#1 COSCA VS, HON LUCIO PALAYPAYAN

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca(Stenographer I), Edmundo B. Peralta(Interpreter I), Ramon C. Sambo(Clerk

II), and Apollo Villamora(Process Server) of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding
Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.

In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein
respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4)
non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6)
requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1 Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court
respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed by
complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial
Court, Naga City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was however transferred to
First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason
that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4

The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as
culled from the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents.

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage (without marriage license) of 7 couples respondent judge did
not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being
that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was
usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the
local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the
attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved,
but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.

Respondent judge appointed respondent Boroy as Clerk II for registry of marriage which was the duty
of the herein complainant Sambo. Respondent Boroy failed to follow up the submission of marriage
contract of the contracting parties which she blames to complainant Sambo who she had instructed to
follow up the licenses.

Respondent judge contends that one of the marriages was exempted for a marriage for the couple had
been living for more than 5 years under Art.34 of F.C. but still there is a failure to submit the necessary
requirements to the civil registrar by Sambo. The other five marriages alluded to in the administrative
complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and
they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the
custody of complainant Sambo.

2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages solemnized
and the number of documents notarized. It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he
solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those
marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six
(6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen
(113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of
only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for
the difference.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge disposed his function as a solemnizing officer in accordance
with the law

Held: Under the Art 22. Of F.C. marriage certificate must be filled up by the contracting parties and must
be authenticated by the by the solemnizing officer. In the case at bar the respondent judge did not sign
the marriage certificate due to absence of marriage license. The marriage is void ab initio due to absence
of marriage license of all the contracting parties (art.4 of F.C. in accordance with art. 2). One of the
marriages which contends that it exempted for a marriage license under art. 34 cannot qualify for one of
the contracting parties is only 18 years old and if they lived together as husband and wife for 5 years it is
impossible for the court to believe in such testimony where they started cohabitation when one couple is
only 13 years old. Under art. 23 it is the duty of the solemnizing officer and not the clerk to file the
necessary documents of marriage that he solemnized, in the local civil registry not later than 15 days after
the marriage. The judge denial of solemnization because he did not sign the marriage contracts does not
suffices. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will
definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency
or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

#2Ireneo GERONIMO VS. CA

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 33850 1 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, Pasig, Metro
Manila in Special Proceeding No. 10036 declaring valid the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and
Antonio A. Esman and appointing the latter as the administrator of the estate of the deceased Graciana
Geronimo.

The findings of fact of the trial court, adopted by the public respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:

This will resolve Ireneo Geronimo's petition for letter of administration of the estate of Graciana Geronimo-
Esman.

On June 29, 1987, a petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the heirs oppositor Antonio A. Esman
and describing the latter as "husband of the deceased". On April 4, 1988, an amended petition was filed by
petitioner naming as one of the surviving heirs Antonio A. Esman and now describing the latter as the
"live-in partner of the deceased" after finding out that the marriage between oppositor and the decedent
was a "nullity for want of a marriage license".

Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses Esman because the copies
of the marriage contract he presented (Exhibits "I" and "J") did not state the marriage license number. The
flaw in such reasoning is all too obvious. Moreover, this was refuted by the respondent when he presented
a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section (Exhibit "7") where
the marriage license number (No. 5038770, dated 7 January 1955) does appear. Petitioner tried to assail
this piece of evidence by presenting Exhibit "V," a certification of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasay City that Marriage License No. 5038770 was issued on 1 October 1976 in favor of Edwin G. Tolentino
and Evangelina Guadiz.

Issue whether or not there is an absence of marriage license to the said marriage

Held: This was sufficiently explained by the Court of Appeals thus:

It is a known fact, and it is of judicial notice, that all printed accountable forms of the Government like the
Marriage License (Municipal Form 95-A) come from the National Printing Office and are printed with serial
numbers. These forms are distributed upon proper requisition by the city/municipal treasurers concerned.
But the serial numbers printed or used in a particular year are the same numbers used in the succeeding
years when the same forms are again printed for distribution. However, the distribution of the serially-
numbered forms do not follow the same pattern.

This is exactly what happened to Marriage License No. 5038770 which the appellant refused to
acknowledge. Thus, it appears that while marriage License No. 5038770 was requisitioned and received by
the Municipality of Pateros on October 09, 1953 thru the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal (as
explained by Mrs. Julita Reyes and borne out by Exhibits "1" and "2") and later used by Antonio A. Esman
and Graciana Geronimo in their marriage on January 07, 1955, another, marriage license bearing the same
number (No. 5038770) was also issued to the municipality of Pasig in October, 1959 (Exhibit "L-1").
Subsequently, still another marriage license bearing No. 503877() was also issued to the Treasurer of
Pasay City on June 29, 1976 (Exhibit "U-1") that was used by a certain Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina
Guadiz (Exhibit "V"). (Appellee's Brief, pp. 31-32) 5

At most, the evidence adduced by the petitioner could only serve to prove the non-recording of the
marriage license number but certainly not the non-issuance of the license itself.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

#3 ATIENZA VS. BRILLIANTES

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with
De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving
instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his
children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as
appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he
alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De
Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by
De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the
withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it
was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five
children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a
Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage
license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko
abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4,
1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his
first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a
party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering
that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the
second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

Issue: whether or not the first marriage was invalid even without final judgement of the court declaring the
invalidity

Held: Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said
Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40
to his case. Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five
children.

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the
time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never
secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one
can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he
and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two
occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge,
his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the
judiciary.

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits
and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.

# 4 Jacinto MARIATEGUI VS. CA

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953. During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted
three (3) marriages.

In the first wife he had 4 children on the second wife he had a daughter and on the third wife he had 3
children.

At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still
unmarried. These properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the
Muntinglupa Estate.

Heirs of the first and second marriage executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated
unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate on December 2, 1967.

Plaintiffs being an heir in the third marriage filed a petition praying for partition of the estate of their
deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967.

Defendant contends that the third marriage is not valid for the absence of marriage license and contract.

Trial court ruled in favour of the heirs of the third marriage. Court of Appeals concurred in the decision of
the trial court. Hence this petition.

Issue: whether or not the absence of marriage license determines the invalidity of the marriage in this
case

Held: Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930.
This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when
(his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get
married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and
wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to
this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa.
The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from
bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA
567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of
Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).

Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in
Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]). In view of the foregoing, there can be no
other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and
therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to
this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the
action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or
impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie
except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 24,
1980 is Affirmed.

# 7 NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The
wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not
fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

Respondent judge contends that the first marriage did nota violation of the family code because he only
relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second
charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not
violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1)
Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to
the case in question.
Whether or not the respondent judge violated the provisions of family code in solemnizing the said
marriages

Held: The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis
added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to
discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or
a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the
aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in
the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3)
upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either
Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request
presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period
of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

# 10 QUITA VS. DANDAN

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They
were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe
sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain
Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo
in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina
Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition
and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the
latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On
30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July
1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T.
Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
The trial court ruled that there was no marriage between respondent Dandan and deceased Arturo and
their alleged children was not acknowledged by Arturo as his own. Only petitioner and Ruperto the brother
of Arturo were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary
estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. In motion for reconsideration of the respondent,
trial court ruled that the Padlan children are entitled to inherit ½ of the estate excluding Ruperto
therefrom.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly
committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of
Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to
who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of
the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April
1996 it denied reconsideration.

Issue: whether or not respondent’s children are legitimate heirs of the deceased

Held: We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit
from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner
herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But
controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties
other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for
immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission
of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or
without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit
from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner
herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But
controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties
other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for
immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission
of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or
without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the
right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was
already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage
of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the
beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can
inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T.
Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by
granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of
evidence by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse
of Arturo Padlan.

#11 NIÑAL VS. BAYADOG

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their
father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code. Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family
Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2
Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

Issue: whether or not the second marriage qualifies for the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death?

Held: the affidavit for the second marriage has no effect because the cohabitation of five years should not
be an impediment to prior marriage. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact,
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy
to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon
by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of
either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that
is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
22
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,
23
and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article
43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond
between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there
was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void
hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
#12 AMOR-CATALAN VS. CA

This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated August
6, 2004, which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in
Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E.
Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution3 dated January 27, 2005, which denied
the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.4
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens
thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.5 Two months after the
divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.6 Contending
that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol,
petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7
against Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of
action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the merits
ensued. On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the respondent before appellate court and ruled in favor of her reversing the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the
appellate court. Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought
embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address
her grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the
Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite overwhelming
evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.

Issue: whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the
respondents on the ground of bigamy.

Held: Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of
whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she
may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes
absolute.23 In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for
being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol
and respondent Merope,24 and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the
respondents.25

However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando,
does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal
personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:

Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should each have the personality to
inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing
interest in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not
affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas.

In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case
to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent
Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or
restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow
respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous
and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant
petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for its proper disposition. No costs.

#13 TENERBRO VS. CA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of
a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal
liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on
April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991,
when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared
with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas,
before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of
this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 When arraigned, petitioner entered a
plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired
two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that
no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract
merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He
further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was
any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Issue: whether or not the first marriage is void for the due to absence of marriage ceremony alleged by the
petitioner
Whether or not the second marriage is void ab initio due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner

Held: To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage
contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes. The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive
evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially
considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that
no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner
informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all
tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely
no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.

JUAN DE DIOS VS. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the
effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
reversed and set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and
damages.

The Facts

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. During the lifetime of Felix
Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment
of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir,
petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. Parcel
No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon
Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II.

Petitioner and respondent upon agreement divided the parcels of land by executing an extrajudicial partition. In August 1995,
petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following
causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of
money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of
petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage
license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the
illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents
prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.
Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late
Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of
the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary
judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying
that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said
testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her testimony,
respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.

Trial court ruled in favour of the Petitioner. Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia,
that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and
Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr. Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the respondent
reversing the decision of the trial court.

Issue: whether or not the petitioner can file A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage

Held: II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside
of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief
that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution.

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare
allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total
forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its
pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad
should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family
Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the
mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within
a valid marriage.37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance,
recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made
on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and
filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent
Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late
Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for
lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

#8 Pilapil vs Somera

Petitioner Imelada Pilpil a Filipino citizen was married to a German national, private respondent Erich in
Germany. Later on the couple lived in Malate Manila where their only child was Isabella was born. The
couple been separated de facto and after about 3 ½ years respondent initiated a divorce against
petitioner. 5 months after the issuance of divorce decree respondent Erich filed two complaints of
Adultery against petitioner separately before the trial court alleging that the petitioner had an affair with
William Chia in 1982 and James Chua in 1983 while still married to the respondent. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss for grounds of insufficiency of evidence but was denied by the respondent court.
Petitioner elevated the case before the secretary of justice for review of the cases. One of the cases was
dismissed and other was reset. Petitioner filed a motion to quash against the respondent court but it was
denied by the court. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: whether or not private respondent can file a complaint of adultery against the petitioner

Held: Crimes against chastity cannot be prosecuted except upon sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. In this case the respondent have already obtained a divorce decree against the
petitioner. After a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offender. Art. 26 of FC provides: where a marriage of a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under the Philippine
laws.