G.R.

No. 153660 Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals

June 10, 2003 which, although affirming the finding of the NLRC that an
employer-employee relationship existed between the contending
PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, parties, nonetheless agreed with respondent that the affidavits of
EDDIE LADICA, ARMAN QUELING, ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO some of the complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor
BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA, EDUARDO GARCIA and Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo
NELSON MANALASTAS, petitioners, Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, should not have been given
vs. probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent to undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the appellate
court dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. In
FACTS: On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of the same Decision however, complainants Eddie Ladica, Arman
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers, Lipercon Queling and Rolando Nieto were declared regular employees since
Services, Inc., People's Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim they were the only ones subjected to cross-examination .
Services, Inc., filed a complaint against respondents for unfair
labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have given
of tenure and the perpetuation of the "Cabo System." They thus weight to respondent's claim of failure to cross-examine them.
prayed for reinstatement with full back wages, and the declaration They insist that, unlike regular courts, labor cases are decided
of their regular employment status. based merely on the parties' position papers and affidavits in
support of their allegations and subsequent pleadings that may be
For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend the filed thereto. As such, according to petitioners, the Rules of Court
scheduled mandatory conferences or submit their respective should not be strictly applied in this case specifically by putting
affidavits, the claims of fifty-two (52) complainant-employees them on the witness stand to be cross-examined because the NLRC
were dismissed. Thereafter, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted has its own rules of procedure which were applied by the Labor
clarificatory hearings to elicit information from the ten (10) Arbiter in coming up with a decision in their favor.
remaining complainants (petitioners herein) relative to their
alleged employment with respondent firm.

On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision ISSUE: Whether or not the said affidavits should not be given
ordering respondent company to reinstate complainants to their probative value?
former positions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due
regular employees, and to pay their full back wages which, with HELD: NO. The case of Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction
the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be Co. v. NLRC11 succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the Labor
computed upon proof of his dismissal as of 31 May 1998, already Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not
amounted to an aggregate of P1,810,244.00. On appeal, the NLRC control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are
employer-employee relationship between the complainants and authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
respondent company when it affirmed in toto the latter's decision. each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due
process. We find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom.

To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by
the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining G.R. No. 110571
in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing March 10, 1994
jurisprudence may be given only stringent application . Under the
Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial- APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC.,
type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided respondents.
based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and
their affidavits. FACTS: The BOI, in its decision dated December 10, 1992 in BOI
Case No. 92-005 granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing
of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to
NLRC dated 30 March 2001 which affirmed in toto the decision of "ceramic tiles." Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for
the Labor Arbiter dated 29 May 1998. reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-
Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor
appeal therefrom . Mariwasa filed a petition for review with
respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91.

On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss
Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the ground that
respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No.
92-005, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court
pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

Petitioner posits the view that respondent court acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolution of
May 25, 1993, for the following reasons:

I. Respondent court has no jurisdiction to entertain
Mariwasa's appeal from the BOI's decision in BOI
Case No. 92-005, which has become final.

II. The appellate jurisdiction conferred by statute
upon this Honorable Court cannot be amended or
superseded by Circular No. 1-91.
Petitioner argues that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or
Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be
Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and
court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from
contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to
from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with this appeal.
Court, to wit:
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-
Judicial relief. All orders or decisions of the Board (of judicial agencies found in the third sentence of Section 1 of
Investments) in cases involving the provisions of this Code Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to
shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI. The second
or decision of the Board by the party adversely affected sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall
shall stay such an order or decision; Provided, that all also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-
appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such
decision. statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words
"(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there are
On the other hand, Mariwasa maintains that whatever "obvious other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered by the Circular but
inconsistency" or "irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have which have not been expressly listed therein
been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question
of venue for appeal has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82
the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the
or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted. right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals
from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed
ISSUE: Where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought
Board of Investments (BOI) should be filed? to the Court of Appeals.

HELD: Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226

grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI
and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what
manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply
deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to
regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.

Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from
decisions of the BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure
 it was near the St. Elizabeth Hospital and Villa failed to secure the
necessary locational clearance.

Two months after the rendition of the judgment against

Veneracion, or more precisely on January 22, 1982, Villa received
a telegram dated January 21 from Commissioner Raymundo R.
Dizon of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
requesting transmittal of proof of locational clearance granted . On
the same day, January 22, 1982, Villa sent Dizon a reply telegram
G.R. No. 69871 reading: "LOCATIONAL CLEARANCE BASED ON CERTIFICATION
August 24, 1990 OF CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR AND
HUMAN SETTLEMENT OFFICER. Villa sent to Dizon : 1) the
ANITA VILLA, petitioner, vs.MANUEL LAZARO, as Presidential certification dated October 24, 1980 of Josefina E. Alaba (Human
Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, and the Settlements Officer, Gen. Santos City) and 2) the certification of
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS REGULATORY COMMISSION, Manuel O. Sales, City Planning and Development Coordinator,
respondents. dated December 27, 1979.

FACTS: On January 18, 1980, Anita Villa was granted a building On February 8, 1982 Villa received what was evidently the official
permit to construct a funeral parlor at Santiago Boulevard in Gen. communication" referred to in Commissioner Dizon's telegram of
Santos City. The permit was issued by the City Engineer after the January 21, 1982, supra, an "Order to Present Proof of Locational
application was processed by the City Engineer's Office, and on Clearance" dated January 20, 1982. Knowing this and "considering
the strength of the Certification that the project was in consonance also that she had already sent the (required) locational clearance
with the Land Use Plan of the City and within the full provision of on January 27, 1982," Villa made no response.
the Zoning Ordinance. With financing obtained from the
Development Bank of the Philippines, Villa commenced No doubt with no little discomfiture Villa received on June 2, 1982
construction of the building. a "Show Cause" Order dated April 28,1982, signed by one Ernesto
L. Mendiola in behalf of the Commission, requiring her to show
In October of that same year, as the funeral parlor was nearing cause why a fine should not be imposed on her or a cease-and-
completion, a suit for injunction was brought against Villa by Dr. desist order issued against her for her failure to show proof of
Jesus Veneracion, the owner of St. Elizabeth Hospital, standing locational clearance. The order made no reference whatever to the
about 132.36 meters from the funeral parlor. The complaint documents she had already sent by registered mail as early as
sought the perpetual enjoinment of the construction because January 27, 1982. On the same day, she also sent to Commissioner
allegedly violative of the Zoning Ordinance of General Santos City. Dizon by registered mail (Reg Receipt No. 6899), as indicated in
her telegram, the same certifications earlier sent by her also by
Veneracion brought the matter up with the Human Settlements registered mail (Reg Receipt No. 1227)
Regulatory Commission. He lodged a complaint with that
commission praying "that the funeral parlor be relocated because On July 27, 1982, she received an Order of Commissioner Dizon
dated June 29, 1982 imposing on her a fine of P10,000.00 and
requiring her to cease operations until further orders from his administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right to
office. 17 The order made no mention of the documents she had notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the
transmitted by registered mail on January 27, 1982 and June 3, proceedings that may affect a person's legal right; (b) reasonable
1982, or to her telegrams on the matter she was served on opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses
November 16, 1982 with a writ of execution signed by and relevant evidence in his favor, (c) a tribunal so constituted as
Commissioner Dizon under the date of October 19, 1982 in to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and
implementation of his Order of June 29, 1982, above mentioned, one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that
imposing a fine of P10,000.00 on her. Again, this Order, like the tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the
others issuing from respondent Commission, made no advertence hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the
whatever to the documents Villa had already sent to respondent parties affected.
Commission by registered mail on January 27, June 29, and July 28,
1982, or her telegrams It being clear that some, at least, of those essential elements did
not obtain or were not present in the proceedings complained of,
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation against Villa of her any judgment rendered, or order issued, therein was null and void,
right to due process? could never become final, and could be attacked in any
appropriate proceeding.
HELD: There was absolutely no excuse for initiating what is held
out as an administrative proceeding against Villa without WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The proceedings
informing her of the complaint which initiated the case; for complained of are ANNULLED and all orders, writs and resolutions
conducting that inquiry in the most informal manner by means issued in the course thereof, beginning with the show cause order
only of communications requiring submission of certain of June 2, 1982 up to and including the challenged Resolutions of
documents, which left the impression that compliance was all that September 21, 1984 and December 14, 1984 of respondent
was expected of her and with which directives she promptly and Presidential Assistant Manuel Lazaro are VACATED and SET
religiously complied; assuming that one of the documents thus ASIDE, for having been taken and/or issued in violation of
successively submitted had been received, but given the fact that petitioner's right to due process, without pronouncement as to
on at least two occasions, their transmission had been preceded by costs.
telegrams announcing that they would follow by mail, for failing to
call Villa's attention to their non-receipt or to make any other G.R. Nos. 90660-61
attempt to trace their whereabouts; for ruling against Villa on the January 21, 1991
spurious premise that she had failed to submit the documents
required; and for maintaining to the very end that pretense of lack UTE PATEROK, petitioner-appellant, vs.BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
of compliance even after being presented with a fourth set of and HON. SALVADOR N. MISON, respondents-appellees.
documents and the decision in the court case upholding her right
to operate her funeral parlor in its questioned location. FACTS: In March 1986, the petitioner shipped from Germany to
the Philippines two (2) containers, one with used household goods
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of and the other with two (2) used automobiles (one Bourgetti and
certain basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the one Mercedes Benz 450 SLC). The first container was released by
due process requirements in investigations and trials. And this the Bureau of Customs and later on, the Bourgetti car, too. The
Mercedes Benz, however, remained under the custody of the said HELD: NO. we agree with the petitioner that a notice of hearing
Bureau. posted on the bulletin board of the public respondent in a
forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the alleged prohibited
In December 1987, after earnest efforts to secure the release of the article is known does not constitute sufficient compliance with
said Mercedes Benz, the petitioner received a notice of hearing proper service of notice and procedural due process. The Court
from the legal officer of the Manila International Container Port, has emphasized the imperative necessity for administrative
Bureau of Customs informing the former that seizure proceedings agencies to observe the elementary rules of due process. And no
were being initiated against the said Mercedes Benz for violation rule is better established under the due process clause of the
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 73 in relation to Section 2530(F) of the Constitution than that which requires notice and opportunity to be
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), as amended, heard before any person can be lawfully deprived of his rights.
and Central Bank Circular (CBC) 1069.
In the present case, although there was a notice of hearing posted
While the said case was pending, the petitioner received only on on the bulletin board, the said procedure is premised on the
April, 1988, a letter informing her that a decision ordering the ground that the party or owner of the property in question is
forfeiture of her Mercedes Benz had been rendered on December unknown. The facts evidently show that the petitioner could not
16, 1986 by the District Collector of Customs. The petitioner had have been unknown. The petitioner had previous transactions
not been informed that a separate seizure case was filed on the with the Bureau of Customs and in fact, the latter had earlier
same Mercedes Benz in question before the said District Collector, released the first container consisting of household goods and the
an office likewise under the Bureau of Customs.. Bourgetti car to the former at her address (as stated in the Bill of
Lading). Moreover, there was a similar seizure case that had been
The petitioner later found out that on November 13, 1986, a instituted by the Manila International Container Port, docketed as
Notice of Hearing set on December 2, 1986, concerning the said S.I. No. 86-224, covering the same Mercedes Benz in question and
Mercedes Benz, was posted on the bulletin board of the Bureau of involving the same owner, the petitioner herein.
Customs at Port Area, Manila.
If only the public respondents had exercised some reasonable
The petitioner, thereafter, filed a motion for new trial before the diligence to ascertain from their own records the identity and
Collector of Customs, Port of Manila, but the latter, in an order 6 address of the petitioner as the owner and the consignee of the
dated May 30, 1988, denied the same, invoking the failure of the property in question, the necessary information could have been
former to appear in the said hearing despite the posting of the easily obtained which would have assured the sending of the
notice on the bulletin board. notice of hearing properly and legally. Then, the petitioner would
have been afforded the opportunity to be heard and to present her
Finally, the public respondent rendered a decision on September defense which is the essence of procedural due process. But the
22, 1989 affirming the previous order of the Collector of Customs public respondent regrettably failed to perform such basic duty.
for the Forfeiture of the Mercedes Benz in question in favor of the
government. Notwithstanding the procedural infirmity aforementioned, for
which the Court expresses its rebuke, the petition nonetheless can
ISSUE: Whether or not a notice of hearing posted in the bulletin not be granted.
board is sufficient notice?
The petitioner does not dispute the fact that the motor car in petitioners,
question, a Mercedes Benz 450 SLC, has an engine displacement of vs.
over 2,800 cubic centimeters which clearly falls within the Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and
prohibited importation specified in the law aforequoted and as FELIX T. CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating Committee,
such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by the public respondents. created by DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON.
Inasmuch as it would be contrary to law, i.e., B.P. Blg. 73, to allow ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal
the petitioner to redeem the Mercedes Benz in question, there is Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING,
therefore no alternative, as correctly claimed by the public Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the
respondents, but to forfeit the same. President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private
Respondent, respondents.
We can not agree with the proposition that the Collector of
Customs is authorized to release the motor vehicle in question to FACTS: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the
the petitioner which, in effect, would absolve the latter from any Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous Region
liability.There is nothing in the Code that authorizes the Collector (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that
to release the contraband in favor of an importer. The Code, on the position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12,
other hand, is clear that the thing may be disposed of by sale alone 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs
"under such restrictions as will insure its use for legitimate instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning
purposes. such order.

The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-

CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-
Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first
affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989, charged Lumiqued
with malversation through falsification of official documents.
Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by
padding gasoline receipts.

In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989,

private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of
Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, he made
unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00.
G.R. No. 117565 Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government "by deliberately
November 18, 1997 concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the falsification
of accounting entries in order not to reflect on 'Cash advances of
ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR other officials' under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules."
CAR, Represented by his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A.
Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued,
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989, charged Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus by the
Lumiqued with oppression and harassment. According to private heirs of Lumiqued praying for the reversal of the Report and
respondent, her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22,
retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier 1992, Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52
without just cause. issued by President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary
Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the "payment of retirement
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio
Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action. Acting Justice Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from
Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order No. the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his
145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against death on May 19, 1994."
Lumiqued.Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted
on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to
On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They
1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the
committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert
counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the that the committee should have suspended the hearing and
committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a
counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
committee rendered a report dated July 31, 1992, finding
Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him. Accordingly, the ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be
investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate criminal charges against him. On May 12, 1993, HELD: NO. These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The
President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in
52 (A.O. No. 52), finding Lumiqued administratively liable for writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect
dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute
dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
and other benefits. proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In
the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in
Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel
among other things, that he was denied the constitutional right to of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any
counsel during the hearing. On May 19, 1994, however, before his crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by
motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994, the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the
Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable
reconsideration for lack of merit. under the law for the complaints filed against him.
Petitioners' misconception on the nature of the investigation Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of fact
conducted against Lumiqued appears to have been engendered by of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are
the fact that the DOJ conducted it. Under the Administrative Code supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not
of 1987, the DOJ shall "administer the criminal justice system in overwhelming or preponderant. The quantum of proof necessary
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only substantial
investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
administration of the correctional system, conducting criminal accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
investigations is not its sole function. By its power to "perform
such other functions as may be provided by law," prosecutors may Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section
be called upon to conduct administrative investigations. 23 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of the same Rule,
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at the penalty of dismissal carries with it "cancellation of eligibility,
times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and the
existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not disqualification for reemployment in the government service." The
be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the "payment of
and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty retirement benefits and other benefits," plus back wages from the
rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with time of Lumiqued's dismissal until his demise, must, therefore, fail.
counsel. In an administrative proceeding such as the one that
transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is
of engaging the services of counsel or not. hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of
the President is AFFIRMED
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard,
not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much
more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments,
through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an
indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given
the opportunity to defend his interests in due course; he cannot be
said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity
to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this
DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted
Doctrine: In administrative proceedings, technical rules of
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
complained of. Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of
motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended 6. Casimiro vs. Tandog | Chico-Nazario, J:
the proceedings conducted by the committee. GR NO 146137, June 8, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Haydee Casimiro was an assessment clerk in the
Office of the Treasurer of San Jose, Romblon and was later HELD: Yes. Records show that petitioner was accorded every
appointed Municipal Assessor. Administrative Officer II Nelson opportunity to present her side. Petitioners argument that the
Andres submitted a report about the alleged irregularities in the affidavit is hearsay because the complainants were never
office of petitioner consisting of anomalous cancellation of (1) Tax presented for cross-examination lacks merit. In administrative
Declarations in the name of Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
a new one in the name of petitioners brother and (2) Tax strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated
Declarations in the name of Antipas San Sebastian and the to due process in its strict judicial sense.
issuance of new ones in favor of petitioners brother-in law.
In administrative proceedings:
Respondent Mayor Tandog immediately issued Memorandum
Order No. 13 placing petitioner Casimiro under preventive Procedural due process simply means, the opportunity to explain
suspension for 30 days. After three days, another memorandum ones side or the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action
order was issued, directing petitioner to answer the charges. or ruling complained of. The record clearly shows that petitioner
Petitioner denied the allegations in her answer, claiming that the not only filed her letter-answer, she also filed a motion for
cancellation of the tax declaration in favor of her brother Ulysses reconsideration of the recommendation of the committee.
Cawaling was done prior to her assumption to office as municipal
assessor, and that she issued new tax declarations in favor of her Procedural due process has been recognized to include the
brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of a deed of sale executed following:
by Antipas San Sebastian in Molinas favor. Respondent Mayor (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
extended petitioners preventive suspension for another 30 days proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights;
to give her more time to gather evidence. Respondent also (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance
directed petitioner to answer the affidavit-complaint of Noraida of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to
San Sebastian Cesar and Teodulo Matillano, further alleging the defend ones rights;
irregularities in petitioners office. (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted
as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
The fact-finding committee, which was created to investigate on guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
the matter, recommended petitioners separation from service for (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
being guilty of malperformance of duty and gross dishonesty. evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
Based on this recommendation, respondent dismissed petitioner contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
from service.
As to substantive due process, the law requires that the quantum
Petitioner appealed to CSC: affirmed respondents order of of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is
dismissal. substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable
Petitioner elevated the case to CA: affirmed CSC decision. mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case,
theres substantial evidence to prove petitioners dismissal: the
ISSUE: WON petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive anomalous cancellations of the tax declarations in favor of her
due process
close relatives without complying with the requirements set under offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor
the law constitute grave acts of dishonesty. heard on in violation of their right to due process.

Globe also invoked the earlier decision of NTC pertaining to the
application of Isla Communications Co. (Islacom) to provide SMS,
Doctrine: Every party subject to administrative regulation holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature of the telephone
deserves an opportunity to know, through reasonable network and therefore does not require the prior approval of NTC.
regulations promulgated by the agency, of the objective
standards that have to be met. Ca affirmed NTC Order. Globe contends that the CA erred in
7. Globe Telecom, Inc. vs. NTC | Tinga, J: holding that the NTC has the power to subject Globe to an
GR No 143964, July 26, 2004 administrative sanction and a fine without prior notice and hearing
in violation of the due process requirements; that specifically due
FACTS: Petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. and private respondent process was denied Globe because the hearings actually conducted
Smart Communications, Inc are both grantees of valid and dwelt on different issues; and, the appellate court erred in holding
subsisting legislative franchises. Smart filed a complaint with that any possible violation of due process by NTC was cured by the
public respondent National Telecommunications Commission to fact that NTC refrained from issuing a Show Cause Order with a
order the immediate interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM Cease and Desist Order, directing instead the parties to secure the
Networks, particularly their SMS or texting services. NTC issued an requisite authority within thirty days.
Order noting that both Smart and Globe were equally
blameworthy for their lack of cooperation in the submission of ISSUE: WON public respondent NTC acted with due process in
the documentation required for interconnection. NTC held that levying the fine against Globe
since SMS falls squarely within the definition of value-added
service or given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95, the HELD: No. Every party subject to administrative regulation
implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory pursuant to deserves an opportunity to know, through reasonable regulations
EO 59. promulgated by the agency, of the objective standards that have to
be met. The assailed NTCs determination and corresponding
The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been penalty were rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions.
providing SMS without authority from it, in violation of Section Therefore, all the requirements of due process attendant to the
420 (f) of MC No. 8-9-95 which requires PTEs intending to provide exercise of quasi-judicial power apply to the present case. Among
value-added services (VAS) to secure prior approval from NTC them are the seven cardinal primary rights as enumerated in Ang
through an administrative process. Tibay v. CIR:

Petitioner filed a petition to nullify and set aside the Order and There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even
claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the
no authority to render SMS, since such matter was not raised as an right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested
issue before it at all. Finally, Globe alleged that the Order is a or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
patent nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.

In the case, NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe
in the promulgation of the assailed Order.

(1) The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence.
Neither does it sufficiently explain the reasons for the decision
rendered. It also does not explain why the NTC was according the
VAS offerings of Globe and Smart a different regulatory treatment
from that of Islacom.

(2) Both Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to present
evidence on the issues relating to the nature of Vas and the prior
approval. Globe and Smart were never informed of the fact that
their operation of SMS without prior authority was at all an issue
for consideration. As a result, neither Globe nor Smart was
afforded an opportunity to present evidence in their behalf on that
point. Opportunity to adduce evidence is essential in the
administrative process, as decisions must be rendered on the
evidence presented.

(3) The imposition of fine is void for violation of due process. CA
upheld the power of NTC to impose a fine without need of hearing,
simply by citing the provision of the Public Service Act[90] which
enumerates the instances when NTC may act motu proprio. NTC
may exercise the power without need of prior hearing; however,
Section 17 does not include the power to impose fine. Section 21
requires notice and hearing because fine is a sanction, regulatory
and even punitive in character. Indeed, the requirement is the
essence of due process