transfers of titles, from O.C.T. No. 2863 covers lands not in Sta.
Mesa, Manila but
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 121159. December 16, 2002]
VSC COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR
ESTOPACE and JOSE SILAPAN, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The present petition for review on certiorari brought before us by VSC
Commercial Enterprises, Inc. (VSC) seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on June 16, 1994 reversing and setting aside the order of
dismissal, dated March 15, 1991, of Civil Case No. 90-55411 issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch 21) and the resolution of the appellate court, dated
July 7, 1995, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On December 12, 1990, herein private respondents Oscar Estopace and Jose
Silapan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint against the Register
of Deeds of Manila and petitioner VSC alleging:
3. x x x that they are bona-fide stallholders inside the Pamilihang Sentral ng Sta.
Mesa, for about ten (10) years or so prior to the institution of this action;
4. As such stallholders, plaintiffs have been paying their market fees to defendant
VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc. under the latters claim that he (sic) was the
registered owner of the lot and building known as the Pamilihang Sentral ng Sta.
Mesa;
5. Of late, the plaintiffs came into possession of certain documents which would
indicate that TCT No. 153406 of the Register of Deeds of Manila (which is in the
name of VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc.),[1] originating as it did after several
lands situated either in Caloocan, Mariquina Estate or in San Juan, Metro Manila;[2]
In support thereof, private respondents cited several documents annexed to
their complaint showing that TCT No. 153406 is fraudulent, spurious and highly
questionable. They pray for the cancellation of defendant VSCs title over the subject
property claiming that:
13. As a consequence of the cancellation of said title of land, the land thereunder
(sic) remains with or reverts to the estate (sic) disposable to qualified applicants to
buy the said land in accordance with law;
14. As stallholders, the plaintiffs together with the other several stallholders on
this land would have pre-emptive rights over this government property.[3]
Instead of filing an Answer, petitioner VSC filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
following grounds:
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST. AS SUCH, THEY HAVE NO
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE HEREIN DEFENDANT.
THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION CONSIDERING THAT PLAINTIFFS
ARE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING TITLE OF THE PROPERTY LEASED BY THEM FROM
THE HEREIN DEFENDANT.
AND ASSUMING BUT WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE THE REAL
PARTIES IN INTEREST AND HAVE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT, THE
CLAIM OR DEMAND SET FORTH IN THE PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT HAS ALREADY
PRESCRIBED OR OTHERWISE EXTINGUISHED.[4]
On March 15, 1991, the lower court issued an order dismissing the complaint.[5]
Private respondents appealed the said order to the Court of Appeals.
On June 16, 1994, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 90-55411 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The records of the case are ordered remanded to the
Court of origin or the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 for appropriate
hearing and/or for further proceedings. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner VSC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the appellate court, in a
Resolution issued on July 7, 1995, denied the same.[7]
Hence, herein petition raising the following Assignment of Errors:
I undisturbed possession for the entire term under the lease, are estopped to deny
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING
THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDING/TRIAL OF THE RESPONDENTS
COMPLAINT DESPITE ITS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENTS ARE MERE LESSEES OR
TENANTS OF THE PETITIONERS PROPERTY COVERED BY TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE NO. 153406 WHICH RESPONDENTS SEEK TO ANNUL IN THE SAID
COMPLAINT. IN SO DOING, THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY VIOLATED ARTICLE
1436 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS WELL AS SECTION 3(b), RULE 131
OF THE RULES OF COURT AND OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ALLOWING THE RESPONDENTS TO PROSECUTE THE SAID COMPLAINT DESPITE THE
CLEAR ALLEGATIONS THEREIN THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT THE REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST TO PROSECUTE THE SAME. IN SO DOING, THE COURT OF APPEALS
VIOLATED SECTION 2, RULE 3 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING
THE TRIAL COURT TO CONTINUE FURTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE SAID
RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT DESPITE THE PARTIES CLEAR ADMISSION OF FACTS
AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION STATED IN THE SAID
COMPLAINT HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED. IN SO DOING, THE COURT OF APPEALS
VIOLATED SECTION 32 OF PRES. DECREE NO. 1529 AS WELL AS SEVERAL
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Private respondents do not directly assert title to the thing leased as against
petitioner. Instead, they contend that petitioners title over the subject property is
void, praying that the same should be cancelled and the disputed property should
be reverted back to the State.
We agree with the petitioner that private respondents are barred from
questioning the formers title over the subject property. In a long line of cases, this
Court has consistently held that the private respondents, as lessees, who had
their landlords title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in
some third person, including the State, while they remain in possession of the leased
premises and until they surrender possession to the landlord.[8] In the present case,
it is undisputed that there exists a lessor-lessee relationship between petitioner and
private respondents, the latter being among the persons who lease a portion of the
subject property owned by herein petitioner. Clearly, therefore, private
respondents, as lessees, are estopped from questioning petitioners title, even on
the ground that the subject property properly belongs to the State.
Moreover, we also agree with petitioner that private respondents are not the
real parties in interest.
Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real party in interest is
defined as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the
rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest.[9] The interest of the party must also be personal and not one based on a
desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.[10] Real
interest, on the other hand, means a present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest.[11]
In the case at bar, the private respondents are mere lessees of the property in
question. As such, they have no present substantial and personal interest with
respect to issues involving ownership of the disputed property. The only interest
they have, in the event that petitioners title over the subject property is cancelled
and ownership reverts to the State, is the hope that they become qualified buyers
of the subject parcel of land. Undoubtedly, such interest is a mere expectancy. Even
the private respondents themselves claim that in case of reversion of ownership to
the State, they only have pre-emptive rights to buy the subject property;[12] that
their real interest over the said property is contingent upon the governments
consideration of their application as buyers of the same.[13] It is settled that a suit
filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed.[14]
It is only the government that has the personality to bring an action for the
cancellation of petitioners title and reversion of ownership of the subject property
to the State. Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the
government may institute an action to recover ownership of a public land. The
principle enunciated in Sumail vs. CFI[15] is applicable in the resolution of the present
controversy. In the said case, this Court held:

Under Section 101 above reproduced, only the Solicitor General or the officer
acting in his stead may bring the action for reversion. Consequently, Sumail may
not bring such action or any action which would have the effect of canceling a free
patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, with
the result that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public
domain.Furthermore, there is another reason for withholding legal personality
from Sumail. He does not claim the land to be his private property. x x
x Consequently, even if the parcel were declared reverted to the public domain,
Sumail does not automatically become owner thereof. He is a mere public land
applicant like others who might apply for the same.

The same principle was reiterated in Lucas vs. Durian[16] and in Nebrada vs. Heirs of
Alivio.[17]

Considering that private respondents have no valid cause of action against

herein petitioners, the issue on prescription has perforce been rendered off-tangent
and therefore there is no longer any need to resolve the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, dated June 16, 1994 and July 7, 1995 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 21) dated March 15,
1991, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-55411, is REINSTATED.
Let copy of herein decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General for
proper information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for collection of sum of money and damages which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 232-M-2003 and raffled to Branch 14.
GUIGUINTO CREDIT G.R. No. 170926
COOPERATIVE, INC. (GUCCI), Summons against respondents were served through a certain Benita S.
Petitioner,
Present: Pagtalunan who received the same on April 22, 2003.[4] The Return of Summons was
Panganiban, C.J. filed on April 24, 2003 by Process Server Valeriano P. Badato which stated:
(Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, RESPECTFULLY RETURNED to the Honorable Court the
Austria-Martinez, herein Summons, together with their Complaints and Annexes in
Callejo, Sr., and connection with the service of the same with the information that it
Chico-Nazario, JJ. was received by Ms. BENITA C. PAGTALUNAN secretary of the
AIDA TORRES, NONILO TORRES defendants on April 22, 2003 at their given address.
and SHERYL ANN TORRES-HOLGADO,
Respondents. Promulgated: PROOF OF SERVICE CAN BE FOUND on the original copy of
September 15, 2006 Summons as shown by her signature therein.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
DECISION Malolos, Bulacan, April 24, 2003.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: (Sgd.) VALERIANO P. BADATO
Process Server[5]

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
On November 18, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to declare respondents in default
annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 24, 2005[1] in
which was granted by the trial court thus:
CA-G.R. SP No. 89974, declaring the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
Branch 14, dated September 15, 2004[2] in Civil Case No. 232-M-2003 null and void Submitted is a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default [f]iled by
for having been rendered without jurisdiction, and its Resolution dated December plaintiffs through counsel, Atty. Jose I. dela Rama, Jr.
9, 2005,[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Records show that on April 22, 2003, Summons together with the
complaint and its annexes were served to defendants Aida Torres,
Respondents are members of Guiguinto Credit Cooperative, Inc. (GUCCI). They Nonilo Torres and Sheryl Ann Torres through their Secretary Ms.
availed of loans from the cooperative but were unable to pay on the due dates Benita C. Pagtalunan per process Servers Return dated April 24,
2003. Despite receipt of the same defendants failed to file their
despite demands.Hence, on March 24, 2003, petitioner filed a complaint before the Answer and/or responsive pleading within the reglementary period.
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Motion to
Declare Defendants in default is GRANTED. The defendants are
hereby declared in default.
The plaintiff is hereby allowed to present its evidence ex-parte
before the court on February 10, 2004 at 8:30 a.m.
SO ORDERED.[6]
After presenting petitioners evidence ex-parte, the trial court rendered judgment
on September 15, 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the
defendants to pay plaintiff the following:
1. For Aida Torres:
a. The amount of P163,516.80 from April, 2004 plus legal
interest until the said amount is fully paid;
2. For Nonilo Torres:
a. The amount of P278,151.58 from April, 2004 plus legal
interest until the said amount is fully paid;
3. For Sheryl Ann Torres:
a. The amount of P15,903.93 from April, 2004 plus legal
interest until the said amount is fully paid;
4. To pay P10,000.00, jointly and severally, as attorneys fees.
5. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioner thereafter moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, which
was granted and accordingly, the writ of execution was issued on even date.[8]
On May 4, 2005, Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte levied respondents house and lot
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-22289 (T-285668) and the same was
scheduled to be sold at public auction on June 7, 2005 when the Court of Appeals
issued a temporary restraining order.[9]
On August 24, 2005, the Court of Appeals annulled the judgment of the trial court
on the ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondents
since they were not validly served with summons and neither did they voluntarily
appear in court.[10] According to the appellate court, the service of summons to
Pagtalunan was in violation of Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court because there
was no explanation why resort to substituted service of summons was made. Thus,
the appellate court held that respondents were deprived of their right to due
process.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration,[11] hence, this
petition on the following assignment of errors:
I
The Court of Appeals erred when it granted the Annulment
of Judgment despite the active participation of the respondents in
the court proceeding without questioning the jurisdiction of the
Court.
II
The Court of Appeals erred when it granted the Annulment
of Judgment despite the availability of legal remedies provided for
by law. Hence, respondents are barred by estoppel and laches to
question the jurisdiction of the court.
III
 The Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the
Complaint and absolved the respondents of any civil liability to the
Cooperative without evidence having been presented in the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals likewise erred when it acted
beyond what is being prayed for.[12]
Petitioner alleges that the trial court rightly assumed jurisdiction over the persons
of respondents, asserting that No. 180 San Vicente Ferrer St., Rosaryville Subd., Sta.
Cruz, Guiguinto, Bulacan, is the residence of all the respondents as shown in (a) the
Affidavit of Merit of Sheryl Ann Torres attached to the Petition, (b) the Special Power
of Attorney executed by Nonilo and Aida Torres and (c) the Verification/Certification
executed under oath by Sheryl Ann Torres.[13] Petitioner asserts that the service of
summons to Pagtalunan at the same address was valid pursuant to the rules and
applicable jurisprudence.
Petitioner avers that respondents cannot avail of the remedy of annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 since there are other available remedies under the Rules of
Court,[14] such as a motion for new trial or reconsideration, petition for relief from
judgment, or an original action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the
obligations of the respondents are guaranteed by their co-signors capital
investments. It claims that the appellate court completely disregarded that the co-
signors in the persons of Danilo Santos and Carmelita Reyes had withdrawn their
capital shares in the cooperative. The Court of Appeals, according to petitioner,
concluded that the obligations of the respondents were already paid, without the
[15]
latter having presented any proof or evidence to that effect.
On the other hand, respondents argue that the Court of Appeals did not commit
reversible error when it granted the annulment of judgment considering that the
trial court, which rendered the judgment, lacked jurisdiction over their
persons. They were not validly served with summons nor did they voluntarily appear
and submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Neither did they actively
participate in the proceedings conducted therein. Respondents assert that their
right to due process was violated when the trial court rendered the questioned
decision.[16]
Respondents also aver that the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment is
proper there being no recourse to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies, which are no longer available
through no fault of their own. They assert that laches and estoppel are not
applicable to the case at bar.[17]
The issues to be resolved are: (a) whether summons was validly served on the
respondents; and (b) whether the judgment of the trial court was correctly annulled
by the Court of Appeals.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against
him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person.[18] Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through
coercive process, generally by the service of summons issued by the court, or
through the defendants voluntary appearance or submission to the court.
Where the defendant is a natural person, service may be personal, substituted, by
publication and such other mode of service as the court may deem sufficient.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary
for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a
resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of the said Rule. If he
is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be
resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside
the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court;
[19]
or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
of his property by violating his constitutional right to due process. The statutory
requirements of substituted service must be strictly construed since it is an
extraordinary method of service in derogation of personal service of summons,
availed of only under certain conditions imposed by the Rules of Court. Any
substituted service other than that authorized under Section 7 is deemed ineffective
and contrary to law.

In these types of civil actions, summons on the defendant must be served by handing
Granting that Pagtalunan is the personal secretary of Aida Torres, as appearing in
a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or in case of refusal, by tendering it to
the Affidavit of Merit of Sheryl Ann Torres and attached to the Petition of Annulment
him. If efforts to find defendant personally makes prompt service impossible, service
filed before the Court of Appeals, there is no showing that the former had indeed a
may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants dwelling house
relationship of trust and confidence with the three respondents. It appears that the
or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by
process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons
leaving the copies at the defendants office or regular place of business with some
without ascertaining the whereabouts of the respondents. Such service of summons
competent person in charge thereof.[20] The proper service of summons is a critical
is not binding upon respondents Nonilo and Sheryl Ann Torres whose relationship
step in litigation because upon such service rests the courts acquisition of
with Pagtalunan was neither readily ascertained nor adequately explained in the
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In the absence of a valid waiver, trial
Return of Summons. Also, no earnest efforts were made to locate respondent Aida
and judgment without such service are null and void.
Torres who was allegedly working abroad at the time summons was served on her
person. No explanation why substituted service was resorted to through Pagtalunan
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that since
was stated in the Return.
substituted service was availed of in lieu of personal service, there should be a
report stating that Pagtalunan was one with whom respondents had a relationship
The Return of Summons by the process server showed that no effort was
of trust and confidence that would ensure that the latter will receive or be notified
exerted and no positive step was taken to locate and serve the summons personally
of the summons issued in their names. This is because substituted service may only
on respondents. Without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of
be availed of when the respondents could not be served personally within a
the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts
reasonable period of time, and such impossibility of prompt service must be shown
were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted
by stating that earnest efforts have been made to find the respondents personally
service of summons.
and that such efforts have failed. Such requirements under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule
14 must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully in order not to deprive any person
It must be emphasized that personal service of summons is the mode which must
be adopted whenever practicable. It ought to be effected either by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or if he refuses, by tendering it to him.
In Ang Ping v. Court of Appeals,[21] we ruled:
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases
is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons. x x x
Well-settled is the rule that summons must be served upon
the defendant himself. It is only when the defendant cannot be
served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service
may be resorted to and such impossibility of prompt service should
be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the
defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is
necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and
hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances
authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted
service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any
substituted service other than that authorized by statute is
considered ineffective.
It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not
only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard
on the claim made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules
regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due
process as of jurisdiction.[22]
In Avon Insurance PLC v. Court of Appeals,[23] we held:
Fundamentally, the service of summons is intended to give
official notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has
been commenced against it. The defendant or respondent is thus
put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff as stated in the
complaint. The service of summons upon the defendant becomes
an important element in the operation of a courts jurisdiction upon
a party to a suit, as service of summons upon the defendant is the
means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
Without service of summons, or when summons are improperly
made, both the trial and the judgment, being in violation of due
process, are null and void, unless the defendant waives the service
of summons by voluntarily appearing and answering the suit.
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This is not,
however, always the case. Admittedly, and without subjecting
himself to the courts jurisdiction, the defendant in an action can, by
special appearance object to the courts assumption on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. If he so wishes to assert this defense, he must
do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have
submitted himself to that jurisdiction. x x x
xxxx
If the defendant, besides setting up in a motion to dismiss
his objection to the jurisdiction of the court, alleges at the same
time any other ground for dismissing the action, or seeks an
affirmative relief in the motion, he is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court.[24]
In Laus v. Court of Appeals,[25] we reiterated that substituted service must: (a)
indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time, (b) specify
the efforts exerted to locate the petitioners, and (c) state that it was served on a
person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein.[26] We held that the pre-
condition that substituted service may be resorted to only if personal service cannot
be made within a reasonable time must be strictly followed.
 In the instant case, there was an undue, if not indecent, haste to serve the
summons at the first attempt without making sure that personal service was an
impossibility because either the respondents had left for a foreign country or an
unknown destination with no definite date of returning within a reasonable period,
or had gone into hiding to avoid service of any process from the courts. Since the
substituted service was not validly effected, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents. The order of default, the judgment
by default, the writ of execution issued by it, as well as the auction sale of the
respondents properties levied on execution are, therefore, null and void.
Statutes prescribing modes other than personal service of summons must be strictly
complied with to give the court jurisdiction, and such compliance must appear
affirmatively on the return.[27]
In the case of Jose v. Boyon,[28] we observed:
In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily
and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons
without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate respondents.
A review of the records reveals that the only effort he exerted was
to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22,
1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents.
While the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were
ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United
States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly
what efforts if any were undertaken to find respondents.
Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process
server obtained the information on their whereabouts. x x x
xxxx
The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually
exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server or
petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on
respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged
whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such
information was verified from a person who had knowledge
thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant
circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a
general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for
purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of
summons.[29]
We explained in Venturanza v. Court of Appeals[30] how the impossibility of personal
service should be shown by the process server:
The substituted service should be availed only when the
defendant cannot be served promptly in person. Impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find
the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The
statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It has been held that substituted service is a method
extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as
prescribed in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the
statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully, and any substituted service other than that
authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.[31]
Jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents never vested with the trial court
since the manner of substituted service by the process server is deemed invalid and
ineffective. Clearly, there was a violation of due process because of the defective
service of summons. The judgment of the trial court should be annulled on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, since the respondents were not properly notified of
the action filed against them, and denied them the chance to answer the complaint
before the court, thus depriving them of an opportunity to be heard.
Under Section 2 of Rule 47, judgments may be annulled on grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction, which refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.[32] A judgment of
annulment sets aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and
renders the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled
in the proper court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 24, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89974, annulling the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan, Branch 14, dated September 15, 2004 in Civil Case No. 232-M-
2003 for having been rendered without jurisdiction and the Resolution dated and
December 9, 2005, denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135496. July 30, 2002]
LONGOS RURAL WATERWORKS AND SANITATION ASSOCIATION, INC. (LRWSAI)
represented by MIGUEL ORTEGA and ANDRES D. MANUEL, SR., petitioners,
vs. HON. ANIANO A. DISIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; VIRGILIO
ORTEGA, AMANDO BORLONGAN, JR., ARMANDO SILOT, SERVANDO SANTOS,
EVELYN AQUINO and VIRGILIO AQUINO, respondents.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which we will treat as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It seeks to annul the Resolution of
the Ombudsman (OMB) dated May 29, 1998 ordering the dismissal of the criminal
complaint filed against the private respondents and the Resolution dated August 14,
1998 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Facts:
Acting on the recommendation of Ombudsman-Luzon, an Information was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch 22) charging herein private
respondents Barangay Captain Virgilio Ortega and other barangay officials,
namely: Amando Borlongan, Jr., Armando Silot, Servando Santos, Evelyn Aquino and
Virgilio Aquino, with Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 otherwise known as Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act[1] as follows:
That on or about September 14, 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, public officers, committing the crime herein
charged in relation to their official functions and through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith did then and there willfully, unlawfully take-over the operation
and management of the Longos Rural Waterworks and Sanitation Association, Inc.
(LRWSA) from the de facto Board of Directors of LRWSA, thereby causing undue
injury to the said de facto Board of Directors and to the public as well and at the
same time giving themselves unwarranted benefits to the damage and prejudice of
the de facto Board of Directors.
Private respondents moved for a reinvestigation of the case claiming that they
are going to present additional documentary evidence and other witnesses which
are in the nature of newly discovered evidence. The RTC granted the motion, thus,
the case was referred back to OMB-Luzon for reinvestigation. Further hearing of the
case was held in abeyance. In an Order dated November 24, 1997, OMB-Luzon
reversed its prior recommendation calling for the indictment of private respondents
and ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon Motion for Reconsideration filed by
herein petitioners Miguel Ortega and Andres Manuel, Sr., OMB-Luzon denied the
same and the Order of dismissal is affirmed. Consequently, petitioners filed an
appeal-request with the Office of the Ombudsman, Central Office which denied the
same, ratiocinating thus:
It is submitted that with the indorsement (to the Office of the Provincial
prosecutor of Bulacan, for appropriate action) by this Office of its resolution (as far
back as January of this year) recommending the withdrawal of the information
against the accused, this Office is therefore constrained not to act on the request
of herein complainants for, as earlier stated, there is no indication on whether: (a)
the court has (already) acted on the (OMB-Luzon) recommendation to withdraw
the information or if (b) complainants sought leave of court before filing instant
motion for reconsideration cum-letter-appeal, in view of the ruling in Crespo v.
Mogul.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the
accused is terminated upon the filing of the information. In turn, as above stated,
the filing of the said information sets in motion the criminal action against the
accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted
to the Court for appropriate action.[2]
The Motion for Reconsideration thereof was likewise denied by the Ombudsman.
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction to public
respondent Ombudsman, petitioners filed the present petition arguing:
 1) that leave of court is not necessary before they could file a Motion for
Reconsideration from the November 24, 1997 Order of the OMB-Luzon
inasmuch as the said Order was not yet final; and
2) that respondents were not duly clothed with authority at the time they
forcibly took the operation of the LWRSA from the petitioners.
In support of their first argument, petitioners insist that there is nothing
in Crespo v. Mogul[3] which required that the court should first act on the
recommendation of the Ombudsman to dismiss the case or that prior leave of court
should be made before petitioner can move for a reconsideration of the decision of
the OMB-Luzon.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the case pursuant to the
aforestated OMB Resolution. But the RTC was informed of the present petition,
thus, it issued an Order holding in abeyance the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss
pending the outcome of herein petition.
As we stated in the Crespo case: The preliminary investigation conducted by
the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
Information in the proper court. In turn, the filing of said Information sets in motion
the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court
must be secured. After such reinvestigation, the finding and recommendations of
the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true
that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought
to Court, whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case
thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.[4]
In the present case, it is the RTC not the OMB which ordered the reinvestigation
upon motion for reinvestigation filed by respondents. The RTC referred the case
back to OMB-Luzon.[5]The RTC was, therefore, deemed to have deferred to the
authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new
relevant and material evidence and determine whether the Information it had filed
should stand.[6]
Thus, there should be a final resolution of the OMB on the matter. In other
words, there is no need to seek permission from the court to file a motion for
reconsideration for this remedy is allowed by the Rules of OMB.[7]
However, the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration was not based on this
technicality alone but the OMB proceeded to delve on the merits, thus:
The basis for the indictment of respondents-accused was the alleged forcible
takeover of LRSWA [sic] operations and its premises, which occurrence was
entered in to the police blotter of Balagtas, Bulacan. However, as discussed in the
November 24, 1997 of GIO II Gongon, when respondents took over the water
system in the barangay, they were duly clothed with authority.. by the
LRWSA. Complainants under the facts as ascertained no longer have the authority
to continue operating the water system as their de facto position had already been
superseded with the election of the regular members of the Board of Directors of
LRWSA. x x x There is the absence in this case of any act where respondents
caused injury to complainants(o)n the other hand, complaints have not established
their rightful authority to operate the water system which apparently they had
lost.
Anent the charge that respondent barangay officers forcibly destroyed the lock of
the door of the pumping station, suffice it to say that with the sworn statement of
Genario Ambrocio stating that it was he alone who unlocked the said door
(accompanied by other LRWSA members and without interference from the
barangay officials), said allegation has been substantially controverted.[8]
The above findings are now being questioned by petitioners arguing that there
is enough evidence to warrant indictment of respondents.
We are not persuaded. The assailed findings is a factual finding which deserves
due respect.[9] In Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.[10] we had the occasion to rule
that we cannot pass upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the
respondents:
As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this
Court. Our duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the
executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was
done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or
final. There are, however, exceptions[11] to this rule, none of which are obtaining in
the case now before us.
 The exceptions to the rule are as follows: Since the Information has already been filed, the final arbiter on whether or
not to proceed with the case is the RTC as earlier discussed.
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
(Hernandez v. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
SO ORDERED.
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez v.
Albano, supra; Fortun v. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);

c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon v. Mabanag,
70 Phil. 62);

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas v. Gil,
67 Phil. 62);

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young v.

Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v. People and Alvendia,

109 Phil. 1140);

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez v. City Judge, L-
25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia v. Ocampo, CA-

G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance
(Recto v. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Raoa v. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R,
October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. v. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA
577); and

j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied. [12]

We do not find in this case any of the exceptions enumerated above. Thus, we
find no cogent reason to warrant a deviation from the general rule.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150925. May 27, 2004]
SPOUSES JAMES TAN and FLORENCE TAN, petitioners, vs. CARMINA, REYNALDO, YOLANDA
and ELISA, all surnamed MANDAP, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision[1] dated August 10, 2001, of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 59694, which affirmed in toto the decision,[2] dated
March 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 34, in Civil Case
No. 89-50263. The trial court declared the sale of properties between
Dionisio Mandap, Sr., and the spouses Crispulo and Elenita Vasquez simulated and
thus void, and hence, the subsequent sale between the Vasquez spouses and
petitioners herein, the spouses James and Florence Tan, similarly void.Likewise
assailed by the petitioners is the resolution[3] dated November 23, 2001 of the
appellate court, denying their motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
The respondents are the legitimate children of the marriage of
Dionisio Mandap, Sr., and Maria Contreras Mandap. When the Mandap spouses
parted ways, their children opted to stay with Maria. To help support the children,
Maria filed Civil Case No. E-02380 in the former Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila for the dissolution and separation of the conjugal partnership.
Two separate lots, each with an area of 88 square meters covered by TCT Nos.
44730 and 55847, respectively, located in Felix Huertas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
with improvements thereon, were adjudicated by the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court in favor of Dionisio Mandap, Sr.
Meanwhile, Dionisio Mandap, Sr., until his death on October 2, 1991 at age 64,
lived with Diorita Dojoles, with whom he had two children. He suffered from
diabetes since 1931, became totally blind in 1940, and was crippled for about 10
years until his death. However, before his death on May 25, 1989, he conveyed the
subject properties to his common-law wifes sister, Elenita Dojoles Vasquez; and her
husband, Crispulo Vasquez. As a result of this sale, TCT Nos. 44730 and 55847 were
cancelled and TCT Nos. 186748 and 186749 covering the subject properties were
issued in the name of Elenita Vasquez married to Crispulo Vasquez.
On September 11, 1989, the Vasquez spouses conveyed the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 186748 in favor of petitioners. TCT No. 188862 covering the
subject lot was then issued in favor of the latter.
On September 5, 1989, prior to the sale to petitioners, the respondents filed
an action for cancellation of title with damages, before the RTC of Manila
against Diorita Dojoles and the Vasquez spouses, alleging that the sale of subject
properties by their father was fictitious, and without any consideration. Further, the
consent of their father was vitiated due to his physical infirmities. The action was
docketed as Civil Case No. 89-50263.
On February 15, 1991, respondents filed a supplemental complaint, this time
against the spouses Tan, for the nullification of the sale to the latter of subject lot.
On March 25, 1998, the trial court decided Civil Case No. 89-50263 in favor of
the herein respondents. The decretal part of its judgment reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 89-50263
1. Declaring the Deeds of Sale (Exh. A and A-1; B and B-1) both dated
May 25, 1989 executed in favor of Elenita Vasquez married
to Crispulo Vasquez as null and void and of no legal force and
effect whatsoever;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 186748
(Exh. K to K-2) and TCT No. 186749 (Exh. L and L-1) registered in
the name of Elenita Vasquez married to Crispulo Vasquez having
been issued thru a void and inexistent contract; further ordering
the reconveyance of said title to the Estate of Dionisio Mandap,
Sr.;
 3. Ordering the plaintiffs or the Estate of Dionisio Mandap, Sr., to SO ORDERED.[4]
reimburse or return the sum of P570,000.00 representing the
purchase price of the subject lot, plus legal rate of interest starting From the above judgment, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-
from the rendition of this decision until fully paid; G.R. CV No. 59694 on the ground that the trial court erred in not declaring them to
be buyers in good faith and in not sustaining the validity of their title, TCT No.
4. Ordering the defendants Spouses Crispulo and Elenita Vasquez 188862.
and Diorita Dojoles to jointly and severally reimburse or return the
In its decision dated August 10, 2001, the Court of Appeals found the appeal
fruits or earnings in the mentioned lots in the form of rentals
bereft of merit and affirmed in toto the lower court decision, thus:
which is hereby fixed at P10,000.00 per month from the date this
complaint was filed until defendants restore and/or surrender the
WHEREFORE, the appeals interposed by appellants Dojoles, Sps. Vasquez and Sps.
subject premises to the Estate of Dionisio Mandap, Sr.;
James and Florence Tan is without merit; the Decision of the lower court dated
March 25, 1998 is AFFIRMED in toto.
5. Ordering the defendants Spouses Crispulo and Elenita Vasquez
and Diorita Dojoles to pay attorneys fees in the amount
Costs against appellants.
of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT AGAINST SPOUSES JAMES
AND FLORENCE TAN
Petitioners seasonably moved for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
appellate court.
1. Declaring the Deed of Sale dated September 11, 1989 (Exh. Q and 7,
Tan) executed by Elenita Vasquez married to Crispulo Vasquez as Hence, this petition for review, submitting the following issues for our
null and void and of no force and effect whatsoever, the vendor resolution:
having no valid title to dispose of the same;
I
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 188862
issued in the name of James Tan, the source of which having been WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO BRING THE
declared null and void; INSTANT PETITION.

3. Ordering Spouses Crispulo and Elenita Vasquez to return the sum II

of P1,000,000.00 representing the purchase price of the lot
covered by TCT No. 188862 with legal rate of interest from the WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE BETWEEN MANDAP SR. AND THE VASQUEZES IS
date of this decision; VALID.

4. Ordering defendants James and Florence Tan to jointly and severally III
pay the sum of P15,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE BETWEEN THE VASQUEZES AND PETITIONERS IS
IN BOTH CASES THE COUNTERCLAIMS INTERPOSED BY THE DEFENDANTS ARE VALID.
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
 IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS [FEES] HAS LEGAL BASIS.[6]
Anent the first issue, the petitioners submit that having been made parties-
defendants by respondents via the supplemental complaint in Civil Case No. 89-
50263, they have the right to appeal to this Court the adverse ruling of the appellate
court against them, even if their co-defendants did not appeal the said ruling of the
Court of Appeals.
Respondents counter that petitioners have no legal personality to appeal the
decision of the appellate court voiding the sale between Dionisio Mandap, Sr., and
the Vasquez spouses.They contend that inasmuch as the latter did not appeal the
questioned decision, it had become final and executory. Respondents contend that
petitioners, not being privy to said sale, cannot invoke its validity.
We find for petitioners on this issue. The trial court voided the petitioners sale
of subject lot, and on appeal that decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, as aggrieved parties, petitioners may elevate to the Supreme Court
the controversy within the prescriptive period for appeal.[7] They possess locus
standi, or legal personality, to seek a review by this Court of the decision by the
appellate court which they assail. Note that while petitioners elevated the trial
courts decision to the appellate court, their co-defendants in Civil Case No. 89-
50263 did not do so. Thus, the trial courts decision became final and executory only
as to petitioners co-defendants in the trial court who did not appeal,
namely Diorita Dojoles and the Vasquez spouses.
With regard to the second issue, the petitioners insist the essential requisites
of a contract of sale have been satisfied, namely, (1) consent of the contracting
parties, (2) object certain, and (3) cause or consideration therefor. They have been
satisfied first in the sale by Mandap, Sr., of the lots to the Vasquez spouses and
subsequently, in the sale by the Vasquezes to petitioners. Hence, petitioners
contend that it was error for the appellate court to declare the sale to them of the
subject lot null and void.
After careful consideration of the submission of the parties, we find in favor of
respondents. Petitioners contentions lack merit.
At the time Dionisio Mandap, Sr., purportedly sold the lots in question to the
Vasquez spouses, he was already totally blind and paralyzed. He could not possibly
have read the contents of the deeds of sale. He could not have consented to a
contract whose terms he never knew nor understood. It cannot be
presumed Mandap, Sr., knew the contents of the deeds of sale disposing of his
properties. Article 1332 of the Civil Code is applicable in these circumstances, to wit:
ART. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a
language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person
enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained
to the former.
As the party seeking to enforce the contract, the petitioners should have
presented evidence showing that the terms of the deeds of sale to the Vasquez
spouses were fully explained to Mandap, Sr. But petitioners failed to comply with
the strict requirements of Article 1332, thereby casting doubt on the alleged
consent of the vendor. Since the vendor in this case was totally blind and crippled
at the time of the sale, entirely dependent on outside support, every care to protect
his interest conformably with Article 24 of the Civil Code must be taken. Article 24
is clear on this.
ART. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is
at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his
protection.
Petitioners presented no evidence disproving that (1) Mandap, Sr. was totally
blind and suffering from acute diabetes such that he could no longer discern the
legal consequences of his acts, and (2) that undue influence was exerted upon him,
which vitiated his consent.
It is true that he who alleges a fact bears the burden of proving it. However,
since fraud and undue influence are alleged by respondents, the burden shifts [8] to
petitioners to prove that the contents of the contract were fully explained
to Mandap, Sr. Nothing, however, appears on record to show that this requirement
was complied with. Thus, the presumption of fraud and undue influence was not
rebutted.
More important, evidence on record, in our view, prove the existence of
fraud. On August 1, 1990, commissioners appointed by the lower court conducted
an ocular inspection concerning the physical condition of Mandap, Sr. He stated on
that occasion that he received P550,000 as first payment, another P550,000 as
second payment, and P1,550,000 the remaining balance of the total selling price of
what was loaned to the vendees. However, in the deeds of sale covering the subject
properties, the prices indicated were P250,000 and P320,000, respectively or a total
of only P570,000. This inconsistency in the amount of the consideration is
unexplained. They point to fraud in the sale of the subject properties, to the
prejudice of Mandap, Sr.
Petitioners do not dispute the fact that the notary public who notarized the
deeds of sale was not duly commissioned. But they contend the deeds validity were
not affected. However, it bears stressing that even an apparently valid notarization
of a document does not guarantee its validity.[9] The crucial point here is that
while Mandap, Sr., testified that he executed the deeds of sale in Las Pias, the said
documents were actually notarized in Manila. Mandap, Sr., did not personally
appear before a notary public. Yet the documents stated the contrary. Such falsity
raises doubt regarding the genuineness of the vendors alleged consent to the deeds
of sale.
ART. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In this particular case, the award of attorneys fees is just and equitable,
considering the circumstances herein. The court a quos order to pay P15,000 as
attorneys fees does not appear to us unreasonable but just and equitable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 10, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59694, which sustained the
decision dated March 25, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34,
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners also claim the purchase price was not grossly inadequate so as to Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
invalidate the sale of subject properties. True, mere inadequacy of the price does Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.
not necessarily void a contract of sale. However, said inadequacy may indicate that
there was a defect in the vendors consent.[10] More important, it must be pointed
out that the trial court and the Court of Appeals voided the sale of the subject
properties not because the price was grossly inadequate, but because the
presumptions of fraud and undue influence exerted upon the vendor had not been
overcome by petitioners, the parties interested in enforcing the contract.
On the third issue, petitioners argue that since the sale of subject properties
by Mandap, Sr. to the Vasquez spouses is valid, it follows that the subsequent sale
of the property by the latter to petitioners is also valid. But this contention cannot
be sustained, since we find that based on the evidence on record, the sale in favor
of the Vasquez spouses is void. Hence, it follows that the sale to petitioners is also
void, because petitioners merely stepped into the shoes of the Vasquez
spouses. Since the Vasquezes as sellers had no valid title over the parcel of land they
sold, petitioners as buyers thereof could not claim that the contract of sale is valid.
On the last issue, petitioners contest the award of attorneys fees. Indeed, no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate, and not every winning party is
entitled to an automatic grant of attorneys fees.[11] The party must show that he falls
under one of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, to wit:
 THIRD DIVISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL G.R. No. 179859
AND TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO, Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriagesthe first to Bibiana
Present:
Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and
MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE
SANTIAGO, CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors
Petitioners, BERSAMIN, Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.
DEL CASTILLO,*
- versus - ABAD,** and
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo,
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago.
ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-
RIVERA, HEIRS OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner
OF CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.[1]
TOMAS SANTIAGO,
Respondents.
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the
second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS
Bulacan[2] a petition for the probate of Basilios will, docketed as SP No. 1549-M. The
SOCO, URBANO SOCO, GERTRUDES SOCO AND
HEIRS OF CONSOLACION SOCO, will was admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and Ma. Pilar was appointed
Oppositors. executrix.

Promulgated: The will contained the following provisions, among others:

August 9, 2010 4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay
INIWAN, IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko sa
x--------------------------------------------------x aking mga nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng
sumusunod:

xxxx
DECISION
 c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at
mamamahala ng balutan na nasa Santiago, Malolos, Bulacan, na
nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(y);
d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng
hayop at lupat bahay sa Maynila, ang lahat ng solar sa danay ng
daang Malolos-Paombong na nasa Malolos, Bulacan, kasali at
kasama ang palaisdaan na nasa likuran niyon, ay ililipat sa
pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente; ngunit ang kita ng
palaisdaan ay siyang gagamitin nila sa lahat at anomang
kailangang gugol, maging majora o roperacion [sic], sa lupat
bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c);
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay
sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang
pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa
aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang
panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng
hayop ay ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at
mga anak na Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad,
Eugenia, Clemente, at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa
loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa araw ng aking
kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni
Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar
na siyang magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang ay ang kita ng mga
iyon matapos na ang gugol na kakailanganin niyon, bilang
reparacion, pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay maawas na. Ninais ko
ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at pagaaring
ibinubuhay ko sa kanila lahat, bukod sa yaon ay sa kanila ding
kapakinabangan at kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng
Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko sa aking nasabing asawa, Cecilia
Lomotan, at mga anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo,
Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente at Cleotilde nang pare-
pareho. Datapwat, gaya din ng mga bigasan, makina at gawaan ng
pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong
(20) taon mula sa aking pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan din nila Ma.
Pilar at Clemente. Ang mapaparte lamang ay ang kita o ani ng
nasabing mga pag-aari matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig
at iba pang mga gugol na kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang hahawak
ng ani o salaping manggagaling dito. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)[3]
The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio and his first wife,
were, on their motion, allowed to intervene.[4]
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a Final Accounting, Partition
and Distribution in Accordance with the Will,[5] the probate court approved the will
by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of deeds of Bulacan
and Manila to register the certificates of title indicated therein.[6] Accordingly, the
titles to Lot Nos. 786, 837, 7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos, Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C
in Manila were transferred in the name of petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente.[7]
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention[8] with the
probate court, alleging that Basilios second wife was not Irene but a certain Maria
Arellano with whom he had no child; and that Basilios will violates Articles 979-981
of the Civil Code.[9]
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing its
previous approval of the Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in Accordance
with the Will.[10]
The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint for
completion of legitime before the Bulacan RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 562-M-
90,[11]against the heirs of the second and third marriages.

In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially
maintained that they were partially preterited by Basilios will because their legitime
was reduced.[12]They thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory and appraisal of all
the properties of Basilio be conducted and that Ma. Pilar and Clemente be required
to submit a fresh accounting of all the incomes of the properties from the time of
[13]
Basilios death up to the time of the filing of Civil Case No. 562-M-90.
RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of legitime)
in favor of the oppositors-heirs of the first marriage.
On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court of Appeals, by
Decision of January 25, 2002,[14] annulled the decision of RTC-Branch 17, holding
that the RTC Branch 17 dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention in SP No. 1549-M
and its August 14, 1978 Order approving the probate of the will constitute res
judicata with respect to Civil Case No. 562-M-90.[15] Thus the appellate court
disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision in Civil Case No. 562-M-90 is
hereby ANNULLED on the ground of res judicata. Let the Decree
of Distribution of the Estate of
Basilio Santiago remain UNDISTURBED.
SO ORDERED.[16] (emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the appellate courts
decision in CA G.R. No. 45801 by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 155606,
which this Court denied.[17] The denial became final and executory on April 9,
2003.[18]
In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of
the second marriage filed before the probate court (RTC-Branch 10) a Motion for
Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names
of the Legatees.[19] Citing the earlier quoted portions of Basilios will, they alleged
that:
x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject
properties should be under administration of [Ma.]
Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago expired on September 16,
1993.
Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente
Santiago should have ceased as such administrator[s] way back
on September 16, 1993 and they should have transferred the
above said titles to the named legatees in the Last Will and
Testament of the testator by then. Said named legatees in the
Last Will and Testament are no[ne] other than the following:
xxxx
Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should
have also rendered an accounting of their administration from
such death of the testator up to the present or until transfer of
said properties and its administration to the said legatees.
x x x x[20]
Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered:
1) To surrender the above-enumerated titles
presently in their names to [the] Honorable Court
 and to transfer the same in the names of the
designated legatees in the Last Will and Testament,
to wit:
1) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak
na
2) Tomas
3) Zoilo
4) Ma. Pilar
5) Ricardo
6) Cipriano
7) Felicidad
8) Eugenia
9) Clemente at
10) Cleotilde
(all surnamed SANTIAGO)
2) To peacefully surrender possession and
administration of subject properties, including any
and all improvements thereon, to said legatees.
3) To render an accounting of their administration of
said properties and other properties of the testator
under their administration, from death of testator
Basilio Santiago on September 16, 1973 up to the
present and until possession and administration
thereof is transferred to said legatees.[21]
Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the approval of the Final
Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will, and with the
subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering the properties involved, the case
had long since been closed and terminated.[22]
The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be
transferred to petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of administration
only, granted the motion, by Order of September 5, 2003,[23] disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer
of Titles in the Names of the Legatees dated October 3,
2000filed by some heirs of the testator Basilio Santiago xxx is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the administratrix [sic] Ma.
Pilar Santiago and Mr. Clemente Santiago are
hereby DIRECTED,as follows:
a.) To surrender the above-enumerated titles
presently in their names to this Honorable Court
and to transfer the same in the names of the
designated legatees in the Last Will and Testament,
to wit: 1.) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan at mga anak na 2.)
Tomas 3). Zoilo 4.) Ma. Pilar 5.) Ricardo 6.) Cipriano
7.) Felicidad 8.) Eugenia 9.) Clemente and 10.)
Cleotilde all named SANTIAGO.
b.) To peacefully surrender possession and
administration of subject properties including any
and all improvements thereon, to said legatees; and
c.) To render an accounting of their administration of
subject properties, including any and all
improvements thereon, to said legatees; and
d.) To submit an accounting of their administration of
the above-mentioned estate of the testator or all
the above said lots including the rice mill, animal
feeds factory, and all improvements thereon
from August 14, 1978 up to the present.
e.) To submit a proposed Project of Partition,
indicating how the parties may actually partition or
adjudicate all the above said properties including
the properties already in the name of all the said
legatees xxx.
 x x x x.
Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are
hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider as no force and effects
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-249177 (RT-46294) [Lot No.
786], T-249175 (RT-46295) [Lot No. 837], T-249174 (RT-46296)
[Lot No. 7922], T-249173 (RT-46297) [Lot No. 836], and T-
249176 (RT-46293) [Lot No. 838] in the names of Ma. Pilar
Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in the
lieu thereof in the names of Cecilia Lomotan-Santiago, Tomas
Santiago, Zoilo Santiago, Ma. Pilar Santiago, Ricardo Santiago,
Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad Santiago, Eugenia Santiago,
Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde Santiago.
Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is
hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider as no force and effect
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131044 [Lot No. 8-C] in the
names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue
new ones in lieu thereof in the names of the Heirs of Bibiana
Lopez, the Heirs of Irene Santiago, and the Heirs of Cecilia
Lomotan.
The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Filemon,
Leonila, Ma. Concepcion, Ananias, Urbano and Gertrudes, all
surnamed Soco, dated December 3, 2002, is hereby DENIEDfor
lack of merit.[24]
Respecting petitioners argument that the case had long been closed and
terminated, the trial court held:
x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament that
subject properties cannot actually be partitioned until after 20
years from the death of the testator Basilio Santiago x x x x. It is,
therefore, clear that something more has to be done after the
approval of said Final Accounting, Partition, and
Distribution. The testator Basilio Santiago died on September
16, 1973, hence, the present action can only be filed
after September 16, 1993. Movants cause of action accrues only
from the said date and for which no prescription of action has
set in.
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the present
probate proceeding which is continuing in character, and
terminates only after and until the final distribution or settlement
of the whole estate of the deceased in accordance with the
provision of the will of the testator. The Order dated August 14,
1978 refers only to the accounting, partition, and distribution of
the estate of the deceased for the period covering from the date
of the filing of the petition for probate on December 27, 1973
up to August 14, 1978. And in the said August 14, 1978 order it
does not terminate the appointment of petitioner[s] Ma.
Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago as executrix and
administrator, respectively, of the estate of the deceased
particularly of those properties which were prohibited by the
testator to be partitioned within 20 years from his death. Since
then up to the present, Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente
Santiago remain the executor and administrator of the estate of
the deceased and as such, they are required by law to render an
accounting thereof from August 14, 1978 up to the present;
there is also now a need to partition and distribute the aforesaid
properties as the prohibition period to do so has elapsed.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)[25]
Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for
[26]
reconsideration, which the probate court denied, drawing them to appeal to the
Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. No. 83094.

[27]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court,
the petition[28] which raises the following grounds:
I.
CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE ITSELF
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT BINDING ITSELF
WITH ITS PREVIOUS DECISION INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES
AND SAME PROPERTIES;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC AS IT
AGREED WITH THE RTC THAT THIS CASE IS NOT BARRED BY
RES JUDICATA;
C. IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS HELD THAT THERE WAS RES JUDICATA; IN C.A.-G.R.
CV NO. 83094, THERE WAS NO RES JUDICATA.
II.
GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALL THE
COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION TO REVERSE ITSELF, STILL THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTCS ORDER TO
TRANSFER THE MANILA PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. 131004
TO THE NAMES OF CECILIA LOMOTAN, TOMAS, ZOILO, MA.
PILAR, RICARDO, CIPRIANO FELICIDAD, EUGENIA, CLEMENTE AND
CLEOTILDE, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO.[29] (emphasis in the
original)
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners argument that the decision of the appellate court in the earlier
CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 155606) constitutes res
judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of the present petition
for review) fails.
hence,
Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b) and 47
(c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[30] The first, known as bar by prior
judgment, proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
demand or cause of action already settled in a prior action.[31] The second, known
as conclusiveness of judgment, ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in
a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action.[32]
Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the present
case. The final judgment regarding oppositors complaint on the reduction of their
legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present petition, which solely
tackles the propriety of the termination of administration, accounting and transfer
of titles in the names of the legatees-heirs of the second and third marriages. There
is clearly no similarity of claim, demand or cause of action between the present
petition and G.R. No. 155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of parties, conclusiveness
of judgment cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the judgment in G.R. No. 155606
would only serve as an estoppel as regards the issue on oppositors supposed
preterition and reduction of legitime, which issue is not even a subject, or at the
very least even invoked, in the present petition.
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors only. The records
reveal, however, that the oppositors did not appeal the decision of the appellate
court in this case and were only impleaded pro forma parties.

Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the appellate court in
CA G.R. No. 45801 that the decree of distribution of the estate of Basilio should
remain undisturbed. But this directive goes only so far as to prohibit the
interference of the oppositors in the distribution of Basilios estate and does not
pertain to respondents supervening right to demand the termination of
administration, accounting and transfer of titles in their names.
Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court granting
respondents Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for
Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees is a proper and necessary
continuation of the August 14, 1978 Order that approved the accounting, partition
and distribution of Basilios estate. As did the appellate court, the Court notes that
the August 14, 1978 Order was yet to become final pending the whole settlement
of the estate. And final settlement of the estate, in this case, would culminate after
20 years or on September 16, 1993, when the prohibition to partition the properties
of the decedent would be lifted.
Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila,
covered by TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the legatees-heirs as
it would contravene the testators intent that no one is to own the same.
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he intended the
house and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners names for administration
purposes only, and that the property be owned by the heirs in common, thus:
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay
sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang
pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa
aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang
panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang bahay at
lupang itoy walang magmamay-ari bagkus ay gagamitin habang
panahon ng sinomang magnanais sa aking kaapuapuhan na
tumuklas ng karunungan sa paaralan sa Maynila at katabing mga
lunsod x x x x[33] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
But the condition set by the decedent on the propertys indivisibility is
subject to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the ruling of
the appellate court, viz:
For this Court to sustain without qualification,
[petitioners]s contention, is to go against the provisions of law,
particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code, which
provide that the prohibition to divide a property in a co-
ownership can only last for twenty (20) years x x x x
xxxx
x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of
the indivision of a property for more than twenty years, it would
be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond
the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code x x x x[34]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.