GATCHALIAN VS.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the
FACTS: On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William
Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native
born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother
Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, William, then twelve years old,
arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son
of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity
issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram
bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto
Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.
On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians
as Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William.
The board of commissioners was directed by the Secretary of Justice
to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the
entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As a
result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which
recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of
Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation[*] issued a mission order
commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. The latter
appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was
released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa. On
September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners
and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge
dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying
the motion to dismiss.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent
judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners (Board of Commissioners,
et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being
vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent
judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion in
preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction
to hear and determine the deportation case against respondent
Gatchalian, and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3)
respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling
that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are beyond the
competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the
cases of Arocha v. Vivo and Vivo v. Arca (supra), which put finality to
the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that
respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the Court of Appeals not RTC which has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-
judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Board of
Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.
2.Whether or not William is to be declared a Filipino Citizen, and if
not, whether the order of his deportation be barred for such issuance
28 years thereafter.
RULING:
1. Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Court
of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any
part of their respective regions." Thus, the RTCs are vested with the
power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court
of Appeals is vested with
"(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, order, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948."
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals extends to all quasi-judicial agencies. The
Court of Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No.
5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of
Appeals.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take
cognizance of the proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian
would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of
Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former
jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements
of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.
2. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that
such deportation proceedings should be instituted within five (5)
years. In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC
decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced
deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William
Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has
already prescribed. The power to deport an alien is an act of the
State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It
is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic
tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals, supra). How
could one who has helped the economy of the country by providing
employment to some 4,000 people be considered undesirable and be
summarily deported when the government, in its concerted drive to
attract foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien who
invest at least US $50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming
arguendo that respondent is an alien, his deportation under the
circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action
taken by petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to
settled government policy.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino
citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution,
which provides:
"Section 1.
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of
respondent William Gatchalian.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R.
Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian
is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently
enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings for lack of
jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen.
JOSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: Distribution of Powers of Government Traditional Branches
FACTS: The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from
office of petitioner Eduardo Nonato Joson as Governor of the province
of Nueva Ecija. Private respondent Oscar C. Tinio is the Vice-Governor
of said province while private respondents Loreto P. Pangilinan,
Crispulo S. Esguerra, Solita C. Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon
Interior are members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On
September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the
President a letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997 charging
petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Private
respondents alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they
were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled
session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently
barged into the Hall; petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in
the Hall and uttered threatening words at them; close behind
petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who
encircled the area. Private respondents claim that this incident was an
offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure
supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan
of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's
acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan; that
fortunately, no session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was held that
day for lack of quorum and the proposed legislative measure was not
considered; that private respondents opposed the loan because the
province of Nueva Ecija had an unliquidated obligation of more than
P70 million incurred without prior authorization from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan; that the provincial budget officer and treasurer had
earlier disclosed that the province could not afford to contract
another obligation; that petitioner's act of barging in and intimidating
private respondents was a serious insult to the integrity and
independence of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and that the
presence of his private army posed grave danger to private
respondents' lives and safety. Private respondents prayed for the
suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the
provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed
loan in light of the financial condition of the province. President
Ramos noted that the situation of "12 Sep at the Session Hall," i.e., the
refusal of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to approve
the proposed loan, did not appear to justify "the use of force,
intimidation or armed followers." He thus instructed the then
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments (SILG) Robert Barbers
to "take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions," but to
"break not the peace." Acting upon the instructions of the President,
Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case against him and
attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its annexes. In the
same notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit his
verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion to dismiss, together with
such documentary evidence that he has in support thereof, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt. Immediately thereafter, Secretary
Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and
private respondents to a conference to settle the controversy. The
parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to
maintain peace and order in the province while private respondents
promised to refrain from filing cases that would adversely affect their
peaceful co-existence. The peace agreement was not respected by the
parties and the private respondents reiterated their letter complaint.
Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer to the letter-complaint
within fifteen days from receipt. Petitioner submitted requests for
extension to submit his answer and was each request was granted
each time. The DILG however, informed him that his "failure to submit
answer will be considered a waiver and that the plaintiff shall be
allowed to present his evidence ex parte." Three months later, on
April 22, 1997, Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then Acting Secretary
of the DILG, issued an order declaring petitioner in default and to have
waived his right to present evidence. Private respondents were
ordered to present their evidence ex-parte. Respondent was hereby
declared in default. On June 24, 1997, petitioner, through counsel,
filed a "Motion to Dismiss." Petitioner alleged that the letter
complaint was not verified on the day it was filed with the Office of
the President; and that the DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and
no authority to require him, to answer the complaint. On July 4, 1997,
petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration" of
the order of June 23, 1997 reinstating the order of default. Petitioner
also prayed that the hearing on the merits of the case be held in
abeyance until after the "Motion to Dismiss" shall have been resolved.
On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President,
placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days
pending investigation of the charges against him. Secretary Barbers
directed the Philippine National Police to assist in the implementation
of the order of preventive suspension. In petitioner's stead, Secretary
Barbers designated Vice-Governor Oscar Tinio as Acting Governor
until such time as petitioner's temporary legal incapacity shall have
ceased to exist. Forthwith, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of
preventive suspension and the order of default. In the meantime, on
October 24, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition.
A few days after filing the petition before this Court, petitioner filed a
"Motion for Leave to File Herein Incorporated Urgent Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction." Petitioner alleged that subsequent to the
institution of this petition, the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments rendered a resolution on the case finding him guilty of
the offenses charged. His finding was based on the position papers
and affidavits of witnesses submitted by the parties. The DILG
Secretary found the affidavits of complainants' witnesses to be "more
natural, reasonable and probable" than those of herein petitioner
Joson's. On January 8, 1998, the Executive Secretary, by authority of
the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG
Secretary. He imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from
office for six (6) months without pay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DILG Secretary, in his resolution, was
exercising the powers of the President which are clearly vested by law
only upon the President or the Executive Secretary, and thus his
action is contrary to law.
RULING: In his second assigned error, petitioner questions the
jurisdiction and authority of the DILG Secretary over the case. He
contends that under the law, it is the Office of the President that has
jurisdiction over the letter-complaint and that the Court of Appeals
erred in applying the alter-ego principle because the power to
discipline elective local officials lies with the President, not with the
DILG Secretary. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions
against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the
Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. Pursuant to
these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the
Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive
Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the
Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not
the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the
Disciplinary Authority may designate a Special Investigating
Committee. The power of the President over administrative
disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his
power of general supervision over local governments. The power to
discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government
officials. A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to
the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted
by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to
petitioner Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining
Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the
power to discipline. Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate
administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the
doctrine of qualified political agency. Under this doctrine, which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act
in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. RATIO: Under the
Constitution and as provided in the Administrative Code of 1987, the
powers of the National Government are distributed among three (3)
branches. The executive power shall be vested in the President. ---
GLOBE WIRELESS LTD. VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
Private respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria Diaz in
Spain through the telegraph office of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Dumagete and was transmitted to Manila. The
message, however, was not delivered to the addressee. After being
informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent a complaint to the Public Service
Commissioner a letter-complaint. In its answer, petitioner denied
liability but questioned PSCs jurisdiction over the subject matter.
After hearing, the PSC found petitioner responsible for the
unsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay a fine.
ISSUE: Whether or not PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose
fine upon petitioner
HELD: NO. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all public services and their franchises,
equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of RA 4630, the
legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited
respondent Commissions jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate
which petitioner may charge the public. The negligence imputed to
public respondent had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject
matter of very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.