69. BELGICA vs. OCHOA (G.R. No. 208566)
COA released results of a 3 year audit investigation to determine the
PROMULGATED: November 19, 2013
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
PETITIONER: Greco Antonius Belgica
RESPONDENT: Hon. Paquito Ochoa as Executive Secretary
TERMS:
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) 2010-2014
- Release of funds directly to implementing agency or local govt unit w/o
further qualifications
- Realignment of funds to any expense category expressly allowed subject to
the ff. conditions: (a) realignment is w/in the same implementing unit and
same project category; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for
original scope of work; (c) request for realignment is w/ the concurrence of
the legislator concerned
- Program Menu: list of general programs and implementing agencies from
w/c a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying
authority
- Allowed formal participation of NGOs
Presidential Pork Barrel:
1. Malampaya Funds (MF): special fund to help strengthen govt efforts
relating to exploration and exploitation of indigenous energy resources
2. Presidential Social Fund (PSF): special funding facility managed by the
Presidential Mgt Staff through w/c the President provides direct assistance to
priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget; sourced
from the share of govt in the gross earnings of PAGCOR
FACTS:
1. (2004) Several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) for being unconstitutional. Petition
was dismissed for lack of pertinent evidence.
2. (2013) The NBI began its probe into allegations that the govt has been
defrauded of some P10B over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds
from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various govt agencies. This sprung
from sworn affidavits of 6 whistle-blowers attesting that JLN (Janet Lim
Napoles) Corp. had swindled billions of pesos for ghost projects using 20
dummy NGOs. Said money was diverted to Napoles private account.
3.
propriety of funds under PDAF and Various Infrastructures including Local
Projects (VLP). The pertinent findings are the ff:
a. Amounts released to legislators significantly exceed their respective
allocations
b. Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts
of sponsoring members
c. Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots which have
yet to be turned over to the govt
d. Implementation of projects was not undertaken by implementing
agencies themselves, but by NGOs endorsed by legislators
e. Selection of NGOs were not compliant with law
4, As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle blowers allega that P900M of
the gas project from Palawan went into a dummy NGO.
5. Several petitions declaring the PDAF unconstitutional were filed.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the 2013 PDAF Article violate the principles of (Limited to the
discussion in class):
a. Separation of powers
b. Non-delegability of legislative power
c. Checks and balances
2. W/N the phrases (a) and for such other pruposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance
restoration of damanged facilities as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegation of legislative power
HELD/RATIO:
I. PDAF
a. Separation of Powers
Court: Unconstitutional. Legislators are given project identification powers
wherein they can identify PDAF projects for as long as the project falls under
a general program listed in the program menu. They are also given powers of
fund release and fund realignment. These post-enactment measures are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the Executive branch.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
Court: Unconstitutional. The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the
principle of non-delegability since they are allowed to individually exercise
the power of appropriation which is lodged in Congress. The power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation (Sec. 29, Art. VI).
They are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they determine.
c. Checks and Balances
Court: Unconstitutional. A prime example of a constitutional check and
balance would be the Presidents veto power (Sec. 27, Art. VI). For him to
exercise his item-veto power, it is necessary that there exists a proper item
w/c may be object of the veto. It is concluded that an appropriation bill must
contain specific appropriations of money and not only general provisions
w/c provide for parameters of appropriation. Appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence meaning an allocation of a
specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose (line-item).
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, legislators could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. This
means that actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written
into the GAA and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This fosters the
creation of a budget within a budget. The system then forces the President
to decide between (a) accepting the entire allocation w/o knowing the specific
projects of the legislators, w/c may or may not be consistent w/ his national
agenda and (b_ rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislations w/ legitimate projects.
II. Presidential Pork Barrel
a. Approriation
Petitioners: Sec. 8 of PD 910 (MF) and Sec. 12 of PD 1869 (PSF) are invalid
appropriation laws since they do not have the primary and specific purpose
of authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. PD 910
concerns the creation of an Energy Development Board and Sec. 8 is not an
appropriations law since it is merely incidental to such purpose. PD 1869
concerns the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR and Sec.
12 is merely incidental as well. These are in contravention with Sec. 29 Art.
VI of the Constitution.
Court: Disagrees. An appropriation law may be detailed and as borad as
Congress wants it to be for as long as the intent to appropriate may be
gleaned from the same (Philconsa). The Court cannot sustain the argument
that the appropriation must be the primary and specific purpose of the law
in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. If a legal provision designates
a determinate amount of money and allocates the same for a particular
purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and
sufficient to satisfy the Constitutional requirement.
b. Undue Delegation
Petitioners: The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President gives the President unbridled discretion to
determine for what purpose the funds will be used.
Court: Agrees. The appropriation law must contain adequate legislative
guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive
either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details or (b) ascertaining facts to
bring the law into actual operation. The completeness test and the sufficient
standard test must be employed.
Sec. 8 of PD 910 constitutions an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine
the limits of the Presidents authority w/ respect to the purpose for w/c the
Malampaya Funds may be used.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice that Sec.
12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 w/c thus moots the
petitioners submissions.
COURT RULING:
Petition PARTLY GRANTED.