Republic vs Huan Te Fu

Naturalization: A Foreigner Living In A Foreign Land Should Conduct Himself

Accordingly In This Country With Care, Circumspect, And Respect For The Laws Of
The Host. ..
MAY 22, 2015 BY THE LAWYER'S POST

The Facts:

Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy, a Chinese businessman allegedly engaged in the
business of manufacturing zippers, married to Irene D. Chan, and born in Taiwan,
filed a petition for naturalisation with RTC of Quezon City. Highlights of his petition
to prove compliance with C.A. 473 are the following:he had resided continuously in
the Philippines for 23 years; received primary, secondary and tertiary education in
Philippine schools; and he derive a monthly income of P15,000.00 from their family
business of manufacturing zippers.
After trial, the RTC granted the petition for naturalisation filed by Huang, hence the
OSG appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its brief, the OSG pointed to the
following disqualifications warranting the reversal of Huangs grant of
naturalisation: he does not own real estate in the Philippines; he does not possess
a lucrative trade or profession, and is not even included in the payroll of the
company; does not have sufficient monthly income since he merely receives salary
from the family corporation which is not even sufficient for his family, much less
lucrative; in a Deed of Sale executed on August, 2001 for a parcel of land in
Antipolo City, Huang signed in the Deed of Sale and falsely misrepresented himself
as a Filipino, exhibiting his lack of good moral character; and, his income tax
returns for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 reveal that his actual monthly income
differs from his monthly income as declared in his petition for naturalization,
leading to the conclusion that either he is evading taxes or concealing the truth
regarding his income; and, on cross-examination by petitioner, he could not cite
any of the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution which he is supposed to
believe in. In his Comment, Huang alleged that he merely signed and did not
prepare the Deed of Sale; he does not prepare his income tax returns; most of his
expenses are taken care of by his parents who own the corporation; his tailure to
cite particular principles underlying the Philippine Constitution were brought about
by his not having been confronted about it.
The CA denied the OSGs appeal hence, the OSG elevated the case to the Supreme
Court on petition for review via certiorari.
The Issue/s:
Whether or not the grant of Philippine citizenship to Huang was proper.
The Courts ruling:
The Court finds for petitioner.
In Republic v. Hong,1 it was held in essence that an applicant for naturalization
must show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the
naturalization law; otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be
denied. This ponente has likewise held that [t]he courts must always be mindful
that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public
interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in
favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon
the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of
law.2

Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that
an applicant for naturalization must be of good moral character and must have
some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. In regard to the
requirement that the applicant must have a known lucrative trade,
this ponente declared:
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation means not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that
the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of
his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in
the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones
becoming the object of charity or a public charge. His income should permit him
and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with
the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human
dignity, at this stage of our civilization.
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income,
the courts should consider only the applicants income; his or her spouses income
should not be included in the assessment. The spouses additional income is
immaterial for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess some
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a
Filipino citizen. Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicants
qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his
petition.3 (Emphasis supplied)
From the above, it may be concluded that there is no basis for the CA finding that
respondent is engaged in a lucrative trade. Indeed, his supposed income of
P15,000.00 to P18,000.00 per month as found by the CA is not enough for the
support of his family. By his own admission, most of his familys daily expenses are
still shouldered by his parents who own the zipper manufacturing business which
employs him. This simply means that respondent continues to be a burden to, and
a charge upon, his parents; he lives on the charity of his parents. He cannot
support his own family on his own.
Indeed, it is even doubtful that respondent is carrying on a trade at all. He
admitted during trial that he was not even listed or included in the payroll of his
familys zipper business. If this is the case, then he may not be considered an
employee thereof. One of the most effective pieces of evidence to prove
employment aside from the employment contract itself and other documents
such as daily time records4 is a workers inclusion in the payroll. With this
admitted fact, one may not be faulted for believing that respondents alleged
employment in his familys zipper business was contrived for the sole purpose of
complying with the legal requirements prior to obtaining Philippine citizenship.
On the other hand, even assuming that respondent was indeed employed by his
parents, his non-inclusion in the payroll for all the years he has worked in his
parents business5 suggests as correctly argued by petitioner an intent to
evade taxes or to conceal the true nature of his employment and the amount of his
salary or income. It is concealment of the truth; an attempt to circumvent with
impunity the tax laws, labor laws relative to the employment of aliens, and other
laws that would otherwise regulate respondents actions during his stay in this
country. Indeed, without payroll records, it can never be said that respondent
works for his parents zipper business. If such is the case, then respondent is not
required to state in his income tax return as is the case his employer and what
he actually receives as salary therefrom; he is free to conveniently declare any
amount of income in his tax returns.
Either way, respondents deliberate non-inclusion in the payroll of his parents
business can have only the most unpleasant connotations. And his consent to be
part of such scheme reflects negatively on his moral character. It shows a
proclivity for untruthfulness and dishonesty, and an unreserved willingness and
readiness to violate Philippine laws.
The appellate courts reliance upon the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals6 is
misplaced. In that case, there was only a discrepancy between the applicants
estimate of his income in his application and that declared by him during his direct
testimony. In the present case, respondent is not at all listed on the payroll of his
parents business, where he is supposed to be its general manager. As a result,
there is absolutely no basis for the correct determination of his income; instead, he
invites Us to conveniently rely on his income tax returns and his unilateral
declarations. As We have earlier said, if We are to believe them, then still, they are
insufficient to generate a conclusion that respondent is carrying on a lucrative
trade; he cannot support his family from his declared income.
Moreover, respondents admitted false declaration under oath contained in the
August 2001 deed of sale that he is a Filipino citizen which he did to secure the
seamless registration of the property in the name of his wife is further proof of
respondents lack of good moral character. It is also a violation of the
constitutional prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign individuals.7 His
defense that he unknowingly signed the deed is unacceptable. First of all, as a
foreigner living in a foreign land, he should conduct himself accordingly in this
country with care, circumspect, and respect for the laws of the host. Finally, as
an educated and experienced businessman, it must be presumed that he acted
with due care and signed the deed of sale with full knowledge of its import.8
Having decided in the foregoing manner, We must conclude the instant case and
disregard the other issues and arguments of the parties; they are deemed
irrelevant and will not alter the conclusion arrived at. As far as this Court is
concerned, respondent has failed to satisfy the law which renders him completely
undeserving of Filipino citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The November 29, 2011 Decision and
March 7, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91213
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The September 24, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 in Nat. Case/Spec. Proc. No. Q-05-55251 is
likewise ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondents Petition for
Naturalization in said case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 200983, March 18, 2015, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HUANG TE FU, A.K.A. ROBERT UY, RESPONDENT.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
1 520 Phil. 276, 285 (2006).
2 Republic v. Ong, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012, 673 SCRA 485, 498.
3 Id. at 499-500.
4 See Ang v. San Joaquin, Jr., G.R. No. 185549, August 7, 2013, 703 SCRA 269, 287.
5 Or since 2000.
6 354 Phil. 733 (1998).
7 CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
8 See Development Bank of the Philippines v. National Merchandising Corporation,
148-B Phil. 310 (1971).
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS KAMRAN F. KABARSI

FACTS:
On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Kabarsi filed a petition for naturalization with the RTC
where he alleged the following:
His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;
He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) as shown in a certification duly issued by the UNHCR;
He is presently residing with his family at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, since
early part of June 2000 and more so has resided continuously in the Philippines for
not less than 11 years immediately preceding the date of this petition; to wit, since
11 July 1990 and in Dipolog City for more than one (1) year;
His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan and his other places of residence,
prior to his present residence, were as follows (i) Panay Ave., Quezon City; (ii) Sta.
Filomena, Dipolog City; (iii) Capitol Area, Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas,
Zamboanga del Norte;

He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran, Iran, as shown in his identity card
which also serves as his birth certificate;
He is married and is the father of one (1) child;
His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino citizen, 22 years old and born on 10 August
1979 in Cebu City, whom he married on 12 October 2000 in Dipolog City, as shown
in their certificate of marriage;
His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, l-year old , was born on 9 June 2001 in Dipolog City
and presently residing with him and his wife at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City;
He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an assumed name (Syed Gul Agha) from
Pakistan on 11 July 1990 specifically at the Manila International Airport on board
Philippine Airlines Flight No. 731, per UNHCR certification containing reference to
his Pakistani passport issued under said assumed name;
Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, which reduced to five years the ten year requirement of continuous
residence;
He speaks and writes English and Visayan;
His trade or occupation is as a repair technician in which he has been engaged
since 1998 and, as such, he derives an average annual income of Php 80,000.00
more or less;
He has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4, of the Commonwealth Act No. 473;

He has complied with the requirements of the Naturalization Law (Commonwealth

Act No. 473) regarding the filing with the Office of the Solicitor General of his bona
fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, as shown in his Declaration of
Intention duly filed on 25 May 2001;

It is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to

renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to Iran of which, at this time, he is
a citizen or subject; that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
date of filing of this petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship;

Dominador Natividad Tagulo, of legal age, Filipino, married and residing at ABC
Compound, Quezon Ave., Miputak, Dipolog City and Alton C. Ratificar, of legal age,
Filipino, married and residing at 047 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, who are Filipino
citizens, whose affidavits are attached to his petition, will appear and testify as
witnesses at the hearing thereof.

After finding that the petition is sufficient in form, the petitioner submitted his
witnesses, and thereafter, took the witness stand himself. He narrated that he is an
Iranian national. He and his brother left Iran in 1986 beacause of the war between
Iran and Iraq at that time. Their government confiscated their passport so they
travelled by camel to Pakistan where they stayed for 3 years, but was not granted a
refugee status there. They decided to come to the Philippines since one of his
brothers was already studying in the country. They procured Pakistani passports
under assumed names.

Upon his arrival in the Philippines on July n, 1990, he submitted himself to the
United Nations in Manila. After several interviews, he was admitted as a refugee
and, later on, as a person of concern. As a refugee, he was granted by the United
Nations allowances, medical benefits and protection to some extent.

On January 17, 2007, the RTC found Karbasi's evidence sufficient to support his
petition. Finding Karbasi as possessing all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen, the RTC rendered its decision
granting the petition for naturalization.
Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal to the CA, based mainly on the
ground that the RTC erred in granting Karbasi's petition as he failed to comply with
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Naturalization Law) on character,
income and reciprocity. Specifically, the OSG pointed out that Karbasi failed to
establish that: 1] Iran grants reciprocal rights of naturalization to Filipino citizens;
2] he has a lucrative income as required under the law; and 3] he is of good moral
character as shown by his disregard of Philippine tax laws when he had
underdeclared his income in his income tax returns (ITRs) and overstated the same
in his petition for naturalization.

The CA ruled that the alleged under declaration in Karbasi's ITRs was prepared in
good faith because he was of the belief that he no longer needed to include the
income he received as payment of his services to Daewoo Electronics Electronics
Services, Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins Philippines International, Inc. (Kolins), because
the same were already withheld at source. The CA likewise affirmed the RTC
finding that Karbasi, as a refugee, need not prove reciprocity between Philippine
and Iranian laws.

ISSUE:
WON reciprocity is necessary in the naturalization of refugees?

HELD: NO
Although it is True that the Naturalization Law disqualifies citizens or subjects of a
foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized
citizens or subjects. A perusal of Karbasi's petition, both with the RTC and the CA,
together with his supplemental pleadings filed with the Court, however, reveals
that he has successfully established his refugee status upon arrival in the
Philippines. In effect, the country's obligations under its various international
commitments come into operation. Articles 6 and 34 of the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the Philippines is a signatory, must be
considered in this case, to wit:
Article 6 of the 1951 Convention:

For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances" implies
that any requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions of
sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfill for the
enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by
him, with the exception of requirements which by their nature a refugee is
incapable of fulfilling.

Article 34 of the 1951 Convention:

The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite
naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs
of such proceedings.
In the same vein, Article 729 of the said Convention expressly provides exemptions
from reciprocity, while Article 34 states the earnest obligation of contracting
parties to "as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees." As applied to this case, Karbasi's status as a refugee has to end with the
attainment of Filipino citizenship, in consonance with Philippine statutory
requirements and international obligations. Indeed, the Naturalization Law must
be read in light of the developments in international human rights law specifically
the granting of nationality to refugees and stateless persons.
Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese
father, was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution.
He has resided in the Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an

application to take the 1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the
Court the following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:

1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified

accountant;

2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a

registered voter of his place; and

3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang

Bayan of Tubao, La Union .

On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was
scheduled on May 5, 1999.

Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to

take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. The Office of the
Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission
to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:

1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so,
unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under
the compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act
providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be
declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"

2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the
present jurisprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship
within a reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be
made within 3 years from upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years
old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of
majority which the court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered
no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with
the nearest civil registry.
Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]
Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a
decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on
the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private
respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989.
This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in
the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of
Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident
of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then
Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905.
He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his
childhood in the province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity.
As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The
two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and
practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was
born in 1948. Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to
put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was
set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal
status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on
February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino
citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order
declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong
Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time,
Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education
in the province of Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as
the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for
better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college
education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the
respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the
Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of
his family in Manila.

In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a
natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on
this subject.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who,
having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The
provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one
born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status
of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under
earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution

accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when

he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a
citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.

He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in
1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.

In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage
and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.

Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen
because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
S_C_:_ _T_h_e_ _C_o_u_r_t_ _c_a_n_n_o_t_ _g_o_ _i_n_t_o_ _t_h_e_
_c_o_l_l_a_t_e_r_a_l_ _p_r_o_c_e_d_u_r_e_ _o_f_ _s_t_r_i_p_p_i_n_g_
_r_e_s_p_o_n_d_e_n_t_s_ _f_a_t_h_e_r_ _o_f_ _h_i_s_
_c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _a_f_t_e_r_ _h_i_s_ _d_e_a_t_h_._ _A_n_
_a_t_t_a_c_k_ _o_n_ _a_ _p_e_r_s_o_n_s_ _c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _m_a_y_
_o_n_l_y_ _b_e_ _d_o_n_e_ _t_h_r_o_u_g_h_ _a_ _direct action for its nullity,
therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine
c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _t_o_ _r_e_s_p_o_n_d_e_n_t_s_ _f_a_t_h_e_r_ _a_s_
_n_u_l_l_ _a_n_d_ _v_o_i_d_ _w_o_u_l_d_ _r_u_n_ _a_g_a_i_n_s_t_ _t_h_e_
_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_l_e_ _o_f_ _d_u_e_ _process because he has already been laid to
rest
BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional r_e_q_u_i_r_e_m_e_n_t_ _t_h_a_t_ _n_o_ _p_e_r_s_o_n_
_s_h_a_l_l_ _b_e_ _a_ _M_e_m_b_e_r_ _o_f_ _t_h_e_ _H_o_u_s_e_ _o_f_
_R_e_p_r_e_s_e_n_t_a_t_i_v_e_s_ _u_n_l_e_s_s_ _h_e_ _i_s_ _a_ _natural-
b_o_r_n_ _c_i_t_i_z_e_n_._ _
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance
to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63
[(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _b_y_,_ _a_m_o_n_g_ _o_t_h_e_r_,_
_r_e_n_d_e_r_i_n_g_ _s_e_r_v_i_c_e_ _t_o_ _o_r_ _a_c_c_e_p_t_i_n_g_
_c_o_m_m_i_s_s_i_o_n_ _i_n_ _t_h_e_ _a_r_m_e_d_ _f_orces o_f_ _a_
_f_o_r_e_i_g_n_ _c_o_u_n_t_r_y_._ _

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service
in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA
2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who
Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the
Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won
over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the
HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of
the Constitution. HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still
be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization, 2. by repatriation, and 3. by direct act of Congress. **
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces; 2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces
in World War II; 3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and 5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides: Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local
Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The
said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance
with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-
Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Based on the results of the
election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed
by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but
of the United States. From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen. The Commission on Elections declared Manzano
disqualified as candidate for said elective position. However, in a subsequent
resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was
reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he
attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Makati City on August 31, 1998. Thus the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in
the philippines.

RULING: The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d)
and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the
other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the
Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship
do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. By electing
Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its
laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That
is of no moment. When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an
oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application. The court ruled that the filing
of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before
as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken
part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough
sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial
of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does
some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 Ramon Labo, Jr. vs Commission on Elections
176 SCRA 1 _Law on Public Officers _Election Laws _Citizenship of a Public
Officer _Dual Citizenship _Labo Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis
Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that
Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an
Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an
Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship,
Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he
married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the
Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that
even if h_e_s_ _c_o_n_s_i_d_e_r_e_d_ _a_s_ _a_n_ _A_u_s_t_r_a_l_i_a_n_,_
_h_i_s_ _l_a_c_k_ _o_f_ _c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _i_s_ _j_u_s_t_ _a_ _m_e_r_e_
_t_e_c_h_n_i_c_a_l_i_t_y_ _w_h_i_c_h_ _s_h_o_u_l_d_ _not frustrate the will of
the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the
mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD:
1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him.
He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an
Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by
taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that
he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he
was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He
cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a
Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or
be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress _none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of
citizenship should not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The
people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of
the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner
(curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The
electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only
citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto
proceeding, that he s_h_o_u_l_d_ _b_e_ _d_e_c_l_a_r_e_d_ _t_h_e_
_m_a_y_o_r_ _b_y_ _r_e_a_s_o_n_ _o_f_ _L_a_b_o_s_
_d_i_s_q_u_a_l_i_f_i_c_a_t_i_o_n_ _b_e_c_a_u_s_e_ _L_a_r_d_i_z_a_b_a_l_
_o_b_t_a_i_n_e_d_ _the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely
repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage
if a candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared
through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election.
YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10,
1978, he was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Despite his naturalization, he
applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office certifies that
his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also declared his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a petition for
habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the
Court en banc. The Court en banc denied the petition. When his Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification.
ISSUE:

W_h_e_t_h_e_r_ _o_r_ _n_o_t_ _p_e_t_i_t_i_o_n_e_r_s_ _a_c_t_s_

_c_o_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_e_ _r_e_n_u_n_c_i_a_t_i_o_n_ _o_f_ _h_i_s_
_P_h_i_l_i_p_p_i_n_e_ _c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _

HELD:
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship
upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as
a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and
represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese
citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his
Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary
proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the
insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or
not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be
displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC (1996)
G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee
questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential
Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based
on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had
proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as the newly elect
Governor of Sorsogon.

ISSUE:
W_h_e_t_h_e_r_ _o_r_ _n_o_t_ _F_r_i_v_a_l_d_o_s_
_r_e_p_a_t_r_i_a_t_i_o_n_ _w_a_s_ _v_a_l_i_d_._ _

HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative
nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of
the filing of his application to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine
Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing the
application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if
the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the
applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the
decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the
application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore
qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
 AKBAYAN YOUTH VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066, March 26 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
to conduct a special registration before May 2001 General Elections for new voters
ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register
on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC
under Republic Act No. 8189.
A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February
17 and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by the COMELEC. Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election
and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election
activities.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to conduct a special
registration of new v_o_t_e_r_s_ _d_u_r_i_n_g_ _t_h_e_ _p_e_r_i_o_d_
_b_e_t_w_e_e_n_ _t_h_e_ _C_O_M_E_L_E_C_s_ _i_m_p_o_s_e_d_
_D_e_c_e_m_b_e_r_ _2_7_,_ _2_0_0_0_ _deadline and the May 14, 2001 general
elections.

HELD:
The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of
new voters. The right to suffrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the
proper bounds and framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register,
thus missed their chance. However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the
President issued a proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the
conduct of special registration for new voters and that bills had been filed in
Congress to amend Republic Act No. 8189. Read full text
 MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal
interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as
a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional
mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning
candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by
Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to
review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that
the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the independence of
the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.

HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting
under this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e.
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by
the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration.
Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the
immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters
and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1
Article V of the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to
vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding an election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and
that the Court may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the
controversy: Affidavit for without it, the presumption of abandonment of Phil
domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is
deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to have
lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No.
9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of registration but
it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary
visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines
otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised
his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or
to repeal or modify it if such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said
that the Congress itself was conscious of this probability and provided for
deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised
stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be
invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning,
the Court is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine,
considering that underlying intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory
construction and intent of the framers, which is to grant Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of
suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not
constitutionally defective.
(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of
the winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation must
remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article
VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning
candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.
(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the
Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the
scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional
mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is
left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision of
law unconstitutional. Read full text
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business).
Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a
stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
_a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging
directly or indirectly in the retail trade
_aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to
continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law,
until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years
after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
_provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures
and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
_provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for
the ff: reasons:
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of
their liberty and property without due process
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession

ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens
the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted.
RATIO: The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among
residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one
class are treated alike. The difference in status between citizens and aliens
constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of
the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in
the enactment of the Act. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the
distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally
lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily
stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and
the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency. While the citizen
holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the
alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people
on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs
and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations
economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
Posted by kaye lee on 12:36 PM
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22 1963 [Executive Agreements]

FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said
implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No.
2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized
by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any
other government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates
that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that
the government has already constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam
and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should
prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.

RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive
agreements has been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts
may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well
as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the
President may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior
thereto.

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing
the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the
very act prohibited by said laws.
Agustin v. Edu, G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979, 88 SCRA 195

Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of

Instruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner
Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device
installed on a vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked
cars.

The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the
acquisition cost.

The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or
highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory.

Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal
protection, and due process/

2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires
at the expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set. Hence the petition.

The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the
unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such acts.

The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road
signs as a regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of
police power.

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of

Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early
warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular
early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh,
cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with
blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And
that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning
devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor
oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights
in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor
vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any
motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized
rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways,
will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that
road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled
or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a
motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the
petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he
will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a
law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the
mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision.

On Police Power

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power.
That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the
submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has
offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the
Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad
and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief
Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing
more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty was
stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the
first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons
and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly
after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a
pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in
Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice
Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,
extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public needs. Its
scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In
the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past
may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical
or urgent changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency,
suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a
group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact
that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to
promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to
invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to
our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point,
Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived
with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of
fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was
likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
IBP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff
and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible
use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is
their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly
argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of
the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI
of the Constitution.
GUDANI VS. SENGA
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry;
Legislative Investigation]

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004
election fraud and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464
enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment
from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff
Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et
al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential
approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a
directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their
assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured
principle of the Chain of Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected
before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a
superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members
of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of
her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer
who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any
chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer
against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel
such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it
may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the
President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket
requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to
attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable
limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally
invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent
military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives
as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive
privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to
appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself
recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries.
The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified
anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent
from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to

authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the
President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the
legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the
final orders of the courts.
Gonzalez et al. vs. Gen. Abaya
G.R. No. 164007, Aug. 10, 2006

The nature of the military justice system

Coup d'etat vis-a-vis violation of the Articles of War

FACTS:

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers
and enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security
guards and planted explosive devices around the building. They then declared their
withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she
resign as President of the Republic.

After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. Subsequently, an
Information for coup detat was filed against them with the RTC, at the same time
that they were tried at court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They
question the jurisdiction of the court martial, contending that the RTC ordered that
their act was not service-connected and that their violation of Art. 96 of the
Articles of War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the crime of coup detat.

ISSUE:

Whether the act complained of was service-connected and therefore cognizable by

court martial or absorbed by the crime of coup d'etat cognizable by regular courts

RULING:

The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest
form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency.
Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also
to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in times of war, but also to
preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for there is
nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and
undisciplined military body. The administration of military justice has been
universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries
of the world look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most
effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has
become invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being
the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war.

The Court held that the offense is service-connected. xxx It bears stressing that the
charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath
as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such
violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In
short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as
military officers. Equally indicative of the service-connected nature of the
offense is the penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from the service
imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in
character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to
preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the
Executive Secretary, et al (2003)

FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-

governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people,
especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to
conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications
to qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office
of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification
Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to
issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. Petitioner
contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the
separation of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government
to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said
scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully
and validly perform for the Muslims.

ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of

religion

RULING: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political
and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural
community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional
barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does
not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment
clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of
the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a food
product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from
the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food
products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of
issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must
minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. There is no
compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like
herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by
assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection
and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in
existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring
that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly
labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious
freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how
to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger
against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The
halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as
the official religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption. The
petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND
VOID.