G.R. No.

94147 June 8, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third
Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A.
CLOUSE, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

R.M. Blanco for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch
69, in Special Proceeding No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor named Solomon
Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of law.

The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A.
Clouse who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.

There is no controversy as to the facts.

On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private
respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18,
1990. The said Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zambales and City of
Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks.

The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United
States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn
became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and
financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.

Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been
under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery
Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.

Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably
recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.

Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law and
that the adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent judge rendered a decision
on June 20, 1990, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for adoption filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and
Evelyn A. Clouse and decrees that the said minor be considered as their child by adoption. To this
effect, the Court gives the minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners.
Henceforth, he shall be known as SOLOMON ALCALA CLOUSE.
 The Court dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his natural parents and vests parental
authority to the herein petitioners and makes him their legal heir. Pursuant to Article 36 of P.D.
603 as amended, the decree of adoption shall be effective as of the date when the petition was
filed. In accordance with Article 53 of the same decree, let this decree of adoption be recorded in
the corresponding government agency, particularly the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Merida, Leyte where the minor was born. The said office of the Local Civil Registrar is hereby
directed to issue an amended certificate of live birth to the minor adopted by the petitioners.

Let copies of this decision be furnished (sic) the petitioners, DSWD, Zambales Branch, Office of
the Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte.

SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for relief, contending:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF ALVIN AND
EVELYN CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE
LAW.

We rule for petitioner.

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the
Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to
adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or
her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala
under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino
citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is
neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private
respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990,
private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she
was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of
Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately,
the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint
adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
 (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with
Article 184. 3

The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code),
provides that husband and wife "may" jointly adopt. 4 Executive Order No. 91 issued on December 17, 1986
amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is
an alien. 5 It was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code reiterated the
rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the said
new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. 6 This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. 7 As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of
a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between
the spouses. 8

In a distinctly similar case, we held:

As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory
for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when
both spouses were of the same nationality.

The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof expresses the
necessity for a joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other.

It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the parental authority, can aptly find
governance.

Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of
the other, jointly parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this
Code. 9

Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its interpretation. There is only room for
application. 10

We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote that objective. 11 Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child
and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life. 12 It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the
interest of the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases. 13 Executive Order 209 likewise
upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount consideration. These
considerations notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the
adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are aliens.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94147 Republic v. Toledano, et. al. June 8, 1994
Facts:
A verified petition was filed before the RTC of Iba, Zambales by spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn
A. Clouse, both aliens, seeking to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of
Evelyn who has been under their care and custody for quite a time.

Alvin is a natural born US citizen. He married Evelyn, a Filipino, who thereafter became a
naturalized citizen of the US in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.

Solomon gave his consent to the adoption, and so did his mother Nery Alcala, a widow, due to
poverty and inability to support and educate her son.

Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study,
favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.

Consequently, respondent judge rendered a decision granting the petition for adoption and
decreeing that said minor be considered as their child by adoption. To this effect, the Court gives
the minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners. Also, it dissolves parental
authority bestowed upon his natural parents and vests parental authority to the spouses and makes
him their legal heir.

Petitioner, through the OSG appealed for relief via a Petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of the lower court, contending that it erred in granting the petition for adoption because spouses
Clouse are not qualified to adopt under Philippine law.

Both spouses are American citizens at the time of the filing of petition for adoption.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the spouses, both aliens, have the right or are qualified to adopt under
Philippine law.
2. Whether or not joint adoption by spouses is mandatory.
Ruling:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of E.O. No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the
Philippines, spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of E.O. No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified
to adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
There can be no question that Alvin is not qualified to adopt Solomon under any of the exceptional
cases in the aforequoted provision. Firstly, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born US
citizen . Secondly, Solomon is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
spouse. Lastly, when spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn was no
longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a US citizen.

Evelyn on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O.
209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the
petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which
mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184.

Today, this case is applicable only insofar as the mandatory nature of a joint adoption by husband
and wife is concerned. As to the qualification or non-qualification of an alien adopter, RA 8552
(enacted on February 25, 1998) is applicable.
 EN BANC

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1952

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
- versus - QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO, former Clerk of Court AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
LUIS C. BUCAYON II, Court Stenographers THELMA CORONA,
A. MANGILIT, CECILIO B. ARGAME, MARICAR N. CARPIO MORALES,
EUGENIO, and RADIGUNDA R. LAMAN and AZCUNA,
Interpreter PAUL M. RESURRECCION, all of the TINGA,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
Respondents. NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ

Promulgated:

December 24, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The instant case stemmed from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in all seven (7)
branches of the Regional Trial Court in MuntinlupaCity, including Branch 276 then presided by herein respondent Judge
Norma C. Perello (Judge Perello). The audit was prompted by reports of perceived irregular disposition of petitions
for habeas corpus by the said court.

In its Memorandum[1] dated January 25, 2004 and submitted to the OCA, the audit team reported that for the period 1998-
2004, a total of 219 petitions for habeas corpus were assigned to Branch 276, the subject matters of which are classified into
(a) hospitalization; (b) custody of minors; (c) illegal possession of firearms; and (d) violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The records for 22 of these cases were not presented to the audit
team, while the case folders of about a hundred cases did not contain copies of the decisions of conviction. The audit team
also noted a huge disparity in the number of petitions for habeas corpus raffled in Branch 276 as against those raffled in the
other branches, which led the team to doubt if the raffle had been conducted with strict regularity considering the fact that
Judge Perello was the Executive Judge that time.
The audit team likewise reported several substantive and procedural lapses relative to the disposition of habeas corpus cases
in Branch 276, such as (a) failure of the branch clerk of court to present to the audit team the case folders of 22 petitions and
to send notices/summons to the Office of the Solicitor General or the Office of the City Prosecutor; (b) lack of return of the
writs issued to the officials of the Bureau of Corrections; (c) absence of certificate of detention/confinement from the Bureau
of Corrections; (d) absence of copies of the judgment of conviction; (e) failure of the court stenographer to transcribe the
stenographic notes and attach the transcript to the records of each case; and (f) failure on the part of the court interpreter to
prepare the Minutes of the court sessions or hearings.

Finally, the audit team observed that in some of the petitions for habeas corpus, respondent Judge Perello erred in ordering
the release of the prisoners before they have served the full term of their sentence.

Thus, the audit team recommended to the OCA to consider the judicial audit report as an administrative complaint
against (a) Judge Perello and Clerk of Court Atty. Luis Bucayon II for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion
and grave misconduct; and (b) Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda
Laman, and Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion for gross inefficiency.

In its Resolution dated March 2, 2005, the Court adopted the aforesaid recommendation.[2]

The OCA, through its 1st Indorsement dated September 9, 2005, directed the herein respondents to comment on the audit
teams recommendations.[3]

In her Comment[4] dated October 10, 2005, Judge Perello opined that the Audit Team that evaluated these Habeas Corpus
cases filed with this Court are probably not lawyers, hence, are not conversant with the Constitution, with jurisprudence, and
the Rules on the grant of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the retroactivity of laws. She insisted that her decisions ordering the
release of the prisoners who were serving their sentence for illegal possession of firearms and violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act were in accordance with law and jurisprudence. For those convicted of illegal possession of firearms under the old
law (Presidential Decree No. 1866), she applied retroactively the provisions of the amendatory law or R.A. No. 8294,
[5]
pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for the retroactive application of laws that are favorable
to the accused even to those already convicted and serving sentence. Inasmuch as R.A. No. 8294 imposed the penalty of six
(6) years only, it was incumbent upon her to grant the writs to those prisoners who have been imprisoned for eight (8) years
already. For those convicted for violation of R.A. No. 6425, she applied the said law and not the amendatory law or R.A. No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, mainly because it aggravated the penalty and is
therefore not favorable to them.
To refute the accusations against her, Judge Perello enumerated her credentials and qualifications and alleged that most of her
decisions were upheld by the Court attesting to her competence in applying the law. She claimed that in all the petitions she
granted, the prisoners therein were all cleared by the National Bureau of Investigation to have no pending cases. The Bureau
of Corrections was always directed to produce the records and reason for the confinement of the concerned prisoners. If from
the records, the prisoner was found to have already served more than the maximum of the imposable penalty, then she would
order the release of the prisoner in open court, without fear or favor. Judge Perello asserted that she had served with utmost
dedication and honesty in all her more than 40 years of government service.

For his part, Atty. Luis Bucayon II, Branch Clerk of Court, explained in his Comment [6] that while he failed to present the
case folders and records of 22 petitions to the audit team at the time the audit was conducted at their branch, there was an
agreement between him and the audit team that the latter could pick up these folders and records before the end of their
audit. However, the audit team failed to return to get these case records. He claimed to be baffled as to how his alleged failure
to make the records available to the audit team could constitute gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and
grave misconduct. Atty. Bucayon likewise manifested that he had transferred to the Public Attorneys Office of the
Department of Justice as of July 26, 2004 and was issued a clearance by the OCA.
On the other hand, Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion averred in his Comment [7] that all petitions for habeas corpus have
their corresponding Minutes but these were not attached to the records because the Branch Clerk of Court refused to put his
remarks and findings thereon. He further claims that he always made it a point to prepare the Minutes and his co-employees
could attest to this fact.

Finally, Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman, all Stenographers of Branch 276,
submitted their Joint Comment[8] dated October 12, 2005 and Joint Supplemental Comment[9] dated October 19,
2005. According to them, Branch 276 had the heaviest case load among all the branches in Muntinlupa City. Despite this,
they allegedly religiously attended the hearings and transcribed their notes thereafter. With respect to the petitions for habeas
corpus, they saw no need to transcribe their stenographic notes as the proceedings therein were non-adversarial in
nature. They prioritized those cases which were adversarial and on appeal.

In the Agenda Report[10] dated March 9, 2006, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. submitted the following
recommendations:
1. respondent Judge Norma C. Perello be FOUND GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE and be meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for three (3) months without salary and
benefit;

2. the complaint against Atty. Luis Bucayon be DISMISSED for being moot and academic;
3. respondents Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda
Laman and respondent Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion be FOUND GUILTY ofSIMPLE NEGLECT OF
DUTY and be FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).[11]
The Court thereafter referred the administrative matter to Justice Conrado Molina, Consultant of OCA, for investigation,
report and recommendation.[12]

On August 1, 2007, the Court required the parties to manifest their willingness to submit the case for decision on the basis of
the pleadings filed.[13] All the respondents manifested that they were submitting the case for decision.

On November 21, 2007, Justice Molina submitted his report and adopted entirely the recommendations of the Court
Administrator.[14]

We agree with the findings of the Court Administrator as adopted by the Investigating Justice, but modify the
recommendation in regard to the penalty imposed upon Judge Perello.

It is the contention of Judge Perello that the prisoners she released were all convicted under the old law, R.A. No. 6425, and
not under the new law, R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 which imposes
the penalty of life imprisonment to death regardless of the quantity of the drug involved. [15] She maintains that the provisions
of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as these prisoners are concerned for the main reason that it would
not be favorable to them. Thus, according to Judge Perello, the provisions of R.A. No. 6425, as interpreted in the case
of People v. Simon,[16] must be applied to the released prisoners. Citing the Simon case, she insisted that the maximum
imposable penalty for violation of R.A. No. 6425 where the quantity involved is 750 grams or less is six (6) months only,
which was the reason why she ordered the immediate release of the prisoners because they had already served two (2) years
of imprisonment.

While we agree with respondent judge that R.A. No. 9165 cannot be retroactively applied to the prisoners involved
in the cases audited, we, however, are not impressed with Judge Perellos justification in granting the writs. Such ratiocination
on her part betrays a lack of understanding of the rule on graduation of penalties. Nowhere in the cited case of Simon does it
state that the maximum penalty shall be six (6) months where the quantity is less than 750 grams. The Simon case clarified
the penalty to be imposed vis--visthe quantity of the drug involved, such that prision correccional shall be imposed if the
drug is below 250 grams; prision mayor if the quantity is from 250 to 499 grams; and reclusion temporal if the drug is from
500 to 750 grams.[17] The same case likewise declared that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine
the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of
penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional.[18]

The penalty of prision correccional is composed of three periods the minimum which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months, the medium which is from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months, and the maximum which
ranges from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. As found by the audit team, Judge Perello considered only the minimum
period of prision correccional in granting the writs for habeas corpus such that when the prisoners had served imprisonment
for a period of two (2) years, she immediately ordered their release. This is clearly erroneous because the petition for habeas
corpus cannot be granted if the accused has only served the minimum of his sentence as he must serve his sentence up to its
maximum term.[19] The maximum range of prision correccional is from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. This is the
period which the prisoners must have served before their applications for writs of habeas corpus may be granted.
In obstinately granting the writs of habeas corpus even if the convicted prisoners had only served the minimum
period of their sentence, Judge Perello displayed a blatant disregard of the rule on graduation of penalties as well as settled
jurisprudence tantamount to gross ignorance of the law. As a trial judge, respondent is the visible representation of law and
justice. Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, she is expected to be the embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence. Judges are expected to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence. [20] He should strive for
excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of
Law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be gross
ignorance of the law.[21]Judge Perello must thereby have more than a cursory knowledge of the law on graduation of penalties
and the imposable penalty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.Indeed, the facts obtaining in this case speak of other
dubious circumstances affecting Judge Perellos integrity and competence too glaring to ignore.

Notably, the record shows that Judge Perello granted the writs of habeas corpus even without the pertinent copies of
detention and judgment of conviction.[22] This is contrary to the provisions of Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:

Sec. 3. Requisites of application therefor. Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified
either by the party for whose relief it is intended, of by some person in his behalf, and shall set forth:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without impairing
the efficiency of the remedy; xxx.

The Rules clearly require that a copy of the commitment or cause of detention must accompany the application for
the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, Judge Perello deviated from the guidelines laid down in Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court. It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and
diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should therefore administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the
system of law itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law.
[23]
Indeed, Judge Perellos stubborn unwillingness to act in accordance with the rules and settled jurisprudence shows her
refusal to reform herself and to correct a wrong, tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.

Be that as it may, however, we agree with the Court Administrator that there is no merit in the charge of grave misconduct
leveled against Judge Perello. For grave misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by
an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. [24] Here, it appears that she was not
motivated by any corrupt or vicious motive. As the Court Administrator puts it:
xxx. Except for the insinuation that there has been connivance among all court staff in railroading the
process of handling these cases, there was no showing that in releasing the petitioners prematurely,
respondent was motivated by corrupt motives. On the contrary, respondent vehemently denies this
accusation. In her comment, she stated that she protests with pain that she has always been viewed and
unjustly condemned as a wrongdoer on an erroneous impression that she had benefited and had reaped
riches for doing her job which she did with compassion, fairness and justice as the law and jurisprudence
dictates. Indeed, if respondent judge or a court employee should be disciplined for a grave offense, the
evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. Charges based on mere
suspicion should not be given credence.[25]

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that Judge Perello had been previously charged with and found guilty of committing
several administrative infractions, namely: (1) gross ignorance of the law for which she was suspended for six (6) months;
[26]
(2) undue delay in transmitting to the Court of Appeals the records of a case for which she was fined P20,000.00;[27] (3)
dereliction of duty for which she was fined P5,000.00;[28] (4) conduct unbecoming a judge for which she was admonished;
[29]
and most recently (5) grave abuse of discretion, grave abuse of authority, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross
ignorance of the law and/or procedure for which she was fined in the amount of P10,000.00.[30] It is therefore evident that
Judge Perello had a penchant for committing infractions during her tenure.

In sum, we find Judge Perello liable for ignorance of the law and jurisprudence and for abuse of discretion. These are serious
charges under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 11 of the same Rule provides that any of the
following sanctions may be imposed upon Judge Perello:

Sec. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may
be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned and controlled corporations. Provided, however, that forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

The OCA imposed the penalty of suspension for three (3) months on Judge Perello. In view, however, of Judge
Perellos compulsory retirement[31] which makes suspension impossible to impose, the proper action is to impose a fine on her
in the maximum amount of P40,000.00, deductible from her retirement pay.
With regard to Atty. Bucayons liability, the charges against him all pertained to his duties as Branch Clerk of Court. It must
be noted that during the pendency of this administrative case against him, Atty. Bucayon had transferred to the Public
Attorneys Office of the Department of Justice on July 26, 2004 and was accordingly issued a clearance by the OCA. Thus,
we accept the OCAs recommendation to dismiss the charges against him for being moot.

On the liability of Court Stenographers Mangilit, Argame, Eugenio and Laman, Administrative Circular 24-90 [32] imposes
upon all court stenographers the duty to transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts of such notes to the
records of each case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes were taken. The records reveal that respondent
stenographers failed to transcribe the stenographic notes and attach them to the records of each case. By their own admission,
they did not bother to transcribe the notes as the proceedings were non-adversarial in nature. We find this explanation
unacceptable considering that the requirement under the Circular applies to all proceedings whether adversarial or not.

For their shortcomings in the transcription of the stenographic notes, respondent stenographers have shown their
utter lack of dedication to the functions of their office. As trial court stenographers, they know, or ought to know, that they
perform an important role in running the machinery of our trial court system and that transcripts of stenographic notes are
vital for the speedy disposition of cases. Their dereliction of duty which may jeopardize public faith and confidence in our
judicial system should not be countenanced.We, thus, find respondent stenographers guilty of simple neglect of duty. While
said offense carries a penalty of one month and one day to six months suspension under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, [33] we deem it reasonable and sufficient to instead impose a fine of P5,000.00, as recommended by
the OCA, considering that it was their first offense. While this Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to
discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable, this Court also has the discretion to temper the
harshness of its judgment with mercy.[34]

Finally, as to Court Interpreter Resurreccion, the record would show that he had been remiss in his duty to prepare the
Minutes of the sessions or hearings and attach them to the records of each case. He cannot escape liability by passing on the
blame to the Branch Clerk of Court whom he claimed refused to put his remarks on the Minutes. Resurreccions explanation
is too flimsy to excuse him from administrative liability. Among the duties of court interpreters is to prepare and sign all
Minutes of the session.[35] After every session they must prepare the Minutes and attach it. The Minutes is a very important
document because it gives a brief summary of the events that took place at the session or hearing of a case. It is in fact a
capsulized history of the case at a given session or hearing, for it states the date and time of the session; the names of the
judge, clerk of court, court stenographer, and court interpreter who were present; the names of the counsel for the parties who
appeared; the party presenting evidence; the names of witnesses who testified; the documentary evidence marked; and the
date of the next hearing. [36] Failure to prepare the Minutes and attach them to the records of a case constitutes simple neglect
of duty and warrants disciplinary action. Accordingly, Resurreccion is hereby fined the same amount of P5,000.00 as
recommended by the OCA.

We take this occasion once more to impress upon all respondents that the conduct of every person connected with
the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility. A public office is a public trust. Since public officers are accountable to the people at all times, they must
strictly perform their duties and responsibilities. As the administration of justice is a sacred task, this Court condemns any
omission or act that may diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary. [37]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Judge Norma C. Perello GUILTY of gross ignorance of the
law and abuse of discretion, for which she is meted a fine of P40,000.00 to be deducted from her retirement benefits. Court
Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman, and Court Interpreter Paul
Resurreccion are found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty, for which they are each meted a fine of P5,000.00, and sternly
warned that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.

For being moot, the charges against Atty. Luis Bucayon II are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.