SIENA REALTY CORPORATION and LILIBETH MANLUGON v. HON.

LOLITA GALANG, ANITA CO NG

and COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 145169, 13 May 2004, THIRD DIVISION

Petitioners Siena Realty Corporation and Lilibeth Manlugon (Siena) filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals (CA) concerning the Regional Trial Court of Manilas (RTC) Order
dismissing Sienas complaint. Upon CAs dismissal of the petition, Siena filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. Pending resolution of the motion, the Supreme Court issued a resolution
approving the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The said
resolution provided that in case of the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, the 60-day
period shall be counted from the denial of the said motion. CA then dismissed Sienas Motion
for Reconsideration on the ground that the said amendment applies to Sienas motion. Hence,
this present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion for applying the amendment
retroactively

HELD:

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence states that judicial departments are mandated to
take judicial notice even without the introduction of evidence, hence, even if petitioner did not
raise or allege the amendment in their motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, it
should have taken mandatory judicial notice. The resolution did not have to specify that it had
retroactive effect as it pertains to a procedural matter.

The amendatory rule in their favor notwithstanding, Sienas petition fails. At the time Siena filed
before the appellate court their Petition for Certiorari on the 60th day following their receipt of
the Order of RTC, the said Order had become final and executory after the 15th day following
Sienas receipt thereof.

DENR vs DENR Region 12 Employees G.R. No. 149724 August 19, 2003

RULE 129 SECTION 1: MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE

FACTS:

Petition for review assailing CA decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and denial of
motion for consideration.
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum pursuant to DENR
Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles:

directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato

Providing for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of Administrative Units in the
Regional and Field Offices

Sec 1. Realignment of Administrative Units.

The supervision of the Provinces of South Cotabato and Sarangani shall be transferred from
Region XI to XII

Respondents filed a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction

RTC of Cotabato issued TRO against DENR Sec and Regional Executive Director from transferring
the offices

DENR then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that

The power to transfer the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) is executive in nature.

The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on Executive Order No. 429, which
reorganized Region XII.

The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in the Case of
Chiongbian vs. Orbos (1995) 245 SCRA 255.

Since the power to reorganize the Administrative Regions is Executive in Nature citing
Chiongbian, the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition.

RTC then decided, ordering the DENR to cease and desist from enforcing their Memorandum
Order xxx for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on their part, and they are further ordered to return back the seat
of the DENR Regional Offices 12 to Cotabato City.

Petition for certiorari with the CA was dismissed for procedural errors: (1) failure to submit a
written explanation why personal service was not done on the adverse party; (2) failure to attach
affidavit of service; (3) failure to indicate the material dates when copies of the orders of the
lower court were received; (4) failure to attach certified true copy of the order denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration; (5) for improper verification, the same being based on
petitioners knowledge and belief, and (6) wrong remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to substitute
a lost appeal.
Motion for Reconsideration denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the trial court should have taken judicial notice of Republic Act No. 6734, and its
implementing Executive Order 429 as the legal bases for the issuance of the assailed DAO-99-14.

HELD:

The trial court should have taken judicial notice of R.A. No. 6734, as implemented by E.O. No.
429, as legal basis of the Presidents power to reorganize the executive department, specifically
those administrative regions which did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM. It is axiomatic
that a court has the mandate to apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in determining
whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on the
complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the
questions before it.[22] In resolving the motion to dismiss, the trial court should have taken
cognizance of the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments because they
are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:

A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality,
the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.

The petition for review is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals, as well as the
decision of the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction,
which enjoined the petitioner from enforcing the Memorandum Order of the DENR XII Regional
Executive Director, is LIFTED.

SUPLICO vs NEDA

G.R. No. 178830; July 14, 2008

FACTS:

Triple petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for the issuance of a
TRO and/or preliminary injunction were filed and consolidated in the SC. The prayers of the said
petitions, among others, sought the annulment of the award of the contract for the national
broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation and to enjoin any activity in connection with
the said deal.
On October 2, 2007, during a meeting, Pres. GMA, acting in her official capacity informed Pres.
Hu Jintao of China that the Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the ZTE-
NBN project. Later, the Solicitor General made a manifestation and motion stating that in an
Indorsement by the Legal Division of the DOTC, it has been informed that the Philippine
Government has decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project. That said, there is no more
justiciable controversy for the Court to resolve. The public respondents then prayed that the
present petitions be dismissed.

The petitioners, in their respective replies, argued that the Indorsement is self-serving and not a
sufficient basis that the deal has been permanently scrapped. Assuming arguendo that the
petition has become moot, the Court may still take cognizance thereof to educate the bench and
the bar. Further, because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised, the Court should
take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.

The petitioners ultimately contended the declarations made by officials belonging to the
executive branch on the Philippine Governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN
Project are self-serving, hence, inadmissible.

ISSUE:

WON the Court may take judicial notice of the acts of President GMA?

HELD:

The SC dismissed the petition. It held that It has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the
official act of the President.

Under the Section 1 Rule 129, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take
judicial notice of the official acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive
branch of our government. It is further provided in the said rule that the court shall take judicial
notice of the foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of
cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the
meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the executive
department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence.
Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of
the executive officials of informing this Court of the governments decision not to continue with
the ZTE-NBN Project is also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the
contrary. The Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this disputable presumption in the
present instance.

NATIVIDAD CANDIDO, assisted by her husband ALFREDO CANDIDO, and VICTORIA C.

RUMBAUA, assisted by her husband AMOR RUMBAUA, petitioners

COURT OF APPEALS and SOFRONIO DABU, respondents.

FACTS:Petitioners Natividad Candido and Victoria Rumbaua are co-owners of a first-class

irrigated riceland with an area of 21,193 square meters located in Orion, Bataan. Respondent
Sofronio Dabu served as their agricultural tenant. On 21 July 1986 petitioners lodged a
complaint[1] with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against respondent Dabu for termination of
tenancy relationship and recovery of unpaid rentals from crop-year 1983 plus attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.

Petitioners averred in their complaint below that a team from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
had fixed a provisional rental of twenty-six (26) and twenty-nine (29) sacks of palay for the rainy
and dry seasons, respectively, which respondent failed to pay beginning the crop-year 1983 dry
season up to the filing of the complaint.

Private respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and claimed that until 1983
their sharing system was on a 50-50 basis. He denied any provisional rental allegedly fixed by the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform and at the same time maintained that only a proposal for thirteen
(13) cavans for the rainy season crop and twenty-five percent (25%) of the net harvest during the
dry season was put forward. He claimed that he paid his rentals by depositing thirteen (13)
cavans of palay for the 1984 rainy season crop, thirteen (13) cavans for 1985 and eight (8) cavans
representing twenty-five percent (25%) of the dry season harvest.

On motion of respondent upon issues being joined, the case was referred to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for a preliminary determination of the existing relationship between the
parties and for certification as to its propriety for trial. Thereafter the DAR certified that the case
was proper for trial but only on the issue of non-payment of rentals and not on the ejectment of
respondent Dabu. Accordingly trial proceeded on the issue of non-payment of rentals.

After finding that no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove the provisional rental alleged
to have been fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the lower court dismissed the complaint.
The counterclaim of respondent Dabu was likewise dismissed after it was established that the
tenancy relationship prevailing between the parties was on a 50-50 basis.
The Court of Appeals confirmed the findings of the court a quo.

Petitioners would impress upon us that the verified complaint and the affidavit presented by
petitioners to the DAR are proofs of the provisional rentals fixed by it and that it was error for
the trial court not to have taken cognizance of these documents.

ISSUE1: Whether the verified complaint and affidavits presented by petitioners may be
considered evidence absent any formal offer

HELD1: A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to
object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it.[8] A formal offer is
necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only -and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.[9] To allow a party to attach any
document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw
unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the
document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing
documents not previously scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the
records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or documents not offered at the
hearing of the case.

ISSUE2: Whether or not the court should take judicial notice of petitioner Natividad C. Candidos
affidavit despite absence of any formal offer

HELD2: NO. Petitioners would insist that we take judicial notice of the affidavit of petitioner
Natividad C. Candido despite absence of any formal offer during the proceedings in the trial
court. This is futile since this is not among the matters which the law mandatorily requires to be
taken judicial notice of; neither can we consider it of public knowledge, or capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.

The testimony of petitioner Natividad Candido cannot even be relied upon, to say the least.
Quite interestingly, she could not even recall when private respondent first failed to pay his rent,
if indeed there was any failure on his part to comply with his obligation. She only said that it was
sometime in 1982 or 1983, and did not even know precisely how many cavans of palay were
being harvested per crop-year.

Petitioners definitely failed to establish their cause of action. They never proved that
respondent Dabu failed to pay his rentals starting 1982. Neither were they able to competently
confirm the provisional rate of rentals allegedly fixed by the team of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform.
EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 152392 May 26, 2005

FACTS:

Korean Airlines (KAL), through its appointed counsel, Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint in RTC
for the collection of the principal amount etc. against Expertravel and Tours, Inc. (ETI). The
verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo.

The ETI sought for the dismissal of the case; disputing the authority of Atty. Aguinaldo to execute
the requisite verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as the resident agent and
counsel of the respondent.

In an attempt to show proof of such authority or representation, KAL through its general
manager, executed and submitted an Affidavit alleging: that the board of directors conducted a
special teleconference; that in that same teleconference, the board of directors approved a
resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to
file the complaint; and that the corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
However, such attempt casted veritable doubt not only on its claim that such a teleconference
was held, but also on the approval by the Board of Directors of the said resolution.

Finally, the petitioner pointed out that teleconferencing is not recognized as a legitimate means
of gathering a quorum of board of directors for purposes of passing a resolution; hence, the trial
court cannot take judicial notice of the said teleconference without prior hearing, nor any
motion therefor.

The RTC and CA dismiss the petition. In its April 12, 2000 Order, the RTC took judicial notice
because of the onset of modern technology. The CA, likewise, gave credence to the respondents
claim that such a teleconference took place, as contained in the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim, as well
as Atty. Aguinaldos certification.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may take judicial notice of the said teleconference without prior
hearing.

HELD:

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must
be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and
not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court.

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records
and facts of general notoriety. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is
dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge.

Although the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be made by
individuals through teleconferencing. The Court agrees that persons in the Philippines may have
a teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or
corporate governance.

In this case, however, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted. And even if there had
been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically
authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against
forum shopping. The respondents allegation that its board of directors conducted a
teleconference and approved the said resolution is not credible, given the additional fact that no
such allegation was made in the complaint.

The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference never took place, and
that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondents Board of Directors during the said
teleconference was a mere concoction for the purpose of creating an impression on the RTC, the
CA and this Court, to avert the dismissal of its complaint against the petitioner.
In view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the lower courts were set aside and the
complaint filed by the respondent was dismissed.

People vs. Tundag, G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense
counselsadmission. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a
hearing isrequired before courts can take judicial notice of such fact

State Prosecutors vs Judge Manuel Muro (A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994)

Facts: The petitioners in this case are state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of
Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the
law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of
the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent
judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers,
which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the President of the
Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.

The respondents decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the
court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He
further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has
made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is
discretionary on his part.

The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters
he purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the newspaper
publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking
judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction
published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case? (YES)

Ruling: The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It
cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the Circular
No. 1353 which is the basis of the Presidents announcement in the newspaper, believing that
the public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and
such matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his
discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in a
newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity.

When the Presidents statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of
not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial
notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the
public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:

the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;

it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact
cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of
the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge
contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the
knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and
one that involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the information he
obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of
a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the
prosecution the right to be heard and of due process.

Sec. 2. Discretionary Judicial Notice

Landbank vs. Wycoco

Facts:

Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice
land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422 and situated in the Barrio of San
Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija. Pursuant to the CARP, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell his land to the
DAR for P14.9 million. The evidence presented by Wycoco in support of his claim were the
following: (1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422; (2) Notice of Land Valuation; and (3)
letter dated July 10, 1992 rejecting the counter-offer of LBP and DAR. However, the offered price
of the DAR is only P2,280,159.82, thus, he rejected the offer. He then filed a case before the RTC
for the determination of just compensation. The RTC ruled in his favor. It ruled that there is no
need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public knowledge
that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from
P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the
compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of
P13,428,082.00.

Issue:

WON the just compensation determined by the RTC was valid and within its jurisdiction.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative,
or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial
court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically
assuming a valuation without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of determining
just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to
be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition,
the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations
thereon. Since these factors were not considered, a remand of the case for determination of just
compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another
way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can
be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it
will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge
of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO,

respondent
October 2, 2001

FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987.
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued
a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian
citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In
their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since
October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were
divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground
of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former marriage only in November. On
the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before
they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce
issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded
before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore,
before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as
a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic,
issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with
the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was
admitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact
that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are two
types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely
suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent
procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict
remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree a party to a marriage who marries again before
this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy. This shows that the divorce
obtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce
sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences
submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged
foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not
be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity
of the parties marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

Digest: Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. CA (1995) G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995 Lessons
Applicable: Territoriality Principle (conflicts of law)

FACTS: Northwest Airlines (Northwest) and C.F. Sharp & Company (C.F.), through its Japan
branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the
Northwest authorized the C.F. to sell its air transportation tickets March 25, 1980: Unable to
remit the proceeds of the ticket sales, Northwest sued C.F. in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the
unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages April 11, 1980: writ of summons
was issued by the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan The attempt to serve the
summons was unsuccessful because Mr. Dinozo was in Manila and would be back on April 24,
1980 April 24, 1980: Mr. Dinozo returned to C.F. Office to serve the summons but he refused to
receive claiming that he no longer an employee After the 2 attempts of service were
unsuccessful, Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other legal
documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan> Japanese Embassy in Manila>Ministry
(now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines>Executive Judge of the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila who ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit>C.F.
Main Office August 28, 1980: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of
summons but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. January 29, 1981: Tokyo Court rendered
judgment ordering the C.F. to pay 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per
annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until payment is completed March 24, 1981: C.F.
received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment. C.F. did not appeal so it became final
and executory May 20, 1983: Northwest filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment a RTC July
16, 1983: C.F. averred that the Japanese Court sought to be enforced is null and void and
unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper notice and/or
with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of law and fact. The foreign judgment in the
Japanese Court sought in this action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant considering that this is an action in personam. The process of the Court in Japan
sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the
defendant in the case before the Japanese Court of the case at bar CA sustained RTC: Court
agrees that if the C.F. in a foreign court is a resident in the court of that foreign court such court
could acquire jurisdiction over the person of C.F. but it must be served in the territorial
jurisdiction of the foreign court ISSUE: W/N the Japanese Court has jurisdiction over C.F. HELD:
YES. instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it
denied NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages
Consequently, the party attacking (C.F.) a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service
of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand. Applying it,
the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of
summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for
that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by
law to that effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. If the foreign
corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is exclusive, and
service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him.
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official
designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance
company (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation (c) the
Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to
do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made, the government office or
official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other legal proccess to the
corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the
service. The service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a
purpose to assimilate.

Laureano vs. CA
Rule 129: What need not be Proved
Section 2: Discretionary Judicial Notice

In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited
(SAL). In 1982 however, SAL was hit by recession and so it had to lay off some
employees. Laureano was one of them. Laureano asked for reconsideration but it was not
granted. Aggrieved, Laureano filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against SAL. But in
1987, he withdrew the labor case and instead filed a civil case for damages due to illegal
termination of contract against SAL. Laureano filed the case here in the Philippines. SAL
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The motion was
denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the termination of Laureano is valid pursuant to
Singaporean law.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case raising the issue of lack
of jurisdiction, non applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.
HELD: No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is
not proved in court. As such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the
termination is indeed valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take judicial
notice of the laws of Singapore. SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed to prove such
law hence Philippine law shall apply. However, the case must be dismissed on the ground
of estoppel. Under our laws, all money claims arising from employer-employee
relationships must be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued.
Laureanos cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was terminated but he only filed the
money claim in 1987 or more than three years from 1982. Hence he is already barred by
prescription.

PCIB vs ESCOLIN

In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In
May 1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie
however also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be
turned over to her brother and sister.
In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon
Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there was an
ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed
as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges when
they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was
in an iron trunk in Charles office. Hence, in the meantime, hed like to have Magno
appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.
Later, Charles will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said
will. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of
Linnies estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles will was
granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed
as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to
Linnies brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected. Magno
also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that
under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnies national
law; that under Texas law, Linnies will shall be respected regardless of the presence of
legitimes (Charles share in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because
Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoi
doctrine).
ISSUE:Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties
failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what the
Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would
be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however emphasized that Texas
law at the time of Linnies death is the law applicable (and not said law at any other
time). NOTE: Dynamics of law.
City of Manila vs Garcia
FACTS:
1.Plaintiff is the owner of certain parcels of land. Without the knowledge and consent of
plaintiff, defendants occupied the property and built their houses.2.Having discovered,
plaintiff through its mayor gave each defendant written permits, each labeled as lease
contract to occupy specific areas. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal
rentals.3.After sometime, plaintiff, through its treasurer, demanded payment of their
rentals and vacate the premises for the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary Schools
expansion.4.Despite the demand, defendants refused to vacate the said property. Hence,
this case was filed for recovery of possession.5.The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff
taking judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 appropriating P100k for the construction of
additional building of Epifanio De Los Santos Elementary School.6.Defendants appealed.
ISSUE: WoN the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school
purposes
HELD: YES The trial court ruled out the admissibility of the documentary evidence
presented by plaintiff
Certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board
which recites the amount of P100k had been set aside in Ordinance 4566 for the
construction of additional building of the said school.
But then the decision under review, the trial court revised his views. He then declared that
there was a need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the
very document. Because of the courts contradictory stance, defendants brought this case
on appeal. However, the elimination of the certification as evidence would not profit
defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken because
he was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 . The reason being that
the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all
ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.
And, Ordinance4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of
P100,000.00 was set aside for the construction of additional building of the Epifanio de
los Santos Elementary School.
Further defendants entry to the said property is illegal. Their constructions are as illegal,
without permits. The city mayor doesnt have the authority to issue permits. The permits
issued are null and void.

Republic VS Court of Appeals

107 SCRA 504 Sept. 10, 1981

FACTS:
 On May 17, 1979, petitioner asked the CFI Bulacan for a fifth motion for extension
of time to file notice of appeal from May 18, 1979 to June 17, 1979. Petitioner filed its
notice of appeal on June 7, 1979 although the lower court has not yet acted on its fifth
motion for extension of time. The private respondents filed an opposition in the notice of
appeal on the ground that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period because
petitioners motion dated May 17, 1979 was filed on May 21, 1979.
Petitioner filed its opposition to the objection of the private respondents, contending that
the said May 17, 1979 motion for extension of time was actually mailed on May 18,
1979, which was the last day of the extended period allowed by the lower courts order on
his fourth motion for extension of time.
The lower court dismissed the appeal of petitioner on the ground that the fifth motion for
extension of time and the record on appeal were filed out of time; and found the said fifth
motion was actually mailed on May 21, 1979 and not on May 18, 1979 as the latter relied
on the date stamped on the envelope by Manila Post Office.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the said motion was filed on
time and attached therein the letter of the postmaster stating that the mail was received by
their office on May 18, 1979; however, it was not included in the May 19 dispatch to
Bulacan and was actually dispatched on May 21, 1979. The said motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, however, their appeal was also denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the practice of the post office of stamping immediately on the envelope
the date on which a letter was posted is one that cannot be a proper subject of judicial
notice.
RULING:
YES. The post office practice of which the lower court took judicial notice is not covered
by any of the instances provided by the Rules. Neither can it be classified under matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought
to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. For a matter to be taken
judicial notice of by the courts of law, it must be a subject of common and general
knowledge. In other words, judicial notice of facts is measured by general knowledge of
the same facts.
Indeed, the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts.
The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must
be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubts upon the subject
should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

Doctrine: There are exceptions to the rule that the court cannot take judicial notice of contents
of other cases pending before it.

Facts:

In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership of a parcel of residential land in Makato,

Aklan, was filed in the RTC of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose
Tabuena. The trial court found that the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Tabernilla
while they were in the United States.
Peraltas mother conveyed the land to Tabernilla upon the latters return. At the same
time, she asked to be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life.
Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she did.
Upon her death, Tabuena, the half-brother of Peralta, took possession of the property.
He refused demands made Tabernilla to surrender the property, claiming it as his won.
The trial court ruled for the estate and ordered Tabuena to vacate the property.
Tabuena protested that the trial court erred in taking cognizance of documents which
had never been formally submitted in evidence and in considering the proceedings in
another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land in resolving the
ownership of the subject lot.

Issues:

Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of Tabuenas testimony in Civil Case
No. 1327?

Held:

Yes.

The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking
judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely
connected with the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending
before the same judge." Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:

. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the
record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is
made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is
actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent
of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.

It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection,"
"with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the
parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are
actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then
pending." These conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was
completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial
court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up
at the trial and was "unfairly sprung upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.

JUMAMIL vs CAF et al, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005

FACTS:
In 1989, Petitioner Jumamil filed before the RTC OF Panabo a petition for declaratory
relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against public
respondents Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo,
Davao del Norte. He questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution No. 7,
Series of 1989. This Resolution was for enacting Appropriation Ordinance No. 111,
provided for an initial appropriation of P765,000 for the construction of stalls around a
proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market. Subsequently, Resolution No. 49
was passed appropriating a further amount of P1,515,000 for the construction of
additional stalls.
Prior to the passage of these resolutions, Mayor Caf had already entered into contracts
with several parties who were close friends and/or relatives of the public respondents.
Thus the petitioner assails that the Resolutions were unconstitutional.
It appears that on May 21, 1990, both parties agreed14 to await the decision in CA
G.R. SP No. 20424, which involved similar facts, issues and parties. The RTC,
consequently, deferred the resolution of the pending petition. The appellate court
eventually rendered its decision in that case finding that the petitioners were not entitled
to the declaratory relief prayed for as they had no legal interest in the controversy. Upon
elevation to the Supreme Court as UDK Case No. 9948, the petition for review on
certiorari was denied for being insufficient in form and substance.
ISSUE: Whether the parties were bound by the outcome in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 20424.
HELD: YES
Adverting to the first issue, we observe that petitioner was the one who wanted the parties
to await the decision of the Supreme Court in UDK Case No. 9948 since the facts and
issues in that case were similar to this. Petitioner, having expressly agreed to be bound by
our decision in the aforementioned case, should be reined in by the dismissal order we
issued, now final and executory. In addition to the fact that nothing prohibits parties from
committing to be bound by the results of another case, courts may take judicial notice of a
judgment in another case as long as the parties give their consent or do not object.
As opined by Justice Edgardo L. Paras:
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of
another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and
of public records on file in the same court. In addition, judicial notice will be taken of the
record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or
involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case between
different parties in the same court.

SOLIDBANK vs Mindanao Ferroalloy

FACTS:

Mindanao Ferroalloy corporation is the fruit of a joint venture agreement between a

Filipino corporation and Korean Corporation. In its operations, its liabilities ballooned over its
assets that it had to secure loans from petitioner Solidbank. The loans were later
consolidated and restructured, evidenced by a promissory note. The promissory note was
signed by Cu and Hong, both officers of the corporation. The corporation, through the same
officers also executed a deed of assignment. Thereafter, the corporation stopped its
operations and the loan was left unpaid. The bank was prompted to file a complaint
against the corporation, and with it, impleading the officers who signed the agreement
and promissory notes. The trial court held in favor of the bank but didn't adjudge liability of the
officers. Both the trial court and CA held that there was no solidary liability on the part of the
officers impleaded by the bank.

HELD:

Though Hong and Cu signed above the maker/borrower and the printed name of the
corporation, without the word by preceding their signatures, the fact that they signed in their
personal capacities is negated by the facts that name and address of the corporation also
appeared on the space
provided for in the maker/borrower and their signatures only appeared once when it
should be twice if indeed it was in their personal capacities. Further, they didn't sign on the
portion allocated for the co-maker, and there was also indicia of it being signed as authorized
representatives.

La Bugal-BLaan vs Ramos (GR No. 127882 December 1, 2004)

La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association Inc. vs Ramos

GR No. 127882 December 1, 2004
Facts: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the
constitutionality of (1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order No. [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the
FTAA dated March 30, 1995,6 executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation
(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision
granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO
96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on
the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision
struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts, which, though permitted
under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the
principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over
the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation. The Decision
quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia,
vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including
operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion
and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products
discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and
beneficial ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987
Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently,
respondents filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated March 9, 2004,
the Court required petitioners to comment thereon. In the Resolution of June 8, 2004, it set the
case for Oral Argument on June 29, 2004.

Issue: Whether or not the FTAA issued were valid.

Held: Yes. The notion that the deliberations reflect only the views of those members who spoke
out and not the views of the majority who remained silent should be clarified. We must never
forget that those who spoke out were heard by those who remained silent and did not react. If
the latter were silent because they happened not to be present at the time, they are presumed
to have read the minutes and kept abreast of the deliberations. By remaining silent, they are
deemed to have signified their assent to and/or conformity with at least some of the views
propounded or their lack of objections thereto. It was incumbent upon them, as representatives
of the entire Filipino people, to follow the deliberations closely and to speak their minds on the
matter if they did not see eye to eye with the proponents of the draft provisions.

In any event, each and every one of the commissioners had the opportunity to speak out and to
vote on the matter. Moreover, the individual explanations of votes are on record, and they show
where each delegate stood on the issues. In sum, we cannot completely denigrate the value or
usefulness of the record of the ConCom, simply because certain members chose not to speak
out.

However, it is of common knowledge, and of judicial notice as well, that the government is and
has for many many years been financially strapped, to the point that even the most essential
services have suffered serious curtailments education and health care, for instance, not to
mention judicial services have had to make do with inadequate budgetary allocations. Thus,
government has had to resort to build-operate-transfer and similar arrangements with the
private sector, in order to get vital infrastructure projects built without any governmental outlay.

The drafters whose ranks included many academicians, economists, businessmen, lawyers,
politicians and government officials were not unfamiliar with the practices of foreign
corporations and multinationals.

Neither were they so nave as to believe that these entities would provide assistance without
conditionalities or some quid pro quo. Definitely, as business persons well know and as a matter
of judicial notice, this matter is not just a question of signing a promissory note or executing a
technology transfer agreement. Foreign corporations usually require that they be given a say in
the management, for instance, of day-to-day operations of the joint venture. They would
demand the appointment of their own men as, for example, operations managers, technical
experts, quality control heads, internal auditors or comptrollers. Furthermore, they would
probably require seats on the Board of Directors all these to ensure the success of the
enterprise and the repayment of the loans and other financial assistance and to make certain
that the funding and the technology they supply would not go to waste. Ultimately, they would
also want to protect their business reputation and bottom lines.

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL

Facts:

Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422
hectares of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the
land planted to coconut and palay was compulsorily acquired by the DAR pursuant to
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992,[2] as amended, the Land Bank valuated the property
at P173,918.55. Respondents rejected the valuation, thus, a summary administrative proceeding
was conducted before the PARAD to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD
rendered its Decision affirming the Landbanks valuation.

Dissatisfied with the Decision, respondents filed with the RTC a petition for determination of just
compensation. The trial court computed the just compensation for the coconut land
at P657,137.00 and for the rice land at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00,

Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. Appellate Court affirmed in
toto the judgment of the trial court.
Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts valuation of the land.

Ruling: Yes.

Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous.

Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents property is P703,137.00,
merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending
before it and applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the
knowledge or consent of the parties.

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court or before the same judge.[24] They may only do so in the absence of objection and with
the knowledge of the opposing party,[25] which are not obtaining here.

Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing
before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:

SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative,
or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No.
228[26] and R.A. No. 3844,[27] as amended, in determining the valuation of the property.

JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR,

- versus - JOSEFINA M. HALASAN and THE COURT OF APPEALS,

March 31, 2006 G.R. No. 165987

Facts
The children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for
Partition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Among the plaintiffs
were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the
surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor. Respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention
claiming that she was the surviving spouse of Jose. Teresita testified before the RTC narrating
that while she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that her husband had been previously
married to her but the two did not live together as husband and wife.

Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order denying the motion and dismissed her complaint,
ruling that respondent was not able to prove her claim. Josefina filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, insisting that under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, an
admission need not be proved.

Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
declaring that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to Jose. In its Decision the CA reversed
the ruling of the trial court. It held that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in
writing) that Josefina had been married to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no longer requires proof. Because of the adverse
decision, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the ruling of the
appellate court.

Issue

Whether or not the first wife of the decedent should be allowed to intervene in an action for
partition involving the share of the deceased husband in the estate of his parents.

Ruling

Yes, the first wife is allowed to intervene in the action. The fact of the matter is
that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the existence of the first
marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC. Likewise, when called to
testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late husband had been previously
married to another. This admission constitutes a deliberate, clear and unequivocal statement;
made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial
admission. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the
field of controversy. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are
conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or
inconsistent with what was pleaded. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.

Rule 129, Sec. 4. Judicial Admission

G.R. No. 147012 January 29, 2004

CRISTINO O. ARROYO, JR. and SANDRA R. ARROYO, Petitioners,

vs.
EDUARDO A. TADURAN, Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Eduardo Taduran and petitioner Cristino Arroyo, Jr. were cousins. In 1988,
respondent Taduran and petitioner Arroyo, Jr. entered into a verbal agreement to form a
corporation and to acquire a suitable office for this purpose.

Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner Arroyo, Jr. was able to purchase from Cityland
Development Corporation a condominium unit. The money used to purchase the condominium
unit was borrowed by petitioner Arroyo, Jr. from the Commercial Bank of Manila (now Bank of
Commerce) and was guaranteed by the time deposit of respondent Taduran in the same bank.
When the loan matured, the proceeds of the time deposit amounting to P500,000 was applied by
respondent Taduran in payment of the loan. Title to the condominium unit in the name of
petitioner Cristino Arroyo, Jr., married to Sandra Arroyo (his co-petitioner in the present case),
was subsequently released by Cityland to said spouses.

Meanwhile Taduran discovered that petitioners had already been enjoying the use of the subject
property. Respondent thereafter, demanded from them the delivery of the title and other
documents, and cause the transfer of title to his name pursuant to their verbal agreement.

When petitioners Arroyo refused, respondent Taduran filed a complaint with the RTC, praying that
petitioners be compelled to deliver and reconvey the title to the subject property to him and that
petitioners be adjudged to pay for damages. Respondent claimed that petitioner Cristino Arroyo,
Jr. was a mere agent tasked to look for a condominium unit to purchase.

Petitioners Arroyo denied the existence of agency and claimed ownership over the subject
property.

RTC: The Court does not find the evidence presented by respondent sufficient to establish
agency. However, respondent is entitled to indemnification from petitioner Arroyo because the
former's time deposit was applied to the loan obligation of the latter.

CA: The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision.

 The CA noted that petitioners have admitted the fact that there is an obligation on
their part to pay for the time deposit proceeds of respondent which was applied to the
payment of the bank loan earlier obtained by petitioner Cristino Arroyo, Jr. in his name.

Hence this petition. Petitioners contend that neither the lower court nor the appellate court could,
under the law, order that respondent be indemnified as it was not prayed for as an alternative
remedy in the complaint.

ISSUEl: WoN petitioner Arroyo is liable to indemnify respondent Taduran.

HELD:

Yes. Respondent Taduran is entitled to recover the amount of P500,000 from petitioners Arroyo
even in the absence of any prayer therefor.

Petitioners admission of their indebtedness to respondent during the trial and in their petition
before us is conclusive. Such admission is binding on them and no amount of contradictory
evidence can offset it.

Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the
trial or other proceedings in the same case, are conclusive on them. No evidence is needed to
prove the same and it cannot be contradicted unless it is shown to have been made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

In this case, however, the records does not show any attempt on the part of petitioners to
contradict their judicial admission, either on the ground of palpable mistake or by denying that
they had ever made such admission. Instead, petitioners specifically restated in their petition that
they were indeed indebted to respondent in the amount of P500,000. They categorically
declared,:

"pursuant to the dictum that no one should be unjustly benefitted or be enriched at the expense of
another, Arroyo, Jr. admitted having an obligation to pay Taduran. The latter can recover whatever
Arroyo, Jr. may owe him, pursuant to Art. 1236 (2nd par.) of the Civil Code, but the recovery
should certainly be done in the proper manner, in the proper case, and in another forum."

Such admission required no further proof and to require respondent to file a separate case to
recover the P500,000 in a different court and in another proceeding will only result in a protracted
litigation.