CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 1
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW - MANILA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES
ARTICLE III Bill of Rights
SECTION 2
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
PEOPLE vs. MARTI
Provision on Searches and Seizures as worded in the 1935
Philippine Constitution
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
Source of the provision on Searches and Seizures
derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United
States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the
pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Exclusionary Rule
Inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and
seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted
in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the
admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its
seizure.
Is the exclusionary rule still the prevailing doctrine until today?
YES
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule
and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation
of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The peculiarity of the case at bar in relation to private persons
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since
the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without
the intervention and participation of State authorities.
Under this peculiarity, can the accused/appellant validly claim that
his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure
has been violated?
NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
Is governmental interference necessary? YES
This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and
seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or
alien, from interference by government, included in which is his
residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies
of his life. . . .
Can the object seized by a private person, absent any governmental
interference, be used against the appellant? YES
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why
the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.
Does the presence of the NBI convert the situation into a
warrantless search? NO
the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is
open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not
search.
To whom do we need protection by invoking our fundamental
liberties and rights? THE STATE
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state.
The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and
the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between
a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does
is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible
to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas ,
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17,
1986; Emphasis supplied)
What must be secured if the search is upon request of law
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enforcers? WARRANT
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality.
However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes,
as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities,
the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked
for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Modification introduced in the 1987 Constitution
For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern
relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized
that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2,
Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof.
The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the
restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is
directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to
anyone else.
To what applies the admissibility of evidence procured privately?
admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected
through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged
violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional
rights to privacy and communication.

STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
Two major groups of seized documents and papers in this case
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
First Group
Petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made
in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless
of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of
them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be.
Petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of those seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to
the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may
not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity.
Objection to unreasonable search and seizure is purely personal
It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by
the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties.
Government possession of those belonging to the corporation VS.
personal defendants
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers
belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect
the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and
thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were
the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants.
Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be
raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a
seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose
homes had not been disturbed.
Second Group
two (2) important questions need be settled, namely:
(1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches
and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or
not, and
(2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.
Two points to be stressed in connection with the constitutional
provision on Search and Seizure
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 2
Warrant alleges no specific offense
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural
and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws.
Evil to be remedied by the constitutional provision
This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It
is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political
strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest
it, even though by legal means.
Amendment of Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
Court
"a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the
Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall
issue for more than one specific offense."
Exclusion of evidence according to Judge Learned Hand
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence
competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
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exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.
Wolf Case and purpose of exclusionary rule
In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could
not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege,
namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been
forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is
to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.
Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by
removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
Conclusions of the case as summarized in Justice Castros
concurring and dissenting opinion
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of
Investigation in this case are general warrants and are
therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of
section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority
of the said search warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs.
People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the
petitioners are expressly declared null and void the searches

and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and
the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against
the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said
residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings
satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to
move for the suppression of the documents, papers and
effects seized in the places other than the three residences
adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the
such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the
searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
J. Castros dissent RE legal standing of the petitioners to object
That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal
standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects
seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in
any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the
search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures
made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing
the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and
seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn
from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of
it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the
lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the
pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite
legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents,
papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family
residences.
Summary of US cases on standing to move for the suppression of
those obtained through unreasonable seizure
(a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives
"standing;"
(b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or
constructive of premises searched gives "standing"; and
(c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant
and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily"
directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved
person," gives "standing."
Aggrieved Person Doctrine
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for
reargument; the United States did not appeal from this decision. The
factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present
petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were
seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as
in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY
AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of
documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In
the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is
much closer than in Birrell.
MANTARING vs. JUDGE ROMAN
Requisites of Search Warrant in Criminal Procedure
In the case of search warrants, the determination is based on the finding
that
(1) the articles to be seized are connected to a criminal activity
and
(2) they are found in the place to be searched. It is not necessary
that a particular person be implicated.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 3
On the other hand, in arrest cases, the determination of probable cause
is based on a finding that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
Requirements for issuance of warrant of arrest
It is now settled that in issuing warrants of arrest in preliminary
investigations, the investigating judge must:
(a) have examined in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and
answers;
(b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and
(c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Complainant may be proceeded even though not included in search
warrant
To begin with, it cannot be contended that complainant Leovigildo
Mantaring, Sr. could not be proceeded against simply because he was
not included in the search warrant issued against Gamo and Leovigildo
Mantaring, Jr., who is apparently his son. The determination of
probable cause in preliminary investigations is based solely on the
evidence presented by the complainant, regardless of whether or not
the respondent in that case is named in the proceedings for a search
warrant. As correctly pointed out by, the OCA, the issuance of a search
warrant and of a warrant of arrest requires the showing of probabilities
as to different facts.
Determination of Probable cause
The framers of the Constitution confined the determination of probable
cause as basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants
to judges the better to secure the people against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
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Failure of the respondent judge
Respondent judge failed to live up to this expectation by refusing to
inhibit himself even when his very impartiality was in question and
worse by issuing a warrant of arrest without determining whether or
not it was justified by the need to prevent a frustration of the ends of
justice.
SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR
Phrasing of the provision from the 1973 Constitution to 1987
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and
the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue
warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law,"
has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
Exclusive and the personal responsibility of the issuing judge
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of

supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be
unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
SILVA vs. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, NEGROS ORIENTAL
Purpose of the constitutional provision against unreasonable
searches and seizures
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches
and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and
property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers
of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give
remedy against such usurpations when attempted.
Requisites of the issuance of search warrant according to the Rules
of Court
Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the
judge must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there
is probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses
through searching questions and answers.
Definition of Probable Cause
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched". This probable cause must be shown to be
within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he
may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
Mere generalization would not suffice
The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search
warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a
cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. Mere
generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements or
probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.
Asking leading questions in a deposition
Citing Prudente case: Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt.
Florencio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. Respondent
Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and
answers". On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they
called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs.
NBI, "the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the
applicant's witness' are not sufficiently searching to establish probable
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 4
cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application
for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner,
would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant.
A judge must comply with the constitutional and statutory
requirement
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with
the constitutional and statutory requirement that he must determine the
existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and
his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His
failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077,
June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the capricious disregard by the judge
in not complying with the requirements before issuance of search
warrants constitutes abuse of discretion".
Pertinent ruling of the Supreme Court
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their
authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is
highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named
as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the
seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and
joints, and that the search warrant was issued for the seizure of
personal property (a) subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to
be used as means of committing an offense and NOT for personal
property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense.
Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion
when he rejected the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the
return of her seized money.
MORANO vs. VIVO
Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940
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Squarely put in issue by petitioners is the constitutionality of Section
37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940, which reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated
by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien:
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any
limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a
nonimmigrant.
Petitioners argue that the legal precept just quoted trenches upon the
constitutional mandate in Section 1 (3), Article III [Bill of Rights] of
the Constitution.
Judicial Intervention in the execution of final order of deportation
is not required
Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not
require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of
deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional
limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial
power4 as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or
proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a
measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent
official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

Congress has the power to order deportation
It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the
deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful.
Owing to the nature of the proceeding, the deportation of an alien who
is found in this country in violation of law is not a deprivation of liberty
without due process of law. This is so, although the inquiry devolves
upon executive officers, and their findings of fact, after a fair though
summary hearing, are made conclusive.
The issue of probable cause does not extend to deportation
proceedings
In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3),
Article III of the Constitution aforesaid, requiring that the issue of
probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings.
HARVEY vs. SANTIAGO
Constitutional provision also applicable to aliens
There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether
accused of crime or not (Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948].
One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or
warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. Probable
cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances
antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are
sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance
thereof." (People vs. Syjuco 64 Phil. 667 [1937]; Alverez vs. CFI, 64
Phil. 33 [1937]).
Requisites of Arrest Warrant effected by a peace officer and/or
private individual
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest
wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private
person
(1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and
(2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5).
Arrest in the case at bar is upon probable cause
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause
determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which
period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs
and posters without warrant.
Restraint against their persons is legal
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid
at its inception, the records show that formal deportation charges have
been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988.
Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March 1988 "for
violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section
69 of the Administrative Code." A hearing is presently being
conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their
persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its purpose.
The process of the law is being followed "were a person's detention
was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases
subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition for hebeas
corpus becomes moot and academic. "It is a fumdamental rule that a
writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or
has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the
beginning.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 5
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest by the Commissioner of
Immigration
The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G. R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24
SCRA 155) that "the issuance of warrants of arrest by the
Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and
before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph
3, Section I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to the 1935
Constitution) 3 is not invocable herein. Respondent Commissioner's
Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to
appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They were
issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code."
Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against
them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step
preliminary to their possible deportation.
What is essential in deportation?
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the
alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be
conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired,
and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.
SALAZAR vs. ACHACOSO
THE CASE: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary
of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the
Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
Mayors cannot issue warrant of arrest and search warrants
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been
described is the state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law
has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the
power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of
arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by
the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date
of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitutions proscription has thereby been manifested that
thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing,
on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be
validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the
elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the
counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from
judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of
arrest or search warrants.
A mere prosecuting body cannot issue the same as well
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force
exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that
ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to
determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or
search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the
success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he
stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To
permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is
to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither.
That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No.
1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.

Secretary of Labor may no longer issue the same
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no
longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38,
paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and
effect.
On Deportation Cases
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo is not
well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69
of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the
Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest
(of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly
authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of
deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized
supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs.
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation
is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be
made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the
Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Guiding Principles of the Case
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following
principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is
only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest
and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner
of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order
of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
ALVAREZ vs. CFI
What is a search warrant?
A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People
of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace,
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the court (section 95, General Orders. No.
58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886).
Important and essential rights of the citizen
Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security,
and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and
papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to
search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.
How to construe statutes authorizing search and seizure?
As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his
constitutional right is one of the highest duties and privileges of the
court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal
construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to
prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the
rights secured by them. Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the
general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search
warrants must be strictly construed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 6
Test of sufficiency of an affidavit
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and
affiant be held liable for damages caused.
Unreasonable search and seizure has no fixed meaning
Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the
constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable
search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General
Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable
meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All
illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are
reasonable.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure?
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any
particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of
the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched,
and the character of the articles procured.
Presentation of Depositions
Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is
of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be
presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit
of the latter. The purpose of both [affidavit of the complainant and
deposition in writing) in requiring the presentation of depositions is
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nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence
of probable cause.
What will happen if the affidavit of the complainant is already
sufficient?
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient,
the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the
affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the
duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for
the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant
the issuance of the search warrant.
Two Conditions:
1. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it
is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable
cause;
2. when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay,
the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal
knowledge of the fact is necessary.
In the case at bar: The warrant issued is likewise illegal.
For search to be made at night
Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be
made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As we
have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued
exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is
equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at
night.

Particular Description VS. Technical Description
Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section
97 of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented,
which shall serve as the basis for determining whether probable cause
exist and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a
particular description of the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly
complied with; but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather generally, it is not required that a technical
description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue.
Can the seized books and documents be effected for the purpose of
obtaining evidence to be used in a criminal case? NO
The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for
the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the
person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional
because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a
violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of
an accused to testify against himself.
Summary of the cases conclusions
(1) That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders,
No. 58, relative to search and seizure, should be given a
liberal construction in favor of the individual in order to
maintain the constitutional guaranties whole and in their full
force;
(2) That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form
and fundamentally restrict the enjoyment of the ownership,
possession and use of the personal property of the individual,
they should be strictly construed;
(3) That the search and seizure made are illegal for the
following reasons:
(a) Because the warrant was based solely upon the affidavit
of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts
of probable cause, and
(b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of
seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal
proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner,
for violation of the Anti-Usury Law;
(4) That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as
it does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles
were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place
indicated, neither could the search and seizure be made at
night;
(5) That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of
witnesses to corroborate the applicant or a complainant in
cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts,
when the applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the facts
is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require
affidavits of other witnesses so that he may determine
whether probable cause exists;
(6) That a detailed description of the person and place to be
searched and the articles to be seized is necessary, but
whereby, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their
description must be rather general, but is not required that
a technical description be given, as this would mean that
no warrant could issue;
(7) That the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights
because the offer of compromise or settlement attributed to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 7
him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated
the search and seizure; and
(8) That an appeal from the orders questioned by the
petitioner, if taken by him, would not be an effective, speedy
or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and,
consequently, the petition for mandamus filed by him, lies.
MATA vs. BAYONA
Requisites of issuance of search warrant
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the
constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that
the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath
or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and
take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Written deposition is necessary
Before issuing a search warrant, the examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, and to hold liable for
perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations
are false. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus
not sufficient.
No deposition in writing in the case at bar
The judges insistence that she examined the complainants under oath
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has become dubious by petitioners claim that at the particular time
when he examined all the relevant papers connected with the issuance
of the questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same from the
lower court since they were not attached to the records, he did not find
any certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the complainants.
Before he filed his motion to quash the search warrant and for the
return of the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his request,
certified true copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but
which certified true copies do not bear any certification at the back.
Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of the said joint affidavit
obtained at the outset of this case does not show also the certification
of respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by
respondent Judges own admission, while insisting that she did
examine thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not take the deposition
of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold a
judicial proceeding which will be open and public", such that,
according to her, the persons subject of the intended raid will just
disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else. Could it be
that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the
warrant? Be that as it may, there was no "deposition in writing"
attached to the records of the case in palpable disregard of the statutory
prohibition heretofore quoted.
Deposition: How Taken?
The searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search
warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the
discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a
reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and
that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers
particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation which
must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the

secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or
investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit
the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be
in writing.
Why are the seized things in the case at bar cannot be returned?
While the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized
cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan (70 SCRA 478), it was held
that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of
the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.
PEOPLE vs. DEL ROSARIO
Buy bust operation
The record is devoid of any reason why the police officers did not make
any attempt to arrest accused-appellant at the time he allegedly sold
shabu to Veneracion Luna who has accompanied by another police
officer. That was the opportune moment to arrest accused-appellant.
The version foisted by the prosecution upon this Court is contrary to
human experience in the ordinary course of human conduct. The
usual procedure in a buy-bust operation is for the police officers to
arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment he hands over the
dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is the every reason why
such a police operation is called a BUY-BUST operation. The
police poseur-buyer buys dangerous drugs from the pusher and
bust (arrests) him the moment the pusher hands over the drug to
the police officer.
Search in the case at bar is highly irregular
The manner the police officers conducted the subsequent and much-
delayed search is highly irregular. Upon barging into the residence of
accused-appellant, the police officers found him lying down and they
immediately arrested and detained him in the living room while they
search the other parts of the house. Although they fetched two persons
to witness the search, the witnesses were called in only after the
policemen had already entered the accused-appellants residence, and,
therefore, the policemen had more than ample time to plant the shabu.
Accused-appellant cannot be convicted in the case at bar
At any rate, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of possession of the
shabu contained in a canister and allegedly seized at his house, for the
charge against him was selling shabu. Sale is totally different from
possession.
Search warrant is not a sweeping authority
The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only
the search and seizure of shabu and paraphernalia for the use
thereof and no other. The described quantity of the Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia. A
search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding
party to undertake a finishing expedition to seize and confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The
Constitution itself and the Rules of Court, specifically mandate that
the search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized.
Thus, the search warrant was no authority for police officers to seize
the firearm which was not mentioned much less described with
particularity, in the search warrant.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 8
PEOPLE vs. GERENTE
Arrest without warrant is lawful when the arresting officer has
personal knowledge that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after
Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in
the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found
the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block
which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness,
Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the
violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two
others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a
warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
Search without warrant is valid when made as an incident to lawful
arrest
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because
it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a
permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect
themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed
and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs.
Williams, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be
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frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting
officer and all unlawful articles found his person, or within his
immediate control may be seized."
UMIL vs. RAMOS
General Rule
General Rule: No peace officer or person has the power or authority
to arrest anyone without a warrant of arrest.
Exception: in those cases, expressly authorized by law.
The law expressly allowing arrests without warrant is found in Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon
which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrest has committed it; and
Arrest without warrant is valid due to continuous crime
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando
Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that,
within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was
committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for

being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization,
where membership penalized, and for subversion which, like rebellion
is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense.
Two conditions for a valid warrantless arrest
under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrest without warrant:
first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense,
second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one
who committed the offense.
Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without
warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the
arresting officer or private person.
Personal knowledge of facts
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without
warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
When are the grounds of suspicion reasonable?
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested.
What must be the foundation of a reasonable suspicion?
A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making
the arrest.
Application in the case at bar:
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with
acts done in good faith by the officers who make the arrest, the Court
notes that the peace officers who arrested Dural are deemed to have
conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are
presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The records show
that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in
arresting Dural. It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of
Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a)
and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Circumstances surrounding the valid arrest in the present case
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances
surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple),
which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information
they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably
guilty of the commission of certain crimes:
first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the
Constantine safehouse;
second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato
Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP,
and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and
communications equipment;
third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed
firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they
admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the
CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 9
identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA
members.
In view of these circumstances, the corresponding informations were
filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that,
as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the
military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia
Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly
performed.
If the arrested is acquitted and innocent, are the police officers
liable?
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law
requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later
found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not
liable. But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the
arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary
detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code and/or for
other administrative sanctions.
Is mere suspicion that someone is a member of CPP or any
subversive organization an absolute ground for warrantless arrest?
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of
being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a
ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court
predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in
these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on
compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules
of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable
cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on
the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the
Court be right.
Chief Justice FERNANs concurring and dissenting opinion RE:
allowing warrantless arrest
Warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are not
sure what particular provision of law had been violated by the person
arrested. True it is that law enforcement agents and even prosecutors
are not all adept at the However, erroneous perception, not to mention
ineptitude among their ranks, especially if it would result in the
violation of any right of a person, may not be tolerated. That the
arrested person has the "right to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the
merits" (Resolution., p. 18) that he was exercising a right which the
arresting officer considered as contrary to law, is beside the point. No
person should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the law
enforcers wrongly perceived his action.
C.J. FERNANs opinion RE: warrantless arrest of violators of the
Anti-Subversion Law
On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-
Subversion Law, it should be underscored that anyone who undertakes
such arrest must see to it that the alleged violator is knowing member
of a subversive organization as distinguished from a nominal one.
C.J. FERNANs opinion RE: Procedure to be observed the moment
a person is arrested
Earlier, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile (G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983,
121 SCRA 538), the Court laid out the procedure to be observed the
moment a person is arrested:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer

(1) to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
(2) He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him.
(3) The person shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter
or messenger.
It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arressted, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition on his behalf, or appointed the court upon the
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.
The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part shall be
inadmissible evidence. (121 SCRA at 554).
Justice GUTIERREZ Jr.s concurring and dissenting opinion RE:
Doctrine of Continuing Offense
To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense is
to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion.
Rebellion, insurrection, or sedition are political offenses where the line
between overt acts and simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is
extremely thin. If a court has convicted an accused of rebellion and he
is found roaming around, he may be arrested. But until a person is
proved guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal
conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel and must be picked up on
sight whenever seen. The grant of authority in the majority opinion is
too broad. If warrantless searches are to be validated, it should be
Congress and not this Court which should draw strict and narrow
standards. Otherwise, the non-rebels who are critical, noisy, or
obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up with those actually
taking up arms against the Government.
Justice CRUZ separate opinion RE: Continuing Offense and
Warrantless Arrest
The beginning of the "continuing offense" may be arbitrarily fixed by
the authorities, usually by simply placing the suspect "under
surveillance," to lay the basis for his eventual apprehension. Once so
placed, he may at any time be arrested without warrant on the specious
pretext that he is in the process of committing the "continuing offense,"
no matter that what he may be actuallly doing at the time is a perfectly
innocent act.
In the case of Dural. the arrest was made while he was engaged in the
passive and innocuous act of undergoing medical treatment.
J. CRUZ opinion RE: Establishing Probable Cause
My own impression is that probable cause must be established
precisely to justify the issuance of a warrant, not to dispense with it;
moreover, probable cause must be determined by the judge issuing the
warrant, not the arresting officer who says it is not necessary.
Meaning of just in has in fact JUST been committed
The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the word "just," which,
according to Webster, means "a very short time ago." The arrest must
be made almost immediately or soon after these acts, not at any time
after the suspicion of the arresting officer begins, no matter how long
ago the offense was committed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 10
Justice FELICIANOs concurring and dissenting opinion RE:
Stricter Standard for officer arresting without warrant
The stricter standard is properly applicable to the officers seizing a
person without a warrant of arrest, for they are acting in derogation
of a constitutional right. That the person unlawfully arrested without
a warrant may later turn out to be guilty of the offense he was suspected
of in the first place is, course, quite beside the point. Even a person
secretly guilty some earlier crime is constitutionally entitled to be
secure from warrantless arrest, unless he has in fact
committed physically observable criminal acts in the presence of the
arresting officer or had just committed such acts when the arresting
officer burst upon the scene.
Justice SARMIENTOs dissenting opinion RE: validity of the arrest
Apparently, Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule, as far as Deogracias
Espiritu and Narciso Nazareno are concerned; certainly, it is not the
Section 5(b) I know. As I indicated, Espiritu was arrested one day after
the act, allegedly, inciting to sedition; Nazareno was picked up
fourteen days after it (allegedly, murder). Yet, the majority would
approve the police's actions nonetheless because the police supposedly
"found out only later." I submit that the majority has read into Section
5(b) a provision that has not been written there.
"More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups,"
concludes the majority, "what is important is that the Court be right."
PEOPLE vs SUCRO
Arrest is valid in the case at bar
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an
officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a
warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof.
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since
their childhood years and that after Fulgencio joined the police force,
he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality. Hence,
it is possible that because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to
report his childhood friend and merely advised him not to engage in
such activity. However, because of reliable information given by some
informants that selling was going on everyday, he was constrained to
report the matter to the Station Commander.
What is the paramount consideration?
knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount
is that probable cause existed.
Citing People vs. Lo Ho Wing: There are several instances when a
warrantless search and seizure can be effected without necessarily
being preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis
of probable cause (e.g. stop and search without warrant at
checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and seizures at
checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of
probable cause. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions)
there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest
appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the
contraband.

PEOPLE vs. RODRIGUEZA
Buy-bust operation
. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace
officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to
the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected
drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling marijuana
or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM
agents failed to meet this qualification. Based on the very evidence of
the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried
marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released appellant
Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody. This
act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of
marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the natural course of
things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a buy-bust
operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without
having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a
dereliction of duty by an agent of the law.
Instances when government authorities are allowed to conduct
searches and seizures without search warrant
(1) when the owner of the premises waives his right against such
incursion;
(2) when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
(3) when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of
customs laws;
(4) when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing
violations of smuggling or immigration laws;
(5) when it involves prohibited articles in plain view;
(6) or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for
the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations
The instant case: It does not appear, either, that the situation falls
under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, appellant's right
against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The
NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the
urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time.
GO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioners arrest is unlawful in the case at bar
We do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner
in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance with
Rule 112, Section 7.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 11
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of
Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within
the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had]
in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting
one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be
registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not,
however, constitute "personal knowledge."
Section 7, Rule 122 is also not applicable
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest
of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear
too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant
for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the
complaint or information may be filed by the offended
party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of
the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or
person
However, before the filing of such complaint or
information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of
non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his
choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for
bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, the accused
may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the
filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in
his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis
supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When
he walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2)
lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all
probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain
Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime.
Role of the Fiscal
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose
of determining whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of
said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused
in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations

of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion
to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or
not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only
qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused., or the right of the People to due
process of law.
POSADAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
When warrantless arrest may be affected
From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a
warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among
others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when
an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
In the case at bar: At the time the peace officers in this case identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they
did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just
suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now
know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an
arrest without a warrant.
Stop and search without a search warrant
Citing Valmonte vs. De Villa
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the government in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men
by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum
up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 12
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community. (Emphasis supplied).
PEOPLE vs. MENGOTE
Is evidence resulting from illegal search admissible as evidence?
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.
That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the
Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the
justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the
prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed."
Section 5, Rule 113 not applicable in the present case
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an
escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. We therefore
confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under
either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed
or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit
an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the
time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely
"looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to
the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that
had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least
being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements
have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the
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time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and
that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating
that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information
from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be
committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been
committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of
the accused-appellant.
Doctrine from the landmark case of People vs. Burgos
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has
just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police,
80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not
enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have
been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an
essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may
have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must
be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)

MALACAT vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Probable cause of the case
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross
negligence and dereliction of duty, not to mention of gross
incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the
grenade, and kill several innocent persons while maiming numerous
others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot
conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are
in agreement with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in
such a situation should not be the kind of proof necessary to convict,
but rather the practical considerations of everyday life on which a
reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will ordinarily
act.
Prosecution failed to establish petitioners guilt
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a
grenade was found in and seized from petitioners possession. Notably,
Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly
seized. According to him, he turned it over to his commander after
putting an X mark at its bottom; however, the commander was not
presented to corroborate this claim. On the other hand, the grenade
presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to
what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer
Diotoy not immediately after petitioners arrest, but nearly seven (7)
months later, or on 19 March 1991; further, there was no evidence
whatsoever that what Ramilo received was the very same grenade
seized from petitioner. In his testimony, Yu never declared that the
grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated
from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the grenade
examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he
examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement
authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so
crucial in cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days
earlier he was with a group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza
Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest
them, then considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in
uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was then
unnatural and against common experience that petitioner simply stood
there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu observed
petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to
petitioner in order to discern petitioners eyes moving very fast.
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the
grenade during his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio,
such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in
palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution.
General Rule
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a
warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same.
Valid Warrantless Search
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following:
(1) customs searches;
(2) search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) a "stop and frisk."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 13
Stop and Frisk VS. Incidental to Lawful Arrest
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a
"stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two
types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum
of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance,
the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can
be made -- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and
the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence
to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in
the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which
may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the
means of escaping or committing violence.
Allowable scope of Stop-and-frisk
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-
and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons.
Is probable cause required in stop-and-frisk? NO
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk,"[40] it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.
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Two-fold interests of Stop-and-frisk
Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.
stop-and-frisk is invalid in the present case
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a
member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two
days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or
record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly
chased that group.
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which
could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his
eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us incredulous
since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was
already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe
that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to
Yu.

PEOPLE vs. AMINNUDIN
No warrant of arrest or search warrant in the case at bar
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant
issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence
of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the
accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about
to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless
arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Can expediency be invoked in the present case? NO
Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention
of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, for example. Here it
was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches
and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles
may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the
warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two
days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival
was certain. And from the information they had received, they could
have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify
the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because
the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary."
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from
Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot
be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court
for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the
fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase.
The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no
warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the
exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless
search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
inadmissible.
Law enforcers are not justified in disregarding constitutional rights
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is
too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said,
"I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in
the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself.
PEOPLE vs. MALMSTEDT
Accused was actually committing the offense in the present case
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs
(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and
he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest.
There was probable cause in the case
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a
search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of
accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 14
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was
then and there committing a crime.
Probable Cause defined
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts
of each case.
Warrantless search is valid in this case
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been
declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause,
where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by
the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had
prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by
the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that
accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
Justice NARVASAs concurring and dissenting opinion RE: Cases
of valid warrantless search
In all five cases, Claudio, Tangliben, Posadas, Maspil, and Lo Ho
Wing, facts existed which were found by the Court as justifying
warantless arrests. In Claudio, the arresting officer had secretly
ascertained that the woman he was arresting was in fact in possession
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of marijuana; he had personally seen that her bag contained not only
vegetables but also a package emitting the odor of marijuana.
In Tangliben, the person arrested and searched was acting
suspiciously, and had been positively pointed to as carrying marijuana.
And in both cases, the accused were about to board passenger buses,
making it urgent for the police officers concerned to take quick and
decisive action. In Posadas, the person arrested and searched was
acting suspiciously, too, and when accosted had attempted to flee from
the police officers. And in Maspil and Lo Ho Wing, there was definite
information of the precise identity of the persons engaged in
transporting prohibited drugs at a particular time and place.
J. NARVASAs opinion RE: Accused shall be absolved on a
reasonable doubt
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that the
appellant should be absolved on reasonable doubt. There was in this
case no confidential report from, or positive identification by an
informer; no attempt to flee; no bag or package emitting tell-tale odors;
no other reasonably persuasive indications that Malmstedt was at the
time in process of perpetrating the offense for which he was
subsequently prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched
Malmstedt's pouch and the bags in his possession, they were simply
"fishing" for evidence.
Justice CRUZ dissenting opinion RE: Fruit of the poisonous tree
The fruit of the poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison our
system of criminal justice. In the case at bar, the search was made at a
checkpoint established for the preposterous reason that the route was
being used by marijuana dealers and on an individual who had
something bulging at his waist that excited the soldier's suspicion. Was
that probable cause? The ponencia notes that the military had advance
information that a Caucasian was coming from the Sagada with

prohibited drugs in his possession. This is what the military says
now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless search. It is so easy to
make such a claim, and I am surprised that the majority should readily
accept it.
The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been
influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused was carrying
a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In
other words, it was the fact of illegal possession
that retroactively established the probable cause that validated the
illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree that
washed clean the tree itself.
LUZ vs. PEOPLE
There was no valid arrest of the petitioner
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged
down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest defined
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by
an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required.
It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties
to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
General procedure for traffic violation under Land Transportation
and Traffic Code
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest
of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.
Procedure in Flagging down vehicles under the PNP Operations
Manual
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles
While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply
in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the
following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation
Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in
prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or
any of the vehicles occupants;
Whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant
to a routine traffic stop should be considered CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION. NO
The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial
interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the
nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the
officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop (MIRANDA vs. ARIZONA)
First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is
presumptively temporary and brief.
The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A
motorists expectations, when he sees a policemans light flashing
behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time
answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license
and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the
end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 15
respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite
different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is
prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning
will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are
not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the
police.
To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed
officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in
deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some
pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of
the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree.
xxx
Terry Stop
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to
a so-called Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to
a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of
detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our
opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The
similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to
hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not
in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
Is the warrant of arrest needed if the penalty is only fine? NO
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which
was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while
riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of
Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be
stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
such an offense.
Does this imply that there can be no arrest in traffic violations? NO
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic
violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police
officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into
custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In
this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Requirements for valid arrest
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer
(1) to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show
that person the warrant of arrest, if any.
(2) Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they
might make could be used against them.
It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements
were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had
been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Miranda warnings must also be given to apprehended persons due
to traffic violations
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure
that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing,
to relieve the inherently compelling pressures generated by the
custodial setting itself, which work to undermine the individuals will
to resist, and as much as possible to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether
particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated

as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of
felonies.
Warrantless search is illegal
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Instances when a warrantless search is allowed
(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(ii) search of evidence in plain view;
(iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search;
(v) customs search;
(vi) a stop and frisk search; and
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.
None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to
a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
Consent to a search
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search
is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search;
that is, the consent must be
(1) unequivocal
(2) specific
(3) intelligently given and
(4) uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction
of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid
and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was
merely told to take out the contents of his pocket.
Characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given (APO-E-PIPES)
(1) the age of the defendant;
(2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location;
(3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively
looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would
be found;
(7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting.
It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
voluntarily given.
In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the
police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police
officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid
consent to a warrantless search.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 16
Stop and frisk rule
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the
rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or
unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act
may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons.
No justification for a full blown search
In Knowles v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police
officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a
citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize
the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held
that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer
does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct
minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car
or doing a patdown.
Two historical rationales for the search incident to arrest exception
(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into
custody, and
(2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial.
The Courts view under the first rationale
We have recognized that the first rationale officer safety is both
legitimate and weighty, x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing
a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a
custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves
danger to an officer because of the extended exposure which follows
the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police
station.
ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Doctrine of presumption of regularity
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x x x. Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other
members of the buy-bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting or
other unscrupulous activities who were motivated either by the desire
to extort money or exact personal vengeance, or by sheer whim and
caprice, when they entrapped her. And in the absence of proof of any
intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a
serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, . . ., must prevail over
the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had
been framed.
Valid arrest in the case at bar
Petitioners arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was
caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by
police officers on the basis of information received regarding the
illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets,
Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to
an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and
discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore,
lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
Limitation of search incidental to a lawful arrest
In the case of People v. Lua, this Court held:
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellants house,
the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its
inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search
was lawful, the warrantless search made inside the appellants house
became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a
search warrant. Such search cannot fall under search made incidental
to a lawful arrest, the same being limited to body search and to that

point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which
may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of
escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house
when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner
portion of his house was within his reach or control.
UNILAB vs. ISIP
Search warrant proceeding
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners contention that a search
warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the
commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against
any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of
personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature,
and made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some
respect with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings.
While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal
action, it does not make it such an action.
Search warrant is a legal process
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of
discovery employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of
crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of
public prosecutions.
A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A
search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People
of the Philippines.
Search warrant has no relation to civil process
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process
for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights. It
concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil
action involving the rights of private persons. It may only be applied
for in the furtherance of public prosecution.
However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to
the NBI or to a government agency charged with the enforcement of
special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear, participate and file
pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the
validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility
of the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed;
such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or such
government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to
quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a motion for the
reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash.
In this case, UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the
respondents motion to quash the search warrant. The respondents
served copies of their reply and opposition/comment to UNILAB,
through Modesto Alejandro, Jr. The court a quo allowed the
appearance of UNILAB and accepted the pleadings filed by it and its
counsel.
Proper party to file petition
General Rule: The proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme
Court to assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant
proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG.
Exception: However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private corporation (the
complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and
considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said
case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu
of the OSG:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 17
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants,
petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led
to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v.
Nano, the Court declared that while the general rule is
that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to
bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought
before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there
appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a
lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed
by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by
the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the Court
gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners
to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu
of the Solicitor General.
Jurisdiction of the Honorable Court
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the
determination of whether there is a legal basis to quash the search
warrant and/or to suppress the seized articles in evidence. Since the
articles allegedly seized during the implementation of the search
warrant Disudrin and Inoflux products were not included in the search
warrant, they were, therefore, not lawfully seized by the raiding team;
they are not illegal per se, as it were, like an arms cache, subversive
materials or shabu as to justify their seizure in the course of a lawful
search, or being in plain view or some such. No need whatever for
some public assay.
For a search warrant to be valid
A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. The officers of the law are to
seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant. A
search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party
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to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited
in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
Requirements for Plain View Doctrine (PIA)
The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply,
namely:
(a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior
justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in
a position from which he can view a particular order;
(b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently; and
(c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.
Is the plain view doctrine an exception to the warrant? NO
The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to
supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some other
legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a search directed
against the accused. The doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition of the fact that when
executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating
evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not be required to
close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime
they are investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be
needless to require the police to obtain another warrant. Under the

doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and
there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution.
Probable cause must be the direct result to be apparent
In other words, to be immediate, probable cause must be the direct
result of the officers instantaneous sensory perception of the object.
The object is apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to
connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating nature of the
evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search, without the
benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the
moment of seizure.
Requirement of inadvertence
The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the
officer must not have known in advance of the location of the evidence
and intend to seize it. Discovery is not anticipated.
Immediately apparent test
The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree
of certainty as to the incriminating character of evidence. It requires
merely that the seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that
there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity;
that a nexus exists between a viewed object and criminal activity.
Incriminating defined
Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of
circumstances tending to prove the guilt of a person.
Probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard
Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely
requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of
reasonable caution and belief that certain items may be contrabanded
or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime. It does not require
proof that such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical,
non-traditional probability that incriminating evidence is involved is
all that is required. The evidence thus collected must be seen and
verified as understood by those experienced in the field of law
enforcement.
The case: It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who
enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed
boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents
knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened.
PAPA vs. MAGO
Duties, power and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs
(1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported
articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties,
accruing under the tariff and customs laws;
(2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the
customs; and
(3) to enforce tariff and customs laws.
As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods
remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is
deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and
other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of
entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The
payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 18
Exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires
exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of
enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or
detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods
in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of
Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the
regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of
Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector
of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January
12, 1967. And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the
issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent
Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court
presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the
goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it,
and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having
acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First
Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order
of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Chief of the Manila Police Department
The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having
been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for
the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure,
among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when
the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed
under customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine
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any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he
had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop,
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected
of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid.
Search of a dwelling house
But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said
"dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." It is our
considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a
dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs
law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.
Recognized Necessary Difference
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of
a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search
warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat,
wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Reasonableness is a judicial question
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable
in the language of the Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative
question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is not
unreasonable, all of the circumstances under which it is made must be
looked to.

Circumstances:
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent
development, which has multiplied by quantity production
and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the
slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted
individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to
standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for
speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful
commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach
and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before
their advent. The question of their police control and
reasonable search on highways or other public places is a
serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-
called "bootleging" or "rum running," which is itself is
no small matter.
While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they
are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation
on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private
premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards
from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent
to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate
commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary,
and murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that
problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper
administration of our criminal laws.
Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway
or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in
its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all
the circumstances under which it is made.
PEOPLE vs. MUSA
Warrantless arrest incidental to lawful arrest
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person
of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n
officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money
or property found upon his person which was used in the commission
of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the
prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or
which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . "
Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the
law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the
person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest
and search warrants.
Plain view doctrine
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt.
The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain
view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the
object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from
the "plain view" of the object. Stated differently, it must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched
in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 19
hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and
found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not
within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify
its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the
house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs.
California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway
of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana,
the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the
obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.
PEOPLE vs. PERALTA
Right to Counsel
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to
prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law specifically
requires that any waiver of this right must be made in
writing and executed in the presence of a counsel. In such case,
counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is voluntarily made
and that the accused understands its nature and consequences, but also
advise and assist the accused continuously from the time the first
question is asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
confession.
Hence, the lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere
witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated
compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused
is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel.
Not lawfully arrested and waiver of illegality of arrest
The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been
waiting for a passenger bus after being pointed out by the Cash
Department personnel of the BSP. At the time of his arrest, he had not
committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any
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crime. Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a
reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a crime. None of
the circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section
5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was present.
Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having
raised the matter before entering his plea, he is deemed to have
waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is
limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an
incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly
found during the search.
Who can contest the legality of arrest?
Moreover, untenable is the solicitor generals argument that Appellants
De Leon, Flores and Loyola waived the illegality of the arrest and
seizure when, without raising objections thereto, they entered a plea of
guilty. It was Garcia who was unlawfully arrested and searched, not
the aforementioned three appellants. The legality of an arrest can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby. Objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal, and third parties cannot avail themselves of it.
VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA
Constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure is
personal
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been
infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable
or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a
judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 20

Are all searches and seizures prohibited? NO

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been
stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning
the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the
incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine
whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful
search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited.
Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.

Checkpoints
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.
In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men
by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum
up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.

Justice CRUZ dissenting opinion RE: against reasons on

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checkpoints
I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as
dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious
threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual
rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact
that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of
the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is
worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to
be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the
required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at
'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and
order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic
and political development of the National Capital Region." For these
purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random and
at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility
or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or
worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES
21

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