Toward Elections in Indonesia

Herbert Feith

EVER SINCE the end of 1949, when the Dutch finally relinquished
sovereignty over Indonesia, both Indonesian and Western observers have been
stressing the importance of early nation-wide elections. A number of
Indonesian parties, and more recently all of them, have taken the same view.
Because of the considerable opposition which is felt toward the present
parliament (only partly elected) and because of the multiplicity of parties and
the general confused state of political authority (as seen particularly at the
almost annual cabinet crises), the election issue has forced itself time and
again into the center of the political stage. It did so more strikingly than ever
after the "October 17 Affair" of t952. The Elections Act followed six months
later.
Election history in Indonesia goes back to well before 1949. Residency
elections were held in Republican territory as early as r946, and by 1948 the
Badan Pekerdja (Working Parliament) of the Republic had passed a law setting
out a system of indirect elections based on proportional representation and
universal franchise of all persons over eighteen. Under this same law too a
Central Electoral Office was established and subsequently this office set up its
branches throughout the whole Republican area. However, the continual
guerrilla struggle and the second Dutch "Police Action," which robbed the
Republic of the greater part of its territory, made the actual holding of
elections impossible until full sovereignty passed into Indonesian hands on
December 27, 1949. In many of the "federal" states and territories (established
by the Dutch in areas outside Republican control) elections for representative
councils were held, but the fact that these were organized by Dutch
administrators and policed by colonial troops made it difficult in most cases to
judge the significance of the results.
It had appeared for some time after the Security Council's resolution of January
28, 1949, that full sovereignty would be granted to Indonesia only in the middle of
195o after the holding of elections supervised by the United Nations Commission
for Indonesia, which were

to have been completed by October 1949. But then came the "New Course," the
series of direct Republican-Dutch negotiations beginning with the Roem-van Royen
agreement and leading to the decisive Round Table Conference at The Hague, which
by-passed the U.N. arrangements and brought sovereignty six months earlybut
not elections.
Even then it seemed that Constituent Assembly elections would have to be held
very soon, for it was assumed that the necessary reconstitution of the federal
 "Republic of the United States of Indonesia" set up under the Hague agreement would
not be effected until a Constituent Assembly had been formed. But the pressure of
nationalism all over the country was too strong. Within a few weeks of its
formation it was clear that the R.U.S.I. structure was tumbling down, and seven
and a half months later the present unitary statethe "Republic of Indonesia" again
came into being. So the immediate political reason for holding elections disappeared
once more. The fact that after December 27, 1949, and again after August 15, 1950,
Indonesia obtained a new constitution and a newly-constituted parliament tended
also to make the need for holding elections seem less urgent, although in fact
the authority of the members of parliament, Republican as well as Federalist, was
very frequently called into question.'
Although the Nitta cabinet of the R.U.S.I. period had instituted a commission to
draw up an elections bill, it was not until its successor, the Natsir cabinet, had
been in office for five months that a bill was sent to parliament.2 The Natsir
government's policy was to make the 1948 law concerning indirect elections valid
for the whole of Indonesia
The federal "Republic of the United States of Indonesia" (R.11.S.f.) had a
bicameral parliament. Its lower house, the "People's Representative Council",
consisted of 150 members, 5o of them representing the old Republic of Indonesia (then a
member state of the federation) and the othea- too chosen by the 15 Dutchponsored states. Its senate
consisted of 32 members, two from each of its states. The parliament established when the present unitary
state came into being was unicameral, and its membership comprised the members of both houses of the
displaced R.U.S.I. parliament as well as those of the Working Parliament of the old Jogia Republic (46
members) and of the old Republic's "Supreme Advisory Council" (13 members). Torsi membership of the
People's Representative Council or parliament of this new -Republic of Indonesia" was 236. It is now some
so or ax men less,
2
This government consisted of a core of Ministers, four from the Masiumi (Consultative Council of
Indonesian Moslems), two from the P.S.I. (Indonesian Socialist Party), two From the conservative P.I.R.
(Greater Indonesia Union), as well as one each from the atrisrian and Catholic parties, Parindra
(Greater Indonesia Party), the Democratic Fraction and the PS.II. (Islamic Association
Party of Indonesia)the last named until his resignarion on December IS, /95o. It also
contained five prominent nonparty men in leading positions, It was a united :abinet,
but in terms of reliable parliamentary support its position was from the beginning weak.
 Pacific Agairs
(and not merely for the original Jogjakarta Republic, whose sovereignty had
been limited by the Linggadjati Agreement to Java, Madura and Sumatra). But
continuing in the Hatta government's policy, the Natsir government wanted the
first nation-wide elections to be not for an ordinary parliament, as laid down in
the 1948 law, but for a Constituent Assembly empowered to make a permanent
constitution (and in addition to elect from its membership a small "Working
Parliament" responsible until the elections under the new constitution). Before its
bill had been discussed in parliament, however, the Natsir government fell
significantly on an issue related to that of elections.
This government had, in its six months of office, been implementing the very
controversial Ordinance 39 of 1950, establishing regional councils on an interim
basis pending the holding of regional elections. In Java, and to a lesser extent
in Sumatra, a considerable number of provincial and regency councils had been
established by local bodies of electors who were the nominees of all properly-
constituted parties and religious, cultural and social organizations. The majority of
nonpolitical organizations being Islamic, it was the Masjumi Party which drew
most benefit from this Ordinance. On January 15, 1951, parliament passed a
motion of Mr. Hadikusumo of the Nationalist Party (P.N.I.) calling for the
freezing and subsequent dissolution of these regional councils, and this led to a
deadlock between cabinet and parliament which the cabinet finally resolved by
resigning. Clearly it was dangerous for a cabinet to risk disturbing the
precarious party balance by a measure like this.
The Sukiman government which followed that of Natsir in April I951
was based on a compromise on Ordinance 39 which was acceptable to the
Masjumi and P.N.I., both of which were given prominent representation in the
new administration.' Maintaining the status quo in the matter of the councils
already established on the basis of Ordinance 39, the Sukiman government did
not establish any more on this
2
These two parties had five seats each. The P.I.R. obtained three, and the
Christian and Catholic parties, Parindra and the Democratic Fraction again one
each. Another party represented was the Labour Party, and there were two non-party
ministers (until one of them, Mr. Mohammad Yamin, resigned on June 54). As the
Natsir Cabinet had been composed largely of men with a general sympathy for the
policies of the Socialist Party of Sjahrir, so the Sukiman Cabinet consisted largely of
groups, from various parries, opposed to the ideas of this party. This division
between those in general support of Socialist Parry policiesthough not necessarily
tacticsand those opposed to them has its roots in the Japanese occupation and the
revolution, and is still of great importance.
basis but devoted its attention to preparations for universal suffrage elections in
the provinces and regencies.
Several such elections were actually held during the period of the Sukiman
cabinet. June 1951 saw the holding of direct elections in the small 95 per cent
literate area of Minahasa in North Sulawesi (Celebes), resulting in what was
regarded as a P.N.I. victory. In August and October came the indirect elections in
the more socially typical Special Territory of Jogjakarta, giving the Masjumi
virtually an absolute majority. Finally in February 1952 direct elections based on
different registration and voting procedure were held in the municipality of
Makassar in South Sulawesi. Boycotted by the P.N.I., these elections gave the
Masjumi a simple but not an absolute majority. From per sonal observation it is
the writer's belief that the first two of these elections, which were the two more
important ones, were satisfactory as elections. Whatever their demerits (the
misunderstanding of election regulations, excessive party influence in the city and
local administrations, some unreported malpractices by polling-booth officials,
and, in the case of the Jogja elections, restrictions arising from the "state of war
and siege" and a considerable amount of indirect vote-buying), the results
reflected the state of opinion in the areas concerned. Nat urally all three elections
had value as experiments and as preparations for the forthcoming nation-wide
elections.

MEANWHILE, progress in framing a law for the Constituent Assembly elections

was slow. On August 1, 1951, the government had been informed in a joint report
from the sub-divisions of parliament that the Natsir government bill, which it (the
Sukirnan government) had taken over, was unacceptable because it provided for
indirect elections. Henceforth the government had to frame a new electoral law
based on the principle of direct election. The Central Electoral Office sent the
draft of such a bill to the government in November and consideration of it was
one of the main tasks of the Minister of General Affairs, but no bill had been
sent to parliament when the Sukiman cabinet fell in February 1952despite
considerable and growing pressure for elections (especially on the part of the
Indonesian Socialist Party), strengthened by the successful completion of national
elections in India.
The thirty-five-day crisis which followed the fall of the Sukiman cabinet
brought the elections issue very much to the fore. On March

30 the Wilopo government was formed,' the first point of its program being "to
realize general elections for the Constituent Assembly and the Regional
Councils". The prospect of early elections came to be much more seriously
regarded as soon as this cabinet assumed office. One of its first acts was to
introduce a bill for the registration of voters in Tilly. The sub-divisions of
parliament waited long before discussing it and then in September replied with a
statement of important objections. In particular the reply objected to placing the
legal onus of responsibility for registration on the voter, preferring that it should be
on the village officials. On the other hand parliament had moved as early as July
for a measure for the filling of its currently vacant seats on the basis of party
 nominations. Official promises of elections continued to be made, but no further
concrete steps of any importance were taken, despite sustained and perhaps
increasing pressure especially from political groups and sections of the press
sympathetic to the ideas of Swan Sjahrir and his Socialist Party. This was the
situation when the much-discussed "October 17 Affair" occurred.

What happened on October 17 and afterwards is understandable only in the

light of the three-and-a-half month parliamentary struggle which preceded it, in
which Indonesia's armed forces came in for radical criticism. The debate arose from a
letter written by a certain Colonel l3ambang Supeno to the Defence section of
parliament and his approach to President Sock arno in defiance of his military
superiors. His letter contained a number of specific criticisms and the general
charge that army policy was laying too much emphasis on technical improvement
along the lines of Western military practice and too little on the army's revolutionary
morale. In the parliamentary discussion which followed party feelings were aroused
to an extent unprecedented in post-revolutionary Indonesia. The army leadership was
charged with corruption, with allowing itself to be outwitted and hoodwinked by
the Netherlands Military Mission, with preferring ex-colonial to ex-Republican
See Indoncsierl February-March tg52. This cabinet again had Masiumi and
ministers occupying the main portfolios. These two parties had four seats rach and the Socialists two, therelsy
replacing P.I.R. from the third position. Ail the small parties represented M the Sul:Unto cabinet. except the
Democratic Fraction, were also given seats in this cabinet. The P.S.I.I. was in the cabinet again, though its
minister was to resign from the cabinet in protest, and there were three independents. In terms of the division
suggested above this cabinet was more like that of Nat sir than that of Sukiman. The Masiumi ministers were
on the whole from the "N'abir group", and die four men largely shared the basic
political ideas of men like Siahrir and NatNirte the extent of being unrepresentative and
on several occasions without support from their party. Hence this was a united cabinet.
 soldiers, and finally with political high-handedness and acting in the interests of
the European-oriented Socialist Party.
The Indonesian army contains the most varied elements, soldiers with Dutch,
Japanese and Republican training, celebrated local leaders and adventurous young
men recruited for a precarious guerrilla existence during the revolution. Not
unnaturally it has continued to be riddled with cliques. Political parties,
recognizing the army as the most important center of power, have tried to capture
these cliques, and frequently succeeded. With economic conditions deteriorating as
the result of the slump in raw materials prices, and with faith in the democratic
nationalist framework declining, the party struggle, always vigorous, was
growing still more intense in the months before October 1952. It was in the long
parliamentary debate on army affairs and the events which followed it that this
struggle for power came to a climax.
At first the main target of the parliamentary attack was the Socialist
Party's strong position in the army.' But as the attack developed it became
clear that its strongest supporters meant also to pull the whole Wilopo cabinet
down.' This aim dominated the last stages of the debate. Increasingly the issue
appeared to be one between cabinet and parliament, as cabinet supporters
denied the right of the legislature to take decisions in such matters as
personnel policy and charges of corruption. On October y6 parliament by a gr
to 54 vote passed the motion of Manai Sophian of the P.N.I.a motion which
the Defence Minister Sultan Hamengku Buwono had said he would consider
one of no-confidence in himself because it implied the need for a change in
army leadership.
6
How strong the Socialist Party's influence actually was is difficult to know. It ran be said with soma
certainty, that of the four men most strongly under parliamentary fire, Sultan Harnengku Buwono (the
Defence Minister), Mr. Ali Budiardjo (the Secretary-General of the Defence Ministry), Major-General B,
Simatupang (the Armed Forces Chief of Staff), and Colonel A. II. Nasution (the Chief of Staff of the
Army), all but the last are Socialist Party "fellow-travellers", men with a political outlook basically like that
of Sjahrir. Some evidence was produced for the contention that the four men had been working for the
interests of this party as distinct from its general ideas. But their record as men who are personally honest
(as well as capable) appears to be unblemished, and their tactics were certainly no worse than those of their
political enemies inside the army. The latter continued to wield considerable power in the second echelon of
army leadership_
6
This group consisted of a number of members from the Progressive Fraction, from the Partai Murba
(Proletarian Partynational-communist), the National People's Party, sections of the
and some non-party men, Yamin's M1rn7'ar Indonesia and B. V. Diah's MercleArr were the two dailies
most strongly behind the attack. There is a rough correspondence between this group and the one
responsible for the so-called July 3 Affair of 5946, the kidnapping of Sjahrir (then Prime Minister) and
the attempted coup d'etat. The Communist Party supported the group, but hesitatingly.
As the Socialist Party and the two Christian parties were pledged to the
Sultan's support, it seemed quite probable that the cabinet would topple.
On the morning of October 17 a surprise demonstration began in the streets of
Djakarta. A crowd of perhaps 5,000 men, town and country labourers, broke into the
parliament building, and to the cry of "Parliament isn't a Coffee Shop" smashed up
the cafeteria. From there they moved around the city, displaying well-painted
banners which demanded the dissolution of parliament and the holding of
elections. After some minor incidents in which several Dutch flags came off their
masts, the crowd, by now perhaps 30,000 strong, demonstrated in front of the
President's house. In a masterly speech from its steps President Soekarno both
rebuked and soothed them. There would be elections as soon as possible, he said.
But meanwhile he could not dissolve parliament just like that. To ask him to do so
was to ask him to become a dictator, to bring to naught what the people had
fought so hard to win. So Soekarno sent the demonstrators home. They cheered him
and went. He had once more demonstrated his power.
Who had been behind this demonstration ? It was evidently assembled with
great rapidity and in well-kept secrecy, yet it gave many signs of thorough
preparation. Some of the demonstrators had travelled into town in army trucks.
Some in fact were soldiers in civilian clothes. No special precautionary measures
were taken by either the army or the police until the demonstration was almost
over. Then, however, the army came out in force, and even placed machine guns
facing the Presidency and Parliament House. Immediately after the President
had addressed the crowd, a group of senior army officers, including almost all the
divisional commanders from the provinces, went personally to President Soekarno,
presenting him with a series of demands strikingly similar to those of the
demonstrators. However, the President appears to have yielded little. After
consulting with Vice-President Hatta and Prime Minister Wilopo, he urged the
Consultative Committee of Parliament to declare a prolonged parliamentary
recess, and this the Committee did. He refused to sign thedocument put before
him.
Army activity did not cease with the return of the high officers from the
Presidency. Even more soldiers filled the streets of Djakarta. Six members of
parliament were arrested and three dailies and two weeklies were banned.
Telegraph and telephone communications were blocked, and an 8 p.m. to 5
a.m. curfew was imposed.
It would be wrong to say that the demonstration was altogether bogus.
Feeling against parliament was certainly high. The luxurious living of the
members, their business practices and their large share of blame for the
slowness of government action, had made them excellent targets for the
inchoate general feeling of disappointment over the fruits of the new
independence. But the close cooperation between the demonstrators and army
personnel, and the statements of certain army leaders themselves, indicate that
the army leadership, or at least parts of it, had a major responsibility for
organizing the demonstration. There is strong circumstantial evidence that
Socialist Party leadership also connived in the affair.'
 Was this thenthe question is still being askedan attempt to "do a
Naguib"? Did the army men act out of anger and panic, or was there a clearly
conceived plan of defending their positions by changing the whole balance of
power? Did their desire for the dissolution of parliament spring from a genuine
wish to see the cabinet made more capable of carrying out its policy, and
particularly its policy for elections, or was their main aim to place the whole
government in a position of dependence on themselves, or even to displace it?
Definite answers to these questions will not be known until a good deal more
evidence is made public. Perhaps the most one can conclude now is that an
attempt was made to intimidate the President. On the basis of reliable confidential
evidence there is good reason to believe that a considerable number of the officers
involved in the affair were working for something approaching military
dictatorship. It seems probable that it was the President's combination of
firmness and compromise and his show of authority before both demonstrators and
army leaders which turned the scales against those officers who wanted to go
further in forcing the issue.
Within a day or two most of the army's emergency measures had been
revoked, and within a week fears of a military coup had com pletely disappeared.
But the country buzzed with political activity. Hundreds of resolutions poured
in from all over the country. A minority of these favoured the dissolution of
parliament. The majority,
7
Part of the evidence is to be found in the statements of Siahrir before the
demonstration (the "sweep parliament clean" statement of October 7 and the
articles questioning the practicability of parliamentary democracy in the Socialist
Party's organ, Sikap, of October 13). But probably of more importance are the
actions of certain Socialist Party members (known to the author) before October 17
and their private admissions (made to him subsequently). This view is held also
by a number of Indonesian political leaders sympathetic to the Socialist Party.

coming mainly from local joint action committees in which P.N.I. (Nationalist
Party) and P.K.I. (Communist Party) organization was evident, wanted parliament
to continue.' But every resolution included the demand for early national elections.
The minority wanted them ordered by emergency law, the majority through
normal parliamentary procedure.
There were other consequences of the October 17 Affair. First came a
remarkable series of bloodless coups within the army leadership of three of the
seven territorial commands. On October 22 in East Java, then on November 15 in
East Indonesia, and again on November 23 in South Sumatra, the divisional
commander was ousted by one of his subordinates on the charge of involvement in
the October 17 Affair. Here were perhaps the severest tests that the Wilopo
government had to face. What with the tacit support which the President gave to
the bloodless coups which had been made in his name and with regional feeling
added to the many existing factional jealousies, there was for some months real
danger of civil war.' Later most of the leading figures of the October 17 drama in
Djakarta were removed from their positions,' and in fact the attempts to remove
more of these men have been an important element in army and party politics for
most of the period since. But all these developments are of only secondary impor-
tance to the political struggle over elections.
In the weeks following October 17 the election issue was in the air as never
before. On November It the government began priming and despatching 5o million
"voters' cards" for registration purposes. At the same time it was decided that there
should be no further attempt to push the Registration of Voters Bill through
parliament by itself, but that a General Elections Bill incorporating all aspects of
elections should be sent to parliament as soon as possible, After a great deal of hard
work on the part of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Ministers of Home Affairs and
Justice and considerable behind-the-scenes negotiation with the political parties,
particularly those represented in the cabinet, a bill
8
A working alliance between these two parties had been developing since the beginning of the year,
when the Communist Party began to suers its new strongly nationalistic subsequently giving conditional
support to the Wilopo cabinet.
V None of the three coups has been undone, and only in South Sumatra was anything like a compromise
solution reached.
"On December 5 Colonel Nasution was dismissed, along with several middle-ranking officers. Oil
January 1 Sultan llamengku Buwono resigned from the cabinet. On April re, Mr. Ali Budiardjo was
transferred to the State Planning Board.
was sent to parliament, on November 25. Two days later parliament reassembled
for the first time after October 17 and immediately began to debate the bill.

BUT BEFORE discussing the various struggles which followed, culminating in the
bill (in amended form) becoming law on April 1, let us examine the causes of the
many delays in preparations for elections during the whole period from. December
27, 1949, to October 17, 1952. Time and again official promises were made and
not kept, dates set and ignored." What is the explanation?
Technical factors were certainly important. In an island nation like Indonesia
where communications are slow and inadequate, where trained administrators
are scarce and where the position of state finances has been, with few variations,
critical, it is a frighteningly difficult task for any government to organize the first
nation-wide elections." Another factor was the general insecurity. Serious
disturbances in parts of Western Java (caused by the activities of Darul Islam) and
in South Sulawesi (caused by the now-affiliated Kahar Muzakar bands) have
continued through most of the post-revolutionary period, and in other areas, such
as the South Moluccas, South Kalimantan (Borneo) and North Sumatra, armed
gangs have from time to time constituted a problem.
But more important are the political factors. It is only by understanding these
that one can account for what one Indonesian publication called the "ping-pang
game" between cabinet and parliament which has characterized the two and a
half years and led some Indonesians to make comparisons with Nationalist
China.
In the first place many members in the existing parliament owe their seats to
accident and anomaly, and realize clearly that they would lose them in elections.
Many are members of small parties and so-called parliamentary fractions with
little or no mass backing. The old system
11
Thus Mr. Wcngsonegoro, Minister for Education in the Natsir cabinet, on
February 5, 1955, hoped elections would begin in August 595/. Mr. Yamin,
Minister of Justice in the Sukiman cabinet, on June 7, 595/, said the elected
Constituent Assembly would be sitting by December of that year. Mr. Mononutu,
Information Minister in the same cabinet, on November 25, 1951, said the cabinet
hoped elections would be completed in 1952. Mononutu again, as spokesman
for the Wilopo cabinet, on May 25, 195r, hoped elections would be finished by the
middle of 5953,
" See "Problems of Elections", friclancriari Affair:, April-May 5952, which also
gives an account of the extent of preparations on the local level.
 Pacific Affairs
of the Republic of Indonesia, at Jogjakarta, (whereby the President appointed
party representatives as members of parliament) and the tendency of
parliamentary committees to consist of single representatives of each party,
however small, have given the small parties a very real power in government, and
there is every likelihood that this would be lost to them after elections. Some
eighteen independent members face the same risk, and individual members who
are in parties likely to maintain or increase their representation but do not
curry favour with the leadership of their parties also have reason to be afraid.

It is widely realized too that Moslem groups are under-represented in the

present parliament. The revolution was led largely by an intellectual and white-
collar group of which the majority is only nominally Islamic, and the present
parliament, in which specifically Moslem parties hold less than a quarter of the
seats, perhaps more than reflects this fact. Yet in any election based on universal
suffrage Islam would certainly be the strongest single election symbol. The fact
that the Masjumi was able to secure eighteen seats of the forty in the elections in
Jogjakarta (generally regarded as anything but a Moslem strong hold) confirmed
a number of the non-Moslem parties in their fear of elections. Virtually all
Indonesian observers expect the Masjumi to emerge from elections as the
strongest single party, though there is much more disagreement about the
likelihood of this party being able to govern by itself, and about which of the two
factions in the Masjumi will emerge dominant. However this may be, elections
might well mean the end of the "Pantja Sila" state' and its replacement by an
"Islamic State". This could mean merely a difference in the wording of the
Preamble to the Constitution, but it could also conceivably mean a major shift
of power affecting the whole community, and especially the whole civil service.
It is thus not surprising that there should have been occasional frank statements
like that of Djokoprawiro (from the aristocratic P.I.R.), who said that his party
would work for the postponement of elections until the situation of the
supporters of the "Pantja Sila" was stronger. A similar argument is advanced by
those who expect a Moslem-dominated Constituent Assembly and Parlia ment
after the elections but want certain basic laws passed by the present House first.
The Pantja Silo Or Five Principles (Faith in God, Humanity, Nationality, Democracy
13

and Social Justice) were first enunciated by President Sockarno on June a, /945, and
constitute the official ideology of the state.
 Again, it has long been clear that any electoral system consistent with the
provisions of the interim constitution would result in weaker representation
for the areas outside Java. The economic consequences of this could be
considerablesince the tendency for Java to benefit from the revenue earned
by the exports of the richer Outer Islands might well he further accentuated.
And quite apart from this economic factor, there is the long-standing anti-
Javanese feeling in the outer provinces, which in recent years has tended to
coalesce with anti- Djakarta feeling, and so to grow as dissatisfaction with
the fruits of the revolution has mounted. Where such feeling is strong there is
every reason to believe that the prospect of increased Javanese representation
in parliament would be resented.
Finally it is clear that a number of social groups would suffer from the
local changes in power relations which universal suffrage elections would
bring. This is particularly true outside Java and Sumatra where the impact of
the revolution has hitherto been felt least, and where some three hundred
petty principalities continue to exist. The stimulus of political party life in
these principalities might well be enough to cause their rulers to fall. Because
of the nature of the elections in the Dutch-sponsored federal states, these
rulers axe well represented in the present parliament.
These various factors go far to explain the slowness of parliament in
preparing for elections. In the case of the successive cabinets, which in
almost equal measure share the responsibility for delays, there are still other
factors of great significance in the whole political balance of forces in
Indonesia.
As noted above, the Indonesian cabinets have all been short-lived.
Whenever a seriously divisive issue has arisen and a cabinet has taken
resolute action on it, it has almost invariably fallen. The Natsir government
fell on the issue of the structure of the regional councils; and so hitter was the
party antagonism aroused, that no cabinet has since dared to take any major
step on this issue or on regional autonomy. The Sukiman government fell on
the issue of acceptance of American aid under the terms of the Mutual
Security Act. Its successor, the Wilopo cabinet, tried hard to steer clear of
foreign policy issues which would again arouse the antagonism between the
Masjumi and the P.N.I. In fact this same cabinet faced a serious threat to its
life when it intimated that it would return certain oil wells to the Dutch
11.P.M. oil company. The party situation prevented bringing the matter to a
decision. Warning was thereby given to the Wilopo cabinet and other
cabinets not to be too firm on any foreign investment issue.
The cabinets of Natsir, Sukitnan and Wilopo were indeed all but hamstrung.
Opposition between the parties, and especially between the Masjumi and P.N.L, was
one important cause. A second cause was factionalism inside the parties, and again
particularly these two. The sentiment of utopian radicalism, a legacy from colonial
days when Indonesians were permanently "against" almost everything and had
little or no political responsibility, manifested itself in a continuing failure to
understand the realities a cabinet had to face. These two factors together made
resolute government virtually impassible for any cabinet unless it was prepared to run
a great risk of being overthrown.
It is thus understandable that most political leaders felt that to bring in an
elections bill was to play with political dynamite. They remembered the fall of the
Natsir cabinet on the regional councils issue. Clearly any measure which bore on
the future voting strengths of the parties could arouse divisions great enough to
wreck a cabinet.
There are other reasons why the governments should have hesitated to push
strongly for elections. From the end of 1951 the raw materials slump was making
itself felt, strengthening regionalism and anti- Djakarta sentiment and adding to
the pessimism and the somethingdrastic-must-happen-soon mentality of political
circles in Djakarta. All this embittered the political conflict. Was it wise to
hold elections in such an atmosphere when campaigning would certainly intensify
the conflicts, and when the army, with its various cliques under the influ ence of
different political parties, could not be relied upon to remain neutral? Would
elections not lead to every sort of extremism ? Would they not make the conflicts
between the democratic nationalist parties so bitter, that the outside groups which
hope to be the heirs to the present democratic structure (that is, the Communists
and Darul Islam) and perhaps their foreign backers, would succeed in their efforts
to gain power ?

THE ELECTIONS BILL in its course through parliament in the eighteen weeks
following its gut mission on November 25, 1952, received extremely wide public
attention and support. Practically all sections of the press urged the government
to push the bill through as fast as possible.' Popular expositions of aspects of the
bill appeared in many government and private magazines, and a rush of booklets on
elections generally came from the publishing houses.' At the same time the
parties were establishing their campaign committees and emphasizing elections as
events which demanded the greatest party loyalty. A big public controversy on the
question of the Islamic State resulted temporarily in a real campaign atmosphere."
The bill itself was most thoroughly discussed, first in the sub-divisions, then in
two long series of plenary debates followed by government replies, and finally
when particular amendments were debated and put to the vote. At some stages,
particularly when the very large number of amendments were being tabled, it
appeared that there was a conscious plan to prolong the debate. But if this was so
the plan was quickly foiled. The strong public pressure and the initiative of the
Chairman of Parliament (Mr. Sartono of the P.N.1.) in adopting a new procedure of
discussing the amendments, led to the bill becoming law within three weeks of the
beginning of the amendment stage. It was a display of unprecedented
legislative teamwork. The motive power of the October 17 Affair was still
strong."
The attitudes of the parties in these long debates clearly illustrate their
interests in the elections question, and their own estimates of their chances.
This is true particularly as there was virtually no clear demarcation between
government and opposition parties, with the result that very strange party
alignments were in evidence. By the same token, however, it is most difficult to
disentangle the various party motives, especially where considerations of regional
interest and loyalty were involved.
14
So= publications with no Socialist Party sympathies at all, such as the weeklies
Mimbsr lecknexia and Peva (Jogjakarta), were particularly emphatic in this.
is A bibliography of these is to be found in Adi Negoro's Pemilihan Ermum Elan Diiwa
Masjerukat di Tntionesia, 1953.
18
This arose out of a speech of the President at Amuntai, Kalimantan, on
January 27, where he said that if we establish a state based on Islam, many areas
whose people are not Islamic, for example the Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, the Kai
Islands, and Sulawesi, will secede." This caused strong Moslem resentment and
vehement attacks were made on the attitude of the President by the extremist
Masjurai leader, Isa Anshary. Spokesmen of the
and other non-Mosiern parties rebutted him.
Although Government spokesmen denied that the act was in any sense a
17

result of The affair, it is clear that without the stimulus of October 17 in speeding
government action and particularly in strengthening the cabinet's position vis--vis
parliament, a bill would not have been passed so soon.

Perhaps the most contentious issue was the question of electorates. The size
and number of these is naturally of great importance as it affects the relative
tactical strengths of parties of different sizes, and the extent to which local and
regional groups are to be represented. The government bill envisaged fifteen
electorates. A Catholic Party amendment for one all-Indonesian electorate,
apparently favouring medium- sized parties with support in many parts of the
country, drew support from the Communists, the Murba, the Progressive
Fraction and the P.S.I.I. A Socialist Party amendment for thirty-three electorates,
favouring parties with strength in East Indonesia, won Democratic Fraction
support, while a P.I.R. amendment for twenty-four was supported by the two
Christian Parties as well as the Democratic Fraction. But all these amendments
were defeated, the only one accepted being that from the Labour Party increasing
the number from fifteen to sixteen by the separation of Greater Djakarta from
West Java. A surprise motion from the P.M. calling for the number of seats for
each electorate to be determined not strictly according to population but according
to the number of regencies in each (which would have been strongly to the
advantage to the areas outside Java) was defeated, despite support from P.I.R., the
Socialists, and the Labour Party.'
The franchise was another important issue. The government originally
proposed universal suffrage of everyone over eighteen. A Communist amendment
for the lowering of the age to sixteen was rejected, but a Masjumi amendment
to include also all persons under eighteen who are or have been married, received
a narrow majority. Several "perfectionist" amendments, such as those on the
rights of overseas voters and of members of the armed forced on operational duty,
which appeared to be receiving support from the Communists and several other
groups because of the administrative difficulties they would create, were also taken
into the bill.
As against the government's attitude in favour of the holding of elections for
the Constituent Assembly and parliament simultaneously, or almost
simultaneously, a P.I.R.-Murba amendment (with a complicated background in
party interests and constitutional opinion) advocated holding Constituent Assembly
elections first. But here the government viewpoint was upheld.
This proposal would have meant 263 seats for Java compared with 25o for the
18

Outer Islands. On the population basis the figures will prubably be 338 to 175.

The tactical interests of the parties were clearer when the debate turned to
procedures of registration, candidacy and voting, and to the division of electoral
authority between the Home Affairs and Justice Ministries and between the
different levels of the adsninistration." The same was true of the debate on the
Masjumi amendment for the reconstitution of the more than 2,000 electoral
committees established under the 1948 law. This motion, which seems bound to
have a delaying effect, was finally carried.
On April r the Bill for Elections for the Constituent Assembly and the House
of Representatives became law.' If there were groups displeased to see it passed
and subsequent developments suggest this they were too weak to do more
than insert delaying clauses. A number of important issues, such as whether
elections would be held at different times in different parts of the country, and
what methods would be used for the control of corruption, were kft to be settled in
the Government Regulations for the act which the Minister of Home Affairs
(Mr. Roan) hoped would be ready in three months.
The government, however, was able to take a number of hitherto legally
impossible steps and continued to act quickly. Before the end of April orders had
been sent to the governors of the various provinces to nominate candidates for
the various electoral committees; the names of nine men and women, mostly
members of Parliament, to constitute the new "Central Electoral Committee"
(Panitia Penailihan Indonesia), had been published by the
government"; and thirty six middle-ranking civil servants from three ministries
-

had been sent to the islands outside Java to report on the state of organizational
preparedness and recommend a basis for sub-division of the electorates. New
committees were working on the draft of the Government Regulations, and the
technical and financial aspects of preparations. Officials still held hopes that the
elections would be held within ten months of the date of the act.
At the same time, however, the general political climate was grow-
" Thus for instance the Masjumi pressed to make the sub-district rather than
the regency the final authority in the matter of electors' lists.
2
An English translation of the Act has been made by the Ministry of
lnforrnation.
21 The non-party member Mr. Assaat, once Acting President of the Jogja
Republic, was named chairman.
Preparations at this stage were relatively advanced in Java and Sumatra, but
22

because of the legal uncertainty little had been done CVEll there in training
officials. Outside these two islands there were only a few skeleton structures in
existence.

ing more threatening to the cabinet. The controversy over the Islamic State
issue, which reached its peak in April, gave rise to an increased fear of
elections?' Responsible critics on all sides feared the development of ever
more intense election campaigning.' The P.N.I. leaders, especially from the
groups not represented in the cabinet, shrank from the prospect of an "Isa
Anshary State", and as a result became increasingly hostile to the cabinet.
Strengthening the anti-Wilopo groups in the powerful P.N.I. party council,
the "Isa Anshary" issue was driving the P.N.I. into closer cooperation with
the Communists and the radical splinter parties and "oppositionist" groups
which had led the attack on the army leadership before October 17. It was
this combination which almost caused the Wilopo cabinet to fall on the issue
of the opening of an Indonesian embassy in Moscow, and again over
personnel policies in the army, and which finally brought it down over an
aspect of land and estates policy in East Sumatra.' Whatever may have been
the Communists' role in this alliance, it seems clear that the other two groups
in it (the or its dominant majority, and the group of extreme nationalist
splinter parties which had been the strongest defenders of the existing
parliament at the time of the October 17 Affair) were opposed to Wilopo
largely because of his determination to hold elections?'
When the Wilopo cabinet finally resigned on June 2, the Masjumi and the
Socialists pressed for a presidential or "business" cabinet led by Vice-
President Hatta as the quickest way toward resolute government and
elections. The P.N.I. on the other hand, with the vociferous backing of the
Communist Party and the oppositionist splinter parties, called for another
coalition cabinet to reflect party strengths in the present parliament. It was
supported in this by the President. Finally, after
23
Isa Anshary and one or two of his followers were even more extreme in
their attacks on nominal Moslems, making no secret about including the
President in this category. The counter-attacks of Mr. Gatot Mangkupradja and
others of the P.N.I. were equally provocative.
"See for instance Pesut. Calls from several sides for the government to set limits to
party controversy led to an Attorney-General's edict on June 57 against political
speeches in religious services and religious schools.
25
On this final issue there is some evidence that it was the Communist Party
which provoked the cabinet's fall.
26
The Communist Party's atrinicit towards the election struggle appears to have
been most flexible. Apparently the Party's leaders see its interests served almost
equally well whether elections are held, or held early, or not. They arc presumably
more concerned with making and keeping the right sort of alliances with other
parties.

almost two months, the cabinet of Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo emerged. 1

Consisting of so many groups with such widely varying political out-
looks, it is almost the opposite of what a Hatta cabinet would have been.
Unlike the Wilopo cabinet, this present one has not had to face the
prospect of unreliable parliamentary support. On the other hand it has been
handicapped by the conflicts between its supporters. Most important of all, it
has had to meet vigorous opposition in the community at large, and from
some parts of the country in particular, because of its exclusion of the
powerful Masjumi.
1 This has four P.N.I. ministers, three from PLR., three from the conservative Moslem group
(Nahrlatul Ulaous), and a single representative from each of seven other smaller parties, but
excluding the Christian parties and the Democratic Fraction.
 On the issue of elections the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet has not been as
positive as its predecessor. In the Prime Minister's statement to parliarhent on
August 25, 1953, he spoke of an election schedule covering a period of
sixteen months to be reckoned from the beginning of January 1954. On
December 3 his government installed the Central Electoral Commission, a
body on which the opposition parties were not represented. The Government
Regulations for the implementation of the act had not yet been issued at the
time this article was written. Thus preparations are already lagging behind
the official schedule of August.2 At the same time there has been no decline,
and probably an actual increase, in the bitterness of party conflictthe
government parties with the Communists on the one side and the Masjumi
and the Socialists on the other.
CAN ELECTIONS be meaningful in a country like Indonesia where
perhaps only two-fifths of the people are literate? Some of the difficulties
have already been noted. On the other hand it must be remembered that
within the villages elections have been held for centuries. Though voting has
been limited to heads of families and (in many areas) to landholders, most
Indonesians possess some understanding of the election technique and its
abuses. In the village elections issues can never be what they are in the cities
of the West. But they nevertheless can be real as issues between the P.N.I.
administration official and the hadji (returned Mecca pilgrim) campaigning
for the Masjumi, or between Pak Guru, the Socialist local schoolteacher, and
Pak promo, just back from the coffee plantation, a Communist. The villager
who has been carefully watching these four, and has seen them in such a
variety of roles and situations in the last fifteen yearsin the pre-war Dutch
period, the Japanese occupation, the revolution and the presentknows
fairly well which one he trusts best.
Up to a point elections may ascertain what the mass of the people want.
But perhaps their importance should rather be seen in the fact that they can
constitute a useful generally accepted tally of the respective strengths of the
parties. If it is possible for elections to be held in a way that will minimize
party abuses and so give the elected body moral authority in the eyes of
those electing itand experience in the Minahasa and Jogjakarta elections
suggests that this is, if difficult, not impossible--they will fulfil this purpose.
In the words of Natsir's weekly Hikmah, they will not be a magic Open
Sesame to rapid prosperity, but will give a real picture of political strengths,
and, by bringing about greater stability, purify and strengthen democracy. 3
If the result is as expected a Masjunti victory, it is reasonable to assume that
there will be a better chance of stable and resolute government, and
probably, though this is open to dispute, a weakening of the danger of Darul

2 Sec the statement of Justice Minister T)jody on December 12, 1953. However, on June 17,
1954, the Government issued the official list of parties and their electoral emblems. For
Djakarta alone 12 parties were listed.Edimr.
3 On April re., 1953.
Islam.4 Finally it is certain that elections scrupulously and intelligently
supervised could increase popular confidence in the whole democratic
nationalist structure.
University of Melbourne, May 1954

Source: Pac ific A ffairs, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1954), pp. 236-254

4 This is the argument of Socialist Party supporters who have been the most consistent
supporters of electioret despite. the fact that their own chances of success are slight. They. in
contrast with supporters of the P.M.1., tend to believe that die "Natair group" of the hfasjumi
will emerge stronger in the elections. and hope to be able to cooperate with this group. The
interesting fact that tilasiumi advocacy of elections has not been as strong as that of the
Socialists should probably be accounted for by reference to the internal struggle in the
Masjumi, although even then much remains unexplained.