44.

ILUPA VS ABDULLAH

FACTS: The complainant alleges in support of the charge that the respondent exhibited
ignorance of his duties as clerk of court when he issued a certificate of divorce, (OCRG Form No.
102) relying mainly on an illegal Kapasadan or Agreement. He claims that the agreement was
executed under duress and intimidation; the certificate of divorce itself is defective and
unreliable as there were erroneous entries in the document and unfilled blanks. He claims that
the respondent took away his beautiful wife by force or had a personal interest in her.

The complainant believes that the respondent should not have issued the divorce certificate
because divorce is not recognized in the country and the Kapasadan or separation agreement
had already been revoked by Philippine civil law.

The respondent prays that the complaint be denied for lack of merit. He mainly argues that his
issuance of a certificate of divorce is not illegal, capricious or whimsical as he acted within the
bounds of his authority. He explains that as court registrar, it is his ministerial duty to accept
and register marriage contracts, conversions to Islam and divorce certificates. When he
performs this duty, he assumes no responsibility with respect to the entries made by the
applicants or owners of the documents to be registered.

The respondent denies that he took the complainants wife by force or that he was interested in
her; he claims that no evidence was ever adduced to prove these allegations. With the divorce
agreement, Mrs. Ilupa applied for a certificate of divorce which he issued under Divorce
Registry No. 2009-027 on November 5, 2009. He points out that in issuing the certificate of
divorce, he observed the same procedure applied to all applicants or registrants.

On the complainants claim that there is no divorce in the Philippines, the respondent points out
that this is true only as far as the civil law is concerned, but not under the Muslim Law which
recognizes divorce. The civil marriage they subsequently entered into was just an affirmation of
their marriage vows under the Muslim Law. Also, the courts dismissal of the complainants
petition for restitution of marital rights affirmed the divorce between the Ilupa couple.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the respondents duty.

HELD: The issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the respondents duties, as defined by
law.Articles 81 and 83 of the Muslim Code of the Philippines provide:
 Article 81. District Registrar. - The Clerk of Court of the Sharia
District Court shall, in addition to his regular functions, act as
District Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of
Divorces, and Conversions within the territorial jurisdiction of said
court. The Clerk of Court of the Sharia Circuit Court shall act as
Circuit Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of
Divorces, and Conversations within his jurisdiction.

Article 83. Duties of Circuit Registrar. - Every Circuit Registrar

shall:

a) File every certificate of marriage (which shall specify

the nature and amount of the dower agreed upon),
divorce or revocation of divorce and conversion and
such other documents presented to him for
registration;

b) Compile said certificates monthly, prepare and send

any information required of him by the District
Registrar;

c) Register conversions involving Islam;

d) Issue certified transcripts or copies of any certificate

or document registered upon payment of the required
fees[.]

Evidently, respondent Clerk of Court merely performed his ministerial duty in

accordance with the foregoing provisions. The alleged erroneous entries on the
Certificate of Divorce cannot be attributed to respondent Clerk of Court
considering that it is only his duty to receive, file and register the certificate of
divorce presented to him for registration. Further, even if there were indeed
erroneous entries on the certificate of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected
nor cancelled through [his] administrative complaint.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative matter against Macalinog

S. Abdullah, Clerk of Court II, Sharia Circuit Court, Marawi City, for abuse of
authority is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
45.
Olazo vs. Hon.Tinga
FACTS: The complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land in Taguig. The land was
previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition.

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02

The complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a
member of the Committee on Awards when he exerted undue pressure and influence over the
complainants father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainants sales application and
claim the subject land for himself. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the
transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the
nephew of the respondents deceased wife.

As a result of the respondents abuse of his official functions, the complainants sales
application was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application
were subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).The

Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to
Manuel Olazo, the complainants brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded
Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. In addition,
the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying
the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the
respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman
of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was
the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his
knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary. The complainant averred that
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an
award.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct first,
while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards;
and second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client
before the office he was previously connected with.

HELD: Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this
Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer.

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers. The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove
his/her defense, until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where
no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense. With this in mind, we
resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the complainants failure to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting the
exercise of the Courts disciplinary power.
46.

MIRANT (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION vs. DANILO A. SARIO

FACTS: Mirant Corporation (company) owns shares in Mirant Sual Corporation and Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation which operate power stations in the provinces of Pangasinan and Quezon. The company
discovered that some of its employees, including herein respondent Danilo Sario (Sario), had been
involved in the rampant practice of favoring certain suppliers, thereby seriously impairing transparency
in its procurement process and compromising the quality of purchased materials. To curb the practice,
the company issued the 2002 Procurement Manual and 2004 Procurement Manual for the guidance of
its employees and officers in soliciting bid quotations and proposals from vendors, suppliers and
contractors.
Sario received a Show Cause Notice from the company and was given ten (10) days, to explain
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for the violations. At the administrative hearing,
Sario argued that he could not be faulted for not complying with the company manual because it was
not properly disseminated. He admitted, however, that he failed to comply with the procurement
procedures laid out in the manual due to his desire to meet the quota imposed by his supervisors.
Thus, the company sent Sario a letter terminating him from employment. Sario then filed a case
for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. The LA ruled that Sario was illegally dismissed. On appeal,
the NLRC reversed the LAs ruling.
Aggrieved, Sario appealed to the CA. The CA reinstated the LAs ruling. Hence, this present
recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sario was validly dismissed from employment?

HELD: The Court finds the petition meritorious.

LABOR LAW: willful disobedience

We understand the companys serious concerns over Sarios repeated violations of the 2002 and 2004
Procurement Manuals. Indeed, these violations cannot but compromise the integrity of the companys
procurement process. He committed the violations for one-and-a-half years. These repeated violations
can only indicate a willful disobedience to reasonable company rules and regulations. InGold City
Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court stressed that willful disobedience of an employee
contemplates the concurrence of at least two requisites: the employees assailed conduct must have
been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude";
and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful and made known to the employee, and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. We find the two requisites present in this
case. Petition is GRANTED.
47.
People vs. Alejandro

FACTS: The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
before the RTC, that on or about the 1st day of September 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver 0.06 gram of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
The RTC, in its decision of May 14, 2004, found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. The RTC also ordered
the appellant to pay a P500,000.00 fine.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA further held that the police officers are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, in the absence of any evidence of improper motive on
their part. It, likewise, disregarded the appellants defense of denial, as it was unsupported by reliable
corroborative evidence.
In his brief, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged
despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that the integrity
of the seized item had been compromised due to the failure of the apprehending police to mark it.

ISSUE: Whether the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: No. We resolve to ACQUIT the appellant, for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In doing so, the prosecution must rest its
case on its own merits and cannot merely rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to
meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense does not even need to present any evidence in its
behalf; the presumption of innocence prevails and the accused should be acquitted.
In convicting the appellant of the crime charged, both the RTC and the CA relied on the
evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. However, this presumption
is not conclusive and cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The
presumption of regularity, it must be emphasized, obtains only when there is no deviation from the
regular performance of duty. Where the official act in question is irregular on its face, no presumption of
regularity can arise.
Conclusion
In fine, the totality of evidence presented in the present case does not support the appellant's
conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense. The prosecutions failure to comply with
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this
Act compromised the identity of the item seized, leading to the failure to adequately prove the corpus
delicti of the crime charged. In accordance with the constitutional mandate that the guilt of the
appellant must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, we hold for failure to establish the required
quantum of evidence that the presumption of innocence must prevail and acquittal should follow as a
matter of right.[54]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 31, 2006 decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01251. Appellant Jhon-Jhon Alejandro y dela Cruz is
hereby ACQUITTED for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is
ordered immediately RELEASEDfrom detention, unless he is confined for another lawful cause.