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then let the wrap occur as it may around to the back.
B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a
Firestorm 2003
Provincial Review
The Honourable Gary Filmon P.C., O.M.
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1
firestorm 2003
firestorm
Table of Contents
Executive Summary 5
Terms of Reference 13
The Challenge 14
The Context 17
Perspective 19
The Issues 23
Summary of Recommendations 69
Final Thoughts 76
Appendices
A. Dates and Locations of Public Consultations 78
B. List of Presenters 79
C. Answers to Some Commonly Asked Questions 91
D. Bibliography 97
E. Glossary of Terms 100
3
Acknowledgements
Julian Fikus
The Review Team would also like to acknowledge time to provide their valuable comments in
the cooperation provided by the Ministry of writing, e-mail or in person. Without their input
Forests and Forest Protection Branch; the Ministry this review would not have been possible.
of Public Safety and Solicitor General and The
Provincial Emergency Program; the Ministry of
Photographs:
Community, Aboriginal and Womens Services and
Cover - Steve Grimaldi;
the Office of the Fire Commissioner; as well as all
Other - Courtesy of Ministry of Forests
the organizations and individuals who took the
4
firestorm 2003
firestorm
Executive Summary
5
It is clear that a successful record of fire suppression has obligation to undertake activities that help fireproof
led to a fuel buildup in the forests of British Columbia. their own residences and businesses. In the aftermath
The fuel buildup means that there will be more of Firestorm 2003, the government has an
significant and severe wildfires, and there will be more opportunity to:
interface fires, unless action is taken.
establish a provincial strategy for fireproofing
Many people who came forward during the consulta- interface communities;
tion process also recognized the severity of the fuel
mandate long-term community fireproofing
buildup problem in the interface zone. We were
programs which will build upon local zoning
impressed with the commitment of citizens to addressing
and building codes; and,
the problem, and their willingness to entertain new
approaches and solutions to safeguard their begin pilot projects that will enhance safety and
communities. that can also produce economic benefits.
assessment of fire-prone ecosystems within or The province has an established and credible
adjacent to a wildland urban interface for risk emergency preparedness and response system based
reduction; and, on the Incident Command System (ICS) model, and
training more professionals who can implement a has implemented the British Columbia Emergency
forest fuel reduction program while meeting com- Response Management System (BCERMS). However,
plex ecological, social, and economic constraints. there are gaps in coverage. The entire province is not
protected by well-thought-out and up-to-date
In addition, the province should investigate alternatives
emergency plans at the local level.
to stumpage as an incentive for the forest industry to
harvest high-risk, low-value fuel types. The Ministry of While municipal governments are required to have
Forests should consider amending Annual Allowable emergency plans, regional governments are not. This
Cut determinations to encourage hazard reduction leaves significant parts of some districts exposed, not
treatments by tenure holders in marginal and uneco- only to interface fires, but also to other emergencies
nomic tree stand areas within the wildland/urban and crises. The government of British Columbia must
interface. ensure that there are emergency plans developed for the
entire area of the province.
Governments and individuals share responsibility for
fireproofing communities and developments that may
be affected by interface wildfires. Homeowners have an
6
firestorm 2003
There is clearly a need for consistent training across the Command and Control,
province in all aspects of emergency planning. It has Communications, Public Education
been said that practice makes perfect. Simulations and
Operations at the very beginning of the fire season
exercises are required on an ongoing basis to ensure
were marked with difficulties in getting organized
that people remain current in their skills. This
dealing with the media, and in communicating with
investment will pay dividends in the future.
the public. This improved later in the fire season.
The province can do its part by ensuring:
It is vital that emergency crews be able to communicate
the consistent use of BCERMS by all agencies; effectively. It is important that residents receive accu-
rate, up-to-date information about the wildfire
that emergency plans are mandatory for all local
situation. To address these issues:
governments including municipal and regional
districts; and, British Columbia Emergency Response
that public servants at all levels have appropriate Management System (BCERMS) and the Incident
training and have opportunities to exercise and Command System (ICS) should be universally
practice their skills. adopted and used in a consistent way by all provin-
cial and local government agencies. Training course
These actions will re-assure citizens that British
material, delivery and examination for the ICS
Columbia has the best possible systems and people
should be standardized across organizations.
in place to help protect lives and property.
A provincial strategy for emergency communica-
tions technology is required to achieve total radio
interoperability between all agencies. It should
Responding to the Emergency include a provincial inventory for all fire, police,
ambulance, and forestry radio frequencies.
In responding to the Firestorm of 2003, emergency and
firefighting resources were taxed to the limit. British There should be a provincial strategy for public
Columbia was, for much of the time, dependent on information and media communications during
resources from outside the province. major emergency events. The strategy should
include the participation of all key stakeholders,
It became evident from some consultation submissions especially the news media.
and the Review Team's subsequent research that while
A cooperative public education program is needed
there is a provincial emergency plan in place, and
to inform residents about the risks of living in
plans at the municipal level, their coverage is
the wildland/urban interface and their personal
incomplete and their execution could be improved.
responsibilities in preparing for and responding
to interface fires. This should include the
preventative and protective measures they
can adopt to make their lives safer.
7
Firefighting Resources the Office of the Fire Commissioner should ensure that
pay rates and payment criteria for volunteer and
Some interface areas are without a responding emer-
professional firefighting personnel are pre-established,
gency fire department. Some fire departments do not
consistent and understood by all parties.
have authorization to attack out-of-boundary interface
fires. Some fire departments do not have effective Currently, volunteer firefighters are expected to pay for
mutual aid/automatic aid agreements with neighbour- the training courses they take to upgrade their skills
ing communities. It is unacceptable that emergency and knowledge as firefighters. Training for volunteer
agencies are prevented from working together. Other firefighters should be funded by municipal and
jurisdictions have found effective means by which this regional governments.
can occur and so should British Columbia.
Aside from firefighters who are members of an
Firestorm 2003 highlighted the need to quickly and established volunteer force, no greater use of untrained
accurately locate firefighting resources and equipment volunteers should be encouraged in wildfire settings.
from across the province. There is no system in place There is a very real risk that sending untrained and
in British Columbia to allow this to be done in an inexperienced volunteers into the midst of a major
effective and efficient manner. To address this issue: forest fire would be to place them in harm's way.
8
firestorm 2003
9
firestorm
Introduction
Wildfires threaten British Columbia fires. The greatest cost of all was the loss of three lives,
communities pilots who died in the line of duty.
The summer of 2003 was unprecedented for British Due to the scale of the destruction and its aftermath,
Columbia. Weather conditions throughout the province and in response to public concerns and questions, the
were hotter and drier than normal for the third year in a Government of British Columbia commissioned an
row. The risk of forest fire became extreme. In the independent review of the 2003 summer interface fires.
Interior, a combination of lightning strikes and human
actions resulted in over 2,500 wildfire starts. Some fires Was British Columbia prepared for the firestorm?
went on burning for days and weeks, growing in size How well did British Columbia's emergency systems
and creating massive challenges for emergency crews and crews deal with the situation? What could be done
and residents. The situation received extensive news better if it happens again in the future? What action
coverage nationally and internationally. should be taken?
While there have been extensive forest fires in British The Firestorm 2003 Provincial Review Team was asked
Columbia before, it was the first time we saw such a sig- to find answers to these and many other difficult ques-
nificant number of fires encroach onto communities tions. The government began the process in September
located in the forest interface. Technically, in firefight- 2003 by providing the Review Team with Terms of
ing, an "interface" fire is one that involves human Reference covering a broad range of issues, from wildfire
development and wild land simultaneously. The planning and preparedness, to response and recovery.
interface fires last summer caused the destruction
To ensure impartiality, the government wanted the
of 334 homes and many businesses in the Interior.
review to be conducted by someone from outside the
More than 45,000 people were evacuated from
province who would approach the task without bias or
their communities.
preconceived ideas. The team leader should have
Over 260,000 hectares of forest were destroyed experience working with a wide range of public and
province wide. private organizations, and specifically in dealing with
large-scale civil disasters.
The total cost of the firestorm that hit the Interior of
British Columbia is estimated at $700 million. This In October 2003, I was appointed to chair the Review
includes property losses and the cost of fighting the Team. My experience includes 25 years of elected public
office, with two terms on Winnipeg's City Council and
10
firestorm 2003
21 years in the Manitoba Legislature. I spent
eleven-and-a-half years as Premier, during
which time we experienced the worst forest
fires in the province's history and the flood of
the century on the Red River. Having experi-
enced crises like these brings important assets
to the wildfire review process here in British
Columbia.
11
Throughout the
consultation, we were
impressed by the high
degree of common
sense and practicality
that characterized the
presentations made by
individuals and organi-
zations. Not only were
people offering
sensible advice, they
were doing it in a
cooperative atmosphere
which showed they
understood the practi-
cal, financial and
organizational limits
that governments face
and Solicitor General, responsible for the Provincial
in dealing with natural disasters.
Emergency Program, and with the Office of the
At the same time, it was clear to the Review Team that Fire Commissioner.
many British Columbians who do not live in fire zones
In performing this review we have exercised our best
have not yet recognized the scope, magnitude and
judgment. We consulted with expert opinion, where
extent of the wildfires which devastated the Interior
required, before arriving at conclusions, and we
of the province in 2003. Many British Columbia
attempted to test for anticipated consequences
communities are not adequately prepared to deal
before making recommendations.
with the types of wildfires experienced by their
neighbours last summer. I am confident the recommendations contained in
this report, when fully implemented, will not only
As well as consulting with members of the public, the
minimize the economic, social, ecological, and public
Review Team also wanted to understand as thoroughly
safety consequences of interface fires in British
as possible the policies, standards and processes
Columbia, but will also serve to impress upon everyone
employed by the various agencies and departments,
the importance of wildfire prevention and mitigation.
from all levels of government, who participated in the
team effort to deal with Firestorm 2003. We needed
The Honourable Gary Filmon, P.C., O.M.
to hear first-hand from firefighters, emergency crews
Chairman
and their supervisors. To do this, we held daylong Firestorm 2003 Provincial Review
briefings with staff from the Ministry of Forests, Forest
Protection Branch, with the Ministry of Public Safety
12
firestorm 2003
Terms of Reference
The British Columbia government provided the Command structure for responding to provincial
Review Team with these Terms of Reference for emergencies and disasters to assess the method
their mission. of response used by the province in support of local
government and the response by local government,
The provincial review will focus on prevention,
including deployment of equipment and personnel;
planning and response including the following:
and to assess wild land/urban strategies and tactics
Roles and responsibilities of all levels of government for responding to interface fires.
to plan for and respond to interface fires - to deter-
Provincial structure required to deal with communi-
mine if the roles and responsibilities are clearly set
cations and public information during emergencies
out and understood by all levels of government.
and disasters - to determine the timeliness and
Risk assessment processes for determining the poten- effectiveness of communications.
tial for interface fires - to assess the methods used in
Training and exercising programs for emergency
determining what the risks might be from interface
response to all-hazard emergencies and disasters at
fires and how local governments and the province
the community and provincial level.
determine the response to fires threatening
communities. Role of volunteers in responding to fires - to assess
how mechanisms for involving volunteers can be
Mitigation strategies used for reducing the potential
supported and enhanced.
for interface fires, including the development of pre-
vention strategies and hazard, risk and vulnerability Compensation and assistance for the province - to
assessments. assess the framework for assistance from the federal
government for abnormal expenditures by
Planning capabilities at the local, provincial and
the province.
federal level to mitigate the impacts of interface
fires (i.e. evacuation planning) - to assess the level of
planning and the ability of communities to activate
those plans.
13
firestorm
The Challenge
14
firestorm 2003
15
self-improvement and enhancement of the systems and
processes in place to protect people and property from
fires in British Columbia.
16
firestorm 2003
Context firestorm
Driest three-year period on record in the making. Going into 2003, some areas along the
Pacific Coast and in the southern interior were in the
As the meteorological maps from Environment Canada
midst of their worst drought in 100 years. From 2000
show (figures C1 and C2), most areas of British
to 2002 inclusive, only two of twelve seasons were wetter
Columbia were significantly drier and hotter than
than normal in southern British Columbia and only one
normal in 2003. Precipitation in the central region
was colder than normal. Prior to this summer, southern
of the province during the summer months was 30 per
BC had gone through its driest three-year period on record.
cent lower than normal, and almost 60 per cent lower
in the southernmost zone near the US border.1 Evidence of prolonged dryness was everywhere.
Near-record low stream flow (10 to 20% of normal in
The situation is best summed up in the following some areas) and deficient ground water raised the concerns
commentary by Environment Canada: of power companies, water utilities and homeowners on
wells. The Fraser River peaked near the first of July at
The conditions for BCs summer of fire were four years
Figure C1 Figure C2
1
Environment Canada website, http://www.msc-smc.ec.gc.ca/ccrm/
bulletin/summer03/figmapp_e.html?season=Summer&date=2003
17
one of the lowest stages
since record keeping began Danger Rating August 1, 2003
90 years ago. Hungry bears
roamed the suburbs; hoards
of beetles munched on pine Weather Stations
Danger Rating
trees; salmon suffocated in 1 Aug 03
lethally warm streams; worried Very Low
18
firestorm 2003
Perspective firestorm
Worst wildfires in It is important to note that over 89 per cent of
British Columbia history all 2003 wildfires were contained to less than four
hectares in size by emergency crews. Wildfires of 1000
In the aftermath of Firestorm 2003, many adjectives
hectares or larger made up less than two per cent of all
were used to describe the fires and their effects. By
2003 wildfire starts. However, 15 of these were major
various measures they were the biggest, the most
interface fires affecting communities, households and
intense, the most expensive, and the most devastating
businesses.
wildfires in British Columbia's recorded history.
A comparison with past fire seasons serves to
put Firestorm 2003 into perspective.
4,500 300,000
4,000
250,000
3,500
Number of Fires
Hectares Burned
3,000 200,000
2,500
150,000
2,000
1,500 100,000
1,000
50,000
500
- -
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
The graph above shows the history of forest fires in British Columbia over the past decade.
19
Walls of flame moved through the
forests at a speed of over 10 metres
per minute to threaten Interior
cities, communities, homes and
businesses. It was the worst wildfire
disaster in memory, but why did
"the Big One" happen in 2003? The
main contributing factors, observers
agree, were the hot, dry weather and
the resulting high-risk conditions in
British Columbia's forests.
July 22, 2003 Chilko Fire Chilko Lk. Alexis Cr. 29,202
July 31, 2003 McLure Fire McLure, Barriere 26,420
August 16, 2003 Okanagan Mt. Park Fire Kelowna 25,600
August 1, 2003 McGillivray Fire Chase 11,400
August 16, 2003 Lamb Creek Fire Cranbrook 10,979
August 16, 2003 Venables Fire Chase 7,635
August 17, 2003 Ingersol Fire SW of Nakusp 6,700
August 1, 2003 Strawberry Hill Fire Kamloops IR 5,731
August 20, 2003 Kuskanook Fire North of Creston 4,832
August 22, 2003 Vaseaux Fire OK Falls 3,300
August 14, 2003 Plumbob Fire Cranbrook 2,870
August 2, 2003 Cedar Hills Fire Falkland 1,620
August 6, 2003 Bonaparte Lake Fire Bonaparte Lake 1,500
July 17, 2003 Anarchist Mt. Fire Osoyoos 1,230
August 20, 2003 Harrogate Fire Radium 1,018
The chart above lists the major interface fires of summer 2003.
20
firestorm 2003
firestorm
Building on Past Experience
In the course of preparing this report, the Review Team ensuring fire regulations, building codes and
had the opportunity to review a great many excellent subdivision standards are used to reduce the risk
reports and studies produced by experts in British of wildfire in interface areas;
Columbia and also in the United States, Australia and
clearly defining roles and responsibilities; and,
other parts of Canada and the world. We are struck by
the fact that so much is already known about the risks requiring regional districts to prepare emergency
and the challenges of living in an interface area and plans.
dealing with the inevitable fires such as those that Similarly, the Ombudsman of British Columbia
occur every year in British Columbia's forests. released a review following the Silver Creek Fire of
1998 near Salmon Arm that damaged over 6,000
To put this in perspective, over the past decade, British
hectares, caused the evacuation of 7,000 people,
Columbia has averaged approximately 2,000 forest fires
destroyed 40 buildings and homes and cost $15 million
annually, although normally, there has only been one
to fight. Improved communications and training, and
serious interface fire per year.
increased personal responsibility by people living in the
Because there has been significant damage and loss due interface, were central themes in the Ombudsman's
to interface fires in the past decade, there have been recommendations.
several major reports produced on the subject.
In 2001, the Auditor General of British Columbia
In March 1995, Price Waterhouse produced a review of produced a report titled "Managing Interface Fire
the Garnet Fire of 1994 near Penticton, which burned Risks." The recommendations from this report focused
5,500 hectares, caused the evacuation of 3,000 people, on the need for better planning and preparation.
destroyed 18 homes and cost over five million dollars.
In 2002, the Ministry of Forests commissioned
The independent consultants identified specific areas
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) to undertake a
for improvement and also made more broadly-based
comprehensive review and benchmarking survey to
recommendations, including:
compare British Columbia's Fire Protection Program
the importance of public education on interface with other jurisdictions and to recommend improve-
wildfire risks and preventative measures; ments with regard to performance measures and
organization.
21
One recommendation from the PWC report in partic- As these previous reports have also demonstrated,
ular is worth noting. That recommendation stated: there is no one right answer.
Overall, the British Columbia Forest Protection Program As was stated in the Alberta Fire Review 98 Final
performs well relative to the other jurisdictions included in Report, "Wildfire will always occur on the forested land-
the survey. Although the Programs costs are not always scape and will always have an impact on people, property
lower than other jurisdictions, British Columbia has a and resources. The goal of the program is to minimize
consistently low average fire size, low total area burned the impacts, not to eliminate the impacts."
and a strong safety record. This suggests that British
Columbias personnel are well-trained and effective.
Nothing in our review of Firestorm 2003 dissuades the
Conclusion
Review Team from reaching this same general conclu-
sion. Our exposure to and contact with officers within The Review Team has been struck by the level of
the Forest Protection Service confirms the finding of concern expressed throughout the course of our review,
the PWC report that, a strong sense of pride and esprit not only by those people who experienced interface
des corps has been developed within the rank and file of fires directly this past year, but by many who felt they
the Program. were spared the experience only by good fortune.
The Review Team met with a number of representa-
The PWC report also noted that: The Program has a tives from other interface areas missed by Firestorm
well-established training and development section that is 2003, who wanted to develop and implement plans to
recognized nationally and internationally. fireproof their communities for the future.
Nevertheless, incremental and continual improvement We believe that the attention of an increasing number
is a trait inherent in all successful organizations. To of British Columbians is focused on this issue with an
that end, our recommendations respecting the Forest awareness and sense of urgency that did not exist in the
Protection Service are intended to comment on those past. We believe that many stakeholders are now more
areas where improvements are desirable, and will open to accepting recommendations for change with
contribute to an even better performance. regard to forest management practices, planning, zon-
ing and building restrictions and other issues that may
It is clear that planning for, responding to and recovering
have been controversial in the past.
from wildfires are significant issues in many jurisdic-
tions. With each wildfire incident, our experience In the aftermath of Firestorm 2003, we believe that
increases and these reports serve to document the more and more British Columbians are willing to
knowledge gained so that we can be better prepared accept renewed leadership and governance in imple-
for the next incident. menting better solutions to the challenges they face
from wildfires.
Several of the recommendations made in the previously
mentioned reports are common to more than one
report. This is not new ground. However, wildfires are
unpredictable and, as a result, fire management is a
complex issue.
22
firestorm 2003
firestorm
The Issues ~ Common Themes Emerge Across the Interior
Based on the public consultations, stakeholder Given our mandate, the Review Team was tasked
meetings and submissions received by the Review with addressing those issues and concerns that had
Team, a number of common themes emerged broad-based impact and relevance to the entire
around Firestorm 2003. We have chosen to use wildfire interface area. Accordingly, and consistent
these themes as the basis for much of our report. with the public input, we looked at and focused
Forest Management
Emergency Management
Communications
Evacuations
Resources
Financial Accountability
23
firestorm
Preparing for Interface Fires ~ Forest Management
24
firestorm 2003
25
decades after the 1930s, controlled (prescribed) burns
continued to be a popular method for disposing of
slash and waste wood, but studies of its effectiveness
yielded contradicting results. Provincially, total pre-
scribed burning for silviculture purposes declined from
over 90,000 hectares per year in the late 1980s to just
over 10,000 hectares per year in 2000/2001.
Silviculture is a branch of forestry dealing with the as illustrated in the following graph.
26
firestorm 2003
When wildfires Annual Fire Statistics Total Number of Fires Number of fires 4 Ha and Less
are successfully
suppressed, the fuel 4500
Number of Fires
burn during those 3500
sometimes resulting
2500
in uncontrollable
2000
fires like those wit-
1500
nessed in Firestorm
2003. High fuel 1000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
loads are not the
only consequence
of skipping disturbance intervals. Recent
research shows that biodiversity and forage
production are reduced, wildlife habitats
are altered and the forests become susceptible
to insects and diseases.
27
A similar situation is occurring around Kamloops and fire threat on their island and spoke in favour of a
the Okanagan Valley. Southern Interior residents have cooperative program to address fuel buildup. Indeed,
noticed the buildup of fuel, forest ingrowth and in their view, all of the Gulf Islands are equally
encroachment as well, and are very concerned about threatened when it comes to wildfire.
the loss of grazing land. As well as fire suppression,
the increased fuel load has been attributed to slash
left from logging. The Review Team Recommends:
Salmon Arm. However, these events appear to have province where communities, infrastructure,
had little impact on public policy. It is apparent in and watersheds have the greatest potential to
reviewing the history of the last decade that it has been be impacted by large-scale fires.
if British Columbia is to successfully manage its fuels planning, fuels mitigation, and protection
buildup and fire risk problem. Ownership of the prob- to these areas.
28
firestorm 2003
The provincial government should commit new Land Management Must Include Fuel Reduction
funding for its share of the fuel management A number of Land and Resource Management Plans
program. (LRMPs) have been developed for the province. Yet few
of these plans address fire management in a meaningful
It is not just the responsibility of senior governments to
way, by considering the impacts on ecosystems and the
manage these risks. Local governments and individuals
relationship to other forest management activities. Fire
must also do their part.
management considerations must become part of land
management decision-making.
29
fire would engulf Okanagan Mountain Park. The 10,000 BC Parks has recently recognized that more aggressive
hectares of forest had been left in their natural state forest management activities are needed to withstand
untouched by fire for almost 50 years. The forest floor was the insect epidemic. In late 2003, a BC Parks policy
covered by tinder. Blocks of standing dead trees grew was approved to specifically allow for removal of trees
bigger because falling them in BC parks is forbidden. from parks and protected areas to facilitate ecosystem
Insects killed many of them, providing more fuel. 1 restoration, human health and safety, and forest health
objectives. This policy would allow for tree removal to
As may be seen from the answers which the Ministry meet broader objectives appropriate to parks, without
of Water, Land and Air Protection provided to specific allowing commercial logging, which is prohibited
questions, given in Appendix C of the report, the BC by legislation.
Parks Administration believes that the Ministry of
Forests, Forest Protection Branch had the authority to These tree removals would be conducted to a much
address these forest management, fuel reduction and higher ecological, health and safety standard, and
forest fire attack issues, after consultation with BC would not focus on removing high value trees or maxi-
Parks and subject to the BC Parks pre-attack plan mizing profit. This would make the process far more
for each location. Clearly the authority has been costly than normal commercial harvesting. In order
at best indirect. to fund this much-needed initiative, it is proposed to
follow the Parks Canada approach of using the funds
Ironically, the success of fire suppression in British from the sale of the harvested wood to partially
Columbias forests during the past 80 years has offset the costs.
significantly reduced wildfires and also resulted in
dangerously increased fuel loads. Lack of natural wild- The Review Team supports this policy initiative, which
fire has allowed the amount of mature lodgepole pine would be applied first in Manning Park and Silver Star
to increase to three times its normal occurrence in Park, where a combination of excessive fuel loads and
Interior forests. Lodgepole pine is the main tree species long-term mountain pine beetle infestation has left
used by mountain pine beetle to carry out its life cycle. the forests at serious risk of wildfire damage.
Excessive mature pine, together with warming climates,
has created an epidemic mountain pine beetle infesta- Another policy initiative that will affect BC Parks is the
tion across the Interior of British Columbia, and is proposed new provincial Wildfire Act, which makes it
expected to impact four million hectares of land, much clear that the authority for acting on fire suppression
of it in protected areas. within provincial parks and protected areas would in
future rest with the Forest Protection Branch of the
Breeding in huge numbers across the Interior, pine Ministry of Forests. We believe this to be an appropri-
beetles bore into healthy trees and eventually kill them. ate change in order to streamline decision-making in
This infestation has been ongoing for several years and times of emergency. This will clarify the responsibility
is a disaster of similar magnitude to Firestorm 2003 in for decision-making on forest fire suppression in parks.
terms of its destructive effect on British Columbias
forests. Though the issue is outside the Terms of 1
Freake, Ross & Plant, Don, "Firestorm - The Summer BC Burned",
Copyright 2003 by The Okanagan Valley Newspaper Group, a
Reference for this review, the pine beetle and wildfires
division of Horizon Operations (Canada) Ltd., McLelland & Stewart
are both natural phenomena which impact on each Ltd., pp. 14-15
30
firestorm 2003
The Review Team Recommends: However, research shows that prescribed burns have
become uncommon in recent years due to:
Reduce Fuel Buildup in Parks
The province should allow selective tree harvesting the inconsistent funding of prescribed burn
in provincial parks to reduce fuel buildup. programs;
Ministry of Forests Responsible for the failure of prescribed burns to meet stated
objectives (fires escaped, or burned too hot, or
Fire Suppression in Parks
didnt consume enough material); and,
Ministry of Forests, Forest Protection Branch should
take the lead in suppressing fires in provincial parks, negative public response to the resulting smoke
as proposed under the new Wildfire Act. and the potential for escape.
These issues are seen as significant impediments to the
Reduce Risk in British Columbia Forests widespread acceptance and use of prescribed fire in
A status quo approach to the buildup of fuel comes British Columbia.
with considerable risks. Clearly, a different response
to the buildup of fuels in British Columbias forests, Thinning is the selective removal of trees from a forest
particularly in the interface areas, is necessary. This stand. This reduces the ladder fuels and number of
response includes identifying the available alternatives, dead standing trees, decreasing the chance of crown
determining the effectiveness of each alternative and, fires. In the forest industry, a type of thinning known
finally, selecting the alternatives best suited to address as spacing is performed. Spacing is the cutting of
fuel buildup in and around interface areas. undesirable trees within a young stand to reduce com-
petition among the remaining trees. As the cut trees,
It must be remembered that fuel treatments alone will known as slash, are usually not removed from the site,
not reduce the probability of fire, but they will increase this practice has resulted in large areas of surface fuel
the chance of suppression success, once a fire has start- throughout many parts of the province.
ed. The end result must be a reduction in severity and
behaviour of wildfire if fuel treatments of wildfire are For the purposes of fuel reduction, the slash cannot be
to be deemed successful. left behind untreated. Thinning can only be considered
an option if the slash is removed or treated to
Reducing fuel buildup can be achieved using a number significantly reduce flammability.
of recognized strategies. These include prescribed fire,
thinning, thinning followed by prescribed fire, In mulching and chipping, the fuels are reduced to
mulching and chipping, and fuel removal from the site. small pieces, called chips, that remain on the forest
floor. The layer of chips is referred to as mulch.
Prescribed fire has been identified by many stakehold- Reducing the size of the fuels removes ladder fuels.
ers in the province as a beneficial tool to resolving fuels It also increases the speed of degradation, the process
and wildfire threat within the interface. In prescribed by which the wood chips slowly become soil. This
fire, fuels within certain areas are intentionally set on is beneficial since nutrients are returned to the soil,
fire under strictly controlled conditions. These fires instead of being lost in the physical removal of the fuel.
serve to reduce the ground and ladder fuels and remove
dead standing trees, while leaving behind live trees.
31
However, during the degradation process, the wood
chips are still fuel for wildfires. There may be opportu-
nities for different levels of government and individuals
to work in partnership to address this issue. Energy
generation and biomass technology, which utilize wood
chips, have been raised as potential solutions.
Amend Forest Practices and Policy tributes to the AAC, thereby reducing the amount of
In 1995, the Ministry of Forests separated its land high quality wood that the tenure holder could harvest.
management and forest protection functions, including The Review Team heard arguments that the current
fire suppression. While reorganization resulted in an policy is a disincentive for tenure holders to engage in
efficient and effective fire suppression organization, proactive fuel reduction and fire management.
some have argued that this separation of land and fire
management policy and practice has also resulted in Furthermore, the addition of stumpage to the basic
decisions being made by one group without necessarily cost of harvest often negates the economic viability of
considering the implications for the other. operating in low-quality tree stand areas. Stumpage is
the Crown rent paid by tenure holders to cut timber
For instance, the Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) sets the on provincial land. The situation is compounded by
volume of trees available for harvest for a given tenure the complexities of the international softwood lumber
holder. A tenure holder pays the provincial government trading arrangements and perceived stumpage-related
for the right to harvest a specified area. Often, low subsidies currently in dispute between Canada and
quality and/or low volume forest stands that are the United States.
marginal or uneconomic for harvest remain uncut,
creating areas of high risk for wildfire. The move to an auction based stumpage system may
provide opportunities to deal with these problems.
Regardless of the quality and volume of wood available
in these high-hazard stands, the volume harvested con-
32
firestorm 2003
The Review Team Recommends: nology including mechanical and manual techniques.
However, additional training will be required for newer
Consider Amending the Annual
technology focused on altering the characteristics of the
Allowable Cut
fuel through bundling, chipping and masticating.
The Ministry of Forests should consider amending
Annual Allowable Cut determinations in fire-prone
ecosystems to encourage hazard reduction treat The Review Team Recommends:
ments by tenure holders in marginal and uneconomic
tree stand areas within the wildland urban interface. Retain the Knowledge Base
The province and the forest industry must pay partic
Look at Alternatives to Stumpage ular attention to retaining the existing knowledge
Where Practical about fuel reduction practices and continue to devel
The province should investigate alternatives to op and expand that knowledge base.
stumpage as an incentive to encourage the harvest
of high-risk, low value fuel types. Be Partners in Research and Development
The 2003 fire season has raised many questions related
More Research and Development
to the ecological, social, and economic impacts of wild-
Industry should undertake research into the use of
fire on communities. These questions all require timely
small diameter trees in non-traditional forest products
answers if we are to maintain public safety, economic
markets such as energy and bio-fuel.
well-being and environmental quality throughout the
province. Research into these issues is already being
Train More Fuel Reduction Professionals done in other jurisdictions in Canada and the
The Review Team heard that, with the reduced focus United States.
on fuel management in recent years, the ability to
effectively treat a fuel hazard has been reduced and is The fuel types and ecosystems affected by wildfires in
becoming limited by a lack of trained, skilled people. British Columbia and southwest Alberta this past
There is a shortage of professionals who understand summer are more similar to the northwest United
how fuel characteristics relate to fire behavior and who States than the rest of Canada. Over the past two
can implement a fuel reduction program while meeting decades, devastating fires in this region of the United
complex ecological, social, and economic requirements. States have provided our neighbours with incentives to
embark on a significant fire management research and
The effective use and application of prescribed fire will development program. Many of the results of this work
require the continued development of a highly skilled are now becoming available.
workforce with advanced knowledge of fire ecology, fire
behaviour, fire effects and the consequences of poorly
designed or poorly implemented projects. The Review Team Recommends:
reliant on the need for skilled practitioners. Much work on collaboration with North American and other
can be done that involves the use of traditional tech- jurisdictions to share knowledge and pursue research.
33
firestorm
Preparing for Interface Fires ~ Emergency Management
34
firestorm 2003
It is difficult, however, to be effective at the community By law, state agencies must use SEMS when responding
level when many areas of the province do not have a to emergencies involving multiple jurisdictions or multiple
documented plan to address emergencies and disasters agencies. Local governments are strongly encouraged to use
for their residents. The basic premise of emergency SEMS, and they must use SEMS in order to be eligible
management is the immediate response by local for state funding of response related costs. While local gov-
resources to the emergency, followed by assistance from ernments are not required to take State Approved Courses
neighbouring jurisdictions and higher levels of govern- of Instruction on SEMS, they are required to maintain
ment when required. minimum training competencies in SEMS.
This approach makes inherent sense during interface Local jurisdictions in California do not have to adopt
fires, but can only work when all jurisdictions have the statewide system for emergency planning. However,
adequate, current emergency plans and mutual aid/ if they opt out, they are not reimbursed for costs they
automatic aid agreements in place. During Firestorm
may be liable for when others expend resources on
2003 this was not always the case.
their behalf.
Previous reports to the provincial government, such
Quebec, on the other hand, ensures local compliance
as the Auditor Generals report and the Ministry of
Forests Garnet Fire Review of 1995, addressed this through their Civil Protection Act of 2001. This legis-
concern. The Garnet Fire Review recommendation lation ensures that regional authorities and any
states: Regional Districts should be required to prepare municipality not part of the regional authority must
emergency plans, and be trained to implement them, make agreements with other regional authorities and
along the same lines as the requirement of municipalities. municipalities for establishing a civil protection plan to
deal with hazards in their area. Ontario mandates
The Review Team received many submissions regarding
emergency planning with annual benchmarks.
the need to increase responsibility for emergency
planning at the municipal/regional district level.
In many ways, the California Standard Emergency
Suggestions to achieve this ranged from a strengthened
Management System is similar to the British Columbia
provincial mandate to voluntary cooperation
Emergency Response Management System (BCERMS).
and incentives.
BCERMS has been adopted as the emergency manage-
ment model by provincial agencies and by many British
35
Without the base knowledge of the emergency response specific building codes for the interface areas.
management system, local emergency plans cannot be
This has led people to build homes with fire-resistant
drafted to address needs in a consistent manner. If, as is
building materials and to follow wildfire prevention
the case presently, some regional districts do not carry
practices modeled after those in the Firewise Program.
out a standardized emergency plan for their areas
population, it is impossible to expect that all citizens This Firewise Program is similar to Californias state
will be protected in an equitable manner if there is an building code, which highlights the following:
interface fire.
structural integrity (the ability of the structure
Currently in British Columbia, unlike municipalities, it to withstand intrusion by fire)
is not mandatory for regional districts to adopt emer-
defensible space (the utilization of fuel and
gency plans. As well, the Review Team heard comments
vegetation management techniques to reduce fire
that plans completed by municipalities and regional exposure to vulnerable structures and infrastructure)
districts are not checked on a regular basis. This leaves
large areas of the province with no emergency plan reliability (the ability for suppression forces to access
in place. structures and the maintenance of water supplies)
36
firestorm 2003
The Review Team Recommends: However, the current situation within wildland/urban
interface regions is much more difficult. The local fire
Require Wildfire-Proofing Across the Province
department may or may not respond, depending on
The British Columbia government should require
organizational boundaries and agreements.
municipal and regional governments to implement
The Ministry of Forests may respond to the wildfire
building codes and land use requirements that have
situation within the interface, but if it is a structural
proven useful elsewhere in limiting the impact of
fire (involving buildings), ministry personnel are not
interface fires.
empowered to do anything until surrounding wildlands
are threatened. Moreover, they are not generally trained
in structural firefighting.
Preparing to Fight Wildfires in There appears to be no system in place to ensure that
British Columbia the closest available, effective firefighting resource is
Firefighter response is the next critical element in wild- designated to respond to an interface wildfire situation.
fire impact reduction. Quick response to the interface Apart from wildland fires, which are a mandated
fire in its initial stage with sufficiently trained staff, responsibility of the Forest Protection Branch, there is
equipment and resources to contain, control and no mandated authority for local fire suppression.
eliminate the fire is a very time-dependent operation.
This has led to the following situations:
Presently, the Ministry of Forests responds to wildfires
from 50 bases throughout the province. Some interface areas of the province are without
a responding emergency fire department.
This is accomplished with mobile, three-person Rapid
Attack Crews who arrive at the incident scene via Some areas with fire departments do not have
vehicle, helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft, sometimes authorization from their councils to attack out-
parachuting to remote locations. The intent, as in all of-boundary interface fires. This is true in spite of
fire response activities, is to hit the fire as soon as the fact that there is cost reimbursement available
possible with well-trained and equipped rapid-response from the Ministry of Forests.
fire crews. As well, a number of self-contained mobile Some fire departments do not have the necessary
20-person Unit Crews are utilized on fires that grow equipment to effectively respond to an interface
to a significant size. fire.
In total, these comprise British Columbias summer Some fire departments do not have effective
forest firefighter contingent of 770 members. The mutual aid /automatic aid agreements.
front-line force is supplemented by the ability of the
Such was the scenario in different parts of the Interior
Ministry of Forests to draw upon approximately 1,200
when Firestorm 2003 began. The Review Team heard
contract firefighters and 500 fire wardens, plus crews
many comments about the need to address these short-
from other provinces and from the United States.
comings. It is unacceptable that emergency responding
There is a well-organized structure by which wildfires
agencies are prevented from working together as effec-
in remote areas are addressed.
tively as possible. Other jurisdictions have found
effective means by which this can occur, most notably
37
through mutual aid agreements and through adopting non-reimbursed contributions for services rendered and is
the principle of automatic aid. Mutual aid is based contingent upon a responding chief s approval. Mutual
upon the following reasonable assumptions: aid is given only when equipment and resources are
available and dispatch will not jeopardize local
It is economically impossible for every firefighting capabilities.
municipality or regional district to have all
necessary equipment and personnel for every In British Columbia, not every area has a mutual
emergency situation. aid / automatic aid plan, nor does every area have an
emergency plan. Indeed, the Review Team was told
If one area helps another, there can be a time
that Fire Chiefs in the Thompson Nicola Regional
when assistance is reciprocated.
District agreed on the need for organization and mutual
By responding to another areas need, a wildfire aid, but were turned down by the Thompson Nicola
interface situation could be averted before it Regional District. To be effective, the system requires
crosses into a neighbouring jurisdiction. such mutual aid agreements.
Automatic Aid embodies the concept of allowing the
Firefighters told the Review Team that they would like
closest fire department or emergency responder to pro-
to acquire a greater range of skills and training for
vide emergency response services regardless of local
interface fire suppression. For example, wildfire fighters
jurisdictional boundaries and without having to wait
from the Ministry of Forests expressed a desire to
for the jurisdiction where the emergency is occuring to
become better trained in structural firefighting
request assistance. A formal Automatic Aid agreement
techniques while structural firefighters, both career and
identifies what types of emergencies (e.g. structural fire
volunteer, wanted basic training in the techniques and
fighting, rescue and/or motor vehicle extrication will be
special risks of forest firefighting. We believe this cross
provided), the type of apparatus and number of fire-
training would be a valuable asset to both groups,
fighters required for the initial response. It also
and would likely reduce risk and damage from
establishes a fee for the service being provided.
interface fires.
It should be noted that the states of California and
It was clear during last summers wildfires that there is
Oregon respond to wildland/urban interface fires
a need to explore how British Columbias structural and
through an integrated and well thought out system of
forest fire resources could be better coordinated and
mutual aid agreements. There is an organized structure
integrated when dealing with interface fires.
with operating guidelines to expeditiously mobilize and
direct fire services using the assumed prior existence of
mutual aid agreements. These agreements ensure that
local, regional and even state firefighting forces are able
to work together to cope with local emergencies.
38
firestorm 2003
Plans should be in a standardized format/tem- other appropriate members to examine best practices
plate consistent across the province, and be relating to interface fires and recommend changes
39
firestorm
Responding to Interface Fires ~ Command and Control
In recent years, the province has adopted an integrated established near-universal standards. While some
response model that enables immediate activation of modifications were made to meet British Columbias
personnel and resources during times of emergency. unique needs, there is a common terminology used
Throughout the Firestorm 2003 consultation process, throughout the ICS universe.
the Review Team heard numerous comments about
the overall management of last summers emergency. ICS is a command and control system delineating job
responsibilities within an organizational structure for
While the general consensus is that the system worked the purpose of managing day-to-day operations during
relatively well during much of Firestorm 2003, there emergency incidents. While originally developed for
were concerns expressed by some presenters as to the wildland incidents, the system can also be applied
provinces overall command and control structures. easily to day-to-day fire and rescue operations in
The criticisms the Review Team heard ranged from urban interface areas. The system is flexible enough to
"too many bosses", to "no one running the ship", manage large catastrophic events involving thousands
to "lack of coordination" to "jurisdictions and of emergency response and management personnel.
responsibilities were confusing".
Individuals in authority within the provincial emergen-
These comments were made primarily respecting the cy structure must have the knowledge, skills and
early days of the emergency operations centres, in attitudes necessary to successfully command operations
the initial stages of the emerging disaster. at large-scale disasters such as last summer's firestorm.
As presented at fire and emergency command training
In the past, to meet the diverse needs of different courses, ICS includes the following components:
regions of the province, the British Columbia govern-
ment developed an "all hazards" provincial emergency pre-hazard identification and analysis
operations system. The British Columbia Emergency (pre-incident planning and mitigation);
Response Management System (BCERMS) is built
control of incident operations (area command,
upon and has adopted much of the Incident
command structure resource management);
Command System (ICS) used in other jurisdictions,
including the United States, Alberta and Ontario. The planning (developing an incident action plan);
ICS has been tried and tested in many jurisdictions and hazard-specific operation
has been found to be an appropriate system with (firefighter safety and property preservation);
40
firestorm 2003
resources (human and capital); positive, but some of which focused on the lack of
effective application. In the early days of the summer's
logistics and finance
firestorms, there was apparent confusion. While staff
(key resource, logistic and finance issues);
had been schooled in ICS and had some opportunities
Emergency Operations Centre to practice, the firestorms challenged the application
(functions, resources and services available); of their skills. From all comments and observations, it
evacuation and shelters (fire department role); and, appears that once the initial problems were worked out,
ICS functioned well.
recovery (short and long term, post incident
analysis). PEP officials consider the province to have the best
The ICS is only as good as its application and delivery emergency management response system in the coun-
by the emergency management personnel in charge try. To ensure public safety, no less should be expected.
of operations. It is essential that all staff know their
However, there needs to be standardization and unifor-
responsibilities, understand the reporting relationships,
mity of training across provincial, municipal and
and use a common language.
regional agencies and between jurisdictions. There are
The following quote sums it up: "Words must have a internationally recognized competency standards for
single definition, functional areas must have one set of fire fighting and emergency training, but within the
responsibilities, and no two words may have the same province there is disagreement among agencies not
definition. If this axiom is changed, confusion is only as to which standards to adopt but whether to
introduced into the conveyance of information, orders, recognize each other's standards.
et cetera." (from Command and Control of Fire
Department Operations at Target Hazards, Student
Manual, United States Fire Administration National
Fire Academy, July 2003, Pages 2-3).
41
Three separate ministries are involved in providing Other jurisdictions have improved their approaches to
training for emergency responders. Each ministry training and have developed models suitable to their
appears to have its own separate training system. This jurisdictions. The states of California and Oregon have
contributes to varying degrees of understanding among embarked upon a better training delivery system to
personnel. The ministries also have differing methods ensure that emergency responders can effectively work
of funding courses. For example: together. In large part this was achieved through the
active involvement of local practitioners working
Outside forest fire fighting contractors receive ICS cooperatively with state officials.
training at a variety of community colleges at their
own expense. Within Canada, the province of Manitoba has a
provincial fire college that provides consistent training
The Provincial Emergency Program uses Justice
to all firefighters within the province and to firefighters
Institute of British Columbia (JIBC) Emergency
from other jurisdictions. Alberta also uses a fire college.
Management Division to provide contracted cours-
es in a variety of emergency management subjects. Some of the apparent confusion in the early days of
However, ICS is not a funded course by them for Firestorm of 2003 may be attributable to these short-
delivery. Instead, in excess of 2,300 people have comings and inconsistencies in emergency command
either directly paid or had their organizations pay and control training.
the Emergency Management Division of the JIBC
Although there remain shortcomings, the Provincial
to complete the ICS 100 to 300 courses.
Emergency Program has made significant improve-
The provincial Office of the Fire Commissioner ments to the delivery of emergency management
(OFC) does not fund any type of ICS training for services in British Columbia over the past four years.
fire service. Instead this basic element is offered The major changes include:
by the Fire and Safety Division of the JIBC in
Emergency Scene Management 1, 2 and 3 the adoption of the Integrated Response Model,
courses on a cost recovery basis. BCERMS;
Keep in mind that ICS is an everyday working tool the use of the Temporary Emergency Assignment
needed by all firefighters and Fire Officers for Management System (TEAMS); and,
effective, standardized operations and is outlined
the development of Provincial Regional Emergency
as part of meeting the NFPA Standard 1021 for
Operations Centres (PREOCs)
Fire Officer Professional Qualifications. NFPA
capable of immediate activation.
Standards have been adopted for fire fighter
training in British Columbia. These initiatives have significantly strengthened the
province's ability to work with and support local
A patchwork approach to funding, course content and
governments in response to all-hazard emergencies.
qualifying standards is inconsistent with an integrated
Yet, given the concerns raised during the consultation
command system approach to managing emergencies
process, British Columbia's emergency response could
within the province.
be further strengthened by ensuring that all personnel
within the ICS system, regardless of their organization
42
firestorm 2003
Standardize BCERMS
and ICS Use and
Training
To gain the full value
of BCERMS and the ICS
it must be universally
adopted by all provincial
and local government
agencies.
The province should consider the establishment of To be effective in time of need, a command and
a single, province-wide focus for training within control system must be applied in a consistent way
British Columbia to achieve: by all users. This requires people to stay current with
changes in technology and procedures. Continuing
Implementation of consistent standards and education credits are a well-recognized requirement
policies for the Office of the Fire Commissioner, in many professions and should apply to emergency
Ministry of Forests, and the Provincial Emergency response personnel.
Program to allow integration from within the
provinces emergency response structure.
The Review Team Recommends:
Development and continual upgrading of a
common curriculum for all ICS training in Continuing Education
British Columbia. Maintaining ICS accreditation over time
should be dependent on a system of continuing edu
cation credits and participation in regularly-scheduled,
integrated simulations using ICS.
43
firestorm
Responding to Interface Fires ~ Communication
Communication was one of the central themes that is the information vacuum they found themselves
emerged during the Review Team's consultation pro- in during the crisis.
cess and was an issue in every community. Almost all
aspects of the response to the 2003 wildfires involved It can be concluded without hesitation that at times
communication in some form or another. there was a significant gap in communications among
the various agencies involved in the disaster response.
Comments ranged from positive, particularly in This left far too many people affected by the wildfires
relation to the Kelowna wildfires, to critical, especially questioning who was in charge, where could they have
in the context of the Barriere and McLure wildfires. obtained timely information, and would it be accurate?
On the whole, there was a consensus that there is
considerable room for improvement in this area. Due to the unique and pervasive role of communica-
tions in all aspects of emergency planning, response
and recovery it is useful to provide a more detailed
description of the comments received by the Review
Inter-Agency Communications Team and the problems encountered by the citizens
themselves.
There were a myriad of federal, provincial, regional
and municipal agencies involved in the response to the John Slater, the Mayor of Osoyoos, expressed concerns
2003 interface fires as well as many non-government regarding the lack of communication between such
and volunteer organizations. The sheer size and com- groups as the Office of the Fire Commissioner, the
plexity of the fires, combined with the number of Interior Health Authority and the Ministry of Forests.
organizations involved, was bound to test the According to Mayor Slater, information officers in
limits of inter-agency communications. these agencies did not communicate with each other,
and at times, each transposed communication into
The Review Team heard many examples of inter-
different words and meanings, resulting in incorrect
agency communications that were less than ideal.
information being released to the media.
This was particularly noticeable in the early wildfires
around Barriere, Chase, Kamloops, and in the southern The lack of inter-agency communication caused con-
Okanagan. Next to the wildfires themselves, the most cern among other locally elected officials, who in some
lasting impression many people have of Firestorm 2003 instances felt they were out of the information loop at
44
firestorm 2003
The Columbia Shuswap Regional District stated in Consultation comments suggest that significant value
its submission that communication among groups such could come from continuing and intensifying British
as the RCMP, Ministry of Forests, the City of Vernon, Columbia's inter-agency training, including participa-
PEP, and the Regional District was initially non-exis- tion by emergency teams in large-scale simulations of
tent. However, as the reality of the wildfire disaster interface wildfires. Also needed is the development
emerged, over the next several days communications of an overall communications strategy/protocol for
improved and inter-agency responsibilities, jurisdictions major events to define the roles, responsibilities
and control were established. and obligations of those involved.
45
Communicating with the the wildfires, there were also concerns about the flow,
Public and the Media timeliness and accuracy of information provided. In
its presentation, the CBC pointed to a lack of timely
Another key aspect of communications focused on how
information in the McLure and Barriere wildfires.
effectively officials provided information to the public
Some media personnel believed that emergency officials
and the media. There were divergent viewpoints regard-
were clamping down on information and not providing
ing how local and provincial officials disseminated
reasonable access to the fire zones, forcing reporters
information to residents affected by the wildfires.
and camera crews to get behind fire lines without
In the early stages of this wildfire season, the flow permission.
of information from officials to the public and the
The Fire Chief of Barriere shared these reservations
media was an issue of great concern. The Review Team
about the way communications were handled and
received presentations stating that the information pro-
stated in his presentation to the Review Team, the
vided on specific fires was exaggerated and inaccurate.
media should have been informed right out, first
For example, concerns were expressed about media
and foremost.
reports that claimed the town of Barriere had been
destroyed. The Incident Commander at Barriere confirmed to the
Review Team that he ordered the media be kept out of
Similar concerns were expressed about reports of the
the fire area because he was concerned for their safety.
lodge at Cathedral Lakes being burned, when in fact
His justification was that the media would get in the
it had not, and about structural damage in the town
way of emergency crews and pose a hazard.
of Ashcroft, when none had occurred. Without doubt,
hearing reports such as these caused great anguish, grief The Review Team was also told that during the early
and confusion among the people of these communities. part of the wildfires there was a lack of trained staff
able to deal with the media in a professional manner.
On the other hand, in the case of the Kelowna wild-
The Thompson-Nicola Regional District wrote: media
fires, local and provincial officials worked diligently
presentations held in Kamloops seemed to be aimed at
to keep the media and the public well informed. The
stemming the media onslaught rather than providing
CBC stated in its presentation to the Review Team:
the information truly required by the people impacted
Officials such as Mayor Walter Gray and Fire Chief by the wildfires.
Gerry Zimmerman told us everything they knew as
This view was echoed by some in the media who
soon as they knew it. Officials with the Ministry of
described the early response to the communication
Forests provided access to the Kelowna fire to dozens
need as woefully inadequate.
of reporters using a convoy of city buses.
Fundamentally, one can conclude that during the
The Review Team also heard that up to six or
initial interface fires there was a lack of understanding
seven news releases were issued on a daily basis
about the role of the media and the assistance they
and designated spokespeople were readily available
could provide in helping to inform the public. In
to update the media.
contrast, and perhaps learning from the initial experi-
From the perspective of some of the media covering ences of those involved in the McLure, Barriere and
46
firestorm 2003
Kamloops wildfires, the response of provincial and experiences of the summer of 2003 and the improve-
local officials during the later wildfires was focused on ments that occurred over the course of the fire season
ensuring the public and the media received the latest so that valuable lessons are not lost.
available information in a timely, forthright and
accurate manner. Information officers in all levels of government should
be trained in media relations so they can anticipate and
With respect to inter-agency communications, the meet crisis-situation needs. Large-scale, unpredictable
marked improvement in media communications over events that unfold rapidly often create unique informa-
the course of the fires suggests there are some lessons to tion challenges. Specialized training and strategies are
be learned. In particular, the public must receive timely required to deal with natural disasters and public
and accurate information right from the beginning of emergencies from a communications standpoint.
the emergency. To that end, management personnel
should focus on delivering information as opposed
The Review Team Recommends:
to managing the message.
Establish Emergency Communications
As a first step, the provincial government needs to
SWAT Team
develop a crisis communications strategy that uses
To coordinate on-site communications during times
all available resources, including the media and the
of emergency, the province should establish a media
internet, to ensure timely delivery of accurate
communications SWAT team with members from
information to the public.
municipal, regional, provincial and federal govern
ments and including other major stakeholders as
The Review Team Recommends: appropriate.
Develop a Crisis Communications Strategy The members of this team would be trained in crisis
The province should immediately undertake the communications and would serve to facilitate, not
development of a provincial communications strategy stem, the flow of information.
and protocol for major emergency events defining
the roles and responsibilities of those involved. Cooperate on Training
The strategy should: All jurisdictions should consider intensifying
inter-agency training efforts, including the use of
Include the participation of all key stakeholders large-scale interface wildfire simulations, to improve
including the media. communications.
Establish clear principles and protocols about Good communications within the command and
the release of information. control structure is essential to successful manage
ment of an emergency event. The experience of last
Identify how the media and the internet can be
summer confirmed that the more these skills are
used in times of emergency as a technical
used, the stronger they get. Practice is important and
resource and to disseminate information to the
all agencies involved should be encouraged to under
public.
take inter-agency communications training on an
47
Communications Technology
Another key communications issue brought to the
attention of the Review Team was the varying state of
emergency communications technology across British
Columbia. By emergency communications, the Review
Team is referring to systems and procedures by which
calls for service are received, processed and prioritized
and then used as the basis for alerting and dispatching
emergency responders to the scene. Communications
technology is used to receive the request for assistance,
coordinate the response, record the incident and
dispatch resources.
During the 2003 interface fires, it was apparent Specific problems encountered with communications
that there were many emergency communications equipment include the following:
technology issues. For example:
some of the responding fire departments use
the capacity of some systems was exceeded; proprietary radio systems that currently do not
emergency phone systems were overwhelmed function in more remote areas.
with calls; and, some designated VHF emergency radio channels
radio systems built for fire departments were cannot be programmed into some of the
not sufficiently expandable to manage all of the newer radios.
additional responders who arrived to assist. many fire departments have inter-operable radio
As well, there were problems with compatibility of systems but police, ambulance, forestry and air
various systems, preventing complete communications support may lack this compatibility.
between crews from various regions of the province
and from outside the province.
The Review Team Recommends:
Though many of these deficiencies were known prior Achieve Emergency Radio Inter-Operability
to the 2003 fire season, it took an event like last sum- The British Columbia government should develop
mers firestorm to demonstrate the problem. The and implement a provincial strategy for emergency
Review Team received a number of presentations that communications technology focused on moving over
pointed out the non-compatibility of communications time to total inter-operability across agencies
equipment and, in some cases, the absence of it. throughout the province.
The comment was made that at times, this left the
communication of fire, weather, and other vital
information up to chance.
48
firestorm 2003
Initial activities should include developing
a provincial inventory for all fire, police,
ambulance, forestry radios and frequencies
to ensure that where radio systems are
compatible, they can be programmed with
common frequencies or talk groups.
Amateur Radio
In the consultation process, the Review Team
also heard about the important role that ama-
teur radio operators played during Firestorm
2003. When emergency radio systems failed
and cellular coverage was lost in some areas, the The Review Team Recommends:
amateur radio operators were an invaluable, but at
Include Amateur Radio Operators in
times overlooked resource.
Emergency Response
During the wildfires, the amateur radio operators All Emergency Operation Centres should include
proved to be very resourceful, and demonstrated their a provision for amateur radio operators, including
commitment and dedication by relaying vital informa- power and antenna space, in case they are needed.
However, some people did not consider them to be an exercised to ensure that equipment, policies and
integral part of the emergency response system. There procedures are functional.
49
Public Education The program's components include a guide on general
preparedness for earthquakes, floods, hurricanes,
All demographic indicators point to the continued
tornadoes, wildfires and severe winter storms.
increase of population in British Columbia's wildfire
interface areas. Those who choose to live in close Another NFPA program circulating in the US, that
proximity to the forests must recognize that they could be adapted for British Columbia, is the Firewise
are placing themselves at increased risk from the process for interface homeowners.
dangers of wildfire.
Both of these NFPA public education programs would
In particular, some presenters in the consultation assist those living in interface areas to understand
process emphasized the need to educate city dwellers - procedures they might undertake to better prepare
such as cabin owners, campers and other seasonal themselves and their fellow residents for the ravages
residents and visitors - about the risks they face. of a wildfire.
Presenters also noted the need to inform and remind
all citizens annually, prior to the fire season, about the Closer to home, the Ministry of Forests provides a vari-
wildfire risk in the Interior. ety of educational materials about fireproofing interface
subdivisions and dwellings in its Fire Smart program.
Perhaps most importantly, presenters stressed the need Public meetings have been held and printed materials
for regular information about basic responsibilities and have been distributed in British Columbia over the last
escape routes during an evacuation. two decades on these topics.
Firefighters told the Review Team that the public has Similarly, the Insurance Bureau of Canada has devel-
misconceptions about forest firefighting. For example, oped and distributed excellent educational material.
during Firestorm 2003 many people believed that
human intervention could halt any fire and the failure A review of material from many jurisdictions, national-
to do so was because of human error. Whereas in ly and internationally, suggests that most successful fire
reality, only Mother Nature could stop a rank five prevention and emergency planning programs place a
or six wildfire, as was experienced in several instances major responsibility for reducing the risks of living in
last summer. wildland/urban interface areas on the homeowner.
There is a strong need to better inform and educate Unfortunately, the past summer's destruction and losses
the general public, and interface residents in particular, would indicate that many British Columbian's are not
about the dangers, risks and realities of forest fires. aware of the things they must do to make living in
Public education is also needed to explain the preventa- interface communities safer.
tive and protective measures that individuals who live
Public education, combined with more appropriate
in the interface can adopt to make their lives safer.
building codes and well-developed subdivision plans,
Much valuable information has been developed by is essential.
many agencies for this very purpose. For example,
some parts of the National Fire Protection Association's
(NFPA) Risk Watch program is being successfully
implemented in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Ontario.
50
firestorm 2003
51
firestorm
Responding to Interface Fires ~ Evacuation
The Review Team received significant public and stake- Concerns Expressed
holder input about the evacuation phase of Firestorm
Despite the general success of the evacuation phase,
2003. More people evacuated their homes and sought
the Review Team heard considerable concern expressed
assistance from the province through Emergency Social
about specific evacuations. This is not surprising.
Services (ESS) Reception Centers during Firestorm
By their very nature, evacuations operate under very
2003 than for any other disaster in British Columbia's
severe conditions. In the case of Firestorm 2003,
history.
the conditions were unprecedented.
Approximately 45,000 residents were forced from their
Many people spoke of the slowness of the evacuation
homes by the encroaching wildfires, and sought tempo-
process. Others expressed the need for earlier notifica-
rary paid accommodations elsewhere. Thousands more
tion to evacuate. Some stated that their evacuations
stayed with friends or relatives, or fended for them-
were needless, and there were those residents who
selves without government assistance. Some people
did not evacuate even when told to do so.
were evacuated on more than one occasion.
There were also a number of comments and submis-
Some citizens also endured either the interruption, or
sions applauding the efforts of the people responsible
in some cases, the complete destruction of their liveli-
for running the evacuation centres, and the effective
hoods. Many others lost their homes to the ravages of
way in which evacuations were accomplished, given
the firestorms. The stress and financial impact of being
their magnitude and urgency.
evacuated from ones home, business and community
was an issue of great importance to many presenters. The Review Team occasionally heard that the process
by which evacuations were determined was overly
During the summer of 2003, the provincial Office of
bureaucratic and complex. On some occasions the
the Fire Commissioner (OFC) issued 122 Evacuation
Review Team received comments from individuals
Alerts and 66 Evacuation Orders. The fact that no lives
who said that, if faced with a similar wildfire situation
were lost during the evacuations is testimony to the
in the future, they would not evacuate.
overall success of the evacuation procedures. Clearly,
officials preferred to err on the side of caution when In spite of these criticisms, the overriding measure
evacuation orders were issued. of success of the evacuations undertaken in Firestorm
2003 is shown by the fact that no residents lost their
52
firestorm 2003
lives or suffered serious injury. In similar emergencies not be used, or they had to be amended in order to
in other jurisdictions, like the California wildfires later make sense to the people involved.
in 2003, many people were not as fortunate.
4. After the Evacuation Branch had formalized
the order, under Section 25 of the Fire Services Act,
an Evacuation Order was issued to the local EOC.
How the Evacuation Process Works This meant having the Fire Commissioner sign the
order in Victoria.
Perceptions are important. British Columbians need to
have confidence in the system, so that when evacuation 5. Then the EOC had the notices delivered to residents
decisions are made the protection of human life will as a physical notification by RCMP and/or local fire
remain paramount over other considerations. departments, search and rescue teams, and bylaw
enforcement personnel. The EOC also notified the
There is always room for improvement, and on the
media, designated evacuation routes and arranged for
basis of the information provided to the Review Team
evacuees' shelter through Emergency Social Services.
we believe there are areas that could be strengthened.
While this process includes checks and balances to
First we need to explain the evacuation process used
ensure each step of the evacuation is done prudently,
during Firestorm 2003. It was as follows:
it may rely too heavily on a rigid approval hierarchy.
1. The on-scene Incident Commander (IC) received
There are several methods and legal instruments by
advice when time permitted from the fire behaviour
which people may be ordered to leave a wildland/urban
specialist and the weather behaviour specialist. Based
interface fire area, including:
on this advice, the IC made a determination as to
whether or not an evacuation was required. Section 85 of The Forest Practices Code, which
allows a designated forest official to order a person
2. Dependent upon the circumstance, the IC may have
to leave an area if the government is engaged in
made an immediate tactical evacuation order under
fire control or suppression. This is usually used tac-
the Forest Practices Code, but in all cases notified the
tically when the on-scene Incident Commander
Ministry Regional Operations Center (MROC) as to
has the need to concentrate upon the fire dangers
the decision.
at hand without the immediate worry of persons
3. With respect to strategic evacuations, the MROC being at risk. When this tactical order is formalized
passed information to the Evacuation Branch by submission to the OFC, people can then be
Coordinator, a position staffed by the OFC, for ordered to evacuate the area.
assessment and authority to proceed. Strategic Section 25 of the Fire Services Act gives authority
evacuations are only made on the advice of the to the Fire Commissioner to evacuate a building or
incident commander. The Evacuation Branch area if it is felt there are persons in imminent dan-
usually contacted the locally affected Emergency ger. This authority is also delegated to municipal
Operations Center (EOC) to determine evacuation fire services through the Community Charter but
boundaries and priorities. Some areas had no EOC. must be adopted through a by-law.
In many instances, maps were not reliable and could
53
A local authority declares a state of local Increase Understanding of the
emergency. The power to do this rests with a Evacuation Process
municipal mayor and council or regional districts The province should target greater resources at
chair and board as defined in the Emergency ensuring better awareness by the public about the
Program Act. A mandatory evacuation can then be stages of evacuation, including the procedures to be
undertaken in those areas within their authority. followed during an evacuation and after the lifting of
an evacuation order, particularly in areas of high
When a provincial state of emergency is declared,
interface fire risk.
the minister responsible (or designate) for the
Emergency Program Act may order an evacuation.
The procedures and powers of the police should be
In Firestorm 2003, it was the Office of the Fire
clarified and the permit re-entry process standardized
Commissioner who issued the order in Victoria.
so that all affected responders, evacuees, media and
The process is designed to ensure maximum public others understand the process, its logic and the
safety in the face of life-threatening wildland and inter- location of the permit issuing authority.
face fires, but it does not adequately take into account
local knowledge and expertise. There may be instances
where local officials, together with emergency person-
nel and municipal/regional district employees, have a Helping the Evacuees
higher degree of knowledge about local road networks, With evacuation came the need for government to
power grids, water systems and other vital infrastruc- provide housing, food and clothing for up to 72 hours
ture. This is likely more important to the evacuation if evacuees did not have sufficient resources to do so
decision than the information available centrally in themselves. With the number of evacuees involved,
Victoria. Access to local knowledge is particularly it was inevitable there would be some problems.
important when the Incident Commander is not
present in the community that is being evacuated. The Review Team heard comments about long line-ups
to register at the Emergency Social Services Reception
Centre, overly complicated forms to fill out, and
The Review Team Recommends: unavailability of forms. Others commented on
inequities in treatment of evacuees and distribution
Allow More Local Decision Making
of benefits.
on Evacuations
The requirements for issuance and lifting of evacua
tion orders should be reviewed by the provincial
The Review Team Recommends:
government to ensure that decisions can be made by
those people with the best information, closest to the Simplify Access to Post-Evacuation Assistance
action, who are competent to do so. Decisions should The appropriate agencies should streamline and
not always be dependent on the Office of the Fire simplify registration processes and procedures, mak
Commissioner in Victoria. ing it easier for wildfire evacuees to obtain the basic
necessities of life during an already stressful time.
54
firestorm 2003
firestorm
Responding to Interface Fires ~ Resources
55
A model for this system is currently being implemented private sector workforce ready and willing to assist in
in this province to provide for an integrated police fire suppression efforts. These workers include indepen-
records management system. This system, called BC dent loggers, contract logging companies, and forest
Prime, was piloted by the police departments in industry employees possessing knowledge of local
Vancouver, Port Moody and Richmond, and is roads, weather and terrain.
now being implemented province wide.
However, many of these individuals have not main-
tained a current S100 certification and the Ministry
The Review Team Recommends: of Forests, Forest Protection Branch can only employ
certified individuals on the fire line. Many residents
Implement Firefighting Equipment Database
believe that the Forest Protection Branch could utilize
The Office of the Fire Commissioner should imple
local resources and equipment better in the future.
ment a searchable database to maintain a current and
As argued by one presenter, the effective utilization
accurate province-wide inventory of private and pub
of available industry resources may reduce firefighting
lic sector equipment available for fire response.
costs to government. More importantly, British
Columbians cannot rely on the level of support they
received from out-of-province and military personnel,
in future forest fire seasons.
Local Knowledge and Human
Resources The Review Team also heard concerns regarding
In every community visited by the Review Team, the the use of local resources from First Nations in the
use of local knowledge and people was discussed. province. Many members of First Nations communities
Residents, industry representatives and First Nations were willing and qualified to assist provincial firefight-
expressed concerns that the experience and expertise ers with their own equipment, but claim they were not
available in communities affected by the fires were approached to do so.
not properly utilized, if at all.
Pre-emergency planning is essential to ensure the
The Review Team heard a strong desire and willingness most effective use of the local resources and knowledge.
by many local people to help during the emergency This can be accomplished, for example, through local
periods of Firestorm 2003. Many expressed their planning committees, firefighter registration processes
frustration at being turned away, while out-of-province and the development of databases which provide up-to-
crews were called in to work on the fires. More impor- date information on the qualifications and expertise of
tantly, we were told that because crews from out of the local residents, contractors, business people and First
area often lacked a local resident as part of their team, Nations communities.
they were unaware of the location of back roads,
It should be mentioned that this type of committee
accessible water supplies, or available equipment
and pre-planning process currently exists in some areas
and resources.
of the province. In a written submission to the Review
Many presenters provided compelling arguments Team, Denis Gaudry, Manager of the Kamloops Fire
with respect to the availability of a highly skilled Centre, refers to a grassroots organization of volunteers,
56
firestorm 2003
fire wardens, special ground patrol resources and The Review Team Recommends:
contractors used by the Kamloops Forest Service. The
Establish Consistent Pay Rates Province Wide
management of this resource is called Pre-Organization
The Forest Protection Branch and the Office of the
Preparedness and, according to Gaudry, has served
Fire Commissioner should ensure that pay rates and
the community well.
payment criteria for firefighting personnel are pre
established, consistent and understood by all parties.
57
A review of the past decade shows
that Forest Protection Branch Type
1 unit crews were reduced from 27
in the early 1990s to 20 in 1999 and
returned to 22 in 2001, with the
addition of two unfunded crews to
cover Mountain Pine Beetle killed
areas. Considering the continued
expansion of the pine beetle infesta-
tion and the outlook for continued
hot, dry weather, this would appear
to be an appropriate time to invest
in an "ounce of prevention".
Restore Crews
The Forest Protection Branch should
restore its Type 1 unit crew The Review Team Recommends:
complement to 27.
Eliminate Delays
As a priority, the Forest Protection Branch should
review the Danger Tree Assessment and Removal
Getting an Early Start
Process, as well as any other sources of delay, so that
On numerous occasions, the Review Team heard from fire crews can be dispatched in a safe yet efficient
experienced present and former forestry workers who manner to improve fire suppression effectiveness.
questioned why, in the height of the Firestorm 2003
activities, fire crews did not get out to the site until
8:00 or 9:00 am. Veterans said it was always accepted
that the most effective time for fighting the fires was The Role of Volunteers
between dawn and 10:00 am, before the heat of the We heard many heartwarming stories of the contribu-
day and the midday winds become a serious impedi- tions and dedication of volunteers in the emergency
ment to controlling the spread of the blaze. We were efforts to cope with the 2003 BC forest fire season.
informed by Ministry of Forests personnel that crews As mentioned earlier, civil disasters often bring out the
were held back for safety concerns. The Ministry's own very best in the human spirit, and British Columbians
internal review suggests the need for "appropriate have much to be proud of. Volunteers are indeed
resources at critical times". In addition to the afore- "the gold of this earth".
mentioned Type 1 crews, the Danger Tree Assessment
and Removal Process appears to have been a factor in
slowing access to the fire line by crews and equipment.
58
firestorm 2003
The effort was led by the many volunteer firefighters
who are available throughout each year in many parts
of the province to protect life and property in local
districts with no permanent fire department. Many of
them were called into service on an emergency basis to
battle the unexpected intrusion of wildfires into their
communities during Firestorm 2003.
A British Columbia Coroner's report on the death of The amateur radio operators who provided emergency
a logger, who was overtaken by fire, spoke very specifi- communications systems when cell phone and wired
cally on this situation. The Coroner found that the systems crashed are another excellent example of the
logger's death was due to his lack of knowledge of valuable contributions volunteers can and did make.
fire behaviour and that he was physically unfit for
the rigours of fire fighting.
59
The Review Team believes that, as much as possible,
volunteers should be kept "in the loop" and fully
informed of policies, event status and expectations in
recognition of their value as team members, and as
communicators to the evacuees and clients of the
Emergency Services Centre. Volunteers should be treat-
ed with the same respect and kept as well informed as
all members of the emergency management staff.
60
firestorm 2003
We are aware that in other provinces, First Nations During events such as Firestorm 2003, when large
people are the primary seasonal workforce for the forest numbers of firefighters from outside the region are
fire fighting effort. In many cases, they live in close involved, complete and accurate maps are essential.
proximity to the site of potential fires and can be Many fire fighters lacked any local knowledge of geog-
quickly mobilized for the effort. raphy, terrain or man-made features such as logging
roads. The availability of accurate maps is vital in
In other presentations, we were informed about the
preparing the fire crews and allowing them to move
requirements for thinning forests by removal of small-
people and equipment safely in the fire zone.
diameter trees, underbrush and other fuel from the
forest floor to restore the forests to good health and
The Review Team heard examples of different teams
lower the risk of wildfires through fuel load reduction.
utilizing maps with different bases because of personal
This is a costly and labour-intensive process.
preferences. It was suggested that efforts be made to
Both forest firefighting and fuel load reduction provide ensure standardization in the maps used by all agencies
employment opportunities that can be offered to First involved in fire fighting in British Columbia, particu-
Nations residents. The First Nations leaders expressed larly when crews from outside the region or outside
the desire to have greater opportunities for their people the province are involved.
to participate in forest fire fighting and fuel load
reducing projects. A significant mapping initiative is currently underway
within the provincial government. The initiative is
aimed at providing modern and current base
The Review Team Recommends: information that is updated regularly and will be
available electronically in the future.
Involve First Nations
The Ministry of Forests should explore ways to
enhance the participation of First Nations in forest The Review Team Recommends:
fire fighting and fuel load reduction activities.
Provide Better Maps
The Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management
should accelerate the completion of the major
Maps mapping initiative currently being undertaken to
ensure it is available for use in future fire seasons.
During the course of the public consultations, the
Review Team heard commentary about the availability
and adequacy of basic maps. Presenters suggested that
at times, current maps were not available at all, and
that some maps contained outdated or incomplete
information and wrong geographic names.
61
Structural Sprinklers
The Review Team heard a number of presentations
about the effectiveness of sprinklers on structural fires.
In particular, we were told of the application of sprin-
klers by Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources staff in
the southeast part of British Columbia, where they
were credited with saving 30 or 40 structures.
Utilize Sprinklers
Communities and homeowners in the interface should
be encouraged to invest in methods of self-protection
such as sprinklers as soon as possible.
62
firestorm 2003
firestorm
Responding to Interface Fires ~ Financial Accountability
Throughout the public consultation process, the some told the Review Team that the use of the Martin
Review Team heard many comments about how Mars water bombers at $33,000 per hour was not cost
money was spent and financial resources were allocated. effective given they could only fly over the fire area
Some were positive but many questioned the economy for two hours before having to make a one-hour flight
of specific decisions and the resulting overall cost of back to Port Alberni on Vancouver Island to refuel.
the response to Firestorm 2003. Yet, there were others who wanted to know why
there was not greater use of the Martin Mars.
The Review Teams mandate and reporting timelines
did not allow for a financial audit. However, we have Some presenters wanted to know why greater numbers
been able to make some observations and recommen- of helicopters and water bombers were not utilized,
dations based on public and stakeholder comments, while still others commented on the apparent lack of
and what has been said in previous wildfire reports. fiscal accountability demonstrated by the air show
being staged courtesy of the Ministry of Forests.
Balancing the principles of financial administration
with emergency response involving human life and Others expressed concern about what they viewed to be
public safety is a delicate task. No one would accept the excessive and inappropriate use of contractors and
that bureaucratic red tape or cost controls should personnel while, conversely, some questioned why, in
interfere with proper emergency responses. At the same their own particular circumstance, more help was not
time, British Columbians would agree that financial provided. Some asked why they or their colleagues did
accountability must be maintained. not have an opportunity to be employed.
The Review Team heard comments about the cost of On other issues such as the availability of forms, proper
the response to the wildfires as it related to the use of documentation, timeliness of payments and inconsis-
contractors, air support and the wages paid to some tent rates of pay from agency to agency, there was more
responders. Several comments were also made about unanimity. A number of comments were made about
procedures and processes followed during the fire both the inconsistency and lack of forms and docu-
response and resulting evacuations, the lack of the mentation from agency to agency and place to place.
proper paperwork and the timeliness of payments.
Shortcomings in paperwork may seem minor in view
On many issues there was no consensus. For example, of the greater challenges, but proper documentation
63
The Review Team does not advocate big changes to
existing financial control and accountability systems in
the British Columbia public sector, but recommends
sensible continuous improvement. To that end,
it is useful to note the conclusion drawn in the
PricewaterhouseCoopers report of December 2002,
regarding fire-fighting costs in the Ministry of
Forests Forest Protection Program.
64
firestorm 2003
65
firestorm
Recovering from Interface Fires ~ Post-Emergency Recovery
All well-developed emergency plans contain a post- However, with many non-profit agencies governed
emergency recovery component. This component by different mandates, there can be a problem in the
should deal with the physical and social consequences post-emergency recovery period of more than one orga-
of the emergency, in this case interface wildfires. nization providing assistance to the same individuals.
This overlap and duplication could be overcome by the
In visiting the affected communities, the Review Team establishment of an umbrella committee with a desig-
observed and received positive indications of the work nated lead agency responsible for collecting donations
being done to restore the physical damage caused by and allocating awards.
Firestorm 2003. However, there is a need to restore
the impacted areas to prevent subsequent problems Suggestions were made to establish a provincial tem-
of floods, landslides and other topographical hazards plate in every local emergency plan that will address the
resulting from the destruction of vegetation. many actions needed to achieve comprehensive recov-
ery from a disaster. The template should be used by all
The assistance and the manner in which it came communities, municipalities and regional districts.
forward varied from community to community.
The fire insurance industry responded by establishing Ideally, in each community, the template would include
emergency claim centres for those who were insured. a broadly structured Recovery Committee composed of
The public responded with a huge outpouring of representatives from local government, volunteer and
funding for victim relief, while neighbours helped funding agencies, Provincial Emergency Program per-
neighbours get re-established. sonnel, local clergy and affected residents.
Non-government agencies such as the Canadian Red Bringing together all social support agencies, both
Cross and the Mennonite Disaster Service, which made public and private, under one organizing group would
presentations to the Review Team, came forward to help ensure those with unique needs do not fall
address the needs of those people with few resources between the cracks.
left after the wildfires. There was a strong understand-
ing throughout the province and the country that
many communities had been suddenly disadvantaged
and needed assistance.
66
firestorm 2003
The Review Team Recommends: loosely held together by damaged roots. As a conse-
quence, under heavy rainfall or runoff conditions, the
Prepare the Recovery Plan Before
moisture will not be absorbed, but will run overland
the Emergency
in a much more accelerated fashion. This can lead to
Every emergency management plan should include
flooding as the water overflows drainage channels and
a recovery committee composed of representatives
exceeds culvert capacity, eroding roadbeds or even
from local government, volunteer and funding agen
causing mudslides.
cies, the Provincial Emergency Program, local clergy
and affected residents. On October 22 and 23, after the 2003 wildfires, such
conditions were experienced near Kelowna. Mayor
For each natural disaster, a provincial "umbrella"
Walter Gray of Kelowna told the Review Team about
committee with a designated lead agency should be
"the difficulty experienced by people who recently suffered
established for the purpose of collecting donations
from the flash flood and debris flow in Kelowna. The
and allocating awards.
debris flow occurred in a one-in-200-year storm event,
which was exacerbated by the wildfires leaving the slopes
hydrophobic and void of grasses, brushes and trees to
absorb the rainfall."
Address Watershed Erosion and
Flooding Concerns It will be many years before the absorptive capacity
In the aftermath of Firestorm 2003, there are many of the landscape is returned to normal. Many areas
ways in which the landscape has been altered. will remain at risk without rehabilitative measures.
The Review Team received an excellent presentation The most significant concern for residents who face
from the Association of Professional Engineers and the risk of water or mudslide damage is that they are
Geoscientists of British Columbia that identified the likely uninsurable. Another area of grave concern is
damage to watersheds in the areas around interface the potential damage to fish habitat and drinking
developments. water sources related to the destruction of
streamside vegetation.
The burning off of vegetation and absorptive material
leaves a coat of impervious material, in many cases
67
The Review Team Recommends: There continue to be gaps and anomalies that certainly
will impact the compensation to British Columbia for
Deal With Watershed Restoration
losses caused by Firestorm 2003. For example, Interior
The provincial government, in partnership with local
ranchers were concerned about lack of compensation
governments, should examine watershed restoration
for fencing destroyed by the fires on Crown leases.
as soon as possible, to identify the areas of severe
DFAA guidelines will cover costs of replacement for
watershed destruction and develop a plan for the
damaged equipment and facilities, while not covering
protection and rehabilitation of these areas.
the costs of prevention of damage.
68
firestorm 2003
firestorm
Summary of Recommendations
69
high interface fire risk to demonstrate and prove the Deal With Slash
social, economic, and ecological costs and benefits The province should require all slash within or
of fuel treatments. adjacent to a wildland urban interface to be removed,
treated or burned on site to mitigate the surface
The provincial government should commit new fund
fuel hazard.
ing for its share of the fuel management program.
At a minimum, this standard should be applied to tree stand areas within the wildland urban interface.
The insurance industry should encourage and reward, stumpage as an incentive to encourage the harvest
through its rate-setting process, dwellings and of high-risk low value fuel types.
The province should review and amend Land Use small diameter trees in non-traditional forest products
Plans and LRMPs to incorporate fire management markets such as energy and bio-fuel.
Reduce Fuel Buildup in Parks ular attention to retaining the existing knowledge
The province should allow selective tree harvesting about fuel reduction practices and continue to
in provincial parks to reduce fuel buildup. develop and expand that knowledge base.
70
firestorm 2003
71
Development and continual upgrading of a
common curriculum for all ICS training in British
Columbia.
Continuing Education
Maintaining ICS accreditation over time should be
dependent on a system of continuing education
credits and participation in regularly-scheduled,
integrated simulations using ICS.
Communications
Develop a Crisis Communications Strategy
The province should immediately undertake the communications and would serve to facilitate, not
Include the participation of all key stakeholders large-scale interface wildfire simulations, to improve
Establish clear principles and protocols about Achieve Emergency Radio Inter-Operability
the release of information. The British Columbia government should develop and
implement a provincial strategy for emergency com
Identify how the media and the internet can munications technology focused on moving over time
be used in times of emergency as a technical to total inter-operability across agencies throughout
resource and to disseminate information to the province.
the public.
Initial activities should include developing a provincial
Establish Emergency Communications inventory for all fire, police, ambulance, forestry
SWAT Team radios and frequencies to ensure that where radio
To coordinate on-site communications during times systems are compatible, they can be programmed
of emergency, the province should establish a media with common frequencies or talk groups.
communications SWAT team with members from
municipal, regional, provincial and federal govern
ments and including other major stakeholders as
appropriate.
72
firestorm 2003
Whenever portable and mobile radios for emergency Evacuation
services are replaced to accommodate narrow band
ing, they should be replaced with new radios that
Allow More Local Decision Making
73
Resources
Implement Firefighting
Equipment Database
The Office of the Fire
Commissioner should imple
ment a searchable database to
maintain a current and accurate
province-wide inventory of
private and public sector equip
ment available for fire response.
74
firestorm 2003
Post-Emergency Recovery
Prepare the Recovery Plan Before
the Emergency
Every emergency management plan should include a
recovery committee composed of representatives
from local government, volunteer and funding agen
cies, the Provincial Emergency Program, local clergy
and affected residents.
75
firestorm
Final Thoughts
During the past four-and-a-half months, the Review sive debate. Simply put, almost everyone who gave
Team has listened to and learned a great deal about the advice to the Review Team agreed that it was better to
fire-related challenges that face British Columbians, par- accept short-term inconvenience and irritation in
ticularly those in the interface zones. On many of the favour of long-term reduction in hazard and cost.
matters addressed, both at our public hearings and in the
We believe that governments have a once-in-a-lifetime
written briefs we received, there was no clear consensus.
opportunity to implement risk reduction policies and
This was especially true regarding individual assessments
legislation while the devastation of Firestorm 2003 is
of how operations were carried out during the stress of
fresh in the public's mind and the costs and conse-
last summer's emergency.
quences of various choices are well understood.
On some issues, however, there was strong and wide
Although this winter has brought some precipitation,
spread consensus. Almost everyone believed that many
Interior snow packs are still below normal, and many
aspects of planning, preparation, response and recovery
scientific bodies are predicting a trend towards hotter,
could be improved.
drier conditions. The hot, dry conditions that British
Another area of clear consensus was that concentration Columbia endured last summer and in recent years also
of resources and effort on issues that anticipate, prevent appeared in California, Europe and elsewhere.
and prepare for disasters is a better investment than
In Europe, for instance, where tens of thousands of
on expenditures made in coping with disasters.
deaths last summer were attributed to a searing heat
Consequently, we have made many recommendations wave, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETH
to invest in preparedness, education and training. Zurich, is predicting a growing trend to more hot weath-
er. According to Dr. Christoph Schar, "our simulations
There was also a firm recognition that many subdivisions
show that, roughly speaking, every second European
in the interface were not designed to mitigate wildfire
summer is likely to be as warm, if not warmer, than
risks, nor were the dwellings constructed to reduce wild-
the summer of 2003."
fire hazards. We believe that local governments and
individual homeowners have recognized the risks and
are now prepared to follow the best information avail-
able to correct for past inaction. We believe they will
accept strong direction and leadership on this issue.
76
firestorm 2003
77
APPENDIX A
78
firestorm 2003
Tim Hockey,
Kamloops, November 13th, 2003
Barriere Fire Marshall
John Ranta,
Barry McLean Thompson Nicola Regional District
79
Gordon Chow Doug Pichette
David Perry,
Osoyoos, November 24th, 2003 Mayor of Penticton
John Slater,
Mayor of Osoyoos Dan Donohoe
80
firestorm 2003
81
Marsha Lederman, Vi Dubyna
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
Jim Newhart
Gary Symons,
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation "Snag Faller"
82
firestorm 2003
Milt Goddard
83
Vancouver, December 8th, 2003 Wally McCulloch,
Paul Kluckner, Fire-Trol
Environment Canada
Ron Bradley,
Archie MacDonald, Fire-Trol
Council of Forest Industries
Barry Marsden,
Gary Crooks, Conair Group
Vice President, Kelowna, Council of Forest Industries
Rick Pedersen,
Alex Sinclair, Conair Group
FERIC
Tony Quo Vadis,
Bowie Keefer, Conair Group
Galiano Island Pilot Project
John Phillips,
Lindsay Olson, Timberwest
Insurance Bureau of Canada
Terry Dixon,
Paul Kovacs, Flying Tankers
Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction
Doug McLeod,
BC Hydro
Vancouver, December 9th, 2003
Peter Anderson,
Vancouver, December 10th, 2003
Simon Fraser University
Ardath Paxton Mann,
Mark McCooey, Western Economic Diversification,
SEI Industries Ltd. Government of Canada
84
firestorm 2003
Don Billard
Vancouver, January 15, 2004
Mayor Douglas Miller, Kathryn Bindon,
Village of Lions Bay Okanagan University College
Paul Birzins,
Okanagan Nation Alliance
Following are names of people, in alphabetical order,
who made written submissions to the Firestorm Tom Blom
Review Team.
Suan Booiman
Don Agnew
Joan Bristow
Charlie Andrew,
Adams Lake Indian Band David Bromley
85
Vince Brotherston Glen Deacoff
86
firestorm 2003
87
Trevor Lind Don Mazur
88
firestorm 2003
89
Steve Sorensen Darrel Wong,
IWA, Local 2171
Greg Stevens
Gavin Young
Judy Steves
Shelley Zupp,
Doug Stickney Okanagan-Shuswap Forest District
D. Tee
Herb Thompson
David Tomaz,
Emergency Social Services
Tannis Trevor-Smith
Frances Vyse,
Kamloops Naturalist Club
Marjory Ward
Bruce Warner
Deborah Webb
Ken Webster,
Urban Development Institute
Brian Weeks
Ken White
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firestorm 2003
91
ground attack, for both equipment and crews and In addition, the prioritization of aircraft for initial
in some cases, there are concerns that crews are not fire attack versus fire support action is also a well-
working around the clock. understood and complex challenge. In BC, we
have the benefit of access to a wide range of air-
Fire behaviour during this fire season was fero- craft, each of which has merits and drawbacks.
cious, and made safety of personnel a major We rely on the experience, training and judgment
concern. The start and stop times of crews was of the experts who have the complete picture
generally made to allow the best suppression action before them when choosing the appropriate air-
according to the fire suppression plan and the fires craft depending on the situation.
behaviour. On almost all the major interface fires,
where the terrain, access and fire conditions The negative comments received, regarding the
allowed it, crews worked around the clock. lack of use of the Mars or the CL415s, are largely
based upon the general publics limited under-
The decisions about when to implement night standing of the nature of forest fires and the role of
shifts and 24 hour operations were not due to these large aircraft. To the public, these aircraft are
financial or other restrictive factors but were made impressively large and therefore must be able to
on the basis of fire suppression tactics and for safe- put out the fire with a single load. While this per-
ty reasons. In some cases, it would have been ception is understandable, it is incorrect. Although
irresponsible and dangerous to put manpower and the Martin Mars is a very large aircraft, even at the
equipment on the fire line at night. early stage of these fires, the magnitude and inten-
sity make it impossible to stop these fires with air
With over three million person hours spent on the
power alone. Ministry of Forests
fire line this past summer, it is significant that were
few accidents and no fatalities. The decisions to
attack, to retreat, and to use the air or the ground
forces, can only be made by those on the scene, Q. Were there limitations on the hours of operation
balancing the overwhelming desire to extinguish of pilots?
the fire with the obligation to reasonably protect
the lives of those fighting the fire. Ministry of A. To the public, huge helicopters such as the
Forests SkyCrane (S-64) and the S-61, which were used
extensively during 2003, ought to be able to
fly continuously. In fact, the machines require
maintenance and the pilots become fatigued.
Q. What determines the use of specific aircraft? The pilots are highly skilled to be able to do
precision drops onto a blazing forest fire, in
A. It is accepted fire fighting theory that aircraft do
very extreme conditions. After six or eight hours
not put out fires. In these hot dry conditions, with
of this, fatigue becomes a major factor for both
a well-entrenched fire, aircraft have limits to their
safety and tactical reasons.
effectiveness. This is well known to the Fire
Management Teams and was a factor considered in The availability of experienced pilots is finite.
planning their strategy. All areas of the interior were extremely busy with
92
firestorm 2003
fires and additional qualified pilots were simply fallers, line locators and in some cases, as actual
not available, despite our prioritization system. fire fighters.
In a world of unlimited supply of these highly
qualified individuals, we could have double-shifted Untrained fire fighters simply cannot be used in
them. In the world of reality, we used the available these situations. The accident rates would skyrock-
pilots to the maximum of their operational et and the resulting inquiries would certainly find
abilities. - Ministry of Forests that we had not followed the recommendations of
the previous coroners report or complied with the
Workers Compensation Board Industrial Safety
regulations. - Ministry of Forests
Q. Why were experienced loggers turned away
because they lacked the certificate?
A. When fire is threatening ones community, able- Q. What about the use of Heavy Equipment?
bodied people want nothing more than to help.
After having volunteered to help, to stand by and A. A system is in place for cataloguing of heavy
wait can only be frustrating. This is compounded equipment and operators, throughout the
when an experienced logger feels they are being province. This system worked well this fire season.
rejected for some simple, bureaucratic reason such In our review of equipment availability, we found
as he does not have a course. that the equipment supply was adequate for our
daily needs. After the August 16th escalation in fire
Contrast this with the volatile fire behaviour that activity, more equipment was needed and quickly,
was predicted and experienced almost every day on and that need was met through the addition of
these fires. Not only were we unable to send more 300 pieces of heavy equipment to the 778 pieces
trained ground crews into these situations, because already deployed. - Ministry of Forests
of the lack of escape routes or access to the fire
itself, we certainly could not use untrained people
in these situations. Fire fighting is extremely dan-
Q. What determines the width and location
gerous at any time, let alone in this fire season. A
of Fireguards?
BC coroners report on this issue, which followed
the death of a logger in Sechelt who was overtaken A. Fire guards are a critical part of suppression strate-
by fire, spoke very specifically on this situation and gies and the tactics surrounding their use depends
found that in that case his death was due to his entirely on the specific situation. The ideal width
lack of knowledge of fire behaviour and that he of fireguards also depends very much on the situa-
was physically unfit for the rigors of fire fighting. tion. Location and width of fireguards will depend
on the terrain, fuel, weather, proximity to the fire
Having said that, local loggers were used extensive-
and the intended use regarding back burning.
ly when it was safe to do so. At one point, there
were 1200 pieces of equipment with operators on
the fire line. They were made up of a large propor-
tion of local loggers. Loggers were also used as
93
The size of guards is not fixed to a standard size, were approved by BC Parks. - Ministry of Water,
but rather the size depends on many factors, which Land and Air Protection
ultimately must be decided upon by the people
determining the strategy. - Ministry of Forests
94
firestorm 2003
several fires in parks this summer - Nunsti Park Q. At what point is an EOC activated? Are there
(Chilko Fire), West Arm Park (Kutetl Creek Fire) activation levels or thresholds?
and Myra Bellevue Protected Area (Okanagan
Mountain Fire). In circumstances where bulldozed A. Activation of an Emergency Operations Centre
fire lines are utilized in parks, the fire lines must (EOC) is a local authority decision. Municipalities
be completely rehabilitated after the fire is and Regional Districts that are "local authorities"
extinguished. - Ministry of Water Land under the Emergency Program Act must have an
and Air Protection emergency plan and a hazard, risk and vulnerabili-
ty analysis for their jurisdiction, which would
likely predetermine the rationale for when and
why their EOC is activated.
Q. Are there funds available to advertise that BC is
still basically green and open for business? The province (ie PEP Regional Managers), on an
incident-by-incident basis may suggest to a local
A. To offset some of the immediate impacts of the authority to activate its EOC.
fires, Tourism British Columbia developed a
provincial marketing strategy for the Fall 2003 to Similar to Provincial Regional Emergency
counteract the negative publicity that has been Operations Centres (PREOCs) activation levels
generated by the fire events. This positive action there are three activation levels for EOCs. -
plan was designed to preserve business in unaffect- Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General
ed areas, mitigate losses in impacted areas, as well
as build momentum across the province and
increase visitation.
Q. Who is in charge under Canadian and Provincial
The total funding for this plan was $450,000 - law when an evacuation is ordered?
with one third of the funding coming from the
A. It depends on whose authority and what legislation
then Ministry of Competition, Science and
the evacuation is ordered under. The Office of the
Enterprise, one third from Tourism British
Fire Commissioner under the Fire Services Act was
Columbia, and one third from the private sector.
generally responsible for evacuations (other than
This partnering effort has reassured potential and BCFS Protection tactical evacuations) during the
expected visitors that British Columbia is a safe 2003 fire season. A number of pieces of legislation
place to travel, and that the province is open for can be used including the Emergency Program Act.
business. Ministry of Small Business and - Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General
Economic Development
95
Q. Did the provincial team address the potential Q. Does unified command allow for joint
need to evacuate or rescue train crews from agency actions?
remote areas when there was zero visibility?
A. That is what unified command is. Unified com-
A. Rail transportation officials are part mand is defined as: "a unified team effort which
of the integrated coordination, if required, at allows for all agencies with jurisdictional responsi-
regional and central level. They were actively bility for the incident, either geographic or
involved as part of the team in fire season 2003. functional, to manage an incident by establishing a
common set of incident objectives, strategies and
This question is again aimed at site level. Generally action plans. This is accomplished without losing
it would be, under BCERMS and ICS principles, or abdicating agency authority, responsibility, or
part of advanced planning, and evacuation branch- accountability. The term "incident command,"
es at site level a role to plan for such variables. when used throughout this standard (Incident
Specific dates and locations are required. Command System I-100 Orientation), shall be
deemed to include Unified Command." - Ministry
Ultimately it is primarily an Incident Commander
of Public Safety and Solicitor General
decision and consideration. Regional response cen-
tres provide support to assist in these decisions if
required. - Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor
General
96
firestorm 2003
Brown, J.K. and J. Kapler Smith (edits.). Wildland Fire The Forest Practices Code of BC Act. Administered by
in Ecosystems: Effects of Fire on Flora. U.S. Dep. Agr. the Ministry of Forests, consolidated to January 1, 2004.
For. Serv. Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-42-vol. 2.
Ogden, UT. 2000. Freake, Ross and Plant, Don. Firestorm - The Summer
B.C. Burned. The Okanagan Valley Newspaper Group,
California State Building Code. Administered by the a division of Horizon Operations (Canada) Ltd.,
Building Standards Commission. McLelland & Stewart Ltd. 2003.
Chisholm Fire Review Committee Final Report. Garnet Fire Review. Produced by Price Waterhouse for
Produced for the Alberta Ministry of Sustainable the Ministry of Forests. March 1995.
Resource Development. October 2001.
97
Hawkes, B.C., J. Beck, and W. Sahle. A Wildfire Parminter, John. Human Influence on Landscape
Threat Rating System for the MacGregor Model Pattern in the Pacific Region: Impacts of Burning by
Forest. Final report submitted to the MacGregor Model First Nations and Early European Settlers. Presented at
Forest Association. Canadian Forest Service Project the Landscape Ecology Symposium, 76th Annual
3015, Victoria, B.C. 1997. Meeting of the Pacific Division, American Association
for the Advancement of Science. Vancouver BC. June
Heinselman. Fire in the Virgin Forests of the Boundary 20, 1995.
Waters Canoe Area. 1973.
Parminter, John. UBC Course Handout: Conservation
Ohlson, D.W., B.A. Blackwell, B. Hawkes, and D. 451. Natural Resources Conservation Program in the
Bonin. A Wildfire Risk Management System An Faculty of Forestry, University of British Columbia. 2003.
Evolution of the Wildfire Threat Rating System.
Proceedings 3rd International Wildland Fire Performance Benchmarking Survey and Organizational
Conference and Exhibition. October 2003. Assessment of the BC Ministry of Forests Forest
Protection Program. Produced by
Omi, P.N., and E.J. Martinson. Effects of Fuels PricewaterhouseCoopers. December 2002.
Treatment on Wildfire Severity. Final Report to the
Joint Fire Science Program Governing Board. Boise, Peterson, D.L., Johnson, M.C., Agee, J.K., Jain, T.B.,
ID. 2002. McKenzie, D., and E.D. Reinhardt. Fuels Planning:
Managing Forest Structure to Reduce Fire hazard.
One Hundred Eight Congress of the United States of Second International Wildland Fire Ecology and Fire
America. Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003. Management Congress and Fifth Symposium on Fire
Washington, D.C. 2003. and Forest Meteorology. Orlando, FL. November, 2003.
Oregon Fire Service Mobilization Plan. The Office of Pollet, J., and P.N. Omi. Effect of Thinning and
State Fire Marshall. Salem, Oregon. February 2003. Prescribed Burning on Crown Fire Severity in
Ponderosa Pine Forests. International Journal of
Parminter, Beck and McDermid, Alexander. UBC
Wildland Fire. 2002.
Forestry Handbook - Fire Ecology and Management.
Quebec Civil Protection Act. 2001.
Parminter, John. Burning Alternatives Panel: A Review
of Fire Ecology, Fire History and Prescribed Burning in Report 1: Managing Interface Fire Risks. Produced by
Southern British Columbia. Presented the Office of the Auditor General of British Columbia.
to the Sixth Annual Management Symposium, Victoria, BC. June 2001.
Southern Interior Fire Management Committee.
May 1991. Report 8: 2003 Follow-up Performance Reports.
Produced by the Office of the Auditor General of
British Columbia, Victoria, BC. January 2003.
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firestorm 2003
Rummer, B., and others. A Strategic Assessment of
Forest Biomass and Fuel Reduction Treatments in
Western States. A report to the United States
Department of Agriculture Forest Service, research and
Development, and Western Forestry Leadership
Council. Washington, D.C. 2003.
99
APPENDIX E Mitigation: To minimize, reduce, or moderate a certain
force such as potential for wildfires
Glossary
AAC: Annual Allowable Cut MOF: Ministry of Forests
BCERMS: British Columbia Emergency Response MROC: Ministry Regional Operations Centre
Management System
NFPA: National Fire Protection Association
CBC: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
Defensible Space: The utilization of fuel and vegetation
management techniques to reduce fire exposure to PEP: Provincial Emergency Program
vulnerable structure and infrastructure
PREOC: Provincial Regional Emergency Operations
DFAA: Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements Centre
(Federal)
PWC: PricewaterhouseCoopers
Ecosystem: Community of organisms and its
OFC: Office of the Fire Commissioner
environment
RCMP: Royal Canadian Mounted Police
EOC: Emergency Operations Centre
SEMS: Standardized Emergency Management System
ESS: Emergency Social Services
Structural Fire: A fire in a building or structure
IC: Incident Commander
Structural Integrity: The ability of a structure to
ICS: Incident Command System
withstand intrusion by fire
IEPC: Inter-agency Emergency Preparedness Council
TEAMS: Temporary Emergency Assignment
Interface Fire: A fire that involves human development Management System
and wild land simultaneously
TNRD: Thompson Nicola Regional District
Interface Region/Zone: A region/zone where there is
Urban Interface: Same as Interface Region/Zone
potential for a fire that involves human development
and wild land simultaneously Wildfire: A rapidly spreading fire involving vegetation
such as trees, bushes and grasses
JIBC: Justice Institute of British Columbia
Wildland Urban Interface: Same as Interface
Local Government: Governing bodies of cities,
Region/Zone
districts, regional districts, municipalities, towns
and villages
100