American Academy of Political and Social Science

Denazification in the United States Zone of Germany

Author(s): William E. Griffith
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 267, Military
Government (Jan., 1950), pp. 68-76
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social
Science
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Denazificationin the United States Zone of Germany
By WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH

LIKE the rest of military govern- genthau plan, the increased American
ment, denazification planning suf- anti-German feeling as the war reached
fered from Washington indecision, Mor- its conclusion, and United States pub-
genthau plan influence, and Roosevelt's lic and press criticism of "undue laxity"
decision not to plan at all.' However, in removing Nazis in Aachen led to in-
based on experience in purging Fascists tensification of the program.4
in Italy, the Public Safety Branch of
INITIAL ADMINISTRATION
the Supreme Headquarters Allied Ex-
peditionary Forces drew up a plan for Most United States field military gov-
immediate removal of top-level Nazis ernment officers, haphazardly picked
and militarists and for retention and and insufficiently trained, were, in
later screening of the others, through Aachen and elsewhere, excellent at re-
questionnaires (Fragebigen), manda- storing public utilities, but much less
tory removal categories, and an elabo- fitted for carrying out with understand-
rate "Special Branch" organization.2 ing-still less with enthusiasm-the
In the early stages these categories were revolution which United States denazifi-
the decisive factor. They apparently cation policy implicitly involved. When
assumed that the Third Reich had been forced to make political decisions, these
controlled by a four-group coalition officers most naturally favored "stable"
consisting of the Nazis plus the three political elements (the Catholic Church,
traditional authoritarian groups-mili- the one organizationwhich had survived
3 the collapse, and the strongly conserva-
tarists, industrialists, and bureaucrats
-and expressed United States policy of tive former civil servants) and too often
replacing them by anti-Nazi, antiau- failed to appoint actively anti-Nazi offi-
thoritarian,and prodemocraticelements. cials.
Military Governmentwas committed to These officers were temperamentally
an experiment new to history: revolu- interested in "getting things done," not
tion by decree. in tearing down; but it was just this
This original program was, in retro- tearing down-and standing by-that
spect, moderate and-temporarily- the first United States postoccupation
workable. But the impact of the Mor- basic directive, JCS 1067/6,5 required.
1 The writer is now engaged in completing This ordered the removal of all "more
a doctoral dissertation on this subject. than nominal"' Nazis from all offices
2
SHAEF GCU Staff Study, May 28, 1944;
SHAEF Public Safety Manual, 1st ed., Sept. 4 In some areas, all Nazi Party members
1944. were automatically removed (see Hq 12th
3 Cf. Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth (N. Y.,
Army Group, G-5 Operational Instructions No.
2nd ed., 1944), p. 632; and Eugene N. Ander- 11, March 11, 1945). For Aachen, cf. Saul K.
son, "Freedom and Authoritarianism in Ger- Padover, Experiment in Germany (New York,
man History," Chap. I, pp. 3-32 in Gabriel A. 1946), a doctrinaire left-wing account.
Almond (Ed.), The Struggle for Democracy 5
April 26, 1945. For text of this and other
in Germany (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1949). Neu- basic military government policy directives,
mann's coalition theory is subject to serious see The Axis in Defeat (Dept. of State Publi-
revision on the basis of our knowledge of the cation No. 2423) and Hajo Holborn, Ameri-
anti-Nazi resistance movement in Germany. can Military Government (Washington, 1947).
68
 DENAZIFICATION IN THE U. S. ZONE OF GERMANY 69

and positions of importance, and pro- At first, in spite of Special Branch

vided that no such persons "shall be protests, these men were not discour-
retained . . . because of administrative aged by Military Government. But the
necessity, convenience or expediency. outcry in the United States press, and
. . ." It also contained large-scale pro- General Patton's off-the-cuff compari-
visions for the arrest and internment of son of Nazis and anti-Nazis to Repub-
top Nazis. licans and Democrats, led to Eisen-
This directive was probably the best hower's ordering Patton's removal and
obtainable at the time. Its postoccupa- brought the matter to a head. Denazifi-
tion implementation of July 7, 1945 at cation was greatly intensified. The hur-
least replaced the previous patchwork riedly drafted 7 and extremely ill-ad-
of regulations with uniform denazifica- vised Military Government Law No. 8
tion procedures. The latter's establish- extended denazification in its most se-
ment of May 1, 1937 as the earliest vere form (limitation to ordinary la-
"nonremovable" date for Nazi Party bor) to all Nazi Party membersin busi-
membership was at least less impracti- ness and industry.8
cal than the previous hastily issued or- These moves, opposed by the military
ders.6 government denazification staff, went
too far. They brought unnecessary in-
INTENSIFICATION
ference with Germaneconomicrecovery,
But in spite of Special Branch efforts, concentration on small fry and statis-
many active Nazis remained in office- tics, and consequent neglect of general
a fact which United States press corre- political objectives. Few positive steps
spondents, their appetites sharpened at were taken, then or later, to appoint
Aachen, reported, and which United sincere anti-Nazis to high German po-
States left-wing opinion exploited. The sitions. Worst of all, there began just
crisis finally broke in Munich in the what the SHAEF denazification plan-
summer and autumn of 1945. There ners had warned against in 1944: the
Military Government had been instru- establishment of a "community of suf-
mental in forming a Bavarian govern- fering" among all Nazis, large and
ment controlled by leaders of the pre- small, and of sympathy for them by
1933 Bavarian People's Party (an ultra- the rest of the population.
conservative, provincial version of the The far too wide scope of the pro-
Catholic Center Party), who-like the gram, the lack of any workable scheme
majority of Germans-frankly admitted for remedying the individual injustices
their opposition to the social revolution of the mandatory removal categories,
involved in a large-scale purge of Nazi the failure to use anti-Nazi Germanper-
and authoritarian elements and the sonnel sufficiently, and the necessity of
transfer of power to a prodemocratic some final solution permitting eventual
ruling group. reintegration of most lesser Nazis into
6 Directive, Hq Germansociety made change inevitable.
USFET, July 7, 1945. Texts
of this and other United States and German But much had been accomplished:
denazification documents are in the only Special Branches had handled over
printed documentary source in English on de- 1,500,000 cases and removed or ex-
nazification, German Denazification Law and
All Implementations and American Directives, 7 Reportedly in a few hours, at
Clay's order,
compiled by Special Branch, Office of Mili- by Charles Fahy, his legal adviser.
tary Government, Bavaria (Munich, 1st ed., 8 Issued
Sept. 26, 1945. The July 7 direc-
1946; 2nd ed., 1947; 3 supplements, 1947-48). tive had already been intensified on August 15.
 70 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICANACADEMY
cluded almost 375,000.9 The clearing-
away work for a new, democratic Ger-
man society had been temporarily ac-
complished. And in spite of much
justified criticism of the category sys-
tem, considering the necessity for speed
and the lack of knowledge and training
of United States field personnel no other
system could have accomplished as
much. Criticism should be directed
not so much against the planning, the
system, or the top denazification staff
as against the largely untrained, often
incompetent, and sometimes corrupt
United States personnel who carried it
out in the field, the lack of consistent
policy, the all too ready bowing of
policy makers before the storms of press
criticism, the much too broad exten-
sion of denazification, and the delay in
finding a permanent solution.
THE GERMANSTAKE OVER
In late 1945 General Lucius D. Clay
established a Denazification Policy
Board, headed by Charles Fahy, to in-
vestigate the program and recommend
a permanent solution. Its Report, sub-
mitted on January 15, 1946, stated as
the three basic objectives of denazifi-
cation (1) the removal of political and
economic authority from those who
dominated Nazi Germany as a means of
assisting in changing the governing ele-
ment; (2) the rapid punishment of
those responsible for Nazi wrongs and
injustices, while (3) avoiding the fu-
ture social instability arising from a
large mass of permanent outcasts. The
latter two were new and of great signifi-
cance. Further, the Report stated that
German public opinion must be taken
into account, that "substantial ele-
ments" in Germany must support the
9 For denazification
statistics, see OMGUS
Public Safety Branch, Monthly Denazifica-
tion Report, and OMGUS, Statistical Annex
to the Monthly Report of the Military Gov-
ernor, 1945-49.
program, and that active German par-
ticipation was essential. These prin-
ciples-opposed by most Special Branch
personnel-became officialUnited States
policy.
The Report proposed individual trials
by local German tribunals, with pre-
sumptive, rebuttable guilt of categori-
cally incriminatedrespondentsand with
sentences ranging from confinement to
fines and from permanent to tempo-
rary reduction to ordinary labor. The
Germanshad also framed draft denazifi-
cation laws, stressing the judicial rather
than the political aspect (punishment
for crimes instead of exclusion from in-
fluence), with no trials for "nominal"
Nazis. But they were forced by Spe-
cial Branch pressure (aided by the
adoption of Allied Control Council Di-
rective No. 24, a near-replica of the
July 7 directive) to include in the final
Law the registration and processing of
questionnaires for all adults, a great
widening of persons subject to trial,
hearings before local, lay tribunals
(Spruchkammern),and presumptive,re-
buttable guilt arising from substantially
the old Military Government manda-
tory removalcategories.10 Furthermore,
most persons with Nazi affiliationswere
reduced to ordinary labor pending trial.
But the Germans did win judicial inde-
pendence for the tribunals; irrespective
of presumptive categories, they could
classify respondents at their discretion.
And those declared followers (Mit-
liufer), after paying a small fine, re-
gained all their civil rights.
The result, the Law for Liberation
from National Socialism and Militar-
ism, was promulgatedfor the U. S. zone
on March 5, 1946. Lack of space pre-
vents any detailed analysis of its pro-
10 Classifications were also sharpened;
they
finally included: Major Offenders (Class I),
Offenders (Class II), Lesser Offenders (Class
III), Followers (Class IV), and Exonerated
(Class V).
 DENAZIFICATION IN THE U. S. ZONE OF GERMANY 71

visions; the flood of regulations, orders, Local, lay tribunal chairmen and public
and commentaries soon made it into an prosecutors were responsive to Nazi
almost impenetrably complex legal sys- pressure and public apathy. Special
tem." Branch personnel saw no reason why
Trials began in the summer of 1946. a former Nazi should be reinstated in
Already many Germans were impatient an influential position because a local
with denazification delays; soon Mili- German tribunal had "cleared" him.
tary Government joined them. The But the initial Denazification Policy
very wideness of the Law's provisions 12 Board Plan that Military Government
delayed, confused, and effectively sabo- would retain approval power over key
taged its operations. positions in German government had
been abandoned in the tide of turning
MILITARY GOVERNMENT CONTROL over responsibility to the Germans.l4
Now the only recourse for Special
Special Branch personnel, from the Branch was to prevent such "white-
first opposed to the Law, had insisted washing" Follower decisions. Now its
upon closely supervising its operations. political ends could be achieved only
They were far more interested in its through judicial means. A system of
removal and exclusion aspects than its supervision of tribunals and of Special
punishment aspects. Determined to try Branch objections to their decisions
the biggest Nazis first and to assure (the "Delinquency and Error System")
that they were barred from influential was established, culminating in the
positions, they were seriously concerned power of Land Special Branches to or-
when the first trials were almost exclu- der decisions vacated and new trials
sively of small fry. Actually, this was held.l5
inevitable. Denazification was now But tribunal leniency continued,16
headed by political ministers,13respon- and in November 1946 General Clay
sible to the Landtage, to their parties, threatened to resume direct Military
and to public pressure. The severity Government denazification operations,
of the pretrial employment restrictions gave the German authorities sixty days
made minor Nazis press for rapid clear- to improve tribunal decisions, and an-
ance; major Nazis had every interest in nounced that "clearing" decisions of
postponing their trials. persons previously removed by Special
The first tribunal decisions were, Branch to which Military Government
even to German opinion, very lenient. objected would not become effective
11 The standard commentary is Erich until these objections were settled.17
Schullze, Gesetz zur Befreiung von National- Although only minor, temporary im-
sozialismus und Militarismus (3rd ed., Munich,
1948); it contains the Law's text, implement-
provement resulted, Clay soon an-
ing regulations, orders, and so forth. See also
the Mitteilungs- or Amtsbldtter of the Laender 14 In OMGUS directives of Aug. 23 and
Ministries. Sept. 21, 1946.
12 Some 28 per cent of all German adults 15OMG Bavaria directive, Sept. 20, 1946;
in the United States zone were affected Change 11 to Part 8, Title 9, Military Gov-
(betroffen) by it. ernment Regulations, Nov. 22, 1946. Military
13 They varied from Binder in Hesse, who Government also instituted strict supervision
(with Knappstein, his deputy) was probably of German-operated internment and labor
the best, to the near-psychopathic demagogue camps.
Loritz in Bavaria. Kamm in Wiirttemberg- 16 Appeal tribunal decisions were consistently
Baden was sincere but contentious. The Ba- more lenient than those in the first instance.
varian Ministry was torn with political strife 17 Speech to the Linderrat, Stuttgart, Nov.
until Hagenauer replaced Loritz in June 1947. 5, 1946.
72 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

nounced that German administration hoped that quadripartite negotiations

would continue. The net result was would produce results.20
Military Government control over the Already in July 1946 the "Youth
reinstatement of "cleared" former Amnesty" had freed some 900,000 in-
Nazis.18 criminated persons born after January
1, 1919 from almost all penalties. In
CHANGES IN THE LAW
December 1946 the "Christmas Am-
Case processing was still too slow. nesty" freed 1,000,000 more nominally
German sympathy was becoming so- incriminated low-income and disabled
lidified behind the "poor, persecuted persons. But still 1,400,000 cases re-
Nazis," because of the delays, the rela- mained for trial, many only because
tively harsh punishment of tte small they involved pre-1937 Nazi Party
fry, and the failure to bring the big members-presumptive Offenders. Some
Nazis to trial. German agitation for accelerated procedure was clearly nec-
substantial revisions in the Law grew essary.
more insistent. Germanauthorities had Now the change in United States pub-
never concealed their dislike for the lic opinion began to take effect. Ameri-
Law; the churches had always opposed can hatred of a conquered Reich had
it; and the political parties were gen- given way to fear of the imperial Sovi-
erally unfavorable, the Christian Demo- ets, and Americans had learned-too
crats and the Liberal Democrats par- often in an exaggerated form-of the
ticularly so, while the Social Democrats slowness and arbitrariness of much of
and (at first) the Communists voiced the denazification program. The New
some support.l9 Deal had been replaced by an aggres-
Military Government faced two al- sively conservativeRepublicanEightieth
ternatives: large-scale amnesties or basic Congress. And-for economy-minded
changes in the Law. The denazification members of Congress the most decisive
staff, split within itself, finally agreed -the yawning German dollar deficit
that the accent must be shifted from made any interference with economic
trials of small fry to trials of top cases recovery (such as the Germans pro-
only, plus exclusion of active Nazis claimed denazification to be) look like
from influential positions only, instead a deliberate drain on the United States
of confinement to ordinary labor. But taxpayer.21
General Clay chose amnesities; he did In the summer of 1947, for the first
not want to admit that his denazifica- time, a large group of members of Con-
tion policy had been mistaken, and still gress visited Germany. They saw the
18 There were
many other such orders: e.g., 20 These
negotiations had previously pro-
that persons sentenced to labor camps must duced Control Council Directives No. 24 and
be confined immediately (the Law provided 38; neither they nor any other multizonal
for confinement only after appeal proceed- agreements seriously affected denazification in
ings). The Germans bitterly criticized them the United States zone, except for Special
as an attack on the rule of law (Rechtsstaat). Branch's use of the former to make the Law
19 For the best summary of the German for Liberation more severe.
viewpoint, and a brilliant analysis of the 21 See, e.g., Lewis A. Brown, A Report on
whole denazification problem, see Karl Hein- Germany (New York, 1947); Gustav Stolper,
rich Knappstein, "Die versaumte Revolution," German Realities (New York, 1948); and
Die Wandlung, Jg. 2, Heft 8 (Nov. 1947), pp. Percy Bidwell, "What Is Happening in Ger-
663-77, 748. See also Eugen Kogon, "Das many," Harper's, Vol. CLXLVI (Feb. 1948),
Recht auf den politischen Irrtum," Frank- pp. 173-79. For the Eightieth Congress' ef-
furter Hefte, Jg. 2, Heft 7 (July 1947), pp. fect on Japan, see Owen Lattimore, The Situa-
641-55. tion in Asia (Boston, 1949), pp. 115-17.
 DENAZIFICATION IN THE U. S. ZONE OF GERMANY 73

delays and injustices of the Law and the
politics and favoritism which too often
characterized its operations. Most of
them became convinced that denazifica-
tion was unwisely planned and adminis-
tered and an impediment to German
recovery, and should be concluded as
soon as possible.22
GeneralClay's hopes for quadripartite
denazification agreement, strengthened
in April 1947 by the Moscow Confer-
ence decisions,23were shattered on Au-
gust 17 by their unilateral Soviet im-
plementation, stressing German respon-
sibility and leniency and rapidity of
procedures for nominal Nazis. Amend-
ments to the Law were now inevitable.
Promulgated in October,24the amend-
ments permitted the declaration as Fol-
lowers, in accelerated proceedings, of
the more nominally incriminated pre-
sumptive Offenders. The Germanswere
relatively well satisfied, especially after
initial Military Government restrictions
in Wiirttemberg-Badenand Hesse were
removed by order of the Office of Mili-
tary Government (US)-which made it
clear that only very rapid disposition
of the remaining cases could prevent
complete abandonment of the program.
FINAL FIASCO
But these First Amendmentswere too irony-in the autumn of 1948 only
limited and too late. Congress was not strong resistance by German denazifica-
satisfied, and cancellation of the whole tion authorities frustrated further mili-
programwas narrowly averted in March tary governmentattempts to close down
1948. The House AppropriationsCom- the program.
mittee refused to approve an Army de-
22 The "Herter Committee" was the most
thorough and influential. See House Select
Committee on Foreign Aid, Final Report
(80th Cong., 2d sess., H. R. 1824), pp. 127-29. judged
23The CFM denazification decision, al-
though outwardly similar to the United States
proposal, was really an adoption of the Soviet
position. The Soviets consistently used de-
nazification as an implement in bringing about
a social revolution and a police state.
24 Approved by OMGUS Oct.
7, 1947.
ficiency appropriation bill unless de-
nazification were stopped. Secretary
Royall agreed, but General Clay in-
sisted that cancellation just at the time
when only the most severely incrimi-
nated cases remained for trial would be
a serious error. He succeeded in re-
taining only the most highly incrimi-
nated for trial-which he defined as
30,000 cases (including 3,000 to re-
main in internment), about one-tenth
of those pending. The other nine-tenths
were to be declared Followers-during
April!
It is a striking example of the politi-
cal reality of military government con-
trol behind the front of German quasi-
judicial denazification operations that
this task was quite easily accom-
plished.25 However, United States de-
nazification staffs only worked them-
selves out of jobs; on May 28, 1948
OMGUS withdrew almost all military
government supervision over the de-
nazification program, and the Germans
attained their desired independence.
But three years had passed since the
Nazi collapse, and the German people
were unutterably weary of the crimes,
errors, and memories of the past. With
military government psychological pres-
sure removed, tribunal sentences be-
came ever more lenient; and-the final
And so, in 1949, the last trials and
appeals dragged out to their dreary and
disillusioning conclusion. Some 950,000
trials had been held; 1,600 had been
Class I and 21,600 Class II Of-
25 The Germans
passed the necessary Second
Amendments to the Law on March 31, 1948.
Military government denazification staffs set
up secret quotas for each Kreis of cases to be
retained for trial, personally selected these
cases, and had the Germans declare all the
others Followers. Fiat justitia . ..
74 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
fenders. Only 22,700 were still in-
eligible to hold public office.26 The
very top Nazis were-temporarily-im-
mobilized, but otherwise, Nazis, milita-
rists, industrialists, and bureaucrats
were free to re-enter society. And they
re-entered in thousands; the flood of
"renazification"ran full tide. From 40
to 80 per cent of the officials in many
branches of public administration are
now reinstated former Nazis. More
pertinent, many of them are present-
day authoritarians. And with the ris-
ing tide of German neo-nationalismand
the competition for the ex-Nazi vote
by all German parties, German (and
United States) criticism of and action
against this trend have been more
vocal than effective.
ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE
Abandoned by the Americans and
universally denounced by the disgusted
Germans, denazification had failed-
failed to come near achieving any ob-
jective ever set forth for it, by Ameri-
cans or Germans. And the effort to
construct democratic foundations for
German society, and thus prevent a re-
crystallization of its traditional au-
thoritarian social structure, had prob-
ably failed with it.27 But why did it
fail? Was-failure inevitable, or could
it have been averted or ameliorated?
External factors
There is no simple or conclusive an-
swer. The failure arose from both ex-
ternal and internal causes. Among ex-
ternal ones-factors relatively beyond
the control of any of the United States
or German participants in the pro-
26 From an OMGUS
report, "A Summary
of Denazification: The Year 1948 and 1 Janu-
ary to 30 June 1949," released in August 1949.
27 Cf. the penetrating essay of Carl E.
Schorske, "The Dilemma in Germany," Vir-
ginia Quarterly Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 1
(Winter 1948), pp. 29-42.
gram-were the war passions, the diffi-
culty of using a military occupation for
political ends, the Germandollar deficit,
and the growing East-West tension and
the consequent competition for Ger-
man support. The German people
never really favored the implications
of denazification-of penetrating behind
Nazism to revolutionize the authori-
tarian society which they still passively
accepted. Its operations were staffed
by German officials who felt no sharp
social or class cleavage with the Nazis
appearing before them, and who, with
them, had no desire for the social
revolution that severe denazification
would bring.28
Then there are other, more contro-
versial factors: Marxists and economic
determinists would say that United
States capitalist democracywould never
have destroyed the German industrial
capitalism which-they maintain-pro-
duced Hitler; a wider group would say
that United States policy makers be-
came, consciously or unconsciously, re-
luctant to conduct a thorough purge of
German groups so similar to them-
selves.29 Of these last two, the writer
does not accept the former, and con-
siders the latter-if true at all-to be
based on a similarity far more apparent
than real.
All of these factors were more or less
predictable, more or less inevitable, and
little subject to control by military gov-
ernment or German denazification au-
thorities.30
28 See Hans
Meyerhoff, "The Reconstruc-
tion of Government and Administration,"
Chap. V, p. 201 in Almond, op. cit. note 3
supra.
29 See Franz L.
Neumann, "Military Gov-
ernment and the Revival of Democracy in
Germany," Columbia Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. II, No. 1 (Winter 1948), pp. 3-20.
30For the above factors and for the last
stages of the program, see John H. Herz, "The
Fiasco of Denazification in Germany," Politi-
cal Science Quarterly, Vol. LXIII, No. 4 (Dec.
1948), pp. 569-94.
 DENAZIFICATION IN THE U. S. ZONE OF GERMANY 75

only reflected the same qualities found

Internal factors in the Germanpeople as a whole. True.
But these deterministic explanations, But, like the German democratic poli-
while illuminating much of denazifica- ticians of 1930-33, their conduct boded
tion's lack of success, do not account ill for the future, and their failure was
for the completeness of its failure. not only a symptom but also a cause of
Complete success was never possible. the shaky and insecure basis upon which
But internal factors must also be con- the copybook structure of present-day
sidered. German policy was weak, western German democracy rests, and
dilatory, and often insincere; United of the neo-nationalistn now beating
States policy was vacillating and self- against it.
defeating. The original United States
planning, in retrospect,seems sound and Shortsighted policy
reasonable. Certainly United States Most United States denazification
Military Government devoted more personnel were technically competent,
(perhaps too much) attention to de- hard-working, and sincere; but their
nazification than the other powers; for crusade for "real" denazification rested
this very reason, its mistakes-although upon a faulty analysis of Germany and
probably no greater than those of the of Nazism, and-most important-of
others-loom higher. United States policy development. Al-
Extension of denazification (symbol- though they, more than the rest of Mili-
ized by Law No. 8) was not inevitable; tary Government,glimpsed the problem
its adoption and stubborn retention, op- of the overthrow of authoritarianism
posed by Special Branchpersonnel,must (militarists, industrialists, and bureau-
be charged to General Clay. Because crats) behind that of the overthrow of
of unwise Special Branch pressure, the Nazism, they dissipated their efforts on
Law for Liberation, unlike all success- the small fry, and never grasped the
ful revolutions, did not hit squarely at exigencies of time and numbers. By
the previous governing elite. Its far the time they accepted the prevailing
too extensive, rigid presumptive guilt German standpoint that only Nazis
categories and employment restrictions should be attacked, it was too late
made speed impossible and injustice even for that.
certain. It attempted to penalize po- The delay in approving amendments
litical errors and punish Nazi crimes- to the Law, the distrust of all German
to combine political and judicial aims; denazification efforts, and the failure
it succeeded in attaining neither, but to recognize the turning tide of United
rather in resolidifying the sundered au- States public opinion (a tide caused
thoritarian (if not the Nazi) block. largely by their own mistakes) must be
The followers of the Nazi Party be- ascribed to the indecision, shortsighted-
came the party of the Followers, and ness, and refusal to admit mistakes, not
Germans came to doubt if democracy only of Military Government policy
could be democratic,or justice be just.31 makers but even more of most United
German denazification officials could States denazification personnel. They
plead that in their indecision, ineffi- forgot that politics is the science of the
ciency, and lack of enthusiasm they possible, and they failed to cut their
31
losses enough and in time.32
See Knappstein and Kogon, op. cit. note
19 supra. The British did separate them, but 32 For their
attitude, see Joseph F. Napoli,
they were slower in turning over denazifica- "Denazification from an American's View-
tion responsibility to the Germans. point," The Annals of the American Academy
76 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

And finally, the United States volte- These were individual, specific de-
face in 1948, just when only the most cisions. Had they been otherwise, the
serious cases were left to try, and pre- failure today would not be so great, or
vented from becoming a complete rout the fiasco so obvious. Although it is
at first by General Clay personally and too early to anticipate the verdict of
later by German anti-Nazi officials, history, the writer feels that it will
must be ascribed to too long delayed probably be that this attempt at a
and uninformed congressional pressure, "revolution by decree" was a disastrous
and to United States public indifference. failure, to a considerable extent an un-
of Political and Social Science,Vol. 264 (July necessary one, and one for which the
1949), pp. 115-23; for criticismof their lack responsibility must rest at least as
of humility, Reinhold Niebuhr, "Germany:
on the shoulders of the con-
Vengeance or Justice," The Nation, Vol. heavily
CLXIX, No. 4 (July 23, 1949), p. 90. querors as on those of the conquered.

William E. Griffith, Cambridge, Massachusetts, is Teaching Fellow in History and

General Education at Harvard University. He served during and after World War II as
Special Branch Officer, Regierungsbezirk Unterfranken, Bavaria; as Secretary, Denazifi-
cation Review Board, and Deputy Chief, Special Branch, Office of Military Government
for Bavaria; and during 1947-48 as Chief, Special (later Denazification) Branch and De-
nazification Adviser, Office of Military Government for Bavaria.