 0.06 -0.03 -0.11 0.1 0.56 -0.35*** 0.8*** 0.54 0.04 0.13
Province (0.09) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.41) (0.08) (0.30) (0.59) (0.05) (0.14)
-0.11** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.17*** 0.02 -0.16*** -0.38*** 0.01 -0.07 -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.17***
SharedCommittee
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
-0.07*** 0.06*** 0.11*** -0.09*** -0.04 -0.03 0.14*** -0.07** -0.16*** -0.06** -0.02
Freshman
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)

N 31166.4257 38486.3509 34897.234 24113.9923 23475.7278 22142.6045 23705.4178 18209.3955 18918.6174 20781.2907 22002.102 20571.7775
AIC 31241.5376 38563.442 34975.0225 24190.1551 23552.5586 22218.6991 23782.117 18285.7613 18995.5788 20857.8573 22078.3327 20647.8721
BIC 15574.213 19234.175 17439.617 12047.996 11728.864 11062.302 11843.709 9095.6978 9450.3087 10381.645 10992.051 10276.889

17

 Shared provincial membership is an equally strong predictor of collaboration

amonglawmakers,withsubstantivelyandstatisticallysignificantcoefficientsinallbut

oneperiod,19861987.

Figure 2: Evolution of Cosponsorship Networks in Argentina, 1984-2007

Province Provincial Party Delegations

1.5
1

Shared Province and Party Block, Model 4

1
Shared Province, Model 5

0
-1

1983-1985

1985-1987

1987-1989

1989-1991

1991-1993

1993-1995

1995-1997

1997-1999

1999-2001

2001-2003

2003-2005

2005-2007
-1.5
-1

1983-1985

1985-1987

1987-1989

1989-1991

1991-1993

1993-1995

1995-1997

1997-1999

1999-2001

2001-2003

2003-2005

2005-2007

Congressional Period Congressional Period

PJ Bloc Membership UCR Bloc Membership
1

1
Shared UCR Trait, Model 5
Shared PJ Trait, Model 5

0
-1

-1
1983-1985

1985-1987

1987-1989

1989-1991

1991-1993

1993-1995

1995-1997

1997-1999

1999-2001

2001-2003

2003-2005

2005-2007

1983-1985

1985-1987

1987-1989

1989-1991

1991-1993

1993-1995

1995-1997

1997-1999

1999-2001

2001-2003

2003-2005

2005-2007

Congressional Period Congressional Period

Particularlynoteworthyistheincreasingimportanceofprovincialcomembership

as a determinant of collaboration since 1998. Results strongly support extensive

18

narrative accounts of the consistent territorialization of party politics since the

beginningofCarlosS.Menemssecondadministration(19951999).

Tobettervisualizeandcomparetheresults,weplotourbootstrappedcoefficients

inFigures3,displayingtheimportanceofsharedprovincialmembership(upperleft),

the importance of shared province and party (upper right), and the importance of

sharedmembershipinthePeronistPJ(lowerleft)ortheUCR(lowerright).

InFigure4weestimatetheeffectofsharedmembershiponthe PeronistorUCR

provincialdelegation.Theimpactofjointpartisanandprovincialeffectsisincreasing

formostofthelasttwentyfiveyears,showingshareddistrictlevelpartymembership

asthelocusoflegislativeactivity.

Figure 4: Co-membership in the PJ and the UCR as a determinant of legislative

Collaboration, 1984-2007
PJ Provincial Delegations UCR Provincial Delegations
1.5

1.5
Shared Province and Party Block, Model 5

Shared Province and Party Block, Model 5

1

1
0

0
-1

-1
1983-1985

1985-1987

1987-1989

1989-1991

1991-1993

1993-1995

1995-1997

1997-1999

1999-2001

2001-2003

2003-2005

2005-2007

1983-1985

1985-1987

1987-1989

1989-1991

1991-1993

1993-1995

1995-1997

1997-1999

1999-2001

2001-2003

2003-2005

2005-2007
-1.5

-1.5

Congressional Period Congressional Period

Toanalyzetheeffectofmembershipinthedifferentprovinces,wealsoranan

unrestrictedmodelwithseparateestimatesbyprovince.Results,presentedinFigures

19

5 and 6, show that the increase in withindistrict collaboration is verified in most

provinces,thoughnotinallofthem.Inallfiveofthelargestprovinces(BuenosAires,

CABA, Cordoba, Santa Fe, and Mendoza) within district collaboration has increased

constantly over time since 1984. The relative smaller delegations of a majority of

provinces,whichelectonly5and7members,havewiderconfidenceintervalsanda

displayamoreerraticcollaborationpattern.

20

Increase in Bill Cosponsorship when Legislator is from the same Province

-2 0 2 4 6 -2 0 2 4 6 -2 0 2 4 6 -2 0 2 4 6
1983-1985
1985-1987
1987-1989
1989-1991

1991-1993
1993-1995
1995-1997

JUJUY
CHACO

1997-1999
1999-2001

CORRIENTES
BUENOS AIRES

2001-2003
2003-2005
2005-2007

1983-1985
1985-1987
1987-1989
1989-1991
1991-1993
1993-1995
1995-1997
CHUBUT

1997-1999

LA PAMPA
ENTRE RIOS

1999-2001
CAP FEDERAL

2001-2003
Membership by Congressional Year, Selected Provinces

2003-2005
2005-2007

1983-1985
1985-1987
1987-1989
1989-1991
1991-1993
1993-1995
1995-1997
1997-1999
LA RIOJA
FORMOSA
CORDOBA

1999-2001
CATAMARCA

2001-2003
2003-2005
2005-2007
Figure 5: Cosponsorship Networks in Argentina, 1984-2007, Shared District

21



Increase in Bill Cosponsorship when Legislator is from the same Province

-2 0 2 4 6 -2 0 2 4 6 -2 0 2 4 6 -2 0 2 4 6
1983-1985
1985-1987
1987-1989
1989-1991

1991-1993
1993-1995
1995-1997
1997-1999
MENDOZA

SANTA FE
SAN JUAN
RIO NEGRO

1999-2001
2001-2003
2003-2005
2005-2007
Congressional Year, Selected Provinces

1983-1985
1985-1987
1987-1989
1989-1991
1991-1993
1993-1995
1995-1997
1997-1999
SAN LUIS
MISIONES

1999-2001

T DEL FUEGO
S DEL ESTERO

2001-2003
2003-2005
2005-2007

1983-1985
1985-1987
1987-1989
1989-1991
1991-1993
1993-1995
1995-1997
SALTA

1997-1999
NEUQUEN

TUCUMAN

1999-2001
SANTA CRUZ

2001-2003
2003-2005
2005-2007
Figure 6: Cosponsorship Networks in Argentina, 1984-2007, Shared District by

22

ConcludingRemarks

Untilrecently,theterritorialrootsofpoliticalrepresentationhavebeenablind

spot of contemporary democratic theory. Striving to fill this conceptual gap,

comparative studies of party nationalization have focused on the geographical

variation of political preferences and behavior. Yet, the conceptions they advance

yield different predictions about the translation of this variation into legislative

outcomes. Homogeneity of electoral support across districts could occur, we argue,

because parties represent constituencies with similar preferences but also because

theysimultaneouslysatisfyconstituencieswithdifferentviewsandneeds.Thesame

goal, electoral nationalization, can be achieved through different legislative

organizations:aresponsiblepartywithfrequentcrossdistrictcollaboration,ifdistrict

levelpreferencesaresimilar;oraneffectivevotetradingmachine,withlessfrequent

collaboration, if they are different. The important substantive point to stress is that

electoral nationalization does not always indicate nationalization of policy intent.

Electoral nationalization may result from the effective combination of several

territorially targeted initiatives. In other words, a complete portrayal of

nationalization as a political phenomenon needs to incorporate a heretofore

overlookeddimension:legislativenationalization.

Electoral and legislative nationalization are conceptually independent. They

are also theoretically related. Logrolling imposes high costs on political transactions

and a heavy burden on fiscal resources. Therefore, gains from trade models may be

difficult to sustain. Geographically circumscribed targeting strategies may be more

efficient when electoral performance is uneven across districts and clientelistic

23

linkages predominate. Under these circumstances, we expect reductions in electoral

nationalization to strengthen provincial cosponsorhip networks and thus lead to a

reductioninlegislativenationalization.

Resultsofourstudyoflegislativecollaborationover12congressionalperiods

in Argentina are largely consistent with this hypothesis. Shared provincial

membership has been a strong predictor of legislative collaboration in almost all

periods, but is has become more significant since 1998, when according to recent

studies the Argentine party system started to show the first signs of political

territorialization.Moresignificantly,thejointimpactofpartyandprovincialeffectson

legislative collaboration has consistently increased as electoral nationalization

declined.

Our study also identifies significant variation across parties, provinces and

periods. This suggests that other factors, whose identification demands further

theoreticalwork,filtertheinfluenceofelectoraltrendsonthestructureoflegislative

collaboration.

24


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