1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. JOSE D. AZARRAGA and JOHN REY PREVENDIDO, G.

R. Nos. 187117 and 187127, October 12, 2011

At the outset, it is an established policy that parties must observe the hierarchy of courts
before they can seek relief directly from this Court. The rationale for this rule is twofold: (a)
it would be an imposition upon the limited time of this Court; and (b) it would inevitably
result in a delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some
instances, had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under
the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is
not a trier of facts.[13] It is only for special and compelling reasons that this Court shall
exercise its primary jurisdiction over the extraordinary remedy of writ of prohibition.

2. SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. and HEIRS OF PETRA CAPISTRANO PIIT

v. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL,
BRANCH 40, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, ET AL, G.R. No. 142628, February 6, 2007
The Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances,
such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to
cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain
cases involving factual issues. 38 The question of whether the DARAB Decision dated
October 5, 1995 is null and void and enforceable against petitioners for having been
rendered without affording petitioners due process is a factual question which requires a
review of the records of this case for it to be judiciously resolved.

3. Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili vs. Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting Pres. Judge, RTC, Br 8
Marawi City, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225, September 6, 2011
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a
co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can
interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for
the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion
of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment.

4. OFELIA HERRERA-FELIX Represented by JOVITA HERRERA-SEA v. COURT OF APPEALS,

and ST. JOSEPH RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., G.R. No. 143736, August 11, 2004
The court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of the
complaint and summons on him, either by personal service or by substituted service or by
extra-territorial service thereof or by his voluntary personal appearance before the court
or through counsel. An appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person.

5. JAPRL DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al v. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, G.R. No. 190107,

June 6, 2011
The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. It is well settled that any form of appearance in court, by the defendant, by his
agent authorized to do so, or by attorney, is equivalent to service except where such
appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the

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defendant as expressly stated in Rule 14, Section 20, of the Rules of Court. When a
defendants appearance is made precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, it cannot be considered as appearance in court.

6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, G.R. No.

192975, November 12, 2012
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over
such action are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law
in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred.20
Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer
to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the same.

7. ROSITO BAGUNU v. SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT, G.R. No.
186487, August 15, 2011
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The
application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal
of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the
competence of the Lands Management Bureau are threshed out and determined.
Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily
served.

8. JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR. v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION, G.R. No.
112193, March 13, 1996
The ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in
criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or
events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching
in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. In the
doctrine of Adherence of Jurisdiction, once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained
up to the end of the litigation or until the case is terminated except when a newly
enacted statute which changes jurisdiction of a court is given retroactive effect.

9. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No.

162322, March 14, 2012
Based on the Doctrine of Estoppel by Laches, a party may be estopped from raising such
[jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he
questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or
order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. Republic filed its Opposition to the
application for registration when the records were still with the RTC.[25] At that point,
petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply
because the case was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the
MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On
appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief. Clearly, the
exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.

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10. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO and CRISTINA
TRINIDAD ZARATE ROMERO, G.R. No. 163827, August 17, 2011
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.[24] A
complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right
in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it arises; (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. If any of these elements is absent, the
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action. Evidently, all the above elements of a cause of action are alleged in
the complaint.

11. DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG v. RENATO AND MELBA ZAMORA, G.R. No. 156375,
May 30, 2011
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is ground
for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. ON the other hand, lack of cause of
action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action
alleged in the pleading. x x x If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the
concurrence of the elements of the cause of action, the complaint becomes vulnerable
to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Evidently, it is
not the lack or absence of a cause of action that is a ground for tie dismissal of the
complaint but the fact that the complaint states no cause of action. Failure to state a
cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to
dismiss, but lack of cause of action may be raised at any time after the questions of fact
have been resolved on the basis of the stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented.

12. CATALINA B. CHU, ET AL v. SPOUSES FERNANDO C. CUNANAN and TRINIDAD N.

CUNANAN, ET AL, G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011
The petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or rescind the
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. Splitting a single cause of action is the act of
dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting
two or more actions upon them. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand
cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different
actions. The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only
a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief was sought under the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage, and then to leave the rest to be presented in another suit;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. Their splitting violated the policy against
multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective was to avoid unduly burdening the dockets
of the courts.

13. GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE v. CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R.

No. 167246, July 20, 2011
Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more suits
are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on
the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others. Several tests exist to
ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such as
whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes
of action (also known as the same evidence test) or whether the defenses in one case
may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test of
determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the
filing of the first complaint. The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case
was grounded on the petitioners violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the

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filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract.

14. THEODORE AND NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE MARVIN B. ACERON v. SOUPES
ALAN AND EM ANG, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
curiosity about the question involved. A real party in interest is the party who, by the
substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced. Applying the foregoing rule, it is
clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as he does not
stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by
the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting
the complaint against the respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean
that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real
party in interest.

15. SIMNY G. GUY, ET AL v. GILBERT G. GUY, G.R. No. 189486 189699, September 5, 2012
The court cannot proceed without the presence of indispensable party before the court.
Settled is the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is compulsory being a sine qua non
for the exercise of judicial power, and, it is precisely when an indispensable party is not
before the court that the action should be dismissed for such absence renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present. The said rule simply states that, in actions
which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative, the beneficiary
shall be deemed the real party in interest and, hence, should be included in the title of
the case. Indeed, to construe the express requirement of residence under the rules on
venue as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff would abrogate the meaning
of a real party in interest, as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis-
-vis Section 3 of the same Rule.

16. JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL v. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC.,

ET AL, G.R. No. 152272 G. R. No. 152397, March 5, 2012
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties
affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the
parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and
can fully protect the interests of all concerned. In this case, the suit is clearly one that
benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. The subject matter of the
instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of
common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous
individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to join
private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private
respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and
excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by
private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as
parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to
be residents of various barangays in Bian, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro,
Laguna.

17. D.M. FERRER & ASSOCIATES CORPORATION v. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, G.R. No.
189496, February 1, 2012
It is settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of

4
action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test is whether
the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and
the prayer asked for. Indeed, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is
whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Only
ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, which should not be
alleged in the complaint in the first place, are considered for purposes of applying the
test.

18. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) v. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F.

CABALLERO, represented by his daughter, JOCELYN G. CABALLERO, G.R. No. 158090,
October 4, 2010
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the
following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same?; (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?; (c) Will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants
counterclaim?; and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the
counterclaim is compulsory. The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court
to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket
fees.[13] This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of
rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the
docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The
judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the
rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even
on appeal before this Court.

19. PERFECTA QUINTANILLA v COURT OF APPEALS** and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING

CORPORATION, G.R. No. 101747, September 24, 1997
RCBCs counterclaim being compulsory in nature, there is no need to pay docket fees
therefor. Nevertheless, RCBC is still bound to pay the docket fees as ordered by the CA in
its August 19, 1991 Resolution, having failed to appeal therefrom. The entrenched
procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who has not himself appealed cannot
obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the
decision of the lower court. Finally, even granting that RCBCs counterclaim is permissive
where the trial court has no/cannot exercise jurisdiction over said claim unless/until the
corresponding docket fees therefor has been paid, petitioner is however barred by
estoppel from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction. We quote with approval the CAs
observation in this matter.

20. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. v. FELIX PARAS AND INLAND TRAILWAYS, INC.,
AND HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012
The third-party claim need not be based on the same theory as the main claim. For
example, there are cases in which the third-party claim is based on an express indemnity
contract and the original complaint is framed in terms of negligence. Similarly, there
need not be any legal relationship between the third-party defendant and any of the
other parties to the action. Impleader also is proper even though the third partys liability
is contingent, and technically does not come into existence until the original defendants
liability has been established. In addition, the words is or may be liable in Rule 14(a)
make it clear that impleader is proper even though the third-party defendants liability is
not automatically established once the third-party plaintiffs liability to the original plaintiff

5
has been determined.

21. MEDISERV, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former 13th Division) and LANDHEIGHTS
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010
However, we must make a distinction between non-compliance with the requirements
for certificate of non-forum shopping and verification and substantial compliance with
the requirements as provided in the Rules of Court. The Court has allowed the belated
filing of the certification on the justification that such act constitutes substantial
compliance. We acknowledged substantial compliance when the lacking secretarys
certificate was submitted by the petitioners as an attachment to the motion for
reconsideration seeking reversal of the original decision dismissing the petition for its
earlier failure to submit such requirement. Landheights rectified its failure to submit proof
of Mr. Dickson Tans authority to sign the verification/certification on non-forum shopping
on its behalf when the required document was subsequently submitted to the Court of
Appeals. The admission of these documents, and consequently, the reinstatement of the
petition itself, is in line with the cases we have cited. In such circumstances, we deem it
more in accord with substantive justice that the case be decided on the merits. It is
settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may
be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same
does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable
attempt at compliance with the rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied
in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice.

22. HUTAMA-RSEA/SUPERMAX PHILS., J.V. v. KCD BUILDERS CORPORATION, represented by

its President CELSO C. DIOKNO, G.R. No. 173181, March 3, 2010
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that an affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct as to his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records. The party does not need to sign the verification. A partys
representative, lawyer, or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged
in the pleading may sign the verification. A certification of non-forum shopping is a
certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading, asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto
and simultaneously filed therewith, that (a) he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom
to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

23. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v. SPOUSES JOSE C. GO and ELVY T. GO, G.R.
No. 175514, February 14, 2011
To specifically deny a material allegation, a defendant must specify each material
allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit, and whenever practicable, shall
set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a
defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is
true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment
made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial. The
purpose of requiring the defendant to make a specific denial is to make him disclose the
matters alleged in the complaint which he succinctly intends to disprove at the trial,
together with the matter which he relied upon to support the denial. The parties are

6
compelled to lay their cards on the table.

24. PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY v. PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC.,
G.R. No. 176628, March 19, 2012
A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment
file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his
failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that
he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such
terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. The records
reveal that the judgment of default was sent via registered mail to PTAs counsel.
However, PTA never availed of the remedy of a motion to lift the order of default. Since
the failure of PTA to present its evidence was not a product of any fraudulent acts
committed outside trial, the RTC did not err in declaring PTA in default.

25. OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION v. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., G.R. No. 183035,
January 9, 2013
Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) identity of parties,
or at least their representation of the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3)
identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

26. ARNEL SAGANA v. RICHARD A. FRANCISCO, G.R. No.161952, October 2, 2009

The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant and to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he
may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. Under the
circumstances of this case, we find that respondent was duly apprised of the action
against him and had every opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner.
However, since respondent refused to disclose his true address, it was impossible to
personally serve summons upon him. Considering that respondent could not have
received summons because of his own pretenses, and has failed to provide an
explanation of his purported new residence, he must now bear the consequences.

27. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF) v. SPOUSES FIDEL and FLORINDA R. SEE and
SHERIFF MANUEL L. ARIMADO, G.R. No. 170292, June 22, 2011
Under the Omnibus Motion Rule embodied in Section 8 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
all available objections that are not included in a partys motion shall be deemed
waived. Pag-ibig next argues that the February 21, 2002 Decision of the trial court, in
ordering Pag-ibig to release the title despite Sheriff Arimados failure to remit the
P272,000.00 to Pag-ibig, modified the October 31, 2001 Decision. According to Pag-
ibig, the October 31, 2001 Decision allegedly decreed that Pag-ibig would deliver the
title to respondent-spouses only after Sheriff Arimado has paid the P272,000.00. In other
words, under its theory, Pag-ibig cannot be ordered to release the title if Sheriff Arimado
fails to pay the said amount. The Court finds no merit in this argument.

28. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.,

GG.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011
The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local
sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. While the Constitution mandates that the creation
of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot
be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the

7
LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original
thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development,
and the concomitant national growth.

29. DOUGLAS F. ANAMA v. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, ET AL, G.R. No. 187021, January 25,
2012
A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal
observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not
deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides
that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts
must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.

30. KKK FOUNDATION, INC. v. HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, Presiding Judge of the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 78 of Morong, Rizal, ET AL, G.R. No. 163785, December 27,
2007
Motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right
to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion
containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory
requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their
motions fatally defective. However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this
rule. These exceptions are: (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in
the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3)
where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.

31. GOODLAND COMPANY, INC. v. ASIA UNITED BANK, ET AL, G.R. No. 195546, March 14,
2012
The well-entrenched rule is that a party cannot, by varying the form of action, or
adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. This Court
has laid down the test in determining whether or not the causes of action in the first and
second cases are identical, to wit: would the same evidence support and establish both
the present and former cause of action? If so, the former recovery is a bar; if otherwise, it
does not stand in the way of the former action.

32. JOANIE SURPOSA UY v. JOSE NGO CHUA, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of
the State that there should be an end to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium,
and (2) the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause,
nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to
a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final
judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject

8
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there
must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action.

33. THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN v. HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR.,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, CEBU CITY, ET AL, G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010
No other principle in remedial law is more settled than that when a motion to dismiss is
filed, the material allegations of the complaint are deemed to be hypothetically
admitted. This hypothetical admission extends not only to the relevant and material facts
well pleaded in the complaint, but also to inferences that may be fairly deduced from
them. Thus, where it appears that the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis
on which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defenses that may be raised by the defendants. Stated differently,
where the motion to dismiss is predicated on grounds that are not indubitable, the better
policy is to deny the motion without prejudice to taking such measures as may be proper
to assure that the ends of justice may be served.

34. ELOISA MERCHANDISING, INC. and TREBEL INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. BANCO DE ORO
(BDO) UNIVERSAL BANK, ET AL, G.R. No. 192716, June 13, 2012
The Court considered the circumstances showing petitioners and their counsels lack of
interest and laxity in prosecuting their case. A party cannot blame his counsel when he
himself was guilty of neglect; and that the laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on
their rights. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt. While under the present
Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails
to do so within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to
prosecute the case diligently. This case had been at the pre-trial stage for more than two
years and petitioners have not shown special circumstances or compelling reasons to
convince us that the dismissal of their complaint for failure to prosecute was unjustified.

35. METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY v. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK, G.R.
No. 176008, August 10, 2011
The contract of chattel mortgage entered into by and between SSC and IEB involves a
conveyance of patrimonial benefit in favor of the latter as the properties subject of the
chattel mortgage stand as security for the credit it extended to SSC. In a very recent
case involving an action for the rescission of a real estate mortgage,27 while this Court
found that some of the elements of accion pauliana were not present, it found that a
mortgage contract involves the conveyance of a patrimonial benefit. Metrobank may
not be allowed to intervene and pray for the rescission of the chattel mortgages
executed by SSC in favor of IEB. The remedy being sought by Metrobank is in the nature
of an accion pauliana which, under the factual circumstances obtaining in the present
case, may not be allowed. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no error in the ruling
of the CA that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing Metrobanks
intervention.

36. SOCORRO LIMOS, ET AL v. SPOUSES FRANCISCO P. ODONES, ET AL, G.R. No. 186979,
August 11, 2010
A party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have
impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized, however,
that the application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of
the court. As such, it is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly the circumstances of
each case and to determine the applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing always
in mind the aim to attain an expeditious administration of justice. The determination of

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the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply with the modes of
discovery also rests on sound judicial discretion. Corollarily, this discretion carries with it
the determination of whether or not to impose the sanctions attributable to such fault.

37. MA. LOURDES C. DE CASTRO v. CRISPINO DE CASTRO, JR., ET AL, G.R. No. 172198, June
16, 2009
The following postponements made at the instance of private respondent: (1) private
respondent moved to reset the hearing because of his trip to Europe; and (2) private
respondent moved to reset the hearing because his counsel was out of the country for
important personal reasons. We take note of the fact that all motions for postponement
by petitioner were made on the scheduled hearing dates themselves. Consequently, we
cannot strike down the trial courts orders for these orders are not violative of the state
policy on marriage as a social institution, for the trial judge has the duty to resolve judicial
disputes without unreasonable delay. Thus, petitioners testimony is not rendered
worthless. The waiver will not expunge the testimony of petitioner off the records. The trial
court will still weigh the evidence presented by petitioner vis--vis that of private
respondents. The situation is not akin to default at all, where, for failure of defendant to
file his responsive pleading and after evidence for the plaintiff has been received ex
parte, the court renders a judgment by default on the basis of such evidence.

38. NENITA GONZALES, ET AL.G.R. No. 173008 v. MARIANO BUGAAY AND LUCY BUGAAY, ET
AL., G.R. No. 173008, February 22, 2012
Respondents demurred to petitioners evidence after the RTC promulgated its Decision.
While respondents motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was granted, it was for
the sole purpose of receiving and offering for admission the documents not presented at
the trial. As respondents never complied with the directive but instead filed a demurrer to
evidence, their motion should be deemed abandoned. Consequently, the RTCs original
Decision stands. Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in granting the demurrer
and dismissing the Amended Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence. The
demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an available remedy to respondents and
should not have been granted, as the RTC had correctly done.

39. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB) v. MERELO B. AZNAR, ET AL, G.R. No. 171805, May 30,
2011
Judgment on the pleadings is, therefore, based exclusively upon the allegations
appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the annexes, if any, without consideration
of any evidence aliunde. However, when it appears that not all the material allegations
of the complaint were admitted in the answer for some of them were either denied or
disputed, and the defendant has set up certain special defenses which, if proven, would
have the effect of nullifying plaintiffs main cause of action, judgment on the pleadings
cannot be rendered. In the interest of justice and in order to expedite the resolution of
this case, the Court finds it proper to already resolve the present controversy in light of
the existence of legal grounds that would dispose of the case at bar without necessity of
presentation of further evidence on the other disputed factual claims and defenses of
the parties.

40. ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER v. SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ and IMELDA DIAZ, ET AL., April 23,
2010
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so
only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as
pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment
cannot take the place of trial. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the trial court

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should have refrained from issuing the summary judgment but instead proceeded to
conduct a full blown trial of the case. In view of this, the present case should be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and proper disposition according to
the rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through an abbreviated termination
of the case by summary judgment.

41. SPOUSES RAMON VILLUGA AND MERCEDITA VILLUGA v. KELLY HARDWARE AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY INC., G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012
A genuine issue is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. Section 3 of [Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court] provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there
must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages;
and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.

42. THE LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. No.
154559, October 5, 2011
The Armovit Law Firm did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in G.R. No.
90983 to protest the exclusion in the dispositive portion of several items it specifically
prayed for in its pleadings. The Decision thus became final and executory on December
17, 1991. The Armovit Law Firm cannot now ask the trial court, or this Court, to execute
the Decision in G.R. No. 90983 as if these items prayed for were actually granted.
Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the execution of the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision
that we do not find Atty. Armovits claim for twenty percent of all recoveries to be
unreasonable. All things considered, it was the interpretation of petitioner Armovit Law
Firm, not that of the trial court, which had the effect of varying the final and executory
Decision of this Court.

43. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SEVERINO LISTANA, G.R. No. 168105, July 27, 2011
It is a fundamental legal principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it
be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The only
exceptions to the general rule on finality of judgments are the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust
and inequitable. Indeed, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere,
even at the risk of occasional errors.

44. HEIRS OF PACENCIA RACAZA v. SPOUSES FLORENCIO ABAY-ABAY and ELEUTERIA

ABAY-ABAY, G.R. No. 198402, June 13, 2012
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation
and substantiation of factual issues. While the Rules of Court allows the introduction by
parties of newly-discovered evidence, as in motions for new trial under Rule 37, these are
not to be presented for the first time during an appeal. In addition, the term newly-
discovered evidence has a specific definition under the law. Under the Rules of Court,
the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after
trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.

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45. PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE v. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL., G.R. No. 158239, January 25,
2012
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. Javellana had only the balance of three days from July
13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of
his motion for reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such,
his filing of the notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time,
as Priscilla insists. The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has
already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in
rules of procedure. Javellanas notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh
period rule.

46. DOMINGA RUIZ, ET AL. v. CIRILA DELOS SANTOS, G.R. No. 166386, January 27, 2009
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in denying petitioners
petition for relief, since they were not prevented from filing their notice of appeal and
payment of docket fees by mistake or excusable negligence that would have deprived
them of their day in court. Such relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court will
not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode
of procedure for that matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to
reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, because of either inexcusable
negligence or counsels mistake in procedure. It bears stressing that appeal is not a right,
but a mere statutory privilege. Corollary to this principle is that the appeal must be
exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions set by law.

47. DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORPORATION V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. No.
161122, September 24, 2012
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that
it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment,
final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking
jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is
not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final
judgments, orders or resolutions. The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the
annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy
disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final
judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts.

48. REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO v. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 160172,
February 13, 2008
The trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.
there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at
all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push
through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They
were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

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49. AUTOCORP GROUP and AUTOGRAPHICS, INC. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R.
No. 157553, September 8, 2004
A writ of possession is generally understood to be an order whereby a sheriff is
commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal property, such as,
when a property is extrajudicially foreclosed. It has been consistently held that during the
period of redemption after the registration of the sale, a writ of possession issues as a
matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of a bond. A writ
of possession may also be issued after consolidation of ownership of the property in the
name of the purchaser. It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale, who becomes the
absolute owner of the property if the same is not redeemed during the one-year
redemption period after the registration of the sale, is entitled to the possession of the
property and can demand it at any time, following the consolidation of ownership in his
name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title.

50. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY v. FORERUNNER MULTI RESOURCES, INC., G.R. No. 199324,
January 7, 2013
Injunctive relief not issued for self-inflicted losses which are damnum absque injuria. In
arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals dwelt on the grave and
irremediable financial losses respondent was poised to sustain as a result of EO 156s
enforcement, finding such prejudice inequitable. No doubt, by importing used vehicles
in contravention of the ban under EO 156, respondent risked sustaining losses. Such risk,
however, was self- imposed. Having miscalculated its chances, respondent cannot look
to courts for an injunctive relief against self-inflicted losses which are in the nature of
damnum absque injuria. Injunction will not issue on the mere possibility that a litigant will
sustain damage, without proof of a clear legal right entitling the litigant to protection.

51. THUNDER SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY/LOURDES M. LASALA, NATIONAL

FOOD AUTHORITY (REGION I) and NFA REGIONAL BIDS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE (REGION
I), G.R. No. 182042, July 27, 2011
Preliminary injunction, at times referred to as the Strong Arm of Equity, we have
consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which
calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should only be
extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or
commensurate remedy in damages. It bears stressing that an injunction is not a remedy
to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a
right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise
to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. Moreover, well-entrenched in this
jurisdiction that no court can compel a party to agree to a contract through the
instrumentality of a writ of preliminary injunction. A contract can be renewed, revived or
extended only by mutual consent of the parties.

52. CARMEN DANAO MALANA, ET AL. v. BENIGNO TAPPA, ET AL., G.R. No. 181303,
September 17, 2009
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of
the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement
thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed,
or contract to which it refers. Where the law of contract has already been contravened
prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume
jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an

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action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed
before the institution of the action.

53. KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., G.R. No. 192289,

JANUARY 08, 2013
Ibrahim is not estopped from challenging the COMELEC en bancs jurisdiction to issue the
assailed resolutions. Estoppel by laches can only be invoked in exceptional cases with
factual circumstances. The instant Petition, which now raises, among others, the issue of
the COMELEC en bancs jurisdiction, was filed on June 3, 2010. With the prompt filing of
the instant Petition, Ibrahim can hardly be considered as guilty of laches.

54. FESTO R. GALANG, JR. v. HON. RAMIRO R. GERONIMO, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81, ET AL., G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011
Interpreting the phrase in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, the Court held that if a case
may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or
judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated where the Court stated that a court may
issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to
review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court. Since it is
the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision
of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it
is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.

55. GOVERNOR SADIKUL A. SAHALI AND VICE-GOVERNOR RUBY M. SAHALI v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), RASHIDIN H. MATBA AND JILKASI J. USMAN,
G.R. No. 201796. January 15, 2013
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an
election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the
appeal of the decision of the Division in due course. This Court may take cognizance of a
certiorari action directed against an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC when the following circumstances are present: first, the order was issued
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and second, under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the subject of the controversy is a matter which (1) the COMELEC en banc
may not sit and consider or (2) a Division is not authorized to act or (3) the members of
the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc.

56. RAFAEL J. ROXAS, ET AL. v. HON. ARTEMIO S. TIPON, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 46, ET AL., G.R. No. 160641, June 20, 2012
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such
conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties-litigant or their witnesses during litigation. The
asseverations made by petitioners to justify their refusal to allow inspection or audit were
rejected by the trial court. It may be noted that a person may be charged with indirect
contempt by either of two alternative ways, namely: (1) by a verified petition, if initiated
by a party; or (2) by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, if made by a court against
which the contempt is committed. In short, a charge of indirect contempt must be
initiated through a verified petition, unless the charge is directly made by the court
against which the contemptuous act is committed.

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57. ISABELO ESPERIDA, ET AL. v. FRANCO K. JURADO, JR., G.R. No. 172538, April 25, 2012
Procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt. First,
there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment
on the charge against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate
the charge and consider respondents answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent
be punished accordingly. The law requires that there be a charge in writing, duly filed in
court, and an opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or
counsel. What is most essential is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity
to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses. This is due process,
which must be observed at all times.

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