PLEASANTVILLE DEVT. CORP. VS.

CA 253 SCRA 10

FACTS Robillo purchased a parcel of land (Lot 9) from Pleasantville Development Corporation
(Pleasantville).

In 1975, Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. Lot 9 was still vacant then. Upon completing
all payments, Jaridinico was able to get a TCT in his name. It was then he discovered that Kee had taken
possession of the land & introduced improvements thereon. It appears that in 1974, Kee bought on
installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from CT Torres Enterprise Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate
agent of Pleasantville. Under the Contract to Sell, Kee could possess the lot even before completion of all
installment payments. CTTEIs employee, Octaviano, accompanied Kees wife to inspect Lot 8.
Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Kee then constructed his residence, a
store, an auto repair shop & other improvements on the lot. After discovering that Kee occupied Lot 9,
Jardinico confronted him. They tried to reach an amicable settlement but failed. Hence, Jardinicos
lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the he remove all improvements & vacate Lot 9. Kee refused so
Jardinico filed w/ the MTCC a complaint for ejectment w/ damages against Kee. Kee, in turn, filed a 3rd
party complaint against Pleasantville & CTTEI.

The MTCC found that Pleasantville had already rescinded its contract w/ Kee over Lot 8 for Kees failure
to pay the installments due, & that Kee no long had any rigt over the lot subject of the contract between
him & Pleasantville. Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, & he cannot
claim reimbursements for improvements he introduced on said lot. The RTC found that Kee was a builder
in bad faith, and that even assuming arguendo that Kee was in good faith, he was still guilty of unlawfully
usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served notice to vacate the
lot, & thus Kee is liable for rental. The CA ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware
of the mix up when he began constructions of the improvements on Lot 8.

ISSUE W/N Kee is a builder in good faith.

RULING YES. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his & his
ignorance of any defect/flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, Pleasantville has the burden of
proving bad faith on the part of Kee. At the time Kee built improvements on Lot 9, he believe that said
lot was what he bought from Pleasantvill. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8.
Thus, Kees good faith. Pleasantville failed to prove otherwise. To demonstrate Kees bad faith,
Pleasantville points to Kees violation of Par. 22 & 26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment. But such
violations have no bearing whatsoever on w/n Kee was a builder in good faith. These alleged violations
may give rise to Pleasantvilles cause of action against Kee under the said contract, but may not be bases
to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.

DE VERA VS CA 305 SCRA 624

FACTS Ricardo Ramos is the legal and absolute owner of a parcel of land by the National Road in Isabela
which he acquired through a homestead patent. In 1981, Ramos has demanded that the Agueda De Vera
vacate a triangular portion of the land but was ignored by the latter. De Vera argues that they have
acquired the said land through Teodoro de la Cruz (husband of De Vera) due to a pending Miscellaneous
Sales Application, which was given due course and favorably recommended by the District Land Office. In
1983, De Vera constructed a house of strong and permanent materials after removing their previous
building of light materials which was constructed in 1970. In the pre-trial conference, the RTC appointed
the Chief of the Survey Party of the Bureau of Lands, to conduct a relocation survey of the subject
property. The result was that only 22 square meters of the plaintiffs lot is occupied by De Vera and that
between the National Road and Ramos property is an area of 51 square meters. The RTC ruled in favor
of Ramos, in which he only owns all the lands up to the National Road. The RTC also ordered that De
Vera remove, at their expense, all improvements that they have constructed. The CA affirmed the RTCs
decision.

ISSUE W/N De Vera was a builder in good faith?

RULING NO. Judgment is Affirmed. Good faith implies freedom from knowledge and circumstances
which ought to put a person in injury. It can only be determined by outward acts and proven conduct. In
the 1981 demand letter, Ramos informed De Vera that they were occupying his property and gave them
the option to buy the property or to lease it. However, the contending parties failed to reach a
compromise. Furthermore, De Vera did not manage to prove sufficiently their claim of ownership by only
presenting tax declarations. In contrast to the OCT presented by Ramos, is conclusive evidence on all
matters. According to Art 449 and 450, the landowner has 3 alternatives: 1. To appropriate which has
been built w/o any obligation to pay indemnity 2. To demand the builder to remove what he has built 3.
To compel the builder to pay the value of the land Also according to Art 451, the landowner is entitled to
be indemnified by the builder in bad faith. With the case at bar, Ramos opted for the 2nd alternative.

HEIRS OF RAMON DURANO VS UY

FACTS: A 128 hectare parcel of land located in the barrios of DUNGA and CAHUMAYMAYAN
DANAO CITY, as originally owned by cebu Portland cement company. Said property has been
purchased by Durano and Co. INC. In 1973, late congressman Ramon Durano Sr. together with
Ramon Durano and the latters wife Elizabeth Hotchkiss durano instituted an action for damages
against the spouses UY et.al.
The Duranos Alleged: They officiate a hate campaign against them lodging complaints in Police
Department of Danao city. which depicted them usurpers, land grabbers and oppressors.
On the other hand, Spouses UY. Et al. alleged: They were the owners of the land as came into
ownership through: 1. Inheritance from parents who in turn inherited form their parents. 2. They had
received mimeographed notices signed by ramon durano sr that the lands they were tilling were
originally owned by cepoc and purchased by Durano and Co. Incorporated. 3. Before they could
vacate, men who were identified as employees Of Durano Corporation and Incorporated proceeded
to bulldoze the lands destroying their plantings and improvements. 4. On the same occasion these
men fired shots in the air. 5. They also maintain that they were unaware of anyone claiming adverse
possession or ownership of this land until the bulldozing operations in 1970. In 1970 the Durano
Corp sold the property to Durano III.
RTC- In favor of Spouses UY, return and pay indemnity in reparation of the destroyed properties
during the demolition. Spouses Uy et al were in possession of the properties in GOOD FAITH.
CA- affirmed the rtc decision Dissatisfied the Duranos filed this petition alleging that the Spouses Uy
et al were builders in bad faith.
ISSUE: WON THE HEIRS OF DURANO WERE BUILDERS IN BAD FAITH.
HELD: YES. A purchaser of a parcel of land, cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, such as when the property subject of the purchase is in possession
of persons other than the seller. A buyer who could not have failed to know or discover the land sold
to him was in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. In the same manner the
purchase of the property of Durano III from Durano Co. could not have to be in good faith. Because it
is not disputed tat Durano III had acquired the property with full knowledge of spouses uy occupancy
thereon. Further there even appears to be undue haste in the conveyance of the property to Durano
III, as bulldozing operations by Durano and Co. were still underway when the deed of sale to Durano
III was executed on sept. 15, 1970/ there was not even an indication Durano Co. attempted to
transfer the registration in its name before it conveyed to Durano III.
ISSUE: WON THE HEIRS OF DURANO WERE BUILDERS IN BAD FAITH.
HELD: YES. Since petitioners knew fully well the defect in their titles, they were correctly held by the
Court of Appeals to be builders in bad faith. And since they were in bad faith. The Civil Code
provides: Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right of indemnity. Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything
has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the
planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of
the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of
the land, and the sower the proper rent. Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the
landowner is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or sower. Based on these provisions, the
owner of the land has three alternative rights: (1) to appropriate what has been built without any
obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or (2) to demand that the builder remove what he had built, or
(3) to compel the builder to pay the value of the land, or pay the rent in case of the sower. In any
case, the landowner is entitled to damages under Article 451, abovecited. The right of the owner of
the land to recover damages from a builder in bad faith is clearly provided for in Article 451 of the
Civil Code. Although said Article 451 does not elaborate on the basis for damages, the Court
perceives that it should reasonably correspond with the value of the properties lost or destroyed as a
result of the occupation in bad faith, as well as the fruits (natural, industrial or civil) from those
properties that the owner of the land reasonably expected to obtain.

Frederico Geminiano vs Court of Appeals

Gr 120303
July 24, 1996

Facts:

On a 12 square meter portion of a lot originally owned by petitioners mother, Paulina Amando vda. de
Geminiano, stood an unfinished bungalow sold by the petitioner to Dominador and Mary Nicolas(private
respondents) with a verbal promise that the petitioner would sell to the respondents the portion of the
land. Later on, a lease agreement was entered into by Vda. De Geminano and the respondents over a
portion of the lot including the portion on which the bungalow was built.

The respondents introduced improvements therein and registered the same. Upon the expiration of
their lease, vda. de Geminiano refused to accept any more rentals. In a separate suit, the lot was
acquired by Maria Lee, who later on sold the same to Lily Salcedo, who in turn sold it to Spouses Agustin
and Ester Dionisio.

On February 14, 1992, the Dionisio Spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the property in favor of
the petitioners. On February 9, 1993, petitioners demanded that the respondent vacate the property
and pay the monthly rentals unpaid.

Due to the respondents failure to comply, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed with the MTCC.
The MTCC ruled that Artcile 448 and 546 of the Civil Code does not apply to the case at bar where the
builder is a lessee because the latter fully knows that his possession of the property would only continue
during the life of the lease. In sum, the MTCC ordered the respondent to vacate the premises.

On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision holding that the respondents are entitled to the
reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements and that they are allowed to retain
possession until the reimbursement is fully made. The RTCs ruling was based on the assurance made by
the petitioner to the respondent that the lot will eventually be sold to them. The CA affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents are builders in good faith.

Decision:

The Court ruled the the respondents are not builders in bad faith. Being mere lessees, the private
respondents well knew that their occupation was temporary. Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Article 546, allows the retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applies only to possessors
in good faith.

The alleged promise of the petitioners to sell the lot was not supported by sufficient evidence. Such
promise nor any option to buy or buy, was not provided in the lease agreement between the parties.
Even if there was in fact a promise to sell, the respondents still could not be held as possessors or
builders in good faith. The mere expectancy of ownership of the lot cannot be raised the respondents as
the promise was not actually fulfilled nor was it sufficiently proven.
G.R. No. 117642 April 24, 1998EDITHA ALVIOLA and PORFERIO ALVIOLA, petitioners,vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, FORENCIA BULING Vda de TINAGAN, DEMOSTHENES TINAGAN, JESUS
TINAGAN,ZENAIDA T., JOSEP and JOSEPHINE TINAGAN, respondents.

Facts: In this petition for review on certiorari , petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 8, 1994 which affirmed the decision of the lower court ordering petitioners to peacefully
vacate and surrender the possession of the disputed properties to the private respondents.

On April 1, 1950, Victoria Tinagan purchased from Mauro Tinagan 2 parcels of land. One parcel of land
contains an areaof 5,704 square meters, more or less; while the other contains 10,860 square meters.
Thereafter, Victoria and her sonAgustin, took possession of said parcels of land.

Sometime in 1960, petitioners occupied portions thereof whereat they built a copra dryer and put up a
store wherein they engaged in the business of buying and selling copra. On June 23, 1975, Victoria died.
On October 26, 1975, Agustin died, survived by herein private respondents.

On December 24, 1976, petitioner Editha assisted by her husband filed a complaint for partition and
damages, claimingto be an acknowledged natural child of deceased Agustin Tinagan and demanding the
delivery of her shares in theproperties left by the deceased. This case was dismissed by the trial court on
the ground that recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parent and petitioner Editha did not fall in any of theexceptions enumerated in Article 285 of the Civil
Code. On March 29, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession against
Editha and her husband Porferio, praying, among others, that they be declared absolute owners of the
said parcels of land, and that petitioners be ordered to vacate the same, to remove their copra dryer and
store, to pay actual damages (in the form of rentals),moral and punitive damages, litigation expenses and
attorney's fees. In their answer, petitioners contend that they own the improvements in the disputed
properties which are still public land; that they are qualified to be beneficiaries of the comprehensive
agrarian reform program and that they are rightful possessors by occupation of the said properties for
more than twenty years. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the private
respondents. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N the lands in question are public lands and W/N the petitioners are rightful possessors by
occupation formore than 20 yearS.

Held: No Ratio: Petitioners aver that respondent court erred in declaring private respondents the owners
of the disputed properties.They contend that ownership of a public land cannot be declared by the
courts but by the Executive Department; and that the respondent court erred in not considering that
private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Victoria Tinagan,during her lifetime, ceded her right to the
disputed properties in favor of petitioner.
VDA. DE NAZARENO VS. CA 257 SCRA 589

FACTS

In 1979, Jose Salasalan & Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on w/c their houses stood from Antonio
Nazareno, the predecessor-in-interest of Vda. De Nazareno. In 1982, Salasalan & Rabay stopped paying
rents. Hence, Nazareno filed a case for ejectment w/ the MTC. The MTC decided in favor of Nazareno &
the RTC affirmed. Before he died, Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands (BOL) of the
survey plan w/ a view of perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the
approved survey could be released to Nazareno, it was protested by Salasalan & Rabaya before the BOL.
Land Investigator Labis conducted an investigation & rendered a report to the Regional Dir. Based on said
report, the Regional Dir. ordered an amendment of the survey plan in the name of Nazareno by
segregating therefrom the areas occupied by Salasalan & Rabaya who, if qualified, may file public land
applications covering their portions. The Dir. Of Lands ordered Nazareno to vacate the portions
adjudicated to Salasalan & Rabaya & remove whatever improvements they introduced thereon.
Desamparado Vda. De Nazareno & Leticia Nazareno filed a case w/ the RTC for annulment of report &
recommendation by the Land Investigator, the decision by the Regional Dir., & order of execution by the
Dir. Of Lands. Vda. De Nazarenos contention: The land is private land being an accretion to his titled
property, applying Art. 457 of the NCC.

ISSUE W/N the subject land is public land.

RULING NO. Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property, requires the concurrence of theses requisites: 1.
the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual & imperceptible 2. it be the result of action of the waters of
the river (or sea) 3. the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of rivers (or the sea
coast) These are called the rules on all alluvion, w/c if present in a case, give to the owners of the land
adjoining banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of
waters. Vda. De Nazareno admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil & other
filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek & the Cagayan River bounding their land. it cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil & other filling materials was gradual &
imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek & Cagayan
River. Having not met the 1st & 2nd requisite of the rules on alluvion, Vda. De Nazareno cannot claim the
rights of a riparian owner. The accretion was man-made or artificial. The requirement that the deposit
should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the
NCC all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Where
land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but
is also the consequence of the direct & deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man made
accretion and, as such, part of public domain. In any case, Vda. De Nazareno is estopped from denying
the public character of the subject land. The mere filing of the Application by the late Nazareno
constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the subject oF the
survey plan.
HEIRS OF NAVARRO v. IAC

GR No. 68166

FACTS

In 1946, the late Sinforoso Parscual filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore
land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan approximately 17 hectares. This application was denied. So was his
motion for reconsideration. Then, Emiliano Navarro, also deceased, filed a filed fishpond application w/
the Bureau of Fisheries (BOF) covering 25 hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon. Initially, such an
application was denied by the Dir. of Fisheries, but in 1958, it gave due course to his application but only
to the extent of 7 hectares of the property as may be certified by the BOF as suitable for fishpond
purposes. The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Navarro's application. Aggrieved by
the decision of the Dir. of Fisheries, it appealed to the Sec. of Natural Resources who, however, affirmed
the grant. The Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of the Phil., similarly affirmed the
grant. On the other hand, sometime in 1960, Pascual filed an application to register & confirm his title to
a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon (around 146,611 sq. m.) Pascual claimed that this land is an
accretion to his property. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by
the Bulacan River, & on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan
River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's
property resulting in an accretion thereon. Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner. In 1960,
the Dir. of Lands, represented by the Asst. Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that
neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the
same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Rep. of the Phil. The Dir. of
Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for the same reason as
that advanced by the Dir. of Lands. Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application.
Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has always been part of the public domain, it
being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a part of the
subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the BOF and confirmed by the Office of the
President; and that be bad already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond. During the
pendency of the land registration case, Pascual filed a complaint for ejectment against Navarro. Pascual
alleged that Navarro have unlawfully claimed and possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a
portion of the subject property. Navarro, in the case, was alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon:
thus he, together with the other defendants, have thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to
be registered. This, notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to vacate the property. The case
was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the CFI. Because of the similarity of the
parties and the subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with the land
registration case and was jointly tried by the court a quo. During the pendency of the trial of the
consolidated cases, Navarro died & was substituted by his heirs. Subsequently, Pascual died and was
substituted by his heirs. The court rendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land
&, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings. On
appeal, the IAC reversed the decision of the CFI and demanded that Navarro turn over the possession of
the portion of the subject land not within the strip of land 50m wide along Manila Bay to Pascual since
the strip of land belongs to the public domain. Hence, this petition by Navarro took place.

ISSUE: W/N Navarro has ownership over the land by virtue of the principle of accretion.
RULING NO. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: 1. that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; 2. that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and 3. that the land
where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. Accretion is the process whereby
the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank; the
owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from
littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal
waters. The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian
owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen but is not automatically registered property,
hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. The disputed land, this, is an
accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay
which adjoined Navarros own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Art.
457 of the Civil Code but Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1886 . In the light of the aforecited
vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in this controversy, the
same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As
part of the public domain, the land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation
belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by
any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent authority."
Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the
declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public
utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard services. Navarro utterly
fail to show that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as
qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of Navarro as owners
of the estates adjacent thereto.
AGUSTIN v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 66075-76, July 5, 1990

FACTS: The Cagayan River separates the Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province
of Cagayan. Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are among those who are occupying
the western bank of the Cagayan River while on the eastern bank is owned by petitioner Eulogio Agustin.
From 1919 to 1968, the Cagayan river has eroded the lands on the eastern bank including Agustins
Lot depositing alluvium on the land possessed by Pablo Binuyag. In 1968, after a typhoon which caused a
big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course and returned it to its 1919 bed and it cut through the
lands of respondents whose lands were transferred on the eastern side.

ISSUE: Whether or not ownership of accretion is lost upon sudden and abrupt change of the course of
the river?

HELD: NO. Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. Accretion benefits a riparian owner
when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that
it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic v. CA, 132 SCRA 514). All these requisites of accretion
are present in this case for, as the trial court found: ". . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919
to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. Within this period, the alluviun (sic) deposited on the other side has
become greater in area than the original lands of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition in every
year is imperceptible in nature, one could not discern it but can be measured after the lapse of a certain
time. The testimonial evidence in these cases that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is
overwhelming as against the denial of defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. The private respondents
ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course
of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred
said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code
apply to this situation. "Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates
from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the
land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes
the same within two years."cralaw virtua1aw library "Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides
itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his
ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current. (Emphasis
supplied). In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong
typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from the
estate by the current." The private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was
transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.