GACAL v. INFANTE, A.M. No.

RTJ041845, October 5, 2011

A. Granting of bail without a hearing is censurable for gross ignorance of the law and the rules

Every judge should be faithful to the law and should maintain professional competence. His role in the
administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law and jurisprudence, lest public
confidence in the Judiciary be eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct. In that light, the
failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of bail in capital offenses was inexcusable
and reflected gross ignorance of the law and the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement.
He well knew that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a matter of
judicial discretion, and that the discretion lay not in the determination of whether or not a hearing
should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecution's evidence of
guilt against the accused.

MATURAN v. GUTIERREZ-TORRES, A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-1606-MTJ, September 19, 2012

A. Inability of respondent judge to decide the cases in question within the reglementary period of
ninety (90) days from their date of submission, constitutes gross inefficiency and is violative of Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to "devote their
professional activity to judicial duties, which include xxx the performance of judicial functions and
responsibilities in court and the making of decisions xxx," and to "perform all judicial duties, including
the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness." Likewise, Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct imposes on all judges the duty to dispose of their courts
business promptly and to decide cases within the required periods. These judicial canons directly
demand efficiency from the judges in obvious recognition of the right of the public to the speedy
disposition of their cases. In such context, the saying justice delayed is justice denied becomes a true
encapsulation of the felt need for efficiency and promptness among judges. A judge like Judge
Gutierrez-Torres should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of the
obligation to promptly administer justice. She must cultivate a capacity for promptly rendering her
decisions.

BAYONLA v. REYES, A.C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011

A. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of her client that may come into her
possession.

Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 demands that the lawyer shall deliver the funds
and property of his client when due or upon demand, subject to the lawyers lien over the funds, or the
lawyers option to apply so much of the funds as may be necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to the client. The relationship between a lawyer and
her client is highly fiduciary, and prescribes on a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith.

There is no question that the money or property received by a lawyer for her client properly
belongs to the latter. Conformably with these canons of professional responsibility, we have
held that a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the property and money she has collected for
her client. This obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money collected by the
lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client. By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her
demand, Atty. Reyes violated the aforestated canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer
of Bayonla was unquestionably money held in trust to be immediately turned over to the client. Atty.
Reyes' failure to immediately account for and to deliver the money upon demand was deceit, for it
signified that she had converted the money to her own use, in violation of the trust Bayonla had reposed
in her. It constituted gross misconduct.

BEJARASCO, JR., v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 159781, February 2, 2011

A. Gross negligence of counsel should not be accompanied by clients own negligence or malice,
otherwise, client is bound by the counsels acts, including mistakes.

The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsels acts, including even mistakes in
the realm of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained,
holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope
of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself. A
recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the
client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the gross negligence should not be
accompanied by the clients own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the duty to be
vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up to date on the status of the case. Failing in this
duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him.

Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the
fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the clients duty to be in contact with his lawyer
from time to time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case hence, to
merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough.
Here, the petitioner took nearly 16 months from the issuance of the entry of judgment by the CA, and
almost 22 months from when the RTC affirmed the convictions before he actually filed his petition for
review in the CA.

LUBATON v. LAZARO, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013

A. Delay and failure to apply for extension is excusable except if it emanated from indolence, neglect,
or bad faith.

The 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is
mandatory. The period is reckoned from the date of the filing of the last pleading. If the Judge cannot
decide or resolve within the period, she can be allowed additional time to do so, provided she files a
written request for the extension of her time to decide the case or resolve the pending matter. Only a
valid reason may excuse a delay. The rule, albeit mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness
of the limitations that may prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the circumstances specific to
this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard respondent
Judge's limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule. With her undeniably heavy
inherited docket and the large volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note the
need for her to apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss. This
failure does happen frequently when one is too preoccupied with too much work and is faced with more
deadlines that can be humanly met. Most men call this failure inadvertence. A few characterize it as
oversight. In either case, it is excusable except if it emanated from indolence, neglect, or bad faith.

CONCERNED CITIZEN v. CATENA, A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16, 2013

A. Misrepresentation is a grave offense punishable even at first offense.

A finding of dishonesty against an employee in the Civil Service carries with it the penalty of dismissal.
Under Rule IV Section 52 (A) (1) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
Rules (Revised Uniform Rules), dishonesty is classified as a grave offense that is already punishable by
dismissal from the service even at the first offense. Considering that Catenas misrepresentation of her
eligibility concerned a material fact that enabled her to secure her appointment equated to her
deliberate fabrication of the truth concerning her eligibility, she was guilty of gross dishonesty. She
should not be allowed to remain in the service of the Judiciary, because no other office in the
Government exacted a greater demand for mortal righteousness from an official or employee than a
position in the Judiciary. Gross dishonesty on the part of an employee of the Judiciary is a very serious
offense that must be severely punished. Dismissal may be meted on the employee, unless she had
meanwhile ceased to be an employee, in which case a high fine shall be imposed.

DE LEON v. CASTELO, A.C. No. 8620, January 12, 2011

A. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead,
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Ethical norms that bind all attorneys, as officers of the Court, to act with the highest standards of
honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness. All attorneys are thereby enjoined to obey the laws of the
land, to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients. Being also servants of the Law, attorneys are
expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves exemplars worthy of
emulation by others. Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only the presumption of
regularity in the discharge of their duties, but also the immunity from liability to others for as long as the
performance of their obligations to their clients does not depart from their character as servants of the
Law and as officers of the Court. A plain reading of the pleadings indicates that the respondent did not
misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the contrary, he directly stated
in his answer and clarification that the Spouses were already deceased.