NAGUIAT vs NLRC
Individual complainants were regular workers of
Petitioner: Sergio F. Naguiat under the name and style of Sergio
F. Naguiat Ent., Inc., & Clark Field Taxi, Inc
Respondent: NLRC, National Organization of Workingmen and
its members, Leonardo T. Galang
Citation: 269 SCRA 564
Date of Promulgation: March 13, 1997
Ponente: Panganiban, J
FACTS:
Clark Field Taxi Inc (CFTI) held a concessionaires
contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services (AAEFS)
for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base
Sergio Naguiat CFTIs president; Antolin Naguiat
CFTIs VP
Like Sergio Naguiat Enterprises, a trading firm, CFTI was a
family-owned corporation
Individual respondents previously employed by CFTI as
taxi cab drivers
- During their employment, they were required to pay a
daily boundary fee of US$26.50 for those working from
1am-12nn; and US$ 27 for those working from 12nn to
12mn
- All the incidental expenses were also accounted against
them + gasoline expenses
- They worked for at least 3-4 times a week, depending on
the availability of taxi cabs
- They earned not less than US$ 15 daily
- In excess of that amount, they were also required to
make cash deposits to the company which they could lter
withdraw every 15 days
Due to the phase out of the US military bases in PH, from
which Clark Base was not spared, AAEFES was dissolves,
and the services of the individual respondents were officially
terminated on November 26, 1991
AAFES Taxi Drives Association (Union)- through its
President, Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations with
regard to the separation benefits that should be awarded in
favor of the drivers. They arrived at an agreement that the
separated drivers will be give PhP 500 for every year of
service as severance pay.
Most of the drivers accepted the said amount in December
1991-January 1992, but the individual respondents herein
refused to accept theirs
Individual Respondents through National Organization of
Workingmen which they subsequently joined after
disaffiliating themselves with AAFES Union, filed a complaint
against Sergio Naguiat and his company, AAFES with Mark
Hooper as Area Service Manager, Pacific Region, and
AAFES Union with Eduardo Castillo as President, for
payment of separation pay due to termination/phase out
Complaint was further amended to include additional taxi
drivers who were similarly situated as complainants, and
CFTI with Antolin Naguiat as VP and Gen. Manager, as party
respondents
- Allegations:
1. They were regular employees of Naguiat
enterprises although their application were
approved by CFTI
2. They have been assigned to Naguiat
Enterprises after having been hired by CFTI
and that the former managed, controlled and
supervise their employment
3. They were entitled to separation pay based on
their latest daily earnings of US$ 1 for working
16 days a month
Position Paper submitted to the LA, petitioners claimed the
fff:
1. The cessation of CFTI was due to great financial
losses and lost business opportunity resulting from
the phase out of Clark Air Base brought about by the
Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of the RP-
US Military Base Agreement
2. Admitted that CFT had agreed with the drivers
union through Pres. Castillo who claimed to have
had the blanket authority to negotiate with CFTI in
behalf of union members, to grant its taxi driver-
employees separation pay equivalent to PhP 500 for
every year of service
Labor Arbiter Findings:
1.
CFTI
2. Ordered CFTI to pay 12k for every year of service
for humanitarian consideration setting aside the
earlier agreement between CFTI and the drivers
union of PhP 500/year of service
3. At the time of the ceased operations, CFTI was
profitably earning and the cessation of its business
was due the untimely closure of Clark Air Base
NLRC:
1. Modified the LA by granting separation pay to the
private respondents
2. Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, which is headed by
Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat, father and
son at the same time the President and Vice-
President and General Manager, respectively,
should be joined as indispensable party whose
liability is joint and several.
MR of petitioners denied; hence they filed this Petition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO
ISSUES:
1) W/N respondent employees of CFTI who were separated
from service due to the closure of Clark Air Base entitled
to separation pay?
2) W/N officers of corporations are ipso facto liable jointly
and severally with the companies they represent for the
payment of separation pay?
HELD:
The petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue: Amount of Separation Pay
Firmly, we reiterate the rule that in a petition for certiorari filed
pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is the only way a
labor case may reach the Supreme Court, the petitioner/s must
clearly show that the NLRC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[12]
Long-standing and well-settled in Philippine jurisprudence is the
judicial dictum that findings of fact of administrative agencies and
quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only great respect but even finality; and are binding
upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of
discretion, or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at
arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record.[13]
Nevertheless, this Court carefully perused the records of the
instant case if only to determine whether public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in granting the clamor of private respondents that their
separation pay should be based on the amount of $240.00,
allegedly their minimum monthly earnings as taxi drivers of
petitioners.
In their amended complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch
in San Fernando, Pampanga, herein private respondents set forth
in detail the work schedule and financial arrangement they had
with their employer. Therefrom they inferred that their monthly
take-home pay amounted to not less than $240.00. Herein
petitioners did not bother to refute nor offer any evidence to
controvert said allegations. Remaining undisputed, the labor
arbiter adopted such facts in his decision. Petitioners did not even
appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter nor manifest any error
in his findings and conclusions. Thus, petitioners are in estoppel
for not having questioned such facts when they had all opportunity
to do so. Private respondents, like petitioners, are bound by the
factual findings of Respondent Commission.
Petitioners also claim that the closure of their taxi business was
due to great financial losses brought about by the eruption of Mt.
Pinatubo which made the roads practically impassable to their
taxicabs. Likewise well-settled is the rule that business losses or
financial reverses, in order to sustain retrenchment of personnel
or closure of business and warrant exemption from payment of
separation pay, must be proved with clear and satisfactory
evidence.[14] The records, however, are devoid of such evidence.
The labor arbiter; as affirmed by NLRC, correctly found that
petitioners stopped their taxi business within Clark Air Base
because of the phase-out of U.S. military presence thereat. It was
not due to any great financial loss because petitioners' taxi
business was earning profitably at the time of its closure.
With respect to the amount of separation pay that should be
granted, Article 283 of the Labor Code provides:
"x x x In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of
closures or cessation of operations of establishment or
undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month
pay or at least one-half () month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be
considered one (1 ) whole year."
Considering the above, we find that NLRC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that individual respondents were
entitled to separation pay[15] in the amount $120.00 (one-half of
$240.00 monthly pay) or its peso equivalent for every year of
service.
Second Issue: NOWM's Personality to Represent Individual
Respondents-Employees
On the question of NOWM's authority to represent private
respondents, we hold petitioners in estoppel for not having
seasonably raised this issue before the labor arbiter or the NLRC.
NOWM was already a party-litigant as the organization
representing the taxi driver-complainants before the labor arbiter.
But petitioners who were party-respondents in said complaint did
not assail the juridical personality of NOWM and the validity of its
representations in behalf of the complaining taxi drivers before the
quasi-judicial bodies. Therefore, they are now estopped from
raising such question before this Court. In any event, petitioners
acknowledged before this Court that the taxi drivers allegedly
represented by NOWM, are themselves parties in this case.[16]
Third Issue: Liability of Petitioner-Corporations and Their
Respective Officers
The resolution of this issue involves another factual finding that
Naguiat Enterprises actually managed, supervised and controlled
employment terms of the taxi drivers, making it their indirect
employer. As adverted to earlier, factual findings of quasi-judicial
bodies are binding upon the court in the absence of a showing of
grave abuse of discretion.
Unfortunately, the NLRC did not discuss or give any explanation
for holding Naguiat Enterprises and its officers jointly and
severally liable in discharging CFTI's liability for payment of
separation pay. We again remind those concerned that decisions,
however concisely written, must distinctly and clearly set forth the
facts and law upon which they are based.[17] This rule applies as
well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
Naguiat Enterprises Not Liable
In impleading Naguiat Enterprises as solidarily liable for the
obligations of CFTI, respondents rely on Articles 106,[18] 107[19]
and 109[20] of the Labor Code.
Based on factual submissions of the parties, the labor arbiter,
however, found that individual respondents were regular
employees of CFTI who received wages on a boundary or
commission basis.
We find no reason to make a contrary finding. Labor-only
contracting exists where: (1) the person supplying workers to an
employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the
form of tools, equipment, machinery, and work premises, among
others; and (2) the workers recruited and placed by such person
are performing activities which are directly related to the principal
business of the employer.[21] Independent contractors,
meanwhile, are those who exercise independent employment,
contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods
without being subject to control of their employer except as to the
result of their work.[22]
From the evidence proffered by both parties, there is no
substantial basis to hold that Naguiat Enterprises is an indirect
employer of individual respondents much less a labor only
contractor. On the contrary, petitioners submitted documents such
as the drivers' applications for employment with CFTI,[23] and
social security remittances[24] and payroll[25] of Naguiat
Enterprises showing that none of the individual respondents were
its employees. Moreover, in the contract[26] between CFTI and
AAFES, the former, as concessionaire, agreed to purchase from
AAFES for a certain amount within a specified period a fleet of
vehicles to be "ke(pt) on the road" by CFTI, pursuant to their
concessionaire's contract. This indicates that CFTI became the
owner of the taxicabs which became the principal investment and
asset of the company.
Private respondents failed to substantiate their claim that Naguiat
Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their
employment. It appears that they were confused on the
personalities of Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual who was the
president of CFTI, and Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., as a
separate corporate entity with a separate business. They
presumed that Sergio F. Naguiat, who was at the same time a
stockholder and director[27] of Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc.,
was managing and controlling the taxi business on behalf of the
latter. A closer scrutiny and analysis of the records, however,
evince the truth of the matter: that Sergio F. Naguiat, in
supervising the-taxi drivers and determining their employment
terms, was rather carrying out his responsibilities as president of
CFTI. Hence, Naguiat Enterprises as a separate corporation does
not appear to be involved at all in the taxi business.
And, although the witness insisted that Naguiat Enterprises was
his employer, he could not deny that he received his salary from
the office of CFTI inside the base.[29]
Another driver-claimant admitted, upon the prodding of counsel
for the corporations, that Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading
business while CFTI was in taxi services.[30]
In addition, the Constitution[31] of CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers
Association which, admittedly, was the union of individual
respondents while still working at Clark Air Base, states that
members thereof are the employees of CFTI and "(f)or collective
bargaining purposes, the definite employer is the Clark Field Taxi
Inc."
From the foregoing, the ineludible conclusion is that CFTI was the
actual and direct employer of individual respondents, and that
Naguiat Enterprises was neither their indirect employer nor labor-
only contractor. It was not involved at all in the taxi business.
CFTI president solidarily liable
Petitioner-corporations would likewise want to avoid the solidary
liability of their officers. To bolster their position, Sergio F. Naguiat
and Antolin T. Naguiat specifically aver that they were denied due
process since they were not parties to the complaint below.[32] In
the broader interest of justice, we, however, hold that Sergio F.
Naguiat, in his capacity as president of CFTI, cannot be
exonerated from joint and several liability in the payment of
separation pay to individual respondents.
A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC[33] is the case in
point. A.C. Ransom Corporation was a family corporation, the
stockholders of which were members of the Hernandez family. In
1973, it filed an application for clearance to close or cease
operations, which was duly granted by the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, without prejudice to the right of employees to seek
redress of grievance, if any. Backwages of 22 employees, who
engaged in a strike prior to the closure, were subsequently
computed at P164,984.00. Up to September 1976, the union filed
about ten (10) motions for execution against the corporation, but
none could be implemented, presumably for failure to find leviable
assets of said corporation. In its last motion for execution, the
union asked that officers and agents of the company be held
personally liable for payment of the backwages. This was granted
by the labor arbiter. In the corporation's appeal to the NLRC, one
of the issues raised was: "Is the judgment against a corporation to
reinstate its dismissed employees with backwages, enforceable
against its officer and agents, in their individual, private and
personal capacities, who were not parties in the case where the
judgment was rendered?" The NLRC answered in the negative,
on the ground that officers of a corporation are not liable
personally for official acts unless they exceeded the scope of their
authority.
On certiorari, this Court reversed the NLRC and upheld the labor
arbiter. In imposing joint and several liability upon the company
president, the Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera, ratiocinated this wise:
"(b) How can the foregoing (Articles 265 and 273 of the Labor
Code) provisions be implemented when the employer is a
corporation? The answer is found in Article 212(c) of the Labor
Code which provides:
'(c) 'Employer' includes any person acting in the interest of an
employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any
labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when
acting as employer.'
The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602, the Minimum
Wage Law. Since RANSOM is an artificial person, it must have an
officer who can be presumed to be the employer, being the
'person acting in the interest of (the) employer' RANSOM. The
corporation, only in the technical sense, is the employer.
The responsible officer of an employer corporation can be held
personally, not to say even criminally, liable for nonpayment of
back wages. That is the policy of the law. x x x
(c) If the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation
employer can have devious ways for evading payment of back
wages. x x x
(d) The record does not clearly identify 'the officer or officers' of
RANSOM directly responsible for failure to pay the back wages of
the 22 strikers. In the absence of definite proof in that regard, we
believe it should be presumed that the responsible officer is the
President of the corporation who can be deemed the chief
operation officer thereof. Thus, in RA 602, criminal responsibility
is with the 'Manager or in his default, the person acting as such.'
In RANSOM, the President appears to be the Manager."
(Underscoring supplied.)
Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who
actively managed the business. Thus, applying the ruling in A. C.
Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an "employer" as
contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly and
severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to its
dismissed employees.
Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and
Naguiat Enterprises were "close family corporations"[34]
owned by the Naguiat family. Section 100, paragraph 5,
(under Title XII on Close Corporations) of the Corporation
Code, states:
"(5) To the extent that the stockholders are actively engage(d)
in the management or operation of the business and affairs
of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict
fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said
stockholders shall be personally liable for corporate torts
unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate
liability insurance." (underscoring supplied)
Nothing in the records show whether CFTI obtained
"reasonably adequate liability insurance;" thus, what
remains is to determine whether there was corporate tort.
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of
"corporate tort." Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation
of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law.[35]
Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty.[36] Article 283
of the Labor Code mandates the employer to grant separation
pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, which is the
condition obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this
law-imposed duty or obligation. Consequently, its
stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or
operation of the business should be held personally liable.
Furthermore, in MAM Realty Development vs. NLRC,[37] the
Court recognized that a director or officer may still be held
solidarily liable with a corporation by specific provision of law.
Thus:
"x x x A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through
its directors, officers and employees. Obligations incurred by
them, acting as such corporate agents, are not theirs but the direct
accountabilities of the corporation they represent. True, solidary
liabilities may at times be incurred but only when exceptional
circumstances warrant such as, generally, in the following cases:
Scl-aw
xxx xxx xxx
4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision
of law, personally liable for his corporate action." (footnotes
omitted)
As pointed out earlier, the fifth paragraph of Section 100 of the
Corporation Code specifically imposes personal liability upon the
stockholder actively managing or operating the business and
affairs of the close corporation.
In fact, in posting the surety bond required by this Court for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the execution
of the assailed NLRC Resolutions, only Sergio F. Naguiat, in his
individual and personal capacity, principally bound himself to
comply with the obligation thereunder, i.e., "to guarantee the
payment to private respondents of any damages which they may
incur by reason of the issuance of a temporary restraining order
sought, if it should be finally adjudged that said principals were not
entitled thereto."[38]
The Court here finds no application to the rule that a corporate
officer cannot be held solidarily liable with a corporation in the
absence of evidence that he had acted in bad faith or with
malice.[39] In the present case, Sergio Naguiat is held solidarily
liable for corporate tort because he had actively engaged in the
management and operation of CFTI, a close corporation.
Antolin Naguiat not personally liable
Antolin T. Naguiat was the vice president of the CFTI. Although he
carried the title of "general manager" as well, it had not been
shown that he had acted in such capacity. Furthermore, no
evidence on the extent of his participation in the management or
operation of the business was proffered. In this light, he cannot be
held solidarily liable for the obligations of CFTI and Sergio Naguiat
to the private respondents.
Fourth Issue: No Denial of Due Process
Lastly, in petitioners' Supplement to their original petition, they
assail the NLRC Resolution holding Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin
T. Naguiat jointly and severally liable with petitioner-corporations
in the payment of separation pay, averring denial of due process
since the individual Naguiats were not impleaded as parties to the
complaint.
We advert to the case of A.C. Ransom once more. The officers of
the corporation were not parties to the case when the judgment in
favor of the employees was rendered. The corporate officers
raised this issue when the labor arbiter granted the motion of the
employees to enforce the judgment against them. In spite of this,
the Court held the corporation president solidarily liable with the
corporation.
Furthermore, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they, in
their individual capacities, filed a position paper[40] together with
CFTI, before the arbiter. They cannot now claim to have been
denied due process since they availed of the opportunity to
present their positions.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed February 28, 1994 Resolution
of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F.
Naguiat, president and co-owner thereof, are ORDERED to pay,
jointly and severally, the individual respondents their separation
pay computed at US$120.00 for every year of service, or its peso
equivalent at the time of payment or satisfaction of the judgment;
(2) Petitioner Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated, and
Antolin T. Naguiat are ABSOLVED from liability in the payment of
separation pay to individual respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Albenson Enterprises Corp vs CA
Petitioner: Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap and Benjamin
Mendiona
Respondents: CA and Eugenio Baltao
Citation: 217 SCRA 16
Date of Promulgation: January 11, 1993
Ponente: Bidin, J
FACTS:
September, October and November 1980 Enterprise
delivered to Guaranteed Industries located at 3267 V. Mapa
Street, Sta. Mesa Manila, the mild steel plate which the latter
ordered
Albenson was given a Pacific Banking Corp check with No.
136361 in the amount of PhP 2, 575 and drawn against the
account of E.L Woodworks
When the check was presented for payment, it was
dishonored. Reason: Account Closed
Albenson through counsel traced the origin of the
dishonored check
- From the records of SEC, it was discovered that the
president of the Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid
mild steel plates was one Eugenio Baltao
- Upon inquiry Albenson was also informed by the Ministru
of Trade and Industry that E.L Woodworks, a single
proprietorship business was registered in the name of
one Eugenio Baltao, and also upon verification with
Pacific Banking Corp, the signature of Baltao on the
check was verified
An extrajudicial demand was then given to Baltao to replace
or make good the check, but he denied issuing such. He also
said that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and could have not
transacted business with Albenson.
Feb. 14, 1983 - Albernson filed at OPP Rizal for violation of
BP 22 against Baltao
Complaint Benjamin Mendiona (employee) was the
affiant
It appears, however, that private respondent has a
namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a
business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor
of the Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila, the very same business address of Guaranteed.
September 5, 1983 Asst. Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an
Information against Eugenio Baltao for violation of BP 22.
Fiscal claimed that he had given him an opportunity to submit
evidence, but failed to do so
Baltao claimed ignorance of the complaint against him. He
filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, alleging that he has not
been given the opportunity to be heard during the preliminary
investigation
Jan. 30, 1984 Fiscal Mauro Castro reversed the findings of
Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated Baltao, for the ff reasons:
- The signature on the check was not Baltaos
- No showing of the records of PI
- Baltao did not actually receibe a notice of said
investigaton
Fiscal Sumawa was castigated by Fiscal Casto for failing to
exercise care and prudence in the performance of his duties,
thereby causing injustice to respondent who was not properly
notified of the complaint against him, and of the requirement
to submit counter evidence
Because of the unjust filing, Baltao filed a complaint for
damages against Albenson, Jesse yap and Benjamin
Mendiona, its employee
RTC QC the check is drawn against the account of E.L
Woodworks not of Guaranteed industries of which Baltao
used to be President --- ordered Albenson to pay Baltao
damages: (Actual 133, 350) ; (Moral 1M) ; (Exemplary
200k); (Attorneys Fees 100k)
CA reduced the moral damages from 1M to 500k and AF
from 100k to 50k
Albenson, Yap and Mendiona - filed this instant petition,
alleging that the court erred in:
1) Cause of action is not based on malicious
prosecution, but one for abuse of rights under Art.
21
2) Hitting and in effect maligning with an unjust criminal
case was, without more, a plain cause of abuse of
rights by misdirection and was therefore actionable
by itself, and which became inordinately blatant and
grossly aggravated when Baltao was deprived of his
basic rights to notice and a fair hearing in the so-
called PI
3) No evidence
4) Holding the petitioner corp, Yap and Mendiona
jointly and severally liable without basis in law and
in fact
5) Award of damages without evidence
Petitioners Contention:
1) The case filed was for malicious prosecution, not for
damages
2)
ISSUE: W/N the case filed against petitioners was for damages?
HELD:
NO.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following:
to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the
primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,
though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements
of each provision is different, these three (3) articles are all related
to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino
puts it: "With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and
20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly
broadened; it has become much more supple and adaptable than
the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of
any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by
the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the
Philippines 72).
There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to
determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be
invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20
and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the
following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised
in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of
law which do not especially provide for their own sanction
(Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or
negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes
damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered
thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has
the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which
causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of
damages.
There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that
is, the act must be intentional. However, Article 20 does not
distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently".
The trial court as well as the respondent appellate court
mistakenly lumped these three (3) articles together, and cited the
same as the bases for the award of damages in the civil complaint
filed against petitioners, thus:
With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in
focus, there is not much difficulty in ascertaining the means by
which appellants' first assigned error should be resolved, given
the admitted fact that when there was an attempt to collect the
amount of P2,575.00, the defendants were explicitly warned that
plaintiff Eugenio S. Baltao is not the Eugenio Baltao defendants
had been dealing with (supra, p. 5). When the defendants
nevertheless insisted and persisted in filing a case a criminal
case no less against plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul of the
legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code) cited by
the lower court and heretofore quoted (supra).
Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00,
certainly had the right to complain. But that right is limited by
certain constraints. Beyond that limit is the area of excess, of
abuse of rights. (Rollo, pp.
44-45).
Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and
not independently of each one, could be validly made the bases
for an award of damages based on the principle of "abuse of right",
under the circumstances, We see no cogent reason for such an
award of damages to be made in favor of private respondent.
Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the
aforestated principle of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners
to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against
private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of
P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed
was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners had
conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded
the following results: from the records of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, it was discovered that the President of
Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one
"Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and
Industry revealed that E.L. Woodworks, against whose account
the check was drawn, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio
Baltao"; verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking
Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing on the check
belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".
In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote
private respondent demanding that he make good the amount of
the check. Counsel for private respondent wrote back and denied,
among others, that private respondent ever transacted business
with Albenson Enterprises Corporation; that he ever issued the
check in question. Private respondent's counsel even went
further: he made a warning to defendants to check the veracity of
their claim. It is pivotal to note at this juncture that in this same
letter, if indeed private respondent wanted to clear himself from
the baseless accusation made against his person, he should have
made mention of the fact that there are three (3) persons with the
same name, i.e.: Eugenio Baltao, Sr., Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr.
(private respondent), and Eugenio Baltao III (private respondent's
son, who as it turned out later, was the issuer of the check). He,
however, failed to do this. The last two Baltaos were doing
business in the same building Baltao Building located at
3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The mild steel plates
were ordered in the name of Guaranteed of which respondent
Eugenio S. Baltao is the president and delivered to Guaranteed at
Baltao building. Thus, petitioners had every reason to believe that
the Eugenio Baltao who issued the bouncing check is respondent
Eugenio S. Baltao when their counsel wrote respondent to make
good the amount of the check and upon refusal, filed the complaint
for violation of BP Blg. 22.
Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of
mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent waited
in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a
time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages.
The Court will not countenance this devious scheme.
The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the
latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check
despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners
to find the best possible means by which they could collect the
sum of money due them. A person who has not been paid an
obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the
debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to
make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the
absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith,
moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of
an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject
the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Rubio vs. Court
of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild
steel plates were ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed at
Baltao building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing check
was issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private
respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio
Baltaos conducting business in the same building he and his
son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which
received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was
issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and
probable cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities
for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100
SCRA 602 [1980]). Still, private respondent argues that liability
under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so encompassing
that it likewise includes liability for damages for malicious
prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for
damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Civil
Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and
2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a case can prosper, however,
the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The
fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was
himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated
with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor
acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or
impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58,
[1991]).
Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even
if he is later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded
either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious
prosecution. As earlier stated, a complaint for damages based
on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three (3)
elements aforecited are shown to exist. In the case at bar, the
second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-
settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously
instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable
cause. "Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a
legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause.
The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great
discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable
ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their
indictment miscarried" (Que vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169
SCRA 137 [1989]).
The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal
consequence, the absence of malice. In the instant case, it is
evident that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or
by sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only
by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights when they filed the
criminal complaint against private respondent.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person, that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities
for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must
be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to
damages (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the
part of petitioners to vex or humiliate private respondent by
instituting the criminal case against him. While petitioners
may have been negligent to some extent in determining the
liability of private respondent for the dishonored check, the
same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to bad faith
warranting an award of damages.
The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of
mistaken identity. It is possible that with a more assiduous
investigation, petitioners would have eventually discovered that
private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is not the "Eugenio Baltao"
responsible for the dishonored check. However, the record shows
that petitioners did exert considerable effort in order to determine
the liability of private respondent. Their investigation pointed to
private respondent as the "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and
signed the dishonored check as the president of the debtor-
corporation Guaranteed Enterprises. Their error in proceeding
against the wrong individual was obviously in the nature of an
innocent mistake, and cannot be characterized as having been
committed in bad faith. This error could have been discovered if
respondent had submitted his counter-affidavit before
investigating fiscal Sumaway and was immediately rectified by
Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro upon discovery thereof, i.e., during
the reinvestigation resulting in the dismissal of the complaint.
Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make
the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral
damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on
the right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages
may not be charged on those who may even exercise it
erroneously. And an adverse decision does not ipso facto justify
the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs.
Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72 [1990]).
Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted
where the action was filed in good faith. If damage results from a
person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria
(Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA
5 [1989]).
Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or
compensatory damages, the records show that the same was
based solely on his allegations without proof to substantiate the
same. He did not present proof of the cost of the medical treatment
which he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous
breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss
to his business caused by the unjust litigation against him. In
determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation,
conjectures or guesswork as to the amount. Without the actual
proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous
(Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]).
Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable
because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property,
profession, job or occupation and the same must be proved,
otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages
will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
For these reasons, it was gravely erroneous for respondent court
to have affirmed the award of actual damages in favor of private
respondent in the absence of proof thereof.
Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in
wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive manner, neither may
exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical
Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).
As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same
is the exception rather than the general rule. Needless to say, the
award of attorney's fees must be disallowed where the award of
exemplary damages is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code;
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover,
in view of the fact that there was no malicious prosecution against
private respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded him on that
ground.
In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners
acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case against
private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud
and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable
for damages (Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155
SCRA 577 [1987]). No damages can be awarded in the instant
case, whether based on the principle of abuse of rights, or for
malicious prosecution. The questioned judgment in the instant
case attests to the propensity of trial judges to award damages
without basis. Lower courts are hereby cautioned anew against
awarding unconscionable sums as damages without bases
therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent
Baltao.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Elcano and Elcano vs Hull and Hill
Petitioner: Pedro Elcano and Patricia Elcano in their capacity as
ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased
Respondents: Reginald Hill, minor and Marvin Hill, as father and
natural guardian of said minor
Citation: 77 SCRA 98
Date of Promulgation: May 26, 1977
Ponente: Barredo
FACTS:
Reginald Hill minor, married at the time of the occurrence,
caused the death of Agapito, son of Pedro. He lives with his
father, Marvin, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence
Pedro and Patricia filed a criminal case against Reginald
but he was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mstake
Elcano then filed a case for damages against Marvin
based on Art. 2180 at CFI QC
Defendants filed for Motion to dismiss, with ff grounds:
1. Present action is against and a violation of Rule 107,
Sec. 1 of RoC
2. Action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final or
in res judicata
3. No cause of action bc Marvin as relieved as guardian of
Reginald through emancipation of marriage
MTD denied by the trial court
MR granted
ISSUES:
1. W/N the present civil action for damages is barred by the
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the
action for civil liability was not reversed?
2. W/N Art. 2180, par 2 of the NCC be applied against Atty.
Hill notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time
of the occurrence complained of Reginald was a minor,
married, but was living with and getting subsistence from
his father?
HELD:
1.
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal
and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was
firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil.
607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly
dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in
relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with
pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the
works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our
own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only
under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the
opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code.
In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil
action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted
that it was the employer and not the employee who was being
sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have
been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence
causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence
being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after
such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability
arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also
made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
(p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we
are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the
past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of
the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have
very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to property- through any degree of
negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only
through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention
to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we,
in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that
killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a
principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but
can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given
rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely
to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a
reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that
the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of
the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it
actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of
Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud
or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil
Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided
textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions
in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall
be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to
quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not
punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead
to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law
that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling
that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother
and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of
the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was
enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of
culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in
violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code,
which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from
quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2,
Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws."
More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code
provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision
(Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate
from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether
on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence,
but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said
article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code)
Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to
only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo
about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather
than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker
should be observed in applying the same. And considering that
the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code
definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability
in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty.
32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age,
Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, subsidiary to that of his son.
equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"-
to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial
Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only opinion. Costs against appellees.
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here
hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal

case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's

emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill,
his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot
be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon

emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176

is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason

behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any
act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol.
II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites
judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child
does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which
cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
(Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)