163. People v. Buduhan, 561 SCRA 178, August 6, 2008.

FACTS:

At 10:40 p.m., while Cherry Rose, a guest relations officer inside a beerhouse was
entertaining the group of Larry Erese, the group of three men, including Robert Buduhan
approached them and poked a gun at Larry. Immediately, a man in blue poked a gun at
Romualde and announced a hold-up. Larry then handed over his wristwatch to
Robert. Instantaneously, all four men from Roberts group fired their guns at Larry and
Romualde, which caused them to fall down. The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling
convicting the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide relying on the
GROs testimony.

ISSUE:

WON CA erred in relying to Cherry Roses testimony.

RULING:

Appellants insist that Cherry Rose is not a credible witness in view of the conflicting
answers she gave in her sworn statement before the police, in the preliminary
investigation of the case and in her testimony in open court. They contend that the trial
court failed to scrutinize the entirety of the statements made by Cherry Rose vis--vis the
shooting incident.

The court ruled that as between statements made during the preliminary investigation of
the case and the testimony of a witness in open court, the latter deserves more credence.

Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, on the matter of inconsistent
statements by a witness, requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing
evidence of inconsistent statements of a witness is founded upon common sense and is
essential to protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the necessary
inquiries, which enable him to explain the statements referred to and to show that they
were made by mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his testimony.

The inconsistency relates only to an insignificant aspect of the case and does not involve
a material fact in dispute.
Inasmuch as the above-stated mandatory procedural requirements were not complied
with, the credibility of Cherry Rose as a witness stands unimpeached. As found by the
trial court, the testimony of Cherry Rose was straightforward throughout. The appellants
were not able to adduce any reason or motive for her to bear false witness against
them. As a matter of fact, Cherry Rose testified during cross-examination that she did
not personally know appellant Robert, and that she had first seen him only during the
night when the shooting incident took place.

164. People v. Pedroso, 115 SCRA 599, July 19, 2000.

FACTS:

Ariel Pedroso y Ciabo, accused, conspiring and confederating with others, while on board
a passenger jeep cruising along Sampaloc, Manila suddenly announced it was a hold-up and
simultaneously poked firearms and bladed weapons on its passengers, then forcibly take, rob and
carry away from Constantino Lucero y Fayloga the following: three (3) pcs. men's rings, two (2)
pcs. gold necklace, one (1) pc. Bracelet and one (1) pc. Seiko wristwatch all amounting to
P22,000.00.

On the occasion of the said robbery, the said accused in pursuance to their conspiracy,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, assault, attack and use
personal violence upon the person of said Constantino Lucero y Fayloga, by then and there
shooting the latter with unknown caliber of firearm hitting him on the right side of the neck and
left chest and thereafter stabbing him with bladed weapons at the back of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious physical injuries, which are necessary fatal and mortal which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter and causing one Elsa Diodoso, also a
passenger of said jeepney to be hit by a stray bullet at the neck, and will require medical
attendance for a period of not less than one (1) day but not more than nine (9) days and
incapacitated and will incapacitate said Elsa Dioso from performing her customary labor during
the same period.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty with the crime of robbery with homicide

HELD:

The elements of robbery with homicide are (1) the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking
is with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is
committed (People v. Tidula, 292 SCRA 596[1998]).

It is beyond dispute that accused-appellant and his cohorts employed violence and intimidation
against persons to consummate their criminal intent to take away, for personal gain, the personal
property of Constantino Lucero. They brandished guns and a knife while divesting the latter of
his necklace, bracelet, wristwatch, and rings.

That a homicide was committed on the occasion of the robbery is equally beyond dispute.
Constantino Lucero was shot twice and stabbed five times as he was divested of his jewelry. He
was pronounced dead on arrival at the UERM hospital.

We, therefore, agree with the trial court that the crime committed by accused-appellant is
robbery with homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal
Code.
Likewise, conspiracy has been amply and sufficiently proven in this case. Pretending to be
passsengers, accused-appellant and his cohorts boarded Aduvisos jeepney as it passed Isetann
along Recto. When the hold-up was announced, they all pulled out and pointed weapons at the
passengers. They all assaulted Constantino Lucero when the latter resisted. They alighted and
fled from the jeepney together.

These acts, taken together, show that there was, among accused-appellant and his cohorts, unity
of purpose and design in the execution of the unlawful act, establishing beyond reasonable doubt
the existence of conspiracy (People v. Verzosa, 294 SCRA 466 [1998]).

It is settled that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion
of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as
principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually
take part in the homicide, unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide (People
v. Nang, 289 SCRA 16 [1998]). Not only is there no proof that accused-appellant tried to prevent
the death of Constantino Lucero, the evidence even positively shows that he fired at least one
shot at the victim.

Accused-appellant is, therefore, liable for robbery with homicide. Under Article 294(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty for robbery with homicide is composed of two indivisible
penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death. As mentioned earlier, the trial court erred when it
sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

Under Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, if an accused is found guilty of a felony for which the
law prescribes a penalty composed of 2 indivisible penalties, the trial court judge has to impose
one or the other, not both. Since no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the information and
since neither was any mitigating circumstance established by the defense, the lesser penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua should be imposed.

165. People v. Sebastian and Pangilinan, 85 SCRA 601, February 27, 1950

Accused conspiring and confederating together and helping each other, and at night time
purposely sought to better accomplish their ends, entered a house inhabited by Mr. and Mrs. Jose
Rivera. By means of threat and intimidation, they pointed a .45 caliber pistol at said Mr. and
Mrs. Jose Rivera and that they will be shot if they will make a false move. With intent of gain
and without the consent of the owner thereof, they took, stole, and carried away cash money
amounting to P28, one palm beach trousers, one knitted skipper color green, one white polo shirt,
two pairs of men's shoes, one white and other tan, one gold lady's ring with one diamond, two
electric flat irons (GE) and one eversharp fountain pen, all valued at P537.30, belongings to the
said Mr. and Mrs. Jose Rivera, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said amount
of P537.30, the Philippine currency.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty of robbery

RULING:

We agree with both the Solicitor General and the attorney de oficio that the lower court
erred in convicting appellant under article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and in
applying to him the penalty therein provided.

Aside from the fact that the information to which appellant pleaded guilty does not allege
that the robbery was committed under any of the circumstances enumerated in said article, such
as entering the house through an opening not intended for entrance or egress, the breaking of
doors, etc., it is now settled that were robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is
characterized by intimidation, this factor "supplies the controlling qualification", so that the law
to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code.

This is on the theory that "robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation

against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things,
because where violence and intimidation against the person is present there is a greater
disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual."

And this is view is followed even where, as in the present case, the penalty to be applied
under article 294 is lighter than which would result from the application of article 299. In
accordance with this view, appellant should have been declared guilty of robbery under
paragraph 5 of article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No 18, since
the charge to which he pleaded guilty alleges robbery through intimidation of persons. His
criminal liability is aggravating by the circumstances of nocturnity and dwelling and not
mitigated by his plea of guilty, which was not entered until after the offended party had already
testified.

166/167. People v. Evangelio, 659 SCRA 579, August 31, 2011

Accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other,

with intent to gain and armed with a handgun and deadly/bladed weapons forcibly enter
the inhabited house/residence of BBB. While inside and by means of violence and
intimidation using said arms on the latter and the other occupants therein, and without the
consent of their owners did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take,
and carry away from said residence personal properties to the damage and prejudice of
said owners to the extent of the value of their respective properties above indicated.

On the occasion of the said robbery and in the same house/residence, accused, by
means of force and intimidation and using the said handgun and deadly/bladed weapons,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA,
\
a 17-year-old minor, against her will and consent and at the time when the latter lost
consciousness after her head was banged on the bathroom floor.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty of robbery with rape

RULING:

In this case, the prosecution established that appellant and his three co-accused took the pieces of
jewelry and valuables of the spouses BBB and CCC by means of violence and intimidation.
Appellant and his co-accused barged into the house of the victims armed with a handgun and
knives and tied the hands and feet of the members of the household. The perpetrators then asked
for the location of the pieces of jewelry and valuables. BBB was also tied and was struck in the
head with a gun causing him to fall face down on the floor with blood oozing from his left
eyebrow. He was able to see the perpetrators going out of the house carrying bags and the
jewelry box of his wife. Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of robbery,
is an internal act; hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things.[17] Having established
that the personal properties of the victims were unlawfully taken by the appellant, intent to gain
was sufficiently proven. Thus, the first three elements of the crime were clearly established.

As regard the last requirement. Although the victim AAA did not exactly witness the actual rape
because she was unconscious at that time, circumstantial evidence shows that the victim was
raped by the appellant and the other accused.

Art. 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and by a band, or
with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley

168. People v Manla, 30 SCRA 389 (no case)

169. People v. Damaso, 86 SCRA 370

At nighttime, in the Province of Tarlac, the accused, four of whom are armed with a
scythe and firearms, namely: Fausto Damaso with a rifle, springfield Cal. 30, Victoriano Eugenio
with a paltik Cal. 12 ga., Estanislao Gregorio with a scythe, and Lorenzo Alviar with a paltik
Cal. 22, confederating, conspiring, helping and aiding one another, by means of force, violence,
threats and intimidation upon the persons of Donata Rebolledo, Victoriano de la Cruz and
Susana Sabado, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain,
take, steal and carry away with them the latters personal properties in the respective amounts of
P125.90, P15.00 and P36,02, Philippine currency.

The accused, on the occasion of the commission of the crime above-mentioned, held and
brought Catalina Sabado and Susana Sabado, daughters of the said Donata Rebolledo, to a
sugarcane field which is a secluded and uninhabited place, at Victoria, Tarlac. By means of force
and grave abuse of superior strength, the said accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, stab the said Catalina Sabado and Susana Sabado on different parts of their body
and cut their necks with a sharp pointed instrument (scythe), as a result of which the latter died
instantly.
 That in the commission of the crime above mentioned, there concurred the aggravating
circumstances of (1) abuse of superior strength, (2) nighttime, (3) uninhabited place, (4) by a
band, (5) treachery, and (6) disregard of sex.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with double
homicide;

RULING:

Yes. The crime committed by appellants is robbery with homicide defined in Article 294,
paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties - Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed.

That robbery was committed is evident from the declaration of prosecution witness
Donata Rebolledo who testified that the two men who barged into her house, one of whom she
recognized as Fausto Damaso, ordered her to open her "aparador" and then they took therefrom
the following items with their respective values a jacket-P25; a necklace P50; earrings P25; a
ring-P15; a hat-P5; scythes-P3.60; and documents worth P2.30. 3 Moreover the appellants
admitted in their separate statements that they were able to get P15 from Donata's house. On this
point, We agree with the Solicitor General that it matters not from what part of the house the
accused got the P15. What is important is that the culprits carried away personal property
belonging to another by the use of force, intimidation or violence.

Counsel points out that because there was a motive, at least on the part of Gregorio, for
the killing of the Sabado sisters, the double homicide could not have been "committed by reason
or on occasion of the robbery" as the law contemplates. He calls Our attention to the sworn
statement wherein Fausto Damaso declared that Gregorio killed Catalina and Susana because
Catalina bought a carabao from him and did not pay for it. Harping further on this motive theory,
counsel mentions such circumstances as why the accused specifically asked for Catalina and
Susana upon entering Donata Rebolledo's house and why Donata and Victoriano were not killed
together with the sisters if the purpose was to remove all opposition to the robbery or to
eliminate witnesses thereto.

As to Damaso's declaration, it should be noted that Damaso himself, in his subsequent

sworn statement, changed his motive theory and stated that the victims were killed in order to
eliminate witnesses to the crime. This was corroborated by Gregorio in the latter's own written
confession. Even assuming, however, that such a motive for vengeance existed on the part of
Gregorio, it does not necessarily exclude the fact that he and co-accused also intended, when
they went to Donata's house that night, to rob the family. In a complex crime of robbery with
homicide, while an intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life, the fact that
the intent of the culprit was tempered with a desire also to avenge grievances against the person
killed does not prevent the punishment of the accused for the complex crime.

Art. 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof

170. People v. Pascual, 93 Phil. 1114, February 23, 1978

FACTS:

Shortly before midnight, on a bright moonlit night, Anastacio de la Cruz, who was riding
with his family in a tilbury on the way home from a moviehouse, saw from a distance of seven
meters a group of seven men, standing on one side of the bridge. Unaware of the mens
homicidal intentions, Anastacio continued driving and as the tilbury was crossing the bridge, the
seven persons simultaneously fired upon Anastacio and his family. Anastacio suffered serious
gunshot wounds, while his wife and two children died. In his statement made barely an hour after
the ambuscade, and while he was in a serious condition, Anastacio named the three defendants as
among the assailants. His wife, in an antemortem statement made in the hospital two days before
she died positively identified one of the defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of three separate crimes of murder

RULING:

Yes. The statement of a gunshot victim made while she was in a serious condition and at
the point of death, identifying a person as among those who perpetrated the crime, is a strong
evidence against the said accused. The spontaneous statement of a gunshot victim made
immediately after his being fired at and while he was in a serious condition may be given in
evidence as part of res gestae.

The dying declaration of a shooting victim corroborated by the spontaneous statement of

another victim made immediately after their being fired at, definitely pointing to specific persons
as among the perpetrators of the crime, constitute strong evidence of the participation of these
persons in the criminal act.

A clear, radiant and 90% illuminated moon makes possible the recognition of persons 5
to 10 meters away and the statement of meteorologist that 9/10 of the whole sky on a particular
day and at a particular place was covered with clouds, and as such, the visibility of the moon was
reduced, being based on mere conjectures because he was not then at the scene of incident
cannot overcome the testimony of persons who were actually present at that particular time and
place to the effect that the night was very clear because of the bright moonlight.

The fact that no gunpowder residue or nitrates were found on the hands of a person is not
conclusive that he did not fire a gun, since a negative finding will result if the person who fired a
gun covered his hands with gloves or cloth, or he washed his hands with nitrate solution.
Likewise, wrong technique in the taking of the casts, or the presence of strong winds which
could carry away powder, or the trying of the bolt mechanism of the firearm will produce a
negative result.

The suspicious conduct of the accused after the shooting incident and the contradiction in
their testimonies as to their whereabouts during the incident are evidence that they are not telling
the truth and are ineffective to overcome the evidence of the prosecution, particularly the
positive testimony of the surviving victim pointing to the accused as among those who
perpetrated the crime.

Where three deaths occurred as a result of several gunshots and were not the product of a
single act, the offenses committed are not complex and the malefactors are guilty of three
separate crimes.

The sudden and unexpected assault by the malefactors in order to insure the killing of the
defenseless victims constitute treachery which qualifies the killings to murder.

171. U.S. v. Dela Cruz, 12 Phil. 87, Nov. 18, 1908

FACTS: At about 10 o clock in the evening, a band, composed of not less than five persons, two
of whom, the appellants in this case, were armed with revolvers, one with a bolo, and the others
with clubs, entered the town of Jaen, where they met one Fortunato Jimenez who, with his wife
and sister, was on his way to visit a neighbors house. With threats of violence, the band obliged
Jimenez and his party to return to his house, and upon arriving there, Timoteo Dizon, one of the
band, went up into the house with Jimenez, and threatened him with a revolver, demanded P500.

Just before the band encountered Jimenez and his party, they had captured Delfin Esquivel, who
was compelled at the point of a revolver to accompany them together with Jimenez and his party
to assist them as look-out.

A short time thereafter, the Constabulary forces surprised and attacked the band, killing Dizon
and wounding another member of the band. The watch was found upon Dizons body, and his
corpse was identified by Jimenez as that of the person who had first gone up into the house and
demanded P500.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be convicted of the crime robbery in an armed band;

RULING:

The testimony of the witnesses Fortunato Jimenez and Delfin Esquivel, clearly establishes the
fact that the band which committed the crime was composed of more than three persons, two of
whom carried revolvers, a third a bolo, the others being armed with clubs.

We are of opinion also that the record clearly establishes the guilt of both Juan de la Cruz and
Pio Yesma, as principals, in the commission of the crime with which they are charged. The
testimony of Jimenez positively identified Yesma as the second person who followed him into
his house, threatened him with a revolver and demanded the surrender of any money he might
have; Esquivel positively identified both Yesma and De la Cruz as members of the band, who
captured him and brought him together with Jimenez and his family, to the house of Jimenez;
and the testimony of both these witnesses, together with the testimony of other witnesses who
saw the band when;it entered the house, clearly establishes the fact that all the band operated
together, and that, while some of the members entered the house, the others stayed below on
guard, thus aiding and abetting, as principals, those who entered and actually took possession of
the stolen property.

Members of a band of robbers carrying clubs are armed persons in the sense in which that term is
used in article 506 of the Penal Code defining a cuadrilla or armed gang.

For the purpose of proving that the defendants were members of a band of robbers, the ante-
mortem statements of one of the band, confessing his guilt and alleging the participation of the
defendants in the crime committed are not admissible.

The silence of the defendants, when they heard a self-confessed member of a band of robbers
charge them with being members of the band, should not be construed as an extra-judicial
admission of the truth of such charge, it appearing that these statements were made in the course
of an official investigation, and that the defendants were at that time under arrest charged with
the commission of the crime of robbery.

172. People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167, March 9, 1922

FACTS:

Apellant, Sergio Manzanilla is a leader of the party formed by seven accused and that more than
three of them were armed. At the order of the said Manzanilla, who was armed with a revolver,
the seven accused took up their posts in different places in the Province of Tayabas for the
purpose of robbing, as they did in fact rob, about ten travellers, whom they stopped on the
highway and took to a nearby forest where they tied them to the trunks of the trees and
intimidated them with their weapons. Manzanilla fired four times on one of the victims, named
Tomas Villare, when the latter attempted to escape, thereby inflicting a wound on his head
which, fortunately, was of a light character; and by this means the accused took the money and
effects mentioned in the information and referred to in the beginning of this decision, leaving
thereafter the victims tied, as they were, to the trunks of the trees in the craggy ground.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of robbery by a band with illegal
detention;

RULING:

The crime proven falls under the provisions of article 503, No. 4, of the Penal Code, for while it
does not appear that the persons detained were held for ransom or deprived of their liberty for
more than one day (which would have made No. 3 of said article applicable), we are of the
opinion that such restraint of liberty constitutes the unnecessary violence and intimidation
referred to in the aforesaid No. 4 of article 503, the penalty to be imposed in such a case be that
of presidio mayor in its medium degree to cadena temporal in its minimum degree had not the
crime been, as it was, committed by a band, and the appellant been its leader, as is shown by the
evidence. For this reason the penalty next higher to that aforementioned is the penalty to be
imposed, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 504 of the Penal Code, which is cadena
temporal in its medium degree to cadena perpetua.

173. People v. Pelagio, 20 SCRA 153, May 24, 1967.

Pancho Pelagio, an ex-convict, came to see the spouses Guico and Villanueva for Pelagio's wife
had just delivered a child and he wanted to borrow money for the hospital expenses however,
Armando Manalang, taking advantage of the said visit, informed Pancho Pelagio of a robbery he,
Manalang was planning with some other friends who later were revealed by Manalang to be Jose
Guico, Oscar Caymo and Arcadio Balmeo. Caymo and Balmeo gained entrance to the house
through its back kitchen door which they found to be open and once inside, Caymo then pointed
the gun at the old lady, Mrs. De Gloria and intimidated her into producing all the money and
jewelry she could. All in all, the pair got about P437 in cash, three pieces of jewelry worth about
P205.00 and a watch worth about P300.00. The two then went down the house and out into the
street where at the gate, however, they failed to find Pancho Pelagio. CFI of Pasay City found
Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo and Jose Guico, guilty to death for the crime of robbery with
homicide as defined and penalized in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellants should be held guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide;
RULING:

After a careful and thorough review of the evidence, this Court believes that the decision
appealed from should be modified to the end that Oscar Caymo's conviction should stand,
Pancho Pelagio's guilt be reduced to simple robbery, and Jose Guico, as recommended by the
Solicitor General, be acquitted on reasonable doubt.

To begin with, Oscar Caymo was positively identified by Mrs. Severina de Gloria as one of those
who broke into her house on the night of the incident and robbed her at gunpoint. He was
likewise positively identified during the trial by Francisco Juni, the driver of the get-away taxi,
as the gunwielder in the fatal shooting of Pat. Trinidad. Against this finding, he has offered
neither denial nor any reasonable explanation.

This Court, however, concurs with appellant Pancho Pelagio's submission that, by the trial
court's own factual determination, his criminal liability cannot be extended beyond simple
robbery. We hold Pancho Pelagio guiltless or innocent of Pat. Trinidad's death.

When the homicide was committed, therefore, Pancho Pelagio could not have had the least
intervention or participation as might justify penalizing him likewise for the said killing. So far
as the records disclose, the conspirators were agreed only on the commission of robbery; there is
no evidence that homicide besides was determined by them when they plotted the crime. All
these warrant the exclusion of Pancho Pelagio from any responsibility for the said killing.

Finally, we find the Solicitor General's recommendation for the acquittal of appellant Jose Guico
well founded. There is ample and positive evidence on record that appellant Jose Guico was
absent not only from the second meeting but likewise from the robbery itself.

174. People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 488 (wala sa net)

175. U.S. v. Ibanez, 19 Phil. 475 (wala sa net)

176. People v. Garduque, 104 Phil. 1049 (wala sa net)

Art. 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances

177. People v. Morados, 70 Phil. 558, November 19, 1940

On the night of March 15, 1939, while Ceferino Ricasata, Rufino Aro and Lucio
Enriquez were sleeping in the latters hut in the sitio of Pasong Tabla, barrio of Bagbag,
municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, a place where they had been treshing palay, several
malefactors suddenly assaulted them. Ricasata who was awakened by the blows being inflicted
upon his companions, tried to flee from the hut, but his dash for salvage was frustrated when
hardly had he gone out the hut one of the ruffians shot him hitting him in the right thigh as a
result of which he fell at a certain distance from the hut. His companions were beaten to
unconsciousness. Court of First Instance of Cavite, sentenced the defendants-appellants, Silverio
Morados, Felipe Moral, and Benjamin Mendoza, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants-appellants be held guilty of complex crime of robbery
with homicide;

RULING:

The respective defenses interposed by the accused converge into one of alibi, but "oral evidence
of alibi is so easily manufactured and usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence."

It is argued that B.M. did not enter the hut and did not take part in the assault, and he should only
have been found guilty of attempted theft of large cattle. This contention is without merit. In
United States v. Landasan, we observed that "neither the divisibility of this crime (robbery with
homicide) into two crimes, nor the divisibility of the liability of the criminals who took part is
allowable." And in United States v. Macalalad and People v. Bautista we held that "whenever a
homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the commission of the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in
the complex crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the
homicide, unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.

178. People v Dagundong, 108 Phil. 682, June 30, 1960

FACTS:

On October 7, 1950, Alice Lake, who was then in her bedroom, requested her niece Josephine,
then 12 years old, to get her a glass of milk from the kitchen however, as Josephine entered the
kitchen, she suddenly came face to face with a man holding a gun. Shortly thereafter, several
shots, not less than five, were heard coming from the sala. After some minutes, feeling certain
that the malefactors had left for good, Alice shouted for help. Upon entering the sala, the police
came upon Mrs. Hewells bullet-ridden body lying on the floor. On entering Mrs. Hewells
bedroom, the police found that it had been ransacked.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellants should be held guilty of crime of frustrated robbery in band
with homicide;

RULING:
We agree with the lower court that appellants Bulaon and Serrano are guilty of the crime of
frustrated robbery with homicide, under Article 297, Revised Penal Code, in relation with Article
296, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 12 inasmuch as it has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt that they had conspired to commit the robbery; and that they actually
took part in the commission thereof, appellant Serrano by standing guard outside the victims
house while appellant Bulaon accompanied appellant Dagundong inside the house and helped
him ransack the victims room.

We believe, however, that the lower court erred in finding appellant Dagundong guilty of
murder. It was established that it was he who had fired the fatal shots at Mrs. Hewell. But though
the slaying was attended by treachery, his crime was not murder. The term "homicide" in
paragraph 1, Article 294, Revised Penal Code, is used in its generic sense and the offense
defined therein comprehends not only robbery with homicide in its limited sense, but also
robbery with murder. So, an offense is not taken out of the purview of this article merely because
the homicide "rises to the atrocity of murder". And the same definition must be given to the term
as it is used in Article 297, Revised Penal Code, which penalizes frustrated robbery with
homicide.

Wherefore, we find appellant Dagundong guilty of frustrated robbery with homicide and
sentence him to life imprisonment. Thus modified, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed in all
other respects, with costs against appellants.

Art. 298. Execution of deeds by means of violence or intimidation

Art. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship

179. People v. Tayag, 59 Phil. 606, March 3, 1934

FACTS:

At two o'clock on the morning of September 12, 1933, the said two appellants, armed with a bolo
and a screw driver, went to Juan Nicasio Go Cuay's store, which also served as his dwelling,
located, as aforestated, at No. 325-A San Marcelino Street, of the City of Manila. Believing that
they were unnoticed, they proceeded to open one of the doors of the said store with the tools
bolo and screw driver which they then carried and which, of course, were not the proper
means for that purpose. After they had succeeded in loosening one of the bars of the door and
upon becoming aware that the inhabitants of the store had been awakened, they tried to escape
but policemen A. Santos, J. Rubic and G. Malap, who up to that time had been watching them,
detained and placed them under arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendants-appellants should be convicted of attempted robbery in an inhabited

house;

RULING:

The act committed by the appellants simply constitutes the crime of attempted trespass to
dwelling, as defined in article 280, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, that is, trespass
committed by means of violence.

The documentary evidence presented by the prosecution does not show that the appellants are
habitual delinquents. The most that the said documents disclose is that at about the same time,
the appellants committed the crimes of theft with which they were charged therein, and therefore
the 10th aggravating circumstance, that is, previous convictions, should be taken into
consideration against them. The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity should likewise be
considered against the said appellants.

180. People v. Constantino, 46 Phil. 745, June 20, 1996

On or about the 15th day of May 1988, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, while armed with handguns
and knives, with intent to gain, entered the house of Hichiro Kubota and Elizabeth Hammond
and once inside, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following, to
wit: a) Assorted jewelries valued at P800,000.00 b) 26,000.00 yen c) US $2,400.00 and d)
P7,000.00 belonging to said Hichiro Kubota and Elizabeth Hammond, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.

On the occasion of the said robbery, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge of Hazel Arjona, Hichiro
Kubota's maid, against her will and consent.

Moreover, accused stab with knives one Hichiro Kubota on the different parts of his body
and stab one Hazel Arjona on her stomach which directly caused their death, and also on the
same occasion, stabbed with a knife one Marilyn Juguilon on the upper part of their right arm.

Art. 300. Robbery in an uninhabited place and by a band

Art. 301. What is an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to religious worship
and their dependencies

Art. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building

Art. 303. Robbery of cereals, fruits, or firewood in an uninhabited place or private building

Art. 304. Possession of picklocks or similar tools

Art. 305. False keys

Art. 306. Brigandage

181. U.S. v. Decusin, 2 Phil. 536, September 25, 1903

FACTS: The defendants were convicted under the provisions of Act No. 518 of the Philippine
Commission, passed November 12, 1902, of having on the 3d day of January, 1903, assaulted the
house of one Anacleto Salvatera in San Fernando de la Union, and, by means of force and
violence of having robbed the house of said Salvatera, and of having taken from him by force,
threats, and intimidation the sum of 800 pesos and a quantity of jewelry. This robbery took place
between 8 and 9 oclock at night. All of the defendants except two were armed with bolos, and
one of the latter had a club.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendants are guilty of aggravated robbery by a band of brigands;

RULING:

The Penal Code, article 502, provides that those who, with intent of profiting thereby,
shall take possession of the personal property of another, with violence or intimidation of the
person, or by employing force upon some inanimate thing, are guilty of the crime of robbery.

Under this article the crime of robbery may be committed by a single person or by several
acting in concert, their purpose and intent being simply the commission of this crime; and in the
absence of violence done to the person, the highest penalty that can be imposed is imprisonment
for a term of ten years.

Evidently this article did not suffice to meet conditions and provide adequately for
robberies or thefts committed by roving bands of highway robbers or brigands, and therefore the
Commission enacted a law for the punishment of such bands, making the penalty more severe for
the aggravation of forming or joining such band.

In statutory robbery the terms of the statute must be duly followed. And where it is
aggravated, as by being in a highway or by defendants being armed with dangerous weapons or
the like, such added facts must be proved.
 It follows that the conviction of the defendants under Act No. 518, can not be sustained.
The complaint, however, in this case, charging the defendants with robbery, and the proofs are
ample to permit a conviction under article 502 of the Penal Code.

The judgment is reversed and the defendants are convicted of the crime of robbery with
violence or intimidation, and are sentenced to the penalty of ten years of presidio mayor, to
return to Anacleto Salvatera the money and property taken, or its value, which is fixed at $1,021,
Mexican currency, and to pay the costs of both instances.

182. US v. Maano, 2 Phil. 723, November 30, 1903

FACTS:

At midnight, together with other persons unknown, the accused, armed with Remington
rifles and war bolos, assaulted the house of Juan Bermudez, situate in the barrio of Pandacaque,
of the municipality of Tayabas, taking from the owners of the said house, Juan Bermudez and
Francisco Abracia, whom they beat and intimidated, the sum of $90.86 in money, and $4 in
goods. The Court of First Instance of Tayabas, found defendants guilty of the crime of
brigandage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendants are guilty of the crime of brigandage

RULING:

Defendants are guilty of the crime of brigandage.

To justify a conviction for the crime of brigandage it is sufficient that the Government
show by either direct or circumstantial evidence (1) that three or more persons conspired
together; (2) that they formed a band of robbers; (3) that such band was formed for the purpose
of stealing carabaos or other personal property by means of force and violence; (4) that they went
out upon the highway or roamed over the country armed with deadly weapons for this purpose;
and (5) that the defendant, or defendants, engaged in the organization of the band or joined after
it was organized.

Act No. 518 of the Philippine Commission, defining and punishing the offense of
brigandage, creates a new crime and does not repeal any of the articles of the Penal Code
concerning the crimes of robbery and theft.
 A conviction under the brigandage act, for unlawfully conspiring to commit the offenses
therein mentioned, would not be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the commission of any
specific act of robbery or theft in pursuance of such agreement.

A criminal conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons by some concerted action

to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose not in itself
criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means.

It is not necessary that the criminal purpose for which conspiracy is formed be
accomplished in order for the offense of conspiracy to be complete, and this is so expressly
declared by the statute with respect to the crime of brigandage under Act No. 518.

It is not necessary to introduce direct testimony to prove a conspiracy. Proof of

disconnected overt acts is sufficient where the proof also shows that the conspirators were drawn
together or acted through a common medium and had a common interest in promoting the object
of the conspiracy.

Proof of the commission of a robbery by the joint act of three or more armed men is not
alone sufficient to warrant a presumption that they had entered into a conspiracy to commit the
crime of brigandage defined by Act No. 518.

If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.

183. People v. Sandoval, supra

Art. 307. Aiding and abetting a band of brigands

Art. 308. Theft

Art. 309. Penalties for theft

184. Jacinto v. People, 592 SCRA 426

FACTS: On or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro
Manila, the accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then all
employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC. and as such had free access inside the
aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent
to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check
No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00, representing payment made by
customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.

RULING:

As may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the
personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to
gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that
the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.

In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but
the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question
arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced. The Court must resolve the
issue in the negative.

Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod
(see doctrines laid out in Intod), the Court went on to give an example of an offense that
involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.

Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility
given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of
qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the
mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be
unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the
face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to
be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
 The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money,
which she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The
Court held in Valenzuela v. People that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft
the taking of personal property of another. As of the time that petitioner took possession of the
check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft,
had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby
Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been
dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's
act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At
most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating
evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced
with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said
scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot
pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of
criminal liability.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the
Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.