THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 178411. June 23, 2010.]

OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY
ADMINISTRATOR OF PARAAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ENGINEER OF
PARAAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN AND SANGGUNIANG
PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY VITALEZ, PARAAQUE CITY, TERESITA A.
GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R. ESGUERRA, ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR., MANUEL M.
ARGOTE, CONRADO M. CANLAS, JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L. GONZALES,
ESTER C. ASEHAN, MANUEL A. FUENTES, and MYRNA P. ROSALES, petitioners, vs.
MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V. EBIO, EDUARDO V.
EBIO, RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, and ARNEL V.
EBIO, respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the January 31, 2007 Decision1 and June 8, 2007 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The CA had reversed
the Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 196, issued on April 29, 2005 in
Civil Case No. 05-0155.
Below are the facts.
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting of 406 square
meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Paraaque City and covered
by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an
accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel
of land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro
Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966,
after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy, 4 Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration
over the said property in his name. 5 Since then, respondents have been religiously paying real property
taxes for the said property. 6
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro's daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedro's advice,
the couple established their home on the said lot. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured
building permits from the Paraaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the said
compound. 7 On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights 8 ceding his claim over the
entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro's name were
cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebio's name. 9
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08,
series of 1999 10 seeking assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the construction of an
access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road, projected to be eight (8)
meters wide and sixty (60) meters long, will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez
Compound 11 traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. When the city government advised all the
affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their opposition thereto. As a
result, the road project was temporarily suspended. 12 aTAEHc
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and
the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot. Respondents filed
letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of Interior and Local
Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor. 13 On June 29, 2003, the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez
held a meeting to discuss the construction of the proposed road. In the said meeting, respondents asserted
their opposition to the proposed project and their claim of ownership over the affected property. 14 On
November 14, 2003, respondents attended another meeting with officials from the city government, but no
definite agreement was reached by and among the parties. 15
 On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to
vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said
property. 16 Respondents sent a letter to the Office of the City Administrator asserting, in sum, their claim
over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. 17 The request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Paraaque City on April 21, 2005 and
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. 18 In the course of the proceedings, respondents
admitted before the trial court that they have a pending application for the issuance of a sales patent before
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 19
On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 20 denying the petition for lack of merit. The trial court
reasoned that respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right to the
property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales patent
has not yet been granted. Additionally, they failed to implead the Republic of the Philippines, which is an
indispensable party.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. 21
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January 31, 2007, the Court
of Appeals issued its Decision in favor of the respondents. According to the Court of Appeals
The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of the lands adjoining Cutcut Creek
particularly Road Lot No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the accreted portion beside RL 8.
The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8 containing an area of 291 square meters is
owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by TCT No. S-62176. The same RL 8 appears to have been
donated by the Guaranteed Homes to the City Government of Paraaque on 22 March 1966 and which
was accepted by the then Mayor FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April 1966. There is no evidence however,
when RL 8 has been intended as a road lot.
On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ possessed the accreted property
since 1930 per his Affidavit dated 21 March 1966 for the purpose of declaring the said property for taxation
purposes. The property then became the subject of Tax Declaration No. 20134 beginning the year 1967
and the real property taxes therefor had been paid for the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972,
1973, 1974, 1978, 1980, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime
in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were issued in favor of Appellant MARIO EBIO for the subject
property. On 21 April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights in the accreted property to MARIO
EBIO and his successors-in-interest.
Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing documentary evidence, it could be
concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the owner of the accreted property considering its ownership of the
adjoining RL 8 to which the accretion attached. However, this is without the application of the provisions
of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription which is likewise applicable in the instant case. DAEaTS
xxx xxx xxx
The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion which [was] duly
proven by the Appellants. It is clear that since 1930, Appellants together with their predecessor-in-
interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have been in exclusive possession of the subject property and starting 1964
had introduced improvements thereon as evidenced by their construction permits. Thus, even by
extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,] Appellants have acquired ownership of the property in question
since 1930 even if the adjoining RL 8 was subsequently registered in the name of Guaranteed Homes. .
...
xxx xxx xxx
Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to have RL 8 registered in its name, which
is almost fifty years from the time PEDRO VITALEZ occupied the adjoining accreted property in 1930. . .
..
xxx xxx xxx
We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes of Appellants which bolster their right
over the subject property. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants [have] amply proven their right over the
property in question.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is herebyGRANTED. The challenged Order of
the court a quo is REVERSED andSET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED. 22
On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A RIGHT IN ESSE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW
AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;]
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT IS AVAILABLE FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IS
IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE COMPLAINT . . . FILED
BY RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER COURT. 23
The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally, whether the State is an indispensable
party to respondents' action for prohibitory injunction; and substantively, whether the character of
respondents' possession and occupation of the subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of
prohibitory injunction.
The petition is without merit. EACTSH
An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the performance of an act. 24 It
is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or as an
incident to an independent action or proceeding. Moreover, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy
of a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction may issue. 25
In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local government of
Paraaque City from proceeding with the construction of an access road that will traverse through a parcel
of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of
the public domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time should also be considered
as part of the public domain. And respondents should have included the State as it is an indispensable party
to the action.
We do not agree.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually
settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the
accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, 26in relation to
Article 457 of the Civil Code.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits
along the banks of a creek. It reads:
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by
accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. 27
Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek
do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate
to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject
to acquisition through prescription by third persons. 28
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the
possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of
public domain. 29 Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State. 30
 Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, 31the land which is formed by the
gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain
by clear provision of law.
Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree
would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence. 32 In contrast,
a necessary party is one whose presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole
controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final decree can be made in their absence without
affecting them. 33 aTcIEH
In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of Paraaque from
proceeding with its implementation of the road construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor an
indispensable party to an action where no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall
be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable party if none of its
properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed.
We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the contested
land entitles them to the avails of the action.
A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. 34 A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief
must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. 35 It should not be
contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise. 36
In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied
and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the
local government of Paraaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro
executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his name for
taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of
Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local
government of Paraaque.
From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can
be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of
Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly,
respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription.
Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot.
It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the
registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as
a means of acquiring ownership. 37 A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer,
ownership. 38
Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains pending before the
DENR, estop them from filing an injunction suit?
We answer in the negative.
Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through judicial
proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant case, respondents admitted that they opted to
confirm their title over the property administratively by filing an application for sales patent.
Respondents' application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or derogate what
may be deemed as their vested right over the subject property. The sales patent application should instead
be considered as a mere superfluity particularly since ownership over the land, which they seek to buy from
the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not
have any authority to convey a property through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no longer a
public land. 39 cHDaEI
Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such principle is equally
applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007 Decision, as well as
the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 are hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-39248. May 7, 1976.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE,defendant-appellant, LAND
REGISTRATION COMMISSIONER and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO
CITY, defendants.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R.
Ramirez and Baltazar Llamas for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose R. Madrazo, Jr. for defendants-appellants.
Gregorio Bilog, Jr. for defendant Land Registration Commissioner.
SYNOPSIS
The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, filed a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title
alleging that: the subdivision of a parcel of land owned by defendant into two lots included an excess area of
82,127 square meters; the Land Registration Commissioner approved said petition for subdivision and; in view
of which transfer certificate of title, which included the excess area, were issued by the Register of Deeds. The
lower court rendered judgment cancelling the new certificates of title (one of the subdivided lots having been
further subdivided and new certificates of title issued therefor) containing the increased area and ordered the
Register of Deeds to issue new ones in lieu thereof after the increased portion had been deducted. Appealed
to the Court of Appeals, the latter certified the case to the Supreme Court since it involved purely a question of
law.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment holding that to bring the increased area under the operation and
coverage of the Land Registration Act proceedings for registration of the land should be filed.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION ACT; PETITION FOR SUBDIVISION INCLUDES ONLY PREVIOUSLY
REGISTERED LANDS. Recourse under Section 44 of Act 496 is good only insofar as it covers previously
registered lands.
2. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Where parts of the tracts of land has not yet been brought under the operation of
the Torrens System, approval of subdivision plans cannot bring said tracts of land under the operation and
coverage of the Torrens Systems. More so where the approval of the subdivision plans was without notice to
all parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands.
3. ID.; REQUISITES FOR REGISTRATION UNDER LAND REGISTRATION ACT. For an applicant to have
this imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act 496, the several
requisites should all be satisfied; (1) Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;
(2) Filing an application for registration by the applicant; (3) Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the
application by the Court; (4) Transmittal of the application and the date of the initial hearing together with all the
documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission; (5)
Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and the date and place of the hearing in the Official
Gazette; (6) Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have interests in the
property by the sheriff; (7) Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or not;
(8) Hearing of the case by the Court; (9) Promulgation of judgment by the Court; (10) Issuance of the decree
by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of
confirmation and registration; (11) Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission; (12)
Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of Deeds; and (13) Transcription of
the decree of registration in the registration book and the issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate
of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.
DECISION
ESGUERRA, J p:
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 47438-R.
The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final consideration and resolution of the pure question of law
involved.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the Republic of the Philippines.
(represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, alleging, among
others, the following:
"3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant Register of Deeds of Davao City
whose Offices are at Espaa Extension, Quezon City and Davao City, respectively, are included in this
complaint, the first being the public Official charged under the law with the approval of subdivision
surveys of private lands while the second is the Official vested with the authority to issue certificates of
titles, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Law;
"4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is the owner of a parcel
of land in the City of Davao containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO SQUARE METERS (525,652), more or less, under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-1439 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City, issued in her name;
"5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of the aforesaid parcel of
land into two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-9322 which was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on March 17, 1967;
"6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 contains an area of 30,100
Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a total area of
607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters more than the original area covered in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of said defendant Luisa Villa Abrille;
"7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land Registration Commissioner, said
Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an order from the Court of First Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO)
Doc. No. 9969, directing the Register of Deeds for the City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct
the area of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 and thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof
TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887;
"8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered Lot 379-B-2-B-1 and issued
TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the name of Luisa Villa-Abrille and on the same date registered Lot No. 3
79-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No. 18887 in the name of Luisa Villa-Abrille;
"9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the aforementioned excess area of
82,127 Square Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the required notice and publication as
prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Law;
"10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of the approval of the
subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a portion of the Davao River which dried up by
reason of the change of course of the said Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public domain;
and
"11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18887 which covers Lot No. 379-B-
2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC) Psd-69322, wherein the excess. area of land belong to the public
domain (not private land) is null and void ab initio."
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao City filed her answer averring that she, "in the
performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good faith effected the registration of Subdivision Lot No.
379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 and the issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886 and TCT No. 18887
therefor, respectively, in view of the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner of Subdivision Plan (LRC)
Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Davao to correct the area in Certificate of
Title No. T-1439, to cancel the same and to issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887". LibLex
On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1, 3, 4,5 and 7 of the complaint. That they admit the increase in area of the land of their
predecessor but that the increase in area of the land was acceded to and concurred in by the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner, and the same was duly noted and approved by the Court of First Instance of
Davao; that they admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887 out of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in
the name of their predecessor-in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT No. T-18886 had been cancelled and
in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor of Gaudencio Consunji, and, TCT No. T-18887 had
likewise been cancelled and several Transfer Certificates of Title were issued thereunder; that the subject
increase of area was made in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and that Luisa Villa Abrille,
predecessor-in-interest of herein defendant-appellant, as riparian owner was entitled under the law to claim, as
she did, the increase or excess in area of her original land as her own.
On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a judgment on the pleadings and
avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of the subject matter of the complaint since the subdivision plan
involved therein was approved by the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas; and that on
February 19, 1968, the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas, issued LRC Circular No.
167 directing the Register of Deeds throughout the Philippines to, among others, deny the registration of
subdivision plans with increased or expanded areas and to withhold the issuance of the corresponding titles, or
if the plans have already been registered and the titles issued, to recall the titles and to take appropriate steps
for their cancellation.

Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene in the case as movant-
intervenors but they were denied standing in court by the trial court in its order of August 16, 1969.
On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" and pray that
judgment be rendered by the trial court on their case based on their stipulation of facts. The "Agreed
Stipulation of Facts" of the parties reads as follows: Cdpr
"COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and unto the Honorable Court, most
respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts and allege:
"1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in the Registry Book of the Register
of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol. A-27, Page 40 under Original Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 317, in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa Villa Abrille;
"2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was inherited by Luisa Villa Abrille and
transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 was issued in the name of said Luisa Villa Abrille;
"3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-69322 by the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T- 18886 and 18887 were issued by the
defendant, Register of Deeds of Davao, copy of which subdivision plan is hereto attached as Annex
"A", and made integral part hereof;
"4. That Transfer Certificate of Title. No. T-18886 was subsequently concern by virtue of deed of sale,
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19077 was issued in the name of Gaudencio Consunji, a
purchaser in good faith and for value;
"5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch IV, through an Order dated March 27, 1967, copy of which order is hereto attached as Annex
"B" and made part hereof;
"6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, on the
strength of the Report of the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of which report is hereto
attached as Annex "C" and made integral part hereof;
"7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was, by virtue of an Order of the Court
of First Instance, Branch I, in Special Proceedings No. 1357, entitled: In the Matter of the Testate
Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille, approving a project of partition cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the following
Transfer Certificates of Title were issued to the following named persons, to wit:
(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;
(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;
(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang;
(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;
(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang;
(f) T-20732 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;
(i) T-20715 - Miguel Huang;
(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;
(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;
 which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision plan LRC Psd-71236 duly
approved by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of which subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-71236 is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made integral part hereof;
"8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot 379-B-2-B, but the same was
with the knowledge of the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner and the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Branch IV;
"9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected or prejudiced in the increase in
area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the registered owner holds property adjacent to the parcel of land in
question;
"10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-2-B and abuts the Davao River;
"11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with coconuts, bananas and other
seasonal crops by the defendants, through their predecessor-in-interest;
"12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time ago as the coconuts planted
thereon had long been fruit bearing;
"13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any portion of the increase in area;
"14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, only Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725; T-20701; T-20713; and T-20690 contain the increase in area; while
all the other certificates of title issued under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 do not contain any
increase in area;
"15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B" was without notice to the Director
of Lands."
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27, 1970, which reads as follows:
"This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title instituted by the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, against the Estate of Luisa Abrille, represented by
Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the Land Registration Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of the
City of Davao. Because the residue of the intestate estate of Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided among
Huang Siu Sin, Josefino Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and lap Tong Ha, heirs, they were
directed to appear and to substitute for the intestate estate and they did.LLphil
"The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
"The increase area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5609 of the Register of Deeds
of Davao in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna and subsequently by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-1439 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and finally, based on subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
71236, by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in the name of Milagros Huang, T-20701 in the
name of Josefino Huang, T-20713 in the name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the name of Huang Siu
Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to 607,779 square meters, or 82,127 square meters.
"The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to include the increase in area was
a petition for approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-79322 recommended by the Commissioner of
Land Registration in his Report, and for issuance of new titles under Section 44, Act 496, as amended,
filed with this Court, which was assigned to Branch IV.
"Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy was sought, notice before
the hearing is required. The parties admit that there was no notice to the persons interested, including
the Director of Lands, before the petition was heard.
"Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 even assuming arguendo that the same belonged to the owner
of the land to which it is adjacent by the simple expediency of a petition for approval of subdivision plan
and issuance of new titles, because a subdivision of a registered land under Section 44 of Act 496 does
not authorize the inclusion of land or area not embraced in the titled or in excess of what is stated in the
title. And the approval of the Court of such subdivision plan does not lend validity to it. The subdivision
must be limited to the area stated in the title. Neither amendment of the title under Section 112 of Act
496 would be a valid remedy.
"The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille, owners of the adjacent estate, might have acquired a registrable title to
the land in question but to bring it under the operation of the Land Registration Act, a petition for
registration under Act 496 should have been filed. More so when the title acquired is by continuous
possession for at least 30 years under a claim of ownership. And even assuming that the land is an
 accretion, the fact that the riparian estate is registered does not bring ipso facto effect its accretion
thereto under the operation of the Land Registration Act. No decree of registration of the land based
upon final judgment promulgated by a court of competent jurisdiction after due publication, notice and
hearing, has been issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration and transcribed by the Register of
Deeds of Davao in the registry, for the reason that no initial or original registration proceedings have
been instituted by the owner. And the only way by which a title to the land in question can be issued for
the first time is for the Land Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of registration based upon
final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction after trial.
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-
20701, T-20713 and T-20690 and directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to issue new certificates of
title in lieu thereof after the portions consisting of 82,127 square meters, the land involved, shall have
been segregated therefrom in accordance with law."
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille brought the case on
appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, in its Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified
the case (CA-G.R. No. 47438-R) to this Court for consideration and final disposition. cdrep
Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC)
Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of notice to interested persons, and in ordering the
cancellation of Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713, and T-20690. It is the contention of the
defendant-appellant that since the government agencies having to do with lands know all the time the increase
in area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the government agencies concerned tolerated if not abetted the
ultimate inclusion of the involved increase in area, defendant-appellant should not be made to suffer the effect
of the allegedly wrong procedure or step taken in the approval of the aforementioned subdivision plan.
Besides, defendant-appellant claims that it is their honest belief that the legal remedy taken by them in seeking
the approval of their subdivision plan concern was well within the law, particularly the provision of Section 44 of
Act 496, as amended.

Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the subdivision plan, with the increase in
area, by the defendant-appellant Land Registration Commission does not lend validity to the said subdivision
plan; and that the issuance of the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-
20690) over the increased area in question is improper and invalid notwithstanding the conformity of the Land
Registration Commissioner and the subsequent order of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV,
approving the subdivision plan concerned, as the required giving of notice to all parties interested in defendant-
appellant's petition for approval of subdivision plan was not at all followed.
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive at judicious disposition of the case
at bar, is whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which cover the increased area in question totalling 82,127 square
meters.
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are of the opinion and so hold that
the lower court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-
20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters under
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the City of Davao.
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval of their Subdivision
Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include the questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters
is, to say the least, unwarranted and irregular. This is so for the increased area in question, which is not a
registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original
registration of the tracts of land of the defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of
their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties
admitted to have been a former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land
Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed instead of an
ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the predecessor-in-interest (Luisa
Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is good only insofar as it covers previously registered
lands. In the instant case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meter, has not yet
been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of Subdivision Plans (LRC)
Psd-09322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands.
For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act
496, the following requisites should all be satisfied: LLpr
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all the documents or other
evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission;
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the hearing in the Official
Gazette;
6. Service of notice upon continuous owners, occupants and those known to have interests in the
property by the sheriff;
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or not;
8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing the Land
Registration Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and registration;
11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;
12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of Deeds; and
13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the issuance of the owners
duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the
prescribed fees.
Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court committed no error in its
appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Heirs of Abrille, G.R. No. L-39248, [May 7, 1976], 162 PHIL 913-929)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17652. June 30, 1962.]
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO
CALALUNG and ESTEBAN CALALUNG,respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales & Fernandez for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. PROPERTY; ACCRETION; ALLUVIAL DEPOSITS ON REGISTERED LAND; INCREMENT NOT
AUTOMATICALLY REGISTERED. An accretion does not automatically become registered land just
because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. Ownership of a piece of land is one
thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over the accretion
received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is
provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or
give title to the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the owner,
making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed
under the operation of the registration laws, wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
DECISION
BARRERA, J p:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case
No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title
to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an
area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of
Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro
Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title
No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was
surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the
same boundary stated in the (title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the
northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank
thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964
square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against
respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their
complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in
peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land
under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the
land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim
ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of
said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership
of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver
possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in
part, reads:
"It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of
alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe
that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in
question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or began in 1931. And, as
declared by Pedro Laman, defendants' witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony
 portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his
witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933
do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the
incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectares, more or less, was formed in 1948,
reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under
Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. '2') when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to
defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. '2') cancelled Tax Dec. No. 28226 (Exh. '1'), because
Exh. "2" says that 'tax under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants
declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the
land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of
land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an
accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art.
457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming, arguendo, that the accretion has been
occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require
any act of possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit
becomes manifest (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no
act of appropriation on the part of the riparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the
alluvial formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
"This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in
possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that
they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on
January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could
not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover,
as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as
registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496; and, therefore, it could not be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession by another person."
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the
decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
"That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvion, which started in
the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore,
unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically
in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457),
which provides that 'to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the water.' The defendants, however, contend
that they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this
case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by
accession, the land in question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original
estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496,
which states that 'no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession'; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant
began only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription
before the present action was instituted.
"As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land
as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend
beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of
confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of
their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the
Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining
stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him
to all the rights conferred by the Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on
accession; and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person
through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. vs. Baguisa, et al., CA-
G. R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
 "We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of
time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the
land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under
occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of
taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name
of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's
testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years
of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins
his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1941, he has always known it to be in the peaceful
possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the
defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less
than one hectare.
"We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of
the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the
defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact
that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners; that the plaintiffs
did not file an action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of
title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation
purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land
surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself
and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title.
This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part
thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.
"The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession from 1933 to 1958
is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the
plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the
plaintiffs had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have
immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they
did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the
fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of
the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was
not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was
legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the
defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in
possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up
to their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had
already supervened in favor of the defendants."
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question
through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the new Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners
are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land to which it adjoins.
The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which
receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the
adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one
thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered
land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not
vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the
owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be
placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
The fact remains, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was
formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on
June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958.
The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the
protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a
question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession.
The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of
the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the
filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after
an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by
us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil
Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the Old Civil Code were not
in force and before the effectivity of the New Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
that the respondents acquired the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitions. So
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

||| (Grande v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17652, [June 30, 1962], 115 PHIL 521-529)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-12958. May 30, 1960.]
FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant and appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and
LAUREANO VALERIANO, oppositors and appellees.
David S. Ignacio for appellant.
Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Crispin V. Bautista for
appellee Director of Lands.
Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano.
SYLLABUS
1. PROPERTY; LAND FORMED BY ACTION OF THE SEA. Land formed by the action of the
sea is property of the state; Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land claimed by
a private person and subject to the ebb and flow of the tides of the Manila Bay.
2. ID.; ID.; WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED FOR PUBLIC USE; DECLARATION NECESSARY.
Until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the
legislature, to the effect that land is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special
industries, they continue to be part of the public domain; not available for private appropriation or
ownership.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J p:
Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing his
application for the registration of a parcel of land.
On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land (mangrove),
situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area of 37,877 square meters. Later, he amended his
application by alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion. To the
application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez
later withdrew his opposition. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public
domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor his predecessor- in-interest possessed sufficient title
thereto, not having acquired it either by composition title from the Spanish government or by possessory
information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and that he had not possessed the same
openly, continuously and adversely under a bona fideclaim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his turn,
Valeriano alleged that he was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of Fisheries,
issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by the President.
It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant which he had
acquired from the Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936. It has also been established that the
parcel in question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila Bay
which borders it on the southwest. Applicant Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935,
planting it with api-api trees, and that his possession thereof had been continuous, adverse and public for a
period of twenty years until said possession was disturbed by oppositor Valeriano.
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore land, covered
by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore, formed part of the public domain.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding that the parcel formed part of the
public domain. In his appeal, Ignacio assigns the following errors:
"I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question, altho an accretion to the land of
the applicant-appellant, does not belong to him but forms part of the public domain.
"II. Granting that the land in question forms part of the public domain, the lower court
nevertheless erred in not declaring the same to be the property of the applicant-appellant, the said land
not being necessary for any public use or purpose and in not ordering at the same time its registration
in the name of applicant-appellant in the present registration proceedings.
 "III. The lower court erred in not holding that the land in question now belongs to the applicant-
appellant by virtue of acquisitive prescription, the said land having ceased to be of the public domain
and became the private or patrimonial property of the State.
"IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the oppositor Director of Lands is now in estoppel
from claiming the land in question as a land of the public domain."
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having been formed by gradual
deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil
Code), which provides that:
"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers,
while the accretion in the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.
Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not applicable because
they refer to accretions formed by the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find
said contention untenable. A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:
"Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance;
an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea
or of a lake." 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6)
Moreover, this Tribunal has in some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands bordering Manila Bay. (See
the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732, involving a parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila
Bay, where it was held that such land formed by the action of the sea is property of the State;
Francisco vs. Government of P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to
the ebb and flow of the tides of the Manila Bay).
Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part of the public domain,
having been gained from the sea, the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary for
any public use or purpose, and therefore, became disposable and available for private ownership. Article 4
of the Law of Waters of 1866 reads thus:
"ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of
the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and
are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the
coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."
Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of Natividad vs.Director of Lands, (CA) 37
Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held that:
"Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the government shall declare it to be the
property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that
only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make
the declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for
the establishment of special industries, or for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been
made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain." (Natividad vs. Director
of Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y
Monteverde vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134, (cited in Velayo's Digest, Vol. I, p. 52).
". . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to
determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of
Waters."
Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department
or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for
public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership.
 Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through acquisitive
prescription, having possessed the same for over ten years. In answer, suffice it to say that land of the
public domain is not subject to ordinary prescription. In the case of Insular Government vs. Aldecoa & Co.,
19 Phil., 505, this Court said:
"The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion,
without previous permission from the proper authorities, although the occupant may have held the
same as owner for seventeen years and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere
detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national
domain; it is intended for public uses and for the benefit of those who live nearby."
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Pars, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcin, Barrera, and Gutirrez
David, JJ., concur.

||| (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-12958, [May 30, 1960], 108 PHIL 335-340)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997.]
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL,respondents.
Yolanda Quisumbing - Javellana & Associates for petitioner.
Joracio R. Viola, Sr. for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; ACCRETION AS A MODE OF ACQUIRING PROPERTY; REQUISITES; LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code, requires
the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river: and (3) that the land where the
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is
deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank; the owner of such estate is
called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being
owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The alluvium, by mandate of
Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit
can be seen hut is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by
third persons.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THIRD REQUISITE NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. There is no dispute as to the location
of: (a) the disputed land; (b) petitioners' own tract of land: (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers. Petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern
side lies now the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be
attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been
deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on the
northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of
accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river
bank.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DISPUTED LAND IS AN ACCRETION NOT ON A RIVER BANK BUT ON A SEA
BANK; THE APPLICABLE LAW IS NOT ARTICLE 457 OF THE CIVIL CODE BUT ARTICLE 4 OF THE
SPANISH LAW OF WATERS OF 1866. There is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land
adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind
of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands and
Valeriano (108 Phil. 336, 338 [1960]) that: "Appellant next contends that . . . Manila Bay cannot be considered
as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:
'Bay, An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the
sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake,' 7 C.J.
1013-1014." The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to
be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the
applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DISPUTED PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION ON A SEA BANK, MANILA BAY BEING AN
INLET OR AN ARM OF THE SEA; AS SUCH, THE DISPUTED PROPERTY IS UNDER ARTICLE 4 OF THE
SPANISH LAW OF WATERS OF 1866, PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. The instant controversy brings a
situation calling for the application of Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land being
an accretion on the foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for all legal purposes, considered a sea. Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows: "Lands added to the shores by accretions and
alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof." In the light of the aforecited vintage but still
valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in this controversy, the same being an accretion
on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the
herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national
domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except
through express authorization granted in due form by a competent authority." Only the executive and possibly
the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by
action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of
special industries or for coast guard services. Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or
legislative department has already declared the disputed land 1966, to be the property of petitioners as owners
of the estates adjacent thereto.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J p:
Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land Registration case by oppositors
thereto, the Government and a Government lessee, involving as it does ownership of land formed by alluvium.
The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. His registered
property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by
the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as
boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the west.
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land. Applicant's registered
property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.
The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it naturally accrues
in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as foreshore land?
Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision 1 and (2) two subsequent resolutions 2 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court 3 (now the Court of Appeals) in Land Registration Case No. N-84, 4 the application over which
was filed by private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, before the Court
of First Instance 5 (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract
of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This
application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond
application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the
property formed part of the public domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May
27, 1988, gave due course to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may
be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's application. Aggrieved by the
decision of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of Natural Resources who, however, affirmed
the grant. The then Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed
the grant.
On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and
confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and
said to have an area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property,
situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is
bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the
northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at
the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon.
Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition
thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject
property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the
Philippines. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for
the same reason as that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of Lands withdrew
his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole oppositor.
On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the Director of Lands and the
Director of Forestry. lexlib
Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted and, on February 13, 1961,
Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be
registered has always been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he
was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the
Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the President; and that he had already converted the area
covered by the lease into a fishpond.

During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed a
complaint for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their privies, alleged by Pascual to
have unlawfully claimed and possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the subject property
covered by Plan Psu-175181. The defendants in the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon:
thus they have thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be registered. This, notwithstanding
repeated demands for defendants to vacate the property.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because
of the similarity of the parties and the subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with
the land registration case and was jointly tried by the court a quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on November 1, 1961 and
was substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the herein private
respondents.
On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land
and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings.
The decision's dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint for ejectment in Civil Case
No. 2873;
(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over the land in question; and
(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2873 and as
applicant in Land Registration Case No. N-84 to pay costs in both instances." 6
The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court, assigned the following errors:
"1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion by the action of the Talisay
and Bulacan Rivers to the land admittedly owned by applicants-appellants [private
respondents].
2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore land.
3.. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the and is controversy in favor of applicants-
appellants [private respondents].
4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-appellants [private respondents] are entitled to
eject the oppositor-appellee [petitioners]." 7
On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted the petition for
registration of the subject property but excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1;
and fifty meters (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.
The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:
"The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the parties in their respective briefs is
whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or not said
land was formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila
Bay. If formed by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is accretion but if formed
by the action of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.
 xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land immediately adjoining
the land sought to be registered. Their property which is covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the
east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The
Talisay and Bulacan rivers come from inland flowing downstream towards the Manila Bay. In other
words, between the Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the property of applicants with both rivers
acting as the boundary to said land and the flow of both rivers meeting and emptying into the Manila
Bay. The subject land was formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private respondents'] land adding
thereto the land now sought to be registered.
This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject land is immediately
attached to appellants' [private respondents'] land and forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said land
immediately faces the Manila Bay which is part of the sea. We can understand therefore the confusion
this case might have caused the lower court, faced as it was with the uneasy problem of deciding
whether or not the subject land was formed by the action of the two rivers or by the action of the sea.
Since the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private respondents']
land, it would be quite easy to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial property
of the State as the lower court did in fact rule . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It is however undisputed that [private respondents'] land lies between these two rivers and it is precisely
appellants' [private respondents'] land which acts as a barricade preventing these two rivers to meet.
Thus, since the flow of the two is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are
deposited at their mouths.
It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the cause of the deposit thereat for
in the natural course of things, the waves of the sea eat the land on the shore, as they suge [sic] inland.
It would not therefore add anything to the land but instead subtract from it due to the action of the
waves and the wind. It is then more logical to believe that the two rivers flowing towards the bay
emptied their cargo of sand, silt and clay at their mouths, thus causing [private respondents'] land to
accumulate therein
However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not seem to accept this theory
and stated that the subject land arose only when . . . Pascual planted 'palapat' and 'bakawan' trees
thereat to serve as a boundary or strainer. But we do not see how this act of planting trees by Pascual
would explain how the land mass came into being. Much less will it prove that the same came from the
sea. Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that it were the few trees that acted as strainers or
blocks, then the land that grew would have stopped at the place where the said trees were planted. But
this is not so because the land mass went far beyond the boundary, or where the trees were planted.
On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of [private respondents'] clearly show that the land that
accumulated beyond the so-called boundary, as well as the entire area being applied for is dry land,
above sea level, and bearing innumerable trees . . . . The existence of vegetation on the land could only
confirm that the soil thereat came from inland rather than from the sea, for what could the sea bring to
the shore but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals? On the other hand, the two rivers would be
bringing soil on their downward flow which they brought along from the eroded mountains, the lands
along their path, and dumped them all on the northern portion of appellants' [private respondents'] land.
In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's finding. While it is true that the
subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay fronting appellants' [private respondents'] land, said
land is not foreshore but an accretion from the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is
exactly what the Bureau of Lands found out, as shown in the following report of the Acting Provincial
Officer, Jesus M. Orozco, to wit:
'Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration made on June 11, 1960, it was
found out that the said land is . . . sandwitched [sic] by two big rivers . . . These two rivers bring
down considerable amount of soil and sediments during floods every year thus raising the soil
of the land adjoining the private property of the applicant [private respondents']. About four-fifth
[sic] of the area applied for is now dry land whereon are planted palapat trees thickly growing
thereon. It is the natural action of these two rivers that has caused the formation of said land . .
. subject of this registration case. It has been formed, therefore, by accretion. And having been
formed by accretion, the said land may be considered the private property of the riparian owner
who is the applicant [private respondents'] . . . .
 In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the government should be
withdrawn, except for the portion recommended by the land investigator in his report dated May
2, 1960, to be excluded and considered foreshore. . . .'
Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the Bureau of Lands withdrew
his opposition dated March 25, 1960, and limited 'the same to the northern portion of the land applied
for, compromising a strip 50 meters wide along the Manila Bay, which should be declared public land as
part of the foreshore' . . . . 8
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration in the name of private respondents and the reversion to private
respondents of the possession of the portion of the subject property included in Navarro's fishpond permit.
On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited decision. The Director of
Forestry also moved for the reconsideration of the same decision. Both motions were opposed by private
respondents on January 27, 1979.
On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Director of Forestry. It, however, modified its decision, to read, viz:

"(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate that portion included in their
fishpond permit covered by Plan Psu-175181 and hand over possession of said portion to applicants-
appellants, if the said portion is not within the strip of land fifty (50) meters wide along Manila Bay on
the northern portion of the land subject of the registration proceedings and which area is more
particularly referred to as fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty (50) meters from
corner 5 towards corner 6 of Plan Psu-175181 . . ." 9
On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the Director of Forestry, an
extension of time within which to file in this court, a petition for review of the decision dated November 29, 1978
of the respondent appellate court and of the aforecited resolution dated November 21, 1980.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed a petition for review entitled, "The
Director of Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals." 10We, however, denied the same in a minute resolution dated
July 20, 1981, such petition having been prematurely filed at a time when the Court of Appeals was yet to
resolve petitioners' pending motion to set aside the resolution dated November 21, 1980.
On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision
dated November 29, 1978.
On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment stating that the decision dated
November 29, 1978 had become final and executory as against herein petitioners as oppositors in L.R.C. Case
No. N-84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga,
Bataan.
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978 was filed
by petitioners' new counsel.
On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting petitioners' request for leave to file
a second motion for reconsideration.
On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of time, citing Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court which provides that a motion for reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen (15) days
from the notice of the final order or judgment.
Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have palpably erred in appreciating the
facts of the case and to have gravely misapplied statutory and case law relating to accretion, specifically,
Article 457 of the Civil Code.
We find no merit in the petition.
The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal
of the waters of Manila Bay and the accretion formed on the
exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought
soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and
 bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in
1948.
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the
disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run
their course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of
the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the
bank of the river. 11 Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited
on the estate fronting the river bank 12 ; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners
are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the
sea or lake or other tidal waters. 13 The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically
owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen 14 but is not automatically
registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. 15
Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is misplaced.
First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay. Petitioners'
land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers whose torrential
action, petitioners insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. In fact, one of the petitioners, Sulpicio
Pascual, testified in open court that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit the disputed land being part of the
bay's foreshore but, after he had planted palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began to rise. 16

Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) petitioners' own tract of land; (c)
the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies now the disputed land where before 1948, there
lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western
boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila
Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the
portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay
is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of water the Manila Bay is.
It is to be remembered that we held that:
"Appellant next contends that . . . Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention
untenable. A bay is part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:
'Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance;
an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of
the sea or of a lake.' 7 C.J. 1013-1014." 17
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the
applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to discern from the facts of the case. As the
trial court correctly observed:
"A perusal of the survey plan . . . of the land subject matter of these cases shows that on the eastern
side, the property is bounded by Talisay River, on the western side by Bulacan River, on the southern
side by Lot 1436 and on the northern side by Manila Bay. It is not correct to state that the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers meet a certain portion because the two rivers both flow towards Manila Bay. The
Talisay River is straight while the Bulacan River is a little bit meandering and there is no portion where
the two rivers meet before they end up at Manila Bay. The land which is adjacent to the property
belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an accretion caused by the action of the two rivers].
Applicant Pascual . . . has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the land he has applied for
registration is the result of the settling down on his registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so as
to be rightfully be considered as an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457
finds no applicability where the accretion must have been caused by action of the bay." 18
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the foregoing observation is that the disputed land is
part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public domain. The respondent appellate court,
however, perceived the fact that petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, to be basis
to conclude that the disputed land must be an accretion formed by the action of the two rivers because
petitioners' own land acted as a barricade preventing the two rivers to meet and that the current of the two
rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila Bay which accumulated somehow to a 14-
hectare land. These conclusions, however, are fatally incongruous in the light of the one undisputed critical
fact: the accretion was deposited, not on either the eastern or western portion of petitioners' land where a river
each runs, but on the northern portion of petitioners' land which adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse, such
conclusions are further eroded of their practical logic and consonance with natural experience in the light of
Sulpicio Pascual's admission as to having planted palapat and bakawan trees on the northern boundary of
their own land. In amplification of this, plainly more reasonable and valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's
observations in his dissenting opinion when he stated that:
"As appellants' (titled) land . . . acts as a barricade that prevents the two rivers to meet, and considering
the wide expanse of the boundary between said land and the Manila Bay, measuring some 593.00
meters . . . it is believed rather farfetched for the land in question to have been formed through
'sediments of sand and salt [sic] . . . deposited at their [rivers'] mouths.' Moreover, if 'since the flow of
the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their
mouths,' why then would the alleged cargo of sand, silt and clay accumulate at the northern portion of
appellants' titled land facing Manila Bay instead of merely at the mouths and banks of these two rivers?
That being the case, the accretion formed at said portion of appellants' titled [land] was not caused by
the current of the two rivers but by the action of the sea (Manila Bay) into which the rivers empty.

The conclusion . . . is not supported by any reference to the evidence which, on the contrary, shows
that the disputed land was formed by the action of the sea. Thus, no less than Sulpicio Pascual, one of
the heirs of the original applicant, testified on cross-examination that the land in dispute was part of the
shore and it was only in 1948 that he noticed that the land was beginning to get higher after he had
planted trees thereon in 1948. . . . cdasia
. . . it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at high tide could reach as far as
the dike of appellants' fishpond within their titled property, which dike now separates this titled property
from the land in question. Even in 1948 when appellants had already planted palapat and bakawan
trees in the land involved, inasmuch as these trees were yet small, the waves of the sea could still
reach the dike. This must be so because in . . . the survey plan of the titled property approved in 1918,
said titled land was bounded on the north by Manila Bay. So Manila Bay was adjacent to it on the north.
It was only after the planting of the aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land in question began to rise or to
get higher in elevation.
The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the sea water and at the same time
a kind of block to the strained sediments from being carried back to the sea by the very waves that
brought them to the former shore at the end of the dike, which must have caused the shoreline to
recede and dry up eventually raising the former shore leading to the formation of the land in
question." 19
In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and bakawan trees, the
withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying up of its former foreshore, and the
regular torrential action of the waters of Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the northern
boundary of petitioners' own tract of land.
The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay
being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed
property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, part of the public domain
At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.
While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano 20 that Manila Bay is considered a sea
for purposes of determining which law on accretion is to be applied in multifarious situations, we have ruled
differently insofar as accretions on lands adjoining the Laguna de Bay are concerned.
In the cases of Government of the P.I. v. Colegio de San Jose 21 , Republic v. Court of Appeals 22 , Republic
v. Alagad 23 , and Meneses v. Court of Appeals 24 , we categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the
accretion on which, by the mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner
of the land contiguous thereto.
The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for all legal
purposes, considered a sea.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form
part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-
guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."
In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in
this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of
Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long
as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being
appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent
authority." 25Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make
the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility
or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard services. 26 Petitioners utterly fail to
show that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified,
under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates
adjacent thereto.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., concurs: The amendatory provisions of the Water Code (P.D. 1067) did not affect Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
||| (Heirs of Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68166, [February 12, 1997], 335 PHIL 537-556)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162037. August 7, 2006.]
HEIRS OF ENRIQUE DIAZ, Represented by AURORA T. DIAZ,petitioner, vs. ELINOR A.
VIRATA, In her capacity as the Administratrix of the Estate of ANTENOR
VIRATA, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
The instant case involves a protracted controversy which has seen the demise of the patriarchs of two
conflicting families, and is now being pursued by their respective heirs.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners Heirs of Enrique Diaz, represented by Aurora T. Diaz, seek
the reversal of the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72907, dated 27
August 2003 and 4 February 2004, respectively, which affirmed with modification the Decision 3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Imus, Cavite, in Civil Case No. 1399-96, dated 25 May 2001.
The Antecedents
On 13 September 1996, respondent Elinor Virata, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Antenor
Virata (Antenor), filed with the RTC a Complaint 4 with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction against Enrique Diaz (Enrique), John Doe, Richard Doe, and all others taking rights or
title under him, praying for the declaration of the validity of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No.
4983, 5 4984, 6 4985, 7 4986, 85027, 9 5028, 10 5029, 11 5030, 12 5031, 13 5032, 14 and 5033, 15 all issued in the
name of Antenor S. Virata (Antenor) and registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cavite. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1399-96.
In her Complaint, respondent averred, inter alia, that: sometime in 1959, the deceased Antenor purchased
from Miguela Crisologo, in good faith and for consideration, two parcels of land located in Palico, Imus, Cavite,
covered by TCTs No. (T-3855) RT-2633 and NO. (T-11171) RT-1228, and registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite; 16 by virtue of the sale, the specified titles were cancelled, and in its place were issued TCTs
No. 517 and No. 518, likewise, in the name of Antenor; 17 the two lots covered by the aforementioned titles
were thereafter subdivided by Antenor into several lots, and titles were issued thereon in Antenor's favor, viz:
TCTs No. 4983, 4984, 4985, 4986, 5027, 5028, 5029, 5030, 5031, 5032, and 5033; 18 and that sometime in
March 1992, Enrique filed a claim with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous possession of the same lots owned by
Antenor. Respondent further proffered that the claim of Enrique over the subject properties created a cloud
which may be prejudicial to the titles issued in the name of Antenor, and now managed by his Estate.
In support of her application for restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction, respondent
alleged, inter alia, that: Enrique had fenced the subject properties and had constructed a driveway thereon;
despite respondent's demand to desist from fencing the properties and using the same as driveway, Enrique
persisted in his occupation of the subject properties; and respondent will suffer irreparable injury by the
continued occupation, use, and construction of the driveway traversing the subject properties.
In sum, respondent prayed that Enrique be ordered to pay jointly and severally with the other defendants
(herein petitioners), reasonable rental for the use of the subject properties from the time the suit before the
DENR was filed in April 1992, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and cost of suit. 19
On 23 October 1996, Enrique filed his Answer with Counter-Claim, 20 and asserted, among others, that he filed
with the DENR a protest action to enforce his valid and legitimate rights over the subject properties. 21 He
denied respondent's allegation that the subject properties were purchased by Antenor.22 Moreover, he
interposed that his ancestors and predecessors-in-interest had been in actual and continuous possession of
the subject properties since time immemorial. 23 In opposition to respondent's application for preliminary
injunction, Enrique argued that the driveway and the fence are within the boundaries of the lots exclusively
owned by him and his heirs, and covered by TCTs No. T-304191 and No. T-66120, respectively. aTHASC
By way of special and affirmative defense, Enrique averred that the subject properties, since time immemorial,
was publicly recognized as their family's ancestral land; 24 that their actual and peaceful occupation over the
subject property was uninterrupted until sometime in 1962, when Antenor claimed a portion of the same, on the
ground that he purchased said portion from one Miguela Crisologo, who acquired the same from a certain
Simeon Marcial; 25 and that both Miguela Crisologo and Simeon Marcial recognized and respected his
ownership over the subject properties. 26
Enrique contended further that the legal battle between the parties commenced when respondent filed an
action for recovery of possession of the subject property with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cavite,
docketed as Civil Case No. N-501 entitled, "Antenor Virata v. Fortunata Diaz." However, in 1969, during the
pendency of the said civil case, Antenor died. Following the development, the CFI ordered for the substitution
of party-plaintiff, but the heirs of Antenor, including herein respondent, failed to comply therewith. By reason of
their non-compliance, the CFI rendered an Order, 27 dated 6 October 1969, dismissing the case. 28
Further, Enrique raised the argument of laches and res judicata in his favor. Anent the claim of laches, Enrique
posited that for a period of almost 27 years after the dismissal of Civil Case No. N-501, the heirs of Antenor
were silent, while he was in actual and continuous possession of the subject properties in the character and
concept of an owner, until again, his peaceful possession is being disturbed by the present suit. It is the
contention of Enrique that respondent's failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time
to assert her right, created a presumption that she had abandoned or declined to assert said right. In raising
the ground of res judicata, Enrique posited that the instant suit, while clothed to appear as an action for
quieting of title, partakes the nature of an action for a recovery of possession. According to Enrique, there
is res judicata as the present action and Civil Case No. N-501 involve similar parties, subject matter, and cause
of action. 29
Consequently, Enrique sought for the dismissal of the Complaint, and prayed that respondent be ordered to
pay attorney's fees, including moral, exemplary and actual damages. 30
On 15 November 1996, the RTC issued an Order 31 allowing respondent to survey the property subject matter
of the case. In answer thereto, Enrique filed a Motion 32 dated 15 November 1996, praying that the survey be
conducted in the presence of his representative, which was accordingly granted by the court a quo. 33
A relocation survey was conducted on 3, 6, 7, 10, and 13 of January 1997 34 by Geodetic Engineer Severino
Raymundo, who testified in open court that the driveway was outside Antenor's property line. 35 Thus,
respondent sought a withdrawal of their application for preliminary injunction, which was granted by the court a
quo in the Order 36 dated 13 February 1997. Respondent's motion to file an appropriate pleading was similarly
granted by the court without objection from Enrique. 37
Subsequent thereto, respondent filed an Amended Complaint 38 dated 19 February 1997, deleting from the
original Complaint, the allegations in support of the application for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Further, respondent alleged anew that: she discovered that Enrique had fenced the subject
properties; and constructed therein one concrete house of about 30 square meters, more or less; the
unauthorized construction was done despite Enrique's full knowledge of the invalidity of his claim; and despite
demand to desist from fencing the subject properties, Diaz refused to take heed of the same and continued to
usurp the subject properties under a feigned claim of right. 39
Thus, respondent sought the following additional reliefs, to wit: (1) an order directing Enrique, his
representatives, or any other person claiming right, title, or interest from him, to vacate the subject properties
and/or to voluntarily surrender possession thereof to respondent; and (2) the removal and demolition of the
barbed wire fence, concrete fence, concrete house, and other improvements Enrique had erected thereon. 40
Holding that the merits of the case would be served by the Amended Complaint, and finding that Enrique and
his co-defendants would not be prejudiced by the allowance thereof, the court a quo admitted the same, in the
Order of 22 May 1997. 41 The same Order gave Enrique, ten (10) days from receipt thereof within which to file
a new Answer. However, no new Answer was filed by Enrique within the time provided for.
On 5 August 1997, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion, 42 stating therein that for the failure of Enrique
to file an Answer to the Amended Complaint within the period provided for under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, 43 the previous Answer shall stand as the Amended Answer; hence, the issues having been joined,
the case is ripe for pre-trial. Acting on the respondent's Motion and Manifestation, the court a quo set the case
for pre-trial.44 Following thus, respondent filed her Pre-trial Brief, 45 dated 8 September 1997. On 11 September
1997, Enrique filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer with Counter-Claim, 46 alleging, inter alia, that:
he had deemed convenient to adopt the Answer previously filed, as the same had already substantially
confronted the issues in the Amended Complaint; however, he discovered a certification issued by the Register
of Deeds of Cavite, signifying that TCT No (T-11171) RT-1228, in the name of Miguela Crisologo, appeared to
have been reconstituted but there existed no record in the Primary Entry Book of said Registry, relative to such
administrative reconstitution, which is a vital defect, affecting not only the validity of the reconstitution of
Miguela Crisologo's title but also Antenor's title, which was derived therefrom; and said certification is being
sought to be adopted as part of his defense. An Opposition 47 to the foregoing Motion was filed by respondent,
contending in the main, that the allegation therein as to the absence in the records of the administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. (T-11171) RT-1228, constituted a collateral attack on the validity of the title, as well
as other titles emanating therefrom, which cannot be allowed in the instant proceedings.

After an exchange of pleadings between the parties, the court a quo rendered an Order, 48 dated 14 January
1998, denying Enrique's Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer, ratiocinating that Enrique's allegation of
the absence of any record in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Cavite, relative to the
reconstitution of TCT No. (T-11171) RT-1228, is a collateral attack to the decree of registration and the
certificate of title which had long been issued in favor of Antenor. The validity of a certificate of title can be
attacked only in an action expressly filed for the purpose. 49
On 27 February 1998, Enrique filed his Pre-Trial Brief but failed to appear before the court a quo for the pre-
trial proceedings set on 4 June 1998. 50 On 16 April 1998, the court a quo rendered an Order, 51 declaring
Enrique and his co-defendants in default for their failure to appear in the pre-trial despite notice. On further
motion of respondent's counsel, the case was referred to the Branch Clerk of Court for the ex-parte reception
of evidence. Enrique filed a Motion for Reconsideration 52 praying for the lifting of the order declaring him in
default. Finding the same to be satisfactory, the court a quo granted reconsideration in its Order 53 dated 20
April 1998.
In the Pre-Trial Order, dated 4 June 1998, the definition of issues were determined, viz.:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF'S TITLE[S] ARE VALID AND WERE THE ONLY ONES ISSUED
OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF SAID PROPERTIES;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM DAMAGES;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA;
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS BARRED BY LACHES; AND
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM DAMAGES. 54
Trial thereafter ensued. Following respondent's offer of exhibits, and at the time when Enrique was scheduled
to present evidence, he filed a Motion to Dismiss 55dated 13 October 1998, assailing the jurisdiction of the
court a quo to entertain the action. Enrique submitted that as the suit is in the nature of recovery of possession
and quieting of title, the issues of ownership and possession cannot be resolved without determining the
correctness of the technical description of the plans, and the bona fide occupants of the subject properties. It
was further contended that as the subject properties originated from friar estate, the sole body which can
determine the rights and interest of the parties is the DENR. An Opposition 56 thereto was filed by respondent,
maintaining that the court a quohas the competence to hear and resolve the case. Respondent, likewise,
asserted that the subject properties having been titled in the name of Antenor on 22 October 1959, the same
are deemed no longer part of the public domain.
On 12 February 1999, the trial court promulgated an Order 57 denying Enrique's Motion to Dismiss, and setting
the hearing dates for the presentation of his evidence. According to the court a quo, Enrique and his co-
defendants were no longer in a position to challenge the jurisdiction and authority of the court, after having
actively participated in the proceedings therein, and repeatedly asking reliefs therefrom. It further opined
that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 mandates that questions in the nature of ownership and possession belong
exclusively to the RTC.
Aggrieved, Enrique and his co-defendants sought relief from the Order of 12 February 1999 via a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals, and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51602. 58 They
interposed therein that the court a quo lacked jurisdiction to entertain the issues raised in Civil Case No. 1399-
96; hence, the denial by the trial court of their Motion to Dismiss constituted a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A writ of preliminary injunction was similarly sought to enjoin and
restrain the court a quo from further conducting any proceeding thereon.
On 28 February 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 59 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari, and
affirming the RTC's Order of 12 February 1999. The appellate court ratiocinated that Enrique's Motion to
Dismiss cannot be granted for to do so would countenance dilatory motions, such motion having been filed
only after Enrique filed his Answer to the Complaint. The Court of Appeals equally took cognizance of the fact
that Enrique and his co-defendants had actively participated in the proceedings a quo, and had repeatedly
sought reliefs therefrom.
In the interim, or specifically, on 14 October 1999, Enrique died. On 9 March 2000, respondent filed an
Omnibus Motion 60 with the RTC, praying that she be allowed to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the Estate of the deceased Enrique, and thereafter, that the case be set for hearing.
Thus, on 24 March 2000, the court a quo ordered petitioners (Enrique's heirs and co-defendants) to file the
necessary pleading for substitution of party; otherwise, it will grant respondent's request for the appointment of
an executor/administrator for Enrique's Estate. 61 Following respondent's Manifestation and Motion to submit
the case for resolution, the court a quorendered a subsequent Order 62 dated 25 September 2000, granting
petitioners ten days from receipt therefrom, to file their Comment to respondent's Motion.
On 14 November 2000, for petitioners' failure to comply with the Orders of the court a quo, dated 24 March
2000 and 25 September 2000, and in consideration of the fact that the case had been pending for an
unreasonable length of time, the RTC ordered the case submitted for decision based on the evidence adduced
by the respondent. HSCATc
The Ruling of the RTC
On 25 May 2001, the RTC promulgated a Decision in favor of respondent. Hereunder is the pertinent
disquisition of the court a quo, in support of its conclusion, thus:
Evidence for the plaintiff shows that Antenor Virata purchased from one Miguela Crisologo in 1959 two
(2) parcels of land located at Palico, Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. T-3855 (Exhibit "P") and T-11171 (Exhibit "Q"). Antenor bought these properties after Epifanio
Victa, then employed by Virata as a liason officer, reported to him that the titles to the said properties
were clean and that no encumbrance nor liens had been annotated on its face. Antenor made
installment payments for the subject properties beginning on 5 August 1959 (Exhibit "R"); then on 20
August 1959 (Exhibit "S"); 3 September 1959 (Exhibit "T"); 3 September 1959 (Exhibit "U") and 22
September 1959 (Exhibit "V"). After having fully paid for the properties, TCT Nos. T-3855 and T-11171
in the name of Crisologo were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-517 (Exhibit "W") and T-518 (Exhibit "X")
were issued to Antenor.
Antenor continued to plant rice on the properties before the same were subdivided in 1963. As a result
of said subdivision, TCT Nos. T-4983, T-4984, T-4985, T-4986, T-5027, T-5028, T-5029, T-5030, T-
5031, T-5032 and T-5033 (Exhibits "A" to "J"), all in the name of Antenor were issued. After Antenor
died in 1969, his niece Elinor Virata was appointed on 4 May 1982 by the then Court of First Instance of
Cavite City as administratrix of his estate (Exhibit "Y").
On 13 February 1997, Severino Raymundo testified in Court that he was the surveyor commissioned to
conduct a joint relocation survey to determine the exact metes and bounds of the titles in dispute.
Present during the survey were defendant Diaz' (sic) representative, his surveyor, some police officers
and the lawyer of Antenor (tsn, February 13, 1997, p. 15). Making use of the certified true copies of the
titles and the survey plan dated 27 September to 30 September 1960 in the name of Antenor (Exhibit
"L"), as well as the title of Diaz, Raymundo attested that the relocation survey shows that a portion of an
existing wall and a concrete structure are encroaching upon the property of Antenor (tsn, February 13,
1997, p. 10).
xxx xxx xxx
During the hearing of this case on 4 March 1999, defendants, thru counsel, manifested that they shall
be presenting a surveyor who will testify that upon verification, lot 4705 occupied by them is within the
property they own and that they are not occupying the lot belonging to the plaintiff. Despite said
manifestation, however, defendants failed to present the said surveyor. 63
The decretal portion thereof pronounces thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding appropriate Antenor Virata's
titles over the properties located at Palico, Imus, Cavite embraced in and covered by TCT Nos. T-4983,
T-4984, T-4985, T-4986, T-5027, T-5028, T-5029, T-5030, T-5031, T-5032 and T-5033 issued in 1962
and declaring said titles as the only official titles covering the lots described therein and declaring
further defendant Diaz' (sic) claim as void and his possession of portions of said properties illegal.
Accordingly, defendant's representative or any other claiming right, title or interest from defendant
Enrique Diaz are hereby ordered to vacate the properties and/or to voluntarily surrender possession
thereof to plaintiff.
Furthermore, defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff the following:
1. P5,000.00 per month as reasonable rental for the use of the subject properties computed from the
date this case was filed on 13 September 1996 until they actually vacate the same;
2. P30,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
Cost of suit.
Defendant's representative and any other claiming right, title or interest from defendant Enrique Diaz
are also directed to remove or demolish the barbed wire fence, concrete fence, the concrete house and
other improvements that have been erected on the properties registered in the name of Antenor
Virata. 64

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the appellate court, petitioners asseverated that they were denied their defense in assailing the validity
of the subject titles when the court a quo denied the allowance of their Amended Answer. Secondly, they
challenged the judgment of the RTC on the ground that res judicata and laches had set in to bar the instant
action. They similarly assailed the award of attorney's fees in favor of respondent.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners' reliance on a certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite
attesting that there existed no records relative to the administrative reconstitution of the title of Miguela
Crisologo, from whom Antenor bought the subject properties, constitutes an indirect attack on these titles. It
underscored that if petitioners believed that respondent's titles were spurious, they should have filed
appropriate proceedings therefor. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that res judicata cannot be appreciated
notwithstanding the previous action (Civil Case No. N-501) instituted by Antenor for recovery of possession of
the subject properties. It emphasized that the case was dismissed on 16 October 1969 for failure of the heirs of
Antenor to substitute him in said litigation. However, the judgment which dismissed the action was not an
adjudication on the merits. Thus, the dismissal of Civil Case No. N-501 was a dismissal without prejudice,
which did not determine the rights or liabilities of the parties thereto. Moreover, the appellate court held that res
judicata cannot be interposed to bar the determination of a subsequent case if the first and second cases
involve different causes of action or subject matter and seek different reliefs, which is true of Civil Case No. N-
501 and the instant case. 65
Anent the issue of laches, the appellate court ruled that laches could not apply to registered land covered by
the Torrens system. According to the Court of Appeals, the properties in controversy are titled in the name of
Antenor and, as the registered owner, he had the right to demand the return of the properties at any time as
the possession of petitioners was unauthorized. 66
Finally, ruling on the propriety of the award of attorney's fees in respondent's favor, the appellate court
pronounced that the same must be disallowed on appeal. It rationalized that the trial court's decision was
bereft of any findings of fact and law to justify the award of attorney's fees. No circumstance was shown to
warrant the grant thereof. 67
Meanwhile, on 9 July 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 68 denying respondent's Motion for
Execution pending appeal and petitioners' Motion to Suspend Proceedings for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals, in the assailed Decision of 27 August 2003, affirmed with modification the judgment of
the RTC deleting the award of attorney's fees in favor of respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit and the
assailed Decision dated May 25, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus[,] Cavite in Civil Case No.
 1399-96 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of attorney's fees in favor of appellee is
deleted. No pronouncement as to costs. 69
Undeterred, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 70 of the 27 August 2003 Decision of the Court of
Appeals, which was denied by the same court in the Resolution of 4 February 2004.
The Issues
Forthwith, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following grounds, to wit:
I.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DECLARING THE SUBJECT LAND TITLES IN THE NAME OF ANTENOR VIRATA AS
VALID; [AND]
II.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT ACTION
CONSTITUTE (sic) RES JUDICATA.71
In addition, petitioners raised the ground that it took respondent 27 years to institute the instant action from the
time Civil Case No. N-501 was dismissed.
The Ruling of the Court
For a full adjudication of the case before us, we shall first resolve the validity of respondent's title; and, if in the
affirmative, determine whether respondent's right to recover the property is barred by res judicata and laches.
A. Respondent was able to satisfy the requisites of the law for the filing of an action to quiet title.
An action for quieting of title is a remedy which may be availed of only when by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or
unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainant's title to real property or any interest therein.
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an
action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein.
Further, Article 477 72 of the same Code mandates that in an action to quiet title, the party bringing the action
must have a legal or, at least, an equitable title 73 to the real property subject of the action and that the alleged
cloud 74 on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid. Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to
or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 75
First. The determination of the circumstances leading to Antenor's acquisition of the subject properties is a
factual matter.
The court a quo found that in 1959, Antenor purchased from Miguela Crisologo two parcels of land located at
Palico, Imus, Cavite, and covered by TCTs No. T-3855 and No. T-11171. Antenor paid for the aforesaid
properties in installment, and after having fully paid for the same, TCTs No. T-3855 and No. T-11171 in the
name of Miguela Crisologo were cancelled, and TCTs No. T-517 and No. T-518 were issued to Antenor. In
1963, the properties were subdivided and, therefrom, TCTs No. T-4983, T-4984, T-4985, T-4986, T-5027, T-
5028, T-5029, T-5030, T-5031, T-5032 and T-5033, all in the name of Antenor were issued. On 4 May 1982,
respondent was appointed administratrix of the Estate of Antenor.
On appeal, such findings of facts were not disturbed by the appellate court. Nothing is more settled than the
rule that where, as in the case herein, the findings of fact of the trial court are affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
the same are final and conclusive upon this Court. 76 Indeed, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. None of
the exceptions 77 to this rule appears to be present in the case at bar, and so should we apply the rule with
force.
Second. Antero's certificates of title, as found by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court, were
issued as early as 22 October 1959. Time and again, we have upheld the fundamental principle in land
registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a
parcel of land. 78 The validity of Antero's titles were upheld by the court a quo and the Court of Appeals and
were not found to be tainted with any defect. Even as Enrique possessed certificates of title over certain
portions of the subject properties, these were issued only on 7 March 1973 and 6 March 1991. On this matter,
we do not find basis to digress from the ruling articulated by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
Well-established is the principle that the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate. This rule refers to the date of the certificate of
title. Absent any muniment of title issued prior to 1959 in favor of appellants [Enrique, et al.] which could
prove their ownership over the contested lots, this Court is left with no other alternative but to declare
appellants' claim over the properties as void. 79
B. A collateral attack on respondent's title over the disputed properties cannot be allowed.
By express provision of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title cannot be subject to a
collateral attack, thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
When is an action a direct attack and when is it collateral? This Court made a distinction, to wit:
An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title,
and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the
object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand,
the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. 80
In the case at bar, petitioners sought to file an Amended Answer, attacking the validity of Antenor's title.
Therein, it was alleged that Enrique discovered a certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite which
purports to signify that there was no valid reconstitution of Antenor's title. Otherwise stated, they sought to
assert that the aforesaid certification shows that TCT No (T-11171) RT-1228, in the name of Miguela
Crisologo, appeared to have been reconstituted; however, no record in the Primary Entry Book of said
Registry, relative to such administrative reconstitution can be found. As submitted, petitioners maintained that
the lack of record is a vital defect, not only to the validity of the reconstitution of Miguela Crisologo's title but
also to Antenor's title, which was derived therefrom.

However, the propriety of the court a quo's disallowance of petitioner's Amended Answer is no longer the
subject of the instant Petition, the same having reached finality. Indeed, after the denial by the court a quo of
Enrique's Motion to File Amended Answer, he filed his Pre-Trial Brief on 27 February 1998. There was no
attempt on the part of petitioners to assail the interlocutory Order of 14 January 1998, denying Enrique's
Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer. At this stage, petitioners can no longer impugn the said Order.
C. The Decision of the CFI of Cavite in Civil Case No. N-501 does not constitute res judicata.
Res judicata exists when the following elements are present:
(a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits;
(d) and there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action. 81 (Emphasis supplied.)
Civil Case No. N-501 was dismissed without prejudice by the CFI of Cavite on 16 October 1969. The same
cannot be deemed a judgment on the merits. A judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of
which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point. 82 The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits
and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action had not
been commenced. In other words, the discontinuance of a case not on the merits does not bar another action
on the same subject matter. 83
D. Laches has not set in to bar respondent from recovering possession of the subject properties.
At first instance, petitioners asserted that it took respondent a period of 27 years to institute the instant action
since the dismissal of Civil Case No. N-501. Otherwise stated, petitioners seek reliance on the equitable
doctrine of laches.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This
equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims
for the peace of society. 84 Indeed, while it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the
registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of
laches. 85However, In the case at bar, laches cannot be appreciated in petitioners' favor.
The Court of Appeals said that respondent could not be faulted for having instituted the action several years
after the dismissal of a case commenced by Antenor himself because it was only in 1982 that the administratrix
for his Estate was appointed, and respondent allowed petitioners to peacefully vacate the premises. Moreover,
the appellate court said that laches cannot lie against respondent on the ground that petitioners cannot feign
ignorance of the possibility of respondent's action for quieting of title because from the time of the dismissal of
the case for recovery of possession in 1969, they knew that another action would be instituted by respondent
since the dismissal of the prior case was without prejudice to the filing of a subsequent action.
We agree.
For laches to apply, it must be shown that there was lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant
that complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit. 86 Petitioners cannot be said to be without
knowledge of respondent's claims over the subject properties as even prior to 1969, Antenor filed Civil Case N-
501, an action for recovery of possession against Enrique. On 16 October 1969, the CFI of Cavite dismissed
the case without prejudice to the filing of a subsequent action. The dismissal without prejudice was adequate to
apprise petitioners that an action to assert respondent's rights was forthcoming.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 72907, dated 27 August 2003 and 4 February 2004 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners. CADHcI
SO ORDERED.
||| (Heirs of Diaz v. Virata, G.R. No. 162037, [August 7, 2006], 529 PHIL 799-826)
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154415. July 28, 2005.]
GASPAR CALACALA, BALTAZAR CALACALA, MELCHOR CALACALA, SOLOMON
CALACALA, FELICIDAD CALACALA, PETRONILA CALACALA and SALOME
CALACALA, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Solicitor General, and SHERIFF JUAN C. MARQUEZ, respondents.
Simplicio M. Sevilleja for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; QUIETING OF TITLE; A COMMON LAW REMEDY GROUNDED ON EQUITY.
An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. As we held in Baricuatro,
Jr. vs. CA: Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law
remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.
Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure '. . . an adjudication that a claim of title to or an
interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming
under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.' In an action for quieting of title, the
competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, '. . . not
only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not
disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt
over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire,
to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. . . .
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN IT CAN BE AVAILED OF; THE PARTY WHO MAY BRING AN ACTION. Under
Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or
unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainant's title to real property or any interest therein. In turn,
Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action to quiet title, thus: Article 477. The
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the
action. He need not be in possession of said property. It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title
to prosper, the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on the real property subject of the
action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TWO INDISPENSABLE REQUISITES. Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2)
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to
or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY BOND; REPUBLIC'S
FAILURE TO DO ANYTHING WITHIN TEN YEARS OR MORE FOLLOWING THE REGISTRATION OF THE
SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE OF SALE CANNOT GIVE RISE TO A PRESUMPTION THAT IT HAS WAIVED OR
ABANDONED ITS RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP. For one, it bears stressing that petitioners' predecessors-in-
interest lost whatever right they had over land in question from the very moment they failed to redeem it during
the 1-year period of redemption. Certainly, the Republic's failure to execute the acts referred to by the
petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to
restore whatever rights petitioners' predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For sure, petitioners have yet
to cite a provision of law or rule of jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a
buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring ownership back to him whose property has been
previously foreclosed and sold. As correctly observed by the trial court, the Republic's failure to do anything
within ten (10) years or more following the registration of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale cannot give rise to a
presumption that it has thereby waived or abandoned its right of ownership or that it has prescribed, "for
prescription does not lie against the government," nor could it "be bound or estopped by the negligence or
mistakes of its officials and employees."
5. ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PROCEDURAL LAWS ARE CONSTRUED TO BE APPLICABLE TO
ACTIONS PENDING AND AT THE TIME OF THEIR PASSAGE. Quite the contrary, Section 33, Rule 39 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that "[u]pon the expiration of the right of redemption, the
purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the
judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy." Concededly, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was
yet inexistent when the facts of this case transpired. Even then, the application thereof to this case is justified
by our pronouncement in Lascano vs. Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc., et al., to wit: Procedural laws are
construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws
cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise
therefrom.
6. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; EXPIRATION OF THE ONE-YEAR REDEMPTION
PERIOD FORECLOSES THE OBLIGOR'S RIGHT TO REDEEM. [W]ith the rule that the expiration of the 1-
year redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute,
the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that
is already vested in the purchaser. As this Court has said in Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al.: Note
must be taken of the fact that under the Rules of Court the expiration of that one-year period forecloses the
owner's right to redeem, thus making the sheriff's sale absolute. The issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale
becomes a mere formality, an act merely confirmatory of the title that is already in the purchaser and
constituting official evidence of that fact.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners urge
us to annul and set aside the resolution dated 31 October 2001 and the order dated 2 July 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court at Rosales, Pangasinan which respectively dismissed petitioners' complaint in Civil Case
No. 1239-R and denied their motion for reconsideration.
The material facts are not at all disputed:
The spouses Camilo Calacala and Conchita Calacala, predecessors-in-interest of the herein petitioners, are
the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Balincanaway, Rosales, Pangasinan and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21204 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.
To secure the provisional release of an accused in a criminal case then pending before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan, the spouses offered their aforementioned parcel of land as a property bond in
said case. For failure of the accused to appear at his scheduled arraignment on 4 November 1981, the CFI
ordered the bond forfeited in favor, of the government, and, following the bondman's failure to produce in court
the body of the accused, rendered judgment against the bond in the amount of P3,500.00. Thereafter, the
court issued a Writ of Execution 1 directing the provincial sheriff to effect a levy on the subject parcel of land
and to sell the same at a public auction to satisfy the amount of the bond. In compliance with the writ, the
deputy provincial sheriff issued on 26 July 1982 a Notice of Levy 2 addressed to the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan who, on 19 August 1982, caused the annotation thereof on TCT No. T-21204 as Entry No. 83188.
Not long thereafter, a public auction of the subject parcel of land was held on 24 September 1982, at which
respondent Republic submitted its bid for P3,500, which is the amount of the judgment on the bond. Hence, on
that same day, a Sheriff's Certificate of Sale 3 was issued in favor of the Republic as the winning bidder. HSaIDc
On 5 October 1982, the same Certificate of Sale was registered and annotated on TCT No. T-21204 as Entry
No. 83793, thereby giving the spouses Calacala a period of one (1) year therefrom within which to redeem
their property. Unfortunately, they never did up to the time of their respective deaths on 13 January 1988 and 8
January 1994.
Claiming ownership of the same land as legal heirs of the deceased spouses, petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court at Rosales, Pangasinan a complaint4 for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of
Encumbrance on TCT No. T-21204against respondents Republic and Sheriff Juan C. Marquez. In their
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 1239-R and raffled to Branch 53 of the court, petitioners prayed, inter
alia, for the cancellation of Entries No. 83188 and 83793 on TCT No. T-21204 or the declaration of said entries
as null and void.
To the complaint, respondent Republic interposed a Motion to Dismiss 5grounded on the (1) complaint's failure
to state a cause of action and (2) prescription of petitioners' right to redeem. aTCADc
In their Opposition, 6 petitioners contend that when respondent Republic moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, it thereby hypothetically admitted all the allegations therein, specifically the
averment that despite the lapse of nineteen (19) years, respondent did not secure the necessary Certificate of
Final Sale and Writ of Possession and failed to execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. Petitioners
thus submit that the Republic's rights over the land in question had either prescribed, been abandoned or
waived. They add that by filing a motion to dismiss, respondent Republic likewise admitted the allegation in the
same complaint that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous possession of the
subject land and paying the realty taxes thereon. CaAIES
In the herein assailed resolution 7 dated 31 October 2001, the trial court granted the Republic's motion to
dismiss and accordingly dismissed petitioners' complaint. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their
motion was denied by the same court in its equally challenged order 8 of 2 July 2002.
Hence, petitioners' present recourse, it being their contentions that
I.
THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FOR QUIETING OF TITLE AND CANCELLATION OF ENCUMBRANCE
ON TCT NO. T-21204, FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, REGIONAL [sic] TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 53, ROSALES, PANGASINAN WAS THE PROPER REMEDY.
II.
THE COMPLAINT STATES SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION.
III.
THE CASE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE HAS NOT PRESCRIBED.
IV.
AND THE RESPONDENT REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES HAS NOT PERFECTED ITS TITLE TO
THE LAND IN QUESTION.
In the main, it is petitioners' submission that their complaint a quo sufficiently states a cause of action because
they are still the owners of the subject parcel of land despite their failure to redeem it within the 1-year
redemption period. They premise their argument on the Republic's failure to secure the Certificate of Final
Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the same
property within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale on 5 October 1982. Prescinding
therefrom, they thus argue that the Republic's right over the property in question has already prescribed or has
been abandoned and waived, citing, in support thereof, Article 1142 of the Civil Code. In short, it is petitioners'
thesis that respondent Republic failed to perfect its title.
On the other hand, it is respondent's posture that its rights and title as owner of the same property are already
perfected by the mere failure of petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest to redeem the same within one
(1) year from the registration/annotation of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale on TCT No. T-21204, in accordance
with Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
As we see it, the only question which commends itself for our resolution is whether the trial court's dismissal of
petitioners' complaint for Quieting of Titlewas proper. It thus behooves us to determine if, in the first place,
petitioners have a cause of action in their complaint.
We rule for respondent Republic.
To begin with, it bears emphasis that an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy
grounded on equity. As we held in Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA: 9
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy
for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.
Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure '. . . an adjudication that a claim of title to or
an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those
claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.' In an action for
quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and
other claimants, '. . . not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to
said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has
the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without
 fearintroduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems
best . . . (Italics supplied).
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby casts on the complainant's title to real property or any interest
therein. The codal provision reads:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an
action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. ADECcI
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein.
In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action to quiet title, thus:
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper, the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at
least, an equitable title on the real property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid. So it is that in Robles, et al. vs. CA, 10 we ruled:
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. cADEHI
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.

To start with, petitioners base their claim of legal title not on the strength of any independent writing in their
favor but simply and solely on respondent Republic's failure to secure the Certificate of Final Sale, execute an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property in dispute within ten
(10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale.
Petitioners' reliance on the foregoing shortcomings or inactions of respondent Republic cannot stand.
For one, it bears stressing that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they had over land in
question from the very moment they failed to redeem it during the 1-year period of redemption. Certainly, the
Republic's failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of
the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rights petitioners' predecessors-in-
interest had over the same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of jurisprudence,
and we are not aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate
of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the
property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring
ownership back to him whose property has been previously foreclosed and sold. As correctly observed by the
trial court, the Republic's failure to do anything within ten (10) years or more following the registration of the
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale cannot give rise to a presumption that it has thereby waived or abandoned its right
of ownership or that it has prescribed, "for prescription does not lie against the government", nor could it "be
bound or estopped by the negligence or mistakes of its officials and employees". TcDAHS
Quite the contrary, Section 33, 11 Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that "[u]pon
the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all
the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy".
Concededly, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was yet inexistent when the facts of this case transpired. Even
then, the application thereof to this case is justified by our pronouncement in Lascano vs. Universal Steel
Smelting Co., Inc., et al., 12to wit:
 Procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive
application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested
right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to
redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a
mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser. As this Court has said
in Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al.: 13
Note must be taken of the fact that under the Rules of Court the expiration of that one-year period
forecloses the owner's right to redeem, thus making the sheriff's sale absolute. The issuance
thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a mere formality, an act merely confirmatory of the
title that is already in the purchaser and constituting official evidence of that fact. (Emphasis
supplied)
With the reality that petitioners are not holders of any legal title over the property subject of this case and are
bereft of any equitable claim thereon, the very first requisite of an action to quiet title, i.e., that the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject matter of the action, is
miserably wanting in this case.
For another, and worse, petitioners never put in issue, as in fact they admit in their pleadings, the validity of the
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale duly registered on 5 October 1982. On this score, the second requisite of an action
to quiet title, namely, that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding alleged to cast cloud on a plaintiffs title
is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facieappearance of validity or legal efficacy, is likewise absent
herein.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed resolution and order of the trial court
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Calacala v. Republic, G.R. No. 154415, [July 28, 2005], 502 PHIL 681-692)
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123509. March 14, 2000.]
LUCIO ROBLES, EMETERIA ROBLES, ALUDIA ROBLES and EMILIO
ROBLES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses VIRGILIO SANTOS and BABY
RUTH CRUZ, RURAL BANK OF CARDONA, Inc., HILARIO ROBLES, ALBERTO PALAD
JR. in his capacity as Director of Lands, and JOSE MAULEON in his capacity as District
Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners inherited the disputed property from their father, Silvino Robles, whose predecessor has been
occupying the same since 1916. Allegedly, the payment of taxes thereof was entrusted to their co-heir,
respondent Hilario. In 1962, however, the tax declaration of the land was transferred to Exequiel Bellena,
father-in-law of Hilario; later, transferred to Antipolo Rural Bank, and then, to the name of Hilario and wife
Andrea, who mortgaged the same to the Cardona Rural Bank. The property was eventually foreclosed,
transferred to the Bank's name and sold to respondent spouses Santos. Petitioners, who discovered the
mortgage, attempted but failed to redeem the property while respondent spouses Santos took possession of
the same and were able to secure Free Patent in their names.
Evidently, there was no valid transfer of the disputed property from the heirs of Silvino to Exequiel in 1962.
Thus, the property still belong to the heirs of the late Silvino and the mortgage executed by Hilario to the Rural
Bank of Cardona was made in his capacity as mere co-owner thereof. The Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. is
considered a mortgagee in bad faith as it did not fully ascertain the title of Hilario and thus failed to observe
due diligence. Hence, as what was mortgaged was only the undivided share of Hilario, respondent spouses
Santos can only acquire the same. The free patent granted to the spouses Santos was void as the disputed
land has already become a private land as petitioners are claiming ownership thereof based on their
possession of the land in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. It has become beyond the authority of
the Director of Lands.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; OWNERSHIP; QUIETING OF TITLE, DISCUSSED. Based on Art. 476 of the
Civil Code, an action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty
on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to
or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CO-OWNERSHIP; PRESCRIPTION IN FAVOR OF A CO-OWNER. It is a fundamental
principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-
owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO REPUDIATION THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. In the present case, Hilario did not
have possession of the subject property; neither did he exclude the petitioners from the use and the enjoyment
thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits. Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage contract with
the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-ownership. As absolute owner of his undivided
interest in the land, he had the right to alienate his share, as he in fact did. Neither should his payment of land
taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The
assertion that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued
occupation and possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as owners.
4. ID.; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE; WHEN MORTGAGOR MERE CO-OWNER OF
THE PROPERTY MORTGAGED. In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor be
the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void. In the present case, it is
apparent that Hilario Robles was not the absolute owner of the entire subject property; and that the Rural Bank
of Cardona, Inc., in not fully ascertaining his title thereto, failed to observe due diligence and, as such, was a
mortgagee in bad faith. In Rural Bank of Compostela v. Court of Appeals, the Court invalidated a real estate
mortgage after a finding that the bank had not been in good faith. The Court explained: "The rule that persons
dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks." At any rate,
considering that Hilario can be deemed to have mortgaged the disputed property not as absolute owner but
only as a co-owner, he can be adjudged to have disposed to the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. only
his undivided sharetherein. The said bank, being the immediate predecessor of the Santos spouses, was a
mortgagee in bad faith. Thus, justice and equity mandate the entitlement of the Santos spouses, who merely
stepped into the shoes of the bank, only to what legally pertains to the latter Hilario's share in the disputed
property.
5. ID.; LAND TITLES; FREE PATENT; NOT VALID WHEN ISSUED AGAINST A PRIVATE LAND. In the
light of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land, petitioners are
"deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of
a certificate of title being issued." The land was "segregated from the public domain." Accordingly, the director
of lands had no authority to issue a free patent thereto in favor of another person. Verily, jurisprudence holds
that a free patent covering private land is null and void. It is apparent that petitioners are claiming ownership of
the disputed property on the basis of their possession thereof in the concept of owners openly, peacefully,
publicly, continuously and adversely since 1916. Because they and their predecessors-in-interest have
occupied, possessed and cultivated it as owners for more than thirty years, only one conclusion can be drawn
it has become private land and is therefore beyond the authority of the director of land.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
To be entitled to the remedy of quieting of title, petitioners must show that they have title to the real property at
issue, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy. Buyers of unregistered real property,
especially banks, must exert due diligence in ascertaining the titles of mortgagors and sellers, lest some
innocent parties be prejudiced. Failure to observe such diligence may amount to bad faith and may result in the
nullity of the mortgage, as well as of the subsequent foreclosure and/or auction sale. Unless the co-ownership
is clearly repudiated, a co-owner cannot, by prescription, acquire title to the shares of the other co-owners. cdrep
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, assailing the June 15, 1995 Decision and the January 15,
1996 Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 34213. 2 In its Decision, the CA ruled: 3
"WHEREFORE, the trial court's June 17, 1991 decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu
thereof a new one is hereby entered ordering the dismissal of the plaintiffs-appellees['] second
amended complaint."
Earlier, the trial court had disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring free patent Title No. IV-1-010021 issued by the Bureau of Lands as null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos to deliver the property subject of
this case to the plaintiff; and
3. Declaring the heirs of Silvino Robles as the absolute owner of the land in controversy."
The January 15, 1996 CA Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. cdphil
The Facts
The present Petition is rooted in a case for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal,
filed on March 14, 1988, 4 by Petitioners Lucio Robles, Emeteria Robles, Aludia Robles and Emilio Robles. The
facts were narrated by the trial court in this wise:
"There seems to be no dispute that Leon Robles primitively owned the land situated in Kay Taga,
Lagundi, Morong, Rizal with an area of 9,985 square meters. He occupied the same openly and
adversely. He also declared the same in his name for taxation purposes as early as 1916 covered by
Tax Declaration No. 17865 (Exh. "I") and paid the corresponding taxes thereon (Exh. "B"). When Leon
Robles died, his son Silvino Robles inherited the land, who took possession of the land, declared it in
his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon.
"Upon the death of Silvino Robles in 1942, his widow Maria de la Cruz and his children inherited the
property. They took adverse possession of said property and paid taxes thereon. The task of
 cultivat[ing] the land was assigned to plaintiff Lucio Robles who planted trees and other crops. He also
built a nipa hut on the land. The plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and
half-brother, Hilario Robles.
"In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the name of Silvino Robles
was canceled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena (Exh. "19"), father of Andrea Robles who is the
wife of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural
Bank, using the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the tax declaration was transferred [to] the name
of Antipolo Rural Bank (Exh. "17") and later on, was transferred [to] the name of defendant Hilario
Robles and his wife (Exh. "16").
"In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cardona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as
security. Andrea Robles testified without contradiction that somebody else, not her husband Hilario
Robles, signed the loan papers because Hilario Robles was working in Marinduque at that time as a
carpenter.
"For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedings were had and defendant Rural Bank
emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale in October 1968.
"The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax declaration was transferred in
the name of defendant Rural Bank. On September 25, 1987, defendant Rural Bank sold the same to
the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos. cdrep
"In September 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the property, but was
unsuccessful. On May 10, 1988, defendant spouses Santos took possession of the property in question
and was able to secure Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 in their names." 5
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:
"The instant action for quieting of title concerns the parcel of land bounded and more particularly
described as follows:
"A parcel of land located at Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. Bounded [i]n the north by the
property of Venancio Ablay y Simeon Ablay; [i]n the east by the property of Veronica Tulak y
Dionisio Ablay; [i]n the south by the property of Simeon Ablay y Dionisio Ablay; and [i]n the
west by the property of Dionisio Ablay y Simeon Ablay, with an area of 9,985 square meters,
more or less, assessed in the year 1935 at P60.00 under Tax Declaration No. 23219.'
"As the heirs of Silvino Robles who, likewise inherited the above-described parcel from Leon Robles,
the siblings Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and Emilio, all surnamed Robles, commenced the instant suit with
the filing of their March 14, 1988 complaint against Spouses Virgilio and Ruth Santos, as well as the
Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. Contending that they had been in possession of the land since 1942, the
plaintiff alleged, among other matters, that it was only in September of 1987 that they came to know of
the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted thereon by the half-brother, Hilario Robles, in
favor of defendant Rural Bank; and that they likewise learned upon further inquiry, that the latter had
already sold the self-same parcel in favor of the Santos spouses (pp. 1-3, orig. rec.). Twice amended to
implead Hilario Robles (pp. 76-80, orig. rec) and, upon subsequent discovery of the issuance of Free
Patent No. IV-I-010021 in favor of the defendant spouses, the Director of Lands and the District Land
Officer of the Bureau of Lands as parties-defendants (pp. 117-121, orig. rec). The plaintiffs' complaint
sought the following reliefs on the theory that the encumbrance of their half-brother, constituted on the
land, as well as all proceedings taken subsequent thereto, were null and void, to wit:
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (a) a preliminary mandatory injunction be issued
forthwith restoring plaintiffs to their possession of said parcel of land; (b) an order be issued
annulling said Free Patent No. IV-I-010021 in the name of defendants spouses Vergel Santos
and Ruth C. Santos, the deed of sale aforementioned and any tax declaration which have been
issued in the name of defendants; and (c) ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. cda
"Plaintiffs pray for other relief as [may be] just and equitable under the premises." (pp. 120-121,
orig. rec.)
xxx xxx xxx'
"With the termination of the pre-trial stage upon the parties-litigants' agreement (p. 203, orig. rec.) the
trial court proceeded to try the case on the merits. It thereafter rendered the challenged June 17, 1991
decision upon the following findings and conclusions:
 "The real estate mortgage allegedly executed by Hilario Robles is not valid because his
signature in the mortgage deed was forged. This fact, which remains unrebutted, was admitted
by Andrea Robles.
'Inasmuch as the real estate mortgage executed allegedly by Hilario Robles in favor of the
defendant Cardona Rural Bank, Inc. was not valid, it stands to reason that the foreclosure
proceedings therein were likewise not valid. Therefore, the defendant bank did not acquire any
right arising out of the foreclosure proceedings. Consequently, defendant bank could not have
transferred any right to the spouses Santos.
'The fact that the land was covered by a free patent will not help the defendant Santos any.
'There can be no question that the subject [property was held] in the concept of owner by Leon
Robles since 1916. Likewise, his successor-in-interest, Silvino Robles, his wife Maria de la
Cruz and the plaintiffs occupied the property openly, continuously and exclusively until they
were ousted from their possession in 1988 by the spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos.
'Under the circumstances, therefore, and considering that 'open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public lands for the period prescribed by law (30 years), creates the
legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the
need of judicial or other action, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.
Possession of public land . . . which is [of] the character and duration prescribed by the statute
is the equivalent of an express grant from the State, considering the dictum of the statute
itself[:]; 'The possessor . . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title . . . .' No proof is
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption[,] and confirmation proceedings would be a
little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed
is of the required character and length of time. Registration thereunder would not confer title,
but simply recognize a title already vested. (Cruz v. IAC, G.R. No. 75042, November 29, 1988)
The land in question has become private land. cdll
'Consequently, the issuance of [a] free patent title to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth C.
Santos is not valid because at the time the property subject of this case was already private
land, the Bureau of Lands having no jurisdiction to dispose of the same.' (pp. 257-259, orig.
rec.)'
"Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, the Santos spouses and the defendant Rural Bank jointly filed
their July 6, 1991 Notice of Appeal (p. 260, orig. rec.) . . . ." 6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners no longer had any title to the subject
property at the time they instituted the Complaint for quieting of title. The CA ratiocinated as follows:
"As correctly urged by the appellants, the plaintiff-appellees no longer had any title to the property at the
time of the institution of the instant complaint. (pp. 25-27, rec.) The latter's claim of continuous
possession notwithstanding (pp. 3-5, TSN, July 5, 1990; p. 12, TSN, July 12, 1990), the aforesaid loss
of title is amply evidenced by the subsequent declaration of the subject realty for taxation purposes not
only in the name of Exequiel Ballena (Exhibits "1" and "2", pp. 23-24, orig. rec.) but also in the name of
the Rural Bank of Antipolo (Exhibit 17, vol. II, orig. rec.). On the theory that tax declarations can be
evincive of the transfer of a parcel of land or a portion thereof (Gacos v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA
214), the court a quo clearly erred in simply brushing aside the apparent transfers [which] the land in
litigation had undergone. Whether legal or equitable, it cannot, under the circumstances, be gainsaid
that the plaintiff-appellees no longer had any title to speak of when Exequiel Ballena executed the
November 7, 1966 Deed of Absolute Sale transferring the land in favor of the spouses Hilario and
Andrea Robles (Exhibit "3", p. 25, orig. rec.)
"Even on the theory that the plaintiffs-appellees and their half-brother, Hilario Robles, are co-owners of
the land left behind by their common father, Silvino Robles, such title would still be effectively
discounted by what could well serve as the latter's acts of repudiation of the co-ownership, i.e., his
possession (p. 22, TSN, November 15, 1990) and declaration thereof for taxation purposes in his own
name (Exhibit "4", p. 26, orig. rec.). In view of the plaintiffs-appellees' inaction for more than twenty (20)
years from the time the subject realty was transferred in favor of Hilario Robles, the appellants correctly
maintain that prescription had already set in. While it may be readily conceded that an action to quiet
title to property in the possession of the plaintiff is imprescriptible (Almanza vs. Arguelles, 156 SCRA
718; Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 270; Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals,
133 SCRA 718; Charon Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 784; Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75
 SCRA 441; Burton vs. Gabar, 55 SCRA 4999), it equally bears emphasis that a co-owner or, for that
matter, the said co-owner[']s successors-in-interest who occupy the community property other than as
co-owner[s] can claim prescription as against the other co-owners (De Guzman vs. Austria, 148 SCRA
75; Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 902; Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil.
857; De Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). If only in this latter sense, the appellants correctly argue that
the plaintiffs-appellees have lost their cause of action by prescription. cdtai
"Over and above the foregoing considerations, the court a quo gravely erred in invalidating the real
estate mortgage constituted on the land solely on the basis of Andrea Robles' testimony that her
husband's signature thereon was forged (p. 257, orig. rec.),
xxx xxx xxx
"In according to the foregoing testimony . . . credibility which, while admittedly unrebutted, was
altogether uncorroborated, the trial court lost sight of the fact that the assailed deed of real estate
mortgage (Exhibit "5", Vol. II, orig. rec.) is a public document, the acknowledgment of which is a prima
facie evidence of its due execution (Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 339). As such, it retains the
presumption of validity in the absence of a full, clear and convincing evidence to overcome such
presumption (Agdeppa vs. Ibe, 220 SCRA 584).
"The foregoing principles take even more greater [sic] when it is, moreover, borne in mind that Hilario
Robles made the following admissions in his March 8, 1989 answer, viz:
'3. The complaint filed against herein answering defendant has no legal basis considering that
as the lawful owner of the subject real property, defendant Hilario Robles has the right
to mortgage the said real property and could dispose the same in whatever manner he
wishe[s] to do." (p. 96, orig. rec.)
"Appropriately underscored by the appellants, the foregoing admission is binding against Hilario
[Robles]. Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of
the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the
same. They cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through [a] palpable mistake or
[unless] no such admission was actually made (Philippine American General Insurance, Inc. vs. Sweet
Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194).
"It does not help the plaintiffs-appellees' cause any that, aside from complying with the requirements for
the foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage (Exhibits "6", "7", "8" and "10", Volume II[)], the
appellant Rural Bank had not only relented to the mortgagor's request to postpone the (Exhibit "g", Vol.
II, orig. rec.) but had likewise granted the latter's request for an extension of the redemption period
therefor (Exhibits "11" and "12", pp. 35-36, orig. rec.). Without going into minute detail in discussing the
Santos spouses' rights as purchasers for value and in good faith (Exhibit "21", Vol. II, orig. rec.), the
mortgagor and the plaintiffs'-appellees cannot now be heard to challenge the validity of the sale of the
land after admittedly failing to redeem the same within the extension the appellant Rural Bank granted
(pp. 10-11, TSN, November 15, 1990).
"Being dependent on the supposed invalidity of the constitution and foreclosure of the subject real
estate mortgage, the plaintiffs-appellees' attack upon . . . Free Patent No. IV-I must necessarily fail. The
trial court, therefore, misread, and ignored the evidence o[n] record, to come up with erroneous
conclusion." cdasia
Contending that such ruling was contrary to law and jurisprudence, Petitioners Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and
Emilio all surnamed Robles filed this Petition for Review. 7
The Assigned Error
Petitioners ascribe the following error to the respondent court:
"Respondent Court of Appeals grievously erred in ruling that with the transfers of the tax declaration
over the parcel of land in question from Silvino Robles to Exequiel Ballena, then to the Rural Bank of
Antipolo, then to Respondent Hilario Robles, then to Respondent Rural Bank of Cardona Inc., and then
finally to Respondent Spouses Santos, petitioners, who by themselves and their predecessors in
interest have been in open, actual and adverse possession of said parcel of land since 1916 up to their
forced removal therefrom in 1988, have lost their title to said property by prescription to their half-
brother, Respondent Hilario Robles, and then finally, to Respondent Spouses Santos." 8
For a better understanding of the case, the above issue will be broken down into three points: first, the nature
of the remedy of quieting of title; second, the validity of the real estate mortgage; and third, the efficacy of the
free patent granted to the Santos spouses.
 First Issue: Quieting of Title
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:
"Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title.
"An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein."
Based on the above definition, an action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or
doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property.9 It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or
an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. 10Also, the deed,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 11
That there is an instrument or a document which, on its face, is valid and efficacious is clear in the present
case. Petitioners allege that their title as owners and possessors of the disputed property is clouded by the tax
declaration and, subsequently, the free patent thereto granted to Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos. The more
important question to be resolved, however, is whether the petitioners have the appropriate title that will entitle
them to avail themselves of the remedy of quieting of title. prcd
Petitioners anchor their claim to the disputed property on their continued and open occupation and possession
as owners thereof. They allege that they inherited it from their father, Silvino, who in turn had inherited it from
his father, Leon. They maintain that after their father's death, they agreed among themselves that Petitioner
Lucio Robles would be tending and cultivating it for everyone, and that their half-brother Hilario would be
paying the land taxes.
Petitioners insist that they were not aware that from 1962 until 1987, the subject property had been declared in
the names of Exequiel Ballena, the Rural Bank of Antipolo, Hilario Robles, the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc.,
and finally, Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos. Maintaining that, as co-owners of the subject property, they did
not agree to the real estate mortgage constituted on it, petitioners insist that their shares therein should not
have been prejudiced by Hilario's actions.
On the other hand, Private Respondents Vergel and Ruth Santos trace their claim to the subject property to
Exequiel Ballena, who had purportedly sold it to Hilario and Andrea Robles. According to private respondents,
the Robles spouses then mortgaged it to the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. not as co-owners but as absolute
owners in order to secure an agricultural loan worth P2,000. Upon their failure to pay their indebtedness, the
mortgage was foreclosed and the property sold to the bank as the highest bidder. Thereafter, private
respondents purchased the property from the bank.
Undisputed is the fact that the land had previously been occupied by Leon and later by Silvino Robles,
petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, as evidenced by the different tax declarations issued in their names. Also
undisputed is the fact that the petitioners continued occupying and possessing the land from the death of
Silvino in 1942 until they were allegedly ousted therefrom in 1988. In 1962, the subject property was declared
in the name of Exequiel for taxation purposes. On September 30, 1965, it was again declared in the same
name; on October 28, 1965, in the name of the Rural Bank of Antipolo; on November 7, 1966, in the name of
Hilario and Andrea; and thereafter, in the name of the Rural Bank of Cardona and, finally, in the name of the
Santos spouses. cdll
Ostensibly, the Court of Appeals failed to consider irregularities in the transactions involving the disputed
property. First, while it was declared in the name of Exequiel in 1962, there was no instrument or deed of
conveyance evidencing its transfer from the heirs of Silvino to him. This fact is important, considering that the
petitioners are alleging continued possession of the property. Second, Exequiel was the father-in-law of Hilario,
to whom petitioners had entrusted the payment of the land taxes. Third, considering that the subject property
had been mortgaged by Exequiel to the Rural Bank of Antipolo, and that it was foreclosed and in fact declared
in the bank's name in 1965, why was he able to sell it to Spouses Hilario and Andrea in 1966? Lastly,
inasmuch as it was an unregistered parcel of land, the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., did not observe due
diligence in determining Hilario's title thereto.
The failure to show the indubitable title of Exequiel to the property in question is vital to the resolution of the
present Petition. It was from him that Hilario had allegedly derived his title thereto as owner, an allegation
which thereby enabled him to mortgage it to the Rural Bank of Cardona. The occupation and the possession
thereof by the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest until 1962 was not disputed, and Exequiel's
acquisition of the said property by prescription was not alleged. Thus, the deed of conveyance purportedly
evidencing the transfer of ownership and possession from the heirs of Silvino to Exequiel should have been
presented as the best proof of that transfer. No such document was presented, however.
Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the petitioners that Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the
Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did not divest
them of title to the property at the time of the institution of the Complaint for quieting of title.

Contrary to the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-
ownership. It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other
co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a
co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. 12
In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property; neither did he exclude the
petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits. 13 Likewise, his
act of entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-
ownership. As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had the right to alienate his share, as he
in fact did. 14 Neither should his payment of land taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be
construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The assertion that the declaration of ownership was
tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued occupation and possession of the disputed property by
the petitioners as owners. cdll
Second Issue: Validity of the Real Estate Mortgage
In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property to be
mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void. 15 In the present case, it is apparent that Hilario Robles was not
the absolute owner of the entire subject property; and that the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., in not fully
ascertaining his title thereto, failed to observe due diligence and, as such, was a mortgagee in bad faith.
First, the bank was utterly remiss in its duty to establish who the true owners and possessors of the subject
property were. It acted with precipitate haste in approving the Robles spouses' loan application, as well as the
real estate mortgage covering the disputed parcel of land. 16 Had it been more circumspect and assiduous, it
would have discovered that the said property was in fact being occupied by the petitioners, who were tending
and cultivating it.
Second, the bank should not have relied solely on the Deed of Sale purportedly showing that the ownership of
the disputed property had been transferred from Exequiel Ballena to the Robles spouses, or that it had
subsequently been declared in the name of Hilario. Because it was dealing with unregistered land, and the
circumstances surrounding the transaction between Hilario and hisfather-in-law Exequiel were suspicious, the
bank should have exerted more effort to fully determine the title of the Robleses. Rural Bank of Compostela
v.Court of Appeals 17 invalidated a real estate mortgage after a finding that the bank had not been in good faith.
The Court explained: "The rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of
title does not apply to banks." In Tomas v. Tomas, the Court held:
". . . . Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in dealing even with registered lands,
than private individuals, for their business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust money
belonging to their depositors, which they should guard against loss by not committing any act of
negligence which amounts to lack of good faith by which they would be denied the protective mantle of
land registration statute, Act 496, extended only to purchasers for value and in good faith, as well as to
mortgagees of the same character and description. . . . ." 18
Lastly, the Court likewise finds it unusual that, notwithstanding the bank's insistence that it had become the
owner of the subject property and had paid the land taxes thereon, the petitioners continued occupying it and
harvesting the fruits therefrom. 19
Considering that Hilario can be deemed to have mortgaged the disputed property not as absolute owner but
only as a co-owner, he can be adjudged to have disposed to the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., only
his undivided sharetherein. The said bank, being the immediate predecessor of the Santos spouses, was a
mortgagee in bad faith. Thus, justice and equity mandate the entitlement of the Santos spouses, who merely
stepped into the shoes of the bank, only to what legally pertains to the latter Hilario's share in the disputed
property. LLjur
Third Issue: Efficacy of Free Patent Grant
Petitioners repeatedly insist that the disputed property belongs to them byprivate ownership and, as such, it
could not have been awarded to the Santos spouses by free patent. They allege that they possessed it in the
concept of owners openly, peacefully, publicly and continuously as early as 1916 until they were forcibly
ousted therefrom in 1988. They likewise contend that they cultivated it and harvested its fruits. Lucio Robles
testified:
"xxx xxx xxx
Q By the way, why do you know this parcel of land?
A Because before my father died, he showed me all the documents.
Q Before the death of your father, who was the owner of this parcel of land?
A My father, sir.
Q How did your father acquire this parcel of land?
A My father knew that it [was] by inheritance, sir.
Q From whom?
A From his father, Leon Robles, sir.
Q And do you know also [from] whom Leon Robles acquired this land?
A It was inherited from his father, sir.
Q What is the nature of this parcel of land?
A It's an agricultural land, sir.
Q Now, at the time of the death of your father, this land was planted with what crops?
A Mango trees, santol trees, and I was the one who planted those trees, sir.
Q When did you plant those trees?
A Before the death of my father, sir.
Q Now, after the death of your father, who cultivated this parcel of land?
A I took charge of the land after the death of my father, sir.
Q Up to when?
A Up to the present, sir, after this case was already filed." 20

The preceding claim is an assertion that the subject property is private land. The petitioners do not concede,
and the records do not show, that it was ever an alienable land of the public domain. They allege private
ownership thereof, as evidenced by their testimonies and the tax declarations issued in the names of their
predecessors-in-interest. It must be noted that while their claim was not corroborated by other witnesses, it
was not controverted by the other parties, either. prcd
Carlos Dolores insisted that the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., of which he was the manager, had acquired and
possessed the subject property. He did not, however, give any reason why the petitioners had continued
occupying it, even as he admitted on the stand that he had visited it twice. 21
In the light of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land,
petitioners are "deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued." 22 The land was "segregated from the public domain."
Accordingly, the director of lands had no authority to issue a free patent thereto in favor of another person.
Verily, jurisprudence holds that a free patent covering private land is null and void. 23
Worth quoting is the disquisition of the Court in Agne v. Director of Lands, 24 in which it held that a riparian
owner presently in possession had a better right over an abandoned river bed than had a registered owner by
virtue of a free patent.
 "Under the provisions of Act 2874 pursuant to which the title of private respondents' predecessor-in-
interest was issued, the President of the Philippines, or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no
authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private
ownership and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the
fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The jurisdiction of the Director of
Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands publicly owned. The purpose of the
Legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act, Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to
lands of the public domain, and lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not
affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee title, or of private ownership,
constitutes no part of the public domain, and cannot possibly come within the purview of said act 2874,
inasmuch as the 'subject' of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the title of
the Act and the same is excluded from the provisions of the text thereof.
"We reiterate that private ownership of land is not affected by the issuance of the free patent over the
same land because the Public Land Act applies only to lands of the public domain. Only public land
may be disposed of by the Director of Lands. Since as early as 1920, the land in dispute was already
under the private ownership of herein petitioners and no longer a part of the lands of the public domain,
the same could not have been the subject matter of a free patent. The patentee and his successors-in-
interest acquired no right or title to said land. Necessarily, Free Patent No. 23263 issued to
Herminigildo Agpoon is null and void and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto cannot become
final and indefeasible. Hence we ruled in Director of Lands v. Sicsican, et al.,that if at the time the free
patents were issued in 1953 the land covered therein were already private property of another and,
therefore, not part of the disposable land of the public domain, then applicants patentees acquired no
right or title to the land.
"Now, a certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if the fraud consisted in
misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain, although it is not. As earlier stated, the nullity
arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Lands. Being null and void, the free patent granted and the subsequent titles produce no
legal effect whatsoever.Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum.
"A free patent which purports to convey land to which the government did not have any title at the time
of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. The Court has
previously held that the Land Registration Act and the Cadastral Act do not give anybody who resorts to
the provisions thereof a better title than what he really and lawfully has.
xxx xxx xxx
"We have, therefore, to arrive at the unavoidable conclusion that the title of herein petitioners over the
land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered owner which is a total nullity. The long and
continued possession of petitioners under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the claim of a
registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning."
The Santos spouses argue that petitioners do not have the requisite personality to question the free patent
granted them, inasmuch as "it is a well-settled rule that actions to nullify free patents should be filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General at the behest of the Director of Lands." 25
Private respondents' reliance on this doctrine is misplaced. Indeed, the Court held in Peltan
Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 26 that only the solicitor general could file an action for the cancellation
of a free patent. Ruling that the private respondents, who were applicants for a free patent, were not the proper
parties in an action to cancel the transfer certificates covering the parcel of land that was the subject of their
application, the Court ratiocinated thus:
"The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper parties to initiate the present suit. The
complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the
ground that they were derived from a "spurious" OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said
title. While private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the government, we agree
with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will have the same result of reverting the land to the
government under the Regalian Doctrine. Gabila v. Barinaga 27 ruled that only the government is
entitled to this relief. . . . ."
Because the cancellation of the free patent as prayed for by the private respondents in Peltan would revert the
property in question to the public domain, the ultimate beneficiary would be the government, which can be
represented by the solicitor general only. Therefore, the real party-in-interest is the government, not the private
respondents. LibLex
This ruling does not, however, apply to the present case. While the private respondents in Peltan recognized
that the disputed property was part of the public domain when they applied for free patent, 28 herein petitioners
asserted and proved private ownership over the disputed parcel of land by virtue of their open, continued and
exclusive possession thereof since 1916.
Neither does the present case call for the reversion of the disputed property to the State. By asking for the
nullification of the free patent granted to the Santos spouses, the petitioners are claiming the property which,
they contend, rightfully belongs to them.
Indeed, the same issue was resolved by this Court in Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals. 29 In that
case, the trial court dismissed a Complaint seeking the declaration of nullity of an Original Certificate of Title
issued pursuant to a free patent, reasoning that the action should have been instituted by the solicitor general.
In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court held:
"It is settled that a Free Patent issued over private land is null and void, and produces no legal effect
whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. Moreover, private respondents' claim of open,
peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the 2,250 square meter portion since 1920, and its
illegal inclusion in the Free Patent of petitioners and in their original certificate of title, gave private
respondents a cause of action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible."
In any event, the Office of the Solicitor General was afforded an opportunity to express its position in these
proceedings. But it manifested that it would not file a memorandum, because "this case involves purely private
interests." 30
The foregoing considered, we sustain the contention of petitioners that the free patent granted to the Santos
spouses is void. It is apparent that they are claiming ownership of the disputed property on the basis of their
possession thereof in the concept of owners openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since
1916. Because they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied, possessed and cultivated it
as owners for more than thirty years, 31 only one conclusion can be drawn it has become private land and is
therefore beyond the authority of the director of lands. LibLex
Epilogue
We recognize that both the petitioners and the Santos spouses fell victim to the dubious transaction between
Spouses Hilario and Andrea Robles and the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. However, justice and equity mandate
that we declare Petitioners Lucio, Emerita, Aludia and Emilio Robles to have the requisite title essential to their
suit for quieting of title. Considering the circumstances peculiar to this complicated problem, the Court finds this
conclusion the logical and just solution.
The claim that petitioners were guilty of laches in not asserting their rights as owners of the property should be
viewed in the light of the fact that they thought their brother was paying the requisite taxes for them, and more
important, the fact that they continued cultivating it and harvesting and gaining from its fruits.
From another viewpoint, it can even be said that it was the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., which was guilty of
laches because, granting that it had acquired the subject property legally, it failed to enforce its rights as
owner. It was oblivious to the petitioners' continued occupation, cultivation and possession thereof.
Considering that they had possessed the property in good faith for more than ten years, it can even be argued
that they thus regained it by acquisitive prescription. In any case, laches is a remedy in equity, and considering
the circumstances in this case, the petitioners cannot be held guilty of it.
In sum, the real estate mortgage contract covering the disputed property a contract executed between
Spouses Hilario and Andrea on the one hand and the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., on the other is hereby
declared null and void insofar as it prejudiced the shares of Petitioners Lucio, Emerita, Aludia and Emilio
Robles; it is valid as to Hilario Robles' share therein. Consequently, the sale of the subject property to the
Santos spouses is valid insofar as it pertained to his share only. Likewise declared null and void is Free Patent
No. IV-1-010021 issued by the Bureau of Lands covering the subject property. LLphil
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Except as modified by the last paragraph of this Decision, the trial court's Decision is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Robles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123509, [March 14, 2000], 384 PHIL 635-660)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-38745. August 6, 1975.]
LUCIA TAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARADOR VALDEHUEZA and REDICULO
VALDEHUEZA, defendants-appellants.
Alaric P. Acosta for plaintiff-appellee.
Lorenzo P. de Guzman for defendants-appellants.
SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff filed an action for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession of a parcel of land and for
consolidation of ownership of two portions of another land. The subject matter of the first cause of action was
acquired by plaintiff in a public auction. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in her favor after defendant
Arador Valdehueza had failed to redeem the same within the one-year period prescribed by law. By reason
thereof, plaintiff applied for an injunction (Civil Case 2002) to prevent defendant from entering the premises
which, injunction, however, was dismissed, for failure to prosecute.
With respect to the second cause of action, defendants executed two Pacto de Retro Deeds of Sale (one
registered and one unregistered) in favor of plaintiff, but the defendant did not vacate the premises and
continued paying the taxes thereon.
The trial court declared the plaintiff as absolute owner on the land and ordered the dispossession of defendant
under the first cause of action; and under the second cause of action, considered the registered Pacto De
Retro Deed of Sale as a mortgage and the unregistered deed "as a simple loan, secured by the property sold
under pacto de retro thus, ordering defendant to pay with interest. Defendant appealed on the ground that
there was res judicata in the first cause of action, and that in the second cause of action the transaction were
simple loan.
The Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not apply in the first cause of action since Civil Case 2002 was
for injunction involving only possession while the instant case seeks "to remove any doubt or cloud of plaintiff's
ownership with prayer for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession;" and that under the second
cause of action, the contracts are presumed to be equitable mortgages under Art 1602 of the New Civil Code,
whether registered or not, there being no third parties involve. However, imposition of interest was held to be
without legal basis for not having been expressly stipulated in writing.
Thus modified decision affirmed in all other respects.
SYLLABUS
1. ACTIONS; DISMISSAL; PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA. CAUSES OF ACTION MUST BE IDENTICAL.
Res Judicata does not apply where the first case of action for injunction against entry into and gathering of
fruits from the land while the second case seeks to remove any doubt or cloud of the plaintiff ownership with
prayer for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession, since the causes of action are not identical.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST OF ABSENCE OF INCONSISTENCY CASE AT BAR. One test of identity of
causes of action is whether the judgment. The failure of plaintiff to secure an injunction against the defendants
to prevent them from entering the land and gathering fruits is not inconsistent with her being adjudged later as
owner of the land with right to recover possession thereof. As the injunction cases involved only possession
and the fruits thereof, and the other case involves ownership, the judgment in the first could not and did not
encompass the judgment in the second case, although the second judgment would encompass the first.
Moreover, the New Civil Code provides that suitors in action to quiet title "need not be in possession of said
property."
3. MORTGAGE; UNREGISTERED MORTGAGE BINDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES. Under Article 1875
of the Civil Code of 1889 registration was a necessary requisite for the validity of a mortgage even as between
the parties, but under Article 2125 of the New Civil Code, this is no longer so. "If the instrument is not recorded
the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties.
4. ID.; WHEN PACTO DE RETRO IS PRESUMED TO BE EQUITABLE MORTGAGE. Where the supposed
vendor a retro remained in possession of the land and paid the realty tax thereon, the contract which purports
to be a pacto de retrotransaction is presumed to be equitable mortgage under Art. 1602 of the New Civil Code,
whether registered or not, where no third parties are involved.
5. ID.; ID.; INTEREST; WRITTEN STIPULATION REQUIRED. Interest may not be imposed in the absence
of a written stipulation therefor, "No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing."
6. EVIDENCE; RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE; DISCRETION OF COURT; EFFECT OF STIPULATION OF
FACTS. Where, as in the case at bar, nowhere in the original and amended complainant is an allegation of
delivery to plaintiff of the harvest, and, further, in submitting their stipulation of facts, the parties prayed "for its
approval and may be made the basis of the decision of the Honorable Court . . . " the court cannot be faulted
for not receiving evidence on who profited from the harvest.
DECISION
CASTRO, J p:
This appeal was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as involving questions purely of law.
The decision a quo was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental (Branch I) in an action
instituted by the plaintiff-appellee Lucia Tan against the defendants-appellants Arador Valdehueza and
Rediculo Valdehueza (docketed as civil case 2574) for (a) declaration of ownership and recovery of
possession of the parcel of land described in the first cause of action of the complaint, and (b) consolidation of
ownership of two portions of another parcel of (unregistered) land described in the second cause of action of
the complaint, purportedly sold to the plaintiff in two separate deeds of pacto de retro.
After the issues were joined, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
"1. That parties admit the legal capacity of plaintiff to sue; that defendants herein, Arador, Rediculo,
Pacita, Concepcion and Rosario, all surnamed Valdehueza, are brothers and sisters; that the answer
filed by Arador and Rediculo stand as the answer of Pacita, Concepcion and Rosario.
"2. That the parties admit the identity of the land in the first cause of action.
"3. That the parcel of land described in the first cause of action was the subject matter of the public
auction sale held on May 6, 1955 at the Capitol Building in Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, wherein the
plaintiff was the highest bidder and as such a Certificate of Sale was executed by MR. VICENTE D.
ROA who was then the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff in favor of LUCIA TAN the herein plaintiff. Due to
the failure of defendant Arador Valdehueza to redeem the said land within the period of one year as
being provided by law, MR. VICENTE D. ROA who was then the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff executed
an ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE in favor of the plaintiff LUCIA TAN.
"A copy of the NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE is hereby marked as 'Annex A', the CERTIFICATE OF
SALE is marked as 'Annex B' and the ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE is hereby marked as "Annex C" and
all of which are made as integral Parts of this stipulation of facts.
"4. That the party-plaintiff is the same plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2002; that the parties defendants
Arador, Rediculo and Pacita, all Valdehueza were the same parties-defendants in the same said Civil
Case No. 2002; the complaint in Civil Case No. 2002 to be marked as Exhibit 1; the answer as Exhibit 2
and the order dated May 22, 1963 as Exhibit 3, and said exhibits are made integral part of this
stipulation.
"5. That defendants ARADOR VALDEHUEZA and REDICULO VALDEHUEZA have executed two
documents of DEED OF PACTO DE RETRO SALE in favor of the plaintiff herein, LUCIA TAN of two
portions of a parcel of land which is described in the second cause of action with the total amount of
ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P1,500.00), Philippine Currency, copies of said
documents are marked as "Annex D" and "Annex E", respectively and made as integral parts of this
stipulation of facts.
"6. That from the execution of the Deed of Sale with right to repurchase mentioned in the second cause
of action, defendants Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza remained in the possession of the
land; that land taxes to the said land were paid by the same said defendants."
Civil case 2002 referred to in stipulation of fact no. 4 was a complaint for injunction filed by Tan on July 24,
1957 against the Valdehuezas, to enjoin them "from entering the abovedescribed parcel of land and gathering
the nuts therein . . ." This complaint and the counterclaim were subsequently dismissed for failure of the parties
"to seek for the immediate trial thereof, thus evincing lack of interest on their part to proceed with the case." 1
The Deed of Pacto de Retro referred to in stipulation of fact no. 5 as "Annex D" (dated August 5, 1955) was not
registered in the Registry of Deeds, while the Deed of Pacto de Retro referred to as "Annex E" (dated March
15, 1955) was registered.
On the basis of the stipulation of facts and the annexes, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
 "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff:
"1. Declaring Lucia Tan the absolute owner of the property described in the first cause of action of the
amended complaint; and ordering the herein defendants not to encroach and molest her in the exercise
of her proprietary rights; and, from which property they must be dispossessed;
"2. Ordering the defendants, Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza, jointly and severally to pay
to the plaintiff, Lucia Tan, on Annex 'E' the amount of P1,200, with legal interest of 6% as of August 15,
1966, within 90 days to be deposited with the Office of the Clerk of Court within 90 days from the date
of service of this decision, and that in default of such payment, the property shall be sold in accordance
with the Rules of Court for the release of the mortgage debt, plus costs;
"3. And as regards the land covered by deed of pacto de retro annex 'D', the herein defendants Arador
Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P300 with
legal interest of 6% from August 15, 1966, the said land serving as guaranty of the said amount of
payment;

"4. Sentencing the defendants Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza to pay jointly and severally
to the herein plaintiff Lucia Tan the amount of 1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
"5. To pay the costs of the proceedings."
The Valdehuezas appealed, assigning the following errors:
"That the lower court erred in failing to adjudge on the first cause of action that there exists res judicata;
and
"That the lower court erred in making a finding on the second cause of action that the transactions
between the parties were simple loan, instead, it should be declared as equitable mortgage."
We affirm in part and modify in part.
1 . Relying on Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which pertinently provides that a dismissal for failure
to prosecute "shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits," the Valdehuezas submit that the
dismissal of civil case 2002 operated, upon the principle of res judicata, as a bar to the first cause of action in
civil case 2574. We rule that this contention is untenable as the causes of action in the two cases are not
identical. Case 2002 was for injunction against the entry into and the gathering of nuts from the land, while
case 2574 seeks to "remove any doubt or cloud of the plaintiff's ownership . . ." (Amended complaint, Rec. on
App., p. 27), with a prayer for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession.
Applying the test of absence of inconsistency between prior and subsequent judgments, 2 we hold that the
failure of Tan, in case 2002, to secure an injunction against the Valdehuezas to prevent them from entering the
land and gathering nuts is not inconsistent with her being adjudged, in case 2574, as owner of the land with
right to recover possession thereof. Case 2002 involved only the possession of the land and the fruits thereof,
while case 2574 involves ownership of the land, with possession as a mere attribute of ownership. The
judgment in the first case could not and did not encompass the judgment in the second, although the second
judgment would encompass the first. Moreover, the new Civil Code provides that suitors in actions to quiet title
"need not be in possession of said property." 3
2 . The trial court treated the registered deed of pacto de retro as an equitable mortgage but considered the
unregistered deed of pacto de retro "as a mere case of simple loan, secured by the property thus sold
under pacto de retro," on the ground that no suit lies to foreclose an unregistered mortgage. It would appear
that the trial judge had not updated himself on law and jurisprudence; he cited, in support of his ruling, article
1875 of the old Civil Code and decisions of this Court circa 1910 and 1912.
Under article 1875 of the Civil Code of 1889, registration was a necessary requisite for the validity of a
mortgage even as between the parties, but under article 2125 of the new Civil Code (in effect since August 30,
1950), this is no longer so. 4
"If the instrument is not recorded, the mortgage is nonetheless binding between the parties." (Article
2125, 2nd sentence)
The Valdehuezas having remained in possession of the land and the realty taxes having been paid by them,
the contracts which purported to be pacto de retrotransactions are presumed to be equitable
mortgages, 5 whether registered or not, there being no third parties involved.
3 . The Valdehuezas claim that their answer to the complaint of the plaintiff affirmed that they remained in
possession of the land and gave the proceeds of the harvest to the plaintiff; it is thus argued that they would
suffer double prejudice if they are to pay legal interest on the amounts stated in the pacto de retro contracts, as
the lower court has directed, and that therefore the court should have ordered evidence to be adduced on the
harvest.
The record does not support this claim, Nowhere in the original and the amended complaints is an allegation of
delivery to the plaintiff of the harvest from the land involved in the second cause of action. Hence, the
defendants' answer had none to affirm.
In submitting their stipulation of facts, the parties prayed "for its approval andmaybe made the basis of the
decision of this Honorable Court." (emphasis supplied) This, the court did. It cannot therefore he faulted for not
receiving evidence on who profited from the harvest.
4. The imposition of legal interest on the amounts subject of the equitable mortgages, P1,200 and P300,
respectively, is without legal basis, for, "No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in
writing." (Article 1956, new Civil Code) Furthermore, the plaintiff did not pray for such interest; her thesis was a
consolidation of ownership, which was properly rejected, the contracts being equitable mortgages.
With the definitive resolution of the rights of the parties as discussed above, we find it needless to pass upon
the plaintiff's petition for receivership. Should the circumstances so warrant, she may address the said petition
to the court a quo.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified, as follows: (a) the amounts of P1,200 and P300
mentioned in Annexes E and D shall bear interest at six percent per annum from the finality of this decision;
and (b) the parcel of land covered by Annex D shall be treated in the same manner as that covered by Annex
E, should the defendants fail to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P300 within 90 days from the finality of this
decision. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. No costs.
||| (Tan v. Valdehueza, G.R. No. L-38745, [August 6, 1975], 160 PHIL 760-767)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 102909. September 6, 1993.]
SPOUSES VICENTE and LOURDES PINGOL, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO N. DONASCO, namely: MELINDA D. PELAYO, MARIETTA D.
SINGSON, MYRNA D. CUEVAS, NATIVIDAD D. PELAYO, YOLANDA D. CACERES and
MARY DONASCO, respondents.
Bernando S. Chan for petitioner.
Orlando A. Galope for respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
An action denominated as one for specific performance and damages was brought by the private respondents
against the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City which, after due trial, rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the respondent Court reversed the trial court's decision.
It is from this judgment that the petitioners have appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari.
The material facts of this case are simple and undisputed.
Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan, with an area of 549
square meters, located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 7435 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. On 17 February 1969, he executed a
"DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND"
in favor of Francisco N. Donasco which was acknowledged before a notary public. The parcel of land referred
to therein is Lot No. 3223 and the pertinent portions of the document read as follows:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY
(P20,530.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, the VENDOR hereby these presents SELL, CONVEY AND
CONVEY by way of Absolute Sale the one-half (1/2) portion, equivalent to Two Hundred Seventy Four
and point Fifty (274.50) square meters, to the VENDEE, the above-mentioned property, his heirs,
assigns and successors-in-interest;
That the VENDOR hereby confesses and acknowledges the receipt of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00)
PESOS from VENDEE as advanced (sic) and partial payment to the above-cited consideration of the
Sale herein mentioned, leaving therefor a balance of Eighteen Thousand and Five Hundred Thirty
(P18,530) Pesos to be paid in several equal installments within a period of six (6) years, beginning
January, 1970;
That after computing the above-mentioned equal installments, the VENDEE agrees and undertakes to
pay unto the VENDOR a monthly amount equivalent to Two Hundred Fifty Seven (sic) and Thirty Six
Centavos (P257.36) within a period of Seventy One (71) months and on the Seven Two [sic] (72)
month, the amount of (P257.44) as the last and final installment thereof;
That the VENDEE agrees that in case of default in the payment of the installments due the same shall
earn a legal rate of interest, and to which the VENDOR likewise agrees;
That the VENDEE undertakes to pay unto the VENDOR the herein monthly installment within the first
five (5) days of each month and the same shall be made available and to be paid at the residence of
the VENDOR, payment to be made either directly to the VENDOR, his wife or his authorized
representative or factor;
That in case of partition of the above-described property between herein VENDOR and VENDEE, the
same shall be divided into two (2) equal parts, the VENDOR gets the corner facing J. De Jesus and
Malolos Avenue and the VENDEE shall get the portion with fifteen (15) meters frontage facing J. De
Jesus Street only." 1
Pursuant to the contract, Donasco paid P2,000.00 to Pingol. The one-half portion, designated as Lot No. 3223-
A, was then segregated from the mother lot, and the parties prepared a subdivision plan (Exhibit "C") which
was approved by the Land Registration Commission. 2
Francisco Donasco immediately took possession of the subject lot and constructed a house thereon. In
January 1970, he started paying the monthly installments but was able to pay only up to 1972.
On 13 July 1984, Francisco Donasco died. At the time of his demise, he had paid P8,369.00, plus the
P2,000.00 advance payment, leaving a balance of P10,161.00 on the contract price. 3 Lot No. 3223-A
remained in the possession of Donasco's heirs.
On 19 October 1988, the heirs of Francisco Donasco filed an action for "Specific Performance and Damages,
with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against the spouses Vicente and Lourdes Pingol (petitioners
herein) before the RTC of Caloocan City. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. 13572 and raffled off to
Branch 125 of the said court.
In their complaint, 4 the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) averred that after the death of their father, they
offered to pay the balance of P10,161.00 plus the stipulated legal rate of interest thereon to Vicente Pingol but
the latter rebuffed their offer and has "been demanding for a bigger and unreasonable amount, in complete
variance to what is lawfully due and payable." They stated that they had "exerted earnest efforts to forge or
reach an amicable and peaceful settlement with the defendants" for the payment of the property in question
but to no avail. They further alleged that the defendants were committing "acts of forcible entry and
encroachment" upon their land and asked that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the
defendants from the acts complained of.
Plaintiffs then prayed that the defendants be ordered, inter alia:
"a. . . . to accept the amount of P10,161.00, more or less, plus the stipulated legal rate of interest due
thereon, as full and complete payment of the balance for the agreed price/consideration on the one-half
(1/2) portion of the parcel of land . . .; [and]
b. . . . to execute the final deed of sale on the one-half (1/2) portion of the lot . . . in accordance with the
partition reflected in the survey and subdivision plan, . . ." 5
In their answer with counterclaim, 6 defendants admitted the execution of the aforementioned deed of sale, the
segregation of the portion sold and the preparation and approval of the subdivision plan, but set up the
following special and affirmative defenses: (1) the plaintiffs' cause of action had already prescribed; (2) the
deed of sale embodied a conditional contract of sale "as the consideration is to be paid on installment basis
within a period of six years beginning January, 1970"; (3) the subdivision plan was prepared on the assumption
that Francisco Donasco would be able to comply with his obligation; (4) when Francisco died, he had not fully
paid the total consideration agreed upon; and (5) considering the breach by Francisco of his contractual
obligation way back in 1976, the sale was deemed to have been cancelled and the continuous occupancy of
Francisco after 1976 and by his heirs thereafter was by mere tolerance of Vicente Pingol. They then asked that
the plaintiffs be ordered to vacate the premises and to pay them attorney's fees and a reasonable
compensation for the use of the land.
In their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim, 7 the plaintiffs pointed out that there is no provision in the deed of
sale for its cancellation in case of default in the payment of the monthly installments and invoked Article 1592
of the New Civil Code. They specifically denied the allegations in the counterclaim.
The issues having been joined, the case was then tried on the merits.
On 22 January 1990, the trial court rendered a decision 8 dismissing the complaint and ordering the plaintiffs to
pay the defendants P350.00 as reasonable monthly rental for the use of the premises from the filing of the
complaint, P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. It held that: (1) the deed of absolute
sale in question, marked and offered in evidence as Exhibit "A," is a contract to sell, not a contract of sale,
since Vicente Pingol had no intention to part with the ownership of the lot unless the full amount of the agreed
price had been paid; (2) the contract was deemed to have been cancelled from the moment the late father of
the plaintiffs defaulted in the payment of the monthly installments; (3) title and ownership over the lot did not
pass to Francisco Donasco and his heirs since the contract to sell was never consummated; and (5)
assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiffs have a cause of action for specific performance, such action had
already prescribed since the complaint was filed only on 19 October 1988 or more than ten years from the time
that they could have lawfully demanded performance. 9
Plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 25967.
On 12 November 1991, the said court rendered a decision 10 reversing the appealed decision and decreeing as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one is
rendered:
 (1) Ordering appellee-vendor Vicente Pingol to accept the sum of P10,161.00, plus the
legal interest due thereon from the date of institution of this action on October 19, 1988;
(2) Upholding the validity of the 'DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) (of)
AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND' (Exh. A), and by virtue and on the
strength of which declaring the 'Heirs of the Deceased Francisco N. Domingo' as the owners of
the 274.50 sq. m. land, denominated as Lot 3223-A, (LRC) Psd-146255 under the technical
description (exh. D) and reflected in the Plan of Subdivision Survey which was approved By
Commissioner of Land Registration on August 13, 1971 (exh. C), representing one-half portion
[of] lot 3223, situated at the corner of Malolos Avenue and G. de Jesus St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City, and covered by TCT No. 7435 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City (exh.
B); and
(3) Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED." 11
The Court of Appeals ruled that the deed of sale in question reveals the clear intention of Vicente Pingol to part
with the ownership of the one-half portion of the land by way of an absolute sale; that the failure to fully pay the
agreed price was not a ground for the cancellation of the sale; and that the plaintiffs' action is imprescriptible
since it is akin to an action to quiet title to property in one's possession. 12

Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the defendants, hereinafter referred to as the petitioners,
filed this petition for certiorari on 9 January 1992. Plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as the private respondents,
filed their comment thereto on 10 September 1992 to which the petitioners filed a reply on 11 November 1992.
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, 13 which
they subsequently complied with.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred:
"I
IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCUMENT (EXHIBIT "A") DENOMINATED AS 'ABSOLUTE DEED OF
SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND' IS AN
ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE SUFFICIENT TO CONFER OWNERSHIP ON THE VENDEE AND HIS
SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST, DESPITE THE FACT THAT BY ITS TERMS AND CONDITIONS, LIKE
THE PRICE BEING PAYABLE ON INSTALLMENTS WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD, THE SAME IS A
CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE.
II
IN HOLDING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE VENDEE FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT (EXHIBIT "A") SPECIFICALLY TO COMPLETE THE
PAYMENT OF THE CONSIDERATION ON THE DATE STIPULATED IN THE CONTRACT WHICH
WAS SUPPOSED TO BE IN JANUARY 1976, COMPLETE PAYMENT THEREOF CAN STILL BE
ENFORCED IN AN ACTION INSTITUTED BY THE HEIRS OF THE VENDEE FILED ON OCTOBER
19, 1988 OR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS FROM THE TIME COMPLETE
PAYMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE;
III
IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' ACTION IS ONE WHICH IS AN OFFER TO
COMPLETE THE PAYMENT LEFT UNPAID BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' FATHER WHICH DOES
NOT PRESCRIBE;
IV
IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' CAUSE OF ACTION HAS NOT PRESCRIBED." 14
The decisive issue in this case is whether Exhibit "A" embodies a contract of sale or a contract to sell. The
distinction between the two is important for in a contract of sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the
delivery of the thing sold, whereas in a contract to sell, by agreement, ownership is reserved in the vendor and
is not to pass until the full payment of the price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover
ownership until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded, whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained
by the vendor until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition, failure of
which is not a breach but an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming
effective. 15
A perusal of Exhibit "A" leads to no other conclusion than that it embodies acontract of sale. The plain and
clear tenor of the "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A
PARCEL OF LAND" is that "the VENDOR hereby . . . SELL, CONVEY AND CONVEY by way of Absolute Sale
the one-half (1/2) portion . . . to the VENDEE . . . his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest." That the
vendor, petitioner Vicente Pingol, had that clear intention was further evidenced by his failure to reserve his
title thereto until the full payment of the price.
In Dignos vs. Court of Appeals, 16 we held that a deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a
"Deed of Conditional Sale" where there is no stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is reserved in
the seller until the full payment of the price, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally
resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period. Exhibit "A" contains neither
stipulation. What is merely stated therein is that "the VENDEE agrees that in case of default in the payment of
the installments due the same shall earn a legal rate of interest, and to which the VENDOR likewise agrees."
Furthermore, as found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to
the contract, clearly show that an absolute deed of sale was intended by the parties and not a contract to sell:
"[P]ursuant to the deed, the vendor delivered actual and constructive possession of the property to the
vendee, who occupied and took such possession, constructed a building thereon, had the property
surveyed and subdivided and a plan of the property was prepared and submitted to the Land
Registration Commission which approved it preparatory to segregating the same and obtaining the
corresponding TCT in his name. Since the sale, appellee continuously possessed and occupied the
property as owner up to his death on July 13, 1984 and his heirs, after his death, continued the
occupancy and possession of the property up to the present. Those contemporaneous and subsequent
events are demonstrative acts that the vendor since the sale recognized the vendee as the absolute
owner of the property sold. All those attributes of ownership are admitted by defendants in their answer,
specifically in paragraphs 7 and 9 of their special and affirmative defenses." 17
The contract here being one of absolute sale, the ownership of the subject lot was transferred to the buyer
upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. The constructive delivery of the subject lot was made upon
the execution of the deed of sale 18 while the actual delivery was effected when the private respondents took
possession of and constructed a house on Lot No. 3223-A.
The delivery of the object of the contract divested the vendor of the ownership over the same and he cannot
recover the title unless the contract is resolved or rescinded pursuant to Article 1592 of the New Civil Code
which provides that:
"In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the
price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may
pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has
been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant him
a new term."
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not find that a notarial or judicial rescission of the contract
had been made. Although Vicente Pingol asserts that he had declared to Francisco Donasco that he was
cancelling the contract, he did not prove that his demand for rescission was made either judicially or by a
notarial act.
Petitioners fault the respondent Court for holding that the action of the petitioners is not barred by the statute of
limitations. They argue that the private respondents' action, being based upon a written contract, has
prescribed since it was brought only in 1988 or more than ten years from the time when the latter could have
lawfully demanded performance. 19
We disagree.
Although the private respondents' complaint before the trial court was denominated as one for specific
performance, it is in effect an action to quiet title. In this regard, the following excerpt from Bucton vs.
Gabar 20 is apropos:
"The real and ultimate basis of petitioners' action is their ownership of one-half of the lot coupled with
their possession thereof, which entitles them to a conveyance of the property. In Sapto, et al. v.
Fabiana [103 Phil. 683, 686-87 (1958)], this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained
that under the circumstances no enforcement of the contract is needed, since the delivery of
possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser, and that,
 actually, the action for conveyance is one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud upon the appellee's
ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors."
That a cloud has been cast on the title of the private respondents is indubitable. Despite the fact that the title
had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object of the contract,
the petitioners adamantly refused to accept the tender of payment by the private respondents and steadfastly
insisted that their obligation to transfer title had been rendered ineffective.
A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof, entered upon the land and
had made valuable improvements thereon, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who had
refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee has an absolute title, an equitable title
being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title. 21
Prescription thus cannot be invoked against the private respondents for it is aphoristic that an action to quiet
title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. 22 The rationale for this rule has been aptly stated thus:
"The owner of real property who is in possession thereof may wait until his possession is invaded or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. A person claiming title to real property, but not
in possession thereof, must act affirmatively and within the time provided by the statute. Possession is
a continuing right as is the right to defend such possession. So it has been determined that an owner of
real property in possession has a continuing right to invoke a court of equity to remove a cloud that is a
continuing menace to his title. Such a menace is compared to a continuing nuisance or trespass which
is treated as successive nuisances or trespasses, not barred by statute until continued without
interruption for a length of time sufficient to affect a change of title as a matter of law." 23
Private respondents shall, however, be liable to pay the legal rate of interest on the unpaid balance of the
purchase price from the date of default or on 6 January 1976, when the entire balance should have been paid,
pursuant to the provision in the deed of sale.
WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. As modified, the
interest on the unpaid balance of P10,161.00, at the legal rate, shall be computed from 6 January 1976. Upon
the payment by the private respondents to the petitioners of the said amount and the interest thereon, the latter
are ordered to deliver Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7435 to the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City who shall
cancel the same and issue two new transfer certificates of title in lieu thereof, one of which shall be in the
name of the herein private respondents covering Lot No. 3223-A and the other in the name of the petitioners
covering the remainder of the lot.

SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Pingol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102909, [September 6, 1993])