THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA[2] COSCOLUELLA Y
BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, [3] dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R.
No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and
ordered the defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey
title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855
square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil,
which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141
P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002
(10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights which
I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of
Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall
have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G.
Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every
year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and
Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give
yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela
y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I
have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee,
mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs
of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75)
piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly
should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my
addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392
from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter
shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina
shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No.
1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot
negotiate with others than my near descendants and my sister." [4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner),
Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned
heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the
defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:

1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in
disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near
descendants and sister of the testatrix.

2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of
sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y
Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil,
despite repeated demands for compliance.

3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in case of
the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the
obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.

The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No.
1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of
Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.

During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein
petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an
amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:

"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be
delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:

75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names,
Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop
year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as
mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next
succeeding crop years.

That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in
cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon,
taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the
total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).

That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment, payable on or
before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:

For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before
December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before
December of crop year 1989-90;

For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before
December of crop year 1990-91; and

For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before
December of crop year 1991-92."[5]

However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial
delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.

On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing
as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is prematurely
filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there
maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated exaction from them simply because they
are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant
the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as
creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to
establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim
under the Codicil.

In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED without
prejudice.

SO ORDERED."[6]

On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court;
ratiocinating and ordering thus:

"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100
piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under
Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to
plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985;
and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No.
1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court
deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge
Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate
proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and
distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by
the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392
until she dies.

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering
defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with
its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

SO ORDERED."[7]

Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this
Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot
1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that
the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of
the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with Article 882
of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence
or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as
there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to
deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and
without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any
effect.

The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the substituted
heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants" without a
definite identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843 [8] and
845[9] of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.

The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated
from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private
respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was,
precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner
pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent[10] and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate
children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are
compulsory heirs.[11] Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the
successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of
subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by
the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his
death.

In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the
condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon
the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said
property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein
private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private
respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter
through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against
petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.

Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable
because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the
testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of
sugar to private respondent.

Again, the contention is without merit.

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs
first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of
another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce
the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, [12] or (2) leave his/her property to
one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution.[13] The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation.[14] In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil
do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be
seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a
fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to
transmit the same later to the second heir.[15] In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact
allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or
the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the
second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution."[16] Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not
definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation
to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the
second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree
from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not
related by first degree to the second heir.[17] In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all
related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in
the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in
point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:

Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by the
testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that
such was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or
his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything
he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this
obligation.

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot
take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most
analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession
as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of
the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed
by the testator upon the heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not
affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. [19] On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary
disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the
testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. [20] To
some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition. [21]
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended
that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix
imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred
piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the
latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his
institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should
the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because
it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the
heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the
intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.
[22]

Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has only a right
of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize
was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any
of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made. [23] Such construction as will sustain and uphold
the Will in all its parts must be adopted.[24]

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of
sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise
negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver
the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of
seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is
clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the
sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said
obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had
become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive
compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the private
respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private
respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject
property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his
property, to take effect after his death.[25] Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends
how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will
cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making
a Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December
23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs

SO ORDERED.

Melo, J., (Chairman), concur in the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.

 Vitug, J., see separate opinion.

Panganiban, J., join the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.

334 SCRA 522 Civil Law Succession Transmissible Obligations

A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee to a 511, 855 hectare land. A
condition was however imposed to the effect that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime of said Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants, shall continue delivering the
fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.
In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey the said land to the estate of
Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny
failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation
of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term near descendants in the will of Aleja pertains to the near descendants
of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of
his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.

ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with the terms of the Will left by Aleja Belleza.

HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The near descendants being referred to in the
will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised property was already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla
when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same property was transmitted to
Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not
extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were transmitted to
his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the
estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear therefore, that Johnny should have
continued complying with the terms of the Will. His failure to do so shall give rise to an obligation for him to
reconvey the property to the estate of Aleja.
G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR
B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS
OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 affirming with modification the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian,
et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages is sought. in these
proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however reinstated upon a second
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents were required to comment thereon. The
petition was thereafter given due course and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These,
together with the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the case.

First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:

The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He owned
extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate
was divided among his three (3) children as follows:

(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena
Locsin;

(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose,
Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;

(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the
residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his
marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she
had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other properties
acquired by the spouses in the course of their union, 1 which however was not blessed with children.

Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System. Those that Mariano
inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin,
married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2

Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all
his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes.
Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of
them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his
"Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian
relatives." 4

Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was
probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the family. As
directed in his will, Don a Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was
Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate court for
approval, 6Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased
and form part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are
conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Don a Catalina was closest to her nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes,
her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two:
Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of
all the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-
nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and, more often than
not, the witnesses to the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or
their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.

Don Mariano relied on Don a Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death,
as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Don a
Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their
respective nephews and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties which she had received
from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES

23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481

favor of Mariano Locsin

1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000

Jose R. Locsin

1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian

1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509

favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin

2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045

favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin

3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)

favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin

4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio

favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco

5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian

6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto -

favor of Aurea B. Locsin

7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto -

favor of Aurea B. Locsin

15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto -

Aurea Locsin
16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado

17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin

19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto -

favor of Mariano Locsin

1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Rosario whose maternal
grandfather was Getulio
Locsin

2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Rosario but the rentals
from bigger portion of
Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were assigned to
Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Cornelio

Of her own properties, Don a Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and nieces and others:

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE

2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000

Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
(6,825 sqm. when
resurveyed)

24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000

in favor of Francisco M.
Maquiniana

26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300

favor of Francisco
Maquiniana

27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000

favor of Ireneo Mamia

28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750

favor of Zenaida Buiza

29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500

favor of Felisa Morjella

30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000

favor of Inocentes Motocinos

31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500

favor of Casimiro Mondevil
32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200
favor of Juan Saballa

25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500

of Rogelio Marticio

Don a Catalina died on July 6, 1977.

Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the transfers she had
made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the
relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them
under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies
which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.

In 1989, or six (6) years after Don a Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already
received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City
(Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her
lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent
the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Don a Catalina did not join the action.

After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin
defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the defendants:

(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful
heirs and entitled to the entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest
collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of
Catalina;

(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange and all other instruments conveying any
part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in the inventory of known
properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;

(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all certificates of title and other transfers
of the real properties, subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives therefrom, and issue new ones
to the plaintiffs;

(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership and possession of all such properties to
the plaintiffs, together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered, and all the fruits and incomes
received by the defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal interest from the filing of this action; and where
reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons that might have intervened and prevent the same,
defendants shall pay for the value of such properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal interest
from the filing, of this case

(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the
further sum of P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and

(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in the amount of
P30,000.00 without prejudice to any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.

Costs against the defendants. 9

The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its now appealed judgment
on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews and nieces of Don a
Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10)
years before her death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11 Property which Don a Catalina had transferred
or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to
which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of
her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right
arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter
vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12

There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Don a Catalina, in transferring the properties she had
received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the
private respondents' rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not
pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer
of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her
freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which,
even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:

Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof, provided he
reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the
time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation,
the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected. (634a)

The lower court capitalized on the fact that Don a Catalina was already 90 years old when she died on July 6, 1977.
It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and
morally pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which
she had inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.

For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Don a Catalina had already begun transferring to
her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on
January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed
away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year, or on March 22,
1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15

On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Don a Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and
Agapito Lorete. 17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the
genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and
the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.

Among Don a, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of property which she made in
favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18

There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Don a Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made
those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she was
transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor
of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) one-half (or
5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to
Julian Locsin. 19

From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and other persons, namely:
Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan
Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by the private respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Don a Catalina sold some lots not only to Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin,
and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to make that conveyance to
Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other pieces of property to
Aurea and Mariano II?

The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a "consciousness of
its real origin" which carries the implication that said estate consisted of properties which his wife had inherited
from her parents, flies in the teeth of Don a Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33
are the private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of the
marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage."
She would have known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal property so it
is safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by
the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the
assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false
inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her
eventually.

This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano died, he and his wife
(Don a Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective properties should eventually revert to their
respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Don a Catalina, he
would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.

Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Don a Catalina's nephews and nieces, those
closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c)
her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and
Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the
Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that
Don a Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact,
considering their closeness to Don a Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ
"fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or donate her properties to them. Don a
Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-
in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and donations which she signed
in favor of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The
(1) deed of donation dated November 19,
1974 23 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero,
and (3) still another deed dated September 9, 1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio
Cornelio (who is married to Don a Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to another
niece, Maria Olbes. 26The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974 27 were witnessed by
Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but
free and voluntary acts on her part.

Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this action
for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had
been consummated, and six (6) years after Don a Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject
transactions were recorded in the Registry of Property, 28 whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to
redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said
transactions because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world. 29

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and
reconveyance of properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is
DISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein. SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN,et al.,petitioners, vs.The CA,JOSE JAUCIAN, et al., respondents.
Facts:
Don Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina Jaucian Locsin,as
the sole and universal heir of all his properties.
Thes p o u s e s b e i n g c h i l d l e s s , h a d a g r e e d t h a t t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s , a f t e r b o
th of them shal l h ave di ed sh ou ld r e v e r t t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s i d e s o f t h e f a m i l
y , i . e . , Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives"(i.e., brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives."Don Mariano died of cancer on
September 14,1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings
No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the family. Don Mariano relied on Don a Catalina to
carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as
if i n o b e d i e n c e t o h i s v o i c e f r o m t h e g r a v e , a n d f u l l y cognizant that she was
also advancing in years,
Don aC a t a l i n a b e g a n t r a n s f e r r i n g , b y s a l e , d o n a t i o n o r a s s i g n m e n t , D o n
M a r i a n o ' s a s w e l l a s h e r o w n , properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She
m a d e t h e f o l l o w i n g s a l e s a n d d o n a t i o n o f p r o p e r t i e s which she had received from her
husband's estate, to hisLocsin nephews and nieces: Four years before her death, she had made a will on
October 22, 1973 she had made a will affirming a n d r a t i f y i n g t h e t r a n s f e r s s h e h a d m a d e d u r i n g
h e r lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed
that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to
them under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive,
except some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to
distribute.I n 1 9 8 9 , s o m e o f h e r J a u c i a n n e p h e w s a n d n i e c e s w h o h a d a l r e a d y r e c e
i v e d t h e i r l e g a c i e s a n d h e r e d i t a r y s h a r e s f r o m h e r e s t a t e , f i l e d a c t i o n i n t h e RTC-
Legaspi to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging
thatthe conveyances were inofficious, without
consideration,a n d i n t e n d e d s o l e l y t o c i r c u m v e n t t h e l a w s o n successi
on. Those who were closest to Don a Catalina did not join the action.After the trial, judgment was rendered
in favor of Jaucian, and against the Locsin. The CA affirmed the said decision, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the nephews and nieces of Don aC a t a l i n a J . Vd a . d e L o c s i n , a r e e n t i t l e d t o i n h e r i t
t h e properties which she had already disposed of more thanten (10) years before her death.
Held: NO
They are not entitled since those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property
and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the t i m e o f ( t h e d e c e d e n t ' s ) d e a t h a n d
t h o s e w h i c h h a v e accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession."T h e r i g h t s t o a p e r s o n ' s s u c c e s s i o n a r e transmitted from
the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. Property which Don a Catalina had
transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer f o r m e d p a r t o f h e r e s t a t e a t t h e
t i m e o f h e r d e a t h t o which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property
that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs. Even if those transfers were,
one and all,
treateda s d o n a t i o n s , t h e r i g h t a r i s i n g u n d e r c e r t a i n circumst
ances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to
the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.
Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any
such,hence t h e r e w e r e n o l e g i t i m e s t h a t c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y b e i m p a i r e d b y a n y
t r a n s f e r o f h e r p r o p e r t y d u r i n g h e r lifetime
. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire
estate subject only to the limitation set forth inArt. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the
respondents may not invoke: Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the
donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the d o n a t i o n , a r e b y l a w
e n t i t l e d t o b e s u p p o r t e d b y t h e donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be
reduced on petition of any person affected. Petition for review is granted
G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993

TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR
LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA,
QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA * ABAPO VELANO,
and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO
CANEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo
Caballero, respondents.

Palma, Palma & Associates for petitioners.

Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Presented for resolution by this Court in the present petition for review on certiorari is the issue of whether or not
the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the
requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code.

The records show that on December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the
twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting
witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. The said testator was duly assisted
by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of that last
will. 1 It was declared therein, among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his
real and personal properties to Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G.
Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator. 2

Four months later, or on April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding No.
3899-R before Branch II of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his last will and
testament. The probate court set the petition for hearing on August 20, 1979 but the same and subsequent
scheduled hearings were postponed for one reason to another. On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before
his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. 3 On February 25, 1981, Benoni Cabrera, on of the legatees
named in the will, sough his appointment as special administrator of the testator's estate, the estimated value of
which was P24,000.00, and he was so appointed by the probate court in its order of March 6, 1981. 4

Thereafter, herein petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition,
entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero" and docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3965-R,
before Branch IX of the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Cebu. On October 18, 1982, herein petitioners had their
said petition intestate proceeding consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 3899-R in Branch II of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu and opposed thereat the probate of the Testator's will and the appointment of a special
administrator for his estate. 5

Benoni Cabrera died on February 8, 1982 hence the probate court, now known as Branch XV of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, appointed William Cabrera as special administrator on June 21, 1983. Thereafter, on July 20, 1983, it
issued an order for the return of the records of Special Proceeding No. 3965-R to the archives since the testate
proceeding for the probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first. On March 26, 1984 the case was reraffled
and eventually assigned to Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu where it remained until the conclusion of
the probate proceedings. 6

In the course of the hearing in Special Proceeding No. 3899-R, herein petitioners appeared as oppositors and
objected to the allowance of the testator's will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator
was already in the poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise
reiterated the issue as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator therein. 7

On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses, Cipriano Labuca, and the notary public Atty. Filoteo Manigos,
testified that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind
and that, contrary to the assertions of the oppositors, Mateo Caballero was in good health and was not unduly
influenced in any way in the execution of his will. Labuca also testified that he and the other witnesses attested and
signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The other two attesting witnesses were not
presented in the probate hearing as the had died by then. 8

On April 5, 1988, the probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament
of the late Mateo Caballero, on the ratiocination that:

. . . The self-serving testimony of the two witnesses of the oppositors cannot overcome the positive testimonies of
Atty. Filoteo Manigos and Cipriano Labuca who clearly told the Court that indeed Mateo Caballero executed the Last
Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "C" on December 5, 1978. Moreover, the fact that it was Mateo Caballero
who initiated the probate of his Will during his lifetime when he caused the filing of the original petition now
marked Exhibit "D" clearly underscores the fact that this was indeed his Last Will. At the start, counsel for the
oppositors manifested that he would want the signature of Mateo Caballero in Exhibit "C" examined by a
handwriting expert of the NBI but it would seem that despite their avowal and intention for the examination of this
signature of Mateo Caballero in Exhibit "C", nothing came out of it because they abandoned the idea and instead
presented Aurea Caballero and Helen Caballero Campo as witnesses for the oppositors.

All told, it is the finding of this Court that Exhibit "C" is the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero and that it
was executed in accordance with all the requisites of the law. 9

Undaunted by the said judgment of the probate court, petitioners elevated the case in the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 19669. They asserted therein that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation
clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the
testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

On October 15, 1991, respondent court promulgated its decision 10 affirming that of the trial court, and ruling that
the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code,
thus:

The question therefore is whether the attestation clause in question may be considered as having substantialy
complied with the requirements of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. What appears in the attestation clause which the
oppositors claim to be defective is "we do certify that the testament was read by him and the attestator, Mateo
Caballero, has published unto us the foregoing will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the acknowledgment,
each page numbered correlatively in letters of the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament, and he
has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin in
the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us (emphasis supplied).

To our thinking, this is sufficient compliance and no evidence need be presented to indicate the meaning that the
said will was signed by the testator and by them (the witnesses) in the presence of all of them and of one another.
Or as the language of the law would have it that the testator signed the will "in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another." If not completely or ideally perfect in accordance with the wordings of Art. 805 but (sic) the
phrase as formulated is in substantial compliance with the requirement of the law." 11

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling of respondent court, but the same was denied in the
latter's resolution of January 14, 1992, 12 hence this appeal now before us. Petitioners assert that respondent court
has ruled upon said issue in a manner not in accord with the law and settled jurisprudence on the matter and are
now questioning once more, on the same ground as that raised before respondent court, the validity of the
attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero.
We find the present petition to be meritorious, as we shall shortly hereafter, after some prefatory observations
which we feel should be made in aid of the rationale for our resolution of the controversy.

1. A will has been defined as a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate after his death. 13 Under the Civil Code,
there are two kinds of wills which a testator may execute. 14 the first kind is the ordinary or attested will, the
execution of which is governed by Articles 804 to 809 of the Code. Article 805 requires that:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or
by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also
sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation should state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction,
in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witness, it shall be interpreted to them.

In addition, the ordinary will must be acknowledged before a notary public by a testator and the attesting
witness. 15hence it is likewise known as notarial will. Where the attestator is deaf or deaf-mute, Article 807
requires that he must personally read the will, if able to do so. Otherwise, he should designate two persons who
would read the will and communicate its contents to him in a practicable manner. On the other hand, if the testator
is blind, the will should be read to him twice; once, by anyone of the witnesses thereto, and then again, by the
notary public before whom it is acknowledged. 16

The other kind of will is the holographic will, which Article 810 defines as one that is entirely written, dated, and
signed by the testator himself. This kind of will, unlike the ordinary type, requires no attestation by witnesses. A
common requirement in both kinds of will is that they should be in writing and must have been executed in a
language or dialect known to the testator. 17

However, in the case of an ordinary or attested will, its attestation clause need not be written in a language or
dialect known to the testator since it does not form part of the testamentary disposition. Furthermore, the language
used in the attestation clause likewise need not even be known to the attesting witnesses. 18 The last paragraph of
Article 805 merely requires that, in such a case, the attestation clause shall be interpreted to said witnesses.

An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the
instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution the same. 19 It is a separate
memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives
affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. 20 It is
made for the purpose of preserving in a permanent form a record of the facts that attended the execution of a
particular will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the attesting witnesses, or other casualty, such facts may
still be proved. 21

Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of
the will, 22 should state (1) the number of the pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed,
or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and
(3) that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its
pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or
decrease in the pages; 23 whereas the subscription of the signature of the testator and the attesting witnesses is
made for the purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same
instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses. 24

Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due execution of the will as
embodied in the attestation clause. 25 The attestation clause, therefore, provide strong legal guaranties for the due
execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof. 26 As it appertains only to the witnesses and not to the
testator, it need be signed only by them. 27 Where it is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as
it would be possible and easy to add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the testator and its
witnesses. 28

In its report, the Code Commission commented on the reasons of the law for requiring the formalities to be
followed in the execution of wills, in the following manner:

The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this Project consists in
the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in
expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and
the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator.

This objective is in accord with the modern tendency with respect to the formalities in the execution of wills. . . . 29

2. An examination of the last will and testament of Mateo Caballero shows that it is comprised of three sheets all of
which have been numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page thereof bearing the respective
signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses. The part of the will containing the testamentary
dispositions is expressed in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is signed at the foot thereof by the testator. The
attestation clause in question, on the other hand, is recited in the English language and is likewise signed at the end
thereof by the three attesting witnesses hereto. 30 Since it is the proverbial bone of contention, we reproduce it
again for facility of reference:

We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our
respective names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the testator, MATEO CABALLERO;
has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each page
numbered correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament and he has the
same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence
of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us.

It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the
presence of the testator and of one another. "Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is the act
of senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest a will
is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal
publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same paper the names of the
witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification. 31

In Taboada vs. Rizal, 32 we clarified that attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in
order to see and take note mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will
and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses'
names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the
testator. As it involves a mental act, there would be no means, therefore, of ascertaining by a physical examination
of the will whether the witnesses had indeed signed in the presence of the testator and of each other unless this is
substantially expressed in the attestation.

It is contended by petitioners that the aforequoted attestation clause, in contravention of the express requirements
of the third paragraph of Article 805 of the Civil Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically state the fact that
the attesting witnesses the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses,
likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. We agree.

What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it
recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and
states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that
said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on
the left hand margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately
preceded by the words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of
the testator and in the presence of each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the
witnesses, it must, however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses
since said phrase immediately follows the words "he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis ,
is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.

It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which
must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are
correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as
merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the
substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in the pertinent provision thereon in the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not
proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article
805" (Emphasis supplied.)

While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of
each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said
witness affixed their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other since, as petitioners
correctly observed, the presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does
not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or
occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity. 33

We believe that the further comment of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes 34 regarding Article 809, wherein he urged
caution in the application of the substantial compliance rule therein, is correct and should be applied in the case
under consideration, as well as to future cases with similar questions:

. . . The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself:
whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether
the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All theses are facts that the will itself can reveal, and
defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number
of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the
attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings. (Emphasis ours.)

3. We stress once more that under Article 809, the defects and imperfections must only be with respect to the form
of the attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a will invalid
should it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. In this regard,
however, the manner of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be limited to merely an
examination of the will itself without resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or written.

The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. 35 In such a
situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific
element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the
defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible way by which we can read into the questioned
attestation clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the
signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

Furthermore, the rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be revoked or relied on by respondents
since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a
consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause
or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual
requirements were actually complied within the execution of the will. In other words, defects must be remedied by
intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself.

In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be
supplied by only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis
whatsoever from with such facts may be plausibly deduced. What private respondent insists on are the testimonies
of his witnesses alleging that they saw the compliance with such requirements by the instrumental witnesses,
oblivious of the fact that he is thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be
doing by the indirection what in law he cannot do directly.

4. Prior to the advent of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950, there was a divergence of views as to which manner of
interpretation should be followed in resolving issues centering on compliance with the legal formalities required in
the execution of wills. The formal requirements were at that time embodied primarily in Section 618 of Act No. 190,
the Code of Civil Procedure. Said section was later amended by Act No. 2645, but the provisions respecting said
formalities found in Act. No. 190 and the amendment thereto were practically reproduced and adopted in the Civil
Code.

One view advance the liberal or substantial compliance rule. This was first laid down in the case of Abangan vs.
Abangan, 36 where it was held that the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. Nonetheless, it was also emphasized that one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will, hence when an interpretation already given assures
such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded. The subsequent cases of Avera
vs. Garcia, 37 Aldaba vs. Roque, 38 Unson vs. Abella, 39 Pecson vs. Coronel, 40 Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, et
al., 41 and Nayve vs. Mojal, et al. 42 all adhered to this position.

The other view which advocated the rule that statutes which prescribe the formalities that should be observed in
the execution of wills are mandatory in nature and are to be strictly construed was followed in the subsequent
cases of In the Matter of the Estate of Saguinsin, 43 In re Will of Andrada, 44 Uy Coque vs. Sioca, 45 In re Estate of
Neumark, 46and Sano vs. Quintana. 47

Gumban vs. Gorecho, et al., 48 provided the Court with the occasion to clarify the seemingly conflicting decisions in
the aforementioned cases. In said case of Gumban, the attestation clause had failed to state that the witnesses
signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator. The will in
question was disallowed, with these reasons therefor:

In support of their argument on the assignment of error above-mentioned, appellants rely on a series of cases of
this court beginning with (I)n the Matter of the (E)state of Saguinsin ([1920], 41 Phil., 875), continuing with In
re Will of Andrada [1921], 42 Phil., 180), Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca [1922], 43 Phil., 405), and In re Estate of
Neumark ([1923], 46 Phil., 841), and ending with Sano vs. Quintana ([1925], 48 Phil., 506). Appellee counters with
the citation of a series of cases beginning with Abangan vs. Abangan ([1919], 40 Phil., 476), continuing
through Aldaba vs. Roque ([1922], 43 Phil., 378), and Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios ([1924], 46 Phil., 922), and
culminating in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar ([1924], 47 Phil., 152). In its last analysis, our task is to contrast and, if
possible, conciliate the last two decisions cited by opposing counsel, namely, those of Sano vs. Quintana, supra,
and Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra.

In the case of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, it was decided that an attestation clause which does not recite that the
witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is
defective, and such a defect annuls the will. The case of Uy Coque vs. Sioca, supra, was cited, but the case of Nayve vs.
Mojal and Aguilar, supra, was not mentioned. In contrast, is the decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra,
wherein it was held that the attestation clause must estate the fact that the testator and the witnesses reciprocally
saw the signing of the will, for such an act cannot be proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not stated
therein. It was also held that the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will can
be proved also by the mere examination of the signatures appearing on the document itself, and the omission to
state such evident facts does not invalidate the will.

It is a habit of courts to reaffirm or distinguish previous cases; seldom do they admit inconsistency in doctrine. Yet
here, unless aided impossible to reconcile the Mojal and Quintana decisions. They are fundamentally at variance. If
we rely on one, we affirm. If we rely on the other, we reverse.

In resolving this puzzling question of authority, three outstanding points may be mentioned. In the first place, the
Mojal, decision was concurred in by only four members of the court, less than a majority, with two strong
dissenting opinions; the Quintana decision was concurred in by seven members of the court, a clear majority, with
one formal dissent. In the second place, the Mojal decision was promulgated in December, 1924, while the Quintana
decision was promulgated in December, 1925; the Quintana decision was thus subsequent in point of time. And in
the third place, the Quintana decision is believed more nearly to conform to the applicable provisions of the law.

The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law of the case is here found in section
61 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of the same Code, as unamended.
It is in part provided in section 61, as amended that "No will . . . shall be valid . . . unless . . .." It is further provided in
the same section that "The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other." Codal section 634 provides that "The
will shall be disallowed in either of the following case: 1. If not executed and attested as in this Act provided." The
law not alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and makes use of the negative, to
enforce legislative intention. It is not within the province of the courts to disregard the legislative purpose so
emphatically and clearly expressed.

We adopt and reaffirm the decision in the case of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, and, to the extent necessary, modify the
decision in the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra. (Emphases in the original text).

But after the Gumban clarificatory pronouncement, there were decisions of the Court that once more appeared to
revive the seeming diversity of views that was earlier threshed out therein. The cases of Quinto vs.
Morata, 49Rodriguez vs. Alcala, 50 Enchevarria vs. Sarmiento, 51 and Testate Estate of Toray 52 went the way of the
ruling as restated in Gumban. But De Gala vs. Gonzales, et al., 53 Rey vs. Cartagena, 54 De Ticson vs. De
Gorostiza, 55 Sebastian vs. Panganiban, 56 Rodriguez vs. Yap, 57 Grey vs. Fabia, 58 Leynez vs. Leynez, 59 Martir vs.
Martir, 60 Alcala vs. De Villa, 61Sabado vs.
Fernandez, 62 Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 63 and Lopez vs. Liboro, 64 veered away from the strict interpretation rule and
established a trend toward an application of the liberal view.

The Code Commission, cognizant of such a conflicting welter of views and of the undeniable inclination towards a
liberal construction, recommended the codification of the substantial compliance rule, as it believed this rule to be
in accord with the modern tendency to give a liberal approach to the interpretation of wills. Said rule thus became
what is now Article 809 of the Civil Code, with this explanation of the Code Commission:

The present law provides for only one form of executing a will, and that is, in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines had previously upheld the strict compliance with the legal formalities and had even said that the
provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended regarding the contents of the attestation
clause were mandatory, and non-compliance therewith invalidated the will (Uy Coque vs. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405).
These decisions necessarily restrained the freedom of the testator in disposing of his property.

However, in recent years the Supreme Court changed its attitude and has become more liberal in the interpretation
of the formalities in the execution of wills. This liberal view is enunciated in the cases of Rodriguez vs. Yap, G.R. No.
45924, May 18, 1939; Leynez vs. Leynez, G.R. No. 46097, October 18, 1939; Martir vs. Martir, G.R. No. 46995, June
21, 1940; and Alcala vs. Villa, G.R. No. 47351, April 18, 1941.

In the above mentioned decisions of our Supreme Court, it has practically gone back to the original provisions of
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure before its amendment by Act No. 2645 in the year 1916. To turn this
attitude into a legislative declaration and to attain the main objective of the proposed Code in the liberalization of
the manner of executing wills, article 829 of the Project is recommended, which reads:

"Art. 829. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is
proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article
829." 65

The so-called liberal rule, the Court said in Gil vs. Murciano, 66 "does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it
open the door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the
dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply
missing details that should appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration into its
confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This
clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results."

It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of
the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not
obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied
except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will
itself. 67

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of respondent court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is accordingly directed to forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No.
3899-R (Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero) and to REVIVE Special
Proceeding No. 3965-R (In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active case and thereafter
duly proceed with the settlement of the estate of the said decedent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

CAEDA VS. CA G.R. NO. 103554 MAY 28, 1993

FACTS: Mateo Caballero executed a last will and testament on December 5, 1978 leaving by way of legacies and
devises his real and personal properties to persons not appearing to be related to him. In the course of the probate
proceedings, herein petitioners, who claim to be nephews and nieces of the deceased, appeared as oppositors
raising the issue of genuineness of the signature of the testator. The probate court found the last will and testament
to be in order.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), petitioners assert that the will in question is null and void for the reason
that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the
will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. What appears in the attestation clause is as follows: "we
do certify that the testament was read by him and the attestator, Mateo Caballero, has published unto us the foregoing
will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in letters of the
upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament, and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the
spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin in the presence of the said testator and in the presence
of each and all of us. The CA found the quoted clause in order and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the above attestation clause is in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Civil
Code and merits the allowance of the wills.

RULING:NO.

Among the requirements of the contents of the attestation under Article 805 of the Civil Code is the it must state
that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that said
witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The subscription of the signature of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of
authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same instrument executed by the
testator and attested to by the witnesses. The attestation clause, therefore, provide strong legal guaranties for the
due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof. Where it is left unsigned, it would result in the
invalidation of the will as it would be possible and easy to add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence
of the testator and its witnesses.

Careful reading of the attestation clause shows that the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that
said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be
characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the
application of the substantial compliance rule.

The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be invoked or relied on by respondents since it
presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a
consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause
or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual
requirements were actually complied within the execution of the will. In other words, defects must be remedied by
intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself.

In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be
supplied by only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis
whatsoever from with such facts may be plausibly deduced.

G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951

In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
Elviro L. Peralta and Hermenegildo A. Prieto for petitioner.
Faustino B. Tobia, Juan I. Ines and Federico Tacason for respondents.

PARAS, C.J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing the will of Antero Mercado dated January 3,
1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect and contains the following attestation clause:

We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of Antero Mercado was signed by
himself and also by us below his name and of this attestation clause and that of the left margin of the three pages
thereof. Page three the continuation of this attestation clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken
and understood by the testator, and it bears the corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and
all them were signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the testator
and all and each and every one of us witnesses.

In testimony, whereof, we sign this statement, this the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred forty three,
(1943) A.D.
(Sgd.) NUMERIANO EVANGELISTA (Sgd.) "ROSENDA CORTES

(Sgd.) BIBIANA ILLEGIBLE

The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero Mercado, followed
below by "A reugo del testator" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross
immediately after his name. The Court of Appeals, reversing the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte, ruled that the attestation clause failed (1) to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of the
three pages and at the end of the will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request of the testator in the presence
of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses; (2) to certify that after the signing of the name of the
testator by Atty. Javier at the former's request said testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the
left margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at the end thereof; (3) to certify that the three
witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the presence of the testator and of each other.

In our opinion, the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty.
Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The herein petitioner (who is appealing by way of certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals) argues, however, that there is no need for such recital because the cross written by the testator after his
name is a sufficient signature and the signature of Atty. Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner's theory is that
the cross is as much a signature as a thumbmark, the latter having been held sufficient by this Court in the cases of
De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104; Dolar vs. Diancin, 55 Phil., 479; Payad vs. Tolentino, 62 Phil., 848;
Neyra vs. Neyra, 76 Phil., 296 and Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil., 429.

It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of
the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of the
cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a
thumbmark.

What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine there is a sufficient recital in the attestation clause as
to the signing of the will by the testator in the presence of the witnesses, and by the latter in the presence of the
testator and of each other. Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with against the petitioner.

So ordered.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased):
APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, (Branch III,
Maasin), respondent.

Erasmo M. Diola counsel for petition.

Hon. Avelino S. Rosal in his own behalf.

GUTIERREZ, JR. J.:

This is a petition for review of the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch III, in
Special Proceedings No. R-1713, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez,
Deceased; Apolonio Taboada, Petitioner", which denied the probate of the will, the motion for reconsideration and
the motion for appointment of a special administrator.

In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last will and
testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of two pages. The first
page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix
alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting
witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.

Since no opposition was filed after the petitioner's compliance with the requirement of publication, the trial court
commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the petitioner's evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted
his evidence and presented Vicente Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, who testified on its
genuineness and due execution.

The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamatian issued the questioned order denying the probate of
the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its execution. In the same order, the petitioner was also required
to submit the names of the intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses so that they could be properly
notified and could intervene in the summary settlement of the estate.

Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a manifestation and/or motion, ex
partepraying for a thirty-day period within which to deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the
disallowance of the will. He also asked that the ten-day period required by the court to submit the names of
intestate heirs with their addresses be held in abeyance.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the will. However, the motion
together with the previous manifestation and/or motion could not be acted upon by the Honorable Ramon C.
Pamatian due to his transfer to his new station at Pasig, Rizal. The said motions or incidents were still pending
resolution when respondent Judge Avelino S. Rosal assumed the position of presiding judge of the respondent
court.

Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator.

Subsequently, the new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the manifestation and/or motion
filed ex parte. In the same order of denial, the motion for the appointment of special administrator was likewise
denied because of the petitioner's failure to comply with the order requiring him to submit the names of' the
intestate heirs and their addresses.

The petitioner decided to file the present petition.

For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the testatrix and all the three
instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one
another?

Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:

Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also
sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction,
in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the lacier witnesses and signed the will and the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to the witnesses, it shall
be interpreted to them.

The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to require that, for a notarial will to be valid, it
is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but an the three subscribing witnesses must also sign at the
same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another because the attesting witnesses to a
will attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to sign the
page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of that page.

On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not make it a condition
precedent or a matter of absolute necessity for the extrinsic validity of the wig that the signatures of the
subscribing witnesses should be specifically located at the end of the wig after the signature of the testatrix. He
contends that it would be absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an import on the space or
particular location where the signatures are to be found as long as this space or particular location wherein the
signatures are found is consistent with good faith and the honest frailties of human nature.

We find the petition meritorious.

Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's
execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done which the statute requires
for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is
the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will
which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).

Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was
subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.

The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation
clause.

While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be
ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).
The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the
law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of
giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to
prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator.
This objective is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will" (Report
of the Code commission, p. 103).

Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were not for the defect in the place of
signatures of the witnesses, he would have found the testimony sufficient to establish the validity of the will.

The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the
instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions,
especially so when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will
executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.

We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages
used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible
from the entire wig that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary
dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left
margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment.
The acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page".

In Singson v. Florentino, et al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the following observations with respect to the
purpose of the requirement that the attestation clause must state the number of pages used:

The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that
the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the win is written, which requirement
has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some
of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re will
of Andrada, 42 Phil., 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs.
Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the
attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is
missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by
evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While
the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last
part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our
opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a
broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely
technical considerations.

Icasiano v. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422, 429) has the following ruling which applies a similar liberal approach:

... Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only (sic) the fact that the testatrix and two other
witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public
before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and
literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose
conduct she had no control where the purpose of the law to guarantee the Identity of the testament and its
component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record
attests to the fun observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. Vs. Murciano, 49 Off.
Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) 'witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or
the attestation clause.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the respondent court which denied the probate
of tile will, the motion for reconsideration of the denial of probate, and the motion for appointment of a special
administrator are set aside. The respondent court is ordered to allow the probate of the wig and to conduct further
proceedings in accordance with this decision. No pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Acting Chairperson), Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J, is on leave.

Taboada vs. Rosal GR L-36033. November 5, 1982

FACTS Petitioner Apolonio Taboada filed a petition for probate of the will of the late Dorotea perez. The will
consisted of two pages, the first page containing all the testamentary dispositions of the testator and was signed at the
end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The
second page consisted of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment was signed at the end of the attestation
clause by the three witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix. The trial court disallowed the will for want
of formality in its execution because the will was signed at the bottom of the page solely by the testatrix, while the
three witnesses only signed at the left hand margin of the page. The judge opined that compliance with the formalities
of the law required that the witnesses also sign at the end of the will because the witnesses attest not only the will itself
but the signature of the testatrix. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE Was the object of attestation and subscription fully when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin
of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions?

HELD (SHORT RULING)

On certiorari, the Supreme Court held a) that the objects of attestation and subscription were fully met and satisfied in
the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the
testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly identified by a subscribing witness to be the same
will executed by the testatrix; and b) that the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages used in
writing the will would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that it is really and actually composed of only
two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses.

(LONG RULING [VERBATIM])

Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator himself
or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed. Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's
execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for
the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the
signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper as the will which
was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).

The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation
clause.

While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be
ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).

The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the law
on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is
in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will" (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 103).

The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental
witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so
when the will was properly identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the
testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.
G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919

In re will of Ana Abangan.

GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee, vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

Filemon Sotto for appellants.

M. Jesus Cuenco for appellee.

AVANCEA, J.:

On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July,
1916. From this decision the opponent's appealed.

Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the
disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of
the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the
bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and
the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects
whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted to
probate.

In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the testator and three
witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its
object (referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the
testator's dispositions. But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by
the testator and three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be
completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly,
the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator and the
witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that the statute requires that
this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As
these signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if
the signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be
unneccessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would add
nothing. We cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance the place where the testator and the
witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the bottom do not
guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient security.

In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been
removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute
disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.

What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering whether or not this
clause is an essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the will in question, the signatures of
the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities
not required by the statute. Moreover, referring specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is
not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to
the testator since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will.

Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains
only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both
sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded. lawphil.net

As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testarix knew the dialect in which
the will is written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and
in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the
contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which this will is written.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants.
So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-13431 Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil 476, AVANCENA

On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangans will executed July, 1916. From this decision
the opponents appealed.

The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by
Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following
sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of
these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters. These
omissions, according to appellants contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been
denied.

Whether or not the will was duly admitted to probate.

YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the testator and three
witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object the avoidance of substitution of
any of said sheets which may change the disposition of the testatrix. But when these dispositions are wholly
written on only one sheet (as in the instant case) signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses, their
signatures on the left margin of said sheet are not anymore necessary as such will be purposeless.

In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been
removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute
disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.

In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the
bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at
the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the
testator and the witnesses, or be paged.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testators last will, must be
disregarded.
Icasiano v. Icasiano Digest
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964

Facts:
1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his appointment as executor
thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog,
and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.

2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will while the
carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original
copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he signed the will. Nevertheless, he
affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other witnesses in his presence.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is
sufficient to deny probate of the will

RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the duplicated
bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a
duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other
will bu the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be probated.

The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of
a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the
identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is no intentional or deliberate deviation existed.

Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be signed by the
witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all respects
THIRD DIVISION

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, G.R. No. 157451

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales, and Garcia, JJ
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Promulgated:
Respondent.
December 16, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

T he law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it should not be
allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court
cannot attribute any reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the
December 12, 2002 Decision[2] and the March 7, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
44296. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its place
judgment is rendered approving and allowing probate to the said last will and testament of Placido Valmonte and
ordering the issuance of letters testamentary to the petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be remanded to the
court a quo for further and concomitant proceedings.[4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:

x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally
reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot
located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca
Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age
of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on
February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause
written down as COR PULMONALE.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated
June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary
dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator
and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause
and again on the left hand margin. It provides in the body that:

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:

I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident of 9200 Catmon Street,
Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare this
to be my last will and testament:

1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of the Catholic Church in accordance
with the rites and said Church and that a suitable monument to be erected and provided my by executrix (wife) to
perpetuate my memory in the minds of my family and friends;

2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion of the follow-
described properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]:

a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro Manila, described and
covered by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila registered jointly as co-owners with my
deceased sister (Ciriaca Valmonte), having share and share alike;

b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong and mixed materials used as my
residence and my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila also covered by Tax
Declaration No. A-025-00482, Makati, Metro-Manila, jointly in the name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte
and myself as co-owners, share and share alike or equal co-owners thereof;

3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties, including my savings account bank
book in USA which is in the possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever and wherever found, I give, devise
and bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte;

4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and testament, and it is my will
that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in Quezon City, Philippines.

The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:

1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA;

2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give
them proper notice pursuant to law;

3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities were not complied
with;

4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he being in an advance sate
of senility;

5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;

6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the petitioner and/or her
agents and/or assistants; and/or

7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his
will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;

and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of understanding and integrity.

At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public Atty. Floro Sarmiento who
prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and
Josie Collado. For the opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.

According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents house at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La
Union but they came to Manila every month to get his $366.00 monthly pension and stayed at the said Makati
residence. There were times though when to shave off on expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was in
one of his travels by his lonesome self when the notarial will was made. The will was witnessed by the spouses
Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no
knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of her husband, but just serendipitously found it in his
attache case after his death. It was only then that she learned that the testator bequeathed to her his properties and
she was named the executrix in the said will. To her estimate, the value of property both real and personal left by
the testator is worth more or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered mental
infirmity because despite his old age he went alone to the market which is two to three kilometers from their home
cooked and cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not accompany him, even traveled to Manila alone to
claim his monthly pension. Josefina also asserts that her husband was in good health and that he was hospitalized
only because of a cold but which eventually resulted in his death.

Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will, testified that it was in the first
week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office
and requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and
dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to
prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The
testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were
instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses
signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect
which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by
the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of
town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten
date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to
his observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.

The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public, and testified that the testator
went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village, Quezon City and requested them to
accompany him to the house of Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving his
instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on June 15, 1983; that they returned on June 15,
1983 for the execution of the will but were asked to come back instead on August 9, 1983 because of the absence of
the notary public; that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and
disposing mind and that he was strong and in good health; that the contents of the will was explained by the notary
public in the Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of them as witnesses attested and signed the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. And that during the execution, the testators wife, Josefina was not with
them.

The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other
children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity
of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old
and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati
residence and asked Leticias family to live with him and they took care of him. During that time, the testators
physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her
daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.

Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidence adduced, reduces the opposition to two
grounds, namely:

1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and

2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of
senility

It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate. [5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the
credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will.
Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that
his sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways[6] did not make him a person of unsound mind.

Hence, this Petition.[7]

Issues Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

I. Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.

II. Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud or trickery, and that
Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his last will and testament.

III. Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the subject will. [8]

In short, petitioner assails the CAs allowance of the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.

This Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue: Probate of a Will

At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under Section 1 of Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence presented during the trial may be examined and the
factual matters resolved by this Court when, as in the instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ
from those of the trial court.[9]
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will presented for
probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that must be satisfied for the probate
of a will.[10] Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:

Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some
other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time
of affixing his signature thereto.
In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by imputing fraud in its execution and
challenging the testators state of mind at the time.
Existence of Fraud in the Execution of a Will
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but maintains that the
circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud. Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who
is the testators wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses
in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the
attestation of the will.
Petitioner contends that it was highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to] almost immediately
plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to be [a] Fil-American
pensionado,[11] thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it
supposedly defies human reason, logic and common experience [12] for an old man with a severe psychological
condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is
cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the
document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding
which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made. [13]
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its
execution.[14] The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible
evidence of fraud.[15] Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of
fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. [16] That the
testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who
was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who werethe
ones who had taken the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years. [17]
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and
acknowledged on the same occasion.[18] More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by
three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.
[19]
Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public. [20] In any event,
we agree with the CA that the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses. [21]

The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985, October 13, 1986, and
October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively as follows:

Atty. Floro Sarmiento:

Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator and his witnesses were
supposed to be in your office?
A Yes sir.

Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house?
A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.

xxxxxxxxx
Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per acknowledgement appearing therein. Was this
the actual date when the document was acknowledged?
A Yes sir.

Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their respective signature on the first and
second pages of exhibit C?
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.

Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body of the document as well as the
attestation clause?
A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own handwriting August 9, 1983 on the
acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)

Eugenio Gomez:

Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the acknowledgement it is
dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and tell us this discrepancy in the date?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses; that was first week of June
and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.

Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your companions?
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)

Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:

Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?

xxxxxxxxx

A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out first time. We went there to talk
to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and testament. After that what they have talked what
will be placed in the testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go back on the 15 th of June. When we
returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to sign it, the will. That is why, for the third
time we went there on August 9 and that was the time we affixed our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)

Josie Collado:

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.

Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.

Q For what purpose?

A Our purpose is just to sign the will.

Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?

A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)[22]

Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand conspiracy in the commission of a fraud. There was no
showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The
testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. [23] Their
testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should
be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.[24]

Capacity to Make a Will

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines:

Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.

Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person
who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly
known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a
lucid interval.

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound
mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty,
and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court
was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he
owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was
sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives
from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.

Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,[25] which held thus:

"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full
testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are
numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of
mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a
weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to
enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a
sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease
or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually
be insane or of unsound mind."[26]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.