I.
Criminal Jurisdiction
a. Subject matter or offense
Revised penal code as amended and Special Penal Laws
Law at time of institution of criminal action not at commission:
G.R. No. 45815 May 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTAD LAGON and HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City and docketed
as Criminal Case No. 7362, charging private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa
under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that the
accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or
merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check,
which check therefore subsequently bounced.
The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence.
However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976, the City Court dismissed the information upon
the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's
authority to impose. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in
force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission of the
crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. However,
by the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder
increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose. Accordingly, the court
dismissed the information without prejudice to its being refiled in the proper court.
Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City Court of Roxas City
had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362 and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing
the case. Because the Petition for Review was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City
Fiscal of Roxas City as counsel for the People, the Court referred the petition to the Office of the
Solicitor General for comment. Responding to the Court's resolution, the then acting Solicitor
General Vicente Mendoza stated that the Office of the Solicitor General, having been previously
consulted by the Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City, agreed with the position taken by the latter
that the City Court had jurisdiction over the criminal case involved, and asked that the petition be
given due course.
After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court considers that petitioner has failed
to show that the City Court had committed reversible error in dismissing the criminal information
in Criminal Case No. 7362 without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the
law governing the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal and city courts in criminal cases in
1975 and 1976, "[municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of
city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not
1 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding
P6,000.00 or both . . . ." It appears that at the time of the commission of the offense charged on
5 April 1975, the penalty imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation to
the third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, was
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; at that time
therefore, the offense clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City.
At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty imposable for
the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 had been increased by P.D. No. 818 (effective
22 October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium period.
It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is
properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action,
rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. 1 Thus, in
accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of
First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable penalty
for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-in excess of the minimum penalty
which a city court could impose.
The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application of the above-settled doctrine to
the instant case not result in also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in
disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . " We do not believe so.
In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of
the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a
criminal information. In People v.Purisima, 2 the Court stressed that:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab
origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not
determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the
evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law
imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts
recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that
the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume
jurisdiction. 3 (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)
The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan, 4 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be
meted out to the offender after trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or even by the result of
the evidence that would be presented during the trial (People v. Co Hick 62 Phil. 503) but
by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal obligations, on
the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information (People v. Purisima, 69
SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense charged, for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court
in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless whether the evidence proves a
lesser offense than that charged in the information (People v. Mision, 48 O.G.
1330) 5(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute is Neither law at arraignment:
proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that lesser
penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the
G.R. No. 149995 September 28, 2007
rule above referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of an inferior court.
ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA, Petitioner,
vs.
In People v. Buissan, 6 the Court also said:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

DECISION

. . . It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a criminal

case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty that is proper for a
crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as the evidence would
warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that the Court of First Instance would be acting
without jurisdiction if in a simple seduction case, it would impose penalty of not more than
six months of imprisonment, if said case, for the reason already adverted to, be held to fall
under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not a city or municipal
court. 7 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
7362 by P.D. No. 818 (prison mayor in its medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty
provided for the same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code (up to prision correccional in its minimum period).
Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial
Court, that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad
Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975).
But the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and
decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the
commission of the offense charged, should be the lower penalty originally provided for in
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. In other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818
would be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing
subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The Order
dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas
City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated September
17, 2001,1 affirming the September 23, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 91-5617 convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with
violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information which
reads as follows:
That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos to apply on
account or for the value the check described below:
Check No. : 326317PR
Drawn Against : Asian Savings Bank
Paseo de Roxas Branch
In the amount of : P590,000.00
Postdated : February 15, 1988
Payable to : Dr. Alex B. Carlos
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check when presented
for payment within (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or make
arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking days after receiving notice. 2

On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioners non-apprehension despite the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest.3 On June 27, 1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled and
set aside4 after petitioner posted the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5

Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987, petitioner and his
wife borrowed money from him in the amount of P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the
loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount in favor of the

2 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)

complainant.6 However, when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the
bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make
good the said dishonored check.7
Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an investment by
the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the subject check was not issued in
September 1987 to guarantee the payment of a loan since his checking account was opened
only on December 1, 1987.8 He claimed that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in
his favor allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership with the
necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was issued sometime in
February 1988,9 complainant knew that the same was not funded.10
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23, 1997 a
Decision11 finding petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana guilty as charged and
sentences him to a prison term of Six (6) months and to indemnify the private complainant the
sum of P590,000.00 plus legal interest from filing of this case until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts
decision in toto.12
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued as a guaranty for
the loan, thereby rejecting petitioners "investment theory". In ruling against the existence of a
partnership between them, the trial court noted that the so-called partnership venture, Palanas
General Merchandising, was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of
petitioner.13 The Court of Appeals also held that the act of lending money does not necessarily
amount to an investment of capital.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE LOWER
COURT DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF
THE SUBJECT ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A CONSIDERATION OR FOR
VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED WAS ONLY TRICKED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO
ISSUE THE SAID CHECK AS A MEANS OF BINDING THE ACCUSED TO RETURN HIS
INVESTMENT IN THE PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS THEN SUFFERING FROM
BUSINESS REVERSALS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME THE ACCUSED WAS ARRAIGNED ON JULY
25, 1995 R.A. 7691 EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT.14
3 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)
The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22; and 2)
whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the Regional Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action15 and not during the arraignment of the accused. The
Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that
time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 12916 which provides:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the latter.
xxxx
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more
than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment17 at the
discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the
Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. 18 The Metropolitan Trial Court
could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for offenses
punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.
The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court"19 on
June 15, 1994 cannot divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioners case. Where
a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is
construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its enactment.
Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases
that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication
can it be construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or
decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.20 The jurisdiction of the RTC over the
case attached upon the commencement of the action by the filing of the Information and could
not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts,
the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in nature. 21
After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioners conviction for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the
accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused
knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at the
time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for payment of such check. Consequently, when the check was presented for
payment, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he
received demand letters to pay the amount of the check from private complainant but he did not
comply with it.22
In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or value, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals upheld private complainants claim that the check was issued as a guaranty for
the loan and rejected petitioners "investment theory". The issue as to whether the amount of the
subject check represents the amount of the money loaned by private complainant to petitioner or
as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question involving the credibility of
witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the appellate court will not generally disturb the
findings of the lower court considering that it is in a better position to settle that issue since it had
the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct during the trial, which
circumstances carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In the present case, we see no
reason to reverse the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the
amount of the subject check was a loan and not an investment. 23
Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the
same was issued for valuable consideration, which may consist either in some right, interest,
profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment,
loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other
side. Since it was established that petitioner received money from private complainant in various
amounts,24 petitioner cannot now claim that the checks were not issued for value. 25
The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to potential suppliers is not a valid
defense. In Cueme v. People,26 the Court held thus:
The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be shown to prospective
investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a defense. The gravamen of the offense
punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad
check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and
inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is
whether the law has been breached. Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are
prohibited for reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal
intent are unavailing.
The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be encashed or deposited in a
bank, produce the same effect as ordinary checks. What the law punishes is the issuance of a
rubber check itself and not the purpose for which the check was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. This is not without good reasons. To determine the purpose
4 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)
as well as the terms and conditions for which checks are issued will greatly erode the faith the
public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring
about havoc in the trading and banking communities. Besides, the law does not make any
distinction as to the kind of checks which are the subject of its provisions, hence, no such
distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. What is important is the fact
that petitioner deliberately issued the checks in question and those checks were dishonored
upon presentment for payment.
Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of the petitioner.27
The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the subject check is likewise
immaterial.1wphi1 Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable Instruments Law, is the first
delivery of the check.28 In the case at bar, the Information alleged that the check was postdated
February 15, 1988 although issued in or about September 1987. During trial, petitioner testified
that the Checking Account was opened only on December 1, 1987 and that the check was
issued sometime in February 1988.
The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during
trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so
that it affects his substantial rights.29 In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the
issuance of the subject check is material since it forms part of the second element of the offense
that at the time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of funds. However, it cannot
be said that petitioner was prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised by it. Records show
that petitioner knew at the time he issued the check that he does not have sufficient funds in the
bank to cover the amount of the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the same claiming that the
same would only be shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid.
Moreover, there is no merit in petitioners allegation that private complainant knew that the check
is not funded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the subject check was
issued as guaranty for payment of the loan hence, was intended to apply for account or for
value. As such, it was incumbent upon petitioner to see to it that the check is duly covered when
presented for payment.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty of fine may be imposed in lieu of imprisonment
considering that the prosecution failed to prove or allege that petitioner is not a first-time
offender.30 Hence, in lieu of imprisonment, a fine of P200,000.00 shall be imposed upon
petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated
September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA guilty of violating Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay private
complainant the amount of P590,000.00, representing the value of the check, with six (6%)
percent interest from date of filing of the Information until the finality of the decision, the amount
of which, inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve percent (12%) interest, from finality of the
decision until fully paid. In lieu of imprisonment, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine
of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
 Exception, offenses under jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan: (Sec 4A, RA 8249)
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
5 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)
G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's resolution is a petition1 dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court that seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division),
dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts follow.
Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at
the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan
with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the
Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in
the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . The Information reads:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo
City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in relation to office, having
obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY
THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of
his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with
deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to
liquidate said cash advances of P33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss3 dated April 7, 2005 with the
Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an Order4 dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to
submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition5 to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005.
Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution6on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. The dispositive
portion of the said Resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the present petition.
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public
officials and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by
Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under
salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or
any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
but also for crimes committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the
Sandiganbayans appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,7 claiming that
the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases
where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) of
P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
In his Comment8 dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
was defined first, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the
paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it
has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public official
with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the accused is a public official below grade
27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of
P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves
offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public
official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan
could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.
In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan
and Amante9 is a case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the
earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were both members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only
difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand
Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-
Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00).
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 as a background
on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.11
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December
10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 12
6 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16,
1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be
applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed on or about December
19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained in
the earlier mentioned case,
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.13 The exception
contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R. A. No.
3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of
The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph
(a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense: x x x.14
Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses
and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved
where the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is
the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of
the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The present case
having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606,
as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
 (b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to
their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A.
Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter
must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those
that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same
law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of
7 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)
the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP
officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same
law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.15
Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the
law, respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding16 case wherein it was ruled that the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and which the
Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier
case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,17 that the Inding case did not categorically
nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense
charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly discussed:
x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that
the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its
disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where
offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4
(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials
enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to
their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to
those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had
ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with
the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no
personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he
not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense
committed in relation" to his office.18 Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et
al..,19 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided
it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b,
what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender
that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4. x x x
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,20 where the public official was charged with grave
threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during
a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected
with the discharge of petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public
respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his
official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that "accuseds
violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private
complainants attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or
angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech." Thus,
based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the case.1avvphi1
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against
respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said
offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been
to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan
could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations
of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on
the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in
relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction
apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public
office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses
and felonies involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies
were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the
meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach
of the term "offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office" by referring to the principle
laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which
was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v.
Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds office if
"the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the
crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that
"although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a
particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective offices
and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x"21
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with
8 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)
Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of
legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,22 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words.23 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. (Italics supplied.)24
With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and
Amante,25 the issue as to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
III. Hierarchy of Courts & Their Criminal Jurisdiction
B. Regional Trial Court
3. Special Courts and their jurisdiction over specific offenses or special penal
laws.
a. Family Courts (Sec 3 and 5(a)), RA 8369)
Section 3. Establishment of Family Courts. - There shall be established a Family Court in
every province and city in the country. In case where the city is the capital of the province, the
Family Court shall be established in the municipality which has the highest population.
Section 5. Jurisdiction offamily Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of
age but not less than nine (9) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age or
where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate
sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred.
The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to
Ptesidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code";
b. Special Criminal Courts
For Kidnapping, Robbery, Dangerous Drugs, Carnapping and Other Heinous Crimes
under RA 7659
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 51-96 May 3, 1996
RE: SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, DANGEROUS DRUGS,
CARNAPPING AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES UNDER R.A. NO. 7659
Pursuant to Sec. 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in the interest of speedy and efficient
administration of justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter set forth, the following Regional
Trial Court branches are hereby designated to exclusively try and decide cases of KIDNAPPING
AND/OR KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED
AGAINST A BANKING OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS
DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF MUNTINLUPA CITY (1 Branch)
1972, AS AMENDED, AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES defined and penalized under Rep. Act 34. Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, presided over by RTC JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO
No. 7659, committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions:
VALENZUELA (1 Branch)
35. Branch 171, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, presided over by RTC JUDGE ADRIANO R.
MANILA (6 Branches)
OSORIO
1. Branch 11, Manila, presided over by RTC JUDGE ROBERTO A. BARRIOS
2. Branch 18, Manila, presided over by RTC JUDGE PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR.
BAGUIO CITY (1 Branch)
3. Branch 27, Manila, presided over by RTC JUDGE EDGARDO P. CRUZ
36. Branch 6, Baguio City, presided over by RTC JUDGE RUBEN C. AYSON
4. Branch 41, Manila, presided over by RTC JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA
5. Branch 53, Manila, presided over by RTC JUDGE MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR.
CABANATUAN CITY (1 Branch)
6. Branch 54, Manila, presided over by RTC JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO
37. Branch 27, Cabanatuan City, presided over by RTC JUDGE FELICIANO V.
BUENAVENTURA
QUEZON CITY (6 Branches)
7. Branch 76, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE MONINA A. ZENAROSA
OLONGAPO CITY (1 Branch)
8. Branch 86, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY
38. Branch 75, Olongapo City, presided over by RTC JUDGE LEOPOLDO T. CALDERON, JR.
9. Branch 95, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
10. Branch 102, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE PERLITA TRIATIRONA
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY (1 Branch)
11. Branch 103, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR.
39. Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City, presided over by RTC JUDGE FILOMENO A. VERGARA
12. Branch 219, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE JOSE C. MENDOZA
LEGASPI CITY (1 Branch)
PASAY CITY (4 Branches)
40. Branch 3, Legaspi City, presided over by RTC JUDGE WENCESLAO R. VILLANUEVA, JR.
13. Branch 109, Pasay City, presided over by RTC JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ
14. Branch 110, Pasay City, presided over by RTC JUDGE PORFIRIO G. MACARAEG
AKLAN (1 Branch)
15. Branch 114, Pasay City, presided over by RTC JUDGE VICENTE L. YAP
41. Branch 3, Kalibo, presided over by RTC JUDGE SHEILA M. CORTEZ
16. Branch 116, Pasay City, presided over by RTC JUDGE ALFREDO J. GUSTILO
ROXAS CITY (1 Branch)
KALOOKAN CITY (3 Branches)
42. Branch 19, Roxas City, presided over by RTC JUDGE SERGIO L. PESTANO
17. Branch 127, Kalookan City, presided over by RTC JUDGE MYRNA D. VIDAL
18. Branch 128, Kalookan City, presided over by RTC JUDGE SILVESTRE H. BELLO, JR.
ILOILO CITY (2 Branches)
19. Branch 129, Kalookan City, presided over by RTC JUDGE BAYANI S. RIVERA
43. Branch 23, Iloilo City, presided over by RTC JUDGE TITO G. GUSTILO
44. Branch 35, Iloilo City, presided over by RTC JUDGE SEVERINO C. AGUILAR
MAKATI CITY (4 Branches)
20. Branch 62, Makati City, presided over by RTC JUDGE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO
BACOLOD CITY (3 Branches)
21. Branch 66, Makati City, presided over by RTC JUDGE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO
45. Branch 42, Bacolod City, presided over by RTC JUDGE BERNARDO T. PONFERRADA
22. Branch 138, Makati City, presided over by RTC JUDGE SIXTO C. MARELLA
46. Branch 44, Bacolod City, presided over by RTC JUDGE ANASTACIO I. LOBATON
23. Branch 143, Makati City, presided over by JUDGE DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO
47. Branch 47, Bacolod City, presided over by RTC JUDGE EDGAR G. GARVILLES
PASIG CITY (6 Branches)
CEBU CITY (3 Branches)
24. Branch 156, Pasig City, presided over by RTC JUDGE MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
48. Branch 24, Cebu City, presided over by RTC JUDGE PRISCILA S. AGANA
25. Branch 163, Pasig City, presided over by RTC JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE
49. Branch 14, Cebu City, presided over by RTC JUDGE RENATO C. DACUDAO
26. Branch 166, Pasig City, presided over by RTC JUDGE JESUS G. BERSAMIRA
50. Branch 18, Cebu City, presided over by RTC JUDGE GALICIANO C. ARRIESGADO
27. Branch 262, Pasig City, presided over by RTC JUDGE GREGORY S. ONG
28. Branch 265, Pasig City, presided over by RTC JUDGE EDWIN A. VILLASOR
TACLOBAN CITY (1 Branch)
51. Branch 6, Tacloban City, presided over by RTC JUDGE GETULIO M. FRANCISCO
MALABON (2 Branches)
29. Branch 72, Malabon, presided over by RTC JUDGE BENJAMIN M. AQUINO, JR.
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY (3 Branches)
30. Branch 170, Malabon, presided over by RTC JUDGE BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO
52. Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by RTC JUDGE NOLI T. CATLI
53. Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by RTC JUDGE NAZAR U. CHAVEZ
MARIKINA (1 Branch)
54. Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by RTC JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS
31. Branch 272, Marikina, Metro Manila, presided over by RTC JUDGE REUBEN P. DELA
CRUZ
DAVAO CITY (2 Branches)
55. Branch 15, Davao City, presided over by RTC JUDGE JESUS R. QUITAIN
PARAAQUE (1 Branch)
56. Branch 17, Davao City, presided over by RTC JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES
32. Branch 259, Paranaque, Metro Manila, presided over by RTC JUDGE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO

LAS PIAS (1 Branch) When the offense is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of these courts, a party may
33. Branch 272, Las Pinas, presided over by RTC JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA immediately petition the Supreme Court for change of venue if it is desired that these cases be
tried in these courts.

9 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)

The following guidelines shall be observed:
1. These cases shall undergo mandatory continuous trial but shall be terminated within
sixty (60) days from initial trial. Judgment thereon shall be rendered within thirty (30) days
from the time the case is submitted for decision unless a shorter period is otherwise
provided by law.
No postponement or continuance shall be allowed except for clearly meritorious reasons. The
filing of motions or pleadings for dilatory purposes shall constitute direct contempt and shall be
accordingly penalized.
2. All cases covered by this Order where trial has already commenced shall continue to be
heard by the branches to which these were originally assigned.
3. The Executive Judges concerned shall exclude the designated Special Criminal Courts
from the raffle of other civil and criminal cases whenever in their judgment the caseload of
these courts shall prevent them from conducting daily trials of the special cases herein
specified.
The Branches thus designated shall continue to perform the functions of Special Criminal Courts
even after the retirement, transfer, or detail of the incumbent judges herein named. Their
successors, whether permanent or temporary, shall act as Presiding Judges of these special
courts unless the Court directs otherwise.
This Order amends and supersedes Adm. Order No. 173-94 dated 28 September 1994.
This Order shall take effect immediately.
3 May 1996.
c. Environmental Courts (AO 23-2008)
4. Appellate jurisdiction of RTC (Sec 2(a), 3(a), Rule 122)
Section 2. Where to appeal. The appeal may be taken as follows:
(a) To the Regional Trial Court, in cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court;
Section 3. How appeal taken.
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
B. The Sandiganbayan (The Anti-Graft Court):
2. Jurisdiction Over Person Public Officer:
(1) Grade 27 and above
10 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department
heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
Member of Sanguniang Panglungsod with Salary Grade 27
People v Sandiganbayan & Plaza (refer to Page 5)
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP,
IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further
defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs,
are as follows:
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by
Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and
Garchitorena dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered
the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher.

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that
Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a
the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of
spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
the accused.
City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by
Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was
composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner- While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of
intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill
Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and
Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 84412 (sponsored by Senator
Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the
Romeo Acop. Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what
actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President
Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal
liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14 denying the
finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation. 1
motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution
dated May 8, 1996."
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified
the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against
On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997
twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation
Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt.
Ricardo de Leon.
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but
before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in
enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5,
eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while
1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same
are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for
informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting
opinion.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4
xxx xxx xxx

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
informations 5before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory,
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and
together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused 6 was
that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has been issued
dropped from the case.
this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic
neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the
Act No. 7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)
cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade
(SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or
higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7
a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which
trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:

11 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)

 a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees
due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as
Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident may be determined by law.
involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may
have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in
the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
Article XI, Section 4:

b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit the
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial had not
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer
be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should
try them, thus making it an ex post factolegislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the
an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due process. Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order,
were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D. No.
1860, 24 P.D. No. 1861, 25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest amendments
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions
introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following
in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law
cases:
(RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of
statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. 17
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No.
8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the cases involving:
Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their
case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated
as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II
acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support the time of the commission of the offense:
of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both
the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question
of whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057
sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those
who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present
case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.

12 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)

 (f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
their office.
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
"27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
Blg. 129, as amended.
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department
heads;
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar
nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the rank;
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules
that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from
the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986. corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with (2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned or Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

13 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)

 (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final
judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying
positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with
the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in
the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word
"accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was
deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads
over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975,
argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject
criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank
of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the
Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in
certain cases, 29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense
14 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)
committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
(b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued
in 1986 (sequestration cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public
official or employee 32 holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and
(3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a
felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional
offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to
"other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to
their office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of
murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under
said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or
rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the
same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public
officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A.
8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention
the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete
evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the
entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department
as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party
who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. 34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those
pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and
whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the
law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence
against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted
their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the
power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it
can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect
pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision.
Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a
different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4
provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory
provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors'
argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory
provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It
just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover,
those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under
Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is
perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya 38 for their
participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator
had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner
further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected
from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in
paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A.
8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and
by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of
Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during
the committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an
otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed
necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which
one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its
plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to
appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law 41 for they are deprived of their
right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they
had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
Bull, 42 an ex post factolaw is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the
defendant. 43
15 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation
of a person to his disadvantage. 44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes
a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of a amnesty. 45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law.
It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of
the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or those
that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment.48 R.A 7975, which
amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural
statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds
can properly administer justice. 49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249
cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they
acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The
same contention has already been rejected by the court several times 50 considering that the
right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The
mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition
against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely
an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete
out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. 52Moreover, the law did not
alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be
made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. 54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to
review questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme
Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been
convincing overcome. 56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The
expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not
have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of
the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the
title57 is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related
to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally interpreted
and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject
(involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended)
and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. 59 The Congress, in
employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section 2, Article
VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of various courts. 60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4
and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249,
we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the
Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case
against herein petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition
must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or informations, 61 and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the
trial. 62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under
Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have
jurisdiction over it. 63 This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of
the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over
criminal cases committed by the public officers and employees, including those in goverment-
owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law." This
constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section
4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now
or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was
committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to
the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. 65 This intimate relation
between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
informations." 66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily
in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of the facts." 67The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. 68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S.
v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused with such a
descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and second to
avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether
16 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)
they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that the
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is
made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he
is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense." 70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended
informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual
averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the
discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses
CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR
INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P.
ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF
SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR
INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and
PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO
F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B.
CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members
of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their
public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully
unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP,
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR.,
SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN,
INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and
members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact
for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that
 there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville City as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated
Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995. Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence thereof.

CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed
the crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of
facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not
indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while
in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as
among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged
therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others,
falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused
herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May
18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused"
surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one
of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly
conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the
immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the
principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and
shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is
the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in
relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate
connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier
discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused
because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held
their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime thus,
there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court
below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed
the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused
for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and
detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose they shot; and killed the said
victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control,
and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in
relation to public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said
phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the
specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the
discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to
qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, 73 not the Sandiganbayan.

The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office
Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not
murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over
sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would
the said cases.1wphi1.nt
show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official
duties.
SO ORDERED.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the
Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or

information and not by the result of evidence after trial.

In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged

Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special
policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and
then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision
and control where his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal complaints
and conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to
arrest and detain person without due process of law and without bringing them to the
proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan

17 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)

Private persons in conspiracy with public officer in conspiracy with the Mayor though not
an accountable officer:
G.R. Nos. 161784-86. April 26, 2005
DINAH C. BARRIGA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH DIVISION) and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the
Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27435 to 27437 denying the motion to
quash the Informations filed by one of the accused, Dinah C. Barriga, and the Resolution
denying her motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
On April 3, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for the
admission of the three Amended Informations appended thereto. The first Amended Information
docketed as Criminal Case No. 27435, charged petitioner Dinah C. Barriga and Virginio E.
Villamor, the Municipal Accountant and the Municipal Mayor, respectively, of Carmen, Cebu,
with malversation of funds. The accusatory portion reads:
That in or about January 1996 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality
of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR and DINAH C.
BARRIGA, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Accountant,
respectively, of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their possession and
custody public funds amounting to TWENTY- THREE THOUSAND FORTY-SEVEN AND
20/100 PESOS (P23,047.20), Philippine Currency, intended for the payment of Five (5)
rolls of Polyethylene pipes to be used in the Corte-Cantumog Water System Project of the
Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, for which they are accountable by reason of the duties of
their office, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, take, embezzle and convert into their own
personal use and benefit said amount of P23,047.20, and despite demands made upon
them to account for said amount, they have failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The inculpatory portion of the second Amended Information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
27436, charging the said accused with illegal use of public funds, reads:
That in or about the month of November 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, above-named accused VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR and
18 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)
DINAH C. BARRIGA, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal
Accountant, respectively, of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their
possession and control public funds in the amount of ONE THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED FIVE PESOS (P1,305.00) Philippine Currency, representing a portion of the
Central Visayas Water and Sanitation Project Trust Fund (CVWSP Fund) intended and
appropriated for the projects classified under Level I and III particularly the construction of
Deep Well and Spring Box for Level I projects and construction of water works system for
Level III projects of specified barangay beneficiaries/recipients, and for which fund
accused are accountable by reason of the duties of their office, in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did then and there, willfully unlawfully and feloniously disburse
and use said amount of P1,305.00 for the Spring Box of Barangay Natimao-an, Carmen,
Cebu, a barangay which was not included as a recipient of CVWSP Trust Fund, thus,
accused used said public fund to a public purpose different from which it was intended or
appropriated, to the damage and prejudice of the government, particularly the barangays
which were CVWSP Trust Fund beneficiaries.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The accusatory portion of the third Amended Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27437,
charged the same accused with illegal use of public funds, as follows:
That in or about the month of January 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused Virginio E. Villamor and Dinah
C. Barriga, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Accountant,
respectively, of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their possession and
control public funds in the amount of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN and 96/100 (P267,537.96) PESOS, representing a portion of
the Central Visayas Water and Sanitation Project Trust Fund (CVWSP Fund), intended and
appropriated for the projects classified under Level I and Level III, particularly the
construction of Spring Box and Deep Well for Level I projects and construction of water
works system for Level III projects of specified barangay beneficiaries/ recipients, and for
which fund accused are accountable by reason for the duties of their office, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously disburse and use said amount of P267,537.96 for the construction and
expansion of Barangay Cantucong Water System, a project falling under Level II of
CVWSP, thus, accused used said public funds to a public purpose different from which it
was intended and appropriated, to the damage and prejudice of the
government, particularly the barangay beneficiaries of Levels I and III of CVWSP.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and admitted the Amended Informations. The petitioner
filed a Motion to Quash the said Amended Informations on the ground that under Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8294, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged. She
averred that the Amended Informations failed to allege and show the intimate relation between
the crimes charged and her official duties as municipal accountant, which are conditions sine
qua non for the graft court to acquire jurisdiction over the said offense. She averred that the
prosecution and the Commission on Audit admitted, and no less than this Court held in Tan v.
Sandiganbayan,5that a municipal accountant is not an accountable officer. She alleged that the
felonies of malversation and illegal use of public funds, for which she is charged, are not
included in Chapter 11, Section 2, Title VII, Book II, of the Revised Penal Code; hence, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the said crimes. Moreover, her position as municipal
accountant is classified as Salary Grade (SG) 24.
The petitioner also posited that although the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that based on the allegations of the Amended
committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office, the mere allegation in the Informations and Rep. Act No. 8249, it has original jurisdiction over the crimes of malversation
Amended Informations that she committed the offenses charged in relation to her office is not and illegal use of public funds charged in the Amended Informations subject of this petition.
sufficient as the phrase is merely a conclusion of law; controlling are the specific factual
allegations in the Informations that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of
Rep. Act No. 8249,13 which amended Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides, inter
her official duties and the commission of the offenses charged. To bolster her stance, she cited
alia, that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by
the rulings of this Court in People v. Montejo,6 Soller v. Sandiganbayan,7 and Lacson v.
public officers and employees, at least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories
Executive Secretary.8 She further contended that although the Amended Informations alleged
thereunder enumerated at the time of the commission of such crimes. 14 There are two classes of
that she conspired with her co-accused to commit the crimes charged, they failed to allege and
public office-related crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249: first,
show her exact participation in the conspiracy and how she committed the crimes charged. She
those crimes or felonies in which the public office is a constituent element as defined by statute
also pointed out that the funds subject of the said Amended Informations were not under her
and the relation between the crime and the offense is such that, in a legal sense, the offense
control or administration.
committed cannot exist without the office;15 second, such offenses or felonies which are
intimately connected with the public office and are perpetrated by the public officer or employee
On October 9, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution9 denying the motion of the while in the performance of his official functions, through improper or irregular conduct. 16
petitioner. The motion for reconsideration thereof was, likewise, denied, with the graft court
holding that the applicable ruling of this Court was Montilla v. Hilario,10 i.e., that an offense is
The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes and felonies
committed in relation to public office when there is a direct, not merely accidental, relation
under the first classification. Considering that the public office of the accused is by statute a
between the crime charged and the office of the accused such that, in a legal sense, the offense
constituent element of the crime charged, there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in the
would not exist without the office; in other words, the office must be a constituent element of the
Information specific factual allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime charged,
crime as defined in the statute. The graft court further held that the offices of the municipal
or that the accused committed the crime in the performance of his duties. However, the
mayor and the municipal accountant were constituent elements of the felonies of malversation
Sandiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes or felonies
and illegal use of public funds. The graft court emphasized that the rulings of this Court
committed by the public officers and employees enumerated in Section (a) (1) to (5) under the
in People v. Montejo11 and Lacson v. Executive Secretary12 apply only where the office held by
second classification if the Information contains specific factual allegations showing the intimate
the accused is not a constituent element of the crimes charged. In such cases, the Information
connection between the offense charged and the public office of the accused, and the discharge
must contain specific factual allegations showing that the commission of the crimes charged is
of his official duties or functions - whether improper or irregular.17 The requirement is not
intimately connected with or related to the performance of the accused public officers public
complied with if the Information merely alleges that the accused committed the crime charged in
functions. In fine, the graft court opined, the basic rule is that enunciated by this Court in Montilla
relation to his office because such allegation is merely a conclusion of law. 18
v. Hilario, and the ruling of this Court in People v. Montejo is the exception.

Two of the felonies that belong to the first classification are malversation defined and penalized
The petitioner thus filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and the illegal use of public funds or property defined
seeking to nullify the aforementioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner claims
and penalized by Article 220 of the same Code. The public office of the accused is a constituent
that the graft court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
element in both felonies.
jurisdiction in issuing the same.

For the accused to be guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following essential
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Special Prosecutor averred that the remedy of
elements:
filing a petition for certiorari, from a denial of a motion to quash amended information, is
improper. It posits that any error committed by the Sandiganbayan in denying the petitioners
motion to quash is merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It asserts that as ruled by (a) The offender is a public officer;
the Sandiganbayan, what applies is the ruling of this Court in Montilla v. Hilario and not People
v. Montejo. Furthermore, the crimes of malversation and illegal use of public funds are classified
as crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, which by their nature fall within (b) He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It insists that there is no more need for the Amended
Informations to specifically allege intimacy between the crimes charged and the office of the (c) The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable;
accused since the said crimes can only be committed by public officers. It further claims that the and
petitioner has been charged of malversation and illegal use of public funds in conspiracy with
Municipal Mayor Virginio E. Villamor, who occupies a position classified as SG 27; and even if
the petitioners position as municipal accountant is only classified as SG 24, under Section 4 of (d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
Rep. Act No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction over the said crimes. The Office of abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or
the Special Prosecutor further avers that the petitioners claim, that she is not an accountable property.19
officer, is a matter of defense.
For the accused to be guilty of illegal use of public funds or property, the prosecution is
The Ruling of the Court burdened to prove the following elements:

The petition has no merit. (1) The offenders are accountable officers in both crimes.

19 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)

 (2) The offender in illegal use of public funds or property does not derive any personal gain Penal Code. Indeed, under the said article, an accountable public officer is one who has actual
or profit; in malversation, the offender in certain cases profits from the proceeds of the control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. Even then, it cannot
crime. thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant can never be convicted for
malversation under the Revised Penal Code. The name or relative importance of the office or
employment is not the controlling factor.24 The nature of the duties of the public officer or
(3) In illegal use, the public fund or property is applied to another public use; in
employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to
malversation, the public fund or property is applied to the personal use and benefit of the
account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not malversation is
offender or of another person.20
committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or
municipal government may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public
We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the public office of the accused Municipal funds and misappropriates the same.
Mayor Virginio E. Villamor is a constituent element of malversation and illegal use of public funds
or property. Accused mayors position is classified as SG 27. Since the Amended Informations
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
alleged that the petitioner conspired with her co-accused, the municipal mayor, in committing the
petitioner.
said felonies, the fact that her position as municipal accountant is classified as SG 24 and as
such is not an accountable officer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan still has exclusive
original jurisdiction over the cases lodged against her. It must be stressed that a public officer SO ORDERED.
who is not in charge of public funds or property by virtue of her official position, or even a private
individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if such public
officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation
or illegal use of public funds or property.

In United States v. Ponte,21 the Court, citing Viada, had the occasion to state:

Shall the person who participates or intervenes as co-perpetrator, accomplice or abettor in the
crime of malversation of public funds, committed by a public officer, have the penalties of this
article also imposed upon him? In opposition to the opinion maintained by some jurists and
commentators (among others the learned Pacheco) we can only answer the question
affirmatively, for the same reasons (mutatis mutandis) we have already advanced in Question I
of the commentary on article 314. French jurisprudence has also settled the question in the
same way on the ground that the person guilty of the crime necessarily aids the other culprit in
the acts which constitute the crime." (Vol. 2, 4th edition, p. 653)

The reasoning by which Groizard and Viada support their views as to the correct interpretation of
the provisions of the Penal Code touching malversation of public funds by a public official, is
equally applicable in our opinion, to the provisions of Act No. 1740 defining and penalizing that
crime, and we have heretofore, in the case of the United States vs. Dowdell (11 Phil. Rep., 4),
imposed the penalty prescribed by this section of the code upon a public official who took part
with another in the malversation of public funds, although it was not alleged, and in fact clearly
appeared, that those funds were not in his hands by virtue of his office, though it did appear that
they were in the hands of his co-principal by virtue of the public office held by him.22

The Court has also ruled that one who conspires with the provincial treasurer in committing six
counts of malversation is also a co-principal in committing those offenses, and that a private
person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of
malversation.23

We reiterate that the classification of the petitioners position as SG 24 is of no moment. The

determinative fact is that the position of her co-accused, the municipal mayor, is classified as SG
27, and under the last paragraph of Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, if the position of one of the
principal accused is classified as SG 27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the offense.

We agree with the petitioners contention that under Section 474 of the Local Government Code,
she is not obliged to receive public money or property, nor is she obligated to account for the
same; hence, she is not an accountable officer within the context of Article 217 of the Revised

20 |Criminal Procedure Fronteras, Lianne Carmeli B. (070317)