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To cite this article: Stephen M. Walt (1997): Why alliances endure or collapse, Survival:
Global Politics and Strategy, 39:1, 156-179
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Why Alliances Endure or Collapse
Stephen M. Walt
Introduction
The formation and cohesion of international alliances can have profound effects
on the security of individual states and help determine both the probability and
likely outcome of war. Because the ability to attract and maintain allied support
can be a formidable asset, prudent leaders will pay close attention to the forces
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Stephen M. Walt is Professor of Political Science and Master of the Social Science
Collegiate Division at the University of Chicago, IL. He is the author of The Origins of
Alliances and Revolution and War, and co-editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs.
Survival, vol. 39, no. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 156-79.
Why Alliances Endure or Collapse 1 5 7
alliance than they would be outside it. On the other hand, it may survive even
after it has become something of a liability, because of domestic politics,
misperception or simple human error. Because political life usually combines
elements of rationality and irrationality, the analysis that follows considers both
sorts of explanation.
What is an Alliance?
An alliance is a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation
between two or more states. Although the precise arrangements embodied in
different alliances vary enormously, the defining feature of any alliance is a
commitment for mutual military support against some external actor(s) in some
specified set of circumstances. This concept includes both formal alliances -
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issues.
Similarly, an alliance is not a collective-security agreement. A collective-
security arrangement is an inclusive institution: it commits the members to
oppose any act of aggression, even one committed by one of its members. By
contrast, alliances are exclusive institutions: they entail a commitment to support
the other members against states outside the community. Although members of
an alliance may also be part of a collective security organisation and may engage
in other forms of security cooperation, failure to keep these concepts distinct can
lead to misleading analyses and muddy policy-making.5
By the same logic, alliances are also likely to dissolve if one of its members
becomes significantly stronger, both because the rising power will have less
need for allied support and because the other members may begin to view it as
a threat to their security.
Second, an alliance will be prone to deteriorate if the members revise their
beliefs about other states' intentions. In particular, if an alliance's members
become convinced that their adversaries are not as bellicose as they once feared,
or if an alliance member becomes increasingly aggressive, then the alliance itself
is less likely to endure. In either case, the magnitude or identity of the main
threat to be countered has shifted, triggering a corresponding shift in alliance
relations.
These two elements of threat are often related: states whose power is
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Declining Credibility
Because alliances are formed primarily to increase their members' security,
anything that casts doubt on their ability to contribute to this goal will encourage
the members to re-evaluate their position. Even if the level of threat is
unchanged, an alliance will become more fragile if its members begin to doubt
that the existing arrangements are sufficient to guarantee their security.15 During
the Cold War, for example, US leaders continually worried that a single setback
might raise doubts about US credibility and lead its allies to move towards a
neutral or even a pro-Soviet position. Because US leaders feared that a minor
defeat could cause its own allies to lose heart, they were willing to commit
extraordinary resources to otherwise marginal areas.16
Doubts about the efficacy of an existing alliance may emerge for at least two
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reasons. First, alliance members may become convinced that they lack the
material capabilities to deter or defeat their opponents. If additional resources
cannot be found, it may be safer to realign with the enemy or to adopt a neutral
position. Weak states are more likely to act this way than strong states are, and
this type of behaviour is probably most common during wartime, when the costs
of being on the losing side are more apparent. Thus, the 1793 First Coalition
against revolutionary France dissolved after a series of French victories in 1794-
95 had convinced Spain, Prussia and others that continued opposition was no
longer viable.17 Romania reluctantly aligned with Nazi Germany in 1940 when
it became clear it had no alternative, and subsequently switched to supporting the
Soviet Union once Hitler's defeat became inevitable. Arab opposition to the state
of Israel waned as each war ended with an Arab defeat, and Anwar Sadat's
decision to abandon Egypt's alliance with the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s in
favour of a partnership with the United States arose from his belief that the
Soviet Union could not provide the combination of military, economic and
diplomatic support he needed to regain the Sinai and to sustain Egypt's faltering
economy.11*
Second, an alliance may dissolve if its members begin to question whether
their partners are genuinely committed to providing assistance. Here the question
is one of will rather than capability, and such doubts are more likely to arise
when it is no longer obvious that the alliance is in every member's interest. This
problem will be more severe when the allies are geographically separate,
because a threat to one may not threaten the other; and when there is a large
asymmetry of power among the member-states. In the latter case, the weaker
members may suspect they are not very important to their more powerful
partners, and will fear being abandoned if they are attacked. Skilful aggressors
will take advantage of these tendencies by exaggerating their power and
portraying their aims as limited in order to raise the perceived cost of resistance
and to persuade potential opponents to leave individual victims to their fate.19
Taken together, these concerns help explain why US allies in Europe and Asia
are now experiencing renewed doubts about the credibility of the US commit-
ment. During the Cold War, both the United States and its Eurasian allies had a
clear and obvious interest in preventing war and containing Soviet expansion.
Now that the Soviet Union is gone, however, the motivation for an extensive US
Why Alliances Endure or Collapse 161
Domestic Politics
The hypotheses just discussed all assume that states are essentially rational
actors making decisions in response to shifts in the external environment. An
alternative perspective explains alliance dissolution by focusing on political
processes within an existing alliance, and especially on political processes within
the member states, ^hese hypotheses fall into four main categories.
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probability of realignment will increase. This effect will be least powerful when
the change is relatively minor (for example, when one set of leaders is replaced
via a legitimate election), but the impact is likely to increase when the leadership
alters because of a change in the basic nature of the regime. Not only are the new
leaders likely to prefer policies that differ sharply from those of their
predecessors, but they will probably feel little obligation to honour prior
commitments.
Not surprisingly, these effects are especially powerful in the aftermath of a
major revolution, and states that undergo a revolution are overwhelmingly likely
to make new alliance arrangements. Revolutionary France thus abandoned its
long-standing alliance with Austria; Bolshevik Russia signed a separate peace
with Germany and severed ties with the Anglo-French entente; the Chinese
Communists ended the Nationalists' close association with the United States and
allied with the Soviet Union (at least temporarily); and the revolutionary regimes
in Cuba (1959), Iran (1979) and Nicaragua (1979) quickly condemned the allies
of the old regime (most notably the US), and sought better relations with several
former adversaries. Similar actions also followed the American, Mexican,
Turkish, Angolan and Ethiopian revolutions.22
The explanation for this pattern is easy to discern. A movement dedicated to
overthrowing the regime is unlikely to view its present allies favourably, particu-
larly if these allies are helping the regime retain power. By the same token, the
regime's allies are unlikely to welcome its demise, if only because they cannot
be certain how its successors will behave. For these and other reasons, relations
between the new government and the regime's associates are likely to be
extremely suspicious, and existing alliance commitments are unlikely to survive
the transfer of power.
movement, alliances among communist states or within the Arab world were
actually extremely fragile.23 Among other things, this argument suggests that
there is little danger of a meaningful alliance among today's Islamic states -
even if fundamentalist movements gain power in additional countries - because
such regimes are unlikely to share identical principles and will be prone to
quarrel over which version of Islam should be followed.24
Summary
Alliances deteriorate and dissolve for several reasons. The most obvious and
important cause is a change in the identity or nature of the threat that produced
the original association. If the threat declines, or if it is supplanted by a greater
one, then an alliance formed to counter the original threat is likely to change.
Alliances will also tend to erode if members acquire other means to protect
themselves, or if the members begin to question either the capacity or
willingness of their partners to fulfill their obligations. An existing alliance will
probably suffer if states redefine their interests as a result of a domestic political
upheaval, or if ideological principles are incompatible and the level of threat is
too small to override these differences.
The strength of these various tendencies - and thus the fragility of existing
alliance networks - will vary considerably from case to case. Alliances will tend
to be less robust in a multipolar world, because the major powers will possess
more options as their numbers increase, and because shifts in the distribution of
capabilities will be more frequent when there are more great powers in the
system. It will also be more difficult for each state to determine where the
greatest threat lies, and international alliances are likely to be more flexible and
fluid.
Domestic politics will become increasingly important as the number of
alliance options increases, if only because the increased range of choice
broadens the range of 'acceptable' public debate.25 Foreign-policy options that
were once regarded as heretical can now be openly considered; for example,
advocates of US isolationism are no longer regarded as irresponsible iconoclasts,
and the current debate over the future course of German foreign policy is wider
than at any time since the early 1950s.26 Debates such as these will be observed
164 Stephen M. Walt
by others and help shape their own calculations and discussions, thereby
reinforcing the fluidity that is inherent in multipolarity.
These trends are likely to be especially important for the US, whose
combination of capabilities and geographic separation grants it unprecedented
security and freedom of action.27 Thus, where bipolarity strongly disposed the
US to support a world-wide network of anti-Soviet alliances, the gradual re-
emergence of multipolarity will give Washington a great deal of latitude. How
that latitude is ultimately exercised will be shaped less by the structure of world
power and more by domestic political competition; similar strictures will apply
to other major powers as well. As a result, neither the history of the past 45 years
nor the public statements of contemporary national leaders offer a reliable guide
to the future, and prudence suggests that existing alliance commitments can no
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external threat, because this creates both a desire for allied support and an
incentive to acquire influence over other states. Third, hegemonic leadership is
most easily exercised against relatively weak clients, which means that this tactic
will be most effective for preserving alliance ties that are relatively less
valuable.29 Finally, hegemonic leadership is not a permanent solution to strong
centrifugal tendencies. Not only will major external changes affect the leader's
interests - and thus its willingness to pay a disproportionate share of the alliance
costs - but the additional burdens of alliance leadership will eventually erode the
asymmetry of power on which such leadership depends.30
Preserving Credibility
Alliances are more likely to persist if they have become symbols of credibility
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Moreover, the lites who lobby to maintain a particular alliance may genuinely
believe that this commitment is both in their own interest and in the broader
national interest. They are virtually certain to describe the commitment in terms
of the latter, and it may be only with the benefit of hindsight that observers can
recognise the extent to which an alliance was sustained by domestic political
manipulation.
This sort of alliance will also be rare and relatively fragile, because most
states cannot afford to squander resources on commitments that are no longer of
value. Furthermore, political lites usually try to avoid being seen as overly loyal
to a foreign power, thereby discouraging them from supporting commitments
that are only of limited value. Thus, although lite manipulation can delay
adjustments to new strategic conditions, it will usually be unable to prevent
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them. Exceptions are most likely when the state in question is extremely wealthy
or secure - and can thus afford to devote resources to marginal interests - or
when the costs of the commitment are relatively small.
1991 Gulf War could not have been fought without NATO assets, and the 1995
intervention in Bosnia relied on a similar base of infrastructure, military assets
and joint decision-making procedures. NATO also provides a hedge against
future uncertainties, and it surely provides a better basis for ensuring its
members' security than any of the more lavish alternatives that have been
proposed since 1990.36
This type of institutionalisation will operate most powerfully when it creates
capacities that are highly adaptable. In general, flexibility will occur when the
alliances possesses diverse capabilities - which may include military, economic
and diplomatic assets - and when these capabilities rest on a division of labour
that would be difficult to replace. Durability is also increased when the alliance's
institutions facilitate the creation of new rules and principles, thereby making it
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easier to adapt to new conditions.37 Once again, NATO seems to the defining
example of this sort of alliance, given its long duration, diverse capabilities and
demonstrated capacity to amend doctrines and organisational forms in response
to external developments.38 Indeed, some experts now see NATO as evolving
from a defensive alliance into a more diverse 'security-management institution',
whose purpose is both collective defence and managing a varied array of low-
level security problems.39
The benefits of institutionalisation are bought at a price, however. High levels
of institutionalisation may not lead to greater efficiency or effectiveness,
especially when an elaborate decision-making process encourages stalemate or
inaction. Moreover, an elaborate institutional structure may mask the degree to
which the fundamental bases for the alliance are eroding. Like Oscar Wilde's
picture of Dorian Gray, an ageing alliance may appear robust and healthy so long
as its formal institutions continue to operate, even if the basic rationale for the
arrangement is crumbling. If the governing bureaucracy continues to function,
if ministerial meetings continue to issue innocuous communiqus on schedule,
and if the alliance is not called upon to do anything, then its members may not
be fully aware of the extent to which their interests have diverged. The danger,
of course, is that the alliance may be dead long before anyone notices, and the
discovery of the corpse may come at a very inconvenient moment.
Finally, although NATO has successfully redirected its mission away from
conventional and nuclear defence and towards regional 'security management',
this new orientation may not be feasible for very long. 'Security-management
institutions' do not have an encouraging track record, and past efforts to devise
institutional remedies for inter-state conflict - including the Concert of Europe,
the League of Nations and the United Nations - proved unable to prevent a
return to competitive power politics.40 Such institutions can provide a forum for
discussing emerging security issues, and may facilitate efforts to resolve minor
problems such as migration or international terrorism. But institutions like
NATO or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) do
not have independent capabilities of their own, and can only take action when
the member-states deem it in their interest to do so. It is by no means clear that
NATO's members (including the United States) will be willing to pay the costs
168 Stephen M. Walt
questionable.41
develop a powerful sense of shared identity, then a threat facing one of them by
definition becomes a problem facing them all, and a mutual commitment is likely
to be sustained, even when there is no immediate challenge to be faced.
Deutsch argued that forming a security community rested on compatible
values, expectations of economic gain, a wide range of mutual transactions
(trade and communications flows, for example), broad lite networks and high
levels of social communication. Drawing upon this logic, a number of scholars
have recently suggested that the Atlantic Alliance has (or is about to) become a
security community in the Deutschian sense. If so, then NATO - or something
very much like it - is likely to endure even in the absence of a major external
threat, simply because the member-states no longer make a firm distinction
between their separate national interests and the broader interests of the 'Atlantic
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Summary
This section has identified a number of reasons why states will maintain a mili-
tary alliance even when the conditions under which it was formed have changed
substantially. Taken together, alliances are more likely to persist when there is
a large asymmetry of power within them, when the allies share similar political
values, and when the relationship is highly institutionalised. Such alliances will
find it easier to adapt to new conditions and will be better equipped to handle the
conflicts of interest that inevitably arise. Alliances will be especially durable
when relations among the member-states have brought about a strong sense of
common identity, but this sort of transformation is extremely rare.
Conclusion
There is nothing sacred about an existing alliance, no matter how successful or
long-lived it has been. When domestic preferences or external conditions
change, existing commitments may no longer be desirable and states are more
likely to seek other arrangements. Yet new conditions need not provoke an
instantaneous reaction, and alliances formed in one context may well endure
under quite different circumstances. The Austro-French alliance lasted from
1756-92; the Austro-German 'Dual Alliance' persisted from 1879 until the end
of the First World War, and the Anglo-Portuguese alliance survived, by some
estimates, an extraordinary 600 years.46 Alliances can endure despite far-
reaching shifts in the internal or external environment, if only because national
leaders are often eager to reduce uncertainty during a period of rapid change.
Why Alliances Endure or Collapse 171
mild conflicts that did arise and facilitated joint efforts to adapt to new
geopolitical conditions. In Asia, where historical enmities still linger and multi-
lateral institutions are weaker, the three bilateral alliances between Washington
and Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei offered both an impediment to regional
competition and a hedge against a rising and increasingly assertive China. Thus,
the US and its allies had little reason to abandon their existing security
commitments after the Soviet Union collapsed, and ample reason to preserve
them.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the US role in these developments,
and the future of these relations will be determined primarily by the future
course of US foreign policy. As discussed above, alliances are more likely to
persist when a strong power is both willing and able to pay the costs associated
with leadership. Because the end of the Cold War left the US in an
overwhelmingly strong position, and because world leadership is a hard habit to
break, the Soviet Union's collapse did not lead to immediate US retrenchment
and thus did not trigger the rapid dissolution of its existing alliance network. And
by helping smooth the transition from the Cold War to the present day - a
transition in which the potential for serious conflict was clearly present - these
alliances made a clear contribution to peace.
On the negative side, however, these relationships are likely to face growing
strains in the years to come. Although the absence of a major threat is cause for
rejoicing, it also means that these alliances will lack a firm basis for
commitment. In the past, intra-alliance conflict was ultimately subordinated to
the larger purpose of deterring the Soviet Union. But with the Soviet Union
gone, there is less reason to keep such disputes within bounds. Managing the
alliance is likely to be more difficult, therefore, and will require a defter
diplomatic touch. In particular, if US leaders do too much to keep their allies
happy, they are likely to trigger a domestic backlash. But if they try to use their
hegemonic position to impose their own preferences or to gain unilateral
advantages (thereby satisfying their domestic constituents), they will inevitably
provoke allied resentment. Similarly, any reluctance to act in places like Bosnia
will trigger doubts about US credibility, but to use force - as in the missile
strikes against Iraq in September 1996 - will undermine the norms of intra-
alliance consultation and raise doubts about US judgement. These are not new
172 Stephen M. Walt
problems, but they will be more difficult to overcome without a clear and present
danger. US leaders will thus have to exhibit greater imagination, wisdom and
restraint than they did during the Cold War, and it will not be easy to balance the
requirements of alliance leadership and the demands of public opinion.
These dilemmas will be exacerbated by a number of other structural trends,
which are slowly undermining the factors that sustained these alliances in the
past. First, far-flung US commitments rest upon a level of military spending that
will be increasingly difficult to justify or sustain. Although US defence spending
has declined from its Cold War levels, it still accounts for nearly 35% of the
global total. The United States spent five times more on defence than Russia in
1995, at least six times more than Japan or Germany (the third and fourth
ranking military powers) and may have spent as much as eight times more than
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its major allies. The US presence is still the best safeguard against renewed
regional competition, and retaining the existing institutional structure provides
a mechanism for coordinating action when unexpected contingencies arise.52 But
instead of seeking a common front on each and every issue, the US and its
principal allies must learn to live with less unanimity and greater flexibility.
Presumptions of agreement will disappoint both sides, and create a greater risk
of a truly disruptive backlash once the inevitable disagreements arise. Among
other things, this means supporting initiatives that facilitate independent action
by certain alliance members, even at the cost of diminished US control.53
Second, although it is probably too late to rescind the pledge to expand
NATO eastwards, efforts to implement this decision should be delayed as long
as possible.54 As many critics have noted, such a step will inevitably fuel Russian
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suspicions and jeopardise relations between Moscow and the West. Russia's
present weakness may diminish such concerns for the time being, but probably
not forever. More important, it is far from clear whether NATO's present
members - especially the United States - are really willing to fight for Poland,
Hungary, Finland or any other potential members. The decision to enlarge
NATO thus seems to be based on the assumption that the commitment will never
have to be honoured, which is hardly a sound basis for a formal military
guarantee. Enlargement will also require formal ratification by the US Senate,
and such a debate could easily turn into a far-reaching referendum on the entire
array of US commitments. It is by no means clear that supporters of NATO
should welcome such a prospect.55
Finally, sustaining the current array of great-power alliances will require
renewed efforts at public persuasion by those who regard these commitments as
a valuable insurance policy for peace. Structural forces and domestic pressures
will make this policy more difficult to sell, but there is a powerful prudential
logic behind it. Even if these alliances do dissolve - as they eventually will - it
will be better if they do so after Europe and Asia have fashioned new security
arrangements to replace the Cold War order. In short, if it is true that 'NATO's
years are now numbered' - and if the same point holds for alliances in Asia - it
would still be prudent to keep that number rather large.56
Acknowledgements Notes
1
James Fearon, Charles Glaser, Lloyd For a representative sample of
Gruber, Pierre Hassner, Robert Keohane alternative views, consult John J.
and John Mearsheimer provided valuable Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future:
comments on an earlier draft of this Instability in Europe after the Cold War',
article. I have also profited from discus- International Security, vol. 15, no. 1,
sions with David Priess and the comments Summer 1990; Barry Buzan et al., The
of participants at the 1996 IISS Annual European Security Order Recast:
Conference, Dresden, \-4 September Scenarios for Post-Cold War Europe
1996. David Edelstein provided timely (London: Pinter, 1990); Kenneth N.
research assistance, for which I am also Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of
grateful. International Politics', International
174 Stephen M. Walt
Best: Future Security Arrangements for clear, the leverage that allies use to
Europe', International Security, vol. 18, restrain each other is based largely on
no. 1, Summer 1991. the importance each attaches to its
2 partners' capabilities. The distinction
Recent theoretical work on alliances
includes Stephen M. Walt, The Origins between 'power aggregation' and
of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 'mutual restraint' is therefore not a very
University Press, 1987); Steven David, sharp one. See Robert Osgood, Alliances
Choosing Sides: Alignment and and American Foreign Policy
Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 22; and Paul
University Press, 1991); Dan Reiter, W. Schroeder, 'Alliances, 1815-1945:
Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, Weapons of Power and Tools of
and World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Management', in Klaus Knorr (ed.),
University Press, 1996); Fred Chernoff, Historical Dimensions of National
After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, Security Problems (Lawrence, KS:
Theories of Cooperation and the Future University of Kansas Press, 1976), pp.
of the Atlantic Alliance (Ann Arbor, MI: 230-31.
University of Michigan Press, 1995); and 5
On the distinction between inclusive
Randall K. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning and exclusive institutions, see John J.
for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of
Back In', International Security, vol. 19, International Institutions', International
no. 1, Summer 1994. For guides to Security, vol. 19, no. 3, Winter 1994-95;
earlier scholarship on alliances, see and also see Arnold Wolfers, 'Collective
Roger V. Dingman, 'Theories of, and Defense vs. Collective Security', in
Approaches to, Alliance Politics', in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Alliance Policy
Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: and the Cold War (Baltimore, MD:
New Approaches in Theory, History and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959).
Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979); 6
See Walt, Origins of Alliances, pp. 17-
Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and 33, 147-180; Walt, 'Testing Theories of
John D. Sullivan, Unity and Alliance Formation: The Case of
Disintegration in International Alliances Southwest Asia', International
(New York: John Wiley, 1973); and Organization, vol. 38, no. 2, Spring
Michael Don Ward, Research Gaps in 1988; and Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for
Alliance Dynamics (Boulder, CO: Profit'. Earlier works advancing similar
University of Denver Monograph Series, arguments include Robert Rothstein,
1982). Alliances and Small Powers (New York:
3
The most extreme form of an Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 52;
Why Alliances Endure or Collapse 1 7 5
and George Liska, Nations in Alliance: because they have less need of allied
The Limits of Interdependence assistance and because the costs of war
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins will be higher. See Thomas Christenson
University Press), p. 13. and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and
7
Pessimistic appraisals of NATO's Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance
future include Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Patterns in Multipolarity', International
Future' ; Waltz, 'Emerging Structure of Organization, vol. 44, no. 2, Spring
International Politics', especially pp. 75- 1990.
12
76; and Walt, Origins of Alliances, See, for example, Pierre Gallois, The
preface to paperback edition, p. vii. Balance of Terror: Strategy for the
8
See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in Nuclear Age (Boston, MA: Houghton
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Mifflin, 1961); Gallois, 'US Strategy and
University Press, 1981). the Defense of Europe', Orbis, vol. 7,
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9
This element of threat is nicely no. 2, Summer 1963; Robert W. Tucker,
revealed in Eyre Crowe's famous 1907 Stability and the Nth Country Problem
memorandum on British policy towards (Washington DC: Institute for Defense
Germany. Crowe noted that 'the mere Analyses, 1962); and Henry A.
existence and healthy activity of a Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A
powerful Germany is an undoubted Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance
blessing to the world', and emphasised (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965),
that 'so long as Germany's action does especially pp. 12-14.
13
overstep the line of legitimate protection See David C. Schwartz, NATO's
of existing rights it can always count on Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington DC:
[England's] sympathy and good will'. Brookings Institution, 1981).
But he also warned that 'this benevolent 14
See Eric Nordlinger, Isolationism
attitude will give way to determined Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy
opposition at the first sign of British or for a New Century (Princeton, NJ:
allied interests being adversely affected'. Princeton University Press, 1995), pp.
See George Peabody Gooch and Harold 47-49, 123-25; and Earl Ravenal,
Temperley (eds), British Documents on Designing Defense for a New World
the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 Order: The 1992 Military Budget and
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Beyond (Washington DC: Cato Institute,
Office, 1928), volume 3, pp. 397-420; 1991), pp. 64-68.
see also Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of 15
Thus Glenn Snyder points out that
the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860- alliances face an unavoidable trade-off
1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980); between 'abandonment' and
and Imanuel Geiss, German Foreign 'entrapment'. Allies must demonstrate
Policy 1871-1914 (London: Routledge their value and commitment in case their
and Kegan Paul, 1977). partners abandon them for other
10
See Schroeder, 'Alliances, 1815- arrangements. Unfortunately, a state's
1945', p. 241; Ernst C. Helmreich, The desire to prove its loyalty will make it
Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912- easier for its allies to 'entrap' it in an
1913 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard undesirable or unnecessary wars. See
University Press, 1938); and Geoffrey Glenn Snyder, 'The Security Dilemma in
Roberts, The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's Alliance Politics', World Politics, vol.
Pact with Hitler (Bloomington, IN: 36, no. 4, July 1984.
16
Indiana University Press, 1989). John F. Kennedy thus warned that 'if
11
In general, states will be less inclined the United States were to falter ... the
to form an alliance when military whole world would inevitably begin to
technology favours the defensive, both move towards the Soviet bloc'; Henry
176 Stephen M. Walt
Kissinger believed that 'if leaders around M. Walt, 'The Precarious Partnership:
the world assume that the United States Europe and America in a New Era',
lacked the forces or the will... they will forthcoming in Charles A. Kupchan
accommodate themselves to what they (ed.), The Future of Transatlantic
regard as the dominant trend'. Similarly, Security Relations (New York: Council
Ronald Reagan once argued that 'if we on Foreign Relations Press, 1997).
22
cannot win [in Central America], our See Walt, Revolution and War,
credibility will collapse and our alliarces chapters 3-6.
will crumble'. These quotations are nom 23
On these general points, see Walt,
Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Origins of Alliances, pp. 35-36, 206-12;
Constancy and Change in US Foreign and Malcolm S. Kerr, The Arab Cold
Policy from Truman to Johnson (New War, 1958-1961: Gamal Abdel Nasser
York: Columbia University Press, 1968), and His Enemies (London: Oxford
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order. This is not to say that there are 1994). For a demonstration of how
no threats that might affect the United enduring commitments can foster
States, but it is surely the most secure ossified strategic beliefs and impede a
great power in history. state's ability to adapt to new conditions,
28
On the differences in alliance see Charles A. Kupchan, The
dynamics between bipolar and Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, NY:
multipolar systems, see especially Cornell University Press, 1994).
33
Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among As of December 1996, there were over
Nations, p p . 4 1 9 - 2 9 . 8,000 people assigned to NATO
29
Soviet control over its Warsaw Pact headquarters, Allied Command Atlantic
allies was thus greater than U S control and Supreme Headquarters Allied
over its allies in Western Europe, but Powers Europe, including over 2,000
the Warsaw Pact contributed less to the civilians - see the NATO homepage,
Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 16:43 04 July 2012
466-68. Since 1991, NATO has Major War (New York: Basic Books,
developed a new Strategic Concept de- 1989); and Robert Jervis, 'The Future of
emphasising forward defence; in 1994 it World Politics: Will It Resemble the
endorsed the Combined Joint Task Past?' International Security, vol. 16,
Forces concept for meeting a wider no. 3, Winter 1991-92.
44
range of non-Article 5 contingencies. See Anthony Smith, 'National Identity
This latter decision balances the and the Idea of European U n i t y ' ,
European desire to act with greater International Affairs, vol. 6 8 , n o . 1,
autonomy against the continued need for January 1992.
US support in key areas such as 45
Indeed, European lites want to
command and control. See Simon Duke, preserve the U S presence in Europe
The New European Security Disorder primarily to prevent a return to inter-
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), pp. state competition. See Robert J. Art,
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288-94; and Charles Barry, 'NATO's 'Why Western Europe Needs the United
Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory States and NATO', Political Science
and Practice', Survival, vol. 38, no. 1, Quarterly, vol. 111, n o . 1, S p r i n g 1996.
Spring 1996, pp. 81-97. 46
The first Anglo-Portuguese alliance
40
See Bradley A. Thayer, 'Creating was signed in 1373 and was
Stability in New World Orders: Why subsequently renewed ten times, most
Concert and Collective Security Systems recently in 1943. See Glyn A. Stone,
Fail, Why the Balance of Power Works', 'The Official British Attitude to the
unpublished doctoral dissertation, Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 1910-1945',
University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, Journal of Contemporary History, vol.
1996. 10, no. 4, October 1975, p. 729.
41 47
As Wallander and Keohane recognise, Estimates of Chinese spending vary
even 'sticky' institutions can collapse if widely, but even the highest estimates
external changes are sufficiently far- place it at roughly a fifth of the US total
reaching. See 'Why Does NATO in 1994. See The Military Balance 1995/
Persist?', p. 17. 96 (London: Oxford University Press for
42
See Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political the IISS, 1995), pp. 263-67, and The
Community in the North Atlantic Area: Military Balance 1996/97 (London:
International Organization in Light of Oxford University Press for the IISS,
Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: 1996), pp. 306-11.
48
Princeton University Press, 1957), US defence spending has been
especially p. 5. sustained partly by conservative
43
See G. John Ikenberry and Daniel Republicans in the US Congress and
Deudney, 'The Logic of the West', partly by President Clinton's delicate
World Policy Journal, vol. 10, no. 4, relationship with the US military, but the
Winter 1993-94; Ole Waever, impact of both factors will probably
'Integration as Security: European decline over time.
49
International Identity and American Trade with Asia now comprises
Domestic Discipline', in Kupchan, roughly 34% of total US trade, while
Future of Transatlantic Security trade with Europe comprises 23%. Direct
Relations; and Charles A. Kupchan, US investment in Europe is still three
'Reviving the West', Foreign Affairs, times larger than investment in Asia, but
vol. 75, no. 3, May-June 1996. The the gap is shrinking. See Direction of
belief that changes in attitudes and Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1993
identities has helped to stabilise Europe (Washington DC: International Monetary
is also made by John Mueller in Retreat Fund, 1993); International Direct
from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Investment Statistics Yearbook (Paris:
Why Alliances Endure or Collapse 179