MARCUS VS.

MANGLAPUZ

Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political,
economic and other aspects of national life.

We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared
President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consolidation of
power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr.
Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support
of "Marcos loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from
Hawii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January
30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the
fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution
enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs.
Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28,
1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that
left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of
lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the military
establishment that threatened civilian supremacy over military and brought to the fore the realization
that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious military.

But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid
followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in
Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have
set up a parallel government of their own on the areas they effectively control while the separatist are
virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up on this groups' determination to
wrest power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also to through the use of
propaganda have they been successful in dreating chaos and destabilizing the country.

Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the
nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic
recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating
the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained
elusive.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs.
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

The Petition

This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and
into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who
within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

The Issue

Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following
issues:

1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and family to the
Philippines?

a. Is this a political question?

2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from
returning to the Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public health

a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the
Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety or public health?

b. Assuming that she has made that finding

(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?

(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?

(3) Has there been a hearing?

(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the President's decision, including the
grounds upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the
same?

c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the
Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political
question?

d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his
family is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have respondents
established such fact?

3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to bar the return of former
President Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the
return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp.
5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President
impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that
before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be
legislation to that effect.

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the
Philippines, provides:

Article 12

1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence.

2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided
by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or
the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant.

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political
question which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:

As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos
and his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional
rights in vacuo without reference to attendant circumstances.

Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of
the determination by the President that such return and residence will endanger national security and
public safety.

It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it
involves merely a determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial and
transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its nationals, the question becomes political
and this Honorable Court can not consider it.

There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish
their residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and
reestablish their residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security
and public safety? this is still a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.

Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall
return to the Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this
Honorable Court can not decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the
President of the Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In
support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may
call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.

Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the
Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo
of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio
batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez
Jimenez of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was
prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted
in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]

The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its
limits. We, however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties'
formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the
controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to
travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v.
Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed.
2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right
to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the
right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the
"right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other
hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence"
[Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights
may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health
or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It
would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in
the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under
our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct
and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of
effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially
material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected
right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American
jurisprudence.

Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be
limitations on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An
appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.

Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its
resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether
or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the
Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar
their return.
Executive Power

The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of
government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)],
"the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines"
[Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of
powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative,
executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the
Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power
means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial
power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative
power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred
members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the
executive power which is vested in one official the President.

As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power"
although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power
of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to
contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of
the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these
se enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that
the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they
assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to
her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument
brings to mind the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally patterned.**

Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same
problem. He said:

Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution
ought to settle everything beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think
that constitution makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it
should be a vision realized.

We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The executive power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-
4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the
office from Washington to the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to
Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in
important measure on who is President." [At 30.]

This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:

For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it remained of course, an agency of
government subject to unvarying demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than
most agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge.
Each President's distinctive temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits,
expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire
government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from the
character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its impact on the constitutional
order, therefore altered from President to President. Above all, the way each President understood it as
his personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the
electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened
or weakened the constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]

We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the
consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions
are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers
under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader
powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of government
into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous
amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto
Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and
restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among
three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for
the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution
itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within
the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated,

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and
the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect directors in the National
Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the
Governor-General to do so, said:

...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee"
respectively, are not charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of
anything which is in aid of performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the
moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act
in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they
are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes
logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one among which the powers
of government are divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]

We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find
reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of
government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the
more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other. ....

xxx xxx xxx

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not
and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]

The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to
serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the
people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of
presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President
has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the
President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an
allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign
powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the
powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution
reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]

The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country
are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from
whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional
guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred
freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be
adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
79690-707, October 7, 1981.]

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect
the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do
anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See
Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the
Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the view that an
allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace.
Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external
and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times
of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to
exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed
forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep
the peace, and maintain public order and security.

That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been
recognized by memembers of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the
House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to
return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as
irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the
Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not
question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals
to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to
the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

The Extent of Review

Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the
Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Court to decide.

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of
judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the
political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the
determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves
through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a
foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set
aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the
grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us
because the power is reserved to the people.

There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question
doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers
intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual
controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not
established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a
matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear
that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which
specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the
ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]

Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers
underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the
separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with
the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of
the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the
authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in
this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the
Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to
determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]

Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she
has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.

We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed
during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual
bases for the President's decision..

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from
within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist
conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers
and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and
their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that
the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against
the State and instigate more chaos.

As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military
establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is
the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that
would break the camel's back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a
serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of
violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the
commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The
State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats
to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection
of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the
people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend
the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the
hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close
associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the
country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the
enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the
continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the
Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread
poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge
and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe
away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is
within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that
determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the
present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare
and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163155

The present petition is one for mandamus and prohibition.

Julita Campos Benedicto (private respondent), the surviving spouse of the deceased Roberto S.
Benedicto, filed on May 25, 2000 a petition for issuance of letters of administration, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 00-97505, Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto (the case), before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 21 presided by Judge Amor A. Reyes (public
respondent).

Private respondent was, by Order[1] of August 2, 2000, appointed Administratrix of the estate of
Benedicto (the estate), and letters of administration were thereafter issued in her favor.

Herein petitioners, Alfredo Hilado, Manuel Lacson, Jose M. Tuvilla, Joaquin Limjap, Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation had, during the lifetime of Benedicto, filed before the
Bacolod City RTC two complaints for damages or collection of sums of money, docketed as Civil Case No.
95-9137 and Civil Case No. 111718, against Roberto Benedicto et al.[2]

In the initial inventory of the estate which private respondent submitted on January 18, 2001[3] in the
case before the Manila RTC, she listed, among other liabilities of the estate, the claims of petitioners
subject of the above-said Bacolod RTC cases as follows:

LIST OF LIABILITIES

DESCRIPTION AMOUNT

xxxx
A claim of several sugar planters P136,045,772.50

which is presently the subject of [at P50.00 per US

Civil Case No. 95-9137 entitled $1.00]

Lacson et al. v. R.S. Benedicto

et al., pending before Branch 44

of the Regional Trial Court in

Bacolod City.

A claim filed by various sugar P35,198,697.40

planters which is presently [at P50.00 per US

the subject of Civil Case No. $1.00]

11178 entitled Lopez Sugar

Corporation et al. v. R.S.

Benedicto, et al., pending

before Branch 41 of the

Regional Trial Court in

Bacolod City.[4]

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From January 2002 until November 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC
allowed petitioners through counsel Sedigo and Associates to regularly and periodically examine the
records of the case and to secure certified true copies thereof.

By December 2003, however, Atty. Grace Carmel Paredes, an associate of petitioners counsel, was
denied access to the last folder-record of the case which, according to the courts clerical staff, could not
be located and was probably inside the chambers of public respondent for safekeeping. [5]
Petitioners counsel thus requested public respondent, by letter [6] of January 15, 2004, to allow Atty.
Paredes to personally check the records of the case. Acting on the letter, the Officer-In- Charge/Legal
Researcher of Branch 21 advised petitioners counsel in writing that per instruction of the Hon. Presiding
Judge[,] only parties or those with authority from the parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status
of the case pending in this Court, and that they may be allowed to go over the records of the above-
entitled case upon presentation of written authority from the [administratrix]. [7]

On February 2, 2004, petitioners counsel was served with a notice of hearing of the case on February 13,
2004.[8] Petitioners counsel thus attended such scheduled hearing during which he filed a Motion for
Inhibition[9] of public respondent on the ground of gross ignorance, dereliction of duty, and manifest
partiality towards the administratrix. Public respondent, noting that an error was committed in the
service to petitioners of the notice of hearing, ignored the motion of petitioners counsel. [10]

Intending to compare the list of properties in the estates inventory all of which properties were
appraised at a fair value of P100 million with the list of assets valued at P1 Billion said to have been
ceded in 1990 to the decedent under his Compromise Agreement with the Presidential Commission on
Good Government,[11] petitioners counsel sent the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC
a letter[12] requesting to be furnished with certified true copies of the updated inventory.

By still another letter,[13] petitioners counsel requested to be furnished with certified true copies of the
order issued by the court during the hearing of February 13, 2004, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken thereon.[14]

By Order[15] of March 2, 2004, public respondent indicated why petitioners had no standing to file the
Motion for Inhibition as well as to request for certified true copies of the above-indicated
documents. Read the Order of March 2, 2004:

Perusal of the motion shows that the movant is asking this Court to act on their motion despite the
denial of their Omnibus Motion to Intervene which to date remains pending resolution with the Court of
Appeals.

As correctly pointed out by the Administratrix, said motion is filed by persons/entities who have no legal
standing in the above-entitled case, hence they cannot ask anything from this Court, much more for this
Court to act on pleadings filed or soon to be filed.

For the record, the Court received two (2) letters dated February 17 and 27, 2004 addressed to Atty.
Maria Luisa Lesle G. Gonzales, the Branch Clerk of Courtasking that he be furnished with certified true
copies of the updated inventory and Order issued by this Court on February 13, 2004 hearing as well as
the corresponding transcript of stenographic notes within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said letters.

Considering that the movants were not allowed to intervene in the proceedings per order of this Court
dated January 2, 2002, copies of all pleadings/orders filed/issued relative to this case may only be
secured from the [Administratrix] and/or counsel. [16] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners thus filed on April 30, 2004 before this Court the present petition for mandamus and
prohibition to compel public respondent to allow them to access, examine, and obtain copies of any and
all documents forming part of the records of the case and disqualify public respondent from further
presiding thereover.

In their petition, petitioners contend that the records of the case are public records to which the public
has the right to access, inspect and obtain official copies thereof, [17]recognition of which right is enjoined
under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 135 and Section 11, Rule 136 of the
Rules of Court.

Petitioners further contend that public respondent manifested her arbitrariness, malice and partiality
through her blatant disregard of basic rules in the disposition and safekeeping of court records, and her
denial of their right to access the records suffices to bar her from presiding over the case;[18] and public
respondents incompetence, malice, bad faith and partiality are underscored by her failure to enforce for
more than three years the requirement of the Rules of Court on the prompt submission by the
administratrix of her final inventory and the filing of a periodic accounting of her administration. [19]

By Comment[20] filed on September 21, 2004, private respondent submits that the petition is fatally
defective since petitioners failed to disclose in their certification of non-forum shopping that they had
earlier instituted an administrative complaint against public respondent which prayed for the same
reliefs[21] for the disqualification of public respondent from presiding over the case and for the court
docket to be opened for examination.

Private respondent further submits that the petition for prohibition should be dismissed since
petitioners are not parties to the case, hence, they have no personality to file a motion for inhibition. [22]

As to the alleged denial of petitioners right to examine court records and participate in the proceedings,
private respondent submits that this is not unqualifiedly true for petitioners must have secured a copy of
the inventory of the assets and liabilities of the estate, they being aware of the declared fair value of the
estate and their counsel was present during the February 13, 2004 hearing. [23]
For consideration then are the following issues: (1) whether the present petition is fatally defective for
failure of petitioners to disclose in the certificate of non-forum shopping that they had priorly instituted
an administrative complaint against public respondent which prays for the same reliefs; (2) whether a
writ of mandamus may issue to compel public respondent to allow petitioners to examine and obtain
copies of any or all documents forming part of the records of the case; and (3) whether a writ of
prohibition will issue in favor of petitioners, who are not parties to the case, to inhibit public respondent
from presiding over the case.

As reflected above, petitioners had, before the filing of the present petition, filed an administrative
complaint before this Court against public respondent, Alfredo Hilado, Lopez Sugar Corporation and First
Farmers Holding Corporation v. Judge Amor A. Reyes, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, docketed
as A.M. No. RTJ-05-1910.

Petitioners subsequently filed a supplemental [24] and a second supplemental administrative

complaint[25] praying for 1) the imposition of appropriate disciplinary sanctions against public respondent
for, among other things, denying them their right to access the docket of the case, and 2) the
disqualification of public respondent from presiding over the case, which latter prayer was, however,
subsequently withdrawn in a motion[26] filed on April 30, 2004, the same day that the present petition
was filed.

Denying the existence of forum shopping, petitioners argue that it exists only where the elements of litis
pendencia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.[27]

It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and
not to the exercise of administrative powers. [28]

The non-existence of forum shopping notwithstanding, this Court proscribes the filing of an
administrative complaint before the exhaustion of judicial remedies against questioned errors of a judge
in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

Resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies are prerequisites for the taking of, among other measures,
an administrative complaint against the person of the judge concerned. So Atty. Flores v. Hon.
Abesamis[29] teaches:
x x x [T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial
Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may
be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction
or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration
(or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary
remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical,
capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the
case may be.

x x x Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the
corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the
persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the
available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality,
that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened,
or closed.

x x x Law and logic decree that "administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof" Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces
or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative
sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and
functions; x x x[30] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

It is thus only after a questioned action of a judge in a pending case has been judicially resolved with
finality that the door to an inquiry into his or her administrative liability may be said to have opened.

Parenthetically, during the pendency of the present petition or on April 15, 2005, the Second Division of
this Court rendered a decision [31] on the above-said administrative complaint filed by petitioners against
public respondent.

On the merits of the petition for mandamus, Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted constitutional provision guarantees a general right the right to information on matters
of public concern and, as an accessory thereto, the right of access to official records and the like. The
right to information on matters of public concern or of public interest is both the purpose and the limit
of the constitutional right of access to public documents.[32]

Insofar as the right to information relates to judicial records, an understanding of the term judicial record
or court record is in order.

The term judicial record or court record does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the
courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all
processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony [33] which took
place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts
for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been described to include any paper, letter, map,
book, other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording, court reporters notes,
transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or electronic form, made or received
pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and includes
all evidence it has received in a case. [34]

In determining whether a particular information is of public concern, there is no right test. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest
or importance as it relates to or affect the public. [35]

It bears emphasis that the interest of the public hinges on its right to transparency in the administration
of justice, to the end that it will serve to enhance the basic fairness of the judicial proceedings, safeguard
the integrity of the fact-finding process, and foster an informed public discussion of governmental
affairs. Thus in Barretto v. Philippine Publishing Co.,[36] this Court held:

x x x The foundation of the right of the public to know what is going on in the courts is not the fact that
the public, or a portion of it, is curious, or that what is going on in the court is news, or would be
interesting, or would furnish topics of conversation; but is simply that it has a right to know whether a
public officer is properly performing his duty. In other words, the right of the public to be informed of
the proceedings in court is not founded in the desire or necessity of people to know about the doing of
others, but in the necessity of knowing whether its servant, the judge, is properly performing his
duty. x x x

The case in Cowley vs. Pulsifer (137 Mass. 392) is so pertinent to the questions presented for our
decision in the case at bar that we cannot refrain from quoting extensively therefrom. x x x
x x x The general advantage to the country in having these proceedings made public more than
counterbalances the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such
proceedings. x x x

The chief advantage to the country to which we can discern, and that which we understand to be
intended by the foregoing passage, is the security which publicity gives for the proper administration of
justice. x x x It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public eye, not because
the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but because it is of the highest
moment that those who administer justice should act under the sense of public responsibility, and
that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public
duty is performed.

From this quotation it is obvious that it was not the idea of the supreme court of Massachusetts to lay
down the proposition that simply because a pleading happened to be filed in a public office it becomes
public property that any individual, whether interested or not, had the right to publish its contents, or
that any newspaper was privileged to scatter the allegations contained therein to the four corners of the
country. The right of the public to know the contents of the paper is the basis of the privilege, which is,
as we have said, the right to determine by its own senses that its servant, the judge, is performing his
duties according to law. x x x[37](Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these are the
authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is
charged with knowledge.[38] Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the opinions of
judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest
knowledge of these from the public.[39] Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge Llamas,[40] this Court found a
judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of his
decision in a criminal case of which they were even the therein private complainants, the decision being
already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize.

Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case
need not be matters of public concern or interest. For they are filed for the purpose of establishing the
basis upon which the court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests.

In thus determining which part or all of the records of a case may be accessed to, the purpose for which
the parties filed them is to be considered.
In intestate proceedings, the heirs file pleadings and documents for the purpose of establishing their
right to a share of the estate. As for the creditors, their purpose is to establish their claim to the estate
and be paid therefor before the disposition of the estate.

Information regarding the financial standing of a person at the time of his death and the manner by
which his private estate may ultimately be settled is not a matter of general, public concern or one in
which a citizen or the public has an interest by which its legal rights or liabilities maybe
affected. Granting unrestricted public access and publicity to personal financial information may
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy to which an individual may have an interest in limiting its
disclosure or dissemination.

If the information sought then is not a matter of public concern or interest, denial of access thereto does
not violate a citizens constitutional right to information.

Once a particular information has been determined to be of public concern, the accessory right of access
to official records, including judicial records, are open to the public.

The accessory right to access public records may, however, be restricted on a showing of good cause.
How good cause can be determined, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Republican
Company v. Appeals Court teaches:[41]

The publics right of access to judicial records, including transcripts, evidence, memoranda, and court
orders, maybe restricted, but only on a showing of good cause. To determine whether good cause is
shown, a judge must balance the rights of the parties based on the particular facts of each case. In so
doing, the judge must take into account all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the nature
of the parties and the controversy, the type of information and the privacy interests involved, the extent
of community interest, and the reason for the request.[42] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)

And even then, the right is subject to inherent supervisory and protective powers of every court over its
own records and files.[43]

The Supreme Court of Canada, expounding on the right of the court to exercise supervisory powers over
materials surrendered into its care, held:
It follows that the court, as the custodian of the exhibits, is bound to inquire into the use that is to be
made of them and, in my view, is fully entitled to regulate that use by securing appropriate undertakings
and assurances if those be advisable to protect competing interests. x x x

In exercising its supervisory powers over materials surrendered into its care, the court may regulate the
use made of it. In an application of this nature, the court must protect the respondent and
accommodate public interest in access. x x x In an application of this nature the court must protect the
respondent and accommodate the public interest in access. This can only be done in terms of the actual
purpose, and in the face of obvious prejudice and the absence of a specific purpose, the order for
unrestricted access and reproduction should not have been made. [44] (Underscoring supplied)

In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion[45] and subject to the supervisory and
protective powers of the court,[46] after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for
access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. In the exercise of such discretion, the
following issues may be relevant: whether parties have interest in privacy, whether information is being
sought for legitimate purpose or for improper purpose, whether there is threat of particularly serious
embarrassment to party, whether information is important to public health and safety, whether sharing
of information among litigants would promote fairness and efficiency, whether party benefiting from
confidentiality order is public entity or official, and whether case involves issues important to the public.
[47]

By the administratrix-private respondents own information, petitioners are the plaintiffs in two
complaints (against Roberto Benedicto et al.) for damages and/or sums of money, Civil Case No. 95-9137
and Civil Case No. 11178, filed before the Bacolod RTC. She contends, however, that if the motion to
dismiss [these RTC Bacolod cases is] granted, . . . petitioners would have absolutely no interest of any
kind [over] the [e]state of the [d]eceased Roberto S. Benedicto. [48]

Petitioners stated main purpose for accessing the records to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules
governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and
appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting[49] appears
legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto et al., they
have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact interested persons
under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court reading:

Rule 135, SEC. 2. Publicity of proceedings and records. x x x x The records of every court of justice shall be
public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person, at all proper business
hours, under the supervision of the clerk having custody of such records, unless the court shall, in any
special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the interest of morality or decency. (Underscoring
supplied),

entitled to be informed of the inventory as well as other records which are relevant to their claims
against Benedicto.

As long then as any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of court records and
pays court fees,[50] a court may not deny access to such records. Of course as this Court held in Beegan v.
Borja,[51] precautionary measures to prevent tampering or alteration must be observed:

We are not unaware of the common practice in the courts with respect to the photocopying or xeroxing
of portions of case records as long as the same are not confidential or disallowed by the rules to be
reproduced. The judge need not be bothered as long as the permission of the Clerk of Court has been
sought and as long as a duly authorized representative of the court takes charge of the reproduction
within the court premises if warranted or if not, the said court representative must bring along the case
records where reproduction takes place and return the same intact to the Clerk of Court. [52]

In fine, this Court finds the petition for mandamus meritorious, petitioners being interested persons who
have a legitimate reason or purpose for accessing the records of the case.

Respecting the prohibition aspect of the petition, the same fails.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court which govern disqualification of judges provide:

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity or
to counsel within

the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he was presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

SECTION 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If it be claimed that an official is
disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file
with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with
the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his
disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the
case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own
competency, until after final judgment in the case.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since petitioners are not parties to the case, they may not seek public respondents inhibition, whether
under the first paragraph of above-quoted Section 1 which constitutes grounds
for mandatory disqualification, or under the second paragraph of the same section
on voluntary disqualification.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent is ORDERED to allow
petitioners to access, examine, and obtain copies of any and all documents-part of the records of Special
Proceeding No. 00-97505 bearing on

the inventory of assets and liabilities of the estate and the hearing conducted by the trial court on
February 13, 2004, subject to precautionary measures to prevent tampering or alteration thereof.

The petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177271

Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set
aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which
have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short)
and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list
elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective
nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List
System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the
second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively
denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14)
accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous letter-request.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, 1 the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271
have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d]
as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for
failure to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec 2]" and,
2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in
the May 2007 elections.

In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public and private
respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a non-extendible period of five (5)
days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7) private respondents 3 in G.R. No. 177271
and one party-list group4 mentioned in G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate comments. In the
main, the separate comments of the private respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of
the plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list groups and thus
disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in the May 14, 2007 party-list
elections.

The facts:

On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under
the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto,
a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly
subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups,
namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY;
(7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG;
(12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a
longer, albeit an overlapping, list.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify,
thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners
appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy
of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to
be resolved.

Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned
14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors,
petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter 5dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden
Dalaig of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Another letter 6 of
the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig
the particular urgency of the subject request.

Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales requests.
The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline
"COMELEC WONT BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES",7 with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list
polls not personality oriented."

On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and
as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter8 to the Comelec formally requesting action and
definitive decision on Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list
nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga
at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the
Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying the
banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-
07249 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect
denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as
follows:

RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in
connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on election day.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to the Commission
inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.)

According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007 Resolution only on
April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last part of the "Order empowering the
Law Department to implement this resolution and reply to all letters inquiring on the party-list
nominees is apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the
impression that the antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 is the final answer to the two formal
requests of Petitioners".10

The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3,
2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724.
To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the accreditation accorded
by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these
groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR, Comelec -

xxx committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations even
without simultaneously determining whether the nominees of herein private respondents are qualified
or not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they claim to represent in Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of the eight-point
guidelines prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani 11 case which states that, "not
only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees." In the case of private respondents, public respondent Comelec granted
accreditations without the required simultaneous determination of the qualification of the nominees as
part of the accreditation process of the party-list organization itself. (Words in bracket added; italization
in the original)12

The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course of action would entail
going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in question, particularly whether
or not they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the
Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of
special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual
issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. 13The sole function of a writ of
certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a
review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence. 14

Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026 in which
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the nominees of the respondent party-
list groups named in their petition.

Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications of
their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification
of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as
aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941
requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec "not later than
ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the submission "not
later than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives
shall be chosen.

Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and captures
the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these consolidated cases and they may be summarized as
follows:

1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-
list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of
said nominees.

While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of
subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while commanding the publication and
the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list system participating groups, nonetheless tells
the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees in said certified list. Thus:

SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before
election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which
have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and
distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of
the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list. (Emphasis added.)

And doubtless part of Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the
public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news report appearing in the adverted April 13,
2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin:

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision not to release the names of
nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions accredited to participate in the party-list
election which will be held simultaneously with the May 14 mid-term polls.

COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. said he and [the other five COMELEC] Commissioners ---
believe that the party list elections must not be personality oriented.

Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 , the people are to vote for sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions,
not for their nominees.

He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees. xxx
(Words in brackets and emphasis added)

Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.

Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to
information enshrined in the self-executory 15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision
enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article
II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens
to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on
the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in
a constitutional regime.16 Without a governments acceptance of the limitations upon it by the
Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those
duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.

By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to
information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. 17 And since every citizen by the simple fact of
his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily
unavailing.18

Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to
official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the peoples right to know is limited to
"matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly,
the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of
confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those
affecting national security.19

The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both terms
embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the
interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case
basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public.

If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as
sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for
a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest.

As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and
duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be
posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is
to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No.
7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the
"Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-
disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections.
The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last
sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.

The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It
cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a
weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information. 20 While
the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons behind the
Comelecs disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to be stressed, however, that
the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts and applicable statutory and
decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always assumes, at the first instance, the
presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of government officials and offices.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about
matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as
veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner
v. Romulo,21 has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that
would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. 22 So it must be here
for still other reasons articulated earlier.

In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to
disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names
of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14,
2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its compliance
herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof.

This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-38354

This case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act on the
ground that only questions of law are involved.

The antecedent facts are summarized in the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. Seventh
Judicial District, Branch 20, Pasig, Rizal in Civil Case No. 16980 to wit:

On January 22, 1972, plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant in the municipal court of Makati,
Rizal, for the collection of the amount of P 2,100 plus penalty of 12% per annum and P 751.30 as
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The sum of P 2,100 represents the association dues assessed
on the lot owned by the defendant as member of the plaintiff association. On February 16, 1972,
defendant filed an answer traversing all the material allegations of the complaint and set up the
following special defenses; 1) That there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant; 2) that the collection of alleged dues from its members is in reality an unlawful exercise of
the power of taxation which is beyond the corporate power of the plaintiff, 3) that the amount sought to
be collected is unreasonable and oppressive, 4) that the assessment of the dues upon the defendant in
so far as he has not voluntarily affiliated with plaintiff is illegal, immoral, contrary to law and public
policy, and 5) that the acts of plaintiff in compelling the defendant to be a member is unconstitutional
and outside the scope of its corporate power. Defendant therefore sets up the counterclaim of P 2,000 as
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. On May 19, 1972, the parties submitted the following
stipulation of facts and prayed for judgment to be rendered therein in accordance with said stipulation of
facts:

STIPULATION OF FACTS

COME NOW the undersigned attorneys for the plaintiff and the defendant in the above-entitled case,
and to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts:

1. That plaintiff was incorporated as corporation way back in August 25, 1957 for the purposes stated in
its Articles of Incorporation, copy of which as amended is attached hereto as Annex 'A';

2. That the By-laws of the association, copy of which as amended is attached hereto as Annex 'B',
provides for automatic membership in the association for every owner and purchaser of lots located
inside the Bel Air Village as defined and bounded in the Articles of Incorporation;

3. That without applying for membership in plaintiff association, defendant in this case, like the other
members, automatically became a member because he is the registered owner of a lot located inside the
Bel Air Village;

4. That in accordance with the By-Laws of the plaintiff, the association is run and managed by a Board of
Governors who (sic) exercises, among other things, the power to assess and collect against every owner
of the lot inside the Bel Air Village, certain amounts for the operation and activities of the association;

5. That pursuant to the powers granted under the By-Laws, the Board of Governors have assessed the
owners of the lots inside the Bel Air Village, a sum to be paid either quarterly, semi-annually or annually,
computed on the basis of the area per square meter of the lot owned by every member as follows:

a. During the period from 1962-1964, the basis of the assessment is P 0.30 for every square meter of lot
owned by the members inside the Bel Air Village compound;

b. From l965-1968, the assessment was increased to P 0.35 for every square meter;

c. From 1969-1971, the assessment was further increased to P 0.40 for every square meter;

d. Starting 1972, the assessment was changed to P0.50 for every square meter of the lot owned by the
members;

6. That under the By-laws, the foregoing assessments if not paid when due, constitute a lien on the lots
of the owners inside the Bel Air Village;
7. That defendant is the owner of a lot located inside the Bel Air Village with an area of 525 square
meters under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal;

8. That pursuant to the powers granted under the By-laws of the association, the Board of Governors has
made the following assessment on defendant's property on the basis of the area per square meter of the
lot owned by him as follows:

1962525 sq. meters x P 0.30P 157.50

1963525 sq. meters x P 0.30P 157.50

1964525 sq. meters x P 0.30P 157.50

1965525 sq. meters x P 0.35P 183.75

1966525 sq. meters x P 0.35P 183.75

1967525 sq. meters x P 0.35P 183.75

1968525 sq. meters x P 0.35P 183.75

1969525 sq. meters x P 0.40P 210.00

1970525 sq. meters x P 0.40P 210.00

1971525 sq. meters x P 0.40P 210.00

1972525 sq. meters x P 0.50P 262.50

TOTAL--------P 2,100.00

9. That the total amount of P 2,100 alleged in paragraph 4 of the complaint represents the assessments
of the plaintiff on the defendant in accordance with the computation stated in paragraph 8 above;

10. That defendant protested the above assessments and refused to pay the same inspite of repeated
demands:

11. That as per Resolution No. 2-65 of the Board of Governors, copy hereof is attached as Annex 'C', all
annual association dues not paid on or before September 30 are considered delinquent and imposed an
interest of 12% per annum until fully paid;

12. That they are attaching to this stipulation as Annex 'D', the brochure of the association which
embodies the deed of restriction and rules & regulations governing the lot owners inside the Bel Air
Village.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered with the foregoing stipulation of facts.

Manila for Makati, Rizal

May 18th, 1972.

(SGD.) FRANCISCO S. DIZON (SGD.) F.R. ARGUELLES, JR.

Counsel for Defendant Counsel for Plaintiff

Suite 311 ABC Building 517 Federation Center Bldg.

Escolta, Manila Binondo, Manila

The parties submitted an addendum to stipulation of facts as follows:

ADDENDUM TO STIPULATION OF FACTS

DATED MAY 18, 1972

COME NOW the undersigned attorneys for plaintiff and defendant in the above a title case, and to his
Honorable Court hereby respectfully submit the following additional stipulation by incorporating to he
Stipulation of Facts , dated May 18, 1972, the Bel Air Village Association, Inc. 1971 Annual Report, to be
marked as Annex "E" and made an integral part thereof.

Manila for Makati, Rizal

June 3, 1972.

(SGD.) FRANCISCO DIZON (SGD.) F.R. ARGUELLES, JR.

Counsel for Plaintiff Counsel for PLaintiff

517 Federation Center Bldg. 517 Federation Center Bldg.

Binondo, Manila Dasmarinas cor. Muelle de

Binondo, Manila

The parties having filed their respective memoranda, the inferior court rendered its decision dated July
31, 1972 in favor of the plaintiff pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the principal amount of P
2,100.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% annually from the year 1962 until the aforesaid amount
is fully paid and to pay plaintiff the amount of P 300.00 as and for attorney's fees and to pay the costs of
suit.

SO ORDERED.

Appeal was perfected pursuant to Republic Act No. 6031.

This Court after examining the pleadings doubted its appellate jurisdiction because issues not capable for
pecuniary estimation were raised and decided in said inferior court. Upon suggestion of the Court the
parties on May 30, 1973 agreed in a joint manifestation for this Court to decide the case in its original
jurisdiction in order to cure the defect. They likewise agreed to submit the case for decision based on the
stipulation of facts, heretofore quoted and the memoranda filed in the inferior court. Upon suggestion of
the Court the plaintiff filed its supplemental memorandum on June 20, 1973." (At pp. 31-37, Rollo)

The decision of the Municipal Court of Makati was affirmed.

Defendant Dionisio then filed a petition for review of the Court of First Instance decision with the Court
of Appeals. As stated earlier, the appellate court elevated the case to us the issues raised being purely
questions of law.

The resolution of the petition hinges on whether or not the respondent association can lawfully collect
the questioned dues from the petitioner.

The petitioner insists that he is not liable to pay the dues on the following grounds:

1) The questioned assessment is a property tax outside the corporate power of respondent association
to impose.

2) Respondent association has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the assessment for lack of
privity of contract.

3) The questioned assessment should not be enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive,
confiscatory and discriminatory.

4) Respondent association is exercising governmental powers which should not be sanctioned.

There is no dispute that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136 covering the subject parcel of land issued
in the name of the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an
automatic member of the respondent Bel-Air Association and must abide by such rules and regulations
laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the
community. It is likewise not disputed that the provision on automatic membership was expressly
annotated on the petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title and on the title of his predecessor-in-interest.

The question, therefore, boils down to whether or not the petitioner is bound by such annotation.

Section 39 of Art. 496 (The Land Registration Act) states:

Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold
the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate ... (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in the case of Tanchoco v. Aquino, (154 SCRA 1 [1987]), we ruled that purchasers of a registered
land are bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel
of land. We stated:

... that when petitioners purchased on April 6, 1964 from Rafael Viola an undivided (1/2) portion of Lot
314 and then on January 5, 1965 a 6/7 portion of the other half of Lot 314 there was at the back of TCT
No. 11682 covering Lot 314 an annotation of a notice of lis pendens in favor of Donato Lajom, under
Entry No. 19553/T-14707 (Rollo, p. 23), as follows:

Entry No. 19553/T-14707; Kind-Lis pendens in favor of Donato Lajom; Conditions-1/2 of the properties
described in this title is the object of a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 8077 of the C.F.I. of N.E.; date of
instrument-Dec. 16, 1949; Date of Inscription-Jan. 11, 1950 at 2:00 p.m.

Petitioner Pastor Tanchoco who holds office as Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija (Rollo, p. 30) could
not have missed the import of such annotation. It was an announcement to the whole world that a
particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said
property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.
Since petitioners herein bought the land in question with the knowledge of the existing encumbrances
thereon, they cannot invoke the right of purchasers in good faith, and they cannot likewise have
acquired better rights than those of their predecessors in interest (Constantino v. Espiritu, 45 SCRA 557
[1972])"

In effect, the petitioner's contention that he has no privity of contract with the respondent association is
not persuasive. When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that
he took the same free of all encumbrances except notations at the back of the certificate of title, among
them, that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association.

One of the obligations of a member of the respondent association is to pay certain amounts for the
operation and activities of the association which is being collected by the Board of Governors. The dues
collected are intended for garbage collection, salary of security guards, cleaning and maintenance of
streets and street lights and establishments of parks. The amount to be paid by each lot owner is
computed on the basis of the area per square meter of the lot owned by every member.

The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended clearly indicate that the
dues are not in the concept of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the
common expenses for necessary services. A property tax is assessed according to the value of the
property (Philippine Transit Association v. Treasurer of the City of Manila, et al. 83 Phil. 722 [1949]) but
the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot. The basis appears reasonable. The dues are fees
which a member of the respondent association is required to pay as his contribution to the expenses
incurred by the respondent association in hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets, street
lights and other community projects for the benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village. These
expenses are necessary, valid, and reasonable for the particular community involved.

The petitioner also objects to the assessment on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary,
discriminatory, oppressive and confiscatory. According to him the assessment is oppressive because the
amount assessed is not based on benefits but on the size of the area of the lot, discriminatory and
unreasonable because only the owners of the lots are required to pay the questioned assessment and
not the residents who are only renting inside the village; and confiscatory because under the by-Laws of
the respondent association, the latter holds a lien on the property assessed if the amount is not paid.

We agree with the lower court's findings, to wit:

The limitations upon the ownership of the defendant as clearly imposed in the annotations of TCT No.
81136 do not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Since
these limitations have been imposed upon the contract of sale as admitted in the stipulation of facts, it is
obvious that the annotation of said lien and encumbrance that the defendant automatically becomes a
member of the plaintiff association and subject to its rules, regulations or resolutions is valid, binding
and enforceable.

The contention that this lien collides with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association is not
tenable. The transaction between the defendants and the original seller (defendant's immediate
predecessor) of the land covered by TCT No. 81136 is a sale and the conditions have been validly
imposed by the said vendor/the same not being contrary to law, morals and good customs and public
policy. The fact that it has been approved by the Land Registration Commission did not make it a
governmental act subject to the constitutional restriction against infringement of the right of association.
The constitutional proscription that no person can be compelled to be a member of an association
against his will applies only to government acts and not to private transactions like the one in question.

The defendant cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the association against
his will because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not desire to
comply with the annotation or lien in question he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of
disposing of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the plaintiff
association. After all, it is not imposed upon him personally but upon his ownership of the property. The
limitation and restriction is a limitation that follows the land whoever is its owner. It does not inhere in
the person of the defendant.

The Court therefore holds that the lien or encumbrance or limitation imposed upon TCT No. 81136 is
valid.

The second question has reference to the reasonableness of the resolution assessing the monthly dues
in question upon the defendant. The exhibits annexed to the stipulation of facts describe the purpose or
goals for which these monthly dues assessed upon the members of the plaintiff including the defendant
are to be disbursed. They are intended for garbage collection, salary of security guards, cleaning and
maintenance of streets, establishment of parks, etc. Living in this modern, complex society has raised
complex problems of security, sanitation, communitarian comfort and convenience and it is now a
recognized necessity that members of the community must organize themselves for the successful
solution of these problems. Goals intended for the promotion of their safety and security, peace,
comfort, and general welfare cannot be categorized as unreasonable. Indeed, the essence of community
life is association and cooperation for without these such broader welfare goals cannot be attained. It is
for these reasons that modem subdivisions are imposing encumbrance upon titles of prospective lot
buyers a limitation upon ownership of the said buyers that they automatically become members of
homeowners' association living within the community of the subdivision.

Even assuming that defendant's ownership and enjoyment of the lot covered by TCT No. 81136 is limited
because of the burden of being a member of plaintiff association the goals and objectives of the
association are far greater because they apply to and affect the community at large. It can be justified on
legal grounds that a person's enjoyment of ownership may be restricted and limited if to do so the
welfare of the community of which he is a member is promoted and attained. These benefits in which
the defendant participates more than offset the burden and inconvenience that he may suffer.

It is contended that the dues are assessed not only upon owners who have residences and houses on
their lots but even upon those owners whose lots are vacant or are being leased to others. It is therefore
argued that this is discriminatory. The Court disagrees. When the defendant bought the lot in question, it
is assumed that he is going to reside in this place. The limitation or encumbrance assailed in the case at
bar is for the assurance that the buyer of the lot will bird his house and live in the Bel Air Village.
Otherwise, the defendant can just speculate and sell his lot a higher price and defeat the very purposes
for which the encumbrance is imposed.

The Court holds that the limitation or lien imposed upon TCT No. 811136 is reasonable. (pp.. 38-42,
Rollo)
The lower court states that the defendant has occupied the lot for ten years up to the time of the
rendition of judgement. On grounds of equity alone, he should contribute his share in the community
expenses for security, street lights, maintenance of streets, and other services.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the
trial court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SECTION 9

GR NO. 156273

THE HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO AND MARIA ROTEA, petitioners herein, are the successors-in-interest
of the former registered owners of two (2) parcels of land situated in Lahug, Cebu City, designated as Lot
No. 916 with an area of 2,355 square meters under TCT No. RT-7543 (106) T-13694, and Lot No. 920
consisting of 3,097 square meters under TCT No. RT-7544 (107) T-13695. 1

In 1949 the National Airport Corporation as the predecessor agency of respondent Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) wanted to acquire Lots Nos. 916 and 920 above described
among other parcels of land for the proposed expansion of Lahug Airport. 2 To entice the landowners to
cede their properties, the government assured them that they could repurchase their lands once Lahug
Airport was closed or its operations transferred to Mactan Airport. 3 Some of the landowners executed
deeds of sale with right of repurchase in favor of the government but many others, including the owners
of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 herein mentioned, refused the offer because the payment was perceived to be
way below the market price.4

On 16 April 1952, as the negotiations for the purchase of the lots necessary for the expansion and
improvement of Lahug Airport irredeemably broke down, the Civil Aeronautics Administration as the
successor agency of the National Airport Corporation filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and other subject realties, docketed as Civil Case
No. R-1881.

On 29 December 1961 the trial court promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 condemning Lots
Nos. 916 and 920 and other lots for public use upon payment of just compensation. 5 Petitioners
predecessors were paid P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with consequential
damages by way of legal interest from 16 November 1947. No appeal was taken from the Decision on
Lots Nos. 916 and 920, and the judgment of condemnation became final and executory. 6 Thereafter, the
certificates of title for these parcels of land were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
under TCT No. 58691 for Lot No. 916 and TCT No. 58692 for Lot No. 920, which under RA 6958 (1990)
were subsequently transferred in favor of respondent MCIAA. 7

At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to MCIAA, Lahug Airport ceased
operations as the Mactan Airport was opened for incoming and outgoing flights. 8 Lots Nos. 916 and 920
which had been expropriated for the extension of Lahug Airport were not utilized. 9 In fact, no expansion
of Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest. 10 Hence, petitioners wrote
then President Fidel V. Ramos and the airport manager begging them for the exercise of their alleged
right to repurchase Lots Nos. 916 and 920. 11 Their pleas were not heeded.12

On 11 March 1997 petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages with RTC of Cebu City
against respondent MCIAA to compel the repurchase of Lots Nos. 916 and 920, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-20015. In the main, petitioners averred that they had been convinced by the officers of the
predecessor agency of respondent MCIAA not to oppose the expropriation proceedings since in the
future they could repurchase the properties if the airport expansion would not push through. MCIAA did
not object to petitioners evidence establishing these allegations.

When the civil case was pending, one Richard E. Enchuan filed a Motion for Transfer of Interest alleging
that he acquired through deeds of assignment the rights of some of herein petitioners over Lots Nos.
916 and 920.13 The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) also sought to intervene in the
civil case claiming that it leased in good faith Lot No. 920 from the predecessor agencies of respondent
MCIAA and that it built thereon its Regional Equipment Services and its Region 7 Office. 14

On 12 April 1999 the trial court found merit in the claims of petitioners and granted them the right to
repurchase the properties at the amount pegged as just compensation in Civil Case No. R-1881 but
subject to the alleged property rights of Richard E. Enchuan and the leasehold of DPWH. 15 The trial court
opined that the expropriation became illegal or functus officio when the purpose for which it was
intended was no longer there.16

Respondent MCIAA appealed the Decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 64456.1vvphi1.nt

On 20 December 2001 the Court of Appeals reversed the assailed Decision on the ground that the
judgment of condemnation in Civil Case No. R-1881 was unconditional so that the rights gained
therefrom by respondent MCIAA were indicative of ownership in fee simple. 17 The appellate court cited
Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan18 which held that mere deviation from the public purpose for which
the power of eminent domain was exercised does not justify the reversion of the property to its former
owners, and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals 19 which is allegedly stare
decisis to the instant case to prevent the exercise of the right of repurchase as the former dealt with a
parcel of land similarly expropriated under Civil Case No. R-1881. 20

On 28 November 2002 reconsideration of the Decision was denied. 21 Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioners argue that Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan does not apply to the case at bar since what
was involved therein was the "right of reversion" and not the "right of repurchase" which they are
invoking. They also differentiate Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals 22 from
the instant case in that the landowners in the MCIAA case offered inadmissible evidence to show their
entitlement to a right of repurchase, while petitioners herein offered evidence based on personal
knowledge for which reason MCIAA did not object and thus waived whatever objection it might have
had to the admissibility thereof. Finally, petitioners allege that their right to equal protection of the laws
would be infringed if some landowners are given the right to repurchase their former properties even as
they are denied the exercise of such prerogative.

On the other hand, respondent MCIAA clings to our decisions in Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan and
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals. According to respondent MCIAA "there
is only one instance when expropriated land may be repurchased by its previous owners, and that is, if
the decision of expropriation itself provides [the] condition for such repurchase." Respondent asserts
that the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 is absolute and without conditions, thus, no repurchase could
be validly exercised.

This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with, there exists an undeniable
historical narrative that the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had suggested to the landowners of the
properties covered by the Lahug Airport expansion scheme that they could repurchase their properties
at the termination of the airports venture. 23 Some acted on this assurance and sold their
properties;24 other landowners held out and waited for the exercise of eminent domain to take its course
until finally coming to terms with respondents predecessors that they would not appeal nor block
further the judgment of condemnation if the same right of repurchase was extended to them. 25 A
handful failed to prove that they acted on such assurance when they parted with the ownership of their
lands.26

In resolving this dispute, we must reckon with the rulings of this Court in Fery v. Municpality of
Cabanatuan and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, which define the
rights and obligations of landowners whose properties were expropriated when the public purpose for
which eminent domain was exercised no longer subsists. In Fery, which was cited in the recent case of
Reyes v. Court of Appeals,27 we declared that the government acquires only such rights in expropriated
parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties -

If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended
or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is
terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If x x x land is
expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only
use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to
the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary x x x x If, upon the contrary,
however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land
becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality,
and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings x x x x When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use,
without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner x x x x 28

In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, respondent Chiongbian sought to enforce an alleged

right of repurchase over her properties that had been expropriated in Civil Case No. R-1881. This Court
did not allow her to adduce evidence of her claim, for to do so would unsettle as to her properties the
judgment of condemnation in the eminent domain proceedings. We also held therein that Chiongbians
evidence was both inadmissible and lacking in probative value -

The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the
Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to
CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was
expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport.
CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan-Cebu International Airport vs. Court of Appeals
wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a written agreement
containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation proceedings but a contract of
sale x x x x To permit CHIONGBIAN to prove the existence of a compromise settlement which she claims
to have entered into with the Republic of the Philippines prior to the rendition of judgment in the
expropriation case would result in a modification of the judgment of a court which has long become final
and executory x x x x And even assuming for the sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN could prove the
existence of the alleged written agreement acknowledging her right to repurchase Lot No. 941 through
parol evidence, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence presented by CHIONGBIAN was
admissible x x x x Aside from being inadmissible under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, [the]
testimonies are also inadmissible for being hearsay in nature x x x x 29

We adhere to the principles enunciated in Fery and in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, and
do not overrule them. Nonetheless the weight of their import, particularly our ruling as regards the
properties of respondent Chiongbian in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, must be
commensurate to the facts that were established therein as distinguished from those extant in the case
at bar. Chiongbian put forth inadmissible and inconclusive evidence, while in the instant case we have
preponderant proof as found by the trial court of the existence of the right of repurchase in favor of
petitioners.

Moreover, respondent MCIAA has brought to our attention a significant and telling portion in the
Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 validating our discernment that the expropriation by the predecessors
of respondent was ordered under the running impression that Lahug Airport would continue in
operation -

As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be doubted. Although Mactan
Airport is being constructed, it does not take away the actual usefulness and importance of the Lahug
Airport: it is handling the air traffic both civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly to Mindanao and
Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the North and Manila. Then, no evidence was adduced to
show how soon is the Mactan Airport to be placed in operation and whether the Lahug Airport will be
closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other departments of the Government to determine said
matters. The Court cannot substitute its judgment for those of the said departments or agencies. In the
absence of such showing, the Court will presume that the Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation
(emphasis supplied).301awphi1.nt

While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the presence of public
purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of Lahug Airport, the trial court in
its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding
that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation." Verily, these meaningful statements in the body of
the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was
confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer "in operation." This inference further implies two (2) things:
(a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being used
for any airport expansion project, the rights vis--vis the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between
the State and their former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and, (b) the foregoing
unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic part of
the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in
accord with the findings as contained in the body thereof. 31
Significantly, in light of the discussion above, the admission of petitioners during the pre-trial of Civil
Case No. CEB-20015 for reconveyance and damages that respondent MCIAA was the absolute owner of
Lots Nos. 916 and 920 does not prejudice petitioners interests. This is as it should be not only because
the admission concerns a legal conclusion fiercely debated by the parties 32 but more so since respondent
was truly the absolute owner of the realties until it was apparent that Lahug Airport had stopped doing
business.

To sum up what we have said so far, the attendance in the case at bar of standing admissible evidence
validating the claim of petitioners as well as the portions above-quoted of the Decision in the
expropriation case volunteered no less than by respondent itself, takes this case away from the ambit of
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals 33 but within the principles enunciated in
Fery as mentioned earlier. In addition, there should be no doubt that our present reading of the fallo of
the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 so as to include the statements in the body thereof afore-quoted is
sanctioned by the rule that a final and executory judgment may nonetheless be "clarified" by reference
to other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. In Republic v. De Los Angeles 34 we ruled -

This Court has promulgated many cases x x x wherein it was held that a judgment must not be read
separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. Hence x x x
the decision of the court below should be taken as a whole and considered in its entirety to get the true
meaning and intent of any particular portion thereof x x x x Neither is this Court inclined to confine itself
to a reading of the said fallo literally. On the contrary, the judgment portion of a decision should be
interpreted and construed in harmony with the ratio decidendi thereof x x x x As stated in the case of
Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans Board, et al., supra, to get the true intent and meaning of a decision,
no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence,
a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo
thereof x x x x The foregoing pronouncements find support in the case of Locsin, et al. vs. Paredes, et al.,
63 Phil., 87, 91-92, wherein this Court allowed a judgment that had become final and executory to be
"clarified" by supplying a word which had been inadvertently omitted and which, when supplied, in
effect changed the literal import of the original phraseology x x x x This is so because, in the first place, if
an already final judgment can still be amended to supply an omission committed through oversight, this
simply means that in the construction or interpretation of an already final decision, the fallo or
dispositive portion thereof must be correlated with the body of such final decision x x x x [I]f an
amendment may be allowed after a decision has already become final x x x such amendment may
consist x x x either in the x x x interpretation of an ambiguous phrase therein in relation to the body of
the decision which gives it life.35

We now resolve to harmonize the respective rights of the State and petitioners to the expropriated Lots
Nos. 916 and 920.

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority 36 is correct in stating that one would not find an express
statement in the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 to the effect that "the [condemned] lot would return
to [the landowner] or that [the landowner] had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it
was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug
Airport." This omission notwithstanding, and while the inclusion of this pronouncement in the judgment
of condemnation would have been ideal, such precision is not absolutely necessary nor is it fatal to the
cause of petitioners herein. No doubt, the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of
petitioners could be readily justified as the manifest legal effect or consequence of the trial courts
underlying presumption that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation" when it granted the
complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities.

The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that is akin 37 to the implied trust
referred to in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, "If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to
secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is
established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may
demand the reconveyance of the property to him." In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots Nos. 916
and 920 to the government with the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug
Airport; failing to keep its bargain, the government can be compelled by petitioners to reconvey the
parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners would be denied the use of their properties upon a state
of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized.

Although the symmetry between the instant case and the situation contemplated by Art. 1454 is not
perfect, the provision is undoubtedly applicable. For, as explained by an expert on the law of trusts: "The
only problem of great importance in the field of constructive trusts is to decide whether in the numerous
and varying fact situations presented to the courts there is a wrongful holding of property and hence a
threatened unjust enrichment of the defendant." 38 Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which are
bound by no unyielding formula when they are used by courts as devices to remedy any situation in
which the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest. 39

In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustees sole duty is to
transfer the title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary. 40 Of course, the "wronged
party seeking the aid of a court of equity in establishing a constructive trust must himself do
equity."41 Accordingly, the court will exercise its discretion in deciding what acts are required of the
plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to obtaining such decree and has the obligation to
reimburse the trustee the consideration received from the latter just as the plaintiff-beneficiary would if
he proceeded on the theory of rescission. 42 In the good judgment of the court, the trustee may also be
paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in sustaining the property, his fixed costs for
improvements thereon, and the monetary value of his services in managing the property to the extent
that plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit from his acts. 43

The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this case, respondent
MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil Code, "When the
conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the
fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have received x x x x In case of the
loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid
down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who is bound to return x x x x"

Hence, respondent MCIAA as representative of the State is obliged to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to
petitioners who shall hold the same subject to existing liens thereon, i.e., leasehold right of DPWH. In
return, petitioners as if they were plaintiff-beneficiaries of a constructive trust must restore to
respondent MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and
920 in Civil Case No. R-1881, i.e., P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with
consequential damages by way of legal interest from 16 November 1947. Petitioners must likewise pay
respondent MCIAA the necessary expenses it may have incurred in sustaining the properties and the
monetary value of its services in managing them to the extent that petitioners will be benefited thereby.
The government however may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of
land, in the same way that petitioners need not account for the interests that the amounts they received
as just compensation may have earned in the meantime. As a matter of justice and convenience, the law
considers the fruits and interests as the equivalent of each other. 44

Under Art. 1189 of the Civil Code, "If the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement
shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x," the creditor being the person who stands to receive
something as a result of the process of restitution. Consequently, petitioners as creditors do not have to
settle as part of the process of restitution the appreciation in value of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 which is the
natural consequence of nature and time.

Petitioners need not also pay for improvements introduced by third parties, i.e., DPWH, as the
disposition of these properties is governed by existing contracts and relevant provisions of law. As for the
improvements that respondent MCIAA may have made on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, if any, petitioners must
pay respondent their prevailing free market price in case petitioners opt to buy them and respondent
decides to sell. In other words, if petitioners do not want to appropriate such improvements or
respondent does not choose to sell them, the improvements would have to be removed without any
obligation on the part of petitioners to pay any compensation to respondent MCIAA for whatever it may
have tangibly introduced therein.45

The medium of compensation for the restitution shall be ready money or cash payable within a period of
three hundred sixty five (365) days from the date that the amount to be returned by petitioners is
determined with finality, unless the parties herein stipulate and agree upon a different scheme, medium
or schedule of payment. If after the period of three hundred sixty five (365) days or the lapse of the
compromise scheme or schedule of payment such amount owed is not settled, the right of repurchase of
petitioners and the obligation of respondent MCIAA to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and/or the
latters improvements as set forth herein shall be deemed forfeited and the ownership of those parcels
of land shall vest absolutely upon respondent MCIAA.

Finally, we delete the award of P60,000.00 for attorneys fees and P15,000.00 for litigation expenses in
favor of petitioners as decreed in the assailed Decision of 12 April 1999 of the trial court. It is not sound
public policy to set a premium upon the right to litigate where such right is exercised in good faith, as in
the present case, albeit the decision to resist the claim is erroneous. 46

The rule on awards of attorneys fees and litigation expenses is found in Art. 2208 of the Civil Code -

In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot
be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interests;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's valid and
demandable claim;1awphi1.nt

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

As noted in Mirasol v. De la Cruz,47 Art. 2208 intends to retain the award of attorneys fees as the
exception in our law and the general rule remains that attorneys fees are not recoverable in the absence
of a stipulation thereto.

In the case at bar, considering the established absence of any stipulation regarding attorneys fees, the
trial court cannot base its award on any of the exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208. The records of the
instant case do not disclose any proof presented by petitioners to substantiate that the actuations of
respondent MCIAA were clearly unfounded or purely for the purpose of harassment; neither does the
trial court make any finding to that effect in its appealed Decision.

While Art. 2208, par. (4), allows attorneys fees in cases of clearly unfounded civil actions, this exception
must be understood to mean those where the defenses are so untenable as to amount to gross and
evident bad faith. Evidence must be presented to the court as to the facts and circumstances constituting
the alleged bad faith, otherwise, the award of attorneys fees is not justified where there is no proof
other than the bare statement of harassment that a party to be so adjudged had acted in bad faith. The
exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorneys fees under Art. 2208, par. (11), demands a
factual, legal or equitable justification that would bring the case within the exception and justify the
grant of such award.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 64456 dated 20 December 2001 and its Resolution of 28 November 2002 denying
reconsideration of the Decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Decision of RTC-Br. 19 of Cebu City dated 12 April 1999 in Civil Case No. CEB-20015 is MODIFIED IN
PART by -

(a) ORDERING respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) TO RECONVEY to

petitioner Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea, namely: Esperanza R. Edjec, Bernarda R. Suela,
Ruby C. Rotea, Bernarda R. Rotea, Elia R. Vda De Limbaga, Virginia R. Arbon, Rosalinda R. Arquisola,
Corazon Rotea, Fe R. Ebora, Caridad Rotea, Angeles Vda. De Renacia, Jorge Rotea, Maria Luisa Rotea-
Villegas, Alfredo R. Rotea, represented by his heirs, namely: Lizbeth Rotea and Elepeth Rotea; Luis Rotea,
represented by his heir Jennifer Rotea; and Rolando R. Rotea, represented by his heir Rolando R. Rotea
Jr., Lot No. 916 with an area of 2,355 square meters and Lot No. 920 consisting of 3,097 square meters in
Lahug, Cebu City, with all the improvements thereon evolving through nature or time, but excluding
those that were introduced by third parties, i.e., DPWH, which shall be governed by existing contracts
and relevant provisions of law;

(b) ORDERING petitioner Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea TO PAY respondent MCIAA what the
former received as just compensation for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 in Civil Case No. R-
1881, i.e., P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with consequential damages by way
of legal interest from 16 November 1947. Petitioners must likewise PAY respondent MCIAA the necessary
expenses that the latter may have incurred in sustaining the properties and the monetary value of its
services in managing the properties to the extent that petitioners will secure a benefit from such acts.
Respondent MCIAA however may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels
of land, in the same way that petitioners need not account for the interests that the amounts they
received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime;

(c) ORDERING respondent MCIAA TO CONVEY to petitioners the improvements it may have built on Lots
Nos. 916 and 920, if any, in which case petitioners SHALL PAY for these improvements at the prevailing
free market price, otherwise, if petitioners do not want to appropriate such improvements, or if
respondent does not choose to sell them, respondent MCIAA SHALL REMOVE these improvements
WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION on the part of petitioners to pay any compensation to respondent MCIAA for
them;

(d) ORDERING petitioners TO PAY the amount so determined under letter (b) of this dispositive portion
as consideration for the reconveyance of Lots Nos. 916 and 920, as well as the prevailing free market
price of the improvements built thereon by respondent MCIAA, if any and desired to be bought and sold
by the parties, in ready money or cash PAYABLE within a period of three hundred sixty five (365) days
from the date that the amount under letter (b) above is determined with finality, unless the parties
herein stipulate a different scheme or schedule of payment, otherwise, after the period of three hundred
sixty five (365) days or the lapse of the compromise scheme or schedule of payment and the amount so
payable is not settled, the right of repurchase of petitioners and the obligation of respondent MCIAA to
so reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and/or the improvements shall be DEEMED FORFEITED and the
ownership of those parcels of land shall VEST ABSOLUTELY upon respondent MCIAA;

(e) REMANDING the instant case to RTC-Br. 19 of Cebu City for purposes of determining the amount of
compensation for Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to be paid by petitioners as mandated in letter (b) hereof, and
the value of the prevailing free market price of the improvements built thereon by respondent MCIAA, if
any and desired to be bought and sold by the parties, and in general, securing the immediate execution
of this Decision under the premises;

(f) ORDERING petitioners to respect the right of the Department of Public Works and Highways to its
lease contract until the expiration of the lease period; and

(g) DELETING the award of P60,000.00 for attorneys fees and P15,000.00 for litigation expenses against
respondent MCIAA and in favor of petitioners.
This Decision is without prejudice to the claim of intervenor one Richard E. Enchuan on his allegation
that he acquired through deeds of assignment the rights of some of herein petitioners over Lots Nos.
916 and 920.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146587

Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Bulacan, docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M, No. 3841-M and No. 3842-M, covering
a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos,
Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for
the "Voice of the Philippines" project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency ("PIA"), took
over the premises after the previous lessee, the "Voice of America," had ceased its operations thereat.
Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of
the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation
proceedings, the trial court issued this order -

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

"Condemning the properties of the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 3839-M to 3842-M located at KM 43,
MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by several transfer certificates of title appearing in
the Commissioners Appraisal Report consisting of the total area of 544,980 square meters, as indicated
in plan, Exhibit A, for plaintiff, also marked as Exhibit I for the defendants, and as Appendix A attached
to the Commissioners Appraisal Report, for the purpose stated by the plaintiff in its complaint;

"Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair
market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with
legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid; and

"Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of suit, which includes the aforesaid fees of commissioners, Atty.
Victorino P. Evangelista and Mr. Pablo Domingo."1

The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously owned
by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area.

It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation
pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May 1984,
respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. On 07
June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of
P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, for the implementation thereof. When the order was not complied with, respondents again
filed a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the
amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation
proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July
1984, granted the motion.

In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, 2transferring 20 hectares
of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and
another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining
portion was retained by the PIA. This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the Santos
heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner
filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way
of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final
computation as might be approved by the court. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation
and motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter
previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter
or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the
Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the assailed order, vacating its decision of 26
February 1979 and declaring it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription -

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby:

"1) declares the decision rendered by this Court on February 26, 1979 no longer enforceable, execution
of the same by either a motion or an independent action having already prescribed in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 39 of both the 1964 Revised Rules of Court and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;

"2) denies the plaintiffs Manifestation and Motion to Permit Plaintiff to Deposit in Court Payment for
Expropriated Properties dated September 16, 1999 for the reason stated in the next preceding paragraph
hereof; and

"3) orders the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs
conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya, 153
SCRA 291, without prejudice to any case which the parties may deem appropriate to institute in relation
with the amount already paid to herein oppositors and the purported transfer of a portion of the said
realty to the Bulacan State University pursuant to Proclamation No. 22 issued by President Joseph
Ejercito."3

Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition was outrightly denied. It would
appear that the denial was based on Section 4, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
provided that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in due time after filing of the judgment, order or
resolution interrupted the running of the sixty-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari;
and that if a motion for reconsideration was denied, the aggrieved party could file the petition only
within the remaining period, but which should not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the
notice of such denial. The reglementary period, however, was later modified by A.M. No. 00-2-03 S.C.,
now reading thusly:

"Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. --- The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of
the denial of said motion."
The amendatory provision, being curative in nature, should be made applicable to all cases still pending
with the courts at the time of its effectivity.

In Narzoles vs. NLRC,4 the Court has said:

"The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion resulting in the
dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. This may have been because, historically, i.e., even before the
1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the amendments
brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so dismissed would have been resolved on the merits.
Hence, the Court deemed it wise to revert to the old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from
notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. x x x

"The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in the Manila
Bulletin on August 4, 2000 and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 7, 2000, two newspapers of
general circulation.

"In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65, can only be described as
curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are applicable.

"Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. (Erectors, Inc. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 629 [1996].) They are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which
they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some
statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment
of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid
under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. (Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. vs. Dela
Serna, 312 SCRA 22 [1999].) Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive.
(Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11 [1994].)" 5

At all events, petitioner has a valid point in emphasizing the "public nature" of the expropriated
property. The petition being imbued with public interest, the Court has resolved to give it due course and
to decide the case on its merits.

Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court, petitioner here posited that a motion which
respondents had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other motions subsequent thereto, was
made within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-year prescriptive period within
which to enforce the 1979 judgment. Furthermore, petitioner claimed, the receipt by respondents of
partial compensation in the sum of P72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the
part of petitioners and effectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section
6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court. 6

In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39, of the
Rules of Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, dated 26 February 1979, within five
years after it had become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. The motion
for payment, dated 09 May 1984, as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of
P72,683.55 by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan, could not be considered as having interrupted the
five-year period, since a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing
party, in this case by petitioner. Respondents maintained that the P72,683.55 paid to them by the
provincial treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court was part of the initial
deposit made by petitioner when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so
regarded as a partial payment. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of
a portion of the property to the Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs
had yet to be finally settled.

The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. 7Fundamental to the
independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are
taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise
of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation,
even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs
for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held
under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the
possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it. 8

The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings.
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is
not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor
in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant
asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to
compensation for the taking.9

Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use,
and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. 10 These twin
proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the
State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the
former and affording protection to the latter. 11 In determining "public use," two approaches are utilized -
the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and the second is public advantage or
benefit.12 It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as
society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which
the resources of the individual may be devoted. 13

The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant
portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the
propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose.
Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property,
pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969
expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character
upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well
within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public
use, which, decidedly, it is.

In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the
pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya 14 where the unpaid
landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It might
be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of
eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. The grant of the power
of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160 15 cannot be understood as being
the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local
governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national
legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of
eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to
be.16

Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic17 where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after
the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled -

"The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots
have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said
proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the
government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as
well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of
their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but
only to demand the fair market value of the same.

"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies, which may be deemed just
and equitable under the premises'."18

The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City19 where the recovery of
possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while
no requisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief
of recovering compensation for his property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and
appropriated by the State.

The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only
for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the property
condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are bound. 20 Petitioner has
occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the property pursuant to
the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least
a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by
prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-
payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an
unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in
rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. 21 After condemnation, the paramount title is in
the public under a new and independent title; 22thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than
may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.23

Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same argument
could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment against
petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had become final. The unusually long
delay in bringing the action to compel payment against herein petitioner would militate against them.
Consistently with the rule that one should take good care of his own concern, respondents should have
commenced the proper action upon the finality of the judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent
deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property. 24

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between
one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government.25 Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court.26 In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he
was in before the taking occurred.27

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the
property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the
property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the
property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per
annum28 should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the
currency over time.29 Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or
deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis
for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to
contractual obligations.30 In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of
extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency. 31

All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26
February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its
execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property,
deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final
judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon
at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the
due amount shall have been fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July 2000, of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petition for certiorari, as well as its resolution of 04 January 2001 denying the motion for
reconsideration, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, dated 01 March 2000, are SET
ASIDE. Let the case be forthwith remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the proper
execution of its decision promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.

G.R. No. 140377

The present petition for review on certiorari raises the question of from what date should just
compensation of the subject properties sought to be expropriated be reckoned whether it is from the
taking of the property or on the filing of the complaint.
Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) took possession in 1978 of properties belonging to
petitioners Patricia L. Tiongson, et al. pursuant to P.D. No. 1669, "An Act Providing for the Expropriation
of the Property Known as the Tambunting Estate Registered Under TCT Nos. 119059, 122450, 122459,
122452 And Lot Nos. 1-A, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E, 1-F, 1-G And 1-H Of (LRC) PSD-230517 (Previously Covered By TCT
No. 119058) of the Register of Deeds of Manila and for The Sale at Cost of the Lots Therein to the Bona
Fide Occupants and Other Squatters Families and to Upgrade the Same, and Authorizing the
Appropriation of Funds For The Purpose" (underscoring supplied), and of properties belonging to Patricia
Tiongson, et al. pursuant to P.D. No. 1670, "An Act Providing For The Expropriation of the Property Along
the Estero De Sunog-Apog Formerly Consisting of Lots Nos. 55-A, 55-B And 55-C, Block 2918 of the
Subdivision Plan Psd-11746, Covered by TCT Nos. 49286, 49287 and 49288, Respectively, of the Register
of Deeds of Manila and for The Sale at Cost of the Lots Therein to the Bona Fide Occupants and Other
Squatter Families and to Upgrade The Same, and Authorizing The Appropriation of Funds For The
Purpose" (underscoring supplied).

In G.R. Nos. L-55166, "Elisa R. Manotok, et al.v. National Housing Authority et al.," and 55167, "Patricia
Tiongson et al. v. National Housing Authority, et al.," this Court, by Decision of May 21, 1987,1 held that
"Presidential Decree Numbers 1669 and 1670, which respectively proclaimed the Tambunting Estate and

the Estero de Sunog-Apoy area expropriated, are declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void," they being violative of the therein petitioners right to due process of law. The decision had
become final and executory.

Subsequently or on September 14, 1987, NHA filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint
against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-42018, which was later amended, for expropriation of
parcels of land part of those involved in G.R. No. L-55166.

By Order of April 29, 1997,2 Branch 41 of the Manila RTC3 to which the complaint for expropriation was
raffled brushed aside a previous order dated June 15, 1988 of the then Presiding Judge of said branch of
the RTC4 and held that the determination of just compensation of the properties should be
reckoned from the date of filing of NHAs petition or on September 14, 1987. The NHA moved to
reconsider the said April 29, 1997 Order of the trial court, contending that the determination of the just
compensation should be reckoned from the time it took possession of the properties in 1978. The trial
court, by Order of August 5, 1997, 5 denied NHAs motion for reconsideration.

The NHA assailed the above-stated trial courts Orders of April 29, 1997 and August 5, 1997 via petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, by the challenged Decision of June 16,
1999,6 reversed and set aside the trial courts orders and held that the just compensation should be
"based on the actual taking of the property in 1978." Thus it disposed:

WHEREFORE, the lower courts Order dated April 29, 1997 ruling that the amount of just compensation
should be based on the date of the filing of the complaint in 1987, as well as the Order dated August 5,
1997 denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and the appointed commissioners are
ordered to re-convene and submit to the court a recommendation on the amount of just compensation
of subject property based on the actual taking of the property in 1978. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts decision but the same was denied by
Resolution of October 7, 1999,7 hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
In its Petition for Expropriation filed before the RTC on September 14, 1987, the NHA alleged, inter alia,
that:

xxxx

9. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1669 providing for the expropriation of the subject properties and
granting the plaintiff the authority to immediately take possession, control and disposition, with power
of demolition of the subject properties, plaintiff took and had been in possession of the subject
properties, until Presidential Decree No. 1669 was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
the case entitled Patricia Tiongson, et al. vs. National Housing Authority and Republic of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 5516[6].8(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) x x x,

and prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that:

1. An order be issued provisionally fixing the value of said properties in the amount equal to the
assessed value of the same and authorizing the plaintiff to enter or take possession and/or placing the
plaintiff in possession of the parcels of land described above; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

In the present petition, petitioners argue that since P.D. No. 1669 pursuant to which NHA took
possession of their properties in 1978 was declared unconstitutional, "[n]ecessarily, in thereafter
resurrecting the filing of another (sic) complaint for expropriation of the same properties," it would be
unlawful . . . to fix the reckoning period for purposes of computing the just compensation . . . based on
[NHAs] previous unlawful taking of said properties in 1978." They thus maintain that the trial courts
Order of April 29, 1997 holding that the determination of the just compensation of their properties
should be reckoned from the date NHA filed the petition before the RTC on September 14, 1987 is in
order.

The petition is impressed with merit.

In declaring, in its challenged Decision, that the determination of just compensation should be reckoned
from NHAs taking of the properties in 1978, the appellate court simply relied on Annex "C" of NHAs
petition before it, the Order dated June 15, 1988 of the then Presiding Judge of the trial court reading:

In this condemnation proceedings, by agreement of the parties, the total value of the properties to be
condemned is hereby fixed at P14,264,465.00, provisionally, and considering the admission of the parties
that plaintiff has taken possession of the properties in question sometime in 1978, or long before the
complaint in this case was filed, plaintiff is hereby authorized to retain possession thereof upon its
depositing with the City Treasurer of Manila the aforesaid sum of P14,264,465.00 subject to the Orders
of this Court and forthwith submit the Official Receipt of the said deposit to this Court, 9(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),

and thus concluded that "the parties admitted that [NHA] took possession of the subject properties as
early as 1978." The appellate court reached that conclusion, despite its recital of the antecedents of the
case including herein petitioners sustained moves, even before the trial court, in maintaining that the
reckoning of just compensation should be from the date of filing of the petition for expropriation on
September 14, 1987.

The earlier-quoted allegations of the body and prayer in NHAs Petition for Expropriation filed before the
RTC constitute judicial admissions10 of NHA that it possessed the subject properties until this Courts
declaration, in its above-stated Decision in G.R. No. L-55166 promulgated on May 21, 1987, that P.D. No.
1669 pursuant to which NHA took possession of the properties of petitioners in 1978 was
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. These admissions, the appellate court either unwittingly
failed to consider or escaped its notice.

Petitioners even brought to the appellate courts attention, in their Motion for Reconsideration 11 of its
Decision of June 16, 1999, the fact that they had called the trial courts attention to NHAs allegation-
admissions in the body and prayer of its petition. But the appellate court, by Resolution of October 7,
1999,12 denied petitioners motion upon the ground that it raised substantially the same issues that
were already considered and passed upon in arriving at its decision. The appellate courts June 16, 1999
decision glaringly shows, however, that the matter of judicial admissions of NHA in the body and prayer
in its petition were not considered by it.

Following then Rule 67, Section 4 of the Rules of Court reading:

SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the
court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon
the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the
filing of the complaint, whichever came first.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

vis a vis the factual backdrop of the case, the just compensation of petitioners properties must be
determined "as of the date of . . . the filing of [NHAs] complaint" on September 14, 1987."

WHEREFORE, the challenged June 16, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the April 29, 1997 Order of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 87-42018
is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 166553

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner National Power Corporation is the
Decision1 dated April 30, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated January 3, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 70582 entitled, "National Power Corporation v. Spouses Ruperto Libunao and Sonia P.
Sanopo and Heirs of Benita Domingo.
The antecedents, as summarized by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and adopted by the CA, are as follows:

This is an action for Eminent Domain filed by the plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government-
owned and controlled corporation, created and existing by virtue of Rep. Act No. 6395, as amended,
against the defendants spouses Ruperto Libunao and Sonia P. Sanopo, and the defendants heirs of Benita
Domingo, namely: spouses Antonio Apacible & Clarita Sioson and spouses Eligio Garcia & Salud Sioson,
represented by Clarita S. Apacible.

The plaintiff is seeking to expropriate the following properties:

1. Lot No. 1277-A-3-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 52726, under Tax Declaration No. 05203-
00456, located at Sumacab Norte, Cabanatuan City, with an area of 1,212 square meters registered in
the name of Sonia P. Sanopo, married to Ruperto Libunao, issued by the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan
City;

2. A portion of 4,380 square meters of Lot No. 1236 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 889
issued by the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City, with a total area of 113,745 square meters in the
name of Heirs of Benita Domingo, namely: Clarita Sioson, married to Antonio Apacible, and Salud Sioson,
married to Eligio Garcia, covered by Tax Declaration No. 05201-00207, located at Sumacab Norte,
Cabanatuan City;

in order to construct and maintain its Cabanatuan-Talavera 69 KV Transmission Line Project for public
purpose, hence, the need to acquire an easement of right- of- way over the affected portions of the
above-described parcels of land.

The defendants, through their lawyers filed their answers to the plaintiff's complaint.

Upon motion of the plaintiff, a writ of possession was issued by the court and on January 7 and 8, 1998,
the plaintiff was placed in possession of the properties in question.

Upon motion of Atty. Marianito Bote, Reynaldo Joson, Pablo Mamaclay and Clodualdo Adao were
allowed to intervene by the Court.

This Court, upon motion of the parties and pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court created a
Commission or Committee composed of a Chairman and two members. The City Assessor of
Cabanatuan, Lorenza Esguerra, was appointed as Chairwoman and the members are Oligario B. Enrile for
the defendants and Atty. Manuel Bugayon and Atty. Henry Alog for the plaintiff. The Chairman and the
members took their oaths of office.

A City Appraisal Committee was likewise formed composed of City Assessor Lorenza Esguerra as
Chairwoman and City Treasurer Bernardo C. Pineda and City Engineer Mac Arthur S. Yap, all of
Cabanatuan City as members.

The aforesaid City Appraisal Committee of Cabanatuan issued Resolution No. 07-[S]-2000 dated March
22, 2000 whereby it resolved that Lot No. 1277-A-3-A with an area of 1,212 square meters registered in
the name of defendant Sonia Sanopo, married to Ruperto Libunao has a current and fair market value
which may be appraised at P2,200 per square meter.
Likewise, said Appraisal Committee issued Resolution No. 08-[S]-2000 dated March 22, 2000 whereby it
resolved that a portion of 4,480 square meters of Lot 1236 registered in the name of the Heirs of Benita
Domingo has a current and fair market value which may be appraised at P1,200 per square meter.

Atty. Henry P. Alog, appointed Commissioner of the National Power Corporation submitted his
Commissioner's Report dated June 7, 2000 and made the following recommendations:

1. For plaintiff NPC to pay defendants for those areas affected that is classified and is actually devoted for
agricultural purposes, an easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the agricultural lots
based on the area covered by the right-of-way clearance;

2. For plaintiff NPC to acquire and pay defendant Libunao the full market value of his property (174.00
sq. m.) that is classified as residential lot.

The plaintiff NPC paid all the defendants and intervenors the damages to improvements existing on their
lands such as palay crops, fruit, trees, etc.

On August 29, 1997, the City Appraisal Committee of Cabanatuan composed of City Assessor Engr.
Norberto P. Cajucom, as Chairman and City Treasurer Bernardo C. Pineda and City Engineer Mac Arthur
S. Yapas, members, issued Resolution No. 03-[S]-97 recommending that the current and fair market
value of the lots in question be appraised at P700.00 per square meter for residential lot and P460.00
per square meter for agricultural lot. Hence, the said committee recommended the total amount
of P122,919.61 as payment for the 1,212.00 square meters of the land owned by the defendant Sonia P.
Sanopo, married to Ruperto Libunao and the total amount of P204,480.00 as payment for the 4,380
square meters of land owned by the defendants heirs of Benita Domingo. 3

On January 5, 2001, the RTC, taking into consideration the Commissioners' Reports, issued its
Decision,4 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Upholding the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the properties of the defendants which are
particularly described below for public use or purpose as stated in the complaint;

2. Ordering the plaintiff National Power Corporation to pay the defendants spouses Ruperto Libunao and
Sonia P. Sanopo the total sum of P1,818,000.00 at the rate of P1,500.00 per square meter of Lot 1277-A-
3-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-52726 issued by the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan
City in the name of Sonia P. Sanopo, married to Ruperto Libunao, located at Sumacab Norte, Cabanatuan
City with an area of 1,212 square meters covered by Tax Declaration No. 05203-00456;

3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants heirs of Benita Domingo the total sum of P2,628,000.00 at
the rate of P600.00 per square meter of a portion of 4,380 square meters of Lot 1236 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-889 issued by the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City in the names of
the heirs of Benita Domingo, namely: spouses Antonio Apacible and Clarita Sioson, and Spouses Eligio
Garcia and Salud Sioson, located in Sumacab Norte, Cabanatuan City, covered by Tax Declaration No.
05201-00207;
4. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the said defendants the legal rate of interest of the said amounts of
compensation fixed by this Court from the taking of the possession of the properties in question by the
plaintiff on January 7 and 8, 1998, until fully paid;

5. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of this suit;

6. Ordering a certified copy of this judgment or decision to be recorded in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Cabanatuan City upon its finality.

SO ORDERED.5

In so ruling, the RTC considered the 3 recommendations/resolutions of different dates submitted to it by

the City Appraisal Committee (CAC) of Cabanatuan City for the purpose of ascertaining the just
compensation for the subject properties to wit: Resolution No. 03-S-97 dated August 29, 1997, and
Resolution Nos. 07-S-2000 and 08-S-2000 both dated March 22, 2000, and the Report submitted by
Commissioner Henry P. Alog for petitioner. It ruled that the amount of just compensation should be
based on the value of the property as of the date of its taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever
came first; that petitioner's complaint was filed on October 30, 1997 and petitioner's taking of the
properties was made on January 7 and 8, 1998, thus, the just compensation for the expropriated
property should be reckoned from October 30, 1997.

The RTC did not give its approval to CAC's recommended appraised value of P2,200 per sq. meter for
respondents Spouses Libunao's property and P1,200 per sq. meter for the property of respondents Heirs
of Domingo, because the appraisals were determined in 2000 and not on October 30, 1997 when the
complaint was filed. The RTC then fixed the value of the properties of respondents Spouses Libunao
at P1,500 per sq. meter and of respondents Heirs of Domingo at P600.00 per sq. meter.

Dissatisfied, petitioner and respondents Heirs of Domingo separately appealed the RTC Decision to the
CA.

On April 30, 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated January 5, 2001 is MODIFIED. The amount of just
compensation to be paid to the Sps. Libunao and to the Heirs of Domingo for NPC's taking of their
properties with an area of 1,212 square meters and 4,380 square meters described in TCT No. 52776 and
T-889, respectively, is hereby fixed at P700.00 per square meter for residential land and P460.00 per
square meter for agricultural land. The costs of suit awarded in favor of the Sps. Libunao and the Heirs of
Benita Domingo are deleted.6

Anent petitioner's appeal assailing the amounts fixed by the RTC as the fair market value for the subject
properties, the CA found that CAC Resolution No. 03-S-97 dated August 29, 1997, recommending the
rates of P700.00 per sq. meter for residential lot and P460.00 per sq. meter for agricultural lot was the
most reliable proof of valuation; that, as between the valuation based on the prevailing market value on
March 22, 2000, or almost three years after the filing of the complaint, and another based on the
appraisal made on August 29, 1997, or two months prior to the filing of the complaint, the latter was
considered as the just and equitable basis for compensation being the closest assessment of the market
value of the properties to the time the expropriation complaint was filed.
The CA found no reversible error committed by the RTC in ordering the acquisition of the entire 1,212 sq.
meters of land owned by respondents Spouses Libunao, since in the document entitled DATA OF LOT
EXPROPRIATED, which was attached to Commissioner Alog's Report, it was admitted that the total land
area affected was 1,212 sq. meters for respondents Spouses Libunao and 4,380 sq. meters for
respondents Heirs of Domingo.

The CA upheld the RTC's award of legal interest on the amount of compensation since a judgment in
expropriation proceedings must provide for the payment of legal interest as a matter of law from the
time the government took over the land until it paid the owners thereof, thus, the government is liable
to pay 6% if no immediate payment was made for the value of the property at the time of actual taking.
It found that the amount which petitioner allegedly deposited in a bank merely represented the
provisional value of the properties sought to be expropriated to enable it to take possession of the land;
that the amount withdrawn by the property owners corresponded to the consequential loss or damage
to improvements suffered by the owners due to the installation of the transmission lines. The RTC's
award of the cost of the suit was deleted since petitioner's charter exempts it from the obligation to pay
the costs of the proceedings.

The CA found no merit on the appeal of respondents Heirs of Domingo and ruled that the valuation
embodied in Resolution No. 03-S-97 dated August 29, 1997 be also made applicable to them.

Petitioner moved for a partial reconsideration of the Decision, which the CA denied in its
Resolution7 dated January 3, 2005.

Hence, herein petition assigning the following errors committed by the CA:

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN PRONOUNCING THAT THE EXPROPRIATION SHOULD
COVER THE ENTIRE AREA OF RESPONDENTS' PROPERTIES, ALTHOUGH ONLY A RIGHT-OF-WAY EASEMENT
THEREON WAS ACTUALLY TAKEN AND BEING USED BY PETITIONER.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REQUIRING PETITIONER TO PAY INTERESTS TO BE RECKONED
FROM THE DATE OF TAKING UNTIL FULL PAYMENT OF THE WHOLE PROPERTY. 8

Petitioner contends that it simply needed a mere right-of-way easement on the aerial space above
respondents' properties; that the presence of transmission lines over the subject area will not damage,
impair or render the entire area thereof inutile for agricultural and residential purposes; that it
conducted relevant studies and initiated safety nets to ensure that the transmission lines are technically
safe, environmental-friendly and would cause least injury to the affected area compatible with public
interest; that, in contrast, respondents did not present any evidence to the contrary and even the two
CAC Resolutions failed to mention any actual damage or impairment that the transmission lines would
possibly cause on the subject properties; that it is but proper and legal that petitioner should only be
obligated to pay 10% of the market value of the subject properties in accordance with Section 3-A of
Republic Act (R.A.) 6395.9

Petitioner claims that it had already paid respondents the full assessed value of the properties in the
amount of P5,196.58 prior to the use of the aerial space above respondents' properties and such
amount was already withdrawn by respondents; that the amount of just compensation determined by
the RTC and modified by the CA indubitably followed the formula of just compensation equals market
value plus consequential loss minus consequential benefit; that consequential loss necessarily included
whatever interest may be due to the owner relative to the unpaid balance of just compensation; and,
that a separate computation for interest in addition to the consequential loss included in the aforesaid
formula is grossly unfair and disadvantageous to the government as it will amount to double
compensation.

Respondents Spouses Libunao argue that the petition should be denied for having failed to present
issues involving questions of law; that the CA correctly ordered the payment of their 1,212 sq. meter
land since the construction of the transmission lines impaired the agricultural purpose of their land; that
the check dated August 5, 1998 in the amount of P387,699.00 issued by petitioner to respondents
Spouses Libunao was payment for the damaged improvements in their subject property and not as
payment for the assessed value of the property; and that the CA correctly upheld the RTC's order for
petitioner to pay legal interest on the amount of compensation.

Respondents Heirs of Domingo claim that the first issue raised in the petition involves a question of fact
and, therefore, it is not proper for a petition for review, nonetheless, they argue that there was no
reversible error committed by the CA. They contend that in the document entitled DATA OF LOT
EXPROPRIATED attached to the Report submitted by Commissioner Alog, it stated in no uncertain terms
that the area of respondents Heirs of Domingos properties affected by the expropriation was 4,380 sq.
meter; that petitioner's allegations that it had conducted relevant studies and initiated safety nets to
guarantee the safety of the transmission lines were not at all raised in the RTC; and that payment of legal
interest on the amount of just compensation is provided under Section 10, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

In its Consolidated Reply, petitioner argues that there is no factual issue involved with respect to the
correct application and interpretation of Section 3-A of R.A. 6395; that there are instances where factual
findings of the appellate court may be reviewed by the Court such as when the CA failed to notice
certain relevant facts which if properly considered will justify a different conclusion; that such exception
applies in this case since the CA failed to consider that petitioner had conducted studies on the subject
properties which result showed that the installation of transmission lines on the aerial space above the
subject properties was safe and would not, in any way, affect the beneficial use thereof for agricultural
purposes.

The petition lacks merit.

The Court shall first resolve the procedural matter raised by respondents, i.e., whether petitioner should
pay just compensation for the entire area of respondents' properties or only an easement fee of 10% of
the market value of the properties traversed by the transmission lines is a factual matter which is not
proper for a petition for review.

In National Power Corporation v. Purefoods Corporation,10 the Court held:

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when
the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute as
to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of
law. The issue raised by petitioner of whether or not only an easement fee of 10% of the market value
of the expropriated properties should be paid to the affected owners is a question of law. This issue
does not call for the reevaluation of the probative value of the evidence presented but rather the
determination of whether the pertinent laws cited by NAPOCOR in support of its argument are
applicable to the instant case.11

On the substantive issue, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the RTC's
conclusion that the payment of just compensation should be for the entire area of respondents' subject
properties. Petitioner's argument that it should only be required to pay an easement fee of 10% of the
market value of the properties since it simply needed a right-of-way easement on the aerial space above
respondents' properties for the passage of its transmission lines has long been found unmeritorious by
the Court.

In National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, 12] a case involving
an easement of a right-of-way over a parcel of land that would be traversed by high-powered
transmission lines, just like the situation obtaining in the instant petition, the Court held that the nature
and effect of the installation of power lines and the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite
period should be considered, as the owners of the properties would be deprived of the normal use of
their properties. For this reason, the property owners are entitled to the payment of just compensation
based on the full market value of the affected properties. The Court explained:

Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondents property was purely an easement of
a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full
value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of
eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the
award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. Republic v. PLDT held thus:

x x x. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to,
and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not
be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way.

True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent
retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As
correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation of power lines, the
limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the
property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither
more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word "just" is used to
intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to
be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a
condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum of money which
a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree
on as a price to be given and received therefor." Such amount is not limited to the assessed value of the
property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee.
However, these values may serve as factors to be considered in the judicial valuation of the property. 13

This ruling has been repeatedly reiterated in subsequent cases 14 and continues to be the controlling
doctrine.

In its complaint for expropriation, petitioner sought authority to enter and take possession and control
over the subject properties, together with the improvements, and to demolish all improvements existing
thereon to commence and undertake the construction of its transmission line project. In fact, petitioner
had already taken possession of the subject properties and had demolished the plants, trees and crops
found in the subject properties as evidenced by checks payments for the damaged improvements. The
overhead transmission lines which traverse respondents properties could be considered indefinite in
nature. Moreover, the high-tension electric current passing through the transmission line would expose
respondents' lives and limbs to danger. Thus, the expropriation would in fact not be limited to an
easement of right-of-way only.15

In National Power Corporation v. Aguirre-Paderanga,16 the Court said:

[I]t cannot be gainsaid that NPCs complaint merely involves a simple case of mere passage of
transmission lines over Dilao, et al.s property. Aside from the actual damage done to the property
traversed by the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the
entire property is unquestionably restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made
dangerous to the occupants life and limb.

Petitioner's allegation that it had conducted relevant studies and initiated safety nets to guarantee that
the transmission lines are technically safe and would cause least injury to the affected areas was not
raised at all in the RTC as correctly argued by respondents Heirs of Domingo, thus, could no longer be
considered on appeal.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 3-A of R.A. 6395, as amended, is misplaced. While Section 3-A of R.A.
6395 indeed states that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the
property subject to an easement of right-of-way, said rule is not binding on the Court. 17 It has been
reiterated that the determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function.18 Any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts
own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. 19

Petitioner's claim that it should not be ordered to pay interest to be reckoned from the date of taking
until the full payment of the value of the subject properties deserves scant consideration.

Section 10, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. - Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant
of the compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest thereon from the taking of the possession
of the property, or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall
have the right to enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or
purpose defined in the judgment, or to retain it should he have taken immediate possession thereof
under the provision of section 2 hereof. x x x.
Clearly, respondents are entitled to the payment of legal interest on the compensation for the subject
lands from the time of the taking of their possession up to the time that full payment is made by
petitioner.20 In accordance with jurisprudence, the legal interest allowed in payment of just

compensation for lands expropriated for public use is six percent (6%) per annum. 21

Finally, the Court finds no merit on petitioner's claim that the amount of P5,196.58 which petitioner
deposited in a bank to be able to obtain the issuance of the writ of possession was already withdrawn by
respondents. A perusal of the records does not show any evidence that respondents had withdrawn
such amount. On the contrary, the CA found that the amount withdrawn by respondents corresponds to
the consequential loss or damages to improvements suffered by them by reason of petitioner's
installation of its transmission lines.22

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 30, 2004 and the Resolution dated January
3, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70582 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.