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Rear view: Lost in Lanka

Written by Inder Malhotra | Published:January 19, 2015 12:59 am

By the middle of 1987, Rajiv Gandhi was besieged by many domestic problems of
extreme gravity. Yet he decided to mediate in the catastrophic ethnic strife in
neighbouring Sri Lanka between the ruling Sinhala majority and the highly aggrieved
Tamil minority concentrated in the northern and eastern regions of the island republic.
The problem had begun long ago, when the Sinhala-dominated government imposed
Sinhala as the only language of the country, and it escalated so fast as to become
nearly intractable. Indias policy on Sri Lanka, which Rajiv inherited from his mother,
was as complex as the situation in the island.
Indira Gandhi did not like the efforts of Sri Lankas veteran and wily executive
president, J.R. Jayewardene, to draw in the United States, some west European
countries and Israel, to help out with his difficulties. She wanted the problem of Sri
Lanka to be resolved with Indian assistance without any any foreign intrusion. So
she had seen to it that her foreign policy advisor, G. Parthasarathy, and a nominee of
Jayewardene worked out an arrangement for devolution of power to the Tamil
minority in Sri Lanka that would be acceptable to the Sinhala majority also. The effort
remained a work in progress. At the same time, she was keen to ensure that Sri
Lankan Tamils did not feel let down by India. There was so much sympathy and
support for them in Tamil Nadu that they could use the Indian state as a safe haven
and also a training field, with the Central government benignly looking away.
Rajiv did not like this and changed the policy. Meanwhile, of the various Tamil
groups resisting Sinhala domination, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
emerged as the most influential and powerful. Eelam in the name stood for complete
independence. This was the brainchild of its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran who, as
the world witnessed, was a brutal fighter.
The old fox, Jayewardene, was usually in awe of Indira. But he found it easy to deal
with her son and successor. Fairly early during their negotiations, the two agreed on a
new approach. The Sri Lankan government had so isolated the northern Tamil area as
to virtually force India to do some bread bombing of Jaffna to enable the starving
people to eat. Yet, the two sides broke new ground soon enough. New Delhi and
Colombo decided to sign an agreement on solving the problem and to cajole or coerce
the LTTE to accept it. The Rajiv-Jayewardene accord was duly inked on July 29 in
Colombo in an immensely tense atmosphere. But, as Rajivs MoS for External Affairs
K. Natwar Singh (who later became foreign minister) has recorded in his
autobiography, One Life Is Not Enough, its implementations created more problems
than it solved.
In the first place, even while the agreement was being signed, Sri Lankas prime
minister, R. Premadasa, and a senior minister, Lalith Athulathmudali, made no secret
of their opposition to it. Something even more startling happened a little later. Seeing
that Jayewardene was talking seriously to Rajiv surrounded only by Sri Lankan
officials, Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao asked Natwar Singh to go and find out
what was afoot. Rajiv told him that Colombo was a besieged city and Jayewardene
feared that there might be a coup before nightfall. So he had asked for an Indian Peace
Keeping Force (IPKF) immediately. To Natwars question of whether he would like
to consult his senior colleagues before sending troops, Rajiv replied that he had
already ordered a division of the army to get to Colombo as fast as possible.
Before signing the agreement, Rajiv had sent for Prabhakaran in Delhi, and was
apparently satisfied with the LTTE supremos verbal acceptance of the draft accord.
Tamil Nadus hugely popular chief minister, M.G. Ramachandaran, was also in Delhi
and reportedly gave Prabhakaran a lot of money. However, when asked to surrender
arms, as required by the July 29 accord, the LTTE insisted on a series of
preconditions, including the release of all Tamil prisoners in government custody and
a halt to Sinhala colonisation of the islands eastern region. How terribly high the
Sinhala rage against Indian intervention in their country was became known at the
time of Rajivs departure for home. At the guard of honour, a Lankan soldier tried to
hit him with the stem of his gun. The prime ministers youthful reflexes saved his life.
At the Bandaranaike International Airport, the Sri Lankan prime minister was
conspicuous by his absence. When asked about this discourtesy, Rajiv blandly
replied: Some presidents have a problem with their prime ministers, and some prime
ministers have a problem with their presidents. The latter part of the statement was a
clear reference to his row with the then president, Giani Zail Singh.
For a short while, an uneasy peace lasted in Sri Lanka. But even the Tamils of that
country turned against India because the IPKF had to storm and capture the LTTE
headquarters in Jaffna, though at a high cost. Several IPKF commanders have written
books about the often vague and even contradictory instructions from Delhi. This
should explain why the much-respected Indian army suffered a dent in its image. Over
a thousand Indian soldiers were killed. In 1989, when Rajiv was defeated in the
election, Premadasa had replaced Jayewardene as Lankas president. He lost no time
in demanding the IPKFs withdrawal. The new Indian prime minister, V.P. Singh, was
happy to undo what Rajiv had done. When the first batch of the IPKF landed in
Chennai, no one in the Tamil Nadu government was willing to receive it. Only the
governor, P.C. Alexander, welcomed them.
Even more sadly, there is no memorial for the IPKF anywhere in India. Only the Sri
Lankans have built one in Colombo. Evidently, they realise that India spilled blood
and spent from its treasury to save their countrys unity.
The writer is a Delhi-based political commentator