Swetha

Conflict, Contradiction,

and Contrarian Elements

in Moral Development

and Education

This page intentionally left blank

 Conflict, Contradiction,

and Contrarian Elements

in Moral Development
and Education

Edited by

Larry Nucci
University of Illinois at Chicago

LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOCIATES, PUBLISHERS

2005 Mahwah, New Jersey London
Copyright 2005 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any
form, by photostat, microform, retrieval system, or any other means,
without prior written permission of the publisher.

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers

10 Industrial Avenue
Mahwah, New Jersey 07430

Cover design by Sean Sciarrone

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Conflict, contradiction, and contrarian elements in moral development

and education / edited by Larry Nucci.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8058-4848-7 (cloth)
1. Moral educationUnited States. 2. SocializationUnited States.
3. Conflict (Psychology) in adolescenceUnited States. 4. Inter
action analysis in education. I. Nucci, Larry R
LC311.C49 2005
370.1 l'4dc22 2004047106
CIP

Books published by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates are printed on acid-

free paper, and their bindings are chosen for strength and durability.

Printed in the United States of America

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 Contents

Preface vii

Part I: Resistance and Conflict at a Societal Level

in Relation to Socialization and Educational Practice
1 Resistance and Subversion in Everyday Life 3
Elliot Turiel

2 Taking a Stand in a Morally Pluralistic Society: Constructive 21

Obedience and Responsible Dissent in Moral/Character
Education
Diana Baumrind

Part II: Resistance, Conflict, and Contrarianism

in Youth: Implications for Education and Parenting
3 Who in the World Am I? Reflecting on the Heart of Teaching 53
William Ayers

4 Adolescent-Parent Conflict: Resistance and Subversion 69

as Developmental Process
Judith G. Smetana

v
VI CONTENTS

5 Risk Taking, Carnival, and the Novelistic Self: Adolescents' 93

Avenues to Moral Being and Integrity
Cynthia Lightfoot

6 Adolescents' Peer Interactions: Conflict and Coordination 113

Among Personal Expression, Social Norms, and Moral
Reasoning
Stacey S. Horn

7 Negative Morality and the Goals of Moral Education 129

Frit? K. Oser

Part III: Moral Education When Social Injustice

and Youth Resistance Converge to Produce
Negative Outcomes
8 The Rise of Right-Wing Extremist Youth Culture 157
in Postunification Germany
Wolfgang Edelstein

9 Race and Morality: Shaping the Myth 173

WmamH.Watkms

10 Moral Competence Promotion Among African American 193

Children: Conceptual Underpinnings and Programmatic
Efforts
Robert J. Jagers

Author Index 213

Subject Index 221

 Preface

There has been a surge in interest over the past two decades in issues of
moral development and what is referred to as character education. That in
terest in the topic of moral development and character formation has not
abated. A quick search on Amazon.com, for example, turned up 1,026 re-
suits for "moral education." Nearly all of these books present a picture of
moral growth and education that conforms to the general notion that chil
dren should get morally "better" as they develop, and that moral education
entails either a process of gradual building up of virtue through socialization
into one's cultural norms (Bennett, 1993; Lickona, 1991; Wynne & Ryan
1993), or movement toward more adequate (better) forms of moral reason
ing (Lickona, 1991; Nucci, 2001; Power, Higgins, &Kohlberg, 1989). This
understandable emphasis on moral education as moral improvement belies
the role of resistance, conflict, and contrarian elements in both the course of
individual moral development and moral "progress" at a societal level.
The focus of this volume, in contrast, is on the nature and functional
value of conflicts and challenges to the dominant moral and social values
framework. These challenges emerge in two realms that are not often
thought of as relating to one another. On the one hand are the conflicts,
challenges, and contradictions that children and adolescents raise in the
process of their development. On the other hand are the challenges and
contradictions to the dominant social order that occur at the level of society.
Both sets of challenges can be viewed as disruptions to normalcy that need
to be repaired or suppressed. For example, many social commentators have
written about the current period as one of moral decay or decline (Bennett,
1992, Etzioni, 1993). The source of this moral decay is generally traced to
the period of social upheaval during the 1960s and the subsequent changes
vii
Vili PREFACE

in family structure and public mores. These sentiments were perhaps best
expressed by my late colleague Edward Wynne (1987) when he wrote that
"By many measures youth conduct was at its best in 1955" (p. 56). From the
point of view of such cultural analysts, moral education is sorely needed as
an antidote to the perceived moral degeneracy of contemporary society.
Alternatively, such resistances can be seen as essential to moral growth at
an individual level and moral progress at the societal level. It is the latter
perspective that has been overlooked in recent attention to children's moral
development and education, and it is that positive role of resistance that the
bulk of the chapters in this volume zero in on. This is not to say that all of the
chapters in this volume take a purely sanguine view of moral and social con
flict. In fact some of the chapters pointedly address the risks entailed by so
cial instability and adolescent antinomianism. On balance, however, the
volume presents a new look at the role of conflict and resistance for moral
development, and its implications for moral education.
The book is divided into three parts to help frame the discussion. The first
part directly takes up the issue of resistance as it occurs at a cultural level,
and the implications of such resistance for moral education and socializa
tion. The second part explores the normative forms of adolescent resistance
and contrarian behavior that vex parents and teachers alike. This discussion
is within the context of chapters that look at the ways in which parenting
and teaching for moral development can positively make use of these nor
mative challenges. The final part brings back the issue of societal structure
and culture to illustrate how negative features of society, such as racial dis
crimination and economic disparity, can feed into the construction of nega
tive moral identity in youth posing challenges to moral education. The book
concludes with a chapter presenting an educational program designed to re
spond to such challenges among African American youth in the United
States.

RESISTANCE AND CONFLICT AT A SOCIETAL

LEVEL IN RELATION TO SOCIALIZATION
AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

The first section contains two chapters that explore the connections be
tween resistances at a sociocultural level and implications for moral educa
tion and socialization.
In the first chapter, Elliot Turiel makes the case that resistance and sub
version are part of everyday life in most cultures, and that they are integral to
the process of development. Turiel argues that as an integral part of develop
ment, it is necessary that moral education incorporate the ideas of resistance
and subversion into their programs. It is also necessary that they be inte
grated into theories of social and moral development. According to Turiel,
PREFACE IX

most of our theories either fail to account for resistance, and largely treat it
as antisocial, or view it as unusual activity sometimes undertaken by those
who have reached a high level of development. By contrast, research has
demonstrated that social conflict and resistance based on moral aims occur
in childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. Turiel draws on research done
within hierarchical societies in the Middle East, and from his own childhood
experiences growing up in the Mediterranean during World War II to illus
trate his points. His position is that especially among adults, conflicts occur
over inequalities embedded in the structure of social systems: the inequali
ties inherent in social hierarchies that allow greater power and personal
entitlements to some groups (e.g., social hierarchies based on gender, socio'
economic class, ethnic or racial status). In their everyday lives adults come
into conflict with others and resist moral wrongs embedded in cultural prac
tices that serve to further the interests of those in higher positions in the so
cial hierarchy. Resistance frequently entails hidden and deceptive actions
aimed at transforming aspects of the social system judged unfair and detri
mental to the welfare of groups of people. Over the long term, conflict, resis
tance, and subversion are sources of the transformation of culture.
The second chapter is by Diana Baumrind, who is widely known for her
work on children's socialization in relation to patterns of parenting and
adult authority. In this chapter she combines those issues with a neo-Marx-
ist analysis of morality and social hierarchy. Many Americans given the out
come of the Cold War have a knee-jerk response to anything labeled
Marxist. In Baumrind's hands, however, the theory speaks to fundamental
questions of moral relativism, individual moral growth, and the definitions
of moral progress and character. As Baumrind argues, moral ambiguities and
uncertainties affecting praxis are not resolvable by appeal to either
universalizable, certain, and fixed principles of justice or to cultural norms,
but arise from historically and personally situated divergent worldviews that
guide actual decision making as well as accepted criteria for validating be
liefs. Cultures then may construct radically different moral codes and value
systems. Rather than simply accept these irreconcilable differences as a fait
accompli, individuals and groups are obliged to adopt and justify a stand
point that should then mandate their moral praxis. In cases where power
disparities privilege one group, one is obliged to take the standpoint of the
least advantaged. From Baumrind's point of view, deontologists, such as
Kohlberg, fail to acknowledge sufficiently the plurality of real value systems
arising from irreconcilable worldviews, whereas culturalists fail to recognize
the multiple conflicting standpoints within a culture arising from divergent
class interests. She argues that the development of optimal competence and
character in children requires the cultivation of the ability to responsibly
dissent and accept unpleasant consequences, as well as to constructively
comply with legitimate authoritative directives. Baumrind reminds us that
X PREFACE

the authoritative model of childrearing that she developed was to serve as a

viable alternative to both the conservative (authoritarian) model and the
liberal (permissive) model of childrearing. From this she makes the case that
effective moral and character education must coordinate flexibility, and
adult authority in the face of the inevitable and essential challenges from
children and youth.

RESISTANCE, CONFLICT, AND CONTRARIANISM

IN YOUTH: IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION
AND PARENTING

Five chapters explore the normative conflicts and contrarian actions of

youth in relation to peer relations, parenting, and moral education. Two of
the chapters deal primarily with schools and teaching, and three chapters fo
cus primarily on issues of youth.
In his chapter William Ayers presents an inspirational challenge to teach
ers and schools to respond to the ethical dimensions of teaching. He employs
selections from media, poetry, and his own work with teachers to make the
case that all students bring a powerful, expansive question into their class
rooms: Who in the world am I? As Ayers makes clear, this question remains
largely unstated and implicit. It is, according to Ayers, nonetheless an essen
tial question, opening to the moral in surprising ways on several dimensions.
It is a question on one level of identity in formation, but it is also a question
that can reveal issues of social ethics as opposed to rule following, conven
tion as opposed to moral reflection, and misbehavior as a sometimes produc
tive form of resistance. With a captivating use of language and examples,
Ayers concludes that educators who are animated by this and related ques
tions can find ways to resist the arid, half language that dominates so much
of the educational discourse, to activate the intellectual and ethical aspects
of classroom life more fully.
Ayers's chapter, which could have been renamed "Talk With Teachers,"
is followed by Judith Smetana's detailed, research-based account of the nor
mal process of adolescent-parent conflict that has its parallel in the class
room resistances of students. Some theoretical viewpoints have stressed the
problematic nature of adolescent-parent relationships and have described
adolescents as normatively rebellious and as rejecting parental and societal
moral values. Smetana's chapter presents an alternative view. She asserts
that adolescent-parent conflict (particularly moderate conflict in the con
text of warm, accepting relationships with parents) is functional for adoles
cent development because it promotes the development of adolescents'
greater agency and autonomy. Conflict provides a context for the renegotia
tion of the boundaries of parental and adult authority, transforming adoles-
cent-parent relationships from hierarchical to more mutual forms and
PREFACE XI

allowing adolescents to construct a more autonomous self. In support of her

claims, Smetana presents a rich compendium of research conducted with
European American and African American families demonstrating that ad
olescents' resistance to adult authority is selective, limited, and develop'
mentally appropriate, and that although adolescents contest adult authority
in some domains, they continue to uphold parental and societal authority
moral values. This aspect of Smetana's work is especially provocative and
important for moral education because it provides a clear analytic frame
work for knowing when to exert authority, when to negotiate, and when to
say "yes" when dealing with adolescent students. Smetana's chapter moves
Baumrind's agenda forward by more clearly defining the realm of authorita
tive teaching, and more clearly identifying the moral domain.
Cynthia Lightfoot's chapter extends the issues raised by Smetana by ex
ploring the functional role of adolescent risk taking. Lightfoot's chapter
broadens the scope of inquiry that has examined the developmental signifi
cance of risk taking by outlining and illustrating an interdisciplinary, theo
retical perspective from which adolescent risk taking is viewed as a moral
enterprise. In particular, she employs insights from interpretive develop
mental approaches, including narrative and cultural psychology and literary
theory, that permit an exploration of adolescent risk taking as a meaning-
making process through which different moral discourses are brought into
dialogical contact. Lightfoot employs Bakhtin's distinction between a prior,
acknowledged, authoritative discourse and an emerging, experimental, in
ternally persuasive discourse, to argue that adolescent risk taking contrib
utes directly to the further development and articulation of the young
person's future social identity, as well as the awareness that one has a social
identity of moral consequence. The chapter makes liberal use of examples
from interviews to bring these issues to life. A notable aspect of the chapter
is Lightfoot's account of the development of "low-rider" art among Mexican
American youth as a way of working through issues of identity and morality.
Whereas Smetana and Lightfoot focus largely on the development of in
dividuals, Stacey Horn's chapter addresses the problem of interpersonal re
lations as they play out in the moral drama of peer exclusion and
harassment. Perhaps no single issue is as prevalent and as vexing for schools
and teachers. Horn's chapter provides a theoretical framework for begin
ning to capture the moral and nonmoral aspects of peer exclusion in ways
that allow for teachers to begin to sort out what components of such con
duct fall within the legitimate desire of children to control their own per
sonal relationships and friendships, and when such conduct goes over the
line into psychological and physical harm. Horn's work demonstrates that
children by and large have a moral framework from which they interpret sit
uations of peer exclusion, and that effective educational attempts to regu
late such things as bullying should be seen as an aspect of a more general
Xli PREFACE

approach to moral and character education. Adding complexity to this is

sue, Horn describes her recent work exploring issues of peer harassment
based on sexual orientation and gender expression.
As noted earlier, this section begins with a chapter written by Ayers, an
American educator whose focus is on ways in which teachers and schools
can make use of the positive tendencies of youth. The section ends with
Swiss educator Fritz Oser's chapter, in which he develops the position that it
is only by engaging in moral wrongs and experiencing the effects of such
wrongs on others and on one's self that genuine moral growth is possible.
Oser's radical view is the result of a career of efforts to apply developmental
discourse in classrooms and schools. From those efforts and his reading of
the research literature, Oser concludes that moral discourse in the absence
of a direct connection to negative lived experience is superficial at best and
wasteful at worst. In his chapter he provides a critique of virtue-based char
acter education as perhaps even more benighted in its reliance on inculca
tion and traditional socialization. Oser's thesis is a rather simple one; that
one can only grow from one's mistakes. He makes the point that all other ar
eas of education, such as mathematics, anticipate the negative as an explicit
and necessary part of successful pedagogy. An example of what Oser views as
successful moral education entails making direct use of lived moral conflicts
such as peer harassment or theft as the basis for genuine moral discourse.
Through such discourse students are said to integrate emotions within their
moral judgments that serve to regulate future moral conduct.

MORAL EDUCATION WHEN SOCIAL INJUSTICE

AND YOUTH RESISTANCE CONVERGE
TO PRODUCE NEGATIVE OUTCOMES

The final three chapters of the book explore cases where the social inequi
ties of society converge with normative youth resistance to produce nega
tive outcomes for the construction of personal identity and moral conduct.
Each chapter explores ways in which education can work toward the moral
growth of youth affected by these social cancers. Edelstein's chapter ex
plores these issues within the context of German reunification. The remain
ing chapters by Watkins and Jagers focus on racism in the United States.
This final section begins with German scholar Wolfgang Edelstein's anal
ysis of the dismaying effects of reunification on some youth from the former
East Germany. As Edelstein describes the years since the downfall of the
German Democratic Republic and the reunification of Germany a xenopho
bic, racist, and anti-Semitic youth movement has become increasingly, and
at times, murderously active, especially, but not uniquely, in eastern Ger
many. Edelstein's thesis is the conjoining of the two Germanys brought to
gether two greatly disparate economies that engendered both financial and
PREFACE X11I

personal humiliation for scores of people from the former East Germany.
The youth from families who bore the brunt of this humiliation responded
with personal anomie and attendant moral deprivation. As an action of
self-defense, these youth often have banded together and treated other
even more defenseless people, especially Jews and foreigners, as objects of
scorn and physical attack. Edelstein concludes his rather sobering chapter
with a discussion of approaches to moral education that would reconstruct
the personal identities and moral positions of these young people.
William Watson follows Edelstein's chapter with an equally sobering look
at the history of American racism as it has played out in the perspectives
White America has had of the morality of African Americans. Watson is an
educational historian and in his chapter he describes how many current
views of the morality of African Americans can be traced back to 19th- cen
tury "scientific racists," who argued that people of color were both intellec
tually and morally inferior. As Watson argues, unable to conclusively
"prove" genetic inferiority, early 20th-century racist educators and eugen
icists tenaciously clung to the moral inferiority argument as a basis for subju
gation of African Americans. Watson develops the thesis that claims of
moral deficiency have provided a rationale for "deficit" theories and manu
factured perceptions of people of color for decades. In the chapter, Watson
explores how this moral deficit argument has been applied to the education
of African Americans over the last 150 years.
Watson's chapter forms the backdrop for the chapter by Robert Jagers
that concludes the volume. Jagers's chapter describes an evolving effort to
promote social and emotional competence development among school-age
African American children. The basis of his educational work builds from
an analysis of four racialized personal identities. These identities are dis
cussed in terms of oppression, morality, community violence, and liberation.
The chapter explores the developmental implications for children's moral
competence promotion in school and extended hour settings. Jagers dis
cusses student-teacher relationships, curriculum content, and learning
contexts as they relate to the potential contributions of low- and middle-in-
come children to the collective well being of the African American commu
nity. This coordinated cultural approach is described by Jagers as an avenue
for engaging the normative resistance of African American youth with its
connection to reality-based judgments of the inequities and injustices that
remain within America's racialized society as an avenue for constructive
moral growth.
Taken together, this collection of chapters presents a rich counterpoint to
the pictures of moral growth as the progressive sophistication of moral rea
soning or the gradual accretion of moral virtues and cultural values. Instead,
we are presented in this book with a series of chapters based on careful re
search that moral life is not a straight forward journey, but rather a series of
XJV PREFACE

challenges, setbacks, detours, and successes. What we also learn in chapters

from Smetana and Lightfoot, among others, is that the challenges posed by
youth resistance, including some of what amounts to risk taking, is a norma
tive aspect of development important to the establishment of autonomy and
moral identity. Finally, what we find, especially in the chapters by Turiel and
Baumrind, is that resistance to what is viewed by adults to be morally and so-
dally right is often morally justified. The task of moral education, as Ayers
makes clear, is a humbling endeavor. As we work to do what we think is best
for the moral growth of our children and students, we must also keep one eye
on ourselves and an open mind to the prospect that their resistance to our
values may indeed be the more moral course.

Larry Nucci

REFERENCES

Bennett, W. (1992). The de-valuing of America: The fight for our culture and our children.
New York: Simon & Schuster.
Bennett, W. (1993). The book of virtues: A treasury of great moral stories. New York: Simon
& Schuster.
Etzioni, A. (1993). The spirit of community: The reinvention of American society. New York:
Touchstone.
Lickona, T. (1991). Educating for character: How our schools can teach respect and responsi'
bility. New York: Bantam Books.
Nucci, L. (2001). Education in the moral domain. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni
versity Press.
Power, C., Higgins, A., & Kohlberg, L (1989). Lawrence Kohlberg's approach tomoral edu
cation. New York: Columbia University Press.
Wynne, E., &. Ryan, K. (1993). Reclaiming our schools: A handbook on teaching character,
academics, and discipline. New York: Macmillan.
 Parti

Resistance and Conflict

at a Societal Level
in Relation to Socialization
and Educational Practice
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 1

Resistance and Subversion

in Everyday Life

Elliot Turiel
University of California, Berkeley

Opposition, resistance, and subversion are central aspects of social interac

tions in most cultures that are largely neglected in most explanations of so
cial and moral development. The focus of research on moral development
has been either on socialization into the social system or on the types of judg
ments made at different ages about matters like justice, welfare, and rights.
In this chapter, I present a position on morality that gives a central role to
conflict, resistance, and subversion in social relationships. Social relation
ships are many sided, entailing the application of judgments from several do
mains. Even within the moral domain, positive orientations to justice and
concerns for the welfare of others bring with them conflict, opposition, and
resistance in the face of inequalities and injustices. Resistance and subver
sion are common because social arrangements and practices often embody
inequalities.
Social resistance and subversion are, therefore, part of most people's ev
eryday lives and have their roots in childhood. I discuss ways in which resis
tance and subversion are manifested in childhood, become more salient in
adolescence, and are particularly common among adults in positions of
lesser power within social hierarchiesthat is, people in lower social castes
or classes, minorities, and in much of the world, girls and women. Accord
ingly, moral resistance is not reserved for those at supposed "higher" levels of
development or people supposedly classified as special or elite in their per
sonal moral characteristics. As part of everyday life, resistance is not re
3
4 TURIEL

stricted to organized social and political movements. Social conditions

embedded in cultural practices, social norms, and societal arrangements
motivate people to act. However, this is not only in the usual sense of people
acting in line with societal expectations; social conditions evoke opposition,
resistance, and subversion.

OPPOSITION IN CHILDHOOD AND ADULTHOOD

Martin Luther King, Jr. has long been recognized as a great moral leader who
spearheaded extremely significant changes toward social justice for African
Americans in the United States. However, King himself recognized that so
cial change is connected with the aspirations of large numbers of people af
fected by societal injustices. As he put it in his famous letter from a
Birmingham (Alabama) jail (King, 1963), "We know through painful expe
rience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be
demanded by the oppressed Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed
forever. The urge for freedom will come. This is what happened to the
American Negro" (pp. 6, 12).
King wrote his letter while imprisoned for leading a nonviolent demon
stration in Birmingham. The letter was in response to a public letter sent by
eight prominent clergymen admonishing King for his civil rights activities.
In the response, King challenged religious and governmental authorities to
support protest and demonstrations to combat injustice. Conflict and ten
sion, King (1963) maintained, can serve positive moral ends:

I have earnestly worked and preached against violent tension, but there is a type of
constructive tension that is necessary for growth ... to create the kind of tension in so
ciety that will help men to rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the ma
jestic heights of understanding and brotherhood, (p. 5)

King also levied a corresponding challenge to psychologists when he ad

dressed the American Psychological Association at its annual meeting in
1967. Recognizing the tendency for psychologists to focus on social adapta
tion and adjustment, he pointed to the imperative to study ways it is not
morally beneficial to fit in socially. As he put it (King, 1968, p. 185), "There
are some things in our society, some things in our world, to which we should
never be adjusted. There are some things to which we must always be malad
justed if we are to be people of good will." Many explanations of social and
moral development are, indeed, tied mainly to social adjustment insofar as
they focus on compliance and internalization of societal norms. If tension in
society is needed for social change, and if resistance is part of everyday life,
then those theories have serious shortcomings. However, Piaget
(1960/1995b) provided a basis for an alternative view to compliance and in
1. RESISTANCE AND SUBVERSION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 5

ternalization in his formulation of moral autonomy, by which he meant "that

the subject participates in the elaboration of norms instead of receiving
them ready-made as happens in the case of the norms of unilateral respect
that lie behind heteronomous morality" (p. 315).
Piaget proposed that the autonomous morality of late childhood is pre
ceded in early childhood by heteronomous morality, with its norms of unilat
eral respect. Because norms are ready-made in heteronomous morality,
young children presumably do not oppose or defy authorities: "From this it
follows, for example, that if distributive justice is brought into conflict with
authority ... the youngest subjects will believe authority right and justice
wrong" (Piaget, 1960/1995b, p. 304). With regard to young children and the
origins of morality, Piaget's proposition differs from my own. Young children
begin to form moral judgments that are not ready-made and that are not de
termined by authority, rules, or the customs and conventions of society
(Turiel, 1983,1998,2002).
Furthermore, the origins of opposition and resistance are in early child
hood. Young children do not accept authority as right when they contradict
justice (Laupa, 1991; Laupa & Turiel, 1986). As an illustrative example,
consider the judgments of a 5-year-old boy, as made in a study designed to
examine distinctions between the domains of morality (pertaining to wel
fare, justice, and rights) and social convention (pertaining to uniformities
coordinating interactions within social systems). In that study (Weston &.
Turiel, 1980), children from 5 to 11 years of age were presented with hypo
thetical stories of preschools depicted as permitting certain actions. One ex
ample was that children were allowed, in this school, to be without clothes
on warm days (classified as a conventional issues). A second example of an
act permitted within a school pertained to the moral issue of physical harm:
Children were allowed to hit each other. Whereas most of the children
judged both types of acts as wrong prior to the presentation of the hypotheti
cal stories, the majority at all ages judged the school rule regarding clothes
acceptable and the one regarding hitting as unacceptable. The findings of
the study are consistent with findings from a large body of research docu
menting that children's moral judgments differ from their judgments about
conventions on a variety of dimensions (which I do not discuss here). For
the purposes here, it is judgments about authority in the context of the study
that are relevant. Consider the following excerpts of responses by the 5-
year-old boy. The first excerpt begins with his answer as to whether it is ac
ceptable for the school to allow children to remove their clothes; the second
excerpt begins with his answer as to whether it is all right to allow hitting.

Yes, because that is the rule. (WHY CAN THEY HAVE THAT RULE?) If that's what
the boss wants to do, he can do that. (HOW COME?) Because he's the boss, he is in
charge of the school. (BOB GOES TO GROVE SCHOOL. THIS IS A WARM DAY
6 TURIEL

AT GROVE SCHOOL. HE HAS BEEN RUNNING IN THE PLAY AREA OUT

SIDE AND HE IS HOT SO HE DECIDES TO TAKE OFF HIS CLOTHES. IS IT
OKAY FOR BOB TO DO THAT?) Yes, if he wants to he can because it is the rule.

# # : ( ! # * * # * # # * * # * # * * * * * *

No, it is not okay. (WHY NOT?) Because that is like making other people unhappy.
You can hurt them that way. It hurts other people, hurting is not good. (MARK GOES
TO PARK SCHOOL. TODAY IN SCHOOL HE WANTS TO SWING BUT HE
FINDS THAT ALL THE SWINGS ARE BEING USED BY OTHER CHILDREN.
SO HE DECIDES TO HIT ONE OF THE CHILDREN AND TAKE THE SWING.
IS IT OKAY FOR MARK TO DO THAT?) No. Because he is hurting someone else.
(Turiel, 1983, p. 62)

Even at the young age of 5 years this boy is of two minds about rules and
authority. With regard to clothing, he accepts the rules of the school as stip
ulated, but with regard to hitting he does not. He judges permitting children
to remove their clothes as acceptable because of the rule and because the
boss (i.e., the head of the school) has the authority to impose the rule or
practice. When it comes to permitting children to hit each other, however,
this boy is unwilling to grant the boss the authority to institute or implement
the rule. If we looked only at this boy's judgments about clothing, it might
appear that he is compliant (or heteronomous) about school rules and au
thorities. His judgments about the act of hitting reveal that he makes dis
criminations between different types of rules or commands and wants to
place restrictions on the jurisdiction of a person in a position of authority. In
doing so, he expresses opposition to rules and authority from a moral stand
point (autonomy).
The responses of this boy indicate that the origins of opposition are in
early childhood. Although that study was not designed to examine opposi
tion, other research has shown that children do engage in oppositional ac
tivities and get into conflicts with siblings, peers, and parents (Dunn, 1987,
1988; Dunn, Brown, &Maguire, 1995; Dunn &Munn, 1985, 1987; Dunn
& Slomkowski, 1992). These oppositional activities exist, in the same chil
dren, alongside positive, prosocial actions and emotions.
Now consider two examples illustrative of opposition, resistance, and
subversion among adultsbut implicate children as well. These examples
do not come from research, but from recollections in adulthood. The first
are my own recollections, and the second come from those of a sociologist
from Morocco, as reported in Dreams of Trespass: Tales of a Harem Girlhood
(Mernissi, 1994).
To place the first example into a cultural context, I need to provide some
personal background. I was born on the Greek island of Rhodes (my father's
birthplace), where I lived until I was 6 years old. My family then lived in the
1. RESISTANCE AND SUBVERSION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 7

city of Izmir in Turkey (my mother's birthplace) for 2 years. We then moved to
New York City. My contacts and knowledge of Greek and Turkish cultural
practices were maintained because we were part of a large community of peo
ple who had immigrated from Greece and Turkey to New York, and because I
went back to those places for extended periods many times (I have also con
ducted research in Turkey). The most relevant feature of cultural practices for
the present purposes is that, for the most part, men were in socially dominant
positions and women were in subordinate positions. In my parents' genera
tion, women did not work outside of the home and men had almost exclusive
control of the family's finances. Typically, women were given an allotted
amount of money (e.g., a weekly allowance) for household expenses.
In many respects, women were not content with the inequalities or the
control exerted by their husbands. One of the actions women took to sub
vert the situation was to, when possible, put some money into places avail
able to them and secret from their husbands. Doing so involved elaborate
deceptions, as well as a fair amount of risk. Women had several reasons for
maintaining secret funds. It was done so they could have some control over
their lives and make purchases without the continual oversight of their hus
bands. It was done to have resources to help members of their side of the
family in times of need. It was also done to ensure that resources would be
available in the case of a husband's death. The last reason was particularly
important because laws were highly unfavorable toward widows.
The hidden activities I have described were not done in isolation.
Women conspired with other women they could trust. In addition, they of
ten discussed their concerns and activities with their children. The second
illustrative example, from Fatima Mernissi's published childhood recollec
tions, shared some of the same features. Mernissi recounted stories from her
childhood living in a harem in the city of Fez during the 1940s (Mernissi,
1994). Before relating her story, let me mention that our research has identi
fied another domain that stands alongside the moral and conventional
the domain of judgments about autonomy of persons and boundaries of their
jurisdiction (Nucci, 2001). Children form judgments about various activi
ties, including recreational ones that are considered up to individual choice.
Although resistance and subversion are grounded in moral judgments, the
personal domain can be part of it. When personal prerogatives are systemat
ically restricted in unequal ways, the inequality can turn the personal into
moral issues. This can be seen in Mernissi's storywhich on the surface is
about the desire of some women to listen to music and dance. On a deeper
level, the story is about how in everyday activities there is commitment to
combating injustices and inequalities, as well as defiance of those in posi
tions of power.
According to Mernissi (1994), the women, who were confined within the
walls of the compound they lived in, were prohibited from listening on their
8 TURIEL

own to a radio in the men's salon; the men kept the radio locked in a cabinet.
It seems, however, that while the men were away the women listened to mu
sic on that very radio. As it happened, one day Fatima (when she was 9 years
old) and her cousin were asked by her father what they had done that day.
They answered that they had listened to the radio. Mernissi told the rest of
the story as follows:

Our answer indicated that there was an unlawful key going around .... it indicated
that the women had stolen the key and made a copy of it.... A huge dispute ensued,
with the women being interviewed in the men's salon one at a time. But after two days
of inquiry, it turned out the key must have fallen from the sky. No one knew where it
had come from.

Even so, following the inquiry, the women took their revenge on us children. They said
that we were traitors, and ought to be excluded from their games. That was a horrifying
prospect, so we defended ourselves by explaining that all we had done was tell the
truth. Mother retorted by saying that some things were true, indeed, but you still could
not say them: you had to keep them secret. And then she added that what you say and
what you keep secret has nothing to do with truth and lies. (pp. 7-8)

Mernissi's tale is a good example of persistence in the pursuit of what is re

garded as right. In addition to violating the rules imposed by the men by lis
tening to the radio, the women resisted by refusing to say how the key was
obtained in spite of 2 days of interrogation. As told by Mernissi, resistance
on the part of the women went beyond recreational activities like listening
to music. The women desired freedoms and rights in many respects, and es
pecially the freedom to venture beyond the walls of the compound. The
women also desired a future for their daughters with greater freedoms and
opportunities than had been available to them. The women conveyed their
goals to their daughters directly and indirectly. As an example, one of the
lessons Fatima received from her mother pertained to symbolic ways of resis
tance toward the goal of social change. Fatima's mother told her
the whole crusade against chewing gum and American cigarettes was in fact a crusade
against women's rights as well... "so you see," said Mother, "a woman who chews gum
is in part making a revolutionary gesture. Not because she chews gum per se, but be
cause chewing gum is not prescribed by the code." (Mernissi, 1994, p. 187)

The use of seemingly trivial actions, such as chewing gum, for symbolic
purposes occurred in other places and times. Another example can be seen
in the activities of women in contemporary Iran. In Iran, women are re
quired to dress in certain ways and cover their faces with veils. They are also
prohibited from wearing makeup. However, it is not uncommon for women
to defy, in safe public places, the requirements to keep their faces covered
1. RESISTANCE AND SUBVERSION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 9

and free of makeup. As was the case with the mother's use of chewing gum,
makeup is seen to serve broader purposes in Iran. As one woman put it, "Lip
stick is not just lipstick in Iran. It transmits political messages" ("Lipstick
Politics in Iran").
The restrictions imposed by Iranian governmental and religious authori
ties on women and men are extensive, including prohibitions on ways of
dressing, watching videos, listening to music, use of alcohol, and relations
between women and men. Moreover, there are serious efforts to enforce
these policies, as vividly told by Naipul (1997): "And helicopters flew over
Northern Tehran looking for satellite disks, just as the Guards walked in the
park to watch boys and girls, or entered houses to look for alcohol and
opium" (p. 65). In spite of the risks of detection, many people engage in hid
den activities in violation of the prohibitions. There is widespread use of sat
ellite dishes, videocassettes, compact disks, and alcohol. In Iran, too,
parents worry about the future of their children. The reflections of an Ira
nian woman are informative ("Beating the System, With Bribes and the Big
Lie," 1997):

We live a double-life in this country. My children know that when their school teach
ers ask whether we drink at home, they have to say no. If they are asked whether we
dance or play cards, they have to say no. But the fact is we do drink, dance, and play
cards, and the kids know it. So they are growing to be liars and knowing that to survive
in this country we have to be. That's a terrible thing, and I want to change it. (p. A4)

OPPRESSION AND THE URGE FOR FREEDOM

The features exemplified in the various examples I have discussed thus far
were writ large in events in Afghanistan that came to great public attention
toward the end of 2001. As is well known, the Taliban, which had ruled Af
ghanistan since 1996, fell in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New
York and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001. While in power, the
Taliban imposed severe restrictions on people's activities. They banned tele
visions, VCRs, most music, movies, kites, and much more. They banned de
pictions of living creatures, and required men to have beards. The
restrictions imposed on women were the most severe. Women were con
fined to their homes unless accompanied by a male relative. When ventur
ing out, women were required to be totally covered by a burka. Females were
denied schooling and the opportunity to work. Furthermore, females could
not receive medical treatment from male physiciansbut women could not
work as physicians. As a consequence, the health of women suffered greatly.
Immediately after the fall of the Taliban, the sense of liberation felt by
many women and men was striking. As told in media accounts day after day,
the reaction was strong and swift. There was widespread use of the previ
1Q TURIEL

ously banned videos, audiocassettes, televisions, VCRs, musical instru

ments, birds, and kites. People flocked to newly reopened cinemas and
barber shops did a brisk business with men shaving their beards. Women
quickly mobilized to reopen schools for girls. Women also began looking for
work and sometimes participated in organized demonstrations for their
rights. Many women did shed their burkas, although there was still fear of
the reactions of men to their doing so.
It certainly appeared, to use Martin Luther King's words, that the urge for
freedom had come. It also appeared that the urge for freedom had been
there, but in a hidden, underground, subversive form. This becomes evident
if we merely ask where all the objects (televisions, VCRs, kites, etc.) brought
out in such quantities came from. The answer, of course, is that the people
had resisted the dictates of the Taliban by hiding many banned objects (e.g.,
difficult-to-hide objects like televisions were buried in backyards). There
were several other examples of resistance and subversive activities that
emerged at the time. Artworks, for instance, were preserved by businessmen
and museum directors who hid them in basements of their homes and muse
ums (sometimes having secured paintings with bribes). One artist, at least,
managed to save many banned paintings of living creatures from destruction
by covering them over with watercolors. Women, too, resisted at great per
sonal risks by running, in their homes, secret schools for girls or beauty shops
for women.
It is still not well publicized that resistance on the part of women from Af
ghanistan took an organized form. As early as 1977, women organized to
fight for human rights and social justice by forming the Revolutionary Asso
ciation of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA). Their objective was explic
itly to involve women in social and political activities pertaining to areas like
education, health, work, and politics. RAWA worked within Afghanistan
until the Taliban took over (even after the group's founder and leader was
assassinated in 1987). After 1996, RAWA was forced to work in other coun
tries like Pakistan, where they held several demonstrations. Within Afghan
istan, members of RAWA documented the activities of the Taliban by
surreptitiously taking photographs and making videos to smuggle to mem
bers in other countries. Those activities involved great risks, because taking
such photographs was illegal and punishable by death. The photographs and
videos (which can be found on the group's Web site, www.rawa.org) reveal
the harsh conditions of people's lives, executions and amputations in sports
stadiums, beatings of women for showing a little hair from beneath the
burka, and much more.
If it were the only example, the reactions of the women and men of Af
ghanistan could be interpreted as an uncommon reaction provoked by the
extreme restrictions imposed by the Taliban. However, all the other exam
ples I have presented (from Morocco, Iran, Greece, Turkey; see also
1. RESISTANCE AND SUBVERSION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1J_

Nussbaum, 1999, 2000, for examples from India and Bangladesh) share key
features with the ones from Afghanistan. The examples demonstrate that
people resist in social conditions of inequality, injustice, and oppression. Re
sistance and subversion are connected with the domains of moral and per
sonal judgments. Moreover, the examples point to the ways in which
children are exposed to a multitude of social experiences. They often receive
mixed messages about social norms, laws, cultural practices, relations
among authorities (e.g., mother and father, parents and governmental au
thorities) , and about matters portrayed by some as moral virtues (especially
honesty and dishonesty, truth and lies). The complex and multifaceted na
ture of children's social interactions was captured by Piaget (195 l/1995a) in
his assertion that:

Socialization in no way constitutes the result of a unidirectional cause such as the pres
sure of the adult community upon the child through such means as education in the
family, and subsequently in the school.... it involves the intervention of a multiplicity
of interactions of different types and sometimes with opposed effects, (p. 276)

THE INFLUENCES OF MORALITY ON CULTURES

The idea that children's social and moral development is a function of a mul
tiplicity of different types of interactions is in accord with the proposition
that resistance and subversion reflect individuals' heterogeneous relations
to cultural practices, including individuals' efforts to evaluate and transform
those practices. In discussing the multiplicity of social interactions, Piaget
(1951/1995a) went on to caution about "sweeping generalizations" in at
tempting to "make sense of the systems of relations and interdependencies
actually involved" (p. 276). However, sweeping generalizations are by no
means uncommon when psychologists and others attempt to draw contrasts
between cultures. The most familiar set of generalizations is seen in descrip
tions of differences between Western and non-Western cultures; it is said
that Western cultures are primarily individualistic and non-Western cul
tures are primarily collectivistic (e.g., Markus &.Kitayama, 1991; Shweder
& Bourne, 1982; Triandis, 1989). By virtue of an individualistic orientation,
Westerners place at the forefront freedoms, independence, and rights.
Given the emphasis on the individual rather than the group, it may well be
that Westerners engage in resistance to cultural practices. It is not expected
that non-Westerners would typically engage in resistance, let alone subver
sive activities, given their emphasis on the group rather than individuals.
Within that viewpoint, non-Westerners accept their prescribed social roles,
which in turn produces social harmony.
The various examples I have presented contradict the proposition that
there are shared understandings regarding social roles in a system of interde
12 TURIEL

pendence in non-Western cultures. Conflicts occur when people are treated

unequally, hold subordinate positions, and are restricted from exercising
their freedoms and rights. People in subordinate positions are not simply
content to accept the perspectives of those in positions of power. As put by
Okin (1989), "Oppressors and oppressedwhen the voice of the latter can
be heard at alloften disagree fundamentally" (p. 67). With such funda
mental disagreements and the associated conflicts, it does not make sense to
characterize cultures through any kind of orientation meant to portray a
general set of perspectives held by the group. Philosophers and anthropolo
gists have voiced objections to the prevalent mode of attempting to charac
terize cultures or communities in these ways. As one example, Nussbaum
(1999) asserted that

Cultures are not monoliths, people are not stamped out like coins by the power ma
chine of social convention. They are constructed by social norms, but norms are plural
and people are devious. Even in societies that nourish problematic roles for men and
women, real men and women can find spaces in which to subvert those conventions.
(P- H)

From an anthropological perspective, Wikan (1991) stated that "the con

cept of culture as a seamless whole and society as a bounded group manifest
ing inherently valued order and normatively regulated response, effectively
masked human misery and quenched dissenting voices" (p. 290).
Research has documented that fundamental disagreements occur
within cultures and that resistance and subversion are everyday activities.
Studies among Druze Arabs in Northern Israel (Turiel & Wainryb, 1998;
Wainryb & Turiel, 1994) and in India (Neff, 2001) have shown that judg
ments about decision making in the family include many of the features at
tributed to both individualism and collectivism. For instance, the Druze,
who maintain a strong patriarchic structure, do make judgments about du
ties and social roles. These are attributed especially to females. Druze ado
lescents and adults think that a wife needs to follow her husband's
directives on the grounds that she should fulfill her duties and social roles.
By contrast, they think that a husband does not need to follow his wife's di
rectives and that he is entitled to freedom of choice, independence, and
autonomy. Members of the Druze community are quite aware of cultural
expectations regarding male independence. They use terms like freedom,
self-reliance, and rights to characterize the cultural perspective on males
(see Turiel, 2002; Turiel & Wainryb, 2000). They are also quite aware that
holding a subordinate position in the social hierarchy makes deviation dif
ficult because of the serious consequences that might ensue. Nevertheless,
adolescent and adult females are critical of those practices, judging them
as unfair.
1. RESISTANCE AND SUBVERSION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1_3

Other studies have examined how people act to counter restrictions

judged unfair (Abu-Lughod, 1993; Wikan,1996). Spending considerable
time with Bedouin groups in a small hamlet on the northwest coast of Egypt,
Abu'Lughod (1993) demonstrated that women employ a variety of strate
gies to get around the unequal restrictions imposed on them by men (hus
bands, fathers, and brothers). Those strategies pertained to matters like
educational opportunities and goals, arranged marriages, polygamy, and the
distribution of resources. The Bedouin women did not always obey their fa
thers or husbands; they did not always adhere to cultural expectations; and
disagreements, conflicts, and struggles between females and males were
common. As articulated by Abu-Lughod (1993), "The Awlad Ali are
patrilineal, but reckoning descent, tribal affiliation, and inheritance
through the male line does not foreclose women's opportunities or desires to
shape their own lives or those of their sons and daughters, or to oppose the
decisions of their fathers" (p. 19).

DEVIOUSNESS, SUBVERSION,

AND THE QUESTION OF HONESTY

Opposing decisions of those in positions of power appears to often involve

deception. When Nussbaum (1999) stated, "people are devious," she did so
in the context of subversion of conventions (p. 14). In most of the examples
I have discussed, there has been an element of deception (e.g., in Mernissi's
[1994] account, in the use of secret bank accounts, in the description by the
Iranian mother, and in the activities of people in Afghanistan and RAWA).
In several of these examples, the deceptions were apparent to children
and it was even conveyed by parents that dishonesties were necessary and
right. Yet, honesty is considered one of the hallmarks of morality in many ac
counts of virtues and character (Bennett, 1993; Sommers, 1984; Wynne,
1989). From the perspective of virtues and habits of character, honesty is to
be highly valued and not to be violated. As the examples I have conveyed
suggest, however, honesty and dishonesty entail highly complex philosophi
cal and psychological issues that have been debated for a long time (Bok,
1978/1999). Some philosophers have maintained that the prohibition
against lying is absolute (e.g., Kant), whereas others argue that it depends on
how it may conflict with other moral ends, such as if truth telling would re
sult in harm. A classic example used in these debates is whether one is obli
gated to tell the truth to a murderer who asks to be told where his intended
victim has gone.
These types of musings among philosophers do sometimes have real-life
relevance. A well-known example is that people frequently had to decide
whether to engage in deception to save people from concentration camps
during World War II. The activities of Oscar Schindler and Raoul
14 TURIEL

Wallenberg have been well publicized. Many others, including diplomats

from several countries (e.g., Japan, Turkey, Holland) and people who were
not in official positions, used deception to save lives. This type of deception
has received little attention in developmental research. The bulk of the re
search on honesty has looked at children cheating in games or tests
(Grinder, 1961,1964; Hartshorne &May, 1928-1930). A little research has
examined what are referred to as white liesthat is, lies to spare the feelings
of others (Lewis &. Saarni, 1993). There is not much research on judgments
about deception to prevent harm or promote justice.
Research of that type has been conducted in the realm of medicine. One
study, published in a medical journal (Freeman, Rathore, Weinfurt,
Schulman, &Sulmasy, 1999) examined the judgments of physicians about
deception in the context of medical care. A sample of physicians was pre
sented with a series of hypothetical situations that depicted a doctor who
considers deceiving a third-party payer (an insurance company or a health
maintenance organization) to obtain treatment or a diagnostic procedure
for a patient who would otherwise be unable to receive it. Six situations were
presented, depicting different medical needs of varying severity (from the
most severe of the need of coronary bypass surgery and arterial
revascularization to the least severe of cosmetic rhinoplasty). Whereas very
few (3%) of the physicians judged deception acceptable for cosmetic sur
gery, the majority (58% and 56%) judged it acceptable for the two most se
vere conditions (percentages for the other conditions fell in between).
Judgments about honesty and dishonesty, therefore, varied by the situa
tion. We can assume that, in the abstract, the physicians would judge honesty
to be good and dishonesty wrong. Nevertheless, many judged deception ac
ceptable in some situations but not other situations. Honesty is not a habit of
character applied in a nonreflective fashion. People approach social situations
with the type of flexibility of mind that entails a weighing of their various fea
tures. In these types of situations physicians judged it necessary to engage in
deception to attain the greater good of their patients. (There is evidence that
physicians actually do engage in this type of deception; see Wynia, Cummins,
VanGeest, & Wilson, 2000.) Perhaps it was the ability to have flexibility of
mind that Mernissi's (1994) mother tried to convey to her when she said that
"what you say and what you keep secret has nothing to do with truth and lies"
(p. 8). Flexibility of mind is also reflected in the subversive activities of women
and men in Afghanistan and Iran, as well as in the deceptive activities of those
who saved people from German concentration camps.
It is likely that the physicians' judgments about deception involve a willing
ness to subvert a system that is perceived to unduly grant power to insurance
companies and too little power to the medical judgments of physicians. Nev
ertheless, the societal context for judgments about deception by the physi
cians differs from the types I discussed because it does not involve societal
1. RESISTANCE AND SUBVERSION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 15

arrangements of inequality and dominance and subordination in the social hi

erarchy. However, we have begun conducting research on judgments about
deceptions in the context of inequalities. In that research, which was con
ducted with adults in the United States, we obtained judgments about several
situations involving deceptions between wives and husbands. In one version
of the situations presented it is only the husband who works outside the home
and the wife who engages in deception; in another version of each situation
only the wife works and it is the husband who engages in deception.
Analyses of the results of this study are still underway. For now, consider
findings from two of the situations involving deception. In one, a spouse
keeps a bank account secret from the working spouse who controls all the fi
nances. In the other, a spouse with a drinking problem attends meetings of
Alcoholics Anonymous without telling the working spouse who disapproves
of attending such meetings. With regard to finances (i.e., maintaining a se
cret bank account), it makes a difference if it is a wife or husband who en
gages in the deception. The majority of participants (64%) thought that it is
acceptable for a wife to have a bank account secret from her working hus
band who controls the finances. However, the majority (66%) also thought
that it is not acceptable for a husband to do so, even when the wife works
and the husband does not. It appears, therefore, the structure of power out
side the family is taken into account in making these judgments. In other
words, a nonworking husband is viewed as having more influence and power
than a nonworking wife. The differences in judgments about deception by
wives and husbands do not extend to all situations. The large majority (over
90%) judged that deception is acceptable by both wives and husbands when
dealing with a drinking problem by attending meetings of Alcoholics Anon
ymous. In that situation, like situations involving physicians' deception of
insurance companies, judgments about welfare override the value of main
taining honesty.
I should stress that people in the study were not sanguine about decep
tion between spousesjust as physicians are not content that they may
sometimes be compelled to deceive insurance companies. They view decep
tion as undesirable but sometimes necessary to deal with unfair restrictions,
especially restrictions imposed by those in greater power and control. The
results of these studies indicate that issues revolving around honesty and de
ception are far from straightforward from a psychological standpoint. To be
sure, deception sometimes occurs for self-serving purposes. Nevertheless,
the reasons people in engage in deception are multidimensional and moti
vated by moral goals. The complexities and moral reasons in people's deci
sions regarding honesty and dishonesty are often lost when people lament
the decline of morality in our youth because so many adolescents admit to
dishonesties. This occurs when survey takers, posing questions like, "Have
you lied to your parents in the past 12 months?" find that most adolescents
16 TURIEL

honestly admit to having done so. We can ask, would the findings be differ
ent if physicians were posed with a similar question: "Have you lied to an in
surance company in the past 12 months?" A more productive approach to
honesty among youths would be to closely examine how they understand
moral and personal consideration in relation to persons in authority, includ
ing parents and teachers.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The data on judgments about honesty and deception point to flexibilities of

mind in applying moral considerations to social situations. The contextual
variations in judgments do not reflect situational determinism, but weigh
ing, balancing, and coordinating different social and moral goals. More gen
erally, the types of acts of resistance and subversion evident in several of the
nonresearch examples 1 have described, along with findings from studies
with Druze and Bedouin women, reflect flexibilities of mind in the ways peo
ple relate to the social world. Social relationships involve a multiplicity of
features. Moral and social development, as Martin Luther King, Jr. implied
in his address to the American Psychological Association, does not involve a
straightforward adjustment to social conditions. Social development is not a
process of increasing acceptance of or identification with culture and its
norms or practices.
This is not to say that people are always or completely at odds with each
other, with the culture, or with societal arrangements. It is to say that there is
heterogeneity of orientations. Adjustment and acceptance coexist with re
sistance and opposition. Social harmony coexists with social conflict, dis
contents, and efforts at changing norms and established practices. The
multiplicity of people's judgments and approaches to the social world means
that to adequately understand social development it is necessary, as Piaget
proposed, to understand children's constructions stemming from many
types of social experiences.
I return, then, to the main idea that resistance and subversion are part of
everyday life. As part of everyday life, most people have moral convictions
and commitments that they act on in the face of possible social disapproval
and serious repercussions. As 1 have indicated, moral resistance is not the
province of a limited number of individuals to be characterized as moral
elites. The commitment and conviction of many people to the viewpoints
they hold results in some complexities in evaluating differing positions in
ongoing debates. If we could say that the fewour moral leadershave the
courage of their convictions in opposition to the many, who simply go along
with system, that would constitute a basis for discriminating sides on partic
ular issues. However, conviction and commitment appear in many guises
and most often can be seen in people holding opposing views. I can draw
1. RESISTANCE AND SUBVERSION IN EVERYDAY LIFE T7

from some of my examples: The women of RAWA, as well as many people of

Afghanistan, had the courage of their convictions, but so did the Taliban. In
the civil rights movements in the United States, Martin Luther King, Jr. had
the courage of his convictions, as did many who were involved in demon
strations and protests at the time; however, counterdemonstrators in south
ern states and elsewhere also maintained their positions with conviction
even in the face of opposition from the federal government.
A clear example of conviction and commitment on opposing sides of civil
rights issues was evident in confrontations over the integration of the Uni
versity of Mississippi in the fall of 1962. Two individualsJames Meredith
and Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippiare illustrative. James Meredith,
a Black man, had attended Jackson State University (a Black school) but
held back from obtaining sufficient credits to graduate so that he could apply
to the University of Mississippi, which has been referred to as the pinnacle of
Mississippi's wealthy segregationist plantation society. Meredith pursued
the matter all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ordered his ad
mission to the university. Meredith's commitment to equality and integra
tion was paralleled by Governor Barnett's commitment to segregation.
Barnett physically blocked Meredith's efforts to register at the university
several times and publicly proclaimed, "I am a Mississippi segregationist and
proud of it." Moreover, Governor Barnett was unresponsive to President
Kennedy's directives, so Kennedy had to mobilize a large number (more
than 30,000) of federal troops and National Guardsmen to be sure that
Meredith was safely enrolled in the university. Conviction, commitment,
and courage are not features that distinguish between James Meredith and
Ross Barnett, nor between the many supporters of each side. We must look
elsewhere for the distinguishing featuresto the nature of moral argumen
tation, moral struggle, and most important to the details of the moral evalu
ations and moral judgments involved.
One incident surrounding James Meredith's efforts to enroll in the Uni
versity of Mississippi poignantly demonstrates that resistance, subversion,
and commitment come from large numbers of people whose involvement of
ten goes unnoticed. Meredith spoke about the incident when he was inter
viewed on the Morning Edition news show of National Public Radio on the
occasion of the 40th anniversary of his enrollment at the University of Mis
sissippi. As introduced by the interviewer, "in the first minutes after he regis
tered Meredith got a message that still brings him to tears." As told by James
Meredith,

The most significant thing that happened when I finished registering, came out to go
my first class, there was a Black standing in the hall. I thought that looked a little
strange. And he had a broom on his arm. When I walked by he turned his body so the
broom handle would touch me. And he was delivering, probably, one of the most im
18 TURIEL

portant messages I ever got at Ole Miss. The message was that we are looking after
youevery Black eye is looking after you. That was a greater act of defiance than what
I was doing because he could have lost his job for that.

So it is not only in the acts of famous figures like Socrates, Mahatma

Ghandi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. that we see moral defiance, resistance,
and subversion. We see it in many people, in people who were not well
known as moral leaders with outstanding personal characteristics, such as
Oscar Schindler, James Meredith, and an unnamed janitor working at the
University of Mississippi.
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2O TURIEL

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 2

Taking a Stand in a Morally

Pluralistic Society:

Constructive Obedience

and Responsible Dissent

in Moral/Character Education

Diana Baumrind
Institute of Human Development
University of California, Berkeley

My standpoint on constructive obedience and responsible dissent in charac

ter education will be presented in three sections. In the first section I present
the philosophic and metaethical perspective from which I consider the sub
stantive issues discussed in the second and third sections. In the second sec
tion I consider the meaning of morality, character, and virtue in the context
of moral education. In the third section I address the role of socialization and
the disciplinary encounter in guiding the development of character and
competence in children.
PHILOSOPHICAL AND METAETHICAL PERSPECTIVE
Divergent approaches to moral versus character education are based, im
plicitly or explicitly, on more encompassing political and philosophical ide
ologies. Such was explicitly the case for Kohlberg (1981), and it is for me.
Kohlberg's perspective on moral education is rooted in Kantian epistemol
ogy and Rawls's theory of justice; mine in dialectical materialist epistemol
21
22 BAUMRIND

ogy (see Marx [1858/1971] andEngels [1888/1941]) and rule utilitarianism

(Mill, 1861/2002). (For a fuller treatment than can be presented here of the
issues discussed in this section the reader is referred to Baumrind, 1975,
1978a, 1978b, 1992, 1998).

Dialectical Materialism
Dialectical materialists seek to understand the driving force of personal and
social development, not in the realization of abstract universalizable ideals
such as the Kantian categorical imperative, or Rawls's original position, but
instead within the conflicting tendencies operative in everyday material
processes of nature and society.
Ontologically Marxist materialism, as opposed to idealism, means that the ob
servable world is real in its own right, deriving its reality from neither a supernat
ural nor a transcendent source, and independent of mind for its existence. Mind
"reflects" the observable world, but in Marxist materialism reflection does not
signify a mirror image passively recorded or a reproduction or exact correspon
dence. The form in which material reality is reflected in consciousness is a prod
uct of the active engagement with its surroundings of the living organism, who
does not merely perceive directly the appearance of things, but conceives of
their interconnections and causes as they relate to his or her purposes. In that
sense, although objective truth is absolute, knowledge of truth is provisional
and relative, limited as well as illuminated by each one's purposes and stand
point. We know how well the ideas consistent with our perspective correspond
to the true properties of external objects and their relations by how successfully
we can produce and change them. Through the effort of production and utiliza
tion the "thing-in-itself' becomes a "thing-for-us."
The term dialectical in dialectical materialism expresses the dynamic inter
connections of things and the universality of change owing to the fact that all
things are composed of opposing forces: A as a process is always becoming
not-A. To think dialectically is to emphasize a unity of opposites, and to at
tempt to synthesize thesis and antithesis. The opposites of mutually exclusive
and jointly all-encompassing categories interpenetrate, as with attraction and
repulsion, yin and yang, organism and environment, life and death, good and
evil. Although the principle of noncontradiction is a precondition for making
a logical argument, contradiction is inherent in the natural and social systems
to which these arguments pertain. Paradox expresses the unity of opposites in
real life. For example, how is one to preach and practice tolerance toward
ideas and conduct that are intolerant or intolerable?
The Marxist sociopolitical lens through which I view obedience and dis
sent in moral education and the disciplinary encounter cannot be charac
terized as either liberal or conservative, although Lakoff (1996), in his
consideration of the politics of morality, places my views on these matters
2. CONSTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE DISSENT 23

firmly in the liberal camp. I applaud the liberal agenda of Rawls (1971) and
his followers in their concern for social justice and equitable distribution of
resources. However, I oppose the primacy liberals place on personal freedom
and rights, exemplified by Dworkin's (1977) claim that "if someone has a
right to do something, then it is wrong for the government to deny it to him
even though it would be in the general interest to do so" (p. 269). From
where I stand, in that remark Dworkin takes rights too seriously relative to
community welfare. In the interest of community welfare (Etzioni, 1993,
2000), I advocate such restrictions on rights in this country as sobriety
checks, drug testing for those entrusted with public safety, and mandated
disclosures to health workers of serious communicable diseases. However, in
support of rights, I oppose the draconian provisions of the Patriot Act, which
would expand the United States government's power to punish dissent,
search homes and offices, and otherwise undercut the power of the judiciary
to check abuses of these broad new powers.
I argue for a rule utilitarian as opposed to a deontic theory of justification
of such normative judgments as those I propose in later sections 2 and 3 of
this chapter, because it is concerned with social utility and affirms the
assailability inherent in moral praxis. Moral praxis is assailable because the
criteria by which praxis is justified are relative to one's standpoint, and in
that sense are not incorrigible. A standpoint is a perspective from which par
ticular features of reality are brought into sharp perspective and other fea'
tures are obscured. The emphasis on praxis, that is action informed by
judgment, in the Marxist view of morality is animated by its atheism: Be
cause God does not exist it is the responsibility of fallible human beings be
reft of the certitude conferred by divine command or secular monistic
deontology to generate all the acts of creation, compassion, and justice as
signed by theists to God.

Deontic Theories of Justification of Normative Judgments

Deontic theories of moral justifications are objectivist in that they affirm
that there is an ahistorical permanent framework to which we can ulti
mately appeal in determining the nature of goodness and Tightness (see
Vokey, 2001, for an excellent treatment of the objectivism-relativism de
bate). Deontic moral theory as instantiated by Rawls's (1971) original posi
tion is intended to provide an unassailable warrant for a progressive
principle of justice that would oppose oppression and favor the least advan
taged, on the basis that one runs the risk of being the least advantaged. The
original position in which one chooses an option ignorant of one's status and
personal attributes is intended to construct an objective foundation for ethi
cal judgments by means of universally valid criteria for rational assessment
that are manifestly acultural, ahistorical, ahedonic, and impartial. However,
24 BAUMR1ND

the original position is an unacceptable cognitive device for validating a sub

stantive claim precisely because it can apply only to counterfactual hypo
thetical situations and not to the proper province of ethics, which is how one
should conduct one's affairs in the real world.
To provide an unassailable warrant for its justice claims deontic theories
of justification treat the formal criteria of universalizability and impartiality
as constitutive. However, the principle of universalizability fails to do justice
to real cultural differences in historically determined values, and the princi
pie of impartiality to the special obligations fiduciaries owe to their clients,
and individuals owe their intimates. Neither principle is false, but the truth
of each is limited in its application to praxis.
Universalist pronouncements cannot establish a social consensus on ba
sic moral premises that does not already exist, and there is no consensus in
our pluralistic society on what constitutes moral premises. For example,
Rawls's (1971) two basic substantive moral premisespersons are of un
conditional value and persons have the right to equal justice in all situa-
tionsmay seem self-evident. However, they are actually controversial, if
only because they make the individual the unit of society, and are not sym
metrically balanced by principles that affirm the rights of the collective
when these conflict with individual rights. A classic such conflict is between
the right of couples to have their desired number of children and the respon
sibility of the collective to control population, as with the one-child policy
in China. There is no neutral descriptive language or overarching founda
tional framework to which we can appeal to adjudicate such competing
moral claims. Contradictory paradigms exist side by side with each stand
point bringing a particular aspect of reality into clear focus by obscuring
other aspects. Therefore, ethical beliefs are not objective in the sense that
their validity can be universally established by a defensible theory of justifi
cation or by social consensus.
Worldviews of different people and societies diverge in important re
spects. How basic these differences in worldview are is both an empirical
question and a definitional one of what one means by basic. Are differences
in Eastern and Western views concerning how individual life should be val
ued basic? Note, for example, the Eastern notion of karma as the sum total of
the ethical consequences of a person's good and bad actions that determine
his or her fate in this and future lives and the fate of his or her descendants. If
life is renewable across generations, or property has symbolic value, as it does
in some societies, then the assumption that individual human life should al
ways take priority over property rights is disputable. We may all agree that
human life is invaluable and yet differ on such basic issues as abortion, eu
thanasia, and capital punishment that implicitly treat some lives as dispos
able. I see no ethical impediment to my acting in accord with my basic values
or you with yours, just because we may adamantly disagree.
2. CONSTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE DISSENT 25

The validity of the principle of impartiality is also limited by real-life con

siderations. Enlightened partiality to one's true self-interest and those of
one's primary groups is unavoidable and within limits, socially useful. Indi
viduals know their own interests and those of their familiars better than they
do those of strangers. Parents have special obligations to their partners and
especially to their children. Elected public officials have fiduciary responsi
bilities to represent the special interests of their community, and their parti
sanship to their constituents is a moral failure only when carried to an
extreme provincialism. Decentration as impartiality is an unrealizable ideal,
whereas coordinating and reconciling the claims of alter with ego is a realiz
able ideal. To decenter then is not to deny the special claim of self or one's in
timates, but rather to increase progressively the scope of self. As Marx put it
poetically in the Pan's Manuscripts (1844/1964) and later in The Grundisse
(1858/1971), naturephysical and socialis our own body: Physical na
ture constitutes our inorganic flesh, and the social environment our organic
flesh. One takes a moral point of view by being cognizant of where one
stands and how one's standpoint may obscure one's vision from the perspec
tive of differently positioned protagonists, as well as by an enlightened un
derstanding of what truly constitutes one's own long-term interests.
A major objective of socialization agents is to sensitize children to issues
of justice and caring, as realized in their daily lives. The ethics of virtue re
quire a rational understanding of what constitutes true self-interest that
transforms desire into goodness so that the moral agent wants to do the right
thing. How educators construe true self-interest will influence how they re
solve conflicts of interest in the school milieu, and present their rationale to
children. I argue on empirical grounds that moral considerations of justice
and compassion do not exclude self-interest but, on the contrary, are im
plicit in true self-interest, for at least the following four reasons: (a) reciproc
ity is a fact of social life and not merely an abstract moral principle; injustice
and cruelty as well as compassion and altruism tend to be reciprocated; (b)
whether as perpetrator or victim normal individuals are empathic and
therefore discomfited by injury and injustice; (c) behaving unjustly or with
out compassion is internally corrosive, harming one's long-range develop
ment; and (d) the self-other boundary is permeable, so that in poisoning
one's environment, one poisons oneself. For reasons such as these, true
self-interest transcends the polarization of prudential and moral concerns.

Rule Utilitarian Theories of Justification

In place of deontic justification, substantive ethical judgments may be
grounded in teleological rule utilitarianism. In concerning himself increas
ingly with children's conduct, Kohlberg (1978) found it necessary to presup
pose a concern about moral content for its own sake. After giving up Stage 6
26 BAUMRIND

as a realizable end state of moral development, Kohlberg moved away from a

pure deontic theory of ethics toward a mixed theory with utilitarian compo
nents, which arguably is not dissimilar from the teleological rule'Utilitarian
perspective I endorse.
Teleological rule utilitarian theory offers coherent justification for sub
stantive moral claims that pertain to the social conditions and personal at
tributes that an educator or parent might endorse. A teleological, in contrast
with a deontological, theory of justification holds that the criterion of what
is morally right and obligatory is the nonmoral value of what is brought into
being, that is the comparative balance of good over bad or evil produced in
practice. Rule utilitarianism justifies an act as right if it would be as beneficial
to the common good (of a particular polity in a specific social context) to
have a moral code permitting that act as to operate under a rule that would
prohibit that act (see Frankena, 1973). Thus, a rule that allows actions that
intuitively are intrinsically harmful and morally repugnant, such as killing
an unwanted fetus, on rational grounds may nonetheless be judged by utili
tarians to be morally justified when the common good (of the social group to
whom one pledges allegiance) is thought to be harmed less by a rule endors
ing such actions than by a rule endorsing any alternative. By requiring not
merely the greatest good, but the greatest good for the greatest number, the
principle of justice is included in a rule utilitarian theory of normative eth
ics. Rule utilitarian theory treats what is right as that which brings about the
greatest good (in affording human fulfillment) for the greatest number in
the long run. By that criterion the reduction of oppression is a superordinate
sociomoral good.
By oppression I mean the imposition on some individuals or groups of
exploitive constraints on their freedom to choose the conditions of
self-formation by other individuals or groups whose purpose is to enhance
their own access to resources and their own options to pursue what they re
gard as a good life. Individuals and societies that deprive some individuals
or groups of resources sufficient for normal development, or that produce
grossly disproportionate inequities in distribution of resources among indi
viduals or groups, are oppressive. The human capabilities approach
(Nussbaum, 1995; Sen, 1985), claims that the goodness of a society can be
judged by the extent to which it promotes and expands the valued capabil
ities of the greatest number of its citizens, depriving none of the basic ma
terial and social resources that would enable them to develop their
fundamental human capabilities. The standpoint that represents the in
terests of the oppressed serves the greatest good of the greatest number
and is more valid than that of the oppressor by being fairer, more progres
sive, and less biased (Baumrind, 1998).
The standpoint that represents the interests (not necessarily the views)
of the oppressed in any culture is fairer and more progressive because the eq
2. CONSTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE DISSENT 27

uitable distribution of resources it demands comes closest to meeting the ba

sic human needs of all its members, rather than the whims of a privileged
minority. Movement toward more equitable distribution of resources, con
sistent with the communist ideal "from each according to ability, to each ac
cording to need" is progressive because it promotes the greatest good of the
greatest number. The standpoint of the oppressed is more comprehensive,
and thus less biased in that it requires an understanding of the position of the
oppressor, as well as of the oppressed. Whereas those in a subordinate posi
tion must heed the interests of their oppressors so that they may adapt to or
circumvent those interests, members of the ruling class, gender, or ethnic
group, by virtue of their power, are not impelled by an equal necessity to take
into account the interests of those whose welfare they control, or to see
them as individuated and unique persons. The undesirable social conse
quences of practices that create relative poverty by magnifying the gap be
tween the rich and poor in access to physical and social resources are to
inflict unnecessary suffering and retard the development of the many to ad
vance the interests of the few.
In treating gross differential distribution of resources as oppressive and
therefore as evil I am making a substantive claim that I have just sought to jus
tify rationally by prototypic Enlightenment criteria. However, the criteria that
justify my opposition to oppression are internal to the progressive worldview
that gives rise to how goodness itself is conceived, and therefore cannot aspire
to universality or impartiality. Those whose moral judgments and actions fol
low from a diametrically opposed standpoint will apply criteria consistent with
their standpoint. For example, CEOs who earn upwards of 400 times the sal
ary of their average employee, and therefore who I might invidiously label op
pressors, are likely to embrace an opposing superordinate sociomoral good
the survival of the fittestby which they justify their relative position in the
social and economic hierarchy: Their fitness to create wealth by being vastly
superior to that of their employees is commensurate with and thus, in their
eyes, justifies their advantaged position.
Ideological conflicts in the culture wars based on fundamentally diver
gent class interests and worldviews are not resolvable by Habermasian ideal
discourse any more than they are by the monologic idealization of Rawls 's
original position. Ideal discourse requires a freely chosen communicative
level playing field in which advantages of social status and differences in
communicative competence are suspended. Habermas (1979, 1993)
claimed that when consensual interaction is disrupted by disagreements
concerning the truth of contentious assertions or the Tightness of norms,
agreement can only be restored by a process akin to ideal discourse. Al
though ideal discourse may be practiced in protected venues such as the Su
preme Court and some jury trials, under most adversarial circumstances
participants with conflicting interests will instead bring political weapons to
28 BAUMRIND

bear, and compromises will be made based on relative power. Such compro
mises, whether in the boardroom or on the playground, seldom result in gen
uine restoration of consensus.

Objectivism and Relativism

Scientific method, as understood in a particular historical period, can pro
vide consensual standards of assessment to which divergent schools of
thought (e.g., Piagetians, cognitive behaviorists, Vygotskyians) might
jointly subscribe. However, moral truths are prescriptions for human flour
ishing and as such are grounded in evaluative more than empirical criteria.
There are no consensual standards about moral truth, no unassailable war
rant for ethical principles, no Archimedean point that corresponds to a
gods' eye view of good and evil, and no ahistorical, permanent framework
to which we can appeal to adjudicate conflicting claims of goodness or
Tightness.
The truth of the existence of the external world is independent of the per
ceiving subject, but the same cannot be said of ethical premises. Unlike nat
ural scientific claims, ethical premises cannot be evaluated as true or false,
except that what cannot be, should not be. Ethical premises make claims
akin to axioms in mathematics, but unlike mathematical axioms, are not
self-evident or universally recognized truths. Those few ethical premises
that are universally recognized truths are grounded in universal socio
emotional experiences. Even ethical premises that in the abstract, because
of their affective appeal, may have the status of universally recognized truths
such as "Don't kill the innocent" are not consensually validated in practice,
as is clearly the case with judgments concerning abortion.
Fundamental ethical premises, such as those that divide protagonists in
the culture wars, cannot be corroborated or disconfirmed and in that sense
they are not objective. However, they must be subject to coherent rational
and public criteria. Ethical premises that are not universally recognized as
true (and I think there are none) are arbitrary, in the sense of being subject
to individual or group discretion, but not in the sense of being inherently ir
rational. Although substantive moral claims are not made incorrigible by
formal criteria, the alternative to deontic objectivity and universalism is not
the radical relativism of postmodern subjectivity. Moral agents are obliged
to justify ethical judgments with principles derived from within their stand
point precisely because in this pluralistic world their truth is not self-evi-
dent. We are each both illuminated and blinded by our historicallyand
personallysituated standpoint. Moral judgments may, indeed must, be
supported with reasons, especially in the absence of consensus. Further
more, moral agents are obliged to seriously consider divergent standpoints,
normative claims, and theories of justification.
2. CONSTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE DISSENT 29

A Pluralist Sensibility: Tolerance and Its Limits

A pluralist sensibility and regard for cultural diversity urges caution in judging
the esthetic preferences or the conventions of another culture or individual as
repugnant or reprehensible, or its epistemology as irrational (Powers & Rich
ardson, 1996). One may find distasteful a culture's sleeping arrangements, or
which animals it chooses to sacrifice to its appetites or religious practices, or
whether it uses shaming or spanking to discipline its children, without finding
such practices morally reprehensible. Knowing that the limitations of one's
standpoint obscure certain features of reality to bring certain other features
into sharp focus mandates tolerance of opposing ideas.
Culture and context can alter the meaning, and therefore within limits
moderate the effects, of certain aversive or painful practices. The moral
force behind multiculturalism is based on its claim to enhance the rights and
respect given to marginalized groups within each society, as well as between
cultures, and not on a claim that all cultural norms and imperatives should
be treated as equally valid. When in the name of tolerance the culture con
struct sanctions oppressive and authoritarian power relationships, it diverts
attention from the dynamics of privilege and privation within a culture.
Practices that are good for some members of a given community may not be
good for all its members; what might have advanced the welfare of a culture
at one time may not now.
An acceptance of antinomies (contradiction between two principles that
both seem equally necessary and valid) should engender tolerance of stand
points that contradict one's own, a tolerance, however, that must have lim
its by those who view oppression as a fundamental moral evil. For example,
practices such as female genital mutilation, bride burning, and dowry
deaths, even when rooted in cultural traditions and buttressed by moral be
liefs, exceed boundaries of tolerance for diversity by anyone who opposes op
pression, whether their opposition is grounded in deontological principles,
substantive teleological reasoning, or neo-Marxist thought.
MORALITY, CHARACTER FORMATION,
AND MORAL/CHARACTER EDUCATION
The perspective I bring to bear on morality, character formation, and char
acter education although rooted in dialectical materialist epistemology in its
acceptance of antinomies and emphasis on praxis, is also indebted to educa
tors such as Montessori, Dewey, and Durkheim.

Morality and Character Formation

I define morality broadly as the evaluative dimension of human behavior
rather than more narrowly as a domain of social judgment, or reducible to a
3O BAUMRIND

unifying principle such as justice, love, or duty. Morality concerns questions

of virtue, character, the good life, and the good society, with an emphasis on
obligatory rules of conduct. The province of morality is how one should live
one's life, how one should govern one's behavior. By "one" I mean primarily
oneself, although "should" extends the obligation to others similarly situ
ated, which implies generalizability and enlightened partiality (but not
universalizability and impartiality). A person is moral to the extent that eth
ical considerations are salient and readily activated for processing informa
tion and arriving at tacit or intentional decisions. So that moral "shoulds"
will in fact guide and motivate one's praxis, such ideals should be realizable
and tied to human welfare concerning what is good for people situated in
real time and place. Ethical concepts are created by human beings about
themselves to preserve and promote their human capabilities, lessen their
suffering and anomie, and bring direction, structure, and meaning to their
lives and activities.
From a neo-Marxist standpoint that places a premium on praxis (i.e., ac
tion informed by knowledge) as central to morality, the formal criteria of
prescriptivity and primacy, but not universalizability and impartiality, are
constitutive. Prescriptivity mandates an internal duty, preferably by inclina
tion, to act in a certain way. Normative judgments are prescriptive, that is
about what should be rather than about what is, but should encompass vir
tues and values that are realizable, and consistent with human nature.Pri
macy places a premium on the moral dimension of praxis. A moral person
experiences ethical directives as internally coercive and consistent claims
on the self to act virtuously. Moral agents accept responsibility for the effects
their actions have on others and on their own long-range well-being. The
moral relevance of intentions resides primarily in the good or evil they lead
agents to cause. In one of Bill Watterson's morally instructive cartoon strips,
Calvin asked Hobbes, "Do you think our morality is defined by our actions,
or by what is in our hearts?" Hobbes replied, "I think our actions show what is
in our hearts." When we excuse evil actions on the basis of good intentions
we condescend to do so on the basis that the actor is immature and therefore
not yet privy to the responsibilities or rights of a developed moral agent.
Unlike the related constructs of temperament and personality, the con
struct of character has moral connotations. When the moral connotation is
explicit, character may be thought of as personality evaluated, as the moral
estimate of an individual. Character is that aspect of personality that engen
ders accountability, is responsible for persistence in the face of obstacles, and
inhibits impulses in the service of a more remote or other-oriented goal that
the individual values. Character provides the structure of internal law that
governs inner thoughts and volitions subject to the agent's control under
the jurisdiction of conscience. A person's character includes sentiments of
righteous indignation, and conscious pursuit of justice for oneself and oth
2. CONSTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE DISSENT 31

ers, as well as of compassion and love, emotional reactions of remorse and

shame, disinterested loyalty and the conscious pursuit of order, solidarity, fit'
ness, and well-being. This inclusive perspective on character is consistent
with Durkheim's (1925/1973) approach to character formation. Character
formation is concerned with development of virtues. A virtue is a habit one
develops by consistently choosing and acting on the good. Virtues are be
havioral tendencies and dispositions to act in certain ways across many, but
not necessarily all, contexts. Character educators seek to foster an environ
ment conducive to the development of virtuous habits in children. Habits,
according to Hume (1739/1960), are customs of the mind, acquired mental
functions supported by sentiments resulting in patterns of conduct that are
reinforced by repetition.

Moral/Character Education
Character education in the classroom is a daunting and controversial en
deavor. How are children to be introduced to the complexities of moral deci
sion making? When, if ever, is lying, stealing, or killing justified? Is it right to
lie to protect family secrets? What, if anything, justifies placing corporate-
sponsored materials and products in the school? Are parents justified in re
stricting the freedom of children in ways they cannot restrict each others'
freedom? How is Virginia Durr to be judged when her work together with
her husband in fighting discrimination in the South was done at the expense
of severely neglecting the emotional needs of her own children (see Colby &
Damon, 1992, chap. 5, "Virginia Durr: Champion of Justice," pp. 91-133) ?
Moral/character education is concerned with character formation, or the
development of virtuous habits in children. To an outside observer, the
moral education and character education movements appear to ground
their educational strategies and view of virtue in divergent political ideolo
gies that pit liberals against conservatives in the culture wars. The character
education movement inclines toward a "traditionalist" or conservative view
of education as transmitting received wisdom, emphasizing the critical role
adults play in reinforcing the virtuous habits that from a traditionalist per
spective comprise good character. The moral education movement is "pro
gressive" or liberal in its rejection of directive pedagogy, believing that the
school's moral atmosphere and how teachers treat children contribute more
to their level of moral development than directed recitation of the right an
swers. In the Platonic Kohlbergian tradition, the liberal moral education
movement tends to be constructivist in its emphasis on cognition and So
cratic methods of teaching, whereas the conservative character education
movement, in the Aristotelian tradition, tends to be behaviorist in its em
phasis on behavioral control processes by which virtuous habits of obedi
ence, loyalty, and diligence are instilled through extrinsic motivation,
32 BAUMRIND

exhortation, and strict enforcement of rules of conduct. The virtues valued

most highly by the character education movement promote order and sta
bility of the status quo, whereas the virtues most prized by the moral educa
tion movement promote critique and transformation.
The earliest character education movement of the first three decades of
the 20th century embraced a clearly traditional perspective, favoring a
top'down structure and teaching methods. They used didactic indoctri'
nation of "10 laws of right living"self-control, good health, kindness,
sportsmanship, self-reliance, duty, reliability, truth, good workmanship,
and teamwork. Their conservative ideology was evident in the virtues they
omittedcritical thought, courage, independence, and integrity. The re
sults of the Character Education Inquiry under the direction of Hartshorne
and May (1928-1930) concluded, according to Kohlberg (1970), that
these heavily didactic programs that sought to indoctrinate children
against cheating and lying and to encourage helping behavior had no posi
tive long-range effects on conduct.
The virtues prized most highly by today's traditional educators such as
Wynne (1997) and Bennet (1993) are similar to those of their progenitors.
Self-control, duty, diligence, cooperativeness, obedience, and loyalty are to
be inculcated by uncritical transmission and drilling of a fixed doctrine.
Teachers in for-character schools today (Wynne &.Ryan, 1993) like earlier
character educators, rely heavily on extrinsic rewards and punishment to
shape children's thoughts as well as their behavior and are highly directive,
manipulative, and psychologically controlling. Their traditionalist perspec
tive appears intended to promote a conservative social ideology in support
of the status quo, with a focus on "fixing the kids" rather than on social
structural inequities that contribute to bad behavior. Objective research on
the effects of for-character schools has yet to be done.
Wynne (1997) cited Jamie Escalante as "a striking instance of a successful
for-character teacher" (p. 67). However, I would call Escalante "authorita
tive" in his educational approach, rather than a "for-character" teacher (see
Matthews, 1988), in that he balanced high demands for achievement and
self-control with respect and responsiveness to the individual needs of each
child. Escalante served as a model of successful achievement without loss of
cultural or personal identity. Still within a traditional framework Lickona's
(1991) comprehensive approach to character education, in my view, is also
more authoritative than it is authoritarian. Lickona construes character edu
cation as intentional proactive efforts to develop virtuous qualities of charac
ter. He set forth a tripartite schema of valuesmoral knowledge, moral
feeling, and moral behaviorand then proposed a comprehensive character
education model consisting of 12 mutually supportive strategies intended to
encompass the total moral life of the school: The teacher acts as a caregiver,
moral model, and moral mentor; creates a caring classroom community using
2. CONSTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE DISSENT 33

discipline as a tool for developing self-regulation, moral reasoning, and re

spect; provides many opportunities for student input; promotes ethical reflec
tion on values as issues arise in the classroom; and teaches nonhostile conflict
resolution. Parents and community leaders are recruited as partners in ex
tending students' caring beyond the classroom. Lickona (1996) offered evi
dence from within the program that this comprehensive approach to fostering
virtuous character has been successful in achieving the goals he sets forth.
However, evidence by objective critics is not yet available.
From a liberal or "progressive" perspective, duty, obedience, and loyalty
unmitigated by constructive dissent are problematic attributes. Two early
"progressive" approaches to moral education rejected indoctrination of re
ceived wisdom: values clarification (Raths, Harmin, & Simon, 1966), a val-
ues-neutral approach that enjoyed popular favor in schools; and Kohlberg's
(1970) cognitive-developmental approach, which won the acclaim of
scholars. Both were studied intensively and, according to Leming (1997),
converged on the following rather pessimistic conclusions: The values clari
fication approach had a success rate in the 0 to 20% range on a wide array of
dependent child outcomes; Kohlberg's moral discussion approach often
found the hypothesized changes in moral reasoning, but did not report sig
nificant changes in social or moral character or conduct.
The Character Education Project (Schaps, Battistich, & Solomon,
1997) exemplifies a modern program embracing a progressive perspective
that has been systematically evaluated by an integrated team of insiders
and outsiders (Benninga et al., 1991). It features the creation of a caring
community that exposes students to prosocial examples and cooperative
learning activities, with an intentional focus on involving children in help
ing relationships. In accord with its liberal philosophy it seeks to promote a
democratic consciousness and respect for the dignity, moral agency, and
individuality of each child. School incidents and literature are used to de
velop respect and sensitivity. Student-centered discipline is used to foster
students' moral reasoning and self-regulation. According to Leming
(1993), the results for student behavior were mixed with no difference in
incidence of negative behavior and with a program effect in the third-
grade sample but not the fourth-grade sample on spontaneous prosocial
behavior. Students were found to score higher than control students on
sensitivity and use of conflict resolution strategies. However, positive be
haviors did not generalize outside the program classrooms, suggesting that
the effects were largely situation-specific.

You Can't Say You Can't Play

I would like to see further developed and evaluated an intriguing experi

ment in character/moral education oblique to the conservative-liberal or
34 BAUMRIND

traditionalprogressive polarities represented by the programs already dis

cussed. In an effort to combat the exclusion and bullying that create a mor
ally toxic atmosphere in most schools, unless adults strongly intervene in
the peer culture, Paley (1992) posted an announcement that read You
Cant Say You Can't Play. Most of her young students reacted with disbelief
and protest. What will happen to friendship if you cannot pick and choose
with whom you will play? How can it be fair for a teacher to interfere with
peer play not only in the classroom, but in the school yard? By attacking
the evil of exclusion, Paley inflicted a particular moral atmosphere on her
students, against the will of most, with the exception, of course, of those
who were excluded. There was nothing democratic about the imposition
by an adult authority of a rule the legitimacy of which the children ques
tioned. However, Paley did more than make and unilaterally enforce a con
troversial rule that many of her students regarded as an illegitimate
exercise of teacher authority. She sustained a dialogue throughout the year
on the legitimacy and meaning of the rule. She created a moral problem
with deep meaning and strong affect, provoking children to reflect on the
existential experience of loneliness and rejection, the human conse
quences of the unthinking cruelty children inflict on each other, and the
responsibilities and rights of authorities in relation to their youthful
charges. Paley's rule, although never enforced with punishment, expressed
unambiguously the moral sentiment and belief of a valued adult, providing
a useful perspective from which children could view their actions and ex
amine their social beliefs. By encouraging discussions about the legitimacy
and meaning of her rule Paley not only forced children to develop nonex
clusionary ways to define friendship, but provoked a need for them to em
ploy moral reasoning to critique an adult-imposed rule.

The Authoritative Classroom

From both Leming's (1993,1997) and Benninga's (1997) accounts it would
appear that past moral/character education efforts have not been notably
successful. Leming (1993) cautioned against both the traditionalist ap
proach of Wynne's for-character schools (Wynne & Ryan, 1993) and the
progressive approach of values clarification on the basis that neither was
likely to change values or character-related behaviors. Benninga's account
suggested that the more effective programs share some of the characteristics
found in optimally competent parentsthey are neither authoritarian nor
permissive, but instead are authoritative in their disciplinary methods and
relationships with students. Wentzel (2002) applied Baumrind's (1991)
parenting dimensions of control, maturity demands, democratic communi
cation, and nurturance to understanding teachers' influence on student ad
justment in middle school. She found that these dimensionsin particular
2. CONSTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE DISSENT 35

adolescent-perceived high maturity demands and nurturanceconsis-

tently predicted student motivation and prosocial behavior for boys and
girls, and for African Americans and European American children.
In describing the Montessori method, Rambusch (1962) illustrated the way
in which authoritative control can be used to resolve the antithesis between
pleasure and duty, and between freedom and responsibility in the classroom:

The discipline resides in three areas in a Montessori classroom: it resides in the envi
ronment itself which is controlled; in the teacher herself who is controlled and is ready
to assume an authoritarian role if it is necessary; and from the very beginning it resides
in the children. It is a three-way arrangement, as opposed to certain types of American
education in which all of the authority is vested in the teacher, or where, in the carica
ture of permissive education, all of the authority is vested in the children, (pp. 49-50)

When a child has finished his work he is free to put it away, he is free to initiate new
work or, in certain instances, he is free to not work. But he is not free to disturb or de
stroy what others are doing ... It is largelya question of balance. In a Montessori class
room the teacher does not delude herself into believing that her manipulation of the
children represents their consensus of what they would like to do. If she is manipulat
ing them insofar as she is determining arbitrarily that this must be done at this time,
she is cognizant of what she is doing, which the child may or may not be. (p. 51)

The importance of the responsibility in selecting matter for the child to learn is placed
in the hands of those adults who are aware of what the culture will demand of the child
and who are able to "program" learning in such a way that what is suitable for the
child's age and stage of development is also learnable and pleasurable to him. (p. 63)

Intuition and Affect in Moral/Character Education

To understand and encourage moral praxis it is necessary to recruit intuitive
and emotional as well as cognitive processes. Amoral intuition is a sudden ap
pearance in consciousness of a moral judgment that something is good or
bad without any conscious awareness of searching, weighing evidence, and
inferring a conclusion. Intuition occurs effortlessly and automatically by a
process not accessible to consciousness, whereas reasoning occurs more
slowly, requires effort, and involves steps, most of which are accessible to
consciousness.
Haidt (2001) presented a reasoned case with some empirical support
that for most people the default process for handling moral judgments is
typically habitual, automatic, and intuitive, occurring outside of con
sciousness. Haidt argued with evidence that moral action covaries more
with intuitive cognitions and moral emotions than with moral reasoning,
and that people rely on their moods and flashes of feeling as guides when
making decisions in daily life, reserving fully conscious cognitive judg
36 BAUMRIND

ments for circumstances when feelings are conflicted, or when they are
called on to justify their intuitively arrived at decisions (e.g., Bargh &
Chartrand, 1999; Haidt &Hersh, 2001; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Thus
the informational assumption about when life begins is arguably an ex post
facto justification for an already fully formed and deeply felt intuition
about whether abortion is ever morally acceptable.
Moral emotions such as empathy and moral indignation often impel ac
tion where cognitive reflection alone might not. In the eloquent words of
Mario Savio, "There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes
so odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can't take part... And you've
got to put your bodies on the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers,
upon all the apparatus and you've got to make it stop" (Goines, 1993, p.
361). Such visceral intuitions, however, are clearly affected by ideology, that
is a coherent examined system of factual statements and value judgments.
This was certainly true for Savio, whose socialist ideology was formed by a
liberal Catholic education and training in political philosophy. Similarly my
critique of deceptive research practices (Baumrind, 1964), in particular,
Milgram's (1963) research, was fueled by moral outrage at the indignities
Milgram and his confederates inflicted on his subjects. I argued that
Milgram's research was characterized by the very dehumanizing processes it
was designed to investigate and that his student confederates exemplified
the destructive obedience that Milgram labeled as "shockingly immoral" in
his paid volunteers. My vigorous objection to deceptive research practices
was clearly emotive, but not merely emotive, because it was rationally justi
fied by an articulated system of metaethical and normative considerations
(Baumrind, 1975, 1992).
The descriptive claim that moral reasoning is less often the cause of moral
judgment or conduct than intuitive affect-laden automatic processes is not a
prescriptive statement that moral judgments should be made intuitively and
automatically. In fact, a prime objective of moral educators should be to en
courage children to value rationality, justification, and critical evaluation of
conducttheir own, their peers', their parents', and their teachers'. Moral
educators want children to be motivated by prosocial moral emotions such
as empathy and moral indignation, and to acquire reliable habits of good
moral character. However, for children to develop as responsible moral
agents and to be able to speak truth to power, they must learn how to reflect
on and take responsibility for regulating their own conduct and the conse
quences of their intended actions. Although much of what we think of as
moral judgment occurs outside of conscious awareness and is the result of
what Tocqueville (1969) called "habits of the heart" (p. 287), the develop
ment of virtuous habits requires exercise of rational judgment. The expres
sion of Aristotelian virtues requires the capacity to judge what is the right
thing to do at the right time in the right way in the right place. Because they
2. CONSTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE DISSENT 37

state prescriptive preemptive obligations to act in a certain way, which are

intended to bind oneself and may be extended to others, ethical statements
are not merely emotive personal expressions. Without trained reasoning
even those naturally inclined by a benign disposition reinforced by devoted
caregivers cannot be counted on to control hurtful desires and emotions
that might be generated by new circumstances.

Moral Disengagement, Rationalization,

and Hypocricy
Perceived self-efficacy in which people believe that they can bring about
good outcomes and impede bad outcomes by their actions is critical to moral
agency. Bandura (1999) and his colleagues (Bandura, Caprara,
Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001) have examined the mechanisms
people use to disavow a sense of personal agency, and to disengage moral
control by justifying inhumane conduct, disregarding or minimizing the in
jurious effects of their actions, and dehumanizing those who are victimized.
Tsang (2002) recently proposed a model of moral rationalization, the cogni
tive process by which individuals convince themselves that their behavior
does not violate their moral standards. Her analysis helps explain why chil
dren in the Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) studies would not necessarily
have interpreted their actions as dishonest, but rather as acceptably disobe
dient. Batson and colleagues (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, &
Wilson, 1997) examined moral hypocrisy, which they defined as the pre
tense of being in accord with one's own principles of right and wrong con
duct without actually acting accordingly. When faced with completing a
boring task or assigning it to the confederate, very few of the 80 female un
dergraduates studied chose an alternative to self-interest. The participants
typically assigned the boring tasks to the confederate rather than to them
selves, even though most judged that either favoring the other or flipping a
coin would be the right thing to do.
The conclusion I draw from these lines of research on moral disengage
ment, rationalization, and hypocrisy is not that people are merely self-serv-
ing, but rather that for most people much of the time moral principles lack
sufficient intrinsic motivating power to govern conduct, even when these
principles as abstractions are internalized. At every level of cognitive moral
development, opportunities to preserve the sense of moral self without act
ing on one's moral beliefs and principles present themselves. Kohlberg
(1978) himself later concluded that merely raising the level of moral reason
ing does not improve moral behavior. Extrinsic rewards and punishments,
including the disapproval and approbation of others, and the desire to please
powerful authorities or conform to the wishes of valued peers remain, even
for adults, important motivating factors in attaining moral identity.
38 BAUMRIND

SOCIALIZATION AND THE DISCIPLINARY

ENCOUNTER
I now consider the socializing role of adults in the development of children's
competencies and moral character.

Agency and Communion in Optimal Competence

and Character
Character is what it takes to will the good, and competence to do good well.
Competence broadly defined is effective human functioning in attainment of
personally desired and culturally valued goals. Within limits imposed by
their competencies, circumstances, and cultures, moral agents are able to
plan their actions and implement their plans; examine and choose among
options; and structure their lives by adopting congenial habits, attitudes,
and rules of conduct.
Optimal competence and moral character require an integrated balance
within the individual of two fundamental interpenetrating modalities of hu
man existencecommunion and agency. Communion refers to the drive to
be of service and connected that manifests itself in caring, cooperative be
havior. Agency is the drive for independence, individuality, and mastery that
manifests itself in assertive, dominant behavior (Bakan, 1966). Unmitigated
by the other, agency or communion is maladaptive: Agency unmitigated by
communion marks the egoistic individualist whose lack of concern for oth
ers eventually elicits reciprocated harm to the self; communion unmitigated
by agency is self-abnegating at best, and at worst characterizes converts who
are willing to destroy or be destroyed to serve their in-group. Both compli
ance, as an aspect of communion, and aggression as an aspect of agency, can
be functional or dysfunctional, depending on how well each modality is inte
grated with the other in practice.

Functional and Dysfunctional Compliance and Aggression

In children behavioral compliance and self-assertiveness are socially desir
able behavioral tendencies, whereas dispositional compliance and hostile
aggression are problematic.
Behavioral compliance requires adapting one's actions to conform with the
direction of another, whereas the attribute of dispositional compliance refers
to the internalization of the norm of compliance to established authority
and committed acceptance of the norms of the preceding generation. Auto
matic or total compliance is not the mark of a competent or securely at
tached child (Matas, Arend, & Sroufe, 1978), and rigid compliance, often
present in young children of abusive parents (Crittenden & DiLalla, 1988),
is associated with internalizing problem behavior (Kuczynski & Kochanska,
1990). Therefore, although a moderate to high level of behavioral compli
2. CONSTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE DISSENT 39

ance from young children is desirable and functional from any standpoint,
the desirability of encouraging the development of dispositional compliance
in children is more open to dispute because, when predominant, this attrib
ute may result in dysfunctional obedience to unjust authority (Baumrind,
1996), as well as be a sign of insecurity.
Bold children are less dispositionally compliant, which means that they
are more likely across contexts to test the limits of adult authority and to re
quire forceful parental intervention to secure behavioral compliance,
whereas fearful children are more malleable and easily conditioned to in
hibit transgression (Dienstbier, 1984). Kochanska distinguished between
situational compliance (where children cooperate for instrumental reasons,
but without commitment) and committed compliance (where children ea
gerly embrace the caregiver's agenda). In Kochanska's study committed
compliance, which I view as a likely index of dispositional compliance, was
associated with children's fearfulness and shyness when they were required
to suppress prohibited behavior (Kochanska, Coy, & Murray, 2001). A high
level of situational or behavioral compliance is not necessarily an index of
dispositional compliance.
The importance of reducing children's level of noncompliance depends
on the type of noncompliance. Clinical psychologists focus on defiant non
compliance, whereas developmental psychologists focus on more functional
types and levels of noncompliance (Kuczynski & Hildebrandt, 1997;
Kuczynski & Kochanska, 1990). From both perspectives, a moderate to high
level of behavioral or situational compliance in young children is optimal,
although some types of noncompliance are more functional than others. For
example, refusals by young children that have self-assertion rather than op
position as their primary goal are more competent forms of noncompliance
(Crockenberg &. Litman, 1990). Less skillful expressions of noncompliance,
such as passive-aggressive noncompliance and direct defiance decrease
with age, whereas more skillful expressions, such as simple refusal without
defiance and negotiation, increase with age (Kuczynski, Kochanska,
Radke-Yarrow, & Girnius-Brown, 1987).
The task of bringing behavioral or situational compliance in the home to
normal levels is a crucial initial step for decreasing other forms of oppo
sitional and antisocial behavior (Barkley, 1981; Loeber StSchmaling, 1985;
Lorber & Patterson, 1981). Behaviorist clinicians such as Patterson (1997)
have shown that before parents can begin to have a positive influence on in
creasing children's prosocial behavior and decreasing their referral problems
(e.g., aggression, noncompliance with medical regimens), children must re
duce their level of noncompliance with parental directives to normal levels,
which from a young child when the mother is present is less than 30%. A
higher level of noncompliance with adults' directives, especially defiant
noncompliance, presages later school difficulties, impoverished moral inter
nalization and greater antisocial behavior (Kochanska & Aksan, 1995;
4O BAUMRIND

Loeber & Schmaling, 1985; Lytton, Watts, &Dunn, 1986; Patterson, Reid,
&Dishion, 1992).
Juvenile antisocial conduct disorderwith its features of defiance, de
ceitfulness, lack of remorse, impulsivity, and offensive aggressionis a pre
cursor of adult criminality; by contrast developmentally normative
oppositional behavior in 2-year-olds and adolescents is not (see Hinshaw &
Anderson, 1996). Agentic dispositional tendencies including divergent in
telligence, competitiveness, and willingness to dissent are aspects of compe
tence and manifestations of self-efficacy, even though such attributes may
conflict with the internalization of some societal norms and perhaps what
Kochanska refers to as committed compliance.
Just as dispositional compliance is not necessarily adaptive or virtuous,
aggression in children is not necessarily dysfunctional or wicked.
Berkowitz (1983) distinguished between instrumental aggression that is
strategic and not fueled by anger, which he found to be adaptive, and hostile
aggression that is emotionally charged, nonstrategic, and generally coun
terproductive. Pulkkinen (1987) distinguished between offensive and de
fensive aggression. She found that children who at age 14 aggressed
offensively (without being attacked first) at age 20 were characterized by
weak self-control and violent criminal behavior. In contrast, children who
at age 14 only aggressed defensively (after being provoked) were not char
acterized by an aggressive personality pattern, and in fact manifested good
self-control and school adjustment.
Confrontational conflict need not involve hostile aggression. Conflict is a
state of opposition or resistance between people. Conflict will have construc
tive or destructive consequences, depending on how it is manifested and
managed. Mismanaged conflict by parents will often elicit hostile aggression,
resentment, or disengagement from children. Especially during adolescence,
constructive engagement in reciprocal communication fosters adaptive con
flict resolution (Walker & Taylor, 1991). Unfortunately, too often during ado
lescence parents disengage or use developmentally inappropriate unilateral
power assertion when adolescents assert themselves forcefully as autonomous
agents (Sternberg & Dobson, 1987). Resolution of parent-adolescent con
flicts may remain unresolved when issues that parents see as prudential or
moral and therefore by right and responsibility under their jurisdiction are
perceived by adolescents to be in the personal domain and therefore by right
under their own jurisdiction (Smetana, 1995).
When parents respond to adolescents' demands for a greater measure of in
dependence and self-reliance with either coercion or disengagement rather
than with negotiation or reasoned authority, adolescents may react by defying
parental authority or by distancing themselves emotionally. Secure attach
ment to parents and trustworthy mentors optimizes the developmental goal of
individuation during adolescence, as it does in infancy. When children and
adolescents test limits they often are seeking more intimacy, not more emo
2. CONSTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE DISSENT 41

tional autonomy. Emotional autonomy may be a healthy expression of per

sonal agency furthering adolescent self-reliance and individuation (Steinberg
& Silverberg, 1986), or it may be an expression of detachment and a result of
parent-adolescent estrangement (Ryan &. Lynch, 1989).

Autonomy
How the concept of autonomy is construed is central to moral politics and
educational philosophy and practice. Piagetian autonomy emphasizes
self-governance and internal regulation and is contrasted with heteronomy
or being controlled by external constraints that are perceived as fixed and
imperative. In communitarian thought autonomy is contrasted with social
order rather than with heteronomy. Communitarian autonomy is equated
with an overemphasis on individual rights and an underemphasis on social
responsibility, and order with the social responsibilities and unifying bonds
that ensure the common good. The stated aim of the communitarian agenda
(Etzioni, 1993, 2000) is to balance the claims of individual conscience and
rights, which Etzioni believes the current American milieu overemphasizes,
with the collective moral voice of the community to which the individual
owes allegiance.
Durkheim's element of autonomy in his theory of moral education em
braces a unity of opposites consistent with the Hegelian (Hegel, 1821/1952)
and Marxist (Marx, 1845/1941, 1858/1971) dialectic by synthesizing
self-determination with heteronomy and order. Moral education, according
to Durkheim (1925/1973), requires the development of three basic ele
ments of moral character that make for dependability: discipline, attach
ment, and autonomy. Discipline consists of two character traits, (a) a
preference for regularity to be developed by structure and regimen in the
classroom and home, and (b) a preference for moderation, or respect for the
impersonal Tightness of moral rules over personal disposition, as this right
ness is conveyed by a worthy educator. The second aspect of moral educa
tion, according to Durkheim, is attachment to the social group through the
faculty of empathy, which by identification with the pain and pleasure of
others can enable the student to become altruistic and socially engaged. The
third element, autonomy or self-determination, develops as the rules of soci
ety are internalized by the child. For Durkheim, these moral rules are not ini
tially self-chosen but, instead, are the rules of the educator who rationally
explains to the student the need for obeying these particular moral rules in
this particular society, and when necessary uses punishment to signal clear
disapproval of the violation of these rules. Thus for Durkheim as for Marx
(1858/1971), freedom is the appreciation of necessity. Discipline, first outer
and then inner, by channeling energy into pursuit of determinate and valued
goals consistent with the needs of others, is the precondition of, not the ob
stacle to, freedom, happiness, and self-determination.
42 BAUMRIND

Durkheim equated autonomy with rational understanding of moral rules,

requiring of teachers that they neither preach nor indoctrinate but instead ex
plain the reasons for rules to children to obtain their "enlightened assent." He
emphasized social conditioning as the source of morality and character forma'
tion in children. In his later years, Kohlberg (1978) adopted much of
Durkheim's theory of moral education, even going beyond Durkheim to state
that moral education can properly be a form of "indoctrination" without vio
lating children's rights, provided that children are involved in the rule-mak-
ing and value-upholding process. Although Durkheim did not consider the
circumstances when constructive dissent should be encouraged in children,
he did so with adults. Durkheim's belief in the need for obligatory rules did not
imply uncritical obedience to the status quo, and in fact Durkheim believed
fervently in progressive evolution (see Wallwork, 1972, p. 171, on Durkheim)
and celebrated the civil disobedience of enlightened individuals such as Soc
rates and Jesus. He argued that criticism of public opinion or established rules
by adults is required when these undermine social solidarity and peaceful co
existence or when they retard progress to a better future state of society. For
children, however, Durkheim viewed education as virtually synonymous with
socialization, an influence exerted by the adult generation to develop in chil
dren the intellectual and moral states required by society as a whole and the
social groups of which a child is a member.

Socialization
Socialization is generally thought of as an adult-initiated process by which
young persons through education, training, and imitation, acquire their cul
ture and the habits and values congruent with adaptation to that culture.
Through the disciplinary encounter, caregivers attempt to induce children
to comply with adult standards of proper conduct. Properly conceived, the
aim of the disciplinary encounter is to control children's short-term behav
ior and to influence, but not determine, their long-term behavior. Although
defiance is thought to characterize certain periods of development, namely
the negativism of the "terrible twos" and individuation during adolescence,
the dialectical interchange between obedience and resistance to authority
remains an ongoing theme in adultchild interaction.
The short-range objective of the exercise of parental authority is to main
tain order in the family subordinated, however, to parents' ultimate objec
tive, which is to further children's development from a dependent infant
into a self-determining, socially responsible, morally agentic adult. The con
temporary discipline controversy has resurrected a false polarization be
tween a hierarchical paternalistic authoritarian model that places
obedience as the cornerstone in the foundation of character (Hyles, 1972)
and a child-centered rights position that demands for children the same
2. CONSTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE DISSENT 43

civil rights as possessed by adults (Cohen, 1980). The current reincarnation

of the false binary opposition between freedom and constraint in
childrearing centers on the proper role of punishment, particularly spank
ing, in the socialization of children. Within this polarity, current anti-
spanking rhetoric (e.g., Hyman, 1990; Straus, 1994) is countered by
Christian fundamentalist defense of strict and sometimes punitive parental
authority (e.g., Dobson, 1992; Hyles, 1972). Neither pole offers parents or
teachers an efficacious model of childrearing today, any more than it did 30
years ago when I developed the authoritative model as a constructive syn
thesis of the valid insights contained in the authoritarian and the permissive
models. Both binary opposites contain a germ of truth: The liberal permis
sive model, that autonomy and self-will are to be cultivated, not punished;
the conservative authoritarian model, that in the interest of social order, dis
cipline, sometimes confrontational and strict, is required to socialize the
child's natural egoistic willfulness. However, each polarized model
demonizes the other by failing to distinguish between mitigated and unmiti
gated agency or communion. The authoritarian model tends to equate will
fulness and individuality with unmitigated egoistic aggression, and the
permissive model tends to equate behavioral compliance to legitimate au
thority with submissiveness and destructive obedience.
Traditional socialization theories of childrearing and education implicitly
assume that the primary goal of parents and educators is to achieve maximum
levels of compliance and internalization of adult values. However, not all
adults or socialization researchers (e.g., Baumrind, 1983,1987,1996;Grusec,
Goodnow, &Kuczynski, 2000), assume that uncritical internalization of soci-
ety's rules is the prime objective of childrearing or even a worthy one: When
adults' demands are just and their authority is legitimate, a reasonable level of
conformity to adult rules is desirable and necessary, especially when the child
is young. However, when the child's developmental needs or objectives con
flict with adults' demands, or adults' demands are unjust or exceed their legiti
mate authority, children's competence and moral maturity are appropriately
expressed by resistance. Because socialization represents the accommodative
force in society, the disciplinary encounter, indeed socialization itself, has lim
ited (although necessary) objectives.
Internalization by one generation of the rules of the preceding generation
represents the conservative force in society, whereas the impetus for progres
sive social transformation comes about by the challenges each generation
presents to the accepted values, rules, and habits of the previous generation.
For parents who want their children to be able and willing to take initiative,
negotiate differences, and oppose injustice, behavioral compliance is a neces
sary but by no means sufficient long-range childrearing objective. For such
parents, effective childrearing practices will balance a demand for behavioral
compliance (which may require power-assertive confrontation) with oppor
44 BAUMRIND

tunities for negotiation and autonomous choice. Moderate power assertion,

including use of mild physical or other punishment, in contrast to love with
drawal, can achieve behavioral control without being psychologically intru
sive. Psychological control, which includes love withdrawal, unlike power-
assertive confrontation, uses subtle manipulation to induce dispositional
compliance by covertly managing children's affect and attitudes.
Authoritative disciplinary strategies combine reasoning and responsive
ness with overt moderate power assertion to encourage both constructive
obedience and responsible dissent. Authoritative parents and educators
clearly express their values, enforce directives, and make appropriate de
mands for mature behavior. By joint use of extrinsic reinforcers and rational
justification of negotiable demands, authoritative caregivers attempt to both
promote children's legitimate striving for autonomy and direct their behavior.
The authoritative model has much in common with the advice given to par
ents by the Soviet Marxist educator Makarenko (1954), who was as widely
read and acclaimed in the Soviet bloc as Spock was in the United States.
Bronfenbrenner, a fluent Russian speaker, became familiar with Makarenko's
work about the same time as I did, bringing his ideas to the attention of Amer
ican families in an influential book in which he contrasted the individualistic
ideology of the world of childhood in the United States with the collectivist
ideology of the Soviet Union (Bronfenbrenner, 1970).
Makarenko's (1954) basic thesis was that optimal personality and moral
development occur through productive activity with a structured regimen
enforced by reasoned and just sanctions in an atmosphere of unconditional
commitment infused with affection. Makarenko emphasized the moral re
sponsibilities of parents and educators in nourishing children as they would
fruit, not flowers:
In our day it has been said that children are "flowers of life." That is good. But rash-
minded, sentimental people have not taken the trouble to think over the meaning of
these beautiful words. Once children are described as "flowers," it means to such
people that we should do nothing but go into raptures over them, make a fuss of
them, smell them, sigh over them. Perhaps they even think we should teach the flow
ers themselves that they are a fragile and "luxury" bouquet ... The "flowers of life"
should not be imagined as a "luxury" bouquet in a Chinese vase on your tables ...
No, our children are not flowers of that kind at all. Our children blossom on the liv
ing trunk of our life; they are not a bouquet, they are a wonderful apple orchard ....
Do not be afraid of it, shake it around a bit, let even the flowers feel a little uncom
fortable, (pp. 19-20)

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
To evaluate rationally the outcomes resulting from character education pro
grams their desired outcomes in furthering children's morality and character
2. CONSTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE DISSENT 45

development must first be made explicit. What is meant by moral education

in a classroom context? Do any efforts to promote desirable behavior and re
duce undesirable behavior qualify? Should the goals of character education
be pursued deliberately or left as part of an implicit hidden agenda? Should
moral educators attempt to shape students' behavior by explicitly inculcat
ing the values that generate that behavior? If so how does one establish a
community consensus on which values should be inculcated? These are
questions I leave to moral educators to answer, as they must, to proceed with
and evaluate their efforts.
The classroom is meant to provide a bridge between the personal affec
tive morality of the family and the impersonal morality of political society.
The material conditions of a classroom compared to a family milieu require a
much higher level of behavioral compliance and conformity from children.
These functional virtues are cultivated in the classroom both to maintain an
orderly environment conducive to learning and to prepare the child for the
impersonal demands of the outside world. Because of pupil heterogeneity,
high child-to-teacher ratio, and the educational objective of imparting re
ceived wisdom, teachers are required to maintain order through a struc
tured regimen and when necessary unilateral power assertion. Because
children are required to comply and obey so much of the time it is important
for teachers to provide opportunities for creative expression and construc
tive dissent, as Paley did when she unilaterally proposed and enforced a rule
to which her students objected. School structure necessarily provides chil
dren with abundant opportunity to practice habits of duty, diligence,
self-regulation, and self-control. It takes active efforts on the part of teach
ers to offer children equal opportunities to exercise moral agency, nonhostile
self-assertion, and critical thought. In particular, teachers must be sensitive
and responsive to expressions of moral indignation in children when di
rected at what they experience as unjust power assertion by adults or more
powerful peers. Although the depth of love and individual attention appro
priate in the home setting is not appropriate or sustainable in the typical
classroom, it is important for teachers to keep in mind that children flourish
best in a caring teaching community.
The moral atmosphere of an authoritative classroom is respectful of the
student and provides abundant opportunities for the development of demo
cratic skills through interactive discussions and participation in elaborating
the norms that govern their conduct, but its governance is hierarchical, not
equalitarian. Authoritative teachers will have mastered their subject mat
ter, be responsive to reasoned criticism, and have intimate knowledge of the
developmental and individual needs of their students. They, not the stu
dents, will remain in charge of the curriculum and rules governing children's
conduct. They will cultivate such habits of the mind and heart as critical
thought, the courage to protest perceived injustice, and self-assertive ere
46 BAUMRIND

ative expression that will enable students to responsibly dissent as well as

obey legitimate authority.
Moral educators are best prepared for their task if they can articulate and
act in accord with a coherent system of factual statements and value judg
ments that constitute an ideology. I have argued, however, that the certitude
conferred on an ideology by a foundationalist theory of justification, whether
grounded in religious beliefs or secular deontic theory, is illusory. Although
the Enlightenment conception of rational justifications as context-free is in
tended to establish an absolute fixed framework for determining goodness, it
cannot resolve personal, social, and political disputes with those who reject its
foundationalist theory of justification. Fallible human beings who choose an
activist life will inevitably be guilty of sins of commission from the standpoint
of equally fallible adversaries. Unlike scientific claims, the validity of moral
judgments cannot be established objectively, although such judgments can
and should be defended rationally. In denying the incorrigible status of any
theory of justification of ethical precepts, I am not asserting the opposite, that
anything goes, that faith-in-faith is the same as faith-in-reason, that because
all personal and cultural narratives are historically situated and many are in
commensurable that all are equally right and good.
A disputed moral position need not be regarded by its adherents as un
assailable to impose on them preemptive obligations to take action consis
tent with their position. The absence of monologic certitude or dialogic
consensus does not justify inertia, accidia, and indifference. Incomplete
and fallible as our moral judgments are, their proper function is to guide
and direct our practice. Moral authority is conferred not by social consen
sus or deontic moral certitude, but by willingness to fully and publicly com
mit oneself to act on one's reasoned and deeply felt moral judgments. It is
through purposive activity that we gain profound knowledge of the mate
rial and social world, and reveal our own nature. "The philosophers have
interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to change it"
(Marx, 1845/1941, p. 84).

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 Part II

Resistance, Conflict,
and Contrarianism in Youth
Implications for Education
and Parenting
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 3

Who in the World Am I?

Reflecting on the Heart

of Teaching

William Ayers
University of Illinois at Chicago

In the opening scene of the Cohen brothers film Miller's Crossing (Cohen &
Cohen, 1990), Johnny Caspar says, "I'm talkin' about friendship." Johnny, a
two-bit thug, is struggling to explain to the big crime boss, Leo, how he's
been wronged by an associate mobster, Bernie Bernbaum. The camera lin
gers on the repulsive and horrifying Johnnywe see the frothy saliva form
ing in the creases of his thin, menacing smile; we watch him sweat. We are
fascinated and disgusted by his insistent physicality and the bizarre case he
presents.
"I'm talkin' about character," he pleads. "I'm talkin' abouthell, Leo, I
ain't embarrassed to use the wordI'm talkin' about ethics" (or, as pro
nounced by Johnny, "e-tics").
Johnny is indeed talking about ethics. Apparently, Bernie Bernbaum is a
cheat and a liar. "When I fix a fight," Johnny proceeds indignantly, "Say I
play a three-to-one favorite to throw a goddam fight. I got a right to expect
the fight to go off at three-to-one." Then Bernie Bernbaum hears of the
deal, manipulates the situation, brings in out-of-town money, and "the odds
go straight to hell."
"It's gettin' so a businessman can't expect no return from a fixed fight,"
complains Johnny. "Now, if you can't trust a fix, what can you trust?" With
out ethics, "we're back into anarchy, right back in the jungle ... That's why
53
54 AYERS

ethics are important. It's what separates us from the animals, from beasts of
burden, beasts of prey. Ethics!"
Leo is not so sure. How does Johnny know Bernie is the problem, when
lots of other people share the same information? Couldn't someone else be
selling him out? No, Johnny assures him, it has to be Bernie: Everyone else in
the loop is under his direct control, and, most tellingly, "Bernie's kinda
shaky, ethics- wise."
"Do you want to kill him?" asks Leo.
"For starters," Johnny replies.
William Bennett, Secretary of Education under President Ronald Rea
gan, former "drug czar," and editor of The Book of Virtues (Bennett, 1993),
has recently written a book for our times with the forbidding title Why We
Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism (Bennett, 2002). Reading
Bennett on right thinking is a bit like hearing Johnny Caspar discuss eth-
icsunreal but nonetheless disturbing.
In The Book of Virtues Bennett (1993) gathers together an enormous
amount of material Rush Limbaugh hails in a jacket blurb as "a superb col
lection, certain to fortify you and yours for a lifetime of morality, goodness,
and right thinking."
In any collection there is the problem of who and what to include. How
ever, an editor has to choose, leaving readers variously irritated and de
lighted. Bennett undoubtedly felt himself stretching for inclusionRosa
Parks is here, for example, and so is a Hanukkah Hymn, and an excerpt from
the Dhammapada. On the other hand, he chose to exclude, for example,
Toni Morrison and W.E.B. DuBois; the excerpt he includes from Mary Woll-
stonecraft's pioneering "A Vindication of the Rights of Women" focuses on a
peripheral argument, her faith that we improve ourselves in concert with
God's plans; and the letter he chooses from F. Scott Fitzgeralda really ap
palling model of fatherhoodto his daughter advises her, among much else,
to make her "body a useful instrument" (Bennett, 1993, p. 226).
The proclaimed virtues under consideration hereself-discipline, com
passion, responsibility, friendship, work, courage, perseverance, honesty, loy
alty, faithtake on a distinctly ideological cast in Bennett's embrace. Leaving
aside what he chooses not to reflect onsay, humility (never!), solidarity,
thoughtfulness, integrity, passion, generosity, curiosity, humor, and commit
ment (forget it!)look at Bennett's perspective on work, for example.
In 94 packed pages we endure several poems about bees and ants, Bible
verses, "Wynken, Blynken, and Nod," "The Little Red Hen," "The Three
Little Pigs," "The Shoemaker and the Elves," "How the Camel Got His
Hump"on and on. They all add up to a scolding on the importance of do
ing as you're told, the rewards of acquiescence and compliance, and the ne
cessity of hierarchy and staying at your post no matter what. Theodore
Roosevelt writes "In Praise of the Strenuous Life," and Ralph Waldo Emer
3. WHO IN THE WORLD AM I? 55

son praises "Great Men." Booker T. Washington describes his climb "Up
From Slavery" and Bennett, without a hint of irony or conflict, introduces
him as a "soul who is willing to workand work, and workto earn an edu
cation" (Bennett, 1993, p. 404). From Shakespeare, Bennett selects this bit
of Henry V: "So work the honeybees;/Creatures, that, by a rule in nature,
teach/The act of order to a peopled kingdom" (Bennett, 1993, p. 388).
Of course there is no Marx here, but neither do we find Herman Melville,
B. Traven, nor Charles Dickens. There's no Studs Terkel, either, someone
who might have relieved the righteous sermonizing and probed the com
plexities and contradictions of work, the violence it can contain; who might
have explored the ways in which human effort can lead to the transforma
tion of people and their world, the ways in which labor can be sometimes lib
erating, sometimes enslaving. Instead, we are instructed on the natural state
of things: Kings rule, soldiers fight and pillage, masons build, and porters
carry heavy loads. End of story.
What Bennett has accomplished is a McGuffey's Reader for the ideal fam
ily of his imagination, a list of dos and don'ts served up in simple stories for
simple livinglittle virtues celebrated at the expense of great ones. There
are "Table Rules for Little Folks" and instruction on how to "retire for eve
ning" and "how to conduct our conversations." Boys and girls, naturally, re
ceive separate instruction: One is informed that "Modest as a violet/As a
rosebud is sweet-/That's the kind of little girl/People like to meet" (Bennett,
1993, p. 28); the other is entreated to "Take your meals my little man,/Al-
ways like a gentleman" (p. 43). There are, too, the requisite evil stepmothers
and wicked women.
Bennett (1993) called this collection a " 'how-to' book for moral literacy,"
and separated the "complexities and controversies" of a moral life from the
"basics" (p, 11). Presumably that is why none of the stories he offered attempt
to investigate and interrogate the inadequacy of self-knowledge, the conflict
and contest between the facts and the aspirations of our identities.
He also distinguished lessons in ethics, which he favored, from moral activ
ity, which he advised suspending until maturity. For Bennett it is important
that youngsters remain in effect passive recipients rather than active cocon
structors of values. This view leads to the claim that "these stories help an
chor our children in their culture, its history and traditions" (Bennett, 1993,
p. 12). For Bennett, "our culture" is permanently settled and smug, lacking
any sense of unease or obligation to think or question. A big believer in uni
culture, Bennett has blinded himself to the vivid, dynamic, colliding, con
flicting, and propulsive power of culture as it is experienced and lived by
human beings. The ethical world he sees is inert, and largely disembodied.
Bennett (1993) noted the "quarry of wonderful literature from our cul
ture and others is deep," and explained that his collection "is drawn from the
corpus of Western Civilization," material "that American school children,
56 AYERS

once upon a time, knew by heart" (p. 15). If there is any doubt who "Ameri
can school children" are in Bennett's dreams, check out the illustrations:
tiny woodcuts and little sketches of farms and fields and frolicking children,
all White. The text echoes the vision, giving us children "with golden hair"
and the "blue'eyed banditti." Bennett's hackneyed nostalgia for a Golden
Age in American schoolsthat rosy period preceding the turbulent 1960s,
when schools were strictly segregated and education mainly the prerogative
of the privilegedpermeates these pages.
In Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism (Bennett, 2002),
his newest effort, we feel the full force of Bennett unleashed. The events of
September 11 have unhinged himthe gate is swinging wildlyand his
standard sanctimonious sermonizing is delivered here at full volume and
with a take-no-prisoners intensity. He wrote the book, he shared, because "I
sensed in my bones that if we could not find a way to justify our patriotic in
stincts, and to answer the arguments of those who did not share them, we
would be undone" (Bennett, 2002, p. 12).
In case we wonder who exactly might "not share" his brand of patriotic
values, Bennett named names: the historian Eric Foner, the English profes
sor Stanley Fish, the editors of The New York Times, scholars with whom he
disagrees, feminists, and all "members of the peace party"whoever and
wherever they might be. These infidels, he claimed, "have caused damage,
and they need to be held to account" (Bennett, 2002, p. 14). The form of his
proposed inquisition is left to the imagination, but its scale and direction are
clear: "A vast relearning has to take place," he instructed, one undertaken
by everyone everywhere, but the burden of the effort "falls [especially] on
educators, and at every level" (p. 149).
Bennett's (2002) greatest fear is "the erosion of moral clarity ... as a thou
sand voices discourse with energy and zeal on the questionable nature, if not
the outright illegitimacy, of our methods or our cause" (p. 169). He claimed
that "rooting out" the sloppiness and the danger of relativism, postmodern
ism, multiculturalism, feminism, and left-wing thinking, and "replacing it
with healthier growths, will be the work of generations" (p. 70). Clearly, it is
the soul and spirit of democracythose thousand energetic voicesthat
Bennett, finally, cannot abide. Moral clarity, certainty, dogma: These are
best delivered from above.
What is fundamentally missing in Bennett is a sense of morality or moral
literacy or virtue embedded in a stance, a set of relationships and commit
ments. We are instructed in rationalist ethics at the expense of relational
morality, deprived an angle of regard that enlarges our view. Bennett is the
stern father with austere regulations: He rebukes, he scolds, he shows us an
iron hand. His moral authority relies for its power on structure, a structure
secured by fear and the absence of dissent. Bennett nowhere linked moral
stance to moral conductespecially his own.
3. WHO IN THE WORLD AM I? 57

Which brings us back to Johnny Caspar, talking about ethics. The bully is
whining, wheedling, hectoring, and threatening as required. He is comical
and menacing in the same gesture.
Bennett squarely places responsibility for the "vast relearning" of moral'
ity on educators. Is "moral education" gaining or losing in our schools, or in
our consciousness? How shaky are we, ethicswise?
It seems to me the world of values and moral thinking and behavior is as
natural to children as any other, and that moral thought and virtuous action
in schools begins with caring and acceptancea fundamental belief in both
the unique value of each human being and the recognition of our shared
predicament. Moral action is about more than individual behavior, it is also
about questioning and engaging the world we live in. Unlike Bennett, for
whom morality is about making sure the establishment does not come "un
done," I believe the fundamental message of the good teacher, inherently a
moral one, rests on transformation: a changed view of the world and of the
student's self. Who am I? What is my place in this world?
The moral effort of teachers is based on seeing each child in this dynamic,
growing waythrusting for life, for learning, for valuingand finding ways
to support the child in that quest. Lillian Weber, founder of the Workshop
Center of City College in New York, characterized this as "unreasonable car
ing, unconditional acceptance." She also pointed out that "the moral state
ment is not a statement guaranteeing perfection. The moral statement that
releases courage is Til try! I'll try!' " (L. Weber, personal communication,
Feb. 12, 1992).
When the moral or the ethical is invokedwhether in education, or a
meeting of mobstersit is wise to proceed with caution. To that end, I
would offer three simple caveats. First, morality is not a word like other
words, a noun like other nouns: It describes an entire realm, one without
stable borders. The kingdom of the moral and the ethical is peopled with
good guys and bad guys, with heroes, conquerors, exploiters, madmen, and
con men, all of whom have evoked elaborate descriptions of morality and a
moral universe to justify their efforts. Many have found morality a conve
nient hammer to beat their opponents into submission. It is simply untrust
worthy and unreliable as a word referring to any one, immutable thing, and
operates best in context.
This brings us to the second caution: It helps to distinguish between mo
rality in general and morality in particular. Didion's (1961) "On Morality"
begins with her struggle to write about the subject at all, until her "mind
veers inflexibly toward the particular" (p. 142). She described several events
close at hand where people reach out to help each other for no other reason
except that is what they were taught, and therefore, knew they should do.
Didion called this a "primitive morality," focused on survival and not on an
ideal of goodness. The ideal, for Didion, turns out to be treacherous in two
58 AYERS

directions, outward and inward. Unlike doing the right thing in specific in
stances, invoking the ideal good typically involves turning a beneficent gaze
outward toward others. Unfortunately, history teaches us that objects of
concern are quickly enough reconstructed into objects of coercion; the
gleam in the eye of the righteous is a powerful tractor beam foretelling fire
and brimstone, death and destruction. Turning inward, on the other hand,
brings its own hazardsit can be a move toward self-deception:

When we start deceiving ourselves into thinking we want something or need some
thing, not that it is a pragmatic necessity ... but that it is a moral imperative that we
have it, then is when we join the fashionable madmen, and then is when the whine of
hysteria is heard in the land, and then is when we are in bad trouble. And I suspect we
are already there. (Didion, 1961, p. 147)

The third and last caution involves a distinction between humanistic and
religious morality. Humanistic approaches begin with the idea that human
beings are the measure of all things. As de Zengotita (2003), who teaches at
the Dalton School, put it, "all else being equal, every human life is, by na-
turethat is, simply by virtue of being humanequal in value to every
other" (p. 39). Our human task is to make life more robust, more full, and
more livable for each human being. Certain religious beliefs, ones that prom
ise a better world, a place without the pain and suffering and hard work of
this one, or that value God above humans, can work against the goals of sec
ular humanism. In "Reflections on Gandhi," Orwell (1949) pointed out the
difference between loving God, or humanity as a whole, and loving particu
lar individual persons. "The essence of being human," he wrote, "is that one
does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes willing to commit sins for the
sake of loyalty, that one does not push asceticism to the point where it makes
friendly intercourse impossible, and that one is prepared in the end to be de
feated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable price of fastening one's
love upon other human individuals" (Orwell, 1984, p. 332). Orwell argued
that most people are not, in fact, failed saints, but rather find both fun and
sorrow in life and have no interest in sainthood at all, and noted that some
who "aspire to sainthood have never felt much temptation to be human be
ings" (p. 332). When the choice is God or man, Orwell chose the latter, and
in actual practice most of us agree. As educators our goal is not sainthood;
our task is to fasten our gaze on particular children, our students.
In all of thisstaying in context, focusing on the specific, valuing each hu
man life as equal to all othersmy aim is to think of morality, in education as
in any facet of existence, as something worked out on the ground, in the
dailyness of lived life. It serves us well to remember the systems of moral
thought that preceded us alongside their gaps, failures, and inadequacies. We
want to make choices on principle, avoiding the deadening effects of ortho
doxy, to embrace moral commitments and at the same time maintain a critical
3. WHO IN THE WORLD AM I? 59

mind. We want to act, yet we need to doubt. This stance asks us to proceed
with caution, with humility, and with our eyes wide open to face a chaotic, dy
namic, and perspectival world, with hope but without guarantees.
Gwendolyn Brooks was Poet Laureate of Illinois for many years, a public
intellectual and citizen, a teacher with a huge following of students and
other admirers. She won the Pulitzer Prize for poetry in the early 1950s, but
never left the neighborhood or the themes that animated her entire life
the people, the families, and especially the youngsters of Chicago's south
side. Her most widely anthologized poem is "The Pool Players Seven at the
Golden Shovel," more commonly known as "We Real Cool" (Brooks, 1960).
When Brooks passed away there was a moving, daylong memorial cele
brating her life and her work at the University of Chicago's Rockefeller Cha
pel, where family and friends honored her huge contribution to literature
and to humanity. On that day Anthony Walton, one of her students, read a
poem he had written for the occasion called simply "Gwendolyn Brooks
(1917-2000)"1 (Walton, 2000):
Sometimes I see in my mind's eye a four- or five-
year-old boy, coatless and wandering
a windblown and vacant lot or street in Chicago
on the windblown South Side. He disappears
but stays with me, staring and pronouncing
me guilty of an indifference more callous
than neglect, condescension as self-pity.

Then I see him again, at ten or fifteen, on the corner,

Say, 47th and Martin Luther King or in a group
of men surrounding a burning barrel off Lawndale,
everything surrounding vacant or for sale.
Sometimes I trace him on the train to Joliet
or Menard, such towns quickly becoming native
ground to these boys who are so hard to love, so hard
to see, except as case studies.

Poverty, pain, shame, one and a half million

dreams deemed fit only for the most internal
of exiles. That four-year-old wandering
the wind tunnels of Robert Taylor, of Cabrini
Green, wind chill of an as yet unplumbed degree
a young boy she did not have to know to love.

Walton and Brooks set me to wondering about the less visible and yet
somehow central dimensions of our workethical dimensions embedded in
'Copyright 2001. Anthony Walton. Reprinted with permission. Anthony Walton is the author of
Mississippi: An American Journey. He teaches at Bowdoin College
6Q AYERS

the enterprise of educationfrom several different angles of regard: from

that of the 4- or 5-year-old boy, coatless and wandering; from the perspec
tive of that 10- or 15-year-old on the corner; from the standpoint of the hu
man cargo on a train destined for the cage; and from the point of view of an
adult world too often caught up in other matters, indifferent in part, and in
other places guided by its theories and its standards, pursuing its well-inten-
tioned but sometimes blinding case studies"condescension as self-pity."
And suddenly that surprising and oh-so-hopeful denouement, "a young
boy she did not have to know to love." With Miss Brooks on my mind, I
turn to the problem of moral education, and see it as a problem that oper
ates and challenges us on four levels at once. Formulated as questions,
these problems or challenges or contradictions are the following: Where
do we locate the moral in education? What is the moral heart of teaching?
What can we do to create a positive environment for moral development
in our schools, and also in families and communities? What conflicts, diffi
culties, or dilemmas do youngsters themselves raise in the process of their
own moral development?

WHERE DO WE LOCATE THE MORAL

IN EDUCATION?

The short answer is at the center, and in every fiber, branch, and limb. To at
tempt to disentangle the moralmatters of right and wrong, normative ques
tions and concerns, aspirationsfrom education is to do violence to each.
Education, of course, is always a realm of hope and struggle. Its hope hov
ers around notions of a future, and struggles over everything: what that fu
ture should look like, who should participate and on what terms, what
knowledge and experiences are of most value, who should have access to
that valuable stuff, and how.
Hope and struggle are manifested and animated each day in every class
room by two powerful, propulsive, and expansive questions that all students,
from kindergarten through graduate school, bring with them to school. Al
though largely unstated and implicit, and often unconscious, these ques
tions are nothing less than essential. Who in the world am I? What in the
world are my choices and my chances?
These are, in part, questions of identity formation and in part, questions
of geography: of boundaries and limits, but also of aspirations and possibili
ties. When my oldest son was in his first months at college and we were
checking in by phone, he told me he was particularly moved by a philosophy
course he was taking. "You never told me about Kierkegaard," he said almost
accusingly, and I thought, "That's not the half of it." His location in an ex
panding universe was altered, as it was meant to be. Recognition and
growth, the moral possibility, were in play; on the other side lay the degrada
3. WHO IN THE WORLD AM I? 61

tion of meaning, the narrowing of optionssomething he had thankfully

missed, at least in this instance.

WHAT IS THE MORAL HEART OF TEACHING?

The fundamental message of the teacherthe graduate school lecturer, the

high school biology teacher, the preschool teacher, and everyone in be-
tweenis this: You are a growing, changing being. As you learn, your way of
regarding the world will metamorphose, and things will never look quite the
same. The good teacher provides recognition and growth, and holds out the
possibility of a change in direction, the possibility of a new and different out
come: Take this sonnet, this formula or equation, this way of seeing or figur
ing or imagining, and you must change.
There is a moral contract, then, between teacher and students, again
largely unstated and improvisational, often implied. Brought to light, made
conscious and articulated, it sounds something like this: I will do my best on
your behalf; I will work hard and take you seriously on every appropriate
level. In turn, you must, by your own lights and in your own way, capture
your education for yourself: Seize it, take hold of it, and grasp it in your own
hands and in your own time.
Committed and aware teachers, engaged in the struggle to understand this
contract, must endeavor to accomplish two crucial tasks. One is to convince
students there is no such thing as receiving an education as a passive receptor
or vessel; to argue that in that direction lies nothing but subservience, obedi
ence, indoctrination, and worse, and that all real education is self-education.
The other is to demonstrate to students, through daily effort and interaction,
that they are valued, that their humanity is honored, and that their growth,
enlightenment, and liberation are education s core concerns.
Teachers, especially good ones, know how difficult such work is. Too
many schools are structured in ways that undermine this essential moral
contract. Too often our schools, certainly the ones I work in and know best,
are organized around the casual disregard of the humanity of their students,
places where formal authority supplants moral authority, and rule following
is substituted for ethical reflectionreminiscent, in fact, of Bennett's moral
universe. In such places, the toxic habit of labeling students by their deficits
and misbehaviors bullies the intellectual and ethical heart of teaching off
the stage.
The language of such places is revealing: Zero tolerance as an educational
policy replaces the teachable moments that present themselves wherever
people try to live purposefully together. Likewise, the whole alphabet soup of
labelingEMH, LD, TAGsubstitutes for a sense of students as three-di-
mensional creatures. Like ourselves, children are made of dreams, aspira
tions, interests, and capabilities. Focusing on these qualities expands our
62 AYERS

understanding; labeling shrinks our view and with it, our awareness and
compassion as teachers.
That this labeling business has run amok is rarely acknowledged, but it
has, and it was perfectly exposed in The Onion, a satirical newspaper. The
headline proclaimed, "New Study Reveals Millions of American Children
Suffering from YTDYouthful Tendency Disorder." A sidebar contained
the Ten Early Warning Signs of YTD, behaviors like "Talks to imaginary
friend," or "Subject to spontaneous outbursts of laughter." A mother is
quoted saying she was concerned to learn her daughter was diagnosed with
YTD, but relieved to know that she wasn't a "bad mother" ("New Study Re
veals," 2000).
Like all cultural satire, this story works because it reveals a deeper truth
about the predicament we have created for ourselves. We would do well to
remember that all children are unruly sparks of meaning-making energy, al
ways dynamic, in motion, and on a journey. The best teachers know this, and
try to be aware of their own quests and their own journeys.

WHAT CAN WE DO TO CREATE A POSITIVE

ENVIRONMENT FOR MORAL DEVELOPMENT
IN SCHOOLS, AND ALSO IN FAMILIES
AND COMMUNITIES?

The environment is itself a powerful teacher, the critical variable that classroom
teachers can discern, critique, build, and rebuild to everyone's advantage.
A basic, if formidable, task for teachers is to create an environment that
will challenge and nurture the wide range of students who actually enter our
classrooms, with multiple entry points toward learning and a range of routes
to moral action and success. The teacher builds the context; the teacher's
values, instincts, and experiences are worked up in the learning environ
ment. It is essential to reflect on our values, our expectations, and our stan
dards, bearing in mind that the dimensions we work with are measured not
just in feet and inches, but also by hopes and dreams, moral reflection, and
ethical possibilities. Think about what one senses walking through the door:
What is the atmosphere? What quality of experience is anticipated? What
technique is dominant? What voice will be expressed?
When I was first teaching, I took my 5-year-olds to the Detroit Metropoli
tan Airport to watch the planes take off and land. I did not have much in
mind beyond an enjoyable field trip, but soon discovered that the concourse
in any airport has a powerful message for all of us: Move this way, keep mov
ing, move rapidly.
To a 5-year-old, the message of the concourse is more specific, and simply
says, "Run!" It took me three field trips to realize that my instructionsstick
3. WHO IN THE WORLD AMI ? 63

together, hold hands, don't runwere consistently overruled by the domi

nant voice of the environment: Run!
What does the environment say? How could it be improved?
A fifth-grade teacher I know begins each year explaining to his students
that he has only three important rules in his classroom: One, you can chew
gumthe students are amazed; two, you can wear your hatsthe boys in
particular look a little ecstatic at this contravening of the official in their
tiny, unique, apparently outlaw space; and three, that "This is a community
of learners, and you must treat everyone here with respect and compas-
sionespecially when it's hard to do."
What this teacher has done in his corner of this school is to create an en
vironment for moral reflection and ethical action. Mistakes will be made,
bad behavior and thoughtless actions will occur, but undergirding all of it is a
framework for learning, for embracing the teachable moment. This class
room environment is a place, in the words of the great Joe Cocker tune, of
"learning to live together" (Cocker, 1970). Such a process goes on for a life
time. It is a process begun in the family and potentially continued and ex
panded in school, and ignored at our collective peril.
Contrast this attitude to a sign I saw in a Chicago high school cafeteria:

RULES
No running.
No shouting.
No throwing food.
No fork fights.

No fork fights? One's mind boggles, imagining the incident that led to the
inclusion of that rule. Beyond that, one wonders, why no fist fights or knife
fights? Here we find echoes of Bennett, the small moral matters emphasized
rather than the great ones. Where in this environment is there a place for
ethical reflection or creation?

WHAT CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES,

AND CONTRADICTIONS DO YOUNGSTERS
THEMSELVES RAISE IN THE PROCESS OE THEIR
OWN MORAL DEVELOPMENT?

Too many to enumerate. Just as a 2-year-old must turn his back on his
mother and the security of family to find himselfthe endless no, no, no;
the so-called terrible twosso a 12-year-old must find herself, in part, by
pushing away, broadening her base of affiliation, and finding values, mean
ing, and a cause to commit to beyond the safety, but also the constraint, of
home. Just as adults can be deceived by the 2-year-old's use of language into
64 AYERS

thinking we share an entirely common meaning, so, too, can adults be con
fused by the grown-up bodies and sophisticated intelligence of adolescents,
and assume that we share an identical moral space.
In reality, the coming of age of the young is always a little scary. The kids
are overwhelmed with the changes going on inside themselves and painfully
aware of their limitations as they stride into adulthood. Emblematic adoles
cents in literature and popular culture are often deeply good, acting with the
best of intentions and sometimes even heroically; yet at the same time, they
are typically uncomfortable with their transformations and surprised by
their sudden super powers, and society inevitably misunderstands them:
Spiderman and Edward Scissorhands immediately come to mind. We adults
feel the implied or explicit criticism of our failures, the gaps and deficiencies
in the world we have left to them. "You're hypocrites and liars!" they shout at
us, and we cannot stand the sound of it. "We can do it better," they insist,
and we assume a defensive crouch. In The Winter's Tale, Shakespeare la
mented, "I would that there were no age between ten and three and twenty,
or that boys would simply sleep out of rest, for there is nothing in between
but getting wenches with child, wronging the ancestry, stealing and fight
ing" (Shakespeare, 1611).
Knowing what the game is, parents, educators, and the society we create
can surely do better. The game can be summed up in two lines from another
poem by Brooks called "Boy Breaking Glass" (in Allison et al., 1983): "I shall
create! If not a note then a hole. If not an overture then a desecration." Moral
education is, in part, a matter of opening: the creative vent, the inventive
mind, the productive option. Openings allow for alternatives to be seen and
chosen, and for destructive routes to be challenged and even closed.
Education lives an excruciating paradox precisely because of its associa
tion with and location in schools. That is because education is about open
ing doors, opening minds, and opening possibilities. School is about sorting
and punishing, grading and ranking, and certifying. Education is uncondi-
tionalit asks nothing in return, except that the student seize it and make it
his or hers. Education is surprising and unruly and disorderly, whereas the
first and fundamental law of school is to follow orders. An educator un
leashes the unpredictable, whereas a schoolteacher starts with an unhealthy
obsession with classroom management.
Ethics is different from conventions, different from simple rule following,
in that it involves reflection and thought and judgment. As Bennett proves,
one person's moral principle is another's dogma, one's guidelines for the
good life nothing more, for another, than genuflection to the status quo.
Most of us, most of the time, follow the conventions of our culture. Most
Spartans act like Spartans, most Athenians like Athenians. For better or
worse, most Americans act like Americans, and we live in a culture that has
traditionally valued individuality over interrelatedness.
3. WHO IN THE WORLD AMI ? 65

It takes a conscious act, or at least an act of will, to resist. Individual ethics

exhort us to be good, and individual virtue is probably a good thing. How
ever, community ethics ask us to wonder how we behave collectively; how
our society behaves; and how the contexts of politics, economics, law, cul
ture, and history interact with what we hold to be ethical. Here things be
come denser and more difficult. Johnny Caspar is trying to be ethical in a
corrupt and inhumane enterprise. Is he moral? In what way? During the time
of slavery there were surely honest overseers and law-abiding slave owners,
but in what sense were they ethical? Everyone knows that all advertising lies
some of the time, and most ads lie all of the time, and yet we ignore it. Is this
moral?
A basic challenge to teachers is to stay wide awake to the world, to the
concentric circles of context in which we live and work. Teachers must
know and care about some aspect of our shared lifeour calling after all, is
to shepherd and enable the callings of others. Teachers, then, invite stu
dents to become somehow more capable, more thoughtful and powerful in
their choices, more engaged in a culture and civilization. More free. More
ethical. How do we warrant this invitation? How do we understand this cul
ture and civilization?
Our principles and ponderings may be philosophical, but moral educa
tion is grounded in particulars, which are most exquisitely illuminated by
poets and writers. Brooks reminds us again and again that it matters who and
what we choose to see. Teachers choose: They choose how to see the world,
what to embrace and what to reject, and whether to support or resist this or
that directive. As teachers choose, the ethical emerges.
James Baldwin (1963) wrote:

The paradox of education is precisely thisthat as one begins to become conscious

one begins to examine the society in which he is being educated. The purpose of edu
cation, finally, is to create in a person the ability to look at the world for himself, to
make his own decisions, to say to himself this is black or this is white, to decide for him
self whether there is a God in heaven or not. To ask questions of the universe, and then
learn to live with those questions, is the way he achieves his own identity. But no soci
ety is really anxious to have that kind of person around. What societies really, ideally,
want is a citizenry which will simply obey the rules of society. If a society succeeds in
this, that society is about to perish. The obligation of anyone who thinks of himself as
responsible is to examine society and try to change it and to fight itat no matter what
risk. This is the only hope society has. This is the only way societies change, (p. 47)

Teachers can be the midwives of hope, or the purveyors of determinism

and despair. In Beloved, Toni Morrison's novel of slavery, freedom, and the
complexities of a mother's love, Schoolteacher, a frightening character with
no other name, comes to Sweet Home with his efficient, scientific interest in
66 AYERS

slaves, and makes life unbearable (Morrison, 1987). Schoolteacher is a dis

turbing, jarring character for those of us who think of teachers as universally
caring and compassionate people. Schoolteacher is cold, sadistic, and bru
tal. He is all about control and management and maintaining the status quo.
He and others like him are significant props in an entire system of dehuman
ization, oppression, and exploitation. They show us teaching as unfreedom,
teaching as linked to slavery.
Amir Maalouf's (2003) Samarkand is a remarkable historical novel about
the life of Omar Khayam and the journey of the Rubiayat. Toward the end,
Howard Baskerville, a British schoolteacher in the city of Tabriz in old Persia
at the time of the first democratic revolution, explains an incident in which
he was observed weeping in the marketplace:
"Crying is not a recipe for anything," he begins, "Nor is it a skill. It is sim
ply a naked, naive and pathetic gesture." However, he goes on, crying is
nonetheless important. When the people saw him crying they figured he
"had thrown off the sovereign indifference of a foreigner," and that they
could come to Baskerville "to tell me confidentially that crying serves no
purpose and that Persia does not need any extra mourners and that the best I
could do would be to provide the children of Tabriz with an adequate educa
tion." "If they had not seen me crying," Baskerville concludes, "they would
never have let me tell pupils that this Shah was rotten and that the religious
chiefs of Tabriz were hardly any better" (Maalouf, 1994, p. 234).
Both these teachers show us that teaching occurs in context and that
pedagogy and technique are not the wellsprings of moral choice. Teaching
becomes ethical action as the practice of freedom, guided by an unshakable
commitment to working with particular human beings to reach the full mea
sure of their humanity, and a willingness to reach toward a future fit for all.
Earlier, I argued that for both teacher and student, education initiates
seeing the world in a new way, and so the fundamental message of the
teacher begins with the belief that you can change your life and transform
your place in this world. As this moral process evolves, a necessary corollary
emerges: Transformed, you must change the world.
In "The Poet's Obligation,"2 Pablo Neruda (1975) advised his fellow poets:
To whoever is not listening to the sea
This Friday morning, to whoever is cooped up
In house or office, factory
Or street or mine or dry prison cell,
To him I come and without speaking or looking
I arrive and open the door or his prison,
And a vibration starts up, vague and insistent,
A long rumble of thunder adds itself
To the weight of the planet and the foam,
2
From "Fully Empowered," by E Neruda, 1975, appearing in Journal of Moral Education. Copyright
2004 by Farrar, Straus &Giroux. Reprinted with permission.
3. WHO IN THE WORLD AM 11 67

The groaning rivers of the ocean rise,

The star vibrates quickly in its corona
And the sea beats, dies, and goes on beating.
So, drawn on by my destiny,
I ceaselessly must listen to and keep
The sea's lamenting in my consciousness,
I must feel the crash of the hard water
And gather it up in a perpetual cup
So that, wherever those in prison may be,
Wherever they suffer the sentence of the autumn,
I may be present with an errant wave,
I move in and out of windows,
And hearing me, eyes may lift themselves,
Asking "How can I reach the sea?"
And I will pass to them, saying nothing,
The starry echoes of the wave,
A breaking up of foam and quicksand,
A resulting of salt withdrawing itself,
The gray cry of sea birds on the coast.
So, through me, freedom and the sea
Will call in answer to the shrouded heart.

If we understand the dry prison cell to be ignorance, cynicism, hope

lessness, and all the entanglements of mystification and easy belief, and if
we consider the sea's lamenting and the errant wave to represent a wider
world and the hope for human liberation, then we recognize this as the
teacher's obligation as well, and further, the activist's obligation, the ob
ligation of every purposeful life. We must act, for we cannot pretend to be
neutral on a moving train. However, our actions should be tempered with
doubt, with the possibility that we have not got it right. We struggle to be
wide awake to a dynamic, complex, and perspectival world. We work to
improve life on the ground: right here, right now, in the particulars of
daily life.
Martin Luther King, Jr. argued that the arc of the moral universe is long,
but that it bends toward justice. This is not a scientific conclusion nor an es
tablished fact, but rather an inspired expression of hope for a world that
could be, but is not yet, a world that requires all of us to act on behalf of free
dom and enlightenment. It is a hope for humanity itself.

REFERENCES

Allison, A. W. et al. (Eds.). (1983). The Norton anthology of poetry (3rd ed.). New York:
Norton.
68 AYERS

Baldwin, J. (1963, December 21). A talk with teachers. Saturday Review.

Bennett, W. J. (1993). The book of virtues: A treasury of great moral stories. New York: Si
mon & Schuster.
Bennett, W. J. (2002). Why we fight: Moral clarity and the war on terrorism. New York:
Doubleday.
Brooks, G. (1960). The bean players. New York: Harpers Press.
Cocker, J. (1970). Space captain [Recorded by Mushroom]. On Mad dogs and San Fran
ciscans [CD]. Oakland, CA: Black Beauty. (2003).
Cohen, E., & Cohen, J. (1990). Miller's crossing [Motion picture]. United States: 20th
Century Fox.
de Zengotita, T. (2003, January). Common ground: Finding our way back to the enlight
enment. Harper's Magazine, 306(1832), 35-44.
Didion, J. (1961). Slouching towards Bethlehem. New York: Random House.
Dolan, F. E. (1971). The Pelican Shakespeare: The winter's tale. New York: Penguin.
Maalouf, A. (1994). Samarkand (R. Harris, Trans.). London: Abacus.
Morrison, T. (1987). Beloved. London: Vintage/Random House.
Neruda, R (1975). "The poet's obligation." Fully empowered (A. Reid, Trans.). New York:
Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.
Orwell, G. (1949, Winter). Reflections on Ghandi. Partisan Review, 6, 85-92.
Orwell, G. (1984). The Orwell reader: Fiction, essays, and reports. New York: Harcourt.
Walton, A. (2000, December 18). "Gwendolyn Brooks (1917-2000)." The New Yorker,
76(39), 48.
 4

Adolescent-Parent Conflict:

Resistance and Subversion

as Developmental Process

Judith G. Smetana
University of Rochester

Adolescence is problematic in contemporary American society. The pre

vailing view is that adolescence is a normative period of storm and stress en
tailing a generation gap and rebellion against adult standards; adolescents
are also said to be experiencing a drastic decline in moral values. These
views are evident in a variety of different places. For instance, childrearing
advice books provide an intriguing window on popular culture perceptions
of teenagers. A quick perusal of parenting advice books suggests that adoles
cence is a battleground. Titles such as Surviving Your Adolescents: How to
Manage and Let Go of Your 13-18 Year Olds (Phelan, 1998), Teenagers: A Be
wildered Parents' Guide (Caldwell, 1996), and "I'm Not Mad! I Just Hate
You!":ANew Understanding of Mother-Daughter Conflict (Cohen-Sandier &
Silver, 1999) portray parenting an adolescent as a challenging task and be
ing an adolescent as equally difficult.
These negative perceptions of adolescents are echoed in the opinions of
the general public. A recent nationally representative telephone survey of
more than 2,000 adults, conducted by the Public Agenda (Duffet, Johnson,
& Farkas, 1999), examined adults' views of teenagers today. The majority of
adults surveyed (53%) had negative views of children, but they had substan-
This chapter is based on an invited talk given at the Annual Meetings of the Association for Moral
Education, Chicago, October 2002.
69
TO SMETANA

tially more negative beliefs about adolescents. Fully 71% of the adults and
74% of parents surveyed described teenagers in negative terms, such as lazy,
disrespectful, or wild. A further question revealed that "not learning values"
tops the public's list of problems facing youth today. Nearly half (45%) of
their sample believed that the major problem facing the current generation
of children is that they have not learned respect and rules.
Some prominent commentators and moral educators also have promoted
this negative perception of adolescents. For instance, Bennett (1992,1997)
argued that there is a rising tide of juvenile delinquency, adolescent drug
and alcohol use, and teenage pregnancy and childbearing and that this re
flects a breakdown in the moral fabric of society. In Bennett's view, as well as
that of other prominent moral educators (Lickona, 1991, 1997), adoles
cents are rejecting parents' moral values and resisting adult authority, and
this has led to widespread moral decay.
In this chapter, it is asserted that these concerns may be misplaced. At the
outset of the chapter, evidence is presented to suggest that for the most part,
youth today are not rejecting adults' moral authority and that evidence for
rebellion and rejection of adult standards is widely overstated. Instead, it is
proposed that moderate amounts of resistance to parental authority may be
normative, both historically and developmentally, that resistance and sub
version may be developmentally appropriate, and that, under certain condi
tions, they may be functional for adolescent development.

ARE ADOLESCENT-PARENT CONFLICT AND

REJECTION OF ADULT AUTHORITY ON THE RISE?

Historical analyses suggest that themes of adolescent rejection of adult au

thority are nothing new. Demos and Demos (1969) analyzed American
childrearing advice books to determine how cultural views of children and
adolescents have changed over time and the themes that emerge during dif
ferent historical periods. According to their analyses, anxiety over parental
authority has been a dominant theme of American childrearing advice
books since these books first became popular nearly two centuries ago. For
example, Demos and Demos (1969) provided the following example from
the early 1800s:

It must be confessed that an irreverent, unruly spirit has come to be a prevalent, an

outrageous evil among the young people of our land ... Some of the good old people
make facetious complaint on this ... "There is as much family government now as
there used to be in our young days," they say, "only it has changed hands." (p. 633)

Thus, it appears that the view of American teenagers as normatively rebel

lious has dominated the American imagination for at least two centuries.
4. RESISTANCE AS DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS 71

The assertion that juvenile delinquency is on the rise also has come under
attack (Fuentes, 1998). Citing data from the National Center for Juvenile
Justice, Fuentes asserted that changes in youth crime are not nearly as dra
matic as the public's perception of it and that although there have been fluc
tuations in juvenile crime rates over the past 30 years, there has been little
overall change. Adolescents' access to guns has increased, and with it has
come a drastic increase in youth violence involving guns. However, in con
trast to the arguments raised by some character educators, it appears that
rates of juvenile delinquency and adolescent pregnancy actually are on the
decline.
Finally, the evidence from psychological research on adolescent-parent
relationships likewise suggests that resistance to parental authority has been
a relatively constant feature of adolescent-parent relationships and that for
most families, its scope and intensity are limited. The results of several
large-scale survey studies, conducted almost 50 years ago, have indicated
that extreme alienation from parents, active rejection of adult values and
authority, and youthful rebellion are the exception, and that close, warm,
and supportive family relations during adolescence are the norm. For in
stance, based on a questionnaire study of approximately 3,500 American
teenagers, Douvan and Adelson (1966) concluded that middle adolescents
and their parents agree on basic values and that adolescents generally ad
mire and trust their parents and believe that their parents' rules are gener
ally fair and just. Likewise, Kandel and Lesser (1972) compared nearly 2,000
mother-adolescent dyads in the United States and Denmark and found that
most American and Danish adolescents reported close or very close rela
tionships with both mothers and fathers and that most adolescents reported
relying on their parents (particularly their mothers) for advice on morality
and values. Finally, in a landmark epidemiological study of parents and
teachers of the entire population of 2,303 adolescents on the Isle of Wight in
Great Britain, Rutter, Graham, Chadwick, and Yule (1976) concluded that
most adolescents shared their parents' values and that they respected their
parents' rules, although they wished their parents were less strict. At the
same time, each of these studies did find increases with age in adolescents'
disagreements with parents over issues like choice of clothing, hair, dating,
and being allowed to go out (Douvan & Adelson, 1966; Kandel & Lesser,
1972; Rutter et al., 1976). Indeed, disputes over these issues were found to
be fairly common and sometimes quite heated.
More recently, these studies have been criticized because of their use of
global assessments of family closeness, intergenerational tension, and inde
pendence. None of these early studies utilized observations of actual family
interactions, nor did they provide detailed accounts of conflicts in daily life
(Silverberg, Tennenbaum, & Jacob, 1992). Nevertheless, the findings from
more recent studies employing more sophisticated methods, including
72 SMETANA

in-depth interviews, more detailed and standardized questionnaires, and

observations of family interactions (Laursen & Collins, 1994; Silverberg et
al., 1992) are very similar to these early, large-scale studies. Conflicts be
tween adolescents and parents have been found to occur over the everyday
details of family life, like doing homework or chores, adolescents' choice of
TV or music, use of the phone, dating and seeing friends, how late to stay
out, and dress and hairstyles (Montemayor, 1983, 1986; Smetana, 1989;
Smetana, Daddis, & Chuang, 2003). Thus, although the research has be
come more methodologically sophisticated and more theoretically
grounded, the results suggest that American adolescents' relationships with
their parents today are not very different from their parents' relationships
with their grandparents, when they were young. Moreover, confirming ear
lier findings, current findings suggest that parentadolescent conflict is rela
tively frequent, but moderate in intensity. A recent meta-analysis (Laursen,
Coy, & Collins, 1998) indicated that the rate of adolescent-parent conflict
(both the number and frequency of conflicts) appears to peak in early ado
lescence and then to decline, although conflict tends to increase in intensity
from early to middle adolescence. Moderate levels of conflict between ado
lescents and parents appear to be a normative aspect of relationships be
tween American adolescents and their parents.

ADOLESCENTS' AND PARENTS' INTERPRETATIONS

OF EVERYDAY DISAGREEMENTS

Although disagreements may pertain to relatively mundane, everyday is

sues, there is more at stake in these disputes than whether adolescents keep
their room neat and tidy. Emery (1992) distinguished between the surface
meaning, which refers to the literal content of family conflicts (e.g., whether
adolescents clean their room or take out the garbage), and the deep mean
ing, which refers to what conflict conveys about the broader structure of re
lationships. In a series of studies, we have examined the deep meaning of
conflicts by obtaining adolescents' and parents' interpretations, or their jus
tifications for their positions on everyday disputes. In most of these studies,
adolescents, mothers, and fathers have been individually interviewed about
important conflicts (either as generated by the participant or identified as
one of their "hottest" conflicts from the Issues Checklist; Robin & Foster,
1989). These studies have included cross-sectional investigations of mid-
dle-class married and divorced European American families with adoles
cents ranging in age from 10 to 18 years (Smetana, 1989; Smetana &
Asquith, 1994; Smetana & Berent, 1993; Smetana, Yau, Restrepo, &
Braeges, 1991), middle-class African American families with early adoles
cents, who were followed longitudinally for 5 years (Smetana et al., 2003;
Smetana & Gaines, 1999), and Chinese adolescents (also 10-18 years of
4. RESISTANCE AS DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS 73

age) in Hong Kong (Yau & Smetana, 1996), and the People's Republic of
China (Yau& Smetana, 2003a).
The findings from these studies indicate that parental authority and so
cial order are much on the minds of parents, much as Demos and Demos
(1969) observed from their historical analyses of childrearing advice books.
Across the different studies, the majority of parents' justifications for their
perspectives on disputes referred to parental authority and social regulation.
However, parents' justifications did not focus on disobedience or disrespect,
but rather reflected parental concern with maintaining family and cultural
social conventions, instilling a sense of responsibility in their teenagers, es
tablishing modes of organization that facilitate the effective functioning of
the family (e.g., coordinating chores so that everyone helps out and does
their part), and concerns about avoiding social condemnation (e.g., disap
proval or embarrassment for not fulfilling expectations).
Two aspects of the findings are notable. First, our findings indicate that al
though parents were concerned with the effective functioning of the family
social system and maintaining and enforcing familial and broader cultural
norms, everyday conflicts rarely entailed disagreements over basic values or
moral issues. Drawing on social domain theory (see Killen, McGlothlin, &.
Lee-Kim, 2002; Nucci, 2001; Smetana, ;995b, 2002; Tisak, 1995; Turiel,
1983, 1998, 2002, for overviews), morality in these studies was defined as
prescriptive judgments of right and wrong pertaining to others' welfare
(harm), fairness, or rights. A great deal of research has shown that moral
concepts are separable, both developmentally and conceptually, from the
types of concerns with social conventions and social organization that par
ents in our studies articulated in the context of everyday disagreements.
Morality regulates interpersonal relationships, whereas social conventions
pertain to individuals' descriptive understandings of social systems. Moral
issues were infrequent sources of conflict in adolescent-parent relationships
and accounted for only a small proportion of disputes (primarily over how
adolescents got along with siblings or others). However, in these different
studies, social-conventional reasons predominated in parents' responses
and accounted for the majority of their justifications. In lesser frequencies,
parents also articulated practical (pragmatic) concerns, prudential con
cerns (which focused on adolescents' comfort, health, and safety), and psy
chological concerns (entailing judgments about their personalities or
traits), with parents' responses distributed among these different categories.
Thus, our findings are consistent with findings from earlier studies (Douvan
& Adelson, 1966; Kandel & Lesser, 1972; Rutter, 1980; Rutter etal., 1976)
indicating that parent-adolescent disagreements do not entail adolescents'
rejection of parental moral values.
The second aspect of the findings that deserves note is that whereas par
ents were concerned with social conventions, social regulation, and paren
74 SMETANA

tal authority, these concerns were rarely voiced by adolescents, and when
they were, adolescents appealed primarily to peer group conventions, not
parental or cultural conventions. In contrast, attaining greater personal
freedoms and maximizing personal choices were much on the minds of ado
lescents. Adolescents' perspectives on conflicts largely entailed claims to
personal choices and personal jurisdiction. Thus, adolescents' reasoning
about conflicts focused on statements that the issues were inconsequential
or unimportant, because they did not affect others, assertions of personal
preferences and choices, and claims to individuality and autonomy. "It's my
room," "It's part of who I am," "I should be able to decide," and "It's my
choice" were frequent adolescent refrains.
These findings are very robust. They emerged when adolescents' justifi
cations were obtained in individual, semistructured interviews (Smetana,
1989; Smetana & Gaines, 1999; Smetana et al., 2003), when justifications
were coded from a structured, videotaped family interaction task (Smetana,
Braeges, & Yau, 1991), and when adolescents rated or endorsed different
reasons through questionnaires (Smetana & Asquith, 1994; Smetana &.
Berent, 1993). Regardless of method, appeals to personal jurisdiction pre
dominated in adolescents' responses, with the remaining responses distrib
uted among other types of justifications (pragmatic, prudential, moral,
psychological, and conventional).
Moreover, when asked to reason from their parents' perspectives (re
ferred to as counterarguments), adolescents clearly understood their par
ents' conventional perspectives on disputes, but reformulated the issues
instead in terms of asserting personal choices and personal discretion. Their
counterarguments demonstrated that these redefinitions of parents' con
ventional arguments as issues of personal choice did not entail wholesale re
jection of parents' conventional authority or values. Rather, adolescents
questioned whether parents' authority extended to the particular issue or
instance or to the way the expectation was performed. For instance, parents
treated conflicts over chores as conventional expectations that serve to
maintain the family social system. Adolescents' personal justifications often
pertained to whether chores needed to be done according to parents' expec
tations (e.g., at the times that parents specified), rather than whether chores
needed to be done at all or whether parents had the legitimate authority to
set those expectations.
Adolescents' appeals to personal jurisdiction were found, in very similar
frequencies, in different samples of European American, African American,
and Chinese adolescents. The findings for European American youth may
not be surprising, given that concerns with personal goals and individualism
are said to characterize individuals in North American societies. However,
reflecting their West African cultural heritage, African American families
are said to be oriented toward communalism and harmony (but see
4. RESISTANCE AS DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS 75

Oyserman, Coon, &. Kemmelmeier, 2002, who found African Americans to

be more individualistic than European Americans). Likewise, Chinese cul
ture has been described as valuing filial piety, obedience to authority, and
harmony in interpersonal relationships (Markus &. Kitayama, 1991;
Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997). Yet appeals to personal jurisdiction
were very much in evidence in both African American and Chinese adoles
cents' justifications for their perspectives on disputes.
Rather than seeing these responses as reflecting individualism, selfish
ness, egoism, or rejection of adult authority, we have interpreted adoles
cents' responses in light of recent psychological research, which has viewed
claims to personal choices and appeals to personal jurisdiction as an aspect
of an organized system of children's developing social knowledge. More spe
cifically, Nucci (1981, 1996, 2001) identified reasoning about personal is
sues as an aspect of children's developing psychological knowledge, which is
a developmental and conceptual system that is distinct from morality and
social convention. Personal issues are issues of preferences and choices and
as such, they are not subject to societal regulation and moral concern. They
typically pertain to issues like privacy, control over one's body, and choices
regarding friends and leisure activities. Although the boundaries and con
tent of the personal domain may vary across cultures (or ethnic groups),
Nucci (1996, 2001) proposed that individuals in all cultures claim control
over personal issues and that defining a personal domain satisfies basic hu
man needs for personal agency, autonomy, and effectance.
Thus, these findings indicate that adolescent-parent conflicts are, at
their heart, debates over where to draw the line between parental control
and authority and adolescents' autonomy over the self. The findings sug
gest further that the culturally and historically pervasive picture of adoles
cents as normatively rebellious and as resisting or subverting parental
authority is both overdrawn and incomplete. It is overdrawn in that ado
lescents are not rejecting all forms of parental authority. It is incomplete in
that it reflects an overemphasis on parents' perspectives and a failure to
consider adolescents' perspectives. This is not surprising. Commenting on
the perspectives of cultural anthropologists, Abu-Lughod (1993) noted
that social science research usually focuses on the perspectives of those in
dominant positions and ignores the views of those in subordinate posi
tions. Turiel (1998, 2002) likewise asserted that developmental psycholo
gists have not fully considered the social judgments and social behaviors of
those in subordinate positions in different social hierarchies. Although
Turiel elaborated his argument primarily in terms of the inequalities that
women (relative to men) in different societies face, the argument also has
relevance in thinking about adolescents. Parents have an intergenera
tional stake in maintaining continuity between generations (Bengston &
Kuypers, 1971) and in socializing adolescents into the norms and values of
76 SMETANA

their culture. Indeed, successful socialization is typically described as will

ingly adopting and complying with the rules and directives of adults
(Kochanska, Aksan, &Koenig, 1995). Conflict, by definition, entails non
compliance or resistance to parental directives.
Our research suggests that adolescents' resistance to parental authority is
selective and in the service of attaining greater autonomy. In general, par
ents do view autonomy as an important developmental goal. In-depth inter
views with mothers have indicated that parents believe it is important for
their young children (Nucci &. Smetana, 1996) and adolescents (Smetana
&Chuang, 2001) to become more independent and that they view granting
children decision-making control over personal issues as facilitating their
competence. Moreover, these views are not restricted to European Ameri
can middle-class mothers. As reviewed elsewhere (Smetana, 2002), moth
ers from a variety of cultures, including Japan, Taiwan, China, and Brazil, as
well as ethnic minority (African American) mothers, have endorsed the im
portance of granting children developmentally appropriate control over
personal issues. However, parents also view their role as keeping their chil
dren safe and protecting them from harm, and thus, their willingness to
grant children and adolescents' greater personal jurisdiction is tempered by
their judgments of whether children and adolescents have the competence
or maturity to make those decisions (Smetana, 2002).

SELECTIVE RESISTANCE AND CONCEPTIONS

OF PARENT AND TEACHER AUTHORITY

The notion that children's resistance to adult authority is selective and oc

curs over the boundaries of adolescents' personal jurisdiction has been
tested directly in a series of studies examining adolescents' and adults' con
ceptions of the legitimacy of adult authority. In the research on adolescent-
parent conflict, participants generated or rated the disagreements or con
flicts that arose in their families, and thus families rated different (but highly
salient) issues. In the research on adult authority, participants rated a stan
dard set of issues. They made judgments about hypothetical acts that were
seen as exemplifying different domains, including morality, social conven
tion, and personal issues. This research also included a category of more
complex issues, which we have termed multifaceted, that typically involved
overlapping concerns in different conceptual domains (usually conven
tional and personal). For instance, in the aforementioned studies, how ado
lescents keep their bedrooms was a frequent source of conflict in American
adolescent-parent relationships; adolescents typically viewed their bed
room as private space, and thus its condition was viewed as an issue of per
sonal choice and personal expression. Parents disagreed. They typically
viewed the adolescent's bedroom as part of the house and its condition as a
4. RESISTANCE AS DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS 77

violation of parental norms. Thus, in the studies of authority concepts, mul

tifaceted issues were issues that adolescents treated as personal but parents
viewed as conventional (and potentially, prudential). In some of the studies
we included a separate category of multifaceted issues pertaining to friend
ships, because many friendship issues (like when to start dating or whether
to hang out with friends who parents do not like) entail overlapping per
sonal, prudential, psychological, and conventional concerns.
In general, the results of cross-sectional studies, including a wide age
range of children (from 10-18 years of age; Smetana, 1988; Smetana &As
quith, 1994) and research with African American families with early adoles
cents, followed longitudinally (Smetana, 2000; Smetana, Crean, &.
Campione-Barr, 2003), have shown that adolescents and their parents over
whelmingly affirm parents' legitimate authority to regulate moral and con
ventional issues and that these judgments do not change significantly with
age. Moreover, adolescents and parents also judged that adolescents have
an obligation to obey parents' moral and conventional rules, even if they dis
agree with them. These findings indicate clearly that adolescents are ori
ented toward acceptance of parents' moral and conventional authority.
Similar findings have been obtained among adolescents from other ethnic
groups, including American adolescents of Chinese, Filipino, and Latino
backgrounds (Fuligni, 1998).
However, as expected, the findings from these studies indicated that ac
ceptance of parental authority is not absolute; rather, it is domain-specific.
In these studies, the same adolescents who endorsed parents as having legit
imate authority to regulate moral and conventional issues overwhelmingly
rejected parents' legitimate authority to regulate prototypical personal is
sues (like how late to sleep on weekends, how to spend allowance money,
and how to wear one's hair). Furthermore, they also judged that adolescents
are not obligated to follow rules limiting adolescents' freedom over personal
issues. Thus, resistance to rules regulating personal issues was seen as legiti
mate, whereas resistance to moral and conventional rules was not. More
over, the pattern of judgments was toward greater resistance to parents'
legitimate authority over personal issues with increasing age. Whereas par
ents were less likely to view parents as legitimate authorities over personal
than moral or conventional issues, at each age, parents lagged behind ado
lescents in their willingness to grant adolescents autonomy over personal is
sues. Thus, although parent-adolescent discrepancies in judgments of
multifaceted issues were found consistently from early to late adolescence,
the overall trend was toward granting adolescents more autonomy over
these issueswhich did not occur for moral or conventional issues.
A consistent finding in these studies is that although adolescents and
parents generally agree in their judgments regarding parents' legitimate au
thority to regulate moral and conventional issues, there are substantial dis
78 SMETANA

crepancies between parents' and adolescents' judgments of legitimate

parental authority over multifaceted friendship issues. At each age, adoles
cents consistently asserted more desires for personal jurisdiction over these
issues than parents were willing to grant. However, the studies revealed sig
nificant decreases with age in parents' and adolescents' beliefs that parents
have the legitimate authority to regulate these issues, which are at the
boundary of conventional regulation and personal jurisdiction. Thus, as ad
olescents got older, they were accorded more personal jurisdiction over
these issues.
These findings are generalizable beyond the immediate context of the
family. Using similar methods, we have also examined adolescents' concep
tions of the legitimacy of school and teacher authority (Smetana & Bitz,
1996). A sample of lower middle-class, primarily (80%) European Ameri
can 5th, 7th, 9th, and llth graders in elementary, junior, and high schools
were asked to make judgments about the legitimacy of teachers' and princi
pals' authority to regulate different types of issues in school. As in the studies
of parental authority, students made judgments about hypothetical items
that were seen as exemplars of different social knowledge domains. In this
study, the stimulus items were generated from discussions with teachers
about frequently occurring rule transgressions in their schools. Thus, the
moral items pertained to stealing money from other students, fighting or
threatening other students, making fun of other students, and not returning
textbooks at the end of the year. The conventional issues included swearing
in the halls, talking back to teachers, coming to class late, and misbehaving
(acting up) in class. The personal items included sitting next to friends in
class, choice of hairstyle, choosing who to have lunch with, and how to
spend lunch money.
We also added a category we called contextually conventional issues. For
reasons of social order, schools may regulate many issues (e.g., going to the
lavatory) that might be personal in other contexts but that are socially regu
lated in school (e.g., setting restrictions on when it is permissible to leave the
classroom to go to the lavatory) and potentially may be seen as having both
conventional and personal components. Thus, contextually conventional
issues can be seen as conceptually similar to the multifaceted issues included
in the studies of beliefs about parental authority in the family. In this study,
contextually conventional items included kissing boyfriends or girlfriends in
the hall, leaving the classroom to go to the lavatory, hanging centerfolds in
the student's locker, and passing notes to friends in class.
The pattern of findings was very similar to the results of research on ad
olescents' judgments of parental authority in the family. Across ages, ado
lescents overwhelmingly affirmed the legitimacy of schools and teachers to
regulate moral and conventional issues, but they overwhelming rejected
school and teachers' authority to regulate personal issues. Only 5% of re
4. RESISTANCE AS DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS 79

sponses entailed an endorsement of schools as having the legitimate au

thority to regulate personal issues. Students were equivocal about whether
schools have the legitimate authority to regulate contextually conven
tional issues; across grades, nearly half of the sample (46%) viewed these
issues as legitimately subject to teachers' and school principals' authority,
but as this suggests, the majority did not view schools as having the legiti
mate authority to regulate these issues. The findings were nearly the in
verse when students were asked whether they should have personal
jurisdiction over these issues. Students claimed personal jurisdiction over
personal issues, and to a lesser extent, over contextually conventional is
sues, but they did not view themselves as having the authority to make
rules about other types of issues.
In unpublished data from this study, we also interviewed 7th, 9th, and
11th grade students to obtain a more elaborated understanding of their rea
soning about school and teacher authority. Students were interviewed to
obtain their judgments about the acceptability of different types of trans
gressions and behaviors in school and their justifications for those judg
ments. Students overwhelming judged that it was permissible (M = 2.67,
SD = .54 on a 3-point scale where 3 = permissibk) for schools to make rules
about how students behave in class (like coming late, talking back to the
teacher, or not listening), based on conventional (46%), prudential (30%),
and pragmatic or efficiency (10%) justifications. Students also overwhelm
ing judged that it was permissible (M = 2.75, SD = .49) for schools to make
rules about issues like hitting, fighting with, or teasing other students, based
primarily on concerns with others' welfare or fairness (62%) and less fre
quently, with authority, punishment, and social order (16%). However, stu
dents also judged that it was not acceptable for schools to make rules about
choice of friends and when to see friends, control over their bodies (e.g.,
what they eat), choice of clothes and hairstyles, and what they write in their
journals or tell as secrets to other students (Ms ranged from 1.20 to 1.55 on
the same 3-point scale, where 1 = not permissible to make rules). For each of
these issues, personal justifications predominated, ranging from 67% to 86%
of justifications offered, and there were no grade or gender differences in any
of these judgments or justifications.
Responses to other questions indicated that adolescents were attempting
to delineate the boundaries between their personal jurisdiction and school
and teachers' legitimate authority. For instance, most students judged that it is
not permissible (M = 1.43, SD = .64) for schools to make rules about stu
dents' choice of activities (e.g., whether they participate in sports or after-
school activities), based primarily (74%) on personal justifications. However,
students were more equivocal about whether schools have the legitimate au
thority to make rules about students' choice of activities within school, like
the classes they take or what they do in gym class (M = 2.08, SD = .76), and
8O SMETANA

their justifications reflected a mixture of personal (35%), prudential (35%),

and conventional (22%) concerns.
The findings from these studies of parental and institutional (school and
teacher) authority indicate that adolescents of varying ethnicities are not
rejecting parents' or other adults' moral or conventional authority or stan
dards. Rather, they are attempting to enlarge their arena of personal jurisdic
tion. Adolescents' claims to greater personal freedom are selective and
occur at the boundaries of parents' authority and adolescents' authority
over the self. Of course, adolescents' resistance to adult authority may take
subversive forms. For instance, adolescents may tell their parents they did
their homework when they did not, or they may dress in conventionally ap
propriate clothing at home and then change into more revealing clothes on
their way to school. Adolescents also can choose not to disclose salient in
formation; for instance, they can "forget" to mention that they failed an
exam or that no parents will be present at the party at their friend's house.
However, our findings indicate that asserting claims to personal jurisdiction,
especially when they differ from parents' conventional perspectives, poten
tially can lead to conflict. Different issues may wax and wane as sources of
conflict, but the process entails an ongoing negotiation over what adoles
cents claim to be personal and what adults view them as competent to con
trol. Through these dialectical processes, the boundaries of parental
authority are transformed, leading to an outward reach of autonomy during
adolescence.

AUTONOMY IN A BROADER
DEVELOPMENTAL CONTEXT

It is important to note that claims to personal jurisdiction and personal

choice do not arise de novo during adolescence. Nucci (1981, 1996) de
scribed the development of children's concepts of personal issues from early
childhood to adolescence. Furthermore, several studies, utilizing observa
tions of adult-child interactions and interviews with both parents and
young children, have indicated that claims to personal jurisdiction are evi
dent during the preschool years, in the United States (Killen & Smetana,
1999; Nucci & Weber, 1995), as well as in other cultures, such as Colombia
(Ardila-Rey & Killen, 2001), Japan (Killen & Sueyoshi, 1995), and Hong
Kong (Yau & Smetana, 2003b). This research suggests that the personal do
main is socially constructed through reciprocal parent-child interactions,
including the child's active negotiation with caregivers (parents and teach
ers) and adults' provision of choices to the child.
Bios (1962, 1979), a neopsychoanalytic theorist, called adolescence a
"second individuation period." In his view, adolescent-parent conflict is
seen to facilitate adolescent individuation and lead to a mature sense of
4. RESISTANCE AS DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS 81

identity. Moreover, the research on conflict has documented adolescents'

sometimes sophisticated ability to articulate their personal perspectives on
disputes (and through counterarguments, to understand, articulate, and
perhaps reject their parents' perspectives). According to Bios, however, ad-
olescent-parent relationships recapitulate in a more complex form issues
that arise during early childhood. Scholars from different theoretical tradi
tions (Damon & Hart, 1988; Erikson, 1958; Mahler, 1979; Spitz, 1957)
have recognized that autonomy first becomes a central issue during early
childhood, when important distinctions between self and others are made.
During the second half of the second year of life, those abilities are evi
denced by children's growing capability for self-assertion, defined most fre
quently in terms of children's ability to say "no." Indeed, saying "no" has
become the hallmark of what has been referred to as the "terrible twos,"
when children first demonstrate active noncompliance with parental au
thority and attempts to establish control over the self.
Crockenberg and Litman (1990) distinguished empirically between dif
ferent forms of early childhood self-assertion. They demonstrated that self-
assertion and defiance are distinct forms of behavior that differentiate the
child's ability to function competently and autonomously. In their study of
2-year-olds, Crockenberg and Litman defined defiance as entailing strong
resistance to the mother's requests, including responses that included anger
and aggression, that were directly contrary to what the mother wanted, or
that intensified the original misbehavior. In contrast, self-assertion entailed
negative responses (e.g., saying "no") to mothers' directions or requests.
Moreover, Crockenberg and Litman demonstrated that self-assertion was
associated with children's more competent social behaviors, including use of
negotiation and positive communication, whereas defiance was not. Fur
thermore, self-assertion was more likely when mothers used low-power as
sertion, guidance, and directives, whereas defiance was more likely when
mothers used high-power assertive control strategies, such as threats, criti
cism, physical intervention, and anger. These latter findings accord well
with the observational studies of young children's social interactions in the
context of personal issues, which have found that personal concepts emerge
from parents' and adults' provision of choices and negotiations over per
sonal issues.
Crockenberg and Litman's (1990) findings are also useful in understand
ing adolescent-parent relationships. As with toddlers, it important to dis
tinguish between healthy forms of adolescent self-assertion that lead to
greater adolescent competence and autonomy, and destructive or dysfunc
tional forms of adolescent self-assertion that entail defiance and rebellion.
In their epidemiological study of adolescents on the Isle of Wight, Rutter et
al. (1976) found that the adolescents who experienced intense conflicts
with parents during adolescence tended to have psychological problems
82 SMETANA

prior to adolescence. More recent studies have confirmed that although

high levels of adolescent-parent conflict are associated with a range of be
havioral problems, including externalizing problems such as drug and alco
hol use, delinquency, truancy, and running away, as well as internalizing
problems, such as depression and attempted suicide (see Laursen & Collins,
1994; SilverbergetaL, 1992; Smetana, 1996, for reviews), most adolescents
who experience problem behavior during adolescence were found to have
psychological problems and poor relationships with parents prior to adoles
cence. Indeed, studies are very consistent in demonstrating that in commu
nity (e.g., non-clinic-referred) samples of families, only a small proportion of
adolescents (ranging from about 5%-20% in different studies) experience
emotional turmoil and highly conflictive relations with parents (see Laursen
& Collins, 1994; Smetana, 1996, for reviews).
Thus, this research indicates that there is significant continuity in par-
ent-child relationships from childhood to adolescence. Children who have
warm and supportive relationships with parents prior to adolescence gener
ally have emotionally close relationships with parents during adolescence,
although, as Laursen et al.'s (1998) meta-analysis indicates, there are nor
mative increases in the rate and intensity of disagreements. Research has
also demonstrated normative declines from middle to late adolescence or
young adulthood in closeness and cohesion with parents (Fuligni, 1998;
Furman &Buhrmester, 1992; Youniss &Smollar, 1985). Moreover, moder
ate conflict in the context of warm, supportive relationships has been shown
to be functional for adolescent autonomy development (Hill, 1987;
Holmbeck, 1996; Smetana, 1988, 1995a; Steinberg, 1990, 2001). Thus,
paralleling Crockenberg and Litman's (1990) findings from early childhood,
the research on adolescence suggests that defiance can be distinguished
conceptually and empirically from more normative and developmentally
appropriate forms of resistance and self-assertion in adolescence. Further
more, the research described in previous sections indicates that develop
mentally appropriate resistance during adolescence occurs over the
boundaries of legitimate parental control versus adolescents' personal juris
diction. As the clinical definitions of conduct disorders and oppositional be
havior disorders suggest, defiance may entail adolescent rejection of
parental moral and conventional rules, norms, and values, but healthy de
velopment does not.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PARENTS AND SCHOOLS

The findings from our research on adolescent-parent conflict and authority

relationships in different social knowledge domains suggest the importance
of providing adolescents some developmentally appropriate decision-mak-
ing autonomy, both in the home and in other settings, such as schools.
4. RESISTANCE AS DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS 83

Eccles and her colleagues (Eccles et al., 1993; Eccles, Wigfield, &Schiefele,
1998) have examined what they called stage-environment fit, or the fit be
tween the environment and children's developing needs. They have
claimed that schools, particularly junior high schools, restrict adolescents'
autonomy precisely when they need it most, in early adolescence. Eccles and
her colleagues provided evidence from several studies indicating that, de
spite students' increasing maturity, junior high school classrooms emphasize
greater teacher control and discipline and offer fewer opportunities for stu
dent involvement in decision making, choice, and self-management than do
elementary school classrooms. Increases in teacher control have been found
when the same students and their teachers were followed through the tran
sition from sixth to seventh grade (Midgley & Feldlaufer, 1987). This re
sulted in increased discrepancies, or mismatches, between early
adolescents' desires for autonomy over decision making and their percep
tions of their opportunities to engage in decision making in their classrooms.
Eccles et al. (1998) reported that this mismatch resulted in declines in in
trinsic motivation and interest in school.
In their discussions of this research, Eccles and her colleagues (Eccles et
al., 1993; Eccles et al., 1998) called for more developmentally appropriate
environments for early adolescents, including more opportunities for stu
dent input into decisions regarding their learning, as well as classroom deci
sion making. The research on adolescents' conceptions of school and
teacher authority discussed previously (Smetana & Bitz, 1996) adds speci
ficity to these recommendations by providing some indications of the types
of issues over which students seek greater involvement and decision-mak-
ing autonomy. The findings indicate that students desire greater autonomy
over contextually conventional and personal issues in school.
In a similar vein, research has shown that adolescents who view parents
as intruding too deeply into their personal domains view their parents as psy
chologically controlling (Smetana & Daddis, 2002), and in turn, greater
perceived psychological control has been related to a variety of psychologi
cal problems, including both internalizing problems like depression and
anxiety, and externalizing problems, like conduct disorders (Barber, Olsen,
& Shagle, 1994). Research also has found that parents who are authorita
tive in their parenting style are able to draw clear boundaries among moral,
conventional, multifaceted, and personal issues (Smetana, 1995c). That is,
authoritative parents make clear distinctions between moral and conven
tional issues, while being responsive in granting adolescents authority over
personal issues. They are also relatively restrictive and do not view adoles
cents as having personal jurisdiction over issues that entail overlaps be
tween conventional and personal issues (multifaceted issues). Thus, it
appears that authoritative parents are relatively demanding in constructing
the boundaries of legitimate parental authority, while still granting adoles
84 SMETANA

cents a limited sphere of personal freedom. In contrast, authoritarian par

ents overextend the boundaries of the domains in several ways. They
moralize conventions in their judgments and also grant adolescents very lit
tle personal jurisdiction over personal issues. Conversely, permissive parents
are too permissive in defining the boundaries of the personal domain and
give adolescents developmentally inappropriate freedoms.
These findings have implications for best practices for parenting and
schools. First, although conflicts may be hotly contested and deeply felt by
both adolescents and parents, it is important to keep in mind that in most
cases, adolescents are not rejecting basic social and moral values. Thus, par
ents and teachers must stay attuned to the developmental nature of these
conflicts. Many parenting advice books advise parents to "pick their battles"
and "don't sweat the small stuff." This is wise counsel; our research indicates
that it is vital for parents to allow adolescents some discretion over personal
issues and to be responsive to adolescents' desires for autonomy and inde
pendent decision making over personal issues, while having firm and clear
expectations for adolescents' moral, conventional, and prudential behavior.
The more difficult issue is to decide how much autonomy is appropriate, par
ticularly as research has shown that too much freedom to make decisions
alone, without any input from parents, has negative implications for adoles
cents' adjustment and well-being (Dornbusch, Ritter, Mont-Reynaud, &.
Chen, 1990; Lamborn, Dornbusch, & Steinberg, 1996). In allowing adoles
cents greater independence, parents need to carefully weigh the relative
risks to adolescents' safety and well-being, along with their understanding of
adolescents' maturity and competence. Furthermore, allowing adolescents
increasing autonomy over personal issues does not mean that parents
should not monitor choices and scaffold healthy decisions.
It is also crucial to recognize that from adolescents' perspectives, these is
sues are not small at all. Rather, conflicts serve a developmentally vital func
tion in that they represent adolescents' attempts to construct their
identities, enlarge their spheres of personal freedom, and construct coher
ent selves. Disagreements and squabbling may make adolescent-parent re
lationships difficult. Indeed, Offer (1969) found the majority of parents in
his studies reported that the early adolescent years were the most difficult
time they had in raising their children. However, research has demonstrated
that the opportunity for adolescents to express and discuss divergent per
spectives in the context of warm, supportive relationships has been found to
be positively associated with adolescent development (Allen, Hauser, Bell,
& O'Connor, 1994 ;Grotevant& Cooper, 1985,1986; Hauser etal., 1984).
Although there are strong parallels to families, the issues in schools may
be somewhat different, because schools have more clearly defined organiza
tional needs and structures than do families. Schools must be more struc
tured to accomplish their educational aims. Thus, maintaining social order
4. RESISTANCE AS DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS 85

often takes priority over allowing personal freedoms in school. As reflected

in the previous discussion of contextually conventional issues (Smetana &
Bitz, 1996), our research suggests that adolescents are able to coordinate
their understanding of the social-organizational needs and requirements of
schools with their desires for greater personal jurisdiction, but at the same
time, teachers and administrators should understand adolescents' develop
mental needs for areas of personal freedom and control. Although social-or-
ganizational needs may take priority, there still is room for teachers to be
flexible in their enforcement of rules and to allow some developmentally ap
propriate autonomous decision making, while remaining firm in their expec
tation of adherence to moral and conventional standards. It is possible that
explicit recognition and granting of these needs for autonomy will forestall
some of the resistance and subversion that happens in school. This view is
consistent with recent writing about the need for developmental discipline
in effective classroom management (DeVries & Zan, 1994; Dreikurs,
Grunwald, & Pepper, 1982).
Nevertheless, not all resistance and subversion in school would seem to
involve adolescents' attempts to increase their personal freedoms. Much
has been written about increases in moral and conventional misbehavior
and norm deviations during adolescence, including increased truancy, sta
tus offenses such as underage drinking, cigarette use, substance use, and mi
nor crimes like petty theft and vandalism. Indeed, some researchers
(Moffitt, 1993) have viewed these behaviors to be normative during adoles
cence, due to the large gap that exists in modern society between adoles
cents' biological and social maturity. Moffitt (1993) provided evidence from
crime statistics and arrest records that for the most part, these are "adoles-
cence-limited" behaviors that do not persist into adulthood and that only a
very small proportion of youth, clearly distinguishable by the early onset of
their troubled behavior and the more serious nature of offenses during ado
lescence, graduate to criminal careers in adulthood.
Schools are not immune to these issues. Schools routinely deal with vio
lations like vandalism, minor theft, harassment, using illegal substances on
school property, and status offenses, such as cigarette smoking and underage
drinking. Schools also frequently confront violations of contextually con
ventional rules, such as violations of dress codes, which may be more strin
gent than in other contexts. The perspective presented here on the
multifaceted nature of adolescents' social knowledge development, along
with Moffitt's (1993) evidence that these youthful transgressions may con
stitute a developmental phase on the route to a generally rule-abiding adult
hood, suggest that one does not need to invoke a homogeneous notion of
character to understand these (mis)behaviors (Nucci, 2001).
Adolescents' attempts to construct a unique identity may involve experi
mentation with rule-breaking behavior. For instance, Brown (1990)
86 SMETANA

mapped the social world of adolescent crowds by placing them along two di
mensions: the extent to which youth are involved in the social institutions
controlled by adults, and the extent to which they are involved in the more
informal peer culture. "Jocks" and "populars" are examples of crowds that
are heavily invested in both adult institutions and peer culture. "Brains" and
"nerds" may be heavily involved in adult'controlled institutions but not in
peer culture, and "partyers " occupy the opposite end of the social map. They
are heavily invested in peer culture but not in adult institutions. An espe
cially ironic aspect of adolescent identity development is that adolescents
typically use their crowd membership as a reference group in their attempts
to establish a unique identity. Personal identities typically are woven out of
crowd values, and the less that crowds are invested in adult social institu
tions, the more their behaviors may entail resistance to or subversion of
adult standards. Some character educators have seen this as evidence of
moral decay and a decline in moral values (Bennett, 1992, 1997; Wynne,
1986). Noting that peer cultures can create norms that are antithetical to
good character, Lickona (1997) argued for the need for a more positive peer
culture. Although the names have changed, their social mapping has not
the major adolescent crowds have remained relatively constant over the
past 50 years. Thus, much of adolescents' resistance and rule breaking may
be seen as attempts at socially constructing and elaborating different social
identities whose uniqueness stems from their differentiation from adult con
ventions. Perhaps it is this contrarian featurethe apparent rejection of
adult tastes and conventionsthat provokes the persistent concern of the
adult generation.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings presented here suggest that adolescents' negotiations,

resistances, and challenges to parental authority are selective and poten
tially functional in transforming adolescent-parent relationships and facili
tating adolescent development. In this chapter, it was asserted that
moderate resistance and challenges to authority are normative and adaptive
as attempts to construct a broader sphere of personal identity and autonomy.
Evidence from studies of adolescent-parent conflict and adolescents' con
ceptions of adult authority was brought to bear on the claim that adoles
cents typically do not defy adult authority in the moral realm.
However, there are some important qualifications to this conclusion. The
research discussed in this chapter focused on situations where parental au
thority was contextually appropriate, where parents had the competence
and status to make demands of their adolescents, and where the requests
were reasonable in that they were not "immoral." As reviewed elsewhere
(Smetana, 1995a, 1995c; Turiel, 1998, 2002), studies of children's and ado
4. RESISTANCE AS DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS 87

lescents' conceptions of adult authority have demonstrated that adult au

thority does not legitimately extend to causing harm, prescribing immoral
acts, or being unjust or unfair. Furthermore, children and adolescents evalu
ate the contextual appropriateness of the acts, as well as different attributes
of the authority (e.g., their social position, knowledge, and status) in
whether authority is legitimate or not. Thus, adolescents' acceptance of
adult authority in the moral domain is not unquestioning or absolute, nor
should it be. Fully autonomous moral judgments entail applications of prin
ciples of justice, welfare, and rights that are separable from and that may
transcend the expectations of particular authorities (parental, institutional,
or societal). Thus, the findings presented here challenge parents and educa
tors to think carefully about balancing demands for moral and conventional
accountability with developmentally appropriate opportunities for auton
omy, both moral and personal.

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 5

Risk-Taking, Carnival,
and the Novelistic Self:
Adolescents' Avenues
to Moral Being and Integrity
Cynthia Lightfoot
Pennsylvania State University

There is no alibi for being.

Mikhail Bakhtin (1993, p. 64)

According to the buzz and chatter in the popular press, and aided and abet
ted by the scientific community, adolescents either are running with scissors
or on the high road to a quality of life that their progenitors could only imag
ine. By the first account, they have never been more poorly educated, pre
maturely pregnant, reckless, drugged, depressed, apathetic, suicidal, and
violent. Responding to this apparent moral crisis is a legion of studies mar
shaled to rout out the blameworthy, pointing fingers in turn at broken fami
lies, chaotic neighborhoods, declining religiosity, eroding social controls,
peer group exclusion, violent media, inattentive parents, and just plain
boredom (e.g., Polakow, 2000). It was written of boys in particular:

Americans are worried about their boys. Large numbers of boys roam the streets with
out much adult supervision or even surveillance. They gather in peer groups and seem
to flaunt adult values in their dress and speech. Large numbers of them are foreign

93
94 LIGHTFOOT

born. These male peer groupsgangs, reallyengage too often in aggressive and vio
lent behavior ... One sociologist's book, The Boy Problem, has labeled this the most
challenging social problem for the generation, (p. xv)

This passage marks the departure point of Mechling's (2001) ethno

graphic study of Boy Scouts and the "making of American youth." Al
though it colors a certain well-penned image of contemporary adolescents,
Mechling tells us that the passage describes American sentiment toward
youth in the year 1900. Discounting the possibility that adolescents simply
come undone at the turn of each new century, there is something telling in
the historical continuity of belief that adolescence is a time of moral col
lapse, and that we would all be better off if youth could simply sleep out the
years between "ten and three-and-twenty ... for there is nothing in be
tween but getting wenches with child, wronging the ancientry, stealing,
fighting" (Shakespeare, The Winter's Tale, 1996, p. 15).
On the other side of the mountain of opinion regarding adolescence
are those who have challenged as extremist, if not baseless illusion, the
prior view that teenagers, for one reason or another, are essentially de
praved and subversive (Acland, 1995; Dohrn, 2000; Fornas & Bolin,
1995; Hancock, 2000; Males, 1999). Both the popular media and the
scholarly community, they argue, have unfairly maligned and
criminalized youth. The crisis of youth is not a real crisis, but a felt crisis.
This second more humanistic view smoothes the rough edge of whatever
else may characterize adolescent social life and behavior and suggests
that youth, by and large, are doing just fine. As consummate consumers
of culture and media, and active deliberators of their personal identities,
lifestyles and futures, they are guilty only of falling victim to insidious so
cial stereotype. Youth have been framed.
There is much to recommend both points of view. Our interviews with
adolescents about their own and others' risk-taking show ample evidence
that their behavior is often undertaken in a spirit of defiance, with an atti
tude that is explicitly clannish, irreverently clownish, and aims for a loss of
self in the moment and in the other in ways that efface personal responsibil
ity (Lightfoot, 1997):

(The thrill of risk-taking) is almost, but not quite getting caught.

(Getting drunk) is a good excuse to fall all over that cute guy you re
ally like.
(Skipping school) makes you feel closer because you've beat the es
tablishment together.
(Stealing a case of beer from a delivery truck) shows what lengths
you'll go to be in the group.
(Taking LSD) is a way to relatea different way of being close.
5. RISK-TAKING, CARNIVAL, AND THE NOVELISTIC SELF 95

Notwithstanding their apparent attraction to a mob mentality that in

verts the general order endorsed and imposed by the broader culture, these
very same teenagers appeared to cast a sideward glance at moral and ethical
boundary conditions. There was much talk about the importance of never
losing total controlof either the situation or one's self. The teens spoke ex
plicitly about codes of conduct and issues of harm and trust that remained
clear and operative through the purple haze and the thrill of the moment.

What is the difference between a risk that you would take and one that you
wouldn't take?
I wouldn't do anything that's immoral.
I wouldn't do anything that would make my parents totally lose trust
in me.
It wouldn't hurt anyone else. It might hurt me, but I probably
wouldn't take a risk that is going to affect someone elsemy friends,
or someone I don't know. Like drinking and driving. I would never do
that, no matter what the situation, no matter how much trouble I
could get in with my parents (i.e., by calling parents to get a ride home, or
"crashing" at the party and not going home at all).
When people hurt each otherthat's the worst. You have no right to
do that. (Like what?) Like drunk driving.
I have friends who steal and shoplift. To most people it's not that big a
deal, but to me it is because you're hurting someone else.

What about someone who tries to get his or her good friend to try pot, even
though he or she doesn't really want to?
That would make me really mad because since you don't do it (smoke
pot), it's breaking the code. (What code is that?) The code is that you
don't put someone in that position.

I present these out-takes from semistructured interviews with 15 to 17-

year-olds as a way of introducing the argument that the shape of adolescent
risk-taking reveals the contours and complexities of an emerging moral
landscape. My plan for this chapter is to draw principally from Bakhtinian
theory to consider adolescent risk-taking as but an example of a broader
realm of activity inherent to the project of becoming a person. According to
the argument I mean to unfold, Bakhtin's (1981) theory of aesthetics, to
which he pinned a developmental conception of self as an ethically
grounded agent, presents an integrative prospect for illuminating the func
tional significance of adolescent social life and experience. Viewed through
the lens of Bakhtin's theory, particularly his conceptions of carnival and the
novelistic self, risk-taking becomes an aesthetic form that objectifies and
comments on who adolescents are and wish to become within a specific so
96 LIGHTFOOT

cial-ideological world. To further the broader aim of my argumentthat in

addition to providing insight into adolescent risk-taking, Bakhtin provided a
potentially powerful theory for understanding the development of self in
generalI apply his analytic method to a second aesthetic form both pro
duced by and having special significance for adolescents of Latin American
descent: lowrider art.

TWO MORALITIES, TWO DISCOURSES

In an inspired moment, Yeats wrote:

If we cannot imagine ourselves as different from what we are ... we cannot impose a
discipline upon ourselves though we may accept one from others. Active virtue, as dis
tinguished from the passive acceptance of a code, is therefore theatrical, consciously
dramatic, the wearing of a mask. (1959, p. 334)

There is a lot of Bakhtin in Yeats's insight. It is a close summary of

Bakhtin's theory of the relationship between art and ethics, a relationship
that I return to shortly. It also brings to mind a perennial distinction in the
human sciences between two forms of moralityone imposed, the other
consciously chosen and embraced (Lightfoot, 2000). In the works of
Piaget (1995), for example, we learn of a morality of obligation and a morality
of goodness. The first is a power politic based on a combination of love and
fear that follows from a unilateral respect of a lesser toward a greater au
thority, as that of a child toward a parent. Moral life and action are ori
ented without qualm or question toward prefabricated norms of authority.
The morality of obligation is a strict and coercive morality that expresses
its authority not only in the unexamined duty of young children, but in the
cultural life of traditional, gerontocratic society that "retards the intellec
tual development of those who are subject to it" (Piaget, 1995, p. 231), and
socializes the individual only "on the surface" leaving intact the "deep hab
its" of egocentrism (p. 219).
Set against what is considered the more developmentally and culturally
immature morality of obligation is a morality of goodness instantiated by
the mutual respect and affection existing between individuals who recog
nize each other as equals. According to Piaget, the morality of goodness
emerges in the context of cooperative social exchange in which the child
slips the bonds of obligation to engage in active norm construction with his
or her peers, as in the case of children negotiating rules in a marble game.
Crossing the threshold of belief that rules are eminent and inviolable, chil
dren come to understand that they can be modified by consensus; the
blinkered moral life imposed by external authority is replaced by a more
5. RISK-TAKING, CARNIVAL, AND THE NOVELISTIC SELF 97

freely roving moral gaze enabled by a new commitment to democratic pro

cess and the common will.
When the dictates of the other fade in the rising light of a moral code per
sonally elaborated through cooperative social exchange (see also Nucci,
1996), unquestioned devotion and fear yield to a "disinterested behavior
which characterizes moral norms" (Piaget, 1995, p. 118). Its rightful heirs
are reflection and self-consciousness, the dissociation of subjective and ob
jective, and the construction of an abstract scale of values that extends be
yond the immediately contingent interests of the moment, permitting one
to hold in abeyance his or her own moral point of view to appreciate and re
spect (although not necessarily adopt) that of another. According to Piaget
(1995), "the initial 'self [i.e., the egocentric self] blossoms as personality
thanks to cooperation, and ... the social thus joins, rather than opposes,
what is innermost in an individual" (p. 240). Linked to the onset of formal
operational thought, all of these developmental milestones are "of a nature
to permit individuals to have a greater consciousness of reason immanent in
all intellectual activity" (Piaget, 1995, p. 239). Such consciousness is, for
Piaget, the mainstay of individual and cultural liberation:

Thanks to these two instruments, i.e. the formal operations and a "personal" hierar
chy of values, the adolescent plays a fundamental role in our societies of liberating
coming generations from older ones. This leads the individual to elaborate further
the new things that he acquired during his development as a child at the same time
that it frees him, at least in part, from the obstacles issuing from adult constraints.
(Piaget, 1995, p. 299)

Consistent with his overall theory, Piaget linked these momentous shifts
in moral life to the grand sweep of cognitive development. Bakhtin
(18951975), a Russian literary scholar and a contemporary of Piaget,
would have objected to Piaget's endorsement of abstract structuralism and
its accoutrements of "disinterested" moral norms and value hierarchies.
There are, however, points of conceptual contact between the two theorists,
including their desire to characterize the emergence of a consciously aware
ethical life that is personally meaningful and relatively free of the shackles of
imposed authority.
Where Piaget spoke of obligation and goodness as two fundamental forms
of moral life, Bakhtin spoke of discourseone that is primarilyauthoritative,
the other internally persuasive. He illustrated the distinction between them
by drawing parallels to two familiar pedagogical modes: reciting by heart and
retelling in one's own words. In the psyche, reciting by heart is analogous to
authoritative discourse. It is imposed; demands allegiance; does not permit
one to argue with it, play with it, or integrate it; or merge it with other beliefs,
values, or knowledge. It cannot be representedit is only transmitted:
98 LIGHTFOOT

It is, so to speak, the word of the fathers. Its authority was already acknowledged in the
past. It is a prior discourse. It is therefore not a question of choosing it from among
other possible discourses that are its equal. It is given (it sounds) in lofty spheres, not
those of familiar contact. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 342)

Authoritative discourse is thus a distant and alien discourse. In con

trast, and akin to retelling in one's own words, internally persuasive dis
course is half-ours and half-someone else's; it is in this sense "double
voiced" or dialogic and therefore more finely interwoven with the texture
of everyday consciousness. Where authoritative discourse is inert, prefig
ured, and calcified, internally persuasive discourse is dynamic, creative,
and open to new applications; that is, open to dialogic engagement with
other internally persuasive discourses. It is the sharp gap between the two
categories of discoursethe imposed versus the persuasive, the official
versus the socially unacknowledged, the alien versus the familiar, the
monologic versus the dialogicthat sets a stage for the development of in
dividual consciousness.
Bakhtin's special interest was the emergence of consciousness, an ideolog
ical consciousness in particular, which he understood to follow directly from
the struggle between authoritative and internally persuasive discourses:
"The struggle and dialogic interrelationship of these categories of ideologi
cal discourse are what usually determine the history of an individual ideo
logical consciousness" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 342). The struggleand it is an
ongoing, lifelong struggleis waged against the line of authority and the
alienated distance that defines it. However, the struggle itself has the effect
of drawing the authoritative into a zone of contact; there is a weakening of
its hold, a degradation of its authority. It is not the case, therefore, that the
maturity of consciousness hangs on hostility to authority. Mere hostility is
not enough, nor is it even necessary. It is dialogue that matters. It follows
that a shucking of authority is not an inevitable outcome of the develop
mental process. Authority, tradition, the "done thing," can be agreed to and
embraced as one's own once it has been challenged, tested, and deprived of
its unconditional allegiance. It can, in other words, become internally per
suasive, and vulnerable to new struggles with other internally persuasive
discourses.
The development of an ideological consciousness is premised in an iron
clad way on the ongoing struggle for hegemony among discoursesthose
various ideological points of viewthat move and persuade us. So long as
discourse remains authoritative, however, it precludes dialogic relations. If
the psyche were composed of it entirely, then people would fully "coincide
with themselves." It is the noncoincidence of internally persuasive discourses
and the intentional hybridization of distinct, individualized, concrete dis
courses that carry the weight and significance of the project of becoming.
5. RISK-TAKING, CARNIVAL, AND THE NOVELISTIC SELF 99

Bakhtin suggested that the ideological consciousness evolves rather late in

development. I suspect he had adolescence in mindthat time of preoccupa
tion with authenticity: the true and false self, duplicity, mask and masquerade
(Lightfoot, 2003). When thought begins to work in what Bakhtin (1981) de
scribed as "an independent, experimenting and discriminating way," (p. 345)
ideological points of view of self and other are objectified through a process of
aesthetic construction. For Bakhtin, an aesthetically constructed event or ob
ject is known as such by the form-bestowing presence of an outside conscious-
nessthe interpretive eye of a spectator or reader, the creative hand of an
authorstriving to achieve a sense of the "whole" (Emerson, 1997, p. 136).
Thus, as he envisioned it, the aesthetic process need not construct an object
of beauty (this being the focal concern of much aesthetic theorizing, past and
present). Its constitutive feature is rather to construct an object of purpose
and understanding. In other words, the "aesthetic" in Bakhtin's world does
not aspire to perfectionthat sacred whole of statues and virgins offered in
compliant supplication to pre-Homeric gods who sat in cold and distant judg
ment of human moral affairs. Instead, it is inspired by the call of the Museof
Clio and Calliope. As Calasso (1993) described, the Homeric god, intemper
ate to the core on earth as in Olympus, imposed no commandments and re
quired of the human world neither good behavior nor devotion. Rather, the
Homeric god wanted above all

(t)o be recognized. Every recognition is an awareness of form. Hence in our enfeebled

modern vocabulary we might say that the way they (the gods) imposed themselves was
first and foremost aesthetic. But in a sense of the word which, with time, has been lost:
the aesthetic of a mesh of powers, (p. 242)

It is this lost sense of the word that characterizes Bakhtin's theory of aes
thetics. His aesthetic object is not one of sacred and self-sufficient beauty
born of unexamined compliance, but one of purpose, power, and under
standing born of inspiration. The person listens; Calliope whispers; the per
son creates. The aesthetic work is not an offering, but an answer.

THE NOVELISTIC SELF

Of particular moment in Bakhtin's theory were his efforts to relate the ethi
cal and aesthetic aspects of human action. He drew extensive parallels be
tween the self and the novel, arguing that both involve a highly complex
combination and dialogue of noncoincident discourses and ways of speak
ing, each expressing a particular worldview or stance. Bakhtin considered
dialogue to be essential to self-development; he described selfhood as "es
sentially novelistic, that is, in terms of inner dialogues and the processes that
shape them over time into a personality" (Morson & Emerson, 1990, p.
1OQ LIGHTFOOT

216). Both self and novel constitute artistically organized systems for bring'
ing different languages in contact with one another; both have the goal of il
luminating one language by means of anotherof carving out an image of
one language in the light of another.
Artistically organized systems vary in the way that languages are repre
sented or interilluminated, or the degree to which they are directly mixed.
At one extreme is direct stylization, an artistic image of another's language
that preserves its integrity while intending to establish resonance with the
language of the stylizer and his or her contemporaneous audience. Although
only one image is constructed, it nevertheless requires the presence of two
individualized consciousnesses: the one that represents, and the one that is
represented. At the other extreme is parodic stylization, in which the artistic
intentions of the representing discourse are explicitly and directly destruc
tive to that which is represented. To be authentic and productive, which is
to say successful, the parodied language must be represented as fully formed
and possessing its own internal logic, however profaned and despised it be
comes through the discourse of parody.
For Bakhtin, the mutual illumination of multiple discourses takes place
between these two extremes. What is crucial for the evolution of the ideo
logical consciousness is the artistic rendering, the intentional giving of form,
and the dramatization and objectification of coherent languages or socio
ideological points of view:

Every language in the novel is a point of view, a socio-ideological conceptual system of

real social groups and their embodied representatives. Insofar as a language is not per
ceived as a unique socio-ideological system it cannot be material for orchestration, it
cannot become the image of a language. (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 411-412)

Bakhtin argued that the product of such engaged language play is pro
foundly ethical. Through it, we are not only liberated from the hegemony of
a unitary, authoritative discourse, but sensitized to the internal form of the
other and, indeed, the internal form of our own inner discourses that them
selves become reified and alien, objects of consciousness illuminated as such
by the other. When consciousness emerges of one's own inner discourse as
only one among others, the fusion of discourse and ideology is disrupted and,
"only then will language reveal its essentially human character; from behind
its words, forms, styles ... faces begin to emerge, the images of speaking hu
man beings" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 370). Thus, a deeply involved participation
with alien languages and cultures gives rise to a verbal-ideological de-
centeringa dissociation of language from the intentions, meanings, and
truths that it embodies and, therefore, an undoing of mythological and mag
ical thought. According to Bakhtin, a healthy self strives for exposure to
multiple perspectives, strives toward a novelized state, to increase its own
5. RISK-TAKING, CARNIVAL, AND THE NOVELISTIC SELF 1O1

choices and responsibility and reduce its impotence in the world. Individu
als, as well as cultures, that open only to others like themselves, or do not
open at all, become rigid, inert, and impoverished.
Bakhtin's theory of the novel and the novelized self contains a transpar
ent humanism that biographers and critics see as responsive to the Russian
political and intellectual movements of his time. Within this broader con
text, the concept that we consider nextthat of carnivalassumes a par
ticularly ambiguous posture due at least in part to Bakhtin's own
reformulation of both carnival and the novel as he struggled to make both
cohere with his overall theory. However, in all its ambiguity, and perhaps be
cause of its ambiguity, carnival has special relevance for understanding ado
lescents' risk-taking as a medium for self-development.

THE CARNIVAL SELF

AND LAUGHING OUTSIDEDNESS

Bakhtin's early work on carnival ran in directions very much opposed to

concepts considered central to his theory of the novel. His early account was
in many ways similar to what probably passes as our folk understanding of
the holiday. According to our folk conceptions, carnival is set apart from the
mundane activities of our everyday lives. We see it as an interruption and a
refuge, a distinct and separate sphere of reality that we enter occasionally,
leaving at its threshold all that carries the weight of the world too much
upon it. On this logic, carnival enables and even demands a bucking of au
thority, an inversion of the moral order; it evokes a space of self-renuncia-
tion in which the otherwise rational, individuated, buttoned-up self is given
over to, or is overtaken by an unrestrained mob mentality that celebrates the
grotesquethe lowest, common human denominator of unrestrained sex,
consumption, and violence. Behind the mask and masquerade of the collec
tive, carnival dissolves the boundaries that ordinarily separate selves, and
therefore also dissolves the responsibilities and obligations that ordinarily
accrue to entities otherwise identified as intentional agents. Begrimed by a
pall of smut and decadence, and undefended save for the laughing alibi of
the crowd, the carnival self is no self at all.
Bakhtin made much of the openness and unfinalizability of the carnival
self. The body grotesque is all orifice and protuberance, prepared to fuse
with all around it. Substances pass into and out of it as if through a colander.
Lacking form and wholeness it has neither private space nor memory. It ex
ists, rather, outside of space and time. It is a participant, but never a specta
tor or an actor. Indeed, as Bakhtin (1968) described, "Footlights would
destroy a carnival, as the absence of footlights would destroy a theatrical
performance. Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it
.... While carnival lasts, there is no other life outside it" (p. 7). While carni
1O2 LIGHTFOOT

val lasts, while the carnival self is eating, drinking, fornicating, or puking, it is
cultivating its alibi for beinglaughter.
The collective orientation of carnivalits laughing alibi, absence of his
tory, and absolute openness to the carnival surroundoperate against the
dialogic goals of the novelized self. Where carnival presupposes fusion, dia
logue insists on distinctiveness; that is, it requires at least two noncoinci
dent consciousnesses, each outside the other. However, the two Utopian
visions of selfone effaced in carnival, and one striving romantically for
definition and individuation by giving form to the otherwere to find a
more conciliatory relationship in Bakhtin's later writings. This is seen most
clearly in his argument regarding the form-generating function of "outsided
ness" in carnival laughter.
Bakhtin (1970/1986) considered outsideness to be "the most powerful le
ver of understanding" (p. 7). It is a concept that runs throughout his work,
and one seen by Russian scholars and critics as the common ground of his
ethics and aesthetics. At every turn, Bakhtin insisted on the necessary sin
gularity and separateness of each individual in relation to another as an en
abling condition for constructing the forms of things, be they aesthetic
works or persuasive ideological discourses. This holds as much for the form
ing and representation of self as it does for forming and representing the
other. Speaking of the author-creator, Bakhtin (1981) wrote:

(He) can represent the temporal-spatial world and its events only as if he had seen and
observed them himself, only as i/he were an omnipresent witness to them. Even had he
created an autobiography or a confession of the most astonishing truthfulness, all the
same he, as its creator, remains outside the world he has represented in his work. If I re
late (or write about) an event that has just happened to me, then I as the teller (or
writer) of this event am already outside the time and space in which the event oc
curred. It is just as impossible to forge an identity between myself, my own "I," and that
"I" that is the subject of my stories as it is to lift myself up by my own hair. (p. 256)

If one part of what it means to strive toward a novelized state is to engage

and struggle with the discourses of others, the other part is all about the fi
nalization of a whole. According to Emerson (1997), one of Bakhtin's most
sympathetic critics and students:

It is precisely because unfinalizability and malleability are inherent in living personali

ties, in everyday events, and in the time-space parameters that the achievement (not
the acknowledgment, not the discovery, but precisely the achievement) of a whole is
so indispensableand so laden with obligation. The whole of something can only be
seen from a position that is outside of it in space and after it in time. But since a whole
can be variously realized from an infinite number of angles (and each of these realiza
tions will be fully recognized as such only by its own "finalizer"), a sense of wholeness is
5. RISK-TAKING, CARNIVAL, AND THE NOVELISTIC SELF 1O3

always "bestowed," not merely decreed or revealed. It looks different, and differently
perfected, to each person who beholds it. Human beings are form-bestowing crea
tures. It is part of our nature to crave to finalize. This craving, according to Bakhtin, is
the aesthetic instinct, (pp. 220-221)

Indeed, for Bakhtin, laughter stood in a specific aesthetic relationship

to reality. It is a weapon "like fists and sticks," but a weapon of distinction
because it is entirely fearless and, for this reason, progressive: "Laughter
liberates us from fear, and this work of laughter ... is an indispensable pre
requisite for ... consciousness. In order to look at the world soberly, I must
cease to be afraid. In this, laughter played a most serious role" (translated
in Emerson, 1997, p. 96). Similarly, laughter is "a specific means for artisti
cally visualizing and comprehending reality and, consequently, a specific
means for structuring an artistic image, plot, or genre" (Bakhtin,
1963/1984, p. 164). Carnival laughter thus possesses enormous creative,
form-shaping power.
In linking carnival laughter to outsidedness, Bakhtin traced an argument
in which laughter is connected to how we see. It is a detaching, individuat
ing force that helps us to define our place in the world of other subjects. We
cultivate laughter (of which the primary and most serious function is partici
patory) as a route to knowledge of the self through communicative ex
change. What follows from all of this is that carnival is not a destructive
defiance of the social order, but an intentional, creative, artistic rendering of
self "for another, and through the other, for oneself" (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p.
287). Its polar opposite is not seriousness, but stasis.

ADOLESCENT RISK-TAKING AS CARNIVAL

Why do you take risks? What do they mean to you?

(Drinking and partying is) something we're all doing together, and
then everyone's really funny. It's to be together and not worry too
much about what you're doing in front of these people. You can do
outrageous things because you're drunk.
Some risks are meaningless and stupid, and some are meaningful. A
meaningful risk would be like ... it could be stupid, like pissing on a
cop's car, but meaningful because probably everybody was drunk and
it seemed really funny.

What's appealing about taking risks?

That's how you grow upexperiences.
I want to be a participant.
I don't want to die a boring old fart.
1Q4 LIGHTFOOT

As suggested in the remarks of these teenagers, there is much to recorri'

mend Bakhtin's analysis of carnival for understanding the functions and
meanings of adolescent risk-taking. Like carnival, risk-taking entails a
laughing outsidedness that is intentional, participatory, and individuating,
shared between individuals who know and act toward one another on the
basis of particular points of view. To take a risk is to participate in a dialogic
process that objectifies, or bestows form on various points of viewthose
of the individual, his or her peers, and the authority they often mean to
parody. Teenagers who together organize their activities around taking
drugs, shoplifting, defacing public property, or throwing rocks through
storefront windows are giving form and expression to who they understand
themselves to be. To be among them, in a sociocultural sense, is precisely
to participate in those acts of self-definition. Risk-taking can thus been
seen as an aesthetic device that organizes action and experience and con
tributes to self-definition.
Bakhtin's concepts of carnival and the novelistic self implicate two pro
cesses relevant to understanding the functions of risk-taking in adoles
cents' social lives. One process is clearly sociocultural. In its broadest sense
contemporary peer culture is itself remarkably differentiated and spec-
tralpunks, rednecks, preppies, jocks, and so on embody a variety of iden
tity forms and potentials; how much more so the fluid network of
individual peer groups. Participating in the diversity of contemporary peer
culture and actively engaging its multiple discourses in true novelistic
fashion provides fertile ground for developing one's self. Indeed, our analy
ses indicate that inertia sets in when individuals participate in peer groups
whose risk-taking is particularly extreme and isolates them from contact
with other teenagers and thus other ideological points of view. One mem
ber of such a group commented on its isolation from the local adolescent
social scene as follows:

We try not to get into that (social scene) anymore, because they're all typical high
school students. They'll go to college and they fit in with school. A lot of the people I
hang out with are dropouts and we are extremely prejudiced against the great percent
age of the school and we try not to get into that kind of grouping.

In describing the context of hallucinogenic drug use in particular, an

other member said, "We used to go to parties where parents weren't there
and hang out and stuff, but now we know older people. Now we go to people
who live by themselves." As Bakhtin would no doubt suggest, the refusal of
these teenagers to seek out other points of view, to strive toward a novelized
state, reduces opportunities for growth, power, choices and responsibility.
Beyond the sociocultural implications for self-development, participat
ing in peer culture also contributes to the awareness that one has a self of
5. RISK-TAKING, CARNIVAL, AND THE NOVELISTIC SELF 1O5

moral consequence. It is in this sense that ethical-aesthetic process is most

strongly implicated. The shaping of multiple discourses, especially those
that conflict, engages a verbal-ideological decentering through the "inter
illumination" of self in relation to others. It introduces an outsidedness in
herent to other aesthetic experiences, and essential to the formation of what
Bakhtin described as the ideological consciousness. It is noteworthy in this
regard that risk-taking can be even more explicitly novelized. It is, after all,
the stuff of which stories are made. Teenagers tell and retell their risks and
adventuresstylize and parody themselvesand this, too, is significant for
the project of self-development.
Seen as an aesthetic process of novelization, adolescent risk-taking occu
pies a privileged role in self-development. It is, however, but one of any num
ber of examples of aesthetic activity. To properly place it in a larger context,
it is useful to consider another aesthetic domain that appeals to adolescents,
particularly those of Latin American descent.

LOWRIDER ART

Lowrider art appeals in a special way to Hispanic adolescents living in the

United Statesmales and females, but mostly males. It usually consists of
elaborate pencil or ink renderings of classic lowrider cars, such as the Im
pala, that are often draped with bikini-clad women. In its early years, the
work was published in Lowrider Magazine, and looked something like the im
age in Fig. 5.1.

FIG. 5.1. Early-style

lowrider art. From
Lowrider Magazine,
2002. Reprinted with
permission of Primedia
Magazine, Inc. Copy
right 2002. All rights
reserved.
1O6 LIGHTFOOT

Over time, the magazine editors began to receive artwork in such quan
tity that they decided in 1992 to start a new magazine devoted to it entirely.
Of particular note is the transformation of the form over the course of the
past decade. As illustrated in Fig. 5.2, the artwork began to introduce dis
tinctly Mexican cultural motifs. There are now repeated themes in lowrider
art that include Aztec and other pre-Columbian images, including the Vir
gin of Guadalupe, and the Mexican Revolution. In fact, as illustrated in Fig.
5.3, the art has become increasingly symbolic, often leaving out of the pic
ture its own namesake (the lowrider car) in the process of constructing
works of cultural and political, as welll as aesthetic significance.
Lowrider art is seen in the Hispanic community as a means of celebrating
Mexican heritage. In an interview conducted by Grady (2002) as a part of a
larger ethnographic study, one of the magazine editors quoted the editorial
policy printed in the submission guidelines that "artwork must be free of
gang slogans, violence, weapons, drugs and/or alcohol" (p. 175). The editor
sees the magazine as a tool of cultural expression; others have described it as
a way to demonstrate that Mexicans "could do other things besides work in
the fields" (Grady, 2002, p. 175). Indeed, the genre has been an inspiration
to Hispanic adolescents of both genders: It is traced onto school notebooks,

FIG. 5.2. Lowrider art

reflecting Mexican
cultural motifs, by Danny
Villescas. Courtesy of
Fred Castro
(www.thecastrocollection.
com).
5. RISK-TAKING, CARNIVAL, AND THE NOVELISTIC SELF 1O7

FIG. 5.3. Example of

lowrider art integrat
ing U.S. and Mexican
symbols, by Edison
Davis. Courtesy of
Fred Castro (www.the
castrocollection.com).

posters are purchased and displayed on bedroom walls, T-shirts bearing

lowrider art are highly prized, and the art is copied and shared.
Ethnographers such as Grady, as well as Goldman (1997) who studied sig
nification in barrio art T-shirts, have argued that the montage created, the
juxtaposition of vernacular iconography, constructs a bridge between ado
lescents' Mexican heritage and their current U.S. residence. Asked to com
ment on different categories of lowrider art images, adolescents identify as
meaningful those that portray Mexico's indigenous heritage: pre-Colum-
bian stone carvings, Aztec warriors in positions of victory and strength, and
other historical images that contest the conquest and colonization of Mex
ico. In this crowd the bikini-clad women lack a certain appeal. Interestingly,
the genre appears to be gaining currency among adolescents of a variety of
ethnic and economic backgrounds, and in this respect creating a bridge
across ethnic groups.
Scrutinizing lowrider art through a Bakhtinian lens shows it to be a par
ticularly illustrative case of aesthetic novelization. The transformation of
the art form itself toward an increasingly direct and dialogic encounter of
two cultural traditions is especially remarkable. Lowrider art may be inter
1O8 LIGHTFOOT

preted as a creative response to the cultural mainstream's impossibly wed

ded assimilationist demands on the one hand, and its marginalizing
stereotypes and practices on the other. At the other extreme, it may be inter
preted as a multicultural hybridization of historically and culturally signifi
cant meanings. Either way, it serves the serious function of constructing an
ideological consciousness, as Bakhtin elaborated the process.

A PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORDINARY

According to his biographers and translators, Bakhtin was the first to formu
late a comprehensive philosophy of the ordinaryof the disorganized, un
systematic, moment- to -moment prosaics of experience, as distinct from the
ordered, abstract, and idealized poetics. The distinction plays out in one of
Bateson's "metalogues" with his daughter, who is interested to know why
things get in a muddle: "People spend a lot of time tidying things, but they
never seem to spend time muddling them. Things just seem to get in a mud
dle by themselves. And then people have to tidy them again" (in Morson &
Emerson, 1990, p. 29). Deflecting his daughter's call for a poetics of mud
dling, Bateson replied simply that the world includes a lot more messiness
than tidiness. Messiness just is.
So, too, for Bakhtin, who argued, in contrast to the leading intellectuals
of his time (including Freud), that it is not disorder and fragmentation that
requires explanation, but integrity, unity, and wholeness. Set against the
messiness of everyday life, unity is always a matter of work. In the case of
developing a self, it is a lifelong and incomplete project. According to
Bakhtin, the self is neither discovered or given, or even fully constructed;
it can only be posited. In this regard, he struck a chord sympathetic to that
of Baldwin, who argued that an essential ingredient to self-development is
"the intent to be a subject," that is, a forward-pressing striving to be what
one is not but may yet become. For Baldwin and Bakhtin, the self leaning
into the future as hypothesis and potentiality, the positing (i.e., of a self for
ever poised to become something else), is aesthetically formed and provi
sionally achieved by virtue of the ethical obligations of each moment and
each situation. In his first published essay, "Art and Responsibility,"
Bakhtin wrote that, "personality must become responsible through and
through. All its aspects must not only arrange themselves along the tem
poral flow of its life, but must also intersect one another in the unity of
blame and responsibility" (translated in Morson & Emerson, 1990, p. 31).
Only a "pretender" would do otherwise. Such a person, according to
Bakhtin, does not feign the identity of another, but rather avoids the pro
ject of selfhood altogether, either by living according to the lofty abstract
norms and demands of another, or by failing to do so; that is, by failing to
engage the other dialogically. An example of this is provided by our teen
5. RISK-TAKING, CARNIVAL, AND THE NOVELISTIC SELF 1O9

age subjects who "are extremely prejudiced against the great percentage of
the school," and refuse to "get into that kind of grouping." Whether the in
dividual succumbs to a moral order not of his or her own making, or rails
against the other in the absence of engaging a process of objectification,
the person is "washed on all sides by the waves of an endless, empty poten
tiality" (translated in Morson & Emerson, 1990, p. 31); personal responsi
bility is null and void.
By Bakhtin's logic, the unity of self, its integrity, does not answer to the
question, "Who am I?" This is rather the question of self-continuity as for
mulated by Erikson and pursued in modern approaches to identity develop
ment (Chandler, Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallett, 2003; Moshman,
2004). However, the lasting and perdurable "I" persisting across time, space,
and accrued experience is not what Bakhtin is after. Only part of the project
of becoming involves arranging oneself diachronically along the "temporal
flow of life" and embracing the twinned epistemological and moral impera
tives of knowing oneself and being true to oneself. Left in the dust of con
temporary scholarship as it stampedes toward the integral self continuous in
time is what Bakhtin considered the most difficult task of self-development:
the creation of a self unified within the synchronous, ethically weighted mo
ment, whose integrity I can stand behindwhich I can respect. Only then
will I seek no "alibis" (Emerson, 1997, p. 238).
For Piaget, respect constituted the very source of moral law and led ulti
mately to the "morality of goodness." His particular version of respect,
however, is of the type given by one to another, bestowed on another by vir
tue of his or her location on our personal metric of value. Missing from his
argument, missing from the entire contemporary enterprise devoted to the
study of moral life and identity, is the self-respect envisioned by Bakhtin as
essential to engaging in any communicative act that I can stand behind.
This leaves out a lot. What I have attempted to accomplish here, in admit
tedly fledgling form, is to map out an argument that implicates his theory of
aesthetics, including his conceptions of carnival, the novelistic self, and
the development of an ideological consciousness, as relevant to contem
porary discourse on self-development. In light of the currently divided and
divisive approaches to adolescent risk-taking, in light of the ambiguity in
herent to adolescents' very own reflections on their risk-taking ("Stealing
beer from a truck shows what lengths you'll go to to be with the group"; "I'd
never do anything that's immoral"), Bakhtin's reading of "becoming a per
son" is a particularly promising antidote. The binocular view that it brings
into focus suggests that much of adolescents' social action, however carni-
valesquebecause it is carnivalesquemay be profitably explored as an
aesthetic ground for testing and developing the self-respect and construct
ing the Muse necessary to navigate the ordinary and messy moral land
scape of their lives.
1 1O LIGHTFQOT

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Piaget, J. (1995). Sociological studies. London: Routledge.

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 6

Adolescents' Peer

Interactions: Conflict

and Coordination Among

Personal Expression, Social

Norms, and Moral Reasoning

Stacey S. Horn
University of Illinois at Chicago

Peer group exclusion, teasing, and harassment are a part of most adolescents'
lives. As adults we are often left asking why it is that adolescents frequently
treat each other with such cruelty and meanness. Some argue that it is be
cause of a moral decline in our society and that adolescents are out of con
trol. Is this the case, however? Are adolescents today simply lacking
morality? Or, rather, is it that adolescents' social worlds are complex and as
such they are faced with coordinating conflicting needs or values in negoti
ating their peer relationships? For example, do adolescents sometimes view
exclusion as a legitimate form of social regulation? In this chapter I discuss
the unique complexity of adolescents' peer groups and some of the ways in
which this complexity may be related to the types of decisions adolescents
make about how to treat one another.
COMPLEXITY IN ADOLESCENTS' PEER GROUPS
Peers and peer relationships (or lack of them) are a critical part of adoles
cents' social worlds. During the transition into adolescence, the peer social
113
1 14 HORN

world moves from being comprised of small groups of predominantly same-

sex friends or playmates to a much larger and more complex system that has
multiple levels (Brown, Mory, &Kinney, 1994). Adolescents, like younger
children, continue to have best friendships and friendship groups (cliques)
that are organized around common interests and reciprocal affections. In
addition, however, they also become part of a larger peer group structure in
which individuals are categorized into groups based on their interests, activ
ities, values, and modes of personal expression (e.g., dress; Brown, 1989;
Brown et al., 1994). These groups emerge in adolescence due to both socio
structural and developmental factors.
In most U.S. school systems, as children get older the structure of the
school becomes larger and more complex. This increase in size and complex
ity makes it difficult for adolescents to know each of their classmates on an
individual level. Thus, the larger peer group structure that emerges in ado
lescence provides adolescents with a way to make sense of this expanding so
cial world by giving them categories or prototypes on which to base their
evaluations of their peers. Additionally, as adolescents move into high
school they are confronted with a much larger and more diverse array of
classes, activities, and interests that they can pursue. Coupled with the in
creased autonomy granted to adolescents by parents and other adults, ado
lescents' social worlds become much more diverse, more peer driven, and
allow for more time spent with peers in the absence of adults.
On the developmental side, adolescents gain cognitive skills that allow
them to see beyond interpersonal relationships (e.g., best friendships) and to
construct broader representations of the peer group and the peer group sys
tem that involve multiple levels, networks, and groups (Brown, 1990;
Selman, 1980). Additionally, during adolescence the development of one's
personal identity becomes much more salient to individuals (Erikson, 1959,
1968). As a part of this process, adolescents use their peer groups as venues
through which to try on and test out their various identities (Newman &
Newman, 1976; Pugh &Hart, 1999). Further, with the onset of puberty, ad
olescents' peer groups become a way for them to learn about and experiment
with their emerging sexuality and sexual identity (Dunphy, 1963). This also
leads to an expansion in the peer group. Prior to puberty, children's peer
groups are comprised predominantly of members of the same gender. With
the onset of puberty, however, most adolescents begin to develop an interest
in opposite-gender peers and start to form mixed-gender groups. These
groups serve as a way for adolescents to engage in heterosocial behavior and
to learn about social practices and norms regarding dating and intimacy
(Dunphy, 1963).
These three developmental factors (cognition, identity, and sexuality)
combined with the sociostructural factors of increased size and complexity
of school, as well as the diversity of opportunities available to adolescents,
6. ADOLESCENTS' PEER INTERACTIONS 1 15

support the emergence of a peer system that is based not on "who hangs
around with who" but rather on prototypic group representations that are
based on the types of activities, attitudes, behaviors, and values different
groups of individuals have in common (McLellan & Youniss, 1999). As
such, this larger peer group system is a more abstract representation of the
peer world than adolescents' actual social networks (McLellan & Youniss,
2000). In turn, these peer group or identity prototypes have associated with
them particular social norms and conventions for behaviors, activities, and
other modes of personal expression that adolescents use in developing their
own personal identities and in stratifying the broader social milieu. Newman
and Newman (1976) argued that peer groups not only provide the proto
types available to and venues through which adolescents test out their iden
tities, they also provide them with critical information, feedback, and
support (or nonsupport) regarding these varying identities. Through this
feedback system then, peer groups and peer group norms set the boundaries
for what is considered appropriate or "cool" individual expression and who is
granted status within that peer system.
It appears then, that one of the complexities of adolescence is trying to
balance the needs to create a personal identity and to "fit in" to the peer
group or peer groups to which you want to belong. In doing this, adolescents
are also taking notice of their peers, their peers' emergent identity construc
tions, and the larger groups' reactions to these identities. Thus, in evaluat
ing and interacting with one's peers, adolescents are then confronted with
having to negotiate and coordinate not only moral considerations, but also
salient personal and social ones. Sometimes, an adolescent's identity expres
sion may coalesce with the norms and conventions valued by the peer group.
In this case there will likely be little conflict between the peer group and this
individual. Conversely, an adolescent's identity expression may be outside
the norms or conventions valued by the group, thereby creating conflict for
both the individual and the others within that peer system. In this circum
stance, how do adolescents negotiate and coordinate these conflicting di
mensions? More specifically, what is the relationship among personal
expression, social group norms, and adolescents' evaluations of the treat
ment of others? Using social cognitive domain theory as a framework, I have
been investigating these issues for the past few years.
Specifically, I have been investigating the ways in which adolescents rea
son about issues of exclusion, harassment, and unfairness based on peer
group membership, gender identity, and sexual orientation. I chose these
three social categories because they are highly salient to adolescents' lives.
Additionally, these categories seem to be dimensions along which adoles
cents get excluded, ostracized, teased, or harassed in schools. Further, unlike
race and biological sex, which are perceived by most individuals to be in
nate, peer group membership, gender expression, and sexual orientation are
1 16 HORN

more often seen as chosen expressions of one's identity, and therefore as cat
egories that can be changed. As such, there seem to be more social norms
that serve to regulate adolescents' identity expressions within these three
categories. This research has begun to illuminate the ways in which adoles
cents coordinate the different dimensions of their social interactions and
the factors that impact their reasoning regarding these interactions. In the
next section of this chapter, I briefly describe social cognitive domain theory
and its usefulness in studying how adolescents reason about peer group rela
tionships. Then I discuss relevant findings from two empirical studies inves
tigating these issues. In the last section of the chapter I discuss implications
of these results for moral education.

SOCIAL COGNITIVE DOMAIN THEORY

AND ADOLESCENT PEER RELATIONSHIPS

In social cognitive domain theory (Turiel, 1983, 1998; Turiel, Killen, &
Helwig, 1987) it is proposed that social judgments are influenced by the
reasoning processes that individuals bring to bear on those judgments.
Specifically, it is posited that there are three conceptually distinct domains
of social reasoningmoral, societal, and psychologicalthat individuals
use when understanding and making decisions about their social worlds
(Turiel, 1983, 1998). The moral domain pertains to issues of others' wel
fare (harm), justice (comparative treatment and distribution), and rights.
The societal domain pertains to issues involving the rules, norms, and con
ventions that coordinate the social interactions of individuals within so
cial systems. In the psychological domain, knowledge pertains to
interpersonal relationships, the understanding of individuals as psycho
logical systems, and those issues over which individuals have personal ju
risdiction (Smetana, 1995; Turiel, 1983).
Recent research on peer relationships utilizing this theoretical frame
work has investigated issues of gender and racial exclusion in diverse peer
group contexts (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002; Killen &
Stangor, 2001), the impact of stereotypes of adolescent peer groups on ado
lescents' reasoning about retribution (Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999); the
impact of ambiguity on adolescents' reasoning about exclusion based on ad
olescent peer groups (Horn, 2003), as well as how adolescents' beliefs about
gender norms and sexuality impact their reasoning about the treatment of
others based on gender expression or sexual orientation (Horn, 2002; Horn
&.Nucci, 2002, 2003). Overall this research suggests that adolescents pre
dominantly view exclusion, teasing, and peer harassment as wrong and that
they think it is wrong because it is unfair or hurtful. Thus, it would seem
then, based on this research, that adolescents do have a moral sense when it
comes to relating with their peers. This research, however, has also delin
6. ADOLESCENTS' PEER INTERACTIONS 1 17

eated a number of factors that are related to adolescents' reasoning regard

ing these issues.
For example, Killen and her colleagues (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002)
found that context is related to the type of reasoning individuals will bring to
bear on their decisions about peer relationships. In more intimate or close
relationships, such as who you are going to be friends with, children and ad
olescents used more personal reasoning in justifying why exclusion is ac
ceptable. For example, it is okay to not play with John because he is Black
because you should be able to choose who your friends are. Conversely, in
contexts in which the peer group was more institutionally sanctioned (e.g., a
school-based group) children and adolescents were more likely to evaluate
exclusion as wrong and used moral reasoning in justifying why. For example,
it is not okay for the other students to exclude John from the math club (be
cause he is Black) because all students should have the right to participate in
school activities and that would be unfair. Thus, this research suggests that
children and adolescents prioritize different domains of reasoning in justify
ing or not justifying peer group exclusion in intimate versus nonintimate
contexts. That is to say, in friendship contexts the fact that excluding a par
ticular person may be hurtful to that person is subordinated to the individu
als' prerogative to be friends with whom they choose. In other contexts,
however, individuals' prerogative to hang out with whom they choose is sub
ordinated to the larger issue of equal access and fairness. Social cognitive
domain theory provides a meaningful framework to investigate the ways in
which adolescents coordinate personal, social, and moral dimensions of
their relationships with one another.
Further, although research suggests that individuals at all ages draw on
these three domains of social knowledge in reasoning about exclusion, how
these domains of knowledge get coordinated and applied to issues of peer
group inclusion or exclusion changes as children move into adolescence
(Horn, 2003; Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002; Killen, McGlothlin, & Lee-Kim,
2002). This research suggests that like younger children, many adolescents
view exclusion that is based solely on one's social group membership (in a
particular race, gender, or peer group) as wrong from a moral viewpoint (it is
unfair or hurtful; Horn, 2003; Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002), but also pro
vides evidence that adolescents are more likely than children to evaluate ex
cluding someone from a peer group or friendship group as acceptable
(Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002; Killen, McGlothlin, & Lee-Kim, 2002). Ad
ditionally, adolescents are also more likely to justify peer group exclusion as
acceptable by making appeals to such things as the identity of the group,
group functioning, group norms, or personal choice (Horn, 2003; Killen,
Lee-Kim, et al., 2002). These results suggest that as children get older they
have an increased knowledge of the conventional features of groups (group
norms, group identity, group functioning) that are legitimately necessary to
1 18 HORN

the organization and maintenance of groups (Bukowski &Sippolla, 2001;

Turiel, 1983), as well as an expanded understanding of issues that are inher
ently personal and legitimately up to the individual to decide (Nucci, 1996,
2001). In my research I have found that adolescents' developing under
standing of social systems as well as their expanded sense of the personal do
main are related to how they understand and make decisions about their
peer relationships. Specifically, three primary issues emerge when investi
gating how adolescents negotiate and reason about issues of personal ex
pression, social norms, and the treatment of others: adolescents' beliefs and
assumptions about normativity or acceptability of others, adolescents' own
social identity (the peer group they belong to), and age. To discuss the ways
in which these factors impact adolescents' reasoning, I draw on data from
two different studies that investigated how adolescents reason about peer
group exclusion based on peer group membership (Horn, 2003) and gender
expression and sexual orientation (Horn & Nucci, 2002, 2003).

ADOLESCENTS' BELIEFS AND ASSUMPTIONS

ABOUT NORMATIVITY OR ACCEPTABILITY
OF OTHERS BASED ON THEIR PEER GROUP
MEMBERSHIP; GENDER EXPRESSION,
OR SEXUAL ORIENTATION
During adolescence, social norms regarding dress, appearance, behaviors,
and activities are quite strong. An individual's adherence to these norms of
ten impacts the way in which that individual is perceived by his or her peers
and also influences the status one is afforded within the peer system as well
as the groups or social relationships to which one has access. Thus, the de
gree to which an individual's identity expressions (in terms of dress, appear
ance, behaviors, and activities) conform to the social norms within the peer
system impacts how others within that system will view that individual. In
both studies we asked adolescents to evaluate the acceptability of the indi
viduals who were being excluded by others from a group. In the study inves
tigating exclusion based on peer group membership, adolescents (N = 379)
ranked individuals from certain peer groups as more acceptable than those
from other groups. In fact, the results suggested that a hierarchy of peer
groups existed at this school with "jocks" and "preppies" at the top and "dirt
ies" and "gothics" at the bottom (for a description of the groups, see Table
6.1). Similarly, in the study investigating adolescents' judgments and rea
soning regarding exclusion based on gender expression and sexual orienta
tion, adolescents (N = 264) rated straight and gender-conforming targets as
more acceptable than gay, lesbian, or gender nonconforming targets (see Ta
ble 6.2 for a description of the targets). Further, the targets who were gender
6. ADOLESCENTS' PEER INTERACTIONS 11 9
TABLE 6.1
Descriptions of Adolescent Reference Groups Used in Study

Group Description

Cheerleaders Involved in cheerleading and danceline, part of the peer culture,

accepted by teachers, participate in a moderate amount of delinquent
activity (drinking) . Female

Dirties Wear old, dirty, or grunge -style clothing, disengaged from school and
teachers, smart, participate in moderate to heavy amounts of
delinquent activity (drinking, smoking pot, trouble at school). Male
and female.

Druggies Engage in heavy amounts of delinquent activity (drinking, heavy drug

use, trouble at school), disengaged from school and teachers, as well as
peers, tough. Mixed gender but more male.

Gothics Wear black clothes and makeup, engage in deviant behavior such as
witchcraft, like music and concerts, indifferent or defiant attitudes
toward school and teachers, loners and outcasts. Mixed gender but
more female.

Jocks Participate in sports and other school activities, part of the popular
peer culture, favored by teachers, not smart, participate in a moderate
amount of delinquent activity (drinking, smoking pot). Male.

Preppies Extremely involved in school activities such as sports and student

council, part of the popular peer culture, liked by teachers, do well in
school, wealthy, participate in moderate amounts of delinquent
behavior (drinking). Male and female.

nonconforming (both gay and straight) in terms of their appearance were

rated as the least acceptable.
These results suggest that adolescents' normative beliefs about their
peers are influenced by individuals' personal expressions or identities re
garding social reference group, gender expression, and sexual orientation.
Further, adolescents who were the most visibly nonconforming in their iden
tity expressions (those labeled as dirties or gothics or those with non
conforming gender appearance) were seen as least acceptable overall,
suggesting that personal expression in terms of appearance is a salient nor
mative dimension along which adolescents evaluate each other. Although
this evidence suggests that adolescents do judge their peers based on their
identity expressions, is it the case that these judgments impact adolescents'
evaluations and reasoning regarding the treatment of others?
 TABLE 6.2
Descriptions of Targets Used in the Scenarios

Gender, Sexual
Orientation, Gender
Expression Description

Male, gay, George is a gay male high school student. He plays on the school
gender- conforming baseball team. He is a B student. He dresses and acts like most of
the other guys at school. To all outward appearances, he seems just
like any other boy at the school.

Male, straight, Steve is a straight male high school student. He plays on the school
appearance baseball team. He is a B student. He dresses and acts differently
nonconforming from most of the other guys at school. For example he acts
feminine, and sometimes wears fingernail polish and eyeliner.

Male, gay, Mark is a gay male high school student. He plays on the school
appearance baseball team. He is a B student. He dresses and acts differently
nonconforming from most of the other guys at school. For example he acts
feminine, and sometimes wears fingernail polish and eyeliner.

Male, straight, Todd is a straight male high school student. He is a member of the
activity local ballet company. He is a B student. He dresses and acts like
nonconforming most of the other guys at school.

Male, gay, activity Matt is a gay male high school student. He is a member of the local
nonconforming ballet company. He is a B student. He dresses and acts like most of
the other guys at school.

Female, lesbian, Jenny is a lesbian high school student. She plays on the school
gender- conforming volleyball team. She is a B student. She dresses and acts like most of
the other girls at school. To all outward appearances, she seems just
like any other girl at the school.

Female, straight, Ashley is a straight female high school student. She plays on the
appearance school volleyball team. She is a B student. She dresses and acts
nonconforming differently from most of the other girls at school. For example, she
acts masculine, has a crew cut, and never wears makeup or dresses.

Female, lesbian, Mary is a lesbian high school student. She plays on the school
appearance volleyball team. She is a B student. She dresses and acts differently
nonconforming from most of the other girls at school. For example, she acts
masculine, has a crew cut, and never wears makeup or dresses.

Female, straight, Talia is a straight female high school student. She is a running back
activity on the high school football team. She is a B student. She dresses
nonconforming and acts like most of the other girls at school.

Female, lesbian, Amy is a lesbian high school student. She is a running back on the
activity school football team. She is a B student. She dresses and acts like
nonconforming most of the other girls at school.

12O
6. ADOLESCENTS' PEER INTERACTIONS 121

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCEPTABILITY

JUDGMENTS AND ADOLESCENTS' EVALUATIONS

AND REASONING REGARDING THE TREATMENT

OF OTHERS

In the study on adolescents' evaluations and reasoning regarding the treat

ment of others based on gender expression and sexual orientation, we
asked adolescents to evaluate whether they thought it was right or wrong
to exclude, tease, harass, or assault individuals because they were gay, les
bian, or gender nonconforming and to provide reasoning for why they
thought it was right or wrong. Overall, most adolescents evaluated it as
wrong to exclude, tease, harass, or assault someone based on his or her gen
der expression or sexual orientation. In fact, virtually no adolescents eval
uated it as acceptable to harass or assault someone based on his or her
gender expression or sexual orientation and virtually all of them provided
moral reasons (fairness to others, human welfare, human equality) for why
this was wrong.
For scenarios in which physical harm to the other was not an issue (ex
clusion) , however, adolescents were more likely to endorse the exclusion
of those that were nonnormative (rated as less acceptable) as acceptable.
That is, adolescents evaluated exclusion as less wrong if the target was gay
or lesbian or gender nonconforming in appearance. Additionally, for the
exclusion scenarios, adolescents utilized personal choice reasoning (they
can do whatever they want) in justifying their judgments much more than
in the stories regarding teasing, harassing, or assault. Further, for the exclu
sion stories, adolescents were more likely to utilize social norms reasoning
(adhering to or negating norms) in relation to gender expression related to
appearance. That is to say, adolescents were sensitive to social norms re
garding gender appearance in justifying their judgments regarding issues of
exclusion. For those adolescents who were nonconforming in their gender
expression, participants were more likely to endorse exclusion as accept
able because the individual did not adhere to social norms regarding gen
der. Interestingly, this was not the case for activity, suggesting that gender
norms regarding appearance may be more rigid in adolescence than social
norms regarding the types of activities in which one can participate. Thus,
based on these results, it seems that adolescents do use moral reasoning
when evaluating issues of how others are treated. It also seems to be the
case, however, that when it comes to peer interaction (who one hangs
around with), adolescents' reasoning about what is right or wrong is re
lated to how they coordinate their understanding of social norms regard
ing gender with their understanding of identity issues related to gender
expression.
122 HORN

SOCIAL IDENTITY

From our study on adolescents' reasoning about exclusion based on peer

group membership, we also have evidence that those adolescents who iden
tify with groups that hold a privileged or accepted position within the peer
group structure are more likely to view their own identity expressions as nor
mative and less likely to view the identity expressions of adolescents in less
accepted groups as normative. These beliefs about normativity, then, seem
to impact their evaluations and reasoning about peer interactions within
school. When one's identity expression conflicts with the social norms of
the group, exclusion is more likely to be seen as legitimate (based on conven
tional reasons) than when one's identity expression conforms to the social
norms of the group. Further, adolescents who adopt "normative" identity ex
pressions are more likely to view peer group exclusion as a legitimate form of
social regulation rather than as a moral issue. That is, as adolescents negoti
ate their identities within the peer social milieu, exclusion serves a regula
tory function in which those with power and status based on their own
identity expressions maintain their privileged position by denying those
with alternative identity expressions access to their group.

AGE-RELATED DIFFERENCES

Research on the development of conventional reasoning suggests that at

this age (14-16-year-olds), adolescents begin to understand social struc
tures as systemic and view conventions and social norms as necessary to the
regulation and functioning of the system (Turiel, 1983). Further, adoles
cents at this age view the social system as uniform, having fixed roles and a
static hierarchical organization (Turiel, 1983). Conversely, older adoles
cents (17- and 18-year-olds) view conventions and norms as "'nothing but'
societal standards that exist through habitual use" (Turiel, 1983, p. 103) and
thus are less likely to see them as necessary in maintaining the social system.
It maybe the case then, that as adolescents' understanding of social systems
is developing, the peer group system becomes one arena in which this emerg
ing knowledge is applied. That is, if middle adolescents understand conven
tions as necessary to the maintenance of the social system, then others'
identity expressions that are nonconventional may be seen as a threat to the
peer system, and as such, they may be more likely to view exclusion as a legit
imate form of social regulation rather than as an issue of moral harm.
In both studies we found significant differences in adolescents' judgments
and reasoning based on age. Middle adolescents (9th- and lOth-graders)
were more likely to evaluate exclusion as acceptable, used more conven
tional reasoning and stereotypes and less moral reasoning in justifying their
judgments, and were less likely to evaluate those adolescents who were non
6. ADOLESCENTS' PEER INTERACTIONS 123

normative in their personal expression as acceptable than older adolescents

(11th- and 12th-graders). Interestingly, this is also the age period when ado
lescents' peer relationships are also changing the most, becoming larger and
more complex (Brown, 1990; Brown et al, 1994). Thus, it might be argued
that peer conflicts related to issues of exclusion and teasing are the result of
adolescents' trying to make sense of this expanding and increasingly com
plex peer system, as well as their own place within that system.

DISCUSSION

The results presented in this chapter suggest that as adolescents are trying to
make sense of themselves and their expanding social world they are negoti
ating and coordinating personal, conventional, and moral considerations in
their peer interactions. As adolescents are trying on and testing out different
identity expressions they are also doing this within a peer group structure
that has norms and conventions that impact how those identity expressions
are perceived by others. Within the peer system certain identity expressions
are seen as more normative than others and adolescents view the exclusion
of those who are perceived as nonnormative as more legitimate.
Additionally, the results suggest that adolescents who have more of an in
vestment in the peer social system will be more likely to view exclusion as le
gitimate. For example, adolescents who identify with a peer group that
benefits from the system (through status) are more likely to view the exclu
sion of those whose identity expressions are nonnormative as legitimate.
Additionally, middle adolescents for whom adherence to conventions and
norms is imperative to the maintenance of the system are also more likely to
evaluate the exclusion of those whose identity expressions are counter to
the system as legitimate.
Research on the development of the self also suggests that during middle
adolescence (14-16), when identity exploration is at its peak, adolescents
are grappling with the conflicts and contradictions within their own self-
constructs (Harter, 1999), putting them in a vulnerable position regarding
their own sense of self. This vulnerability makes them extremely sensitive to
the norms and conventions of the peer structure and the feedback this sys
tem gives them regarding their emergent sense of who they are. If the peer
system provides positive and affirming feedback regarding their personal
identity expressions, they will try to maintain the norms and values inherent
in that system by excluding and teasing others who they view as a threat to
this system. On the other hand, if the peer system provides them with nega
tive and rejecting feedback regarding their personal identity expressions,
they may try to do one of three things. They may try to change themselves to
fit into the peer system, they may try to change the peer system, or they may
place themselves (and their values) outside of the peer system completely.
124 HORN

At the extremes, either of these options can lead to violence and harm di
rected toward the self or others. For some adolescents, the only way to re
solve the conflict between who they are (their identity expression) and the
norms and conventions of the adolescent social world is to kill themselves.
For other adolescents, the way to resolve this conflict is to harm those that
they perceive as negating or rejecting their identity expressions.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL EDUCATION

Piaget (1939/1965) argued, "In order to discover oneself as a particular indi

vidual, what is needed is a continuous comparison, the outcome of opposi
tion, of discussion, and of mutual control" (p. 393). Adolescents' peer
groups do provide them with the conflict, resistance, and support necessary
for them to begin to understand who they are, what they want to be, and
how they fit within the larger social world (Pugh & Hart, 1999). Thus, there
is a component to adolescent peer conflict that is developmentaliy neces
sary and appropriate when this conflict occurs between individuals of equal
status and within an environment that is generally supportive. It is often the
case, however, that adolescents' peer interactions are also fraught with
power imbalances in that certain types of identity expressions afford individ
uals more power and privilege within the peer system than others. In some
cases, then, peer conflict, rather than being developmentaliy appropriate or
healthy, serves to perpetuate a system that is unfair and often harmful.
Thus, one of the goals of moral education should be to help adolescents
coordinate their understanding of the social system (and the norms and val
ues associated with it) with their understanding of moral principles such as
fairness, individual rights, and human welfare. One way to do this is by ask
ing adolescents to analyze social systems and social practices that unfairly
advantage one group or type of person over another. For example, having
students systematically investigate issues such as segregation and affirma
tive action will push adolescents to think about and try to coordinate issues
of access, privilege, and individual merit. Another way to do this would be to
have adolescents analyze the norms and values inherent in popular culture
and how these norms and values support or constrain the types of identity
expressions available to individuals.
A second goal of moral education should be to ensure that schools are
places in which healthy conflict, resistance, and opposition are fostered and
in which adolescents are supported in negotiating the personal, social, and
moral dimensions of their interactions with their peers. This can be done at
the classroom or school level by creating an atmosphere in which multiple
identity expressions and a diversity of views and opinions are encouraged,
valued, and supported. For example, schools that value excellence in multi
ple domains (arts, sciences, athletics, leadership) create an environment in
6. ADOLESCENTS' PEER INTERACTIONS 125

which multiple identity expressions are valued and supported. This in turn
reduces the likelihood that certain identity expressions will be privileged
over others, reducing the stratification of the peer group system. Addition
ally, classrooms in which a diversity of opinions and voices is presented,
sought, and valued and in which respectful argument and negotiation are
fostered can help students understand how to negotiate the complexity of
the peer group world. Further, schoolwide conflict resolution programs that
help adolescents analyze the different facets or perspectives within a conflict
also help adolescents to practice coordinating the personal, social, and
moral dimensions of the situation.
Finally, a third goal of moral education should be to encourage adoles
cents to interact with a diversity of people within their school and commu
nity environment. Simple exposure to diverse groups, however, is not
enough (Allport, 1954). These interactions should involve diverse adoles
cents working together toward a mutually beneficial goal. Through interact
ing with others, adolescents get to know one another on a more personal
level, thus breaking down the stereotypes or assumptions they might have of
one another. Additionally, by working toward a common goal, adolescents
come to depend on one another and can begin to value the unique skills and
knowledge that each person brings to the group.

CONCLUSION

Adolescents' peer groups are complex and negotiating relationships within

the peer system involves personal, social, and moral dimensions. During ad
olescence, individuals are not only developing a broader understanding of
social systems, including the peer system; they are also constructing a sense
of who they are and who they want to be within this system. This can lead to
conflict for some adolescents or between some groups of adolescents. Al
though some of this conflict may be helpful and developmentally appropri
ate, in negotiating these conflicts adolescents will often make decisions
about how to treat others that are unfair or harmful. The goal of moral edu
cation, then, should be to help adolescents better negotiate conflicts be
tween issues of personal expression and social norms so that they
understand the impact that these factors have on the decisions they make
about others.

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 7

Negative Morality and the

Goals of Moral Education

Fritz K. Oser
Institute of Pedagogy
University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland

When she had been "clean and sober" for 15 years, a 36-year-old alcoholic
in our study of how alcoholics and addicts recover integrity explained to us
how she had finally learned from her mistakes. She was a very clever child,
and had always been able to get away with things. Her parents, busy profes
sionals, encouraged her creativity and independence. "I thought I had them
fooled. I didn't understand how I hurt them," she said. "I just kept heading
down the wrong road until I finally hit a wall." The wall was named Officer
McMurray. "When he pulled me over and told me to step out of the car, I fi
nally understood where the line was. I'd been pulled over lots of times be
fore, but somehow, this time, even before I got out of the car, I had a flash ...
Everything before that was wrong. I knew he was right to lock me up. I was
too ashamed to call my parents to bail me out. I knew from then on where
the edge of the cliff was." She went on to describe her daily struggles with
"the edge of the cliff," but she felt sure, after her awareness of the difference
between right and wrong, that she now knew better, and that "the people in
the village below that cliff, my parents and allthey're safe now. I'm not a
disaster waiting to happen anymore. I'm not rolling down that cliff." On the
15th anniversary of her sobriety, now an art therapist and mother of two, she
honored Officer McMurray because, she said, he "showed me the line."
This story from the work of the Blakeneys (R. Blakeney, Blakeney, &
Reich, 2003) illustrates how negative moral experience may lead to a posi
129
13O OSER

tive insight, to the will not to violate the trust of others, and the commit
ment to do the right thing. It tells us also how complex and painful the moral
learning process is. It shows us that meaningful negative moral knowledge is
constructed in situations in which doing the right thing is contrasted with
doing the wrong thing, in which relationships and moral emotions of indig
nation are salient features, and in which we learn to accommodate to the
limits of being clever and successful. We claim that moral learning without
negative experience is not possible. In this chapter I develop this particular
thesis and its implications for a comprehensive model of moral education.
Our approach is based on the premise that negative information has a
fundamental role in the construction of knowledge more generally. In effect,
to know what is right, we must keep in our episodic memory both the nega
tive knowledge and the underlying generated insight. But what is the
epistemological basis of negative knowledge?
"Do not cross this street when the light is red, because you could be hit by a
car and killed," says a mother to her 4-year-old daughter. She holds her
daughter's hand firmly, and the fear in her eyes expresses her seriousness.
Such an act builds negative knowledge. Because the mother wants to protect
her daughter, she believes that if the situation is serious and she is serious
when she tells her how to behave, her daughter will be protected. To talk
about negative knowledge means to express an epistemological necessity
(Wittgenstein, 1990). To know what is, one must know what is not. To under
stand how something functions, one must know what this functioning inhib
its. To know what to do, we must know what not to do. To know what strategy
works, we must know which one does not work, and why. To understand the
notion of a "just community" we must also know why something like a "zero
tolerance" school can never be a just community school, and so on. Negative
knowledge is a necessary counterpart to positive knowledge, a mirroring, or
dering schema that frames any knowledge. Of course instead of using the term
negative knowledge we could also talk about knowledge of the negative side of
any given subject, topic, strategy, or process. However, this would only con
fuse the reader. We can more clearly describe the mentioned epistemological
basis of understanding when we consider negative knowledge as a force shap
ing positive knowledge. The distinction between negative experience and
negative knowledge is that the first describes the process of acquiring negative
knowledge, the second is the result thatpartly through metacognition
remains in long-term episodic moral memory.

NEGATIVE KNOWLEDGE AS KNOWLEDGE

OF ERRORS

Negative knowledge is functional in the sense that without it one cannot

have a firm grasp of any subject. Negative knowledge, knowledge of what a
7. NEGATIVE MORALITY AND THE GOALS OF MORAL EDUCATION 131

thing is not, is inherent in understanding its parameters (i.e., what it is).

Moreover, negative knowledge also protects, supports, or preshapes positive
knowledge. The function of negative knowledge as a protective force can
best be illustrated in a nonmoral setting. An example that I like to refer to is
that of the airplane pilot (see Oser & Veugelers, 2003). A pilot knows many
rules about how to fly correctly, because he or she must be able to make the
airplane take off, fly, and land in complete safety. This system of rules that
describes what the pilot must do is supplemented by a whole range of rules
about what he or she must not do. However, these latter rules do not actually
form part of the pilot's competence; rather they are simply rules about what
not to do. Negative knowledge arises through the mistakes the pilot makes
in the simulator and the things he or she does that he or she should not do.
The simulator reacts quickly, the plane goes into a spin, the pilot loses con
trol, and the plane crashes. This experience prevents the pilot from doing
things, or failing to do things, that he or she must not do, or must not fail to
do. It is therefore a knowledge of errors that prevents the pilot from failing to
do the right thing or from doing the wrong thing. This knowledge of errors is
the pilot's most important "knowledge." It is episodic and unstructured, but
enormously effective. The knowledge of errors prevents the pilot from doing
things, or failing to do things, that lead to spinning out of control, losing
height too quickly, or indeed, to crashing.
Another function of negative knowledge is concerned with the process of
limiting something. To say that something is steep we must know when the
flat stops being flat and begins to ascend. This identifying marker is espe
cially important for concepts and strategies. We must, for instance, know
when a democracy can no longer be called a democracy because it becomes a
dictatorship. We must know, for instance, that interactive mental strategies
are not effective in a final exam because in an exam, individual compe-
tencenot interactive competenceis assessed. One criticism that might
be raised is that the term knowledge is cold, external, objective, and trivial.
However, from a constructivist point of view, the term knowledge refers to
more than formally acquired information. In the cognitive psychological
sense, what is meant by knowledge is a processed, declarative, or strategi
cally empirical knowledge. It is knowledge that has become comprehension.
Comprehension means that knowledge is use-oriented. Comprehension is
also an ordering schema within an experienced context (Hermann, 1982).
Individual components are inserted into the ready-made overall structure.
"Comprehension is therefore a one-way street which follows a natural gradi
ent, from the individual to the all-embracing, from the specific to the gen
eral, from the dread of the new to the brilliance of order" (Hermann, 1982,
p. 22). Negative knowledge can be developed the same way, whether it is de
clarative, procedural, strategic, or conceptual. With respect to declarative
negative knowledge, a person must experience cold to understand hot, that
132 OSER

which is bad to understand good; and that which is immoral to understand

what is moral. Declarative negative knowledge presupposes knowledge
about the opposite state of any object. With respect to procedural knowl
edge, we must know what not to do. For instance, in working with a comput
erized production engine, we must know which buttons not to press to avoid
stopping production. These examples illustrate the role of negative knowl
edge in understanding and competently communicating negative knowl
edge in a complex professional, social, and moral world.
The best waybut not the only wayto construct negative knowledge is
by making mistakes: by making one's own mistakes or by being aware of the
mistakes of others. Processing these mistakes builds a storehouse of protec
tive knowledge. This is a complex and painful process that should never be
romanticized. On the one hand humans want to avoid mistakes, but on the
other hand mistakes can be fruitful for building episodic memories. In some
cases, of course, mistakes can be irreversible, as in the case of Chernobyl. In
such tragic cases we may also speak about advocacy-produced negative
knowledge in which the next generation in an advocatory way may learn
from the mistakes of prior generations without having to directly learn from
personal situations. What is interesting, however, from an educational point
of view, is the degree to which young people appear to need to experience
the negative consequences of actions; to produce their own mistakes to con
struct a full understanding of what should be done.
On the one hand mistakes can produce what we call positive anger. This
kind of anger over mistakes is called positive because it leads to a develop
mental change in thinking and goal orientation. On the other hand, there
is negative anger, which arises when one's mistakes are cynically dispar
aged, when one is openly blamed, chastised, or disrespected for one's mis
takes. Such negative anger can turn into shame, guilt feelings, and
sadness. It can completely block any learning, especially creativity and
learning involving taking risks, and it can produce negative motivational
consequences. As educators then, we can, especially in the realm of proce
dural knowledge, use simulations for learning through mistakes. On the
other hand no one has the right to intentionally set other people up to
"learn from their mistakes."
When we say that making mistakes is a good way to build up negative
knowledge we are aware that schools and learning situations can stimulate
the same effective learning process not by using mistakes but by contrasting
opposing bits of knowledge. If the teacher asks students why the American
Revolution was not a revolution, but rather a war for independence, stu
dents have to be aware of the characteristics of a true revolution and balance
it against a kind of uprising that is not a true revolution. Similarly, if, during a
drought, a teacher asks children what kind of people will be happy when it fi
nally rains, the question of what kind of people will be unhappy when it rains
7. NEGATIVE MORALITY AND THE GOALS OF MORAL EDUCATION 133

would be precisely the contrary. If I am talking about life I also have in mind
death and its implications.
Schools in general inhibit learning from both the introduction of mean
ingful contrasts and the direct experience of negative actions. Teachers of
ten try to prevent students from building up negative knowledge in that they
try to prevent student mistakes, hide mistakes, scratch out mistakes, or
overlook mistakes, and thus hinder the construction of negative knowledge;
and hence all the narratives and episodes in popular culture related to it.
Schools often prevent youngsters from critical questioning as the movie
Dead Poets Society suggests. Instead of learning from contrary positions, mis
takes, and contrasting procedures and thus developing a culture of mistakes,
schools inhibit mistakes. In our recent work, we have developed an instru
ment for measuring the culture of mistakes in schools, classes, and learning
situations (Oser &Spychiger, 2004). What we have found is that schools fail
to achieve what we would consider to be a critical pedagogical goal, namely
learning from what is wrong to understand the right. Our work has been
done in Europe, but we doubt that the situation is much different in schools
in North America.

THE MORAL CONCEPT OF NEGATIVITY

How do these ideas apply to the construction of morality? The saying that
children who never ever lie, deceive, misbehave, and so on, could not be
come moral persons has been attributed to Janusz Korczak, the great Polish
pedagogue and physician (Oser &. Veugelers, 2003). This saying can be in
terpreted as meaning that the experience of injustice enables it to be pre
vented, the experience of wickedness leads to an emotional consciousness of
such behavior, and the experience of inadequacies makes it possible for
them to be overcome. From a psychological point of view, it is necessary to be
able to hold up both the downside of a possible moral solution and the up
side, the positive and the negative, and to do this not merely as the aware
ness of a possibility but as the crystallized experience of this possibility (in
such cases the warning deriving from tradition, literature, and stories can
possess a status similar to the genuine episodic experience; see later).
Let us suppose that a person knows and has command of a set of moral rules
that state what is to be done and what is not to be done, including information
about that which is obligatory and that which is recommended. This set of
rules is only that, a set of rules. It does not show the person what noncompli
ance means for him or her and for others. As a result, the person requires
quasi-models of "terror" (i.e., models that allow him or her to experience the
effects of positive and negative actions, both within the deliberative process
and as an outcome). It is not a consequentialist form of ethics that is expressed
here, but an ethics that for purposes of justification considers the possibility of
134 OSER

the misery created by failure. In other words, it is important that a person

knows what he or she has to do (positively and negatively) and what noncom
pliance means in the extreme case. The rule "Thou shall not kill," to be un
derstood, requires that there is knowledge of the kind of suffering, fears, and
flagrant injustice that murder and manslaughter involve. Being aware of the
situation in which the rule is broken, the negative knowledge, is what makes
the rule valid in the first place because it fills an empty abstract rule with rich,
real, concrete content that can be connected with one's real life. This is what
we describe as negative moral knowledge. Why do children love books like
Shock-Headed Peter, Pinocchio, and Where the Wild Things Are, which are scan
dalous from a pedagogical viewpoint? Presumably because negative moral
knowledge is clearly and unambiguously depicted as such. The rule is always
shown in its opposite form, in its violation. Every child therefore learns in
stinctively that the world operates more smoothly when rules are obeyed, but
what is actually exciting exists in the incredibly painful consequences of not
obeying the rules. Negative moral knowledge is not, as the negative theology
of Maimonides calculated, that man can only say what God is not. It is rather
the other side of a necessary or nonnecessary obligation, a phenomenon that
has until now scarcely been investigated. It is the secret content with which
people give substance to their standards from the reverse side.
This was precisely what Kohlberg (1981, 1984) did not demand from his
experimental participants, or he only obtained it indirectly through his inter
views. It is true that he asked why Heinz should or should not commit burglary
to get the medicine that would save his wife's life. However, persons from a
specific stage (e.g., stage 4) could have quite varied existential background
knowledge of what will cause the extent and intensity of the always antici
pated harm caused by noncompliance with any of these rules. Noncompli
ance with a rule, however, is a necessary form for moral epistemology. Morality
grows through the experience of moral negativity and through the emotions
related to it. People who experience or suffer the utter horror of violating a
positive or negative rule are prevented from violating this rule. People who are
aware of the horror of the consequences of the absence of a rule forbidding a
particular action fight for creating such a law. (The military saw no difficulty
with laying land and sea mines only as long as the civilian population knew
nothing about it and was not directly affected. People who have seen and ex
perienced the misery of children who have stepped on such mines have the
protective knowledge that gives them the impetus to call for these mines to be
banned.) Negative knowledge thus "protects" compliance with rules, even
under conditions of conflict, stress, and situational pressure, whereas the ab
sence of such knowledge weakens rules, rendering them meaningless in terms
of understanding the rules' functions. In this case the center does not hold;
public and private injustice increases; and the forces of overweening ambi
tion, lust for power and possessions, and so on, are let loose.
7. NEGATIVE MORALITY AND THE GOALS OF MORAL EDUCATION 135

The individual acquires a set of negative knowledge components

through his or her experiences and these support his or her positive knowl
edge. Individuality is characterized by episodic moral knowledge that has
been gained through making mistakes or having negative experiences.
This becomes the prima facie justification for compliance with a moral
rule, namely the misery and sense of revulsion that are imagined when one
considers its violation. Episodic negative knowledge is the hidden content
of our moral reactions. For Freud, for whom the superego is the wall that
rejects or restrains certain desires, this negative knowledge is not subject
to nearly enough control by the ego, the person. It is quasi-uncontrollable
by the person himself or herself because it is processed externally through
the fear of loss of love. Freud did not see that empathy is just as effective as
compulsion, and that the experience of the negative motivates one's own
long-term processing, which makes sense out of rules and guarantees that
compliance with these rules as a form of human reconstruction validates
their necessity.

THE NONAUTOMATIC MECHANISM THAT PROTECTS

US FROM OUR OWN WEAKNESSES

The mechanism of protective moral knowledge shall now be more pre

cisely elaborated against the following background. In one of our in
terviews, a 58-year-old woman recounted howafter being newly
marriedshe would often shoplift small things whenever she had to
buy something from a large store. She did this just for fun, as she had
when she was a teenager. She never was caught. One day she arbi
trarily began telling this to her husband, a successful and famous at
torney. On her hearing her story, he became pale and furious and
expressed his shame and indignation in no uncertain terms. There
were terrible scenes in which he told her that she had jeopardized his
whole career, and the like. She recounted that after this incident (es
pecially at work) she was repeatedly tempted, in the gray areas of so
cial amorality, to steal little things, evade paying taxes, or claim
expenses that had never been incurred. In the face of temptation, she
would recollect the episode with her husband, and restrain herself.
Thus, in her case, negative knowledge, knowledge of the consequence
of rule violation, strengthened rule observance.
This example may be dismissed as simplistic, but at the beginning of all
morality we find indignation and the related feeling of being ashamed of
oneself (Tugendhat, 1984). Generally, the residual traces left behind by
such indignation have not been sufficiently stressed. They are the moral
scars a person carries with him or her, and they ache in similar situations
136 OSER

and so recall key moral experiences relating to this indignation. As we

have seen in the case of posttraumatic stress, humans reconstruct in a simi
lar situation the past event, and they act according to this reflection.
There is no automaticity in this in a behaviorist sense. Negative experi
ences do not in themselves prevent one from doing things again. However,
the feelings accompanying the meanings attached to an event do become
integrated within the moral schemes that are constructed, and may be in
voked whenever the person is in a similar situation (Arsenio &. Lover,
1995), serving as a motive force within the person's moral judgment.
In fact, it can be maintained that this recollection, even if vague and
often almost forgotten, is a form of protection against similar acts in new
situations. Without this indignation (either self-generated or generated
by the environment), moral rules are cold, sterile, abstract, and suscepti
ble to unnecessary exceptions dictated by selfishness. The more the ex
perienced indignation is linked to the generated rule, the more
obligatory the rule becomes, not in the sense of blind obedience but in
the sense of an individual not acting indifferently, but reflecting on and
attributing responsibility. Knowledge gained from negative experience
encourages reliable and appropriate compliance with a rule. Negative
knowledge is like a wall that, in even extreme situations and conditions
of stress, restrains a person from doing wrong and hurting others. This in
ner moral attitude, originating from the scars of one's own failures, or the
failures of others, is the protection that is referred to here. It is the soil
from which civil rights activism grew (R. F. Blakeney, 2002). It is not con
ceivable without experience.
In his book The Ethical Didactic of Kant, Koch (2003) stated that the
categorical imperative as a principle for finding a rule for the morally per
mitted is based on the concept of universality. If we can state that univer
sality is a given, this leads to the morally permitted; if universality is not
given, it leads to the morally prohibited. But what, asked Koch, leads to
the morally necessary? He gave three answers: First, that a categorical
imperative is a positive principle, which implies that it is the criteria for
the examination of an action maxim; second that this categorical imper
ative is a negative criterion, which helps us to find out what not to do;
third, that only through the roundabout way of the morally impermissi
ble do we understand what is morally necessary. This is the way to under
stand why positive duties are only possible through the negative, through
what is immoral and not desired. To avoid vices that lead to serious mis
behavior, one should avoid considering the good in egocentric terms at
all. The good in this sense cannot only be good because it meets the test
of usefulness. It must also be submitted to the universality rule. The du
ties of moral self-survival are also negative. No virtues are recommended
but vices are prohibited.
7. NEGATIVE MORALITY AND THE GOALS OF MORAL EDUCATION 137

WHAT IS EDUCATIONAL MORAL PROGRESS

CONCERNING THE ASPECT OE NEGATIVE
MORALITY?

If we know what negative morality means it is of crucial importance to ask

what implications this has for moral education. Education is related to prog
ress. To ask about moral progress in sociological terms leads to one central
answer, namely that during the last centuries man became more morally ra
tional. Rorty (2003), on the basis of the philosophical reflection of Baier
(1995), denied this hypothesis and instead believed that moral progress de
velops through moral sentiments and moral storytelling in which feelings
and sentiments for the weak and strangers are articulated. The first author
does not see that the sentiments for the weak and the stranger are based on
negativity. The second author does not see it systematically. It is more than a
suffering. It is a regret that this person suffers. With this regret we develop
feelings of empathy and morality, which lead to rules and moral regulations.
If we apply this idea to the educational and developmental field in general, it
could mean that progress in moral education develops through the growth
of negative moral feelings, through storytelling with negative moral content
followed by a positive outcome and possibilities to put oneself in the shoes of
others in the sense that they feel miserable and negatively treated by life. In
simple terms, reading Les Miserabks from Victor Hugo or Chinua Achebe's
Things Fall Apart would be more effective in facilitating perspective taking
than rationally solving positive moral problems (cf. Selman, 2003). Moral
progress thus is not primarily more moral knowledge or not simply a higher
moral stage or not only a better judgment-action relatedness. It is also a
better protection from one's own moral mistakes through the concept of
negative morality and its situatedness. Situatedness means that with the
created moral norm, the situation in which the negative experience oc
curred is also remembered and produces a kind of moral warning, an im
mune system against immoral behavior.
It is also crucially important to understand that we cannot stimulate pu
pils to achieve a higher level of moral judgment (one form of rational prog
ress) simply by imparting knowledge, or by using teaching methods based on
practical experience and problem solving, or by treating personal experi
ences in a creative and artistic manner, or by the teaching of strategies de
signed to improve memory, and so forth. All these methods are important for
general teaching, but they will not lead to any accommodative transforma
tion of cognitive moral patterns, nor is it possible to succeed in achieving a
higher level in a short space of time. It is imperative, moreover, to be aware
that transformations such as these can be brought about only against the
background of a development theory and a transformational grammar ap
propriate to it, involving a constant process of critical arguments and nega
138 OSER

tive events. Some knowledge about the transformation of cognitive moral

judgment is therefore required if others are to be successfully stimulated to
achieve a higher level, and it must also be recognized that human beings are
perennially disinclined to take steps to transform and improve their patterns
of behavior (to make progress). Negative knowledge of equal complexity but
different in nature is required for the task of creating shared norms, or when
a competency to act is aimed for. I return to these points later.
The foregoing also suggests that moral education in situated contexts is a
complex and multidirectional phenomenon, that it can provoke a network
of suggestions for action, that norms play a role, that justifications are re
quired, and that negative moral acts from others are a basic raw material
from which to construct moral meaning. If however, as is often pronounced,
a single method is promoted as the only correct one, or if teachers subscribe
to a single method (e.g., the character education approach, or develop-
ment-oriented education), this will inevitably lead to false causal assump
tions concerning the antecedents and consequences of that moral
education in question. When Leming (1997) asserted that the character ed
ucation movement is eclectic "both in terms of its psychological premises
and its pedagogical practices" (p. 47), we may counter by stating that what
ever system of education has precedence, practice is always eclectic, and
that until now there has been too little research devoted to untangling the
separate strands of simultaneous effects with respect to negativity. One re
sult of the debate in recent years is that there is no longer just one type of
moral education and a pedagogic method appropriate to it; we are attempt
ing rather to reach different goals at the same time in a consciously differen
tiated manner, and to stimulate a corresponding learning activity each with
different concepts of negativity.
How can we create a synthesis of all these forces? How can we postulate a
moral education, which will enable and produce the complex formation of
moral sense in a young person? What are the minimal preconditions, and
what is the indispensable core of moral education?

THE TRIFORIAL SYSTEM OF MORAL EDUCATION:

A THEORY

The approach we propose involves three core elements, all of which work at
the same time; it is designated as triforial because the term suggests that the
core elements have something in common, namely their foundation, their
support, and their actualization of a moral structure. Based on three arched
windows, a triforium permits different things to occur at the same time each
to be supported in a different way.A triforium is a kind of gallery in the inte
rior of Romanesque and especially Gothic churches consisting usually of tri-
ple-arched windows running under the roof space of the transept and nave.
7. NEGATIVE MORALITY AND THE GOALS OF MORAL EDUCATION 139

Despite all the problems of borrowing analogies, the concept of a triforial

structure can readily be transferred to the realm of moral education, where
the tripartite arched positions signify the three core elements, the structure
they support, and the general formation to which the three core elements
lead (cf. Klafki, 1991). Why do we speak of this threefold or triforial moral
education and its accompanying threefold pedagogic practice (in which the
figure of three is used to describe the mere minimum of the many links that
are always present in educational modes of action) ? I should like to formu
late the problem in a negative triforial manner as well:

1. Moral education is more than training to weigh and balance ad

versarial positions. Although such experiences in critical reasoning stim
ulate moral judgment, they do nothing more. The moral judgment is
merely a precondition for moral action.
2. On the other hand, one can also say that education designed to fos
ter character and inculcate values simply represents an attempt to influ
ence pupils through persuasion, and as such it often remains blind and
unreflective. This can readily be demonstrated through examples of sec
ondary values such as cleanliness, punctuality, discipline, precision, and
so forth (cf. Hoffe, 1986). These values must always be linked back to
higher values (justice, solicitousness, objective neutrality), otherwise
they threaten to become fragile, dangerous or even fundamentalist. An
extreme example would be the carrying out of genocide in the name of ex
actness or precision.
3. If we simply stimulate moral action, however, then we must always
deal with specific situations and use our intuition. However, intuitions
are frequently unfair, lacking in regard for others and crude. Thus, senti
ments and storytelling alone would be one-sided.

In short, each one of these approaches falls short, either because we lack
empathy, fall victim to a false belief, or fall victim to blind action. We are
courting the danger of being quasi-moral, of thinking and interpreting in a
quasi-moral manner. A deeper analysis shows that each of the theories rep
resented through these three components sets its sights on one extreme, and
thus the central goals of a comprehensive moral education cannot be
achieved. We are therefore in need of an overall theory that will enable us to
combine different goals in the proper manner. Different methodical or
rather pedagogic modes of acting must be integrated within this theory in
different ways. Instead of pursuing just one of the goals previously indicated,
therefore, we need a triforial theory of moral education, which will permit at
least three central technological frameworks of conditions and their nega
tive counterparts. Figure 7.1 shows these three fields that intersect with
each other.
14O OSER

FIG. 7.1. A triforial theory of moral education: Descriptive part.

The judgment circle contains moral analyses, moral justifications, and a

progressive stage-by-stage anchoring of moral thinking. At a given stage we
can understand and elaborate the respective cognitive and knowledge-
based arguments. We can also easily understand what it is that a person at a
given stage denies and how that person sees negative moral conflicts. The
value core (second circle) contains value knowledge, the intuitive knowl
edge deriving from moral customs, and the respective specific moral culture.
This is where moral convictions and moral group identity (unconsciously
internalized, or consciously derived from direct participation) come into
play. Here is also the place of negative moral knowledge in general. A person
has an episodic memory concerning what happens with respect to moral fail
ure and moral transgressions. The action circle (3) contains forms of pro-
social, moral, and participative behavior. Here a person knows what does
not function in a certain way and how judgment and action can contradict
each other. Qualities required here include moral courage, moral senti
ments, and also moral performance and the ability to deal in moral terms
with concepts of law and justice.
In Fig. 7.11 placed particular emphasis on the intersections of the core el
ements. Intersection 1 relates to content interpreted in a stage-specific
manner (e.g., children's narratives are interpreted from the viewpoint of
their belonging to a certain stage). Kohlberg's Stage 2 stresses the morality of
exchange (you will get something only when you do something for another
person, but also negatively, if you do not give you will not receive). Con
versely, value judgments and culture-bound moral contents enter into the
judgment and modify it. Intersection 2 emphasizes the necessity of combin
ing judgment with action. This is the point at which the hiatus between
7. NEGATIVE MORALITY AND THE GOALS OF MORAL EDUCATION 141

judgment and action becomes apparent. A whole range of models illustrat

ing this connection is available (cf. Moralisches Urteil und Handeln; Garz,
Oser, & Althof, 1999); more and more variables are being investigated to es
tablish their effect on prompting action, including, for example, moral stage,
strength of will, extent of obligations, negative experiences, and so on.
Moral culture (Intersection 3) possibly constitutes an important variable af
fecting moral action, although there is admittedly a relative lack of research
in this area. The subjective acceptance of value responsibility is determined
through internal and external pressure against or for a certain moral or pro-
social course of action. In the absence of a counterpressure, which resists the
direct will, we cannot speak of the acceptance of value responsibility (cf.
Oser, 1999).
The overlapping process represents the moral self of an individual (cf.
Damon & Hart, 1982). The moral self combines judgment, knowledge
(consent), and action in a balanced manner. It always contains its counter
part negative side. It is now possible to describe the triforial theory from the
viewpoint of various aspects of educational theory, such as (a) variations in
goals, (b) diverse sources of moral thought, (c) a model of moral transforma
tion (moral pedagogy), (d) negative moral thought or behavior, (e) the mea
suring of morality, and so on. However, comprehensive coverage of these
issues is beyond the scope of this chapter.

HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE STRUCTURAL

AND DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH
TO MORAL EDUCATION

A core feature of our triforial theory is its connection to the work of

Kohlberg and subsequent cognitive-developmental theory. Before discuss
ing work in which we have applied our theory, I need to take a moment to
discuss how our approach builds from and differs from the classical Kohlberg
model. When Kohlberg (1958) introduced his theory he was responding to
views of moral growth based on nonrational processes of internalization and
socialization. In place of these earlier accounts, Kohlberg built from Piaget
(1932) in an attempt to develop a detailed genetic epistemological structure
of morality. His work resulted in the now widely known six-stage approach
to moral development, a theory that he himself improved at least three
times. Kohlberg's approach, together with its assumed ideals of optimal con
ditions for potential decision making and moral action, has a well-known at
traction. His theory, however, misses the negative counterpart to the forms
of justification described by each of his stages, and fails to describe the im
portance of negative experience in understanding morality as a human ne
cessity. This is especially relevant for efforts to put into play Kohlberg's
catch-phrase "development as the aim of education." Kohlberg's promotion
142 OSER

of this interpretation of progressive education has played a considerable role

both in educational research and in the specifics of practical intervention
(Kohlberg, 1981,1984). In this view, education means stimulation of devel
opment toward the next higher moral stage.
There have been numerous criticisms aimed at Kohlberg's theory. These
include the criticisms that the theory overemphasizes on justice (see
Gilligan, 1982), that the lower stages are less egocentric than Kohlberg had
assumed (Keller, 1996), and that Kohlberg's stage descriptions include as a
single structure aspects of social cognition that comprise distinct domains of
social convention, morality, and personal discretion (Nucci, 1981, 1996,
2001; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Turiel, 1983,1998). Finally, the
nature of the higher stages as described by Kohlberg has been called into
question (Reichenbach, 1998; for earlier criticism, e.g., on measurement
problems, see Oser, 1981). The most important shortcomings of the
Kohlberg theory, however, from our point of view are concerns regarding (a)
the lack of an integration between abstract structures of judgment and the
specifics of content and knowledge to be applied in specific contexts, and (b)
the lack of an adequate account of the relations between judgment and ac
tion, and (c) the lack of integration between moral structures and specific
moral experiences and emotions. These are all central concerns of our
triforial model. In Kohlberg's defense, I must add the following points.

1. Much of this critical debate ignores the fact that Kohlberg con
ceived of his developmental theory as a theory of competence. In describing
competence theories, we are not so much concerned with asking how
people form judgments in concrete situations but rather with the ques
tion of how the highest and qualitatively best kind of judgment a person
can make is produced in a variety of general, mostly decontextualized, sit
uations. That is why our concept of negative moral knowledge is comple
mentary to Kohlberg's work; it is content based and not competence
oriented.
2. It is also frequently overlooked that Kohlberg constantly stressed
the limited scope of his scheme. Kohlberg's theory of moral development
is powerful because its area of applicability is clearly circumscribed and its
scope is both highly controllable and comprehensible. The structures are
abstract and therefore highly transferable creations. They indicate the
extent and nature of the reversible thinking that people can produce as
justifications for their deeds and intentions. The higher the stage, the
closer the judgment is to universal principles, the more adequate it is in
terms of philosophical theories, and the more the individuals are able to
think reversibly in the spirit of the Golden Rule.
3. Finally, a fact that is often ignored is that Kohlberg himself raised
numerous questions, such as these: What is the relationship between in
7. NEGATIVE MORALITY AND THE GOALS OF MORAL EDUCATION 143

telligence and morals? How does judgment relate to action? What role is
played by emotional elements under real conditions? Is principled think
ing also possible at the lower stages? Is moral judgment better described in
categories of a soft or hard stage concept (cf. Kohlberg, 1981,1984) ? Even
if Kohlberg was unable to provide answers to many of these questions (cf.
Kohlberg, 1995), he was striving for a solution. However, he, like many re
searchers rooted in the concept of enlightenment, was reluctant to en
gage the question of negativity. He never spoke about the canon of moral
scars someone must have to become a moral person, and he apparently
never saw the reconstruction of the bad as a necessary detour to the mor
ally right.

A criticism of Kohlberg and related cognitive-developmental approaches

is not the central purpose of this chapter. In fact, it is possible to offer a de
scription of possible connections between the negative and each of
Kohlberg's stages. For instance, in Stage 1 negativity is related to the experi
ence of not having obeyed or of being punished. In Stage 2 negativity is re
lated to the fact that we do not receive according to what we have given. At
Stage 3 someone is not in accord with the group, and the group excludes him
or her arbitrarily; the boy is a bad boy and the girl is not nice and is not ac
cepted. In Stage 4 the negativity lies in the experience of being an outlaw:
having knowledge concerning the rights and duties of everyone in a society,
or to experience that societal forces misuse power or are biased and unjust.
At Stage 5 negativity is the experience of not having the courage to use one's
knowledge to craft a just solution.
A question one might ask in relation to Kohlberg's descriptions is how
much or what sort of negative experience a child must have at each develop
mental period to construct a particular level of moral development? What
sorts of negative experience or encounters with contradiction are needed to
move someone to the next stage of development? It is conflict and contra
diction, and not merely confirmatory experience that Piaget postulated as
conducive to growth.

THE JUST COMMUNITY SCHOOL AND NEGATIVITY

We can get some idea of how negative experience works to promote moral
growth by looking at events that we observed in efforts to implement the
Just Community School. Kohlberg's (1986) original idea in establishing
what has become known as the Just Community School was that schools
could be self-regulating communities in which the very regulations them
selves would provide opportunities for moral learning and the construc
tion of a value system. This is an approach to moral education, a concept
that relies on the participation of everyone. In Just Community meetings
144 OSER

(a central feature of Just Community Schools) all students and teachers of

the school come together to discuss controversial issues and to decide
whattodo (Higgins, 1989; Oser & Althof, 2001; Power, 1979). In one such
meeting, I observed the creation of a foundation to be sponsored by all
members of the school community for students who became victims of
thefts. The most important part of this event was the reconstruction be
fore the entire community of the theft situations that prompted the subse
quent collective moral response. In this case, one student related that he
had returned from a break and discovered that his expensive pen was gone.
Another student told how he had gone to the bathroom and had his jacket
disappear. As students reconstructed their cases, they told of their shock,
outrage, and indignation; expressed their disappointments; and proposed
suggestions about what to do and how to punish the violators if someone
were to be caught. They also expressed sympathy for others who had been
harmed. In my view, this process was a rebirth of the evil these students
had experienced in that it released all of the contained moral emotions at
tached to experience of the violation. The negative was brought to light,
step by step, and everyone agreed that one could only overcome and trans
form moral indignation if we first reconstruct it. In this case, we see an in
stance where evil became the means for the good. The negative urged the
movement toward the positive. Moral mistakes thus served at least three
functions: (a) It demonstrated the font of moral rules; (b) it helped con
front the necessity to treat moral issues; and (c) it developedespecially
because of emotional and empathic reactions that were reconstructed and
remembereda protective fence against recidivism.
This whole process illustrated in this example can be produced only
through a comprehensive transformation of the school as a place for discov
ering the bad to overcome it. The core of this process is the forum, in which
contentious questions are clarified and proposals for change put to vote, and
where every act of voting always implies an important setting of standards
within the system of a particular school. The structural features of the Just
Community allow for the incorporation of the "bad" as an aspect of the for
mation of social and moral sensitivity in the individual and the group in a
fashion that is considerably superior to most school-based methods of gener
ating moral growth. This is because the context of the Just Community sup
ports the following.

1. First, there exists the ongoing possibility of putting oneself into the
shoes of the suffering other through the actual encounter of this suffering
other within a real-life situation. This in turn permits students to take on
different roles to engage in the defense of others, and to prepare for taking
positions against the negative. These processes of perspective taking
made salient through the engagement of an actual other raise the proba
7. NEGATIVE MORALITY AND THE GOALS OF MORAL EDUCATION 145

bility that students will generate the social flexibility required to arrive at
an impartial moral decision.
2. A second related aspect of the Just Community is that it puts into
practice a fundamental reconceptualization of the stated purpose of de
velopmentally based moral education, which is to increase students' lev
els of moral reasoning. From the perspective being advanced in this
chapter, the development of morality is more than the simple attainment
of a higher stage of moral reasoning through discourse generated through
discussion of dilemmas relating to particular fields of study and school
events in general. Such discourse does raise "moral stage" as assessed by
traditional methods. However, the moral knowledge that results from dis
cussions about abstract or hypothetical situations, even when situated
within curricular content such as discourse about historical events does
not provide for the deeper confrontation with the negative requisite for
genuine moral knowledge. For genuine moral growth to occur, it is neces
sary to deal with actual moral mistakes, with the morally negative. Only
in overcoming the morally negative does it truly make sense to be moral.
For, in the experiential context of the negative, we may speak of the stim
ulation of two modalities of cognitive imbalance. The first is the widely
recognized and researched cognitive disequilibrium that comes from the
serious attempt to reconcile contradictory information. The second is the
moral indignation that one feels because of directly or indirectly experi
enced immorality. This latter source of cognitive imbalance is generally
missing from typical classroom moral discourse.
3. A third element of the Just Community process is that student
identification through participation in wrongdoing is also transformed.
Through the engagement that transpires, students who are perpetrators
of moral transgressions are drawn into a recognition of the "bad" that en
tails emotional involvement. This emotional component reduces the
prospect that the moral discourse will remain at a surface level. Accepted
self-shame helps to overcome immoral thinking and acting. It works es
pecially to combat moral weakness with respect to the courage to act ac
cording to one's own conviction. Only those who jointly decide to refute
negative behavior can truly feel responsible for what is to be done. Unlike
the unilateral process of punishment and recantation that is the hallmark
of traditional character education, the Just Community discourse en
gages perpetrators, victims, and other members of the community in a
mutual process of responsibility, restitution, and reconciliation.
4. The fourth element of the Just Community consists in overcoming
the judgment-action dissociation (cf. Garz et al., 1999). In essence, the
actions to be decided on are ones that directly impact the actors in the
discourse. As such, the justifications and judgments are ones that cannot
be abstractly parsed from the effects of the actions. There is little room
146 OSER

then, for moral sophistry or moral cowardice. To be a moral coward means

to know what to do and not do it. The nuance here is the recognition that
the limits of one's own freedom fall squarely at the curb, the crossing of
which violates others in some way. The others in this case are not abstract
figures in the school curriculum, but one's peers and fellow community
members.
5. The fifth component relates to the reality of life itself. Through the
process of codetermination and of fighting against the negative, school
life becomes an authentic entity. There are always two ways of seeing a
moral problem, one in which someone does not see that there is some
thing wrong, and one in which we see it. In the first case we have to make
a person feel the indignation of others. In the second case we have to help
translate the "good" decision into action.

THE ROUND TABLE MODEL

AND NEGATIVE MORALITY

The Realistic Discourse

I have abstracted these aspects of the Just Community process into what I
refer to as realistic discourse. I constructed this approach (Oser, 1999) in the
spirit of the situated learning movement. My goal was to build from that as
pect of the Just Community that employs lived student conflicts to con
struct a process of social decision making that would stem from the everyday
occurrences of school life. This more generalized approach does not require
the commitment of an entire school. It can hold for any social subset, such as
a classroom, in which the decisions of members are binding on the partici
pants in the discourse. The process employs selection of an actual conflict as
the focus of discourse. The teacher serves to ensure that everyone involved
in the discourse has the opportunity to speak and to participate in the pro
cess of problem solving and decision-making. This presupposes an attitude
on the part of the teacher that pupils are reasonable and capable of responsi
bility, even though they may appear to be lazy, troubled, and stupid, or in
other words to appear superficially to be irresponsible. The fourth and final
component of this realistic discourse is that the solution must be put into
practice. Thus, all parties to the discourse must agree to the solution and
that from the moment the approved solution is considered the best, will be
held to over the next days and months, even though better solutions might
be theoretically possible.
It is a model within which the primary aim is not to attain the next higher
stage, but instead it attaches central importance to finding a practical solu
tion to a moral violation acceptable to everyone. It is a dynamic model
7. NEGATIVE MORALITY AND THE GOALS OF MORAL EDUCATION 147

geared horizontally toward action (and not oriented vertically toward a

more sophisticated structure of judgment). The basic principle of this model
of moral education is that the frictions (negative events) of everyday life in a
school provide moral learning opportunities. Research on Just Community
moral discussion has tended to emphasize an examination of the discussion
process and its outcome in terms of individual stage development and the
moral atmosphere of the community. Research has paid little attention to
the necessary reconstruction of the moral conflict in its negative aspects, or
to the negative as a condition for creating the good. Our position is that neg
ative morality and its emotional expression are a critical source for genera
tion of the good.
One exception to the lack of attention to the role of the negative is the
work of the Blakeneys (C. Blakeney & Blakeney, 1991) in their approach to
working with "troubled youth." In their program, youngsters, counselors,
and teachers used weekly roundtables (called discipline committees) to dis
cuss the ways any participant felt wronged by another, or when a participant
(student or staff) was "pulled up" for violating a community rule. Here the
focus was on reconstructing the underlying moral meaning of the misbehav
ior in question to both achieve a just resolution (e.g., restitution for stealing
a sweater) and turn the negative behavior into a positive reformation. An il
lustrative example of how they employ realistic discourse within their disci
pline committees took place within the context of an incident of racial
disrespect. In this case, one student had referred to an African American
peer as a "brown cow."
"How is calling somebody a brown cow different from just calling some
body a cow?" the teacher asked, when the students were reconstructing
the incident. After the hurt party expressed indignation and others shared
related experiences when they had felt "dissed," one student argued that
both racial disrespect and individual disrespect hurt the same and should
thus have the same punishment. A second student replied that racial dis
respect was worse because the person is not only "dissing" you, but "they're
dissing your whole race." A third student said that when the disrespect is
individual it is directed just at you, personally, so it hurts more. After a bit
more exploration, the teacher asked how to resolve the problem. The
teacher probed for student views of what could right the wrong and restore
what had been lost to the communityand to the relationship between
the individual students who had been involved in the incident. The point
here is that the negative was not taken as an abstract case. Instead, stu
dents and staff were all able to experience and share times when they
themselves were "dissed" (disrespected), how it felt, and what they would
have wanted in terms of a just resolution. They could also talk about the
impact of racial disrespect, and its contraryrespect, tolerance, fairness,
and caringin a multicultural community.
148 OSER

Realistic Discourse in Contexts of Unequal Power

In the cases we have discussed thus far, we have focused on situations in which
power relationships within the community are made relatively equal. Knowl
edge of morally negative experiences, in interactive relationships that are not
symmetrical, educational, or productive, represents a special problem in an
tagonistic situations. Children who are inwardly bruised and remain silent
and people who suffer injustice and say nothing too often become the subject
of decisions by superiors that are made without the suffering being properly
treated and worked through. On the other hand, superiors (e.g., teachers or
section heads) sometimes confront situations that they themselves cannot re
solve without producing further harm or more examples of injustice. An ex
ample is the case of an employee who has been granted flexible working hours
but who shamelessly exploits the arrangement.
We have questioned professional people about such situations, and have as
certained that in cases such as these three moral dimensions are in opposition to
each other, namely justice, respect for others' feelings, and truthfulness. A pupil
who is making every effort but whose attainments are still poor can be treated
kindly; but perhaps an unjust decision is made, or we are less than truthful and
give the pupil the idea that his or her work is good, and vice versa. Antagonistic
situations arise primarily in professions with a high degree of independence. A
lawyer must decide whether he or she will act for someone about whom he or
she has negative information. A dentist is in a position to reveal the shoddy
work done by a colleague, but perhaps refrains from doing so.
We raised a number of such situations, standardized them, and presented
them to professionals. In the process, we discovered a range of decision
types, namely (a) evasion, which refused to take issue with the situation at
all; (b) delegation, which involved passing the problem up the line to higher
authority; (c) unilateral snap decisions, which could bring about greater
harm or injustice for people; and (d) incomplete and complete realistic dis
course. As discussed in greater detail next, the realistic discourses resulted
in the most effective and ethically defensible resolutions. These discourses
amounted to roundtable procedures in which negative knowledge is re
vealed and thus properly experienced. Roundtable discussions in profes
sional contexts are not ideal places of negotiation, any more than they are in
children's classrooms. In both settings they are partly irrational, emotion-
fraught processes seeking the right way to respond to the situation.
The realistic roundtable, however, requires that certain important pre
conditions be observed. First, there is the element of gentle constraint that
must be exercised to bring all those affected, even against their will, to the
table; a constraint-free search for a solution is rarely possible. Further, there
must be some guarantee that controversy will prevail; this is brought about
by the chairperson himself or herself playing an active part in making sure
7. NEGATIVE MORALITY AND THE GOALS OF MORAL EDUCATION 149

that the injured parties and shy participants have their say. Third, it must be
accepted and assumed that everyone is capable of establishing a balance
among justice, regard for others' feelings, and truthfulness, and that at any
time the equilibrium among the three can be coordinated. Finally, the solu
tion that emerges from the discussion is to be regarded as the best solution at
the time, even though other possibilities, such as those deriving, for exam
ple, from philosophical ethics, could be found.
Investigations show (cf. Oser, 1998; Oser & Althof, 1992) that persons
who cultivate realistic discourse procedures are estimated to be more just,
more attuned to others, more successful professionally, and more committed
than persons who do not practice such procedures. They are perceived to be
persons commanding the respect of others and able to create a good social at
mosphere, commitment, didactic abilities, justice, truthfulness, and a feeling
of well-being.
In connection with negative morality, however, there is a further important
matter. The roundtable is the place where negative moral knowledge is com
municated. Suddenly a person can notice that his or her remark has deeply
hurt or insulted another person. The roundtable thus does not merely pro
duce a rationalizing of rules and standards; it also succeeds in bringing nega
tive moral knowledge itself to light. Although the relationship of realistic
discourse to Habermas's ethics of discourse (e.g., 1991) or the work of Appel
(e.g., 1988) has not been fully explored, some differences have already been
mapped out. The primary aim of realistic discourse is not to rationalize stan
dards but to find solutions through negativity. The constraint-free agreement
does not exist here. Establishing a balance demands antagonistic situations.
Reason and postconventional morality cannot be assumed. As I have shown,
realistic discourses take place with children, for example, who are capable
only of direct reciprocity in justifying their moral positionsa level of moral
development considerably below that of the assumptions generally main
tained for moral competence in a Habermas (1991) ethical discourse. Identi
cal presuppositions cannot be assumed to be held by all participants, but
rather the discussion leader of the roundtable will at an early stage introduce
conditions for accepting responsibility and for presenting arguments and will
precisely through doing so make possible their practice. In sum, realistic dis
course offers a practical step toward bringing the process of moral education
into contact with an individual's lived experiences. A critical element of such
discourse is that it make use of the morally negative as a starting point for con
structing what is morally meaningful and positive.

FINAL THOUGHTS

We hear much these days about moral decay and the problems of our youth.
Many of the writers in this volume have addressed how such pronounce
ISO OSER

ments may be either exaggerated, politically motivated, or reflect a lack of

awareness of the degree to which youthful rebellion might signal moral
shortcomings in the positions of adult society. In my view, an overlooked as
pect of these issues is to understand the role of the morally negative in allow
ing for positive moral growth. It would come as no surprise to hear math
educators speak of the importance of error in the development of mathe
matical competence. Why then should it come as a surprise that an essential
component of moral growth is direct experience with moral error? In saying
this, I am not dismissing the very real problem of youth who engage in crimi
nal or self-destructive conduct. In such cases, we would need to explore
what it is in the history of such youth that has resulted in their willingness to
engage in such a morally negative way of being. (My colleague, Wolfgang
Edelstein, has provided an analysis of such a youth crisis in his chapter in this
volume.) My focus instead is on the role of the negative in allowing for the
construction of morality among youth in general.
We can see the beginning of an empirical approach to the role of negative
moral experience for the construction of moral understanding in Turiel's
(1983) quasi-naturalistic work. Turiel assumed that insight into the wrong
ness of a moral violation is not provided through the emergence of logic or
through socialization, but that it arises from the perception of the conse
quences of one's own or other persons' right or wrong actions (cf. Keller,
1996). "The experience of physical harm or harm to someone's interests is,
according to his view, directly apprehended by the child and is understood
within a process of observation via the proxy of empathetic reconstruction"
(Keller, 1996, p 74). This then, is how knowledge of how to act morally and
do the right thing originates. It is derived from these experiences. It is not an
act of pedagogical intervention or a socialized system of rules that creates
this possibility, but negative knowledge (a term not used by Turiel). The
knowledge is thus gained from experience as a process of abstraction that
creates a moral perspective. A kind of empathetic reconstruction is at work
generalizing judgments along the lines of "one shouldn't do that ... one
must not do that... I wouldn't do that."
It would be incorrect to conclude that these experiences of young chil
dren account for the entire phenomenon of moral cognition, moral sensitiv
ity, and moral action. However, one can see in these early experiences a set
of parallels to the range of phenomena that form the basis of our individual
and collective encounters with moral outrage that philosophers have specu
lated as the basis for our universal efforts to generate shared moral positions.
Here we begin to see not only an account of the origins of moral knowledge,
but also of moral action (cf. Garz et al., 1999, Oser & Althof, 1992, 1993).
Without the experience of suffering, suffering cannot be imagined. Without
having the negative experience of victimization, as well as the consequences
of being a victimizer, morality exists as an abstraction. Through develop
7. NEGATIVE MORALITY AND THE GOALS OF MORAL EDUCATION 151

ment, as we coordinate our own suffering with that of others, we establish

mutual constraints on our social conduct. This constraint is not that of pris
oners constrained by fear, but of cooperative members of a mutual commu
nity of trust. The predictability of moral action is connected with the sense
of trust, which people show to one another. Trust implies the assumption de
riving from experience that the other person will behave in a rationally pre
dictable and fair manner. The prediction of this trust, however, is not just a
hypothetical option; in the daily course of events, for example, when two
people pass each other in the street without doing anything to each other,
causing any harm or performing an act of exploitation, we are witnessing se
curity and control. This control stems from the rational rejection of such ac
tions guaranteed through negative knowledge.
As we look at the indiscretions of youth, a part of what we see is an effort
to experiment anew with the limitations of negative morality. How far can
one go in a negative direction before the consequences are beyond what is
acceptable to the self and others? As we look at our efforts at education, we
need to ask how we make use of the negative. If we simply endeavor to sup
press, repress, or otherwise cover up the negative, then how can we hope to
contribute to the construction of deep-seated moral convictions that can
only arise from genuine encounters with the emotions and meanings that
are requisite for the construction of morality? How do we go beyond the su
perficial analysis of moral issues raised in the curriculum to get at the real
problems being addressed in the lives of our students? This is a large and dif
ficult question, but one that education and developmental research needs
to address.

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ventionellen Moral [Discourse and Responsibility. The problem of transition to post
conventional morality]. Frankfurt, Germany: Suhrkamp.
Baier, A. (1995). Moral prejudices. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Blakeney, C., & Blakeney, R. (1991). Understanding and reforming moral misbehavior
among behaviorally disordered children. Journal of Behavioral Disorders, 16,135-143.
Blakeney, R. F. (2002). How to know this is a good thing: A developmental analysis of
inter-cultural, anti-racist education. Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Bildungswissen
schaften, 24, 467-485.
Blakeney, R., Blakeney, C., & Reich, K. H. (2003, July). Leaps of faith: The role of reli
gious development in recovering integrity among Jewish alcoholics and drug addicts. Pa
per presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Moral Education,
Krakow, Poland.
Damon, W.( & Hart, D. (1982). The development of self-understanding from infancy
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 Part III

Moral Education When

Social Injustice and Youth
Resistance Converge to
Produce Negative Outcomes
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 8

The Rise of Right-Wing

Extremist Youth Culture
in Postunification Germany
Wolfgang Edelstein
Max Planck Institute for Human Development

In the long decade that has passed since the unification of the two Germa
nics, a new extremism has emerged in German youth, specifically in eastern
Germany. The main components of this right'wing extremism are xenopho
bia and nationalism; anti-Semitism; and ideological commitment to author
itarianism, inequality, and racism. Xenophobia is the lead variable, which,
according to surveys, affects at least one third of the young population and
considerably more locally, especially in the lower social strata (Bromba &.
Edelstein, 2001). In the recent IEA Civics Study, German 15-year-olds held
the most xenophobic attitudes among the 28 participating countries
(Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schutz, 2001). Anti-Semitism is on
the rise, but perhaps rather less so than in other European countries, and
perhaps less for the traditional reasons than as a consequence (at least
partly) of the IsraeliArab conflict and the Israeli military rollback in the
Palestinian territories, which in many young people arouses outrage rather
than sympathy.
Every study shows that in eastern Germany the incidence of extremism as
measured by various indicators is about twofold more frequent than in the
west. More than 50% of all racist, xenophobic, and neo-Nazi incidents, and
especially of all such violent incidents, have happened in the eastern prov
inces, with less than 20% of the German population living there (see
157
158 EDELSTEIN

Bromba & Edelstein, 2001; Sturzbecher, 2001). In this sense, East Germany
appears more similar to Eastern Europe than to West Germany. In Eastern
Europe (especially in Russia) a neo-Nazi youth movement is definitely a
threat.
In the following I do not pursue a discussion about the phenomenology
and the quantitative relevance of right-wing extremism. That is a topic of its
own, and I have written about it elsewhere (Bromba & Edelstein, 2001;
Edelstein, 2002). I propose to accept it here as fact. I start with these re
marks merely to situate the problem and to demonstrate its importance. Al
though this is and remains a German problem of great political and
psychological relevance, one might look at it more as a general youth prob
lem emerging in Germany under specific conditions in a specific form. In ef
fect, I argue that what is taken to represent the local problem of neo-Nazi
extremism may represent, in its own idiosyncratic way, a general condition
of adolescence in the modern world. The treatment of the local problem
thus is, in a way, vicarious, although the phenomenology, the forms of bru
tality and violence, the symbolic presentations of the self, the cultural mani
festations, and the historical associations are, of course, specific and vary
across cultures and territories. There are universal features that provide
meaning to the local experience in a generation that is involved in social,
economic, and sociocultural transition.
Normatively, right-wing extremists are morally wayward in thinking and
in action. The concept of moral deprivation or waywardness points to the
psychosocial and moral implications of a syndrome that combines eco
nomic, familial, educational, and cultural factors in variable ways. The
causal relationship of the elements remains moot. It is possible, however, to
describe the anomic correlates of social dispossession, individualization, and
the dissolution of institutional bonds. Adolescents may respond to these
with either hedonism or rebellion, and often with moral indifference. Ado
lescents who wind up unsuccessful in jobs and who end failure prone in ap
prenticeships following unsuccessful school careers may respond to the
humiliation involved with a violent ideological or socially rebellious reac
tion that protects the person's self-esteem. In Germany, these responses
have often been viciously extremist, xenophobic, racist, and anti-Semitic.
This means a refusal to abide by the moral conventions that until very re
cently have been the more or less unanimously accepted basis of social ac
tion in the Federal Republic, where a historical process of social learning
after World War II has brought about political consensus concerning univer
sal human rights and the equality of all human races.
It is the refusal to heed this covenant, generally accepted as politically
correct since the downfall of the Hitler state in 1945, that turns the youthful
rebels into racists and neo-Nazis. Needless to say, trying to comprehend the
motives for this development does not imply acceptance of the rebels' Nazi
8. EXTREMIST YOUTH CULTURE IN POSTUNIFICATION GERMANY 159

convictions or justify their stance. Compassion with the underdog or a posi

tion of solidarity with an emerging underclass does not justify their behav
iors or their ideologies. (Similarly, understanding the Palestinian intifada
does neither justify terroristic acts nor the anti-Semitism of Palestinian
fighters.) However, we need to ask questions about the origins of these de
velopments, and, while opposing the actors, we need to view them as victims
of their economic, social, and psychological condition. Paraphrasing the ti
tle of one of Anna Seghers's stories, the question is this: How does a man be
come a Nazi (Seghers, 1977) ? Who becomes a Nazi? What kind of person is
receptive to Nazi values? What are the conditions and contexts that turn
people into Nazis? Finally, are there ways and means to counteract such de
velopments? These concrete historical questions then must be translated
into the corresponding general code to understand the general predicament
of youth that is involved in the process.
In her story, Seghers reconstructs the socialization of a boy named Fritz
Miiller in humiliated post-World War I Germany, where soldiers returned
home unemployed and devastated to bring up their children in misery.
These children of losers in their families, schools, and peer groups develop
mechanisms of compensation, character traits, and motives of spite and re
venge that take them, first, into the ranks of the storm trooper thugs, later
into the SS, and finally, years later, during the war in Eastern Europe, to their
well-known involvements in concentration camps, firing squads, and mass
murder in Polish and Russian villages and ghettos.
How do developmental prerequisites interact with the social opportuni
ties for action in adolescence? This question was equally important in the
aftermath of World War I as it is in the present globalization crisis. All indi
viduals have potential for development, but psychosocial needs and social
opportunities determine how individuals use their potential: whether for so
cial adjustment, for a career as moral exemplar, as maladapted neurotics, or
as outright monsters. Fritz Miiller's brothers joined the youth movement of
the communist party, whereas Fritz himself joined the Nazis. Beyond the so
cial structures that operate uncomprehended behind the individuals' backs,
differential opportunity structures decide their fortunes. Among the differ
ential factors we note social class and family, schools and teachers, and the
peer group, all providing differential reinforcement for needs and disposi
tions. Seghers, in her story, drew a picture of the school experience that af
fects Fritz Miiller: Different teachers exert different influences, using
contrasting modalities of shaping and modeling the characters of their de
pendent pupils. Note that the influence is not necessarily linear, nor does it
always work in the direction we might expect: Thus there is a liberal and
progressive teacher who overtaxes slow-learning Fritz with his good inten
tions, and the unintended consequence is to move him closer to his destiny.
There is a Nazi teacher who recognizes that Fritz has restricted potential,
16O EDELSTEIN

but instrumentalizing it promotes his successful monster's career. With re

markable empathy Seghers reconstructed the psychology, first of the young,
then of the adolescent schoolboy; his psychology could have opened a path
way to a conventional life, but it also permits him to open the gate to a differ
ent type of career, a different, evil kind of normalcy. The author described
the collective impoverishment in which Fritz's family has its place. She high
lighted the solidarity of the deprived, where Fritz and his likes could earn
recognition. Caught in the dynamic of the process, he transcended the
boundaries to violence and, exerting power in the form of terror, he did earn
praisefrom the Nazis. Fritz found himself master of life and death, rather
happenstance at first in the early years, but later, in Russia, in a systematic
and goal-oriented fashion, no longer incidentally, but entirely intentional.
Recognition and humiliation are central dimensions of adolescent expe
rience, not least in Germany's selective schools. Recognition and humilia
tion are woven into the fabric of pedagogy and instruction. They are aspects
of teachers' and students' roles, inevitable aspects of instruction, part of
grades and feedback, tests, and exercises. What is the hidden agenda of
school in development, and what is the voluntary influence exerted through
grades and the evaluation culture of the school? School plays an essential
role in the emergence of the extreme right in Germany, as we may recognize
in individual stories such as Seghers's account of Fritz Miiller's career from a
deprived childhood to Nazi killer. More to the actual point, perhaps, are re
cent data of surveys about youth and violence in eastern Germany. These
surveys demonstrate that considerable numbers of disaffected adolescents
are utterly disappointed with school and see very little meaning in the sub
jects they are taught. They are lost and distraught in their schools, distrust
their teachers, hold them accountable for their boredom, perceive them as
basically disinterested in their lives and fortunes, and accuse them of a hu
miliating aloofness from their problems. Up to 40% of students in the
so-called comprehensive schools and vocational secondary schools in the
East German state of Brandenburg voice these complaints (Sturzbecher,
2001). It is this very group of the educationally underprivileged who are the
breeding ground for right-wing extremism. Humiliation and deprivation of
meaning foster adolescent rebellion.
The school experience of young people is of interest, not so much because
the responsibility for the emergence of extreme right-wing positions in
youth should be attributed to the school, but because we should give the role
of the school in the development of educational losers more thought, to
gether with the role that schools might play in the prevention of such devel
opments. How could the school shape experience to prevent losers from
seeking an extremist compensation for their failure? How could a culture of
the school provide its youthful members with a life world of experiences that
grant immunity from neo-Nazi or other right-wing temptations and impul
8. EXTREMIST YOUTH CULTURE IN POSTUNIFICATION GERMANY 161

sions to extremist action? What can schools do to effectively oppose the ac

tive components of the extremist syndrome: xenophobia, anti-Semitism, a
racist affirmation of inequality, and expressive nationalism? What are the
cognitive and affective strategies, the designs of instruction, the modalities
of shaping the classroom and school climates that counteract the assimila
tion of adolescents into extremist subcultures? To come up with viable an
swers to these questions, we need to understand the real causes of right-wing
extremism among young people, and going beyond the local context of
school-based humiliation, we need to relate the causes of adolescent rebel
lion and waywardness to the moral ecology of adolescent experience, in
which school plays an important part indeed.

MACROLEVEL PROCESSES:
ANOMIC DISORDER AND WEAK INSTITUTIONS

At first I propose to outline the model guiding the following description. On

the macro level, social structural changes produce contexts of psychological
experience that interact with developmental vulnerabilities of adolescents
in quest of identity. Given specific contingencies of the actual social con
text, vulnerable adolescents will tend to develop dispositions toward ex
tremist orientations. Of the elements in the macro system that occupy the
position of "independent factors" in the analysis, the two important ones
are anomie and individualistic modernization. Anomie and individualistic
modernization represent psychosocial consequences of "long processes" of
social transformation. Mediating between the effects of long processes at the
macro level and the micro level of individual development are meso or fam
ily processes that play a decisive role in the socialization of the children. Re
searchers have shown that in Germany dismissive attachment patterns in
families with authoritarian rearing styles have played a distinctive role in the
socialization of right-wing extremists (Hopf, Silzer, & Wernich, 1999).
When these effects emerged in a cohort that for contingent reasons hap
pened to harbor special vulnerabilities, dismissive attachment patterns
added to the saliency of other developmental vulnerabilities. Cohort effects
eventually trigger the emergence of new orientations in youth, and there
fore call for a detailed analysis of their effects on individual and social devel
opment. Elder's (1974) description of the Children of the Great Depression is
one model of this type of analysis. In Germany an analogous study, Children
of the Unification Process, would be needed. We can assume that functionally
equivalent analogs of the German unification cohort exist in other regions
of the world, from Palestine to Pakistan, that experience corresponding
forms of trouble.
Let us now turn to the systemic factors on the macro level. At the end of
the 19th century, Durkheim introduced the notion of anomie to describe the
162 EDELSTEIN

sociomoral consequences of the breakdown of traditional society with its

stable social formations, rules, and value systems (Durkheim, 1968). The
breakdown marks the transition to modern society, characterized by the in
dustrial division of labor. Whereas traditional society had been organized
through intergenerationally stable rules of "mechanical solidarity" with lit
tle room for individual variation and individual influence on the social or
der, and whereas traditional loyalties and duties persisted against the
onslaught of individual needs, goals, and desires, the latter became the regu
latory forces in the system of competitive market capitalism that succeeded
the traditional world of personal bonds, inherited skills, and natural ex
change. In the wake of that transition, individual performance and the ra
tional individual's judgment had to provide a substitute for tradition to
guide action. Durkheim named organic solidarity the principled, discursive,
and universalist cognitive morality that replaced tradition as the regulatory
force guiding individual action, locating it in the individual's educated and
enlightened mind. Hence the importance of the school for moral education
in Durkheim's theory.
The bleak side of the development to higher order organization and
growing functional differentiation is fragmentation and disorganization.
Social and cognitive conflicts tend to produce a more or less far-reaching
sociomoral disorder, a loss of moral consistency that, in the community,
leads to "anomic" withdrawal of the person, whose motivation increas
ingly depends on his or her own needs and desires. Durkheim identified
anomie as a situation of socially generated individual risk, a deprivation of
the socially sustained meaningfulness of life. Loss of orientation and mean
ing (a consequence of the corrosion of guiding traditions) may result in
contradictory effects: One is retreat from action, depressive withdrawal,
and even death, as Seligman (1975) described the consequence of anomic
disorder. Durkheim, in his famous work about the subject, developed the
notion of anomic suicide (Durkheim, 1968). At present we are learning
that anomic despair can also take the form of rebellious action. Rejecting
the accepted public moral coordinates and refusing social control, individ
uals may turn against prevailing norms and expectations in what is simul
taneously a moral and antimoral rebellion. Recently, we have learned with
shock that suicide can be an actively rebellious rather than a depressive re
sponse to social anomie.
To bring the Durkheimian analysis of anomie to bear on the local and co-
hort-specific story about the extremist youth rebellion in eastern Germany,
it must be applied to the sudden transition from the rigidly stable and cen
trally planned organization of the (East) German Democratic Republic to
Western-style capitalism in the year 1989. Many young people saw them
selves deprived of perspectives, orientations, and expectationsa predica
ment adding up to a cohort-specific experience of disenchantment. Some
8. EXTREMIST YOUTH CULTURE IN POSTUNIFICATION GERMANY 163

reacted with violence, most of all against foreigners, but also against handi
capped or homeless persons. This reaction has been taken to represent pro
test against a "system" that was believed to redistribute their entitlements to
"parasites." Deep down they were presumably reacting to their own humilia
tion, and exacting a loser's revenge on who they believed were undeserving
winners. Turning their backs on the unsatisfactory present they look for the
preservation of pride to an imaginary better past that, due to the observed
failure of socialism, could only be a past preceding socialism. Adopting the
insignia of racial superiority and using their bullying power, they redeemed
themselves from the status of victims of an uncomprehended development.
Vindicating empowerment, they turned to a past that seems to compensate
for the shameful experience of dispossession.
The development of anomie in the unification cohort is not the only pro
cess affecting the development of youth in the 1990s. It is accompanied and
strengthened by the collateral effects of the long process of institutional
transformation. Using a concept that has gained wide currency, Beck (1992)
spoke about the emergence of a "risk society," because the new type of social
order is characterized by weak social organizations coinciding with forceful
individualization. Heitmeyer et al. (1995) analyzed this process in terms of
the diminishing power of institutions that channel and support the course of
individual lives, first and foremost the family, whose ability to regulate indi
vidual behavior and individual goals and intentions in life is weakened by
the continuous rise of individualism. Weak institutions mark a danger zone
through which the rising generations must travel, confronting an increasing
"risk" of loss of moral purpose, whereas the traditional agents of socialization
lose power of direction and guidance. Thus traditions progressively lose
their function as syntactic rules for the collective conduct of individual
lives. Increasing competition between lifestyles, standards, and styles of
conduct bring increasing pressure to bear on the integrity of the normative
order, the disintegration of which appears to those who experience it as an
achievement of liberation.
Increasing competition has multiplied the pressure on the modernization
losers. This process is salient in the economy and the labor market. Recipro
cal bonds weaken under the strain of market-driven interests. The stress
emanating from these tensions must be borne by the individuals alone, as
the weak institutions are unable to provide the normative support that is
needed psychologically. Economic modernization (the neoliberal dissolu
tion of protective institutions) and intensified competition subject individu
als to pressure from the forces of individualism. For victims and losers in this
process, the nostalgia of strong institutions and the flight into the security
and relief of groups represent strong temptations, often accompanied by the
disaffection of individual moral standards. This process is sometimes criti
cally identified as "the lure of fun society." The alternative lure is the temp
164 EDELSTEIN

tation of simplistic, sometimes violent worldviews that are corroborated in

alliances of the like-minded.
To sum up the macro part of the analysis, the detraditionalization of soci
ety generates anomie and its individual correlatesloss of orientation,
hopelessness, and depression. The correlative processes of the moderniza
tion of institutions and the individualization of goals and motives impose
the loss of institutional supports on the losers of the long processes of social
and psychological transformation. In the West, these processes have typi
cally been viewed as representing the social dynamic of industrial capital
ism. There are, however, strong cues for similar processes of detradition
alization and individualization worldwide, which, in conjunction with de
mographic change, urbanization, migration, and neoliberal globalization,
produce strong effects on the growing masses of young people affected,
sometimes activated and sometimes demoralized, by the relative depriva
tion unfolding in the wake of these processes.

MICROLEVEL PROCESSES:
VICISSITUDES OF IDENTITY FORMATION
AND SITUATIONAL CONTINGENCIES

To this point we have argued about cohort-specific macro pressures on the

postunification youth generation in eastern Germany. A more in-depth dis
cussion of meso and micro factors that contribute to the predicament of the
cohort in question is now needed. Earlier, I briefly pointed out the role of dis
missive attachment patterns in the development of right-wing youth in au-
thority-prone families in Germany (Hopf et al., 1999). I omit a more detailed
analysis of the mesolevel phenomena here and proceed to the micro level of
individual experience. To represent the micro level we turn to the role of
identity development in potentially troubled adolescents.
To Erikson (1959,1975) we owe the classical theory of identity formation
in the context of historical change. For Erikson, ego identity is the feeling of
trust in the reliable unity and continuity of the self, as mirrored by supportive
others. This feeling provides strength and motivation for action in the pres
ent, and hope and perspective for action in the future. The support of fami
lies, schools, and peer groups is needed for this development. In the
vulnerable phase of adolescence the failure of these support structures can
threaten the process of identity formation and put the person at risk of iden
tity diffusion, disintegration, or identification with the aggressor. Ideological
movements and other collective forces are then called on to supply surro
gate supports and lend strength to the weak and vacillating psychological
structure from which identity emerges. Erikson (1975), in Life History and
the Historical Moment, described vividly how the youth movement of the
1960s provided structure and meaning to the budding adolescent identities
8. EXTREMIST YOUTH CULTURE IN POSTUNIFICATION GERMANY 165

of the times. When the social situationfor whatever reasonfails to pro

vide support for the positive collective process of identification with trans-
individual meanings and purposes, this leaves room for unresolved inner
conflicts to surface, thwart the development of a stable identity, and gener
ate some variety of identity confusionguilt and weakness, inability to
work and to concentrate, defeat and depression, or, alternatively, anger and
negative reciprocitya negative form of identity engaging the person in a
destructive developmental career. (Recall Fritz Miiller's career as described
by Seghers.)
"Youth," wrote Erikson (1968), "is sensitive to any suggestion that it
may be hopelessly determined by what went before in life histories or in
history" (p. 247). This is why humiliation witnessed or experienced, op
portunities forgone, and perspectives blocked or reserved for others arouse
anger and resentment among youth whose future is threatened or fore
closed. In Germany, their affect targets those who they believe have appro
priated the benefits of welfare that should have been their due: foreigners,
Jews, asylum seekers, the handicappedall alleged parasites of a system
that deprives them of their future. It is a provocative challenge in the pre
vailing system in Germany to identify with the Nazithe objects of moral
shame and collective guilt. The rebels refuse to share the politically cor
rect consensus about Germany's Nazi past. The posture of rebellion pro
vides token control over their own lives, a show of meaning to compensate
for the experience of powerlessness, humiliation, and deprivation (Frey &
Rez, 2002; Skinner, 1996). To achieve a feeling of control over one's life is
indeed the developmental function of identity formation in adoles-
cencea process failed at the cost of confusion and depression, or even
death. However, achieving control is also a process that may, at times, only
succeed at the cost of one's life.

Situational Contingencies
After long processes at the macro level, cohort effects and family influences
at the intermediate level, and identity formation at the individual level situ
ational contingencies determine the lifestyles, living conditions, consump
tion patterns, and social experience of the cohort. Such contingencies, in
fact, require a systematic description, because the choice of rebellious and
sometimes even violent lifestyles is supported by mechanisms and forms of
life that need to be known and appraised. A thick description of the back
ground of neo-Nazi group culture is obviously needed, but this would ex
ceed the scope of this chapter. Minimally, however, the set of factors
characterizing the life world of the extremist groups and contributing to
their attitudes and motivations needs to be mentioned, because any pro
gram of prevention and moral education for these groups must respond to
166 EDELSTEIN

the experience they are exposed to. The following three situational factors
appear influential:

Group Life and Group Cohesion. The lives of right-wing extremists,

skinheads, and their fellow travelers are organized in highly cohesive groups
that cultivate a common lifestyle, mostly attached to local gathering places
such as specific pubs. Right-wing musica very important forcebeer
drinking, and expressive aggression are important beyond the occasional but
forever latent violence directed at outsiders and the defined objects of their
instinctive and ideological hostility. Life in groups (as well as the drinking)
makes it more easy to defuse the moral responsibility of the individual and
serves to enforce and maintain the ideological belief system of inequality,
racism, and xenophobia, and a system of authoritarian group leadership.
The addictive rock music of the right-wing scene, combining brutal text and
beat, appears to serve an emotionally effective function of arousing the
group to violent actionan effective strategy for moral desensibilization.

School Experience. As mentioned before, a common element of right-

wing adolescents' careers is a negative and disappointing school experience.
Right-wingers most often come from the lower tracks of the selective Ger
man school system, and thus frequently share an experience of humiliation
and exclusion that is generated by the organizational features of school and
instruction. School, curricula, and instruction, therefore, are often rejected
as meaningless and frustrating, and provide a setting for continuous defeat
and alienation. Employability is a significant issue that occupies an impor
tant segment of racist and xenophobic discourse ("They take away jobs from
their rightful German owners"). The myth of unrightful appropriation of
jobs by foreigners serves to quench the shame that employability forgone
through insufficient school achievement elicits in educational losers.

Media Experience. Experience of the modern media (TV and computer)

is a global attribute of youth worldwide. The media carry images of Western
lifestyles around the world, and with them a set of expectations and aspira
tions that for most of the world's youth including even many in the West, are
out of reach. This is bound to foster feelings of relative deprivation probably
never experienced as strongly and extensively before. Simultaneously the
media transport images of violence that never before have been instanta
neously available on a worldwide scale, extended once again in the global
ized form of violent computer games. The long-standing debates
questioning media effects have finally given way to more realistic discus
sions concerning mechanisms that relate media consumption and aggres
sion, and the sniper skills learned in computer games (Grossman &
Degaetano, 1999). A German study has found that extremist adolescents
8. EXTREMIST YOUTH CULTURE IN POSTUNIFICATION GERMANY 167

view violent videos five times more frequently than other adolescents
(Weiss, 2000). Cell phones and the Internet have produced a qualitative
change in communication among groups locally as well as internationally,
enabling groups to sustain ideological exchange, but also quick strategic
planning and tactical deploymentthe very same advantages that terrorist
groups draw from the availability of the electronic media.

YOUTH AS A GLOBAL PLAYER

AND A VICTIM OF RISK

In an increasingly globalized world, no place can remain an island. Thus, to

conclude this chapter, it seems in order to address, at least briefly, the youth
scenery beyond the confines of local conditions. In a recent issue of the Jour
nal of Research on Adolescence (Larson, Brown, & Mortimer, 2002) and in
two book publications (Brown, Larson, & Saraswathi, 2002; Mortimer &
Larson, 2002), Larson and his coauthors unfold the vision of youth as a new
global actor. What the authors describe is the emergence of adolescence as a
global phenomenon, a global problem, and, to some extent, a global player.
The term,player generally connotes conscious and intentional action. Thus,
global players in business, the international corporations, clearly have defi
nite goals and strategies that guide their actions on a worldwide scene. Al
though youth is not, in this sense, an intentional actor on the international
scene, the emerging presence of youth on that scene is nevertheless a force
that is on its way to changing the situation in the world. Thus, youth is a
global player by dint of demography. However defined or demarcated, youth
is going to be, for an unspecified time, the largest segment of the world's pop
ulation, perhaps one fourth now, and increasing. This group raises serious
problems of schooling, health, and the availability of work. In many regions
of the world, largely media-generated rising expectations stand in contrast
to the scant opportunities available. Youth around the world are, of course,
an extremely variegated group, living under extremely varied conditions,
depending on very different cultural norms, and abiding by radically differ
ent values, traditions, and orientations. Thus it may appear almost impossi
ble to impose any sort of unity on a scene of which the very essence seems to
be its total lack of uniformity.
However, besides the obvious differences, Larson and his coauthors
demonstrated a set of similarities across the world. They highlighted the
emergence of separate youth cultures across the globe, a widespread sexual
revolution, expectations of schooling, and concomitantly the inaccessibil
ity of education to the masses of the poor. "For the poor in developing na
tions," Larson and Verna (2002) wrote, "the luxury (of the new
adolescence) is out of reach" (p. 23). Due to the omnipresence of the visual
media, however, they are aware of this luxury. They are exposed to a new
168 EDELSTEIN

type of deprivation, the ubiquitous awareness of a promise that is out of

reach. Transported by the media, by the new global consciousness indus
try, the awareness of a lifestyle and simultaneously of its unfulfilled promise
is carried into the remotest corners of the world. As the vast poor majority
of the world's youth are at increased riskdue to urbanization and crowd
ing, the diminishing quality of life and health, and the increasingly un
equal distribution of social, economic, and cultural opportunitiesyouth
have become aware of the discrepancy between the standards of the
wealthy, especially in the West, and their own disconnection from this
privileged world. As Larson and Verna put it, "This disconnection com
bined with high demands can be expected to create stress, alienation and
purposelessness for some youth .... It also can create conditions of genera
tional revolt and civic unrest" (p. 24). This is almost a definition of relative
deprivation on a worldwide scale, a condition added to the absolute eco
nomic deprivation prevailing in large parts of the world. Relative depriva
tion, however, is a conscious condition. It implies comparison of one's own
group's condition with that of another that provides a standard for one's
entitlements and expectations. The fact of comparison has consequences
for one's conscious attitudes. It may lead to a state of frustration, disaffec
tion, alienation, and purposelessness, to a condition of anomie. However,
it can also arouse moral emotions, humiliation, anger, or outrage, and in
extreme cases it can trigger violent and even suicidal action.
The intention pursued with this chapter was the presentation and classi
fication of a rather specific German phenomenon: the rise, among young
people between, say, 14 and 24 years old, of a right-wing, extremist, xeno
phobic, and often racist youth movement in mostly eastern and less fre
quently western Germany. The topic was a mostly local challengehow to
understand the local conditions and find locally valid answers. Gradually,
however, the rise of the local neo-Nazi youth movement came to fit within a
wider and less local perspective, as part of a larger issuethe global issue of
an emergent crisis of youth. Although the local issue of neo-Nazi youth con
tinues to be interesting, relevant, and challenging politically, morally, and
educationally, and although it remains necessary to deploy locally effective
strategies to counter its onslaught, there appears something can be gained
from placing it in the wider frame of the global process described by Larson
and his coauthors.
The gain from the wider perspective may be twofold: The analysis of the
local, regional, or national phenomena will benefit from the broader ranging
theories needed to account for the worldwide process, including a more crit
ical attitude to the Western or American bias in research on adolescence.
Conversely, it may be helpful to ask what light the local data and findings
can shed on the larger processes. It is impossible, of course, to do empirical
research directly on the world scene, but it is possible to enrich our percep
8. EXTREMIST YOUTH CULTURE IN POSTUNIFICATION GERMANY 169

tions of the more local phenomena by using encompassing concepts derived

from the global analysis of worldwide processes. The new global data present
a challenge to our traditional cultural relativism.
So the question is the following: Can anything be learned from the Ger
man case? Can the emergence of a neo-Nazi youth culture be understood as
an instance of a larger process? The tension produced by this double ap
proach may defy quick resolution, because it is complex and needs extensive
treatment. Our aim here is to open a window on the huge problem of disem
powerment of youth around the globe who have precious little to lose by re
jecting enlightened standards and adopting violence instead.

STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL PREVENTION:

A FEW SUGGESTIONS

To end a brief chapter in a small volume it would be presumptuous to present

a program aspiring to worldwide prevention in response to a worldwide
problem. Any response must, of course, address the local problem (or, more
adequately perhaps, the local representation of the worldwide problem).
Therefore, at the close of this chapter, I briefly list a few aspects of school
quality that promise to counteract the consequences of anomic wayward
ness, moral disillusionment, and deprivation of meaning that vitiate the
school experience of so many students, especially in the lower tracks of Ger
man secondary schools, but certainly also in other schools elsewhere.
Many students of German secondary schools experience both the subject
matter and the learning process as meaningless and useless in view of their
present lives and their expectations for their futures. The most effective and
sustainable strategy against the painful and consequence-ridden boredom
that determines the experience of young people in many schools would be a
switch from instruction for memorization to teaching for competence, from
the hoarding of information to the acquisition of knowledge for action
(Rychen &. Salganik, 2001). There are good empirical reasons to believe
that young people who are satisfied with school because it involves them in
work they experience as meaningful will not be as easily prone to brainwash
ing by violent or fundamentalist groups or neo-Nazi ideologues. However,
the seemingly simple switch to teaching for competence and understanding
nevertheless entails a radical transformation of the school, instruction,
teacher competence, and the entire spirit of educational praxis, and thus of
the educational experience shaping the lives of the young.
Learning for understanding and competence is best promoted in settings
of situated learning (Palincsar, 1998) in projects that require knowledge for
constructive action. Ever since Dewey (1938/1963) it has been known (if
not always recognized) that experiential education in projects engages hu
man agency in the process of its development, enhancing the construction
17O EDELSTEIN

of sociomoral and political competence through the planning and exercise

of shared purpose, cooperative goal setting, functional division of labor, and
mutual coordination of perspectives (Adalbjarnardottir, 1999; Selman &
Adalbjarnardottir, 2003). No method is better suited than sustained project
learning to combine individual experience with mutual recognition among
collaborating participants. No method is better organized to enlist individ
ual motivation for common goals than learning in projects. No institution or
arrangement is better able to prevent humiliation and to foster moral growth
than the participatory setting of a co-constructive community of purpose.
The greater the distance from the experience of democracy as the prac
tice of participatory decision making in the institutional settings of every
day life such as the school, the greater is adolescent disaffection with
politics, including the egalitarian regulation of relationships in groups, re
spect for others, and listening to other voices. From this disaffection de
rives the resistance to peaceful regulation of conflicts between contractual
equals and the susceptibility to resort to violence to impose authority, hier
archy, inequality, and the self-centered satisfaction of needs. Hence there
is the necessity to provide adolescents with the basic experience of partici
pation and empowerment in an institution appropriated as one's own, and
thus, with the feeling of belonging, the experience of commitment to a
moral order that transcends the self. Following Dewey (1964) and
Kohlberg (1985; Power, 1985), learning democracy implies participating
in an institutionally ordered life world where standards (and thus con
flicts) are negotiated, responsibility is shared, and commitment is valued
(Edelstein &Fauser, 2001).
Not only is the school in Germany an authoritarian and hierarchical
institution, but a deep divide exists between the school and the commu
nity. This makes it difficult to turn the universal experience of schooling
into an experience of lived democracy available to everyone. If school ex
perience were to function as a deterrent from racist aggression and con
tempt for those who are different, the participatory model of democratic
self-government needs to be an integral part of that experience (Piaget,
1998). This would provide students with a model of responsible action in
civil society instead of projecting an image of authoritarian domination.
In the United States, service learning is a widespread opportunity struc
ture for the exercise of civil responsibility linking school and community
(Schine, 1997).
Europeans would be well advised to adopt this model and to push it be
yond the somewhat narrow and formal obligation it represents in many U.S.
schools. When developed to its full potential, it obliges the young person to
engage in the self-transforming practice of cooperation, discourse, and so
cial development that continues the promise of Dewey's democratic work
place with the moral atmosphere of Kohlberg's just community.
8. EXTREMIST YOUTH CULTURE IN POSTUNIFICATION GERMANY 171

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 9

Race and Morality:

Shaping the Myth
William H. Watkins
University of Illinois at Chicago

Morality continues to be an emotional hot'button issue in America's culture

wars. Many see our nation in decline as they rekindle images of Babylon, the
Roman Empire, and other "decadent" societies. For the general public, mo
rality is most often associated with the erosion of the core values that made
us "great." We have all heard that frugality, sobriety, piety, and chastity have
given way to sloth, greed, and carnality. In the Western world this may be an
eternal debate, as every generation demonstrates concern and fear that the
young have abandoned the values of their forefathers.
Beyond those issues, our highly stratified industrial society faces other
moral concerns with profound social consequences. An ethnically and ra
cially heterogeneous society demands accommodation among diverse peo
ple if it is to function. The plague of racism, ethnocentrism, and prejudice
remain deeply embedded in U.S. history and culture. Serious and organized
public discourse on racism is mostly lacking or absent.
Powerful political and religious groups are demanding that schools in
creasingly participate in moral "uplift." The concerns of the fundamentalists
and "hard" right focus mostly on character. Although some character-build-
ing initiatives are being integrated into the curriculum, there is little mean
ingful excavation of problems on race and privilege. Sponsored school
multiculturalism (Watkins, 1994) has done little to ameliorate hardened at
titudes. Public education has substituted gimmicky schemes of diversity and

173
174 WATKINS

empty tokenistic celebrations of third-world people for meaningful discus

sions of the deep roots and effects of racism and privilege in our society.
The role of morality within racism is deeply rooted in America's social
and political history. Over time inferiority and immorality were joined. Al
though notions of genetic inferiority were easily undermined, the linkage of
immorality to people of color has proven to be tenacious and adaptable. The
nexus of racism and morality is not widely understood by society in general
or (moral) educators in particular.
This is an effort to explore how notions of morality were used in the social
construction of racism, segregation, prejudice, and oppression in the United
States from colonial times through the 19th and 20th centuries. Although
not a thorough history, it is intended to examine some of the ideological and
political foundations of morality and race that have become a part of this na-
tion's cultural legacy and social practice.
The story is told by looking at four periods crucial to the shaping of ideol
ogy on morality and race. It is argued that views advanced during these peri
ods became salient, and perhaps permanent fixtures in U.S. social life. Those
four periods include the colonial, reconstruction, "scientific racist," and the
turn of the (20th) century.
America's enduring views on race emerged early in the colonial period
and became institutionalized in the late 18th century. Disdaining the "usur
pations" and oppressive policies of the king of Great Britain, the new "exper
imental" country with its mix of religious zealots, asylum seekers,
indentured servants, slaves, entrepreneurs, and other assorted people de
veloped its own national forms of privilege and oppression. Notions of mo
rality advanced by Puritans, founding fathers, and other culture makers
(Takaki, 1990) became building blocks of a new American ethos.
Second, the reconstruction period (1865-1875) found America trying to
overcome regionalism and rebuild in preparation for dramatic industrial ex
pansion. Previously enslaved Africans were "fit" into the modern rapidly
changing nation. The "Negro question," situating the Negro, took on mon
umental importance for the nation's long-term goals. Samuel Armstrong,
founder of Hampton Institute, was a principle race ideologist of the time.
His views on race and morality influenced the next 150 years.
The scattered imperial racial attitudes of Europe were exported to the
shores of the new world, but the expansion of slavery gave rise to new "justi
fications" and "explanations" of that "peculiar institution" (Stampp, 1956).
Midway through the 18th century, scientific racism emerged. It was a period
where biologists, physicians, scholars, politicians, and intellectuals at
tempted to systemize outlooks supporting the biological and genetic inferi
ority of people of color (Ehrlich &Feldman, 1977; Gould, 1981; Watkins,
2001). Notions of morality were an integral part of these emergent views.
9. RACE AND MORALITY 175

Finally, the turn of the 20th century witnessed a consolidation of racial

attitudes that would characterize the country for the next century. The
place of morality in racism was central to the time. Popular literature often
illustrated the racial attitudes of the new American century.

MORALITY AND RACE IN EARLY AMERICA

Puritan Ideology

Conceptions of morality arose early in the history of colonial America.

Whereas Calvinism often found resistance and opposition in certain parts of
Western Europe, adherents found asylum in frontier New England. The Pu
ritans called for moral regeneration in a world they found overrun with sin
and corruption. Their definition of morality became an important building
block in American culture.
The Puritans rejected modern explanations of man, society, and duty. For
them, such matters were defined and ordained in the scriptures. God's will
was clearly written for all to embrace. No aspect of human conduct could be
left to chance as the scriptures were seen to address every aspect of life.
Whereas the "word" was clear, the fate of individuals was not, for all would
not live up to expectations. God predestined some men for salvation and
others for damnation. Puritanism was ambiguous and filled with contradic
tory issues that had to be interpreted. How could helpless men, mired in sin,
save themselves to secure God's grace?
Middlekauff (1971) untangled some tenets of Puritan theology as it was
practiced in colonial New England. Predestination, he observed, was drawn
from the relationship of God and man. God is omnipotent, whereas man is
weak and dependent. Vaughan (1972) described fundamental covenants of
God in puritan doctrine. The first covenant was that God created Adam and
gave him free will. Adam's fall spelled the end of man's free will. God accom
modated to a second covenant, the "covenant of grace," wherein a sinner
could by faith and deeds attain salvation. Bearing a sinful makeup, man
must seek to be Christ-like. The entire self must be devoted to God's cause
and lived in conformity with strict injunctions.
Whether man lived eternally or condemned to hell was not determined
by himself but instead by God's judgment of his deeds. Thus salvation was
attainable but not easy. A strict code of moral conduct had to be followed to
be considered for redemption.
Puritan views on morality became an integral part of the call for inde
pendence and eventually the Revolutionary War. Luxury and extravagance
were viewed as immoral and decadent. The King of England and by associa
tion his people were thus not only oppressive in their economic and political
176 WATKINS

actions; they were also intemperate, immodest, licentious, and extravagant.

Their immoral qualities more than justified breaking with them. Summariz
ing the views of colonial insurrectionists, cultural historian Takaki (1990)
wrote:
Americans thought they saw the symptoms of the British disease. Luxury and effemi
nacy seemed to be appearing everywhere, and "Venality, Servility, and Prostitution"
seemed to be spreading like "Cancer." Determined to protect and isolate Americans
from the disease of British corruption, patriot leaders sought to enact sumptuary
laws to check the growth of luxury and to prohibit plays and extravagant dress and
diet. (p. 6)

Takaki further examined early conceptions of morality. His discussion of

"Republicanism" points to the self-governing man. The self-governing man
had to be virtuous, industrious, sober, and thrifty. Giving in to one's passions
and lust was antithetical to the path of the republican man. Restraint was a
personal proposition but had dire social consequences.

Privilege and Subjugation: The Puritan Way

Social stratification and differentiated privilege in biblical history and Puri
tan society required explanation. Puritan doctrine, relying on scripture, of
fered definitive views of master to servant and servant to master role
expectations. Those views helped provide the foundation for ongoing cul
tural views of the treatment of subservient people.
Masters were to care for those that served them. Vaughan (1971) ex
plored Wadsworth's (1712) The Well-Ordered Family to understand Puritan
views on treating subservients. He summarized the central responsibilities a
master owed his servant as required by scripture:

1. Masters should suitably provide for the bodily support and comfort of their ser
vants. Servants are of their household, and if they provide not for such, they're worse
than infidels and have denied the faith. 1 Timothy 5:8 ...
2. Masters should keep their servants diligently employed. Indeed they should allow
them sufficient time to eat, drink, sleep, and on proper occasions some short space for
relaxation and diversion may doubtless be very advisable.
3. Masters should defend and protect their servants. Since their servants are under
their care, and employed in their business, if any would wrong or injure them, they
should endeavor to protect and defend them.
4. Masters should govern their servants well. They should charge them to obey God's
commands, to live soberly, righteously, and godly. They should use their authority in
furthering their servants in a blameless behavior and in restraining them from sin.
9. RACE AND MORALITY 177

5. Masters should teach and instruct their servants well. When masters take ap
prentices, to teach them some particular trade or occupation, they ought in duty and
conscience to give them all the skill and insight they can in such their occupation,
(pp. 186-187)

Masters, overseers, rulers, and governors had a paternalistic duty to man

age their charges. Cruelty was not encouraged but neither was equality. Role
distinction and privilege were clearly acceptable. Although not specifically
directed to named racial or ethnic groups, this model of conduct was easily
applied where ethnic difference was evident.
The responsibilities of servants toward masters were far more expansive
as they guaranteed the power of privilege and subservience. Vaughn (1972)
again summarized the Bible-based tenets for servant conduct:

1. Servants should fear their masters. Malachi 1:6

2. Servants should honor their masters. Timothy 6:1

3. Servants should obey their masters, diligent and faithful to their service and to
their interest. Colossians 3:22
4. When a servant disobeys his master, he disobeys God.

5. Obey your master willingly, heartily, cheerfully, and with good will. Ephesians 6:6

6. Servants are wicked if they are lazy and idle while in their master's service.
Matthew 25:26

7. Servants should not cheat their masters financially nor steal from them. Titus 2:10

8. Servants should not run away as it was God who established their arrangement of
servitude.
9. Servants should bear any chastisements directed toward them with patience. 1
Peter 2:19, 20

10. Servants should pray for God's blessing upon their masters. Genesis 24:12 (pp.
188-192)

Thus the Puritan defense of servitude provided a rationalization for the

stratification that would soon evolve throughout the nation. If the Bible
sanctioned servitude then it could be explained as man's natural state.
To enforce their views on servitude and all doctrine, the Puritans insisted
on obedience. They believed God would judge an entire community that al
lowed an individual to transgress. They meant to maintain order at any cost.
They understood that the imposition of law was accompanied by lawbreak
ers and the enforcement of doctrine would yield heretics. They developed a
theory of exclusion giving authorities the right to punish and expel. The
178 WATKINS

exclusionary concept became oppressive on non-Puritans, such as Angli

cans, who resided within Puritan communities. Thus the notion of an
"other" was established in their social order. The "other" could easily be
viewed as deviant. The ideological foundations for discrimination were thus
deep within Puritan dogma.
BUILDING A "UNITED" STATES:
SITUATING THE BLACKS
General Samuel C. Armstrong:
Educator and Moral Theorist
Samuel Chapman Armstrong (1839-1893), son of missionaries, officer in the
Confederate Army, and educator was an important actor in the theorizing
about morality and race. Founding Hampton Institute (in Virginia), a teacher
training and vocational skills institute for African and Native Americans in
1868, Armstrong was enmeshed in the ideological shaping of attitudes about
race, morality, politics, and culture in the post-Civil War period. For the next
several years he utilized the pages of the widely circulated Southern Workman,
a Hampton Institute paper, to present his views to the nation.
As a nation builder, pragmatist, and patriot Armstrong rejected regional
ism in favor of a broad political agenda. He wanted the country to move for
ward in unity and prosperity. Although committed to segregation and White
supremacy, Armstrong broke with the primitive racialism of the slaveocracy.
One example of his views surfaced in opposition to the popular racist notion
that people of African descent were genetically moribund and would die off.
The respected Boston Journal wrote:
Nearly all the statistics relating to the subject, now accessible, are those coming from
the larger Southern cities, and those would seem to leave no doubt that in such centers
of population the mortality of the colored greatly exceeds that of the white race, (cited
in Southern Workman, January, 1878, p. 4)

Convinced that some people of color (e.g., certain Pacific islanders) were
moribund, Armstrong put America on alert that the Black race was here to
stay. He concluded that because they are here they should continue to be
put to work. He wrote:

There is no source whatever of a suitable supply in lieu of Negro labor. The large, low,
swampy, malarial, but highly productive area of the South would become almost a
desert without it.

The successful Southern farmer knows that he has the best labor in the world. The
Negro is important to the country's prosperity.
9. RACE AND MORALITY 179

The decrease of the race would be a serious matter in many ways; it would destroy their
morale. Young colored men, seeing no future, without hope, enthusiasm or esprit de
corps, would gradually degenerate; there would be an appalling number of worthless
blacks, mere driftwood, creatures who would care only for the passing day. (cited in
Southern Workman, January, 1875, p. 4)

Armstrong, the educational leader, recognized the need for a more realis
tic vision on the role and place for Blacks. Foreshadowing his views on race,
he insisted Blacks could learn but were immoral. He recognized the need for
new formulas that would build on accepted traditions. Embracing segrega
tion and Negro inferiority, he understood if North and South were to be rec
onciled and the industrial economy made viable, a new politics had to be
established. Armstrong was instrumental in shaping the politics of share
cropping and accomodationism that offered "semicitizenship" to Black
Americans.
Having lived and worked among the enslaved Africans in Virginia,
Armstrong developed keen and uncommon insights into Black life. He mar
veled at the indefatigable quest of the slaves to educate themselves. Having
seen the intellectual development of the slaves thwarted, he understood
their potential and hence could not accept the popular biological or genetic
explanations of inferiority.
How then would he justify and defend segregation and Black subservi
ence? The answer for him resided in long-standing moral arguments of the
earlier colonial period. In his words:
Lack of brains is not the greatest difficulty with tropical or oriental races. The Hindoos
and the Zulus have poets and orators.

A people in the ruts of barbarism, as were some of the ancients, may have a literature
and science that will not in the least relax their bondage to vice.

We cannot reason from intelligent Negroes necessarily, to a civilized progressive

race. The question with them is not one of special proficiency, of success in one
direction the pursuit of knowledgebut of success all around. It is one of mor
als, industry, self-restraint, of power to organize society, to draw social lines be
tween the decent and indecent, to form public sentiment that shall support pure
morals and to show common sense in the relations of life. (Southern Workman,
July, 1876, p. 50)

He asserted that morals were the dividing characteristic between White and
Black people:

Moral force is the heavy artillery that Providence takes sides with. This and not his
machinery and manufactures is the success of the Anglo Saxon. (Southern Workman,
July, 1876, p. 50)
18Q WATKINS

On Morals, Politics, and Black Life

As a patriot Armstrong committed his life first and foremost to the well-be-
ing of the nation. Settling citizenship, educational, and vocational issues
was important in stabilizing the Black population. Armstrong was con
vinced that stabilizing the Black population was key to reconstruction and
nation building. His examinations and explanations of the Negro focused on
their sociocultural life. An important aspect of that development for
Armstrong was morality. Throughout his writings he politicized morality as
an important area of inquiry:
In portions of the South there seem to be a relapse into barbarism. What else can be
expected when the people are, in some places, in mental darkness and moral deadness,
left to the guidance of demagogues, of preachers who are blind leaders of the blind, vic
tims of whatever is low and base in themselves, unable to read, destitute of schools,
cast by emancipation upon an impoverished and ill-feeling country, to pass through
the fiery furnace of reconstruction, and to care for themselves after six generations of
dependence. (Southern Workman, March, 1876, p. 18)

Because of his sensitive position as "principal" of Hampton, elected offi

cials, philanthropists, educators, clerics, and policymakers paid close at
tention to Armstrong. A major address delivered to the American
Missionary Association at Syracuse, New York, on October 24, 1877,
summed up his lifelong views. It was presented as a kind of broad, sweeping
overview of the "Negro question." This essay revealed deep-seated beliefs
in the immorality of the Black race. It was the lack of morals constraining
their racial and social progress. He believed the Negro could excel intellec
tually but he would continue to trip over his moral shortcomings. Thus it
was the Negro, not the system, who was to blame for his own status.

The Negro question of the day is the Negro himself... For generations to come it will
be his deplorable condition, his deficiencies, and how to make the most of him ... In
his mental, moral, and material destitution, he has as much power as anybody to make
the next President, or to decide on questions of tariff, currency, or war. Hence the Ne
gro question is and will be, as it has been for the past forty years, a foremost one.

The difficulty with him is, mainly a subjective not an objective one; himself, not his re
lations. His low ideas of life and duty, his weak conscience, his want of energy and
thrift, his indolent, sensuous, tropical blood are, rather than mere ignorance, the im
portant and unfortunate facts about him. (Southern Workman, December, 1877, p. 94)

Commenting on what he perceived as glaring moral contradictions in Black

life, he wrote:
9. RACE AND MORALITY 181

Pastors and deacons can sell whisky and lead loose lives without scandal; and ex-jail-
bird returns to his former social position; in politics and in society character goes for
little or nothing.

The power of Christian education and of right public sentiment has never reached the
Negro race; it has been made impossible. (Southern Workman, December, 1877, p. 94)

Further:

His worst master is still over himhis passions. This he does not realize. He does not
see "the point" of life clearly, he lacks foresight, judgment, and hard sense. His main
trouble is not ignorance, but deficiency of character; his grievances occupy him more
than his deepest needs. There is no lack of those who have mental capacity. The ques
tion with him is not one of brains, but of right instincts, of morals and of hard work.
The differential of the races seem to be in moral strength. (Southern Workman, Decem
ber, 1877, p. 94)

Education and Morality

Although Armstrong never believed Blacks could be intellectually equal to

Anglo-Saxons, he did hold out hope that education, especially, his
Hampton version of education, could provide both intellectual and moral
uplift. Again drawing from the long- standing notions that virtue resides in
hard work, Armstrong steadfastly advocated such.
The following passage sums up his lifelong philosophy for Negro education:

They need a system of training which aims at the formation of character, and of self-re-
spect; these rest upon a foundation of morals and good habits. We can best aid them by
Christian example and teaching ...When his whole routine of life is controlled, the
Negro pupil is like clay in the potter's hands.

Drill, training, toning up, is the important feature ... it is, I believe, a well balanced,
thorough-going system of culture, aiming directly at the mark, mingling mental with
moral and physical training.
The natural indolence of the Negro is as much in his way as his ignorance. In salvation
by hard work is his hope. (Southern Workman, December, 1877, p. 94)

Armstrong's reconstructionist politics developed alongside the institu

tionalizing of biological "explanations" of racial inferiority. The movement
of scientific racism gained adherents as it theorized a social role for Black
people.
182 WATKINS

SCIENTIFIC RACISM*

The brutal exploitation of people of color provided context for "color cod
ing" and classifying. Scientifically rendering dark people as inferior helped
justify and rationalize colonial plunder. If proof could demonstrate that na
ture rendered Whites superior, a ready-made explanation for social hierar
chy could be established.
As world hegemony and power shifted from Europe across the Atlantic
during the 19th century, America became the main locus of White suprem
acy. Its virulent brand of slavery outlasted most others. Long after most Eu
ropean countries abandoned slavery and the slave trade, the United States
continued building both its economy and social order on the foundations of
slave labor, exploited labor, and subservience. This economic base could not
help but shape social ideology. By Reconstruction, a modern sociology of
race was firmly embedded. Race influenced every aspect of America's social
order. Moreover, it made its presence felt in both culture making and among
the culture makers (Takaki, 1990,1994).

Defining Scientific Racism

Scientism was an important theme in 18th-century intellectual life. Social
scientists looked to quantification as they attempted to construct lawlike as
sumptions about societal and human development. Issues surrounding race
began to receive great attention.
Gould's (1981) celebrated work The Mismeasure of Man offers a thorough
discussion of the pre- and post-Darwinian movement to measure intelli
gence, classify races, and critically examine the genetic arguments that have
influenced the social sciences for more than 200 years.
Notions of difference in the social order have long been a part of the West
ern intellectual tradition. These views can be found as early as in the writings
of ancient Greeks, including Aristotle (1970). Although space does not per
mit a complete historical examination, a look at important theories and theo
rists since the 18th century is useful to understand racial naturalism and the
emergence of scientific racism. A glimpse of Arthur de Gobineau provides
foundation for further understanding.

The Father of Scientific Racism

The earliest significant intellectual racist was Arthur de Gobineau
(1816-1882) of France, although far too little public knowledge circulates
about this seminal racist historical figure. In the mid-1840s, Gobineau
worked as a journalist and frequent contributor of political articles to a vari
ety of journals. Soon he moved beyond French politics and wrote on issues of
*An earlier version of the section of Scientific Racism appears in Watkins (2001). See references.
9. RACE AND MORALITY 183

German regionalism and nationality. He favored the Prussian aristocracy in

its expanding conflicts with the more lower classes.
For the next several years, Gobineau wrote widely on a variety of topics,
such as Christianity, the Renaissance, and philosophy. He struck up a rela
tionship with Alexis de Tocqueville and both found their discussions intel
lectually rewarding. Support for aristocracy and nationalism were
common themes in Gobineau's writings. Soon he turned to an exploration
of race theory.
The source of virtue was of interest to Gobineau. Christian doctrine had
always linked virtue with faith. Questioning this notion, Gobineau began to
associate virtue with bloodlines (Biddiss, 1970). He looked at the Aryans,
northern Europeans, as he asserted that blood purity was responsible for the
heroism and intellect in the Aryans. He argued that racial integrity had to be
maintained.
Gobineau's theoretical racism was articulated in his magnum opus enti
tled Essai sur I'lnegalite des Races Humaines (1854/1967). In it, he wrote that
the racial question overshadowed all other issues in history. The inequality
of races explained all destinies. Of most significance to Gobineau was social
decay, or social decline. He rejected social decline as the product of excesses
or misgovernment. Rather, he insisted that it was the product of miscegena
tion between the races. He argued that tribes were unable to remain pure
and virile when the mixture of blood has been introduced. He wrote:

The human race in all its branches has a secret repulsion from the crossing of blood, a
repulsion which in many branches is invincible, and in others is only conquered to a
slight extent. Even those who most completely shake off the yoke of this idea cannot
get rid of the few last traces of it; yet such peoples are the only members of our species
who can be civilised at all. Mankind lives in obedience to two laws, one of repulsion,
the other of attraction; these act with different force on different peoples. The first is
fully respected only by those races which can never raise themselves above the ele
mentary completeness of the tribal life, while the power of the second, on the contrary,
is the more absolute, as the racial units on which it is exercised are more capable of de
velopment, (cited in Biddiss, 1970, p. 116)

He further argued that all civilizations derive from the White race, espe
cially the superior Aryan stock. Mankind is thus divided into races of un
equal worth. Superior races are in a fight to maintain their position. Racial
relationships then become the driving force in history.
He offered a hierarchy of race that influenced the next century and a half.
At the top were the Caucasian, Semitic, or Japhetic peoples. The second or
yellow group consisted of the Altaic, Mongol, Finnish, and Tartar peoples.
The lowest group was composed of the Hamites or Blacks. He set out de
scriptions of each group.
184 WATKINS

White people were characterized by "energetic intelligence," great physi

cal power, stability, inclinations to self-preservation, and a love of life and
liberty. Their great weakness, according to Gobineau, was a susceptibility to
cross-breeding. Asians were mediocre, lacked physical strength, and wished
to live undisturbed. They could never create a viable civilization. Black peo
ple, the lowest of all, possessed energy and willpower but were unstable, un
concerned about the preservation of life, given to absolutes, and easily
enslaved.
Theoretically, Gobineau developed a notion of racial determinism. He
insisted racial determinism was objective and could be reduced to scientific
law. His racial view of history meant that race had driven all events back to
the beginning of time. Race theory was more scientific than politics, moral
ity, or state organization.
In TheEssai (1854/1967), Gobineau wrote about race and social order.
He believed civilization defined itself in the process of war, conquest, and
migration. It was, however, these interactions that allowed miscegenation to
occur. If unchecked, miscegenation would undo civilization.
For Gobineau, advanced status and civilization, such as possessed by Ary
ans, could only survive in a rigidly hierarchal order. An elite must totally dedi
cate itself to the maintenance of racial and social hierarchy, and use force and
domination to maintain that social, racial, and economic organization. Soci
ety must not be disrupted by the popular classes or lower racial groups.
Gobineau, the "racial prophet" (Biddiss, 1970), was among the first to ar
ticulate a political sociology of race and racism forecasting social decline.
His ideology helped frame a generation of "scientism" on questions of race
and social development.

18th-Century European and American Influences

In 1735 Carolus Linnaeus, the acclaimed biological taxonomist, was among
the first (Ehrlich &Feldman, 1977; Gould, 1981; Tucker, 1994) to classify
human beings by race. He used both skin color and personal characteristics
for his typology. His essay Systema Naturae divided people into White,
Black, Red, and Yellow. He found Whites to be innovative and of keen mind,
whereas Blacks were lazy and careless. The notion that races exhibited dif
ferent mental and moral traits became a central part of a new discourse.
German zoologist Ernst Haeckel, an early advocate of Darwinism,
authored Anthropogenic (1874). In this book he situated Blacks on an evolu
tionary tree below gorillas and chimpanzees. He hypothesized that individu
als, in the course of development, relive their evolutionary history; that is,
ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. Building on this theme a century later,
race theorists such as Brinton (1890) argued that some races retained infan
tile traits, rendering them inferior to others (Ehrlich & Feldman, 1977).
9. RACE AND MORALITY 185

In 1781, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, physiologist and founder of mod

ern anthropology, added aesthetic judgments to race. He introduced the
term Caucasian as he considered White people as beautiful as the southern
slopes of Mount Caucasus. For Blacks the pejorative term "oran-outangs"
became popular as it placed them in the realm of chimpanzees and monkeys.
President Thomas Jefferson used the term "oranootan" in his writings to de
scribe Black men and even himself when he surrendered to his own passions
(Takaki, 1990). Perhaps his dalliances with slaves, notably Sally Hemmings,
were examples of such surrender.
In 1799, British surgeon Charles White added a new dimension to the
race dialogue. He asserted that Blacks were a separate species, intermediate
between Whites and apes (Tucker, 1994). His book An Account of the RegU'
lar Gradation in Man and in Different Animals and Vegetables and From the For
mer to the Latter (White, 1799) argued that the feet, fingers, toes, legs, hair,
cheekbones, skin, arm-length, skull size, size of sex organs, and body odor
placed Blacks closer to the animal kingdom, most notably apes.
Undergirding the writings of the natural scientists was the philosophical
embrace of natural inequality, an Aristotelian idea that inequality was the
foundation of the natural order (Tucker, 1994). Natural difference came to
be viewed as hierarchical. Organisms and races could be rank-ordered. A
central task of science came to be the ranking of living organisms. Colonial
ism, 18th-century slavery, and the exploitation of fertile and mineral-rich
foreign lands provided economic and political context for the new
pseudoscience to take hold.
These early scientific racists wrapped themselves in the robe of science.
White repeatedly declared his lack of enmity toward the Black race, claim
ing he sought only insight into nature.

Expanding the Discourse: Medicine and Science

Scientific racism was reinforced and expanded when the established medi
cal profession entered the field. Notions of anatomical, physiological, and
psychological difference framed their inquiry.
Benjamin Rush, founding father, signer of the Declaration of Independ
ence, and medical doctor, contributed to views of race and racial inferiority
in the early period of the nation. As Surgeon General in the Revolutionary
Army and professor of medicine at the University of Pennsylvania, Rush had
a national podium. Concerned with the survival of the young republic, he
spoke out on questions of politics, morality, education, and race.
Rush examined the "savage" American Indian, claiming they were given
to "uncleanness," "nastiness," "idleness," intemperance, stupidity, and inde
cency. By the early 1770s he was writing about Black Americans, slavery,
186 WATKINS

and race relations. Intellectually and politically opposed to slavery, he nev

ertheless advocated a segregated society (Takaki, 1990).
He believed Blacks to be pathologically infected. Their coloration was
disease driven. In a paper delivered to the American Philosophical Society
entitled Observations Intended to Favor a Supposition That the Black Color of
the Negroes is Derived From Leprosy (Rush, 1799), presented views on Black
"pathology." He argued that the big lip, flat nose, woolly hair, and Black skin
were the characteristics of lepers. He also wrote about insensitive nerves,
uncommon strength, and venereal desires. Blacks needed to be civilized and
restored to morality and virtuosity through righteous living. As a political
figure and doctor, Rush helped shape the culture of racism characterizing
early America and evolving over the next two centuries.
Much of his medical practice involved work with the mentally ill as he
turned his attention to the "diseases of the mind." His preoccupation with
morality and virtue came to be joined with his exploration of mental disease.
He began to insist that idleness, intemperance, masturbation, and sexual ex
cess were associated with mental diseases (Takaki, 1990). His book Diseases
of the Mind (Rush, 1812) presented "remedies" for these problems.
In the mid-19th century, physicians such as van Evrie (1853) offered a "sci
entific" justification of slavery. He wrote that dark-skinned people were dis
eased and unnatural and that Blacks possessed impeded locomotion, weakened
vocal organs, coarse hands, hypersensitive skin, narrow longitudinal heads, nar
row foreheads, and underdeveloped brains and nervous systems. Van Evrie con
cluded that the aggregation of these traits translated to human inferiority. He
asserted that even the animal kingdom recognized Negro inferiority and said
that a hungry tiger was more likely to prey on Blacks than Whites.
Also writing on this topic in the 1850s was Dr. Samuel Cartwright, who
chaired a committee to inform the Medical Association of Louisiana about
the Black race. His Report of the Diseases and Physical Peculiarities of the Negro
Race (Cartwright, 1851) gained attention for its "scholarly" approach. It
spoke of the insufficient supply of red blood, smaller brain, and excessive
nervous matter found in the Negro. This combination of problems, wrote
Cartwright, led to the "debasement of minds" in Blacks. The physical exer
cise provided by slavery would help increase lung and blood functions ac
cording to Cartwright. Slaves, he argued, were sometimes afflicted with
"drapetomania," a disease of the mind making them want to run away. The
prescription for drapetomania he argued, was care and kindness, but the
whip should not be spared should kindness fail.
Dr. Edward Jarvis (1844), a specialist in mental disorders and President of
the American Statistical Association, wrote that insanity for Blacks in the
North was 10 times greater than for Blacks in the South. He concluded that
slavery had a salutary effect on Blacks, sparing them the problems that free
self-acting individuals faced.
9. RACE AND MORALITY 187

Thus the scientific racists established a body of views that served as a foun
dation to explain race for the next 150 years. Conservatives, reactionaries,
and apartheidists would draw on these themes for their partisan outlooks.

ENTERING THE 2OTH CENTURY:

REFINING NOTIONS OE RACE AND MORALITY

The United States underwent monumental social and political change as it

entered the 20th century. Agriculture gave way to industrialization. Rural
dwellers found their way to the crowded polyglot urban metropolis. Hostile
and overt manifestations of regionalism yielded to nationalism although
muted allegiances silently lived on. No longer isolated by geography and pol
icy, America was manifesting imperial urges and actions in the Pacific, Ca
ribbean, and Great Northwest.
The rise to world power was accompanied by scientific and academic rev
olutions. The scientific revolution touched both business and government.
In business and manufacturing Taylorist efficiency became the watchword.
More productivity, less wasted motion, and attention to bottom-line profits
drove the factory. In government the concept of planned rational change
would be employed to manage the wildly gyrating experimental society with
myriad ideological and ethnic and social class diversity.
Great changes were also underway in the academic arena. The knowl
edge revolution was off and running. Advocates of various social science dis
ciplines were calling for scientism and empiricism and equally important,
autonomy. Thus sociology, anthropology, and political science would assert
their individual integrity as disciplines. The umbrella concept of social sci
ence would lose steam.
Many scholars within the new disciplines embraced scientific racism or
eugenics. Notables included Edward Thorndike, Louis Terman, Robert
Yerkes, Goddard, David Pearson, and Johann Frederich Blumenbach. Of
special importance was Columbia professor Franklin H. Giddings. Giddings
was the first full-time professor of sociology in the United States. He was a
leader in the scientific (measurement) movement, a vigorous proponent of
sociology as an independent discipline, and a theorist on race and morality.
Giddings wanted assessments of the social order to move away from moral
philosophy into empirical research. His lifelong research on social stratifica
tion argued that there was a hierarchy of mental, moral, and personality
types. His hierarchy was associated with race and ethnicity.

Classifying People and Groups

For Giddings, quantification served the interests of classification. He be
lieved natural evolution rendered distinct classes. Those classes were of
188 WATKINS

people, behaviors, abilities, intelligence, and so on. Sociology must be able

to understand the distinct nature of people. The most important distinc
tions for Giddings were physical, mental, and social. To understand these
distinctions would allow us richer explanations of societal development.
Classification became a focus of his work.
Giddings believed people and races were divided physically into three vi
tality classes: high, medium, and low. The high group was described by
bodily vigor, high mental power, a high birth rate, and a low death rate. The
medium group experienced adequate bodily vigor, high mental power, a low
birth rate, and an equally low death rate. The lowest groups experienced low
bodily vigor, low mental power, extremely high birth rates, and high death
rates. The higher groups described European people, whereas people of
color, especially Blacks, belonged in the low vitality group.
Giddings's classification of mental or personality types also offered three
categories. The high group was called the inventive. This was the genius
group who made disproportionate contributions to the world in business,
law, government, art, literature, music, and so on. He calculated that this
group numbered approximately 250 out of every 1,000,000 people. The sec
ond personality or mental group was called imitative. This was the middle
group, who was led by the high group. The lowest mental group for Giddings
was the defective. They were the incompetents, cripples, insane, and imbe
cilic. This helpless group had few grounds to justify their existence.
Regarding social class, Giddings constructed four groups: the social,
nonsocial, pseudosocial, and antisocial. Similar to his other categorizations,
this one was hierarchical and full of implicit ethnic references.
Members of the highest group were identifiable by their consciousness.
Those in this group were aware of their surroundings, their legacy, and were
guided by higher calling. They were dedicated to the betterment of the so
cial order. They were the leaders and pillars of the community. The second
group, the nonsocial, represented for Giddings the majority of society. This
was the in-between group capable of moving in either direction. The pseu-
do-social group represented the third category. This group contained the
"congenital and habitual paupers." Giddings believed that this group pre
tended to be the victims of misfortune but were really shirkers and loafers
who leeched from the public trough.
The final antisocial grouping had no redeeming value. They existed to
tally without virtue. This was the class of criminals who carried out aggres
sion against the other classes. This group grew with the expanding affluence
of society, living off its surplus.
These social classes, for Giddings, were difficult to escape. They were the
products of lengthy evolutionary development; thus it was extremely diffi
cult to abandon one's class moorings. An individual's social class was mani
fested by his or her "consciousness of kind" or his or her "social mind," both
of which were allegedly indicators of one's level of civilization.
9. RACE AND MORALITY 189

Giddings's writings on sociology were saturated with these classification

schemes. He believed that differences were the essential dynamic within hu
mankind. We could never understand society and its various ability and ra
cial groups unless we could explain difference.
Another influential racial sociologist, Edward Ross, contributed to the
genetic and moral arguments of the early 20th century. His popular book
The Old World in the New (Ross, 1914) attacked the character and physical
features of Mediterranean Europeans. He wrote of "low foreheads," "open
mouths," "weak chins," "skew faces," "knobby crania," "servile," "wife beat
ers," "criminals," "alcoholics," and "given to crimes of sex and violence."
Like other academic racists he also embraced the argument that the
darker people were morally inferior:

That the Mediterranean peoples are morally below the races of northern Europe is as
certain as any social fact. Even when they were dirty, ferocious barbarians, these blonds
were truth-tellers. Be it pride or awkwardness or lack of imagination or fair-play sense,
something has held them back from the nimble lying of the southern races. Immigration
officials find that the different peoples are as day and night in point of veracity, and re
port vast trouble in extracting the truth from certain brunet nationalities, (p. 293)

Among his objectives was to demonstrate significant differences between

northern and southern Europeans. The underlying premise suggested that
darker people were morally inferior. He wrote:

In southern Europe, teamwork along all lines is limited by selfishness and bad faith ...
One of the maxims of Greek business life, translated into the American vernacular, is
'Put out the other fellow's eye.' "These people seemed incapable of carrying on a large
cooperative business with harmony and success."

Nothing less than venimous is the readiness of the southern Europeans to prey upon
their fellow. Never were British or Scandinavian immigrants so bled by fellow-coun-
trymen as are South Italian, Greek and Semitic immigrants ... The Greek is full of
tricks to skin the greenhorn ... The Greek ... exploits his help as mercilessly as ever he
was exploited, (pp. 294-295)

Ross was a staunch nationalist. For him, if America was to take its place as
leader in commerce and military might, it would require sturdy men who
could be relied on for the daunting task ahead. The darker peoples lacked
both the sturdiness and ethical foundation necessary. He argued:

The Northerners seem to surpass the southern Europeans in innate ethical endow
ment ... The southern Europeans, on the other hand, are apt, in their terror, to forget
discipline, duty, women, children, everything but the saving of their own lives. In ship
wreck it is the exceptional Northerner who forgets his duty, and the exceptional
Southerner who is bound by it. (p. 295)
19O WATKINS

Ross concluded his book by insisting that Europe was keeping its solid citi
zens and allowing only the deficient to immigrate to America. He wrote:

There is little sign of an intellectual element among the Magyars, Russians, South
Slavs, Italians, Greeks or Portuguese ...

The fewer brains they have to contribute, the lower the place immigrants take among
us, and the lower the place they take, the faster they multiply, (p. 299)

His final insult was that the southern immigrants were as repulsive as the
Negroes, in some cases more so:

In their homes you find no sheets on the bed, no slips on the pillows, no cloth on the ta
ble, and no towels save old rags. Even in the mud-floor cabins of the poorest Negroes of
the South you find sheets, pillow-slips, and towels, for by serving and associating with
the whites, the blacks have gained standards, (p. 300)

Grants's (1918) widely read The Passing of the Great Race continued the
attack on southern European groupings, which was ultimately, aimed at all
dark peoples. Like Ross he pointed to both the physical and moral qualities
of his targets:

Such are the three races, the Alpine, the Mediterranean and the Nordic, which enter
into the composition of European populations of to-day and in various combinations
comprise the great bulk of white men all over the world. These races vary intellectually
and spiritual attributes are as persistent as physical characters and are transmitted sub
stantially unchanged from generation to generation. The moral and physical charac
ter are not limited to one race but given traits do occur with more frequency in one
race than in another. Each race differs

Mental, spiritual and moral traits are closely associated with the physical distinctions
among the different. European races, although like somatological characters, these
spiritual attributes have in many cases gone astray, (pp. 226227)

Dr. Carl C. Brigham (1923), psychology professor at Princeton, sup

ported the aforementioned conclusions on physical traits and morality in his
celebrated work A Study of American Intelligence (1923). He wrote:
In a very definite way, the results which we obtain by interpreting the army data by
means of the race hypothesis support Mr. Madison Grant's thesis of the superiority of the
Nordic type: "The Nordics are, all over the world a race of soldiers, sailors, adventurers,
and explorers, but above all, of rulers, organizers, and aristocrats ..." The pure Nordic
peoples are characterized by a greater stability and steadiness than are mixed peoples
such as the Irish, the ancient Gauls, and the Athenians, among all of whom the lack of
these qualities was balanced by a correspondingly greater versatility, (p. 182)
9. RACE AND MORALITY 191

FINAL THOUGHTS

Racism, racial stratification, inequality, and the myth of racial inferiority

persist into the 21st century. Although the language of shiftlessness, flawed
character, and intemperance no longer appear in polite public discourse
they are deeply embedded in the stereotyping of people of color.
The racial myth has gone far beyond personal attitudes and folklore. It is
inextricably connected to social engineering, international politics, labor
economics, and public policy. Although it may make us uncomfortable as
Americans to do so, several points compel reflection, particularly in the
context of an effort to engage in meaningful moral education.
Any society built on privilege must justify inequality. America today is with
out question one of the most dramatically stratified societies in the history of the
world. With what can be arguably viewed as an oligarchy firmly in place, the
economic gap between those at the top and those at the bottom rivals the dis
tance between the masses and the monarchs of feudal Europe. The now dra
matic and accelerating pyramiding of our society is tied to both meritocracy and
race. Those who enjoy privilege are seen to have earned it. The correlation of
wealth to race continues to be viewed in terms of capabilities and ingenuity.
Second, the world has changed in the 21st century. Post-Cold War uni
lateralism has fueled the impulse toward empire. The United States is rap
idly rebuilding its military (The Project for the New American Century,
2000) as many commentators raise fears about a new period of aggression
(Bookman, 2002; Pilger, 2002). How will such actions be justified? It ap
pears that race and religion will continue to provide salient points to con
struct the "other" who is unlike us, evil, primitive, and lacking in democracy.
Finally, although repeated until it is now almost trite, the ideology of rac
ism is a taught and learned phenomenon. Racism and the myths supporting
it are transmitted through the institutions we encounter daily whether it be
family, church, school, or other milieus. The world and humanity can never
peacefully coexist until the bane of racism is eliminated from our midst.
Several issues and challenges remain for citizens and (moral) educators
alike. Morality and moral education must be both politicized and histor
icized. We need to explore moral issues and moral development within the
context of power and human group relationships. Race and morality must be
viewed within today's dynamic social and political context. How can we ex
pand the public discourse on morality beyond sex, stealing, and fighting?
How can we expand the sociology of morality so that it turns our attention to
the serious excavation of race and privilege?

REFERENCES

Aristotle. (1970). Politics. Munich: W. Fink.

192 WATKINS

Biddiss, M. D. (1970). Father of racist ideology: The social and political thought of Count
Gobineau. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Bookman, J. (2002, September 29). The president's real goal in Iraq. Atlanta-Journal
Constitution, Fl.
Brigham, C. C. (1923). A study of American intelligence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni
versity Press.
Brinton, D. G. (1890). Race and peoples. New York: Hodges.
Cartwright, S. A. (1851, May). Report on the diseases and physical peculiarities of the
Negro race. New Orleans and Medical and Surgical journal, 691-715.
Ehrlich, R R., & Feldman, S. S. (1977). The race bomb: Skin, color, prejudice and intelli
gence. New York: Quadrangle.
Gobineau, A. de. (1967).Essai sur I'inegalite des races humaines [Essay on the inequality of
human races]. New York: Fertig. (Original work published 1854)
Gould, S. J. (1981). The mismeasure of man. New York: Norton.
Grant, M. (1918). The passing of the great race or the racial basis of European history. New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Haeckel, E. (1874). Anthropogenic. Leipzig, Germany: W. Engelmann.
Jarvis, E. (1844). Insanity among the coloured population of the free states. American
Journal of the Medical Sciences, 7, 80-83.
Middlekauff, R. (1971). The Mathers: Three generations of puritan intellectuals, 1596-1728.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Pilger, J. (2002, December 16). America's bid for global dominance. The New Statesman.
Retrieved from www.dissidentvoice.org/Articles/Pilger_USDominance.htm
The Project for the New American Century. (2000). Rebuilding America's defenses: Strategy,
forces and resources for a new century. Retrieved from www.newamericancentury.org/
publiccationsreports.htm
Ross, E. A. (1914). The old world in the new. New York: The Century Co.
Rush, B. (1799). Observations intended to favor a supposition that the black color of the
Negroes is derived from leprosy. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 4,
289-297.
Rush, B. (1812). Diseases of the mind. Philadelphia: Kimber &. Richardson.
Stampp,K. M. (1956). The peculiar institution: Slavery in the ante-bellum south. New York:
Vintage.
Takaki, R. (1990). Iron cages: Race and culture in 19th century America. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Takaki, R. (1994). From different shores: Perspectives on race and ethnicity in America. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Tucker, W. H. (1994). The science and politics of racial research. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press,
van Evrie, J. H. (1853). Negroes and Negro "slavery": The first and inferior race; the latter, its
normal condition. New York: V L. Dill.
Vaughan, A. T. (1972). The puritan tradition in America 16201730. New York: Harper
&Row.
Watkins, W. H. (1994). Multicultural education: Toward a historical and political in
quiry. Educational Theory, 44, 99-117.
Watkins, W H. (2001). The White architects of Black education: Ideology and power in
America, 1865-1954. New York: Teachers College Press.
White, C. (1799). An account of the regular gradation in man and in different animals and
vegetables and from the former to the latter. London: C. Dilly.
 1O

Moral Competence

Promotion Among African

American Children:

Conceptual Underpinnings

and Programmatic Efforts

Robert J. Jagers
Howard University CRESPAR
Morgan State University Public Health Program

Over the past few years, my project team and I have been working to de
velop, implement, research, and evaluate a multi- component social and
emotional competence enhancement program for urban African American
school-aged children. We have pursued this work with an eye toward reduc
ing risk for problem outcomes, but perhaps more important, with an interest
in promoting desirable developmental competencies (Catalano, Berglund,
Ryan, Lonczak, &. Hawkins, 1999; Weissberg &Greenberg, 1997). It is fairly
well known that African American children are placed at elevated risk for
academic underachievement, substance abuse, aggression, and delin
quency. Although eliminating risk for such problems is essential, what con
stitutes a well-functioning African American child has not been clearly
articulated.

Portions of this chapter were presented at the meeting of Association of Moral Educators, Chicago,
November 8, 2002.
193
194 JAGERS

Social and emotional competence entails an array of intra- and interper

sonal characteristics, which, if considered from a distinct domain perspec
tive, reflect aspects of personal, prudential, conventional, and moral
domains of social development (Turiel, 1983). This chapter highlights ele
ments of our work deemed germane to children's moral competence devel
opment. Moral competence refers to the ability to assess and respond to
ethical, affective, or social justice dimensions of a situation (Catalano et al.,
1999). This is particularly important to us in light of the persistence and in
tensity of community violence and its implications for the moral develop
ment of children and youth. We understand this violence to be intrapsychic,
interpersonal, and structural in nature (Jagers, Mattis, &. Walker, 2003;
Sparks, 1994; Ward, 1988, 1995).
Among the principal assumptions of this effort is that there is consider
able variation among African American people. We suggest that some of
that variation is explained by the complex intersection of gender, culture,
class, and race, which yields multiple moral communities among urban Afri
can Americans. We have proposed four racialized cultural identities, and
outlined some of the associated moral cognitions and emotions that prompt
or inhibit violence involvement by members of the distinct identity groups.
A second assumption is that historical and contemporary circumstances
dictate that programs for African American children explicitly prepare
them to realize their potential and responsibility to contribute to the ongo
ing struggle for self-determination and empowerment within the American
democratic system.
In this chapter I first discuss oppression and liberation as overarching orga
nizing concepts for our endeavors. The four racialized cultural identitiesac-
quisitive assimilationist, acquisitive oppressed, communal humanist, and
communal nationalistare then described. A tentative competence model is
offered and our proposed target moral competencies are presented prior to
outlining competence promotion efforts in family and school contexts.

OPPRESSION AND LIBERATION

AS POINTS OF DEPARTURE

It seems uncontroversial to say that African Americans continue to experi

ence oppression and exploitation in American society. Regardless of income
level, a glance at any indicator of health, economic, or social status will usu
ally find African Americans hovering near the bottom as compared with
other identified race or ethnic groups. Watts and his colleagues (Watts &
Abdul-Adil, 1998; Watts, Williams, & Jagers, 2003) defined oppression as
the unjust use of power by one socially salient group over another in a way
that creates and sustains inequity in the distribution of coveted resources.
Power is needed both to establish and perpetuate oppression. Shweder's
10. MORAL COMPETENCE PROMOTION 195

(1996) distinction among authoritarianism, paternalism, and pure moral

authority as types of power is useful to our thinking about the broader con
text of our competence promotion efforts.
For the most part, African Americans have endured the imposition of au
thoritarian power. An authoritarian social order is one in which those in
power act in such a way that only their own interests are served. Although
participants in this social order recognize this situation, they lack the ability
to stop the exercise of authoritarian power. This can be contrasted with a pa
ternalistic social order, in which those in authority strive to promote the true
interests of others, but participants do not recognize them as having moral
authority. A paternalistic power can either force participants to do what is
good for them or engage in benign neglect until participants recognize the
ability of the authority to help. Although it is clear that African Americans
have been coerced and have experienced benign neglect, it is debatable
whether a paternalistic power has ever had the true interests of African
Americans in mind. By extension, pure moral authority has seldom been ev
ident. In a moral social order, authority is derived from the recognized ability
to promote the growth and development of others.
As Watts et al. (2003) suggested, liberation requires challenging gross so
cial inequities between social groups and creating new relationships that
dispel oppressive social myths and values. This process necessitates personal
and institutional changes that support the economic, cultural, political, psy
chological, social and spiritual needs of individuals and groups. Of course,
issues of power are relevant to liberation processes and outcomes as well.
These observations raise important questions for us about the current
and projected context of Black child development. For example, what are
the points of commonality and divergence among various segments of the
African American community? What are the potential alliances and
contestations with other marginalized foreign and domestic groups? What is
the most effective strategy for dealing with a White power agenda that vacil
lates between pseudo-egalitarianism on one hand and domestic repression
and neo-imperialism on the other?

THE CONFLUENCE OF CULTURE AND RACE

We have pursued a cultural psychology approach to the social development

of African American children. The concept of culture has a long history in
the social sciences (Shweder, 1991; Turiel, 1998). After losing favor in the
1950s, cultural approaches were advanced by African American psycholo
gists in the late 1960s (Boykin, 1983; Nobles, 1991) and have recently re
gained currency in mainstream American psychology as well (e.g.,
Betancourt & Lopez, 1993; Cooper &Denner, 1998; Greenfield & Cocking,
1994; Shweder, 1991).
196 JAGERS

Cultural psychologists tend to conceive of cultures as shared systems of

meaning that are transmitted within and across generations. These meaning
systems contain an array of fundamental themes to which individuals orient
themselves. Cultural orientations imply repertoires or scripts of personhood
and collective identity that define the preferred functional psychology (e.g.,
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral inclinations) of individuals, groups,
and institutions.
Some of the more compelling critiques offered of the prevailing cultural
psychology approaches have focused on the assumption of cultural homoge
neity among members of distinct cultural groups (e.g., Turiel, 1998; Turiel &
Weinryb, 2000). It is argued that one can find disagreement, dissension, and
subversion within such groups and that much of this conflict is informed by
the gender or socioeconomic status within these groups. We find consider
able merit in such a critique and consider it as an invitation to interrogate
the complexities of present-day African American culture.
We start from the premise that African Americans have to negotiate si
multaneously three intersecting realms of social experience: mainstream
American culture, their African cultural legacy, and racial minority status
(Boykin, 1983). A host of themes have been attributed to these cultural
realms. In our view, the themes of acquisitive individualism and communal
ism are primary considerations for understanding the social psychological
development among African American children and youth.
Acquisitive individualism is but one form of individualism. It refers to
an orientation in which the effective control and accumulation of people,
material objects, knowledge, and influence is seen as a primary indicator of
self-worth and social standing (Boykin, 1983). By contrast, communalism
connotes an orientation in which the fulfillment of social duties and re
sponsibilities reflects a premium on the fundamental interconnectedness,
interdependence, and well-being of one's group (Boykin, Jagers, Ellison, &
Albury, 1997; Jagers, 1997). The assumption is that these orientations in
fluence various types of social relationships, to include family, peer, and
race relations.
Jagers et al. (2003) attempted to outline the ways in which communal
and acquisitive orientations might inform race-related attitudes and coping
strategies that African Americans can adopt. We opted to use the racial ide
ology dimension of a multidimensional racial identity model (Sellers, Smith,
Shelton, Rowley, &Chavous, 1998). As racial ideology reflects one's sense
of how African Americans ought to think and behave, we reasoned that an
acquisitive orientation can be likened to an assimilationist ideology because
it similarly promotes the desire to integrate fully into mainstream American
consumer culture. Acquisitiveness was also paired with an oppressed-mi-
nority ideology reflective of the self-depreciation brought on by exploitation
and limited mobility within American society. On the other hand, a commu
10. MORAL COMPETENCE PROMOTION 197

nal orientation coincides with the reciprocity and human interconnected

ness featured in a humanist ideology. It also shares much in common with a
nationalist ideology that emphasizes the uniqueness and primacy of the Af
rican American experience.

RACIALIZED CULTURAL IDENTITIES AND MORALITY

The preponderance of scholarship on African American morality has pro

ceeded from a cultural deficit perspective. It is assumed that most residents of
low-income and working communities embrace a Black oppositional street
culture, which prescribes moral depravity (Anderson, 1999; Reed, 2000; Wil
son, 1996). Moral decency in this population is thought to derive from the in
ternalization of mainstream American values and practices (Anderson, 1999;
Wilson, 1996). Others contend that moral decency among African Ameri
cans derives from African cultural retentions (e.g., Ward, 1995)
The moral implications of acquisitive assimilationist, acquisitive op
pressed, communal humanist, and communal nationalist identities as they
related to community violence have been outlined elsewhere Gagers et a ^->
2003). In brief, whether it is manifested in terms of assimilation or internal
ized oppression, the acquisitive individualistic orientation implies a bour
geois morality characterized by utilitarianism and instrumentality in social
relations (Scheler, 1994). Such a moral stance mitigates the type of sustain
able personal or collective well-being we advocate for. We are especially
concerned about internalized oppression among low-income African Amer
icans. The effects of oppression are often mistaken for indigenous Black cul
ture (Anderson, 1999; Massey & Denton, 1993; Ogbu, 1985; Wilson,
1996). However, it is fairly evident that at least some of the central features
of oppressed identity like, for example, hyperconsumerism and the use of vi
olence to establish and maintain dominance are contextualized applications
of mainstream American cultural thrusts.
On the other hand, a communal orientation corresponds with caring and
justice moralities, especially when framed in humanist terms. This moral
stance eschews violence and is probably best typified by Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. during the Civil Rights struggle. Nationalists also place a premium
on caring and justice, but tend to focus on cultivating relevant moral norms
among African Americans to obtain human rights and counter the oppres
sive and exploitative cultural hegemony associated with the prevailing
bourgeois morality. Conservative (typically middle-income) nationalists
generally leave it at that. Political nationalists tend to be less well-off finan
cially and may take this a step further, promoting a revolutionary morality
(Santucho, 1982), which supports sustained struggle and sanctions the use
of violence, if necessary, to establish a more equalitarian moral order. This
derives from the conclusion that revolutionary violence by the oppressed is
198 JAGERS

the only mechanism by which oppressors can be forced into "reciprocal rec
ognition" or full acknowledgment of the humanity and integrity of the op
pressed (Fanon, 1963).
TOWARD AN ACTION RESEARCH AGENDA
Rather than being seen as rigid, static categories into which African Ameri
cans can be pigeonholed, the four racialized cultural identities just offered
are construed as rough anchor points for our applied research on compe
tence development. Specifically, we were interested in cultivating a commu
nal orientation as it holds the potential to reduce risk and to promote moral
competence development. This includes the type of critical consciousness
needed to identify and correct asymmetric social relations (Watts & Ab-
dul-Adil, 1998).
For example, a communal orientation has been associated with prosocial
interpersonal values such as helpfulness and forgiveness, a sense of closeness
to in-group and perceived similarity to family and same-race others among
college students (Jagers &Mock, 1995). In a study of community activists,
Mock (1994) found a positive association between a communal orientation
and both agentic hope and a sense of vision for collective well-being. Finally,
a communal orientation was consistent with greater levels of community
volunteering among African American men (Mattis et al., 2000).
Among children and preadolescents such an orientation corresponds
with greater empathy and perspective taking (e.g., Jagers, 1997) and higher
levels of sociomoral reasoning (Humphries, Parker, & Jagers, 2000). It is also
predictive of reduced violent behaviors (Mock, Jagers, &. Smith, 2003).
We certainly recognize the limits of a communal orientation. However,
we do not think that a priority on communalism erodes an appreciation for
autonomy, self-expression, or personal achievement associated with indi
vidualism. Rather, it provides the necessary grounding for such pursuits,
hopefully reducing the unfortunate tendency in American consumer cul
ture to place things over people. In addition, we are not partial to either the
humanist or nationalist position. It seems more prudent and adaptive to cul
tivate entrepreneurial sensibilities couched in an awareness of past struggles
and a commitment to collective well-being in a complex present and uncer
tain future.
CHILD COMPETENCIES
The dearth of available cultural theory required us to generate a preliminary
model to guide our basic and applied research efforts. This model is shown in
Fig. 10.1.
It seems reasonable to assume that cultural orientations, like commu
nalism, evolve out of children's understanding and expression of moral emo
10. MORAL COMPETENCE PROMOTION 199

FIG. 10.1. Hypothetical model of children's developmental competencies.

tions. Children form generalized scripts of sociomoral events that include

typical affective consequences, such as happiness resulting from receiving
help (Arsenic, 1988; Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2000). We assume that these
scripts can help young children to develop cultural orientations, which reflect
preferred or idealized patterns and outcomes of social interactions.
We borrowed from Arsenic's (Arsenic, 1988; Arsenic & Lover, 1999)
distinct domain framework for exploring emotional expectancies. A focus is
placed on prosocial morality, which highlights the use of private resources to
create beneficial outcomes for others (e.g., sharing, cooperating); active mo
rality, which concerns interventions on behalf of victimized others (e.g.,
helping, comforting); and inhibitive morality, which involves victimization
and unfairly depriving others of their rights (e.g., hitting, stealing, disres
pecting; Arsenio, 1988; Arsenio &. Lover, 1999).
Given the prevalence of violence in low-income African American com
munities, inhibitive morality warrants particular attention. Chronic violence
exposure can contribute to the development of a "victim complex" (Bulhan,
1985, p. 126). This complex frequently entails generalized fear, suspicion, an
ger, and a heightened sensitivity to personal slights or disrespect (Anderson,
1999). This may result in some children manifesting symptoms consistent
with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Osofsky, 1995) or gravitating to
ward drugs and alcohol as a means of numbing themselves. Still others resort
to violence themselves (Fitzpatrick &Boldizar, 1993).
2OO JAGERS

Indeed, the probability of a violent response to personal victimization is

made more likely by the common perception that failure to respond in kind
may invite further victimization (Anderson, 1999). Astor (1994) reasoned
that a history of violence exposure prompts youth to key in on the immoral
ity of intentional (or unintentional) provocation (e.g., hitting, name calling,
lying, and stealing) and construe physical retaliation as a form of reciprocal
or street justice. Rather than de-escalating the situation or relying on sanc
tioned authority figures to intervene on their behalf, children and youth feel
compelled to take revenge on those who transgress against them.
In our current project, 50% of participating third- to sixth-grade children
would resolve a conflict about an accidental bump through retaliatory phys
ical or verbal aggression. Another 25% would avoid any further conflict, and
the remaining 25% would actively work to resolve the conflict. Roughly one
quarter indicated that they would respond to a conflict over turn-taking by
resorting to aggression. Almost 60% would work to peacefully resolve the
situation. Finally, most students (43%) indicated that they would ignore a
classmate who was trying to aggravate them during class. However 25%
would respond with physical aggression, and 17% would use verbal aggres
sion. Only 15% reported using prosocial problem-solving strategies.
Although variations in strategies used for specific provocations are evi
dent, the reliance on retaliation is also apparent. It does not require a huge
leap to envision an oppressed trajectory of anger at victimization leading to
alliances with deviant peers for protection, and escalating lethality of street
justice being linked to activity in the street economy.
This is part of the reason why the moral emotions of empathy and guilt
are privileged in our efforts. Empathy is an other-oriented emotion that re
fers to an affective response more appropriate to another's situation than
one's own and is thought to be foundational to human concern for others
(Hoffman, 2000). Guilt is a self-conscious emotion, which refers to "an ag
itation based emotion or painful feeling of regret that is aroused when the
actor actually causes, anticipates causing or is associated with an aversive
event" (Ferguson & Stegge, 1995, p. 20). It has been linked to the con
structive management of anger to include, moral restraint, remorse, and
reparative action (Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow,
1996). In addition, admission of guilt precedes forgiveness, which refers to
a "giving up of resentment, hatred and anger and taking up a stance of love
and compassion" (Enright & the Human Development Study Group,
1991, p. 64).
We have consistently found a positive connection between a communal
orientation and empathy (e.g., Humphries et al., 2000; Jagers, 1997) and
forgiveness Qagers & Mock, 1995). As expected, the anticipated positive
relationship between a communal orientation and guilt emerged in our on
going project.
10. MORAL COMPETENCE PROMOTION 2O1

In addition, we speculated that a communal orientation would also be

consistent with social skills. Social skills are goal-directed behaviors that fa
cilitate effective social interactions. We are particularly interested in self-
control and cooperation. Self-control is relevant to prosocial and inhibitive
morality as it refers to appropriate responding in turn-taking, teasing, and
other situations in which conflict is possible. Cooperation implies compli
ance, helping, and sharing behaviors and thus is germane to prosocial moral
ity. As expected, a communal orientation was positively associated with
both self-control and cooperation.
A related area that warrants attention is children's beliefs about their
ability to behave morally in various contexts. Bandura (1991) delineated
several interrelated self-sanctioning processes that can prompt and sustain
moral engagement. These include adhering to humane principles rather
than pursuing expedience, refraining from using worthy social ends to justify
destructive means, willingness to sacrifice personal well-being rather than
participating in unjust social practices, remain sensitive to the plight of oth
ers, taking personal responsibility for the consequences of their actions, and
highlighting commonalities with others rather than accentuating differ
ences (Bandura, 2002). Being morally engaged may help to determine
whether prosocial, active, and inhibitive moral sensibilities and related skills
get translated into meaningful moral action in family, school, and commu
nity contexts.
With age, race-related attitudes become increasingly important in chil-
dren's social relationships, especially in school and community contexts.
The multidimensional racial identity model advanced by Sellers et al.
(1998) offers additional prospects for understanding the emergence of hu
manist and nationalist ideologies. In addition to the ideology dimension, the
model includes three other dimensions (racial centrality, racial regard, and
racial salience). Centrality and regard are stable dimensions that can readily
be thought of from a developmental perspective. Racial salience is a more
complex dimension that refers to the extent to which race is an important
personal characteristic in a given situation or point in time. As such, its ex
pression may be contingent on centrality, regard, and ideology dimensions
(M. Sellers, personal communication, July 2003).
For example, we speculate that children might first develop the private
and public affective appraisals comprising racial regard. The private compo
nent reflects the degree to which one feels closeness or pride in his or her ra
cial group membership, whereas public regard concerns one's perception of
the way in which African Americans are viewed by others. These sensibili
ties might help inform racial centrality, which indicates the degree to which
race is a core aspect of the person's self-definition. Sellers et al. (1998) lend
some support to this, reporting that, among 474 African American college
students, racial centrality was positively associated with both private regard
2O2 JAGERS

and nationalist ideological attitudes. On the other hand, centrality was neg
atively related with assimilationist and humanistic ideological attitudes.
COMPETENCE PROMOTION EFFORTS
We have approached our competence promotion efforts assuming coher
ence and purpose to the African American experience. This implies a need
to fully collaborate with stakeholders, who possess or must acquire the
knowledge, preferences, skills, and abilities necessary to enhance and sus
tain social and emotional learning processes and outcomes for children.
Such an approach requires us to be cognizant of power dynamics as we at
tempt to craft a shared vision of viable, realistic program goals and pursue ef
fective implementation processes. The underlying aim is to provide children
with a narrow socialization pathway (Arnett, 1995) that offers consistent,
morally relevant messages and experiences across family, school, and com
munity contexts.

Family Programming
In our view, largely tacit family socialization processes contribute to young
children gravitating toward a given cultural orientation. For example, cul
turally grounded factors such as the affective quality of early adult-child re
lationships, the allocation of family responsibilities, parental discipline
strategies, and race-related socialization are all thought to guide the emer
gence of children's moral sensibilities. These types of family experiences pro
vide children with a rudimentary understanding of moral issues such as
fairness, compassion, reciprocity, need, accountability, envy, anger, empa
thy, guilt, forgiveness, legitimate authority, and the like.
Our attempts at a culturally grounded family strengthening component
reflect best practices in the area (e.g., Kumpfer &. Alvarado, 1998), but are
designed to meet the specific concerns of low-income African American
families. For example, the stress, anger, and frustration associated with per
sonal financial strain and living in an under-resourced community can un
dermine effective parenting (e.g., Elder, Eccles, Ardelt, &Lord, 1995). As
such, social and emotional health and well-being of caregivers, to include
outlets and supports for coping, is addressed prior to entering into discus
sions of caregiver roles and responsibilities. We explore ways in which mate
rial and emotional concerns might be addressed, with an emphasis on
mobilizing family and neighborhood resources (Bowman, 1990; Sampson,
2001; Taylor, Casten, &Flickinger, 1993).
Although this strategy has been shown to moderate the stress-parenting
linkage in both African American mothers and fathers (Bowman, 1990;
Taylor et al., 1993), we are increasingly interested in a more nuanced under
standing of resource pools available to individual families (Jarrett & Burton,
10. MORAL COMPETENCE PROMOTION 2O3

1995). Briefly, heterogeneous pools include working and middle-income

relatives who can provide more substantive assistance than may be available
in economically homogeneous pools.
Attention is then turned to the historical context of Black child develop
ment. Notions of caregiver identity, responses to oppression, and empower
ment and liberation strategies are broached in the context of discussing
parenting philosophies, goals, and developmental imperatives for children.
Separate workshop sessions are used to describe normative benchmarks for
African American children's intellectual, social, and emotional compe
tence development. Associated childrearing strategies and practices are dis
cussed, with a particular focus on emotional socialization, discipline
strategies, and race-related socialization.
Emotional socialization of children occurs through modeling of emo
tional expressiveness, reactions to children's emotions, and teaching about
emotions (Denham, 1998). There tends to be a positive relationship be
tween the emotional expressiveness of parents and their children. Research
on emotional socialization in African American families has highlighted
mothers' tendency toward negative emotionality and its impact on chil-
dren's understanding of anger and sadness (Garner, Jones, & Miner, 1994;
McLoyd, 1990). It is assumed that explicitly addressing stress and coping
and highlighting children's normative development will create emotional
awareness and foster relational skills that will assist caregivers in becoming
more affectively balanced with their children (Denham, 1998). In this con
nection, we promote effective regulation and communication of anger and
more open expression of pride and joy, as well as the modeling and coaching
of moral emotions such as empathy and guilt.
It is commonly held that the pervasive negative emotionality among Afri
can American caregivers contributes to authoritarian parenting, featuring
harsh, power-assertive discipline techniques (e.g., McLoyd, 1990). How
ever, research suggests that these caregivers use a variety of discipline strate
gies (e.g., Jagers, Bingham, &Hans, 1996; Kelly, Power, &Wimbush, 1992).
Although induction contributes to young children's moral reasoning, the
use of ignoring undermined it but physical discipline did not Qagers, et al.,
1996). In addition, corporal punishment does not appear to prompt children
to become aggressive and such restrictive parenting practices are construed
to be effective in protecting children in risky neighborhoods (e.g., Deater-
Deckard, Dodge, Bates, & Petit, 1996).
Consistent with Brody and Flor's (1998) notion of no-nonsense
parenting, we emphasize that the proximal environment requires caregivers
to exercise firm control within an affectionate, caring parent-child relation
ship. Emphasis is placed on family meetings and constructivist problem solv
ing as well as making caregivers aware of the benefits of aligning discipline
strategies with the social domain characteristics of the children's transgres
2O4 JAGERS

sion (Smetana, 1995). One complexity we face is caregiver responses associ

ated with children fighting in response to provocation. Although caregivers
generally resonate with encouraging their children to avoid conflict, they
also insist that their children fight back if hit by a peer. This tactic may be es
sential for children to effectively negotiate their neighborhood, but is incon
sistent with school rules that often feature a zero-tolerance policy for
violence.
The contribution of household work to fostering responsibility is another
aspect of the family component that is worthy of comment. Consistent with
Grusec, Goodnow, and Cohen (1996), we advise that family care, as com
pared with self-care work, assignments enhance children's concern for oth
ers. However, as Jarrett and Burton (1995) pointed out, within low-income
African American families, family responsibilities and associated authority
are often defined by the age structure of the family unit. They contrasted an
age-extended structure, which has 18 or more years between generations,
with an age-condensed structure, where there are only 13 to 17 years be
tween children and their parents. It is suggested that age-condensed struc
tures often force children to assume adultlike self- and family-care
responsibilities in the home. This not only limits adult authority, potential
for guidance, and monitoring, but it also makes it difficult for children to ful
fill age-appropriate expectations in schools and other public settings.
Caregivers' cultural and racial-related attitudes and practices should
have implications for their race-related socialization of children. Such so
cialization has been identified as an important factor in the competence de
velopment of children of color (Coll et al., 1996). Racial socialization is used
in the literature to encompass both cultural and race-related socialization
efforts. Although a majority of African American parents engage in race-re-
lated socialization (Thornton, Chatters, Taylor, &. Allen, 1990), low-in-
come single parents were least likely to do so. Most parental messages
emphasize personal attributes needed to integrate into mainstream Ameri
can culture, with a smaller percentage of parents focusing on racial pride
and cultural heritage. Hughes and Chen (1997) found that among middle-
income parents, parents' perceptions of workplace bias and the age of the
child help to determine the content of race-related socialization messages.
Consistent with these developmental trends, we emphasize the need for
younger children to be exposed to Black history and heritage. As children
get older, we suggest caregivers prepare them for the prospects of confront
ing racial stereotypes and biases.
Finally, we highlight the need for consistent proactive caregiver advocacy
for children in school and community contexts. Strategies for cultivating
meaningful relationships with school personnel, especially classroom teach
ers, are provided. An effort is made to identify and develop partnerships
with community members and organizations that can assist in supporting
10. MORAL COMPETENCE PROMOTION 2O5

the healthy development of children. We support a sense of collective effi

cacy (Sampson, 2001), which refers to "the extent of social connections in
the neighborhood and the degree to which residents monitor the behavior
of others in accordance with socially accepted practices and with the goal of
supervising children and maintaining public order" (Leventhal &
Brooks-Gunn, 2000, p. 326).
This seems particularly important given that almost half of responding
children felt that community problems resulted a lack of caring (48%) or
know'how (25%) to make needed improvements. We assume that interac
tions with caring, committed community residents and institutions will help
to contribute to the emergence of a moral-civic identity and a propensity to
ward sustained community activism (Youniss & Yates, 1999). Correspond
ing efforts to achieve community uplift are consistent with the development
of communal humanist and communal nationalist identities.
Given our concern with empowerment and liberation processes, we are
moving toward a caregiver-led program. This mutual-help group model en
courages and supports local stakeholders in activating and sharing experien
tial wisdom and in evolving existing relationships into sustainable support
systems. This strategy parallels the cooperative group activities featured in
our child curriculum and is aligned with our recommendation that class
room teachers use class meetings and cooperative learning techniques to
create a caring community of learners (e.g., Jagers &. Carroll, 2002). The no
tion of a caring community has been used to characterize effective mutual
help groups as well (Roberts et al., 1999). This invites research attention to
the ways in which individual characteristics of caregivers and group helping
processes impact on program outcomes for caregivers and children.

School-Based Efforts
School-based programs offer an effective way to promote and refine moral
competencies, as they are natural gathering places for students and their so
cializing agents within their community. There has been a groundswell of
support for the infusion of social and emotional learning into the core class
room curriculum (Payton et al., 2000).
It makes sense to use classroom teachers as implementers of school-based
programs if there is a desire for sustained infusion of the program into the
normal school day. However, many teachers are exposed to and subse
quently internalize negative assumptions about the intellectual and social
competencies of low-income African American children (e.g., Pigott &
Cowen, 2000). Their diminished expectations, pity, frustration, anger, or
cynicism can lead to excessive permissiveness or harsh, punitive treatment
of children. Such interactions reflect the exercise of paternalistic and coer
cive power authority, respectively, and often precipitate children's poor
2Q6 JAGERS

school adjustment and discipline problems (Waxman, Huang, Anderson, &

Weinstein, 1997).
In our evolving professional development, we encourage teachers to con
sider education as a cultural and political process. Discussion addresses pro
fessional goals and their relevance to preparing African American children
to assume responsible and transforming roles in their families, communities,
and the broader society (Hale, 2001; Ladson-Billings, 2001).
Attention is then turned to ways in which the necessary moral authority
can be developed and exercised in several ways. For example, class meetings
are promoted because they feature democratic principles. They minimize
the hierarchical relationship between teachers and students and allow both
to express their opinions and suggestions about classroom rules and pro
cesses (Developmental Studies Center, 1996;Nelsen, Lott, & Glenn, 2000).
This provides an opportunity to align these norms and practices with chil-
dren's notions of justice and harm (Nucci, 2001). Once agreed on, rules,
procedures, and practices should be actively taught to ensure that they are
understood and can be performed well.
Positive recognition and encouragement are encouraged (Emmer &Stough,
2001). When inappropriate behavior does occur, the focus should be on high
lighting moral consideration and brainstorming, selecting, and enacting a just
solution, rather than blaming and punishing students (e.g., Nelsen et al., 2000;
Nucci, 2001). There is some evidence that using these classroom management
strategies can yield positive results with low-income African American chil
dren, (e.g., Freiberg, Stein, & Huang, 1995; lalongo et al., 1999).
These teacher-student relational strategies set the context for the infusion
of social and emotional competence modules into the regular classroom in
struction. Social and emotional curriculum modules are intended to teach the
requisite understanding, skills, and abilities students need to become produc
tive, responsible members of a caring community of learners and to contribute
to their families and broader community. Proponents of the social and emo
tional learning movement suggest that programs should entail the core skills
of awareness of self and others, positive attitudes and values, responsible deci
sion making, and social interaction skills (Payton et al., 2000).
Our curriculum modules are intended to extend best practices in social
and emotional learning through a critical treatment of self-other relation
ships in African American cultural and racial contexts. An initial set of les
sons is intended to guide students through an exploration of who they are
from a cultural history perspective so that they can appreciate various aspects
of their personal and communal identities. This provides a foundation for val
uing themselves as unique, but deeply connected individuals. It also prepares
them to learn to identify and understand the antecedents and consequences
of their moral emotions, with special attention to empathy and guilt, anger
and stress management, self-efficacy, persistence, and goal setting.
10. MORAL COMPETENCE PROMOTION 2O7

A subsequent set of modules addresses various levels of self-other rela

tions. The critical need to respect others and a have a sense of social respon
sibility is supported by the discussion of interpersonal and situational cues
and the importance of prosocial verbal and nonverbal communication pro
cesses. As children experience frequent and often intense interpersonal
conflict, we explore the causes of disagreements, prosocial goals, and prob
lem solving as part of a critical examination of familial, school, and commu
nity relations. The connection is made between school success and family
and community well-being and moral questions associated with oppression
are addressed, including evidence of its internalization. The value of com
munity service participation is highlighted and meaningful, replicable op
portunities are created through community partnerships. Only after these
issues are addressed is attention turned to multiculturalism and diversity.
Similar to the family component, collaborative learning and hands-on
activities are featured prominently in each module. The critical analysis of
books and films accents and brings additional substance to each module.
There is a focus on children's comprehension of moral themes (Narvaez,
2001). There is an effort to promote moral sensitivity, moral reasoning, and
moral motivation through reading comprehension strategies like discerning
feelings, perspective taking, fact versus opinion, cause and effect, drawing
inferences, and predicting outcomes.

CONCLUSIONS

Morality is a pivotal concern in our competence enhancement efforts.

There is much to learn about the moral lives of low-income Black children
in family, school, and community contexts. However, when placed in the
context of oppression and liberation strivings, their arrested life chances and
undeveloped potential suggest that we do not have the luxury of pursuing
basic research without making some distinct contribution to improving the
quality of life of these children and their families.
This chapter was intended to summarize some current work, and I have
admittedly not done justice to the issues raised. For example, there is much
more conceptual and theoretical development to be done, especially if we
want to map out trajectories for the various racialized cultural identities for
males and females. Effectively assessing processes and outcomes from this
research presents significant challenges as well. Strategies for creating sus
tainable school and community-based programs for children and families
also deserve attention.
In addition, the chapter does not give adequate attention to issues of gen
der and socioeconomic status. This is not because they are deemed unim
portant. Despite the fairly obvious concern for young mothers, related
matters such as evolving definitions of manhood and womanhood in popu
2O8 JAGERS

lar youth culture and among middle'income people warrant close and in-
depth attention. In a similar way, we need to explore the intersection of class
and racialized cultural identity. We are concerned, for example, with the
draw of the oppressed minority identity for middle-income children and
youth as well as with middle-income activism in the context of conservative
attacks on civil rights.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The work reported herein was supported by a grant from the Institute for Ed
ucational Science (formerly the Office of Educational Research and Im
provement), U.S. Department of Education. The findings and opinions
expressed in this report do not reflect the position or policies of the Institute
for Educational Science or the U.S. Department of Education.

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 Author Index
A Bakhtin, M., 93, 95, 97, 98, 99,100, 101,
Abdul-Adil, J.K., 194,198,212
Abu-Lughod, L, 13,18, 75, 87
Acland,C., 94, 110
Adalbjarnardottir, S., 170, 171
Adelson,]., 71, 73,88
Aksan, N., 39,48, 76, 89
Albury, A., 196, 208
Allen, J., 84,87
Allen, W., 204,212
Allison, A. W., 64, 67
Allport, G., 125,151
Althof, W., 141, 144, 145, 149, 150,152
Alvarado.R., 202,210
Anderson, C. A., 40,48
Anderson, E., 199,212
Anderson, L., 197, 206,208
Appel, K., 149, 151
Ardelt, M, 202, 209
Ardila-Rey, A., 80, 87
Arend, R., 38,49
Aristotle, 182, 191
Arnett, J. J., 202, 208
Arsenio, W. F., 136, 151, 199,208
Asquith, R, 72, 74, 77, 90
Astor, R. A., 200, 208
B Bios, E, 81, 87
Baier,A., 137,151
Bakan, D., 38, 46
102,103,110
Baldwin, J., 65, 68
Bandura,A.,37,46,201,208
Barbaranelli, C, 37,46
Barber, B. K., 83, 87
Bargh, J. A., 36,46
Barkley, R. A., 39, 46
Bates, J.E., 203,209
Batson, C. D., 37,47
Battistich, V, 33,47, 50
Baumrind, D., 22, 26, 34, 36, 39, 43,47
Beck.U, 163, 171
Bell, K., 84,87
Bengston, V. L., 75, 87
Bennett, W. J., vii, xiv, 13, 18, 32, 47, 54,
55, 56, 68, 70, 86,87
Benninga, J. A., 33, 34,47
Berent, R., 72, 74, 90
Berglund, M., 193, 194,209
Berkowitz, L., 40, 47
Betancourt, H, 195, 208
Biddiss, M. D., 183,192
Bingham, K., 203,210
Bitz, B., 78, 83, 85, 90
Blakeney, C., 129, 147, 151
Blakeney, R. E, 129, 136, 147,151
Bloodworth, M. R., 205, 206,211
Bok, S., 13, 18
Boldizar, J. E, 199,209
Bolin.G., 94,110
213
214 AUTHOR INDEX

Bookman, J., 191, 192 Collmann, B., 163, 171

Bourne, E.J., 11, 19 Coon, H. M., 75, 90
Bowman, P. J., 202, 208 Cooper, C. R., 84, 88, 195,209
Boykin, A.W., 195, 196, 208 Conrads.J., 163, 171
Braeges, J., 72, 74, 90, 91 Cowen, E. L., 205,211
Brigham, C. C., 190,192 Coy, K. C., 39,48, 72, 89
Brinton, D.G, 184,192 Crean, H. E, 72, 77, 91
Brody, G. H., 203, 209 Crittenden, E M., 38, 47
Bromba, M., 157, 158, 171 Crnic, K., 204, 209
Bronfenbrenner, U., 44, 47 Crockenberg, S., 39,47, 81, 82, 87
Brooks, G., 59, 68 Cummins, D. S., 14, 20
Brooks-Gunn,J., 205,210
Brown, B. B., 114, 123,125, 126, 167, 171, D
172
Brown, C., 206, 210 Daddis, C., 72, 83, 91
Brown, J. R., 6, 18,85,87 Damon, W., 31,47, 81, 88, 141,151
Buchanan, C. M., 83, 88 Deater-Deckard, K., 203, 209
Bukowski.W, 118, 126 Degaetano, G., 166, 171
Bulhan, H. A., 199, 209 Delucci, L., 33, 47
Buhrmester, D., 82, 88 Demos, J., 70, 73, 88
Burton, L.M., 202, 204,210 Demos, V, 70, 73, 88
Denham, S. A., 203,209
C Denner, J., 195, 209
Denton.N. A., 197,210
Cacioppo, J. T., 36,50 DeVries, R., 85,88
Calasso, R., 99,110 Dewey,]., 169, 170,171
Caldwell, E., 69, 87 De Zengotita, T., 58, 68
Campione-Barr, R, 72, 77, 91 Didion, J., 57, 68
Caprara, G. V, 37,46 DiLalla, D. L, 38,47
Carroll, G., 205,210 Dinnerstein, J. L., 37, 47
Cartwright, S. A., 186, 192 Dienstbier, R. A., 39, 47
Casten,R., 202,212 Dishion, T. J., 40, 50
Catalano, R. E, 193, 194, 209 Dobson, D. M., 40,50
Chadwick, O. E, 71, 73 Dobson, J., 43, 47
Chandler, M., 109, 110 Dohrn,B.,94, 110
Chartrand, T. L, 36, 46 Dodge, K. A., 203,209
Chatters, L, 204,212 Dolan, E E., 64, 68
Chavous, T. M., 196,201,211 Dornbusch, S. M., 84, 88, 89
Chuang, S. S., 72, 76, 90, 91 Douvan, E., 71,73,88
Chen, L, 204,210 Dreikurs, R., 85, 88
Chen, Z., 84,88 Duffet, A., 69, 88
Cocker, J., 63, 68 Dunn, B. E., 40, 49
Cocking, R. R., 195,209 Dunn, J., 6, 18
Cohen, E., 53, 68 Dunphy, D., 114,126
Cohen, H., 43,47 Durkheim, E., 31, 41, 42,48, 162,171
Cohen, J., 53, 68 Dworkin, R., 23, 48
Cohen, L, 204,209
Cohen-Sandier, R., 69, 87 E
Colby, A., 31,47
Coll, G. C., 204,209 Eccles, J. S., 83, 88, 202,209
Collins, W. A., 72, 82,89 Edelstein, W., 157, 158,170,171
AUTHOR INDEX 215

Ehrlich, ER., 174, 184,192 Gould, S.J., 174, 182, 184,192

Eisenberg, N., 199, 209

Graczyk, E A., 205, 206,211
Elder, G.H., 161,171,202,209 Grady, K., 106, 107,110
Ellison, C., 196,208 Graham, E, 71,90
Emerson, C., 99, 102, 103, 108, 109,1W
Gramzow, R., 200,212
Emery, R. E., 72, 88
Grant, M., 190,192
Emmer, E. T, 206, 209
Greenberg, M. T., 193,212
Engels, E, 22, 48
Greenfield, E M., 195, 209

Enright, R. D., 200,209 Grinder, R. E., 14, 18

Erikson, E. H., 81, 88, 114, 126,164,165,

Grotevant, H. D., 84, 88

171
Grossman, D., 166, 171

Etzioni, A., vii, xiv, 23, 41, 48

Grunwald, B. B., 85,88
Grusec, J. E., 43,48, 204,209
F
H
Fanon, E, 198, 209

Farkas, S., 69, 88

Habermas, J., 27, 48, 149, 152

Fauser, E, 170,171 Haeckel.E., 184, 192

Feldlaufer, H., 83, 89

Haidt, J., 35, 36,48
Feldman,S. S., 174, 184,192 Hale, J.E., 206,210
Ferguson, T. J., 200, 209
Hallett,D., 109, 110

Fitzpatrick, K. M., 199, 209

Hancock, L., 94, 110

Flanagan, C., 83, 88

Hans, S., 203,210
Flickinger, S. M., 202,212 Harmin, M., 33, 50

Flor, D. L., 203, 209

Hart, D., 81, 88, 114,124,127, 141, 151

Follansbee, D., 84, 88

Harter, S., 123, 126

Fornas,]., 94, 110

Hartshorne, H., 14, 18, 32, 37,48

Foster, S. L, 72, 90
Hatcher, C, 198,210
Powers, B. ]., 29,48 Hauser, S. T., 84,87,88
Frankena, W. K., 26, 48
Hawkins, D., 193, 194, 209

Freeman, V. G., 14, 18

Hegel, G., 41, 48

Frey, D., 165, 171

Heitmeyer, W,, 163, 171

Freiberg, H.J., 206,209 Helwig.C., 116,117

Fuentes, D., 71,88 Hersh, M., 36, 48

Fuligni, A. J., 77, 82,88 Higgins, A., vii, xiv, 144, 152

Furman, W., 82, 88

Hildebrandt, N., 39,49
Hill, J., 82, 88

Hill-Barlow, D., 200,212

G Hinshaw, S. E, 40,48
Hoffe, O., 139, 152

Gaines, C., 72, 74, 91

Hoffman, M. L, 199, 200,210
Garcia, H. V, 204, 209
Hopf,C., 161,164, 171

Garner, E W., 203, 209

Holmbeck, G. N., 82, 88

Garz, D., 145, 150,152 Hermann, H., 131,152

Gilligan, C., 142, 152
Horn,S.S., 116, 117, 118,126

Girnius-Brown, O., 39, 49

Huang, S., 206,209,212
Glenn, H. S., 206,211 Hughes, D., 204,210
Gobineau, A. de., 182, 192
Hume, D., 31,48
Goines, D. L., 36,48 Humphries, M., 198, 200,210
Goldman, D., 107, 110
Hyles, J., 42, 43,48
Goodnow, J. J., 43,48, 204,209 Hyman, I. A., 43, 48

216 AUTHOR INDEX

I
Laursen, B., 72, 82, 89

Lawhon, D., 198,209

lalongo, R, 206,210 Lee-Kim, J., 73,88,116, 117,126
Lehmann, R., 157, 172

J Leming, J. S., 33, 34,49, 138, 152

Lesser, G.S., 71,73,88

Jacob, 1,71,90 Leventhal, T, 205,210
Jacobson, A. M., 84,88 Lewis, M., 14, 19

Jagers, R. J., 194, 195, 196,197, 198, 200,

Lickona, T., vii, xw, 32, 33,49, 70, 86, 89

203, 205,208, 210,211,212 Lightfoot, C., 94,96,110

Jarrett, R. L, 202,204,210 Lin, Y, 206,210
Jarvis, E., 186, 192

Litman.C.,39,47,81,82,87
Jenkins, R., 204,209 Loeber, R., 39, 40, 49

Johnson, J., 69, 88

Lonczak, H. S., 193, 194,209
Jones, D. C., 203,209 Lopez, S. R., 195,208
Lorber, R., 39, 49

K
Lord, S., 202,209
Lott,L.,206,211
Kampf, H. C., 37,47
Lover, A., 136,151,199,208
Kandel.D.B., 71,73,88
Luke, D. A., 205,211
Kellam.S., 206,210 Lynch, J.H., 41,50
Kelley.M. L.,203,210
Lytton, H., 40,49
Keller, M., 142, 150,152
Kemmelmeier, M., 75, 90

M
Killen, M., 73, 80, 87,88, 89, 116, 117,

126, 127
Maalouf, A., 66, 68

King,M.L.,4, 18
Maguire, M., 6, 18

Kinney.D., 114, 123, 126

Mahapatra, M., 142, 153

Kitayama,S., 11,19,75,89 Mahler, M. S., 81, 89

Klafki, W, 139,152 Makarenko, A. S., 48, 49

Kobrynowicz, D., 37, 47

Males, M., 94, 110

Koch, L., 136, 152

Markus, H. R., 11,19,75,89
Kochanska, G., 38, 39,48,49, 76, 89
Marschall,D.E.,200,212
Koenig, A., 76,89
Marx, K., 22, 25, 41, 46,49

Kohlberg, L., vii, xw, 21, 25, 32, 33, 37, 42,
Massey, D. S., 197,210
48, 134,141,152, 170, 172
Matas, L., 38,49
Krawls.D, 163, 171
Mattis.J.S., 194, 197, 198,210

Kuczynski, L., 38, 39, 43,48,49

May, M. A., 14,18, 32, 37,48

Kuhnel.W., 163, 171
McAdoo, H. R, 204,209
Kumpfer, K. L., 202,210
McGlothlin, H., 73,88, 116, 117,126
Kuypers, J. A., 75, 87
McLellan, J. A., 115, 126

McLoyd.VC., 203,211
L Mechling, J., 94,110
Mernissi, E, 6, 7, 8, 13,14,19
Ladson-Billings, G., 206,210 Midgley, C., 83,89
Lakoff, G., 22,49 Middlekauff, R., 174, 192

Lalonde.C, 109,110 Milgram, S., 36, 49

Lamberty, G., 204, 209

Mill, J. S., 22,49
Lambom, S. D., 84, 89
Miller, J.G., 142,153
Larson, R., 167, 172
Miner, J. L., 203, 209

Laupa, M., 5, 19
Mock.L.O., 198, 200,210,211
AUTHOR INDEX 217

Moffitt, T. E., 85,89 Payton.J.W., 205,206,211

Moller, R., 163, 171 Pepper, E C., 85, 88, 90
Montemayor, R., 72, 89 Petit, G. S., 203, 209
Mont-Reynaud, R., 84, 88 Petty, R. E., 36,50
Morrison, T., 66, 68 Phelan, T. W., 69, 90
Morson.G., 99, 108, 109, 110 Piaget, J., 4, 5, 11,19,96,97, 111,124,
Mortimer,]., 167, 172 127, 141, 142,153, 170, 172
Mory,M., 114, 123,126 Figott, R. L, 205,211
Moshman, D., 109,110 Filger,]., 191, 192
Mullally, P. R., 75,89 Polakow, V, 93, 111
Munn, E, 6, 18 Power, C., vii, xiv, 144, 153, 170, 172
Murphy, E., 198,210 Power, T.G., 203,210
Murray, Y., 39, 48, 198,210 Powers, S. I., 84, 88
Pugh, M.J., 114, 124, 127
N Pulkkinen, L., 40, 50

Naipal, V S., 9, 19 R
Narvaez, D., 207,211
Neff,K., 12, 19 Radke-Yarrow, M., 39, 49
NelsenJ., 206,211 Rambusch, N., 35, 50
Neruda, E, 66, 68 Rappaport, J., 205,211
Newman, B. M., 114, 115, 126 Rathore, S. S., 14, 18
Newman, ER., 114, 115,126 Raths, L. E.. 33,50
Noam, G. G., 84,88 Rawls, J. A., 23, 24,50
Nobles, W.W., 195,211 Reed, A., Jr., 197,211
Nucci, L. E, vii, xiv, 7,19, 73, 75, 76, 80, Regalia, C., 37, 46, 50
85,89,97,110, 116,118,126, Reich, K. H., 129, 151
127,142,152,206,211 Reichenbach, R., 142, 153
Nussbaum, M., 11,12, 13,19, 26,49 Reid, J. B., 40, 50
Restrepo, A., 72, 91
O Reuman, D., 83, 88
Rez, H., 165,171
O'Connor, X, 84, 87 Richardson, E C., 29, 48
Offer, D., 84, 90 Ritter, E L., 84,88
Ogbu.J., 197,211 Roberts, L.J., 205, 211
Okin, S. M., 12, 19 Robin, A. L., 72, 90
Olsen, J. E., 83, 87 Rorty, R., 137, 153
Orwell, G., 58,68 Ross, E. A., 189,192
Oser, E K., 131,133, 141, 142, 143, 144, Rowley, S. A., 196,201,211
145, 146, 149, 150,152, 153 Rush, B., 186,192
Osofsky, J. D., 199,211 Rutter, M., 71, 73, 81, 90
Oswald, H., 157,172 Ryan, J. A., 193, 194,209
Oyserman, D., 75, 90 Ryan, K., vii, xiv, 32, 34, 50
Ryan, R. M., 41, 50
P Rychen.D. 169,172

Faley, V. G., 34, 49 S

Falincsar, A. S., 169, 172
Earker, B., 198, 200,210 Saarni,C., 14, 19
Fastorelli, C., 37, 46, 50 Salem, D., 205,211
Fatterson, G. R., 39, 40, 50 Salganik, L. H., 169, 172
218 AUTHOR INDEX

Sampson, R.J., 202, 205,211 Sulmasy, D. E, 14, 18

Santucho, MR.,197,211
Saraswathi, T.S., 167, 171 T
Scheler, M., 197,211
Schiefele, U, 83, 88 Takaki, R., 174, 176,182, 185, 186,192
Schine,]., 170, 172 TangneyJ.E, 200,212
Schmaling, K. B., 39, 40,49 Taylor, J. H., 40, 50
Schulman, K. A., 14,18 Taylor, R. D., 202,212
Schulz.W., 157, 172 Taylor, R. J., 204,211
Seghers, A., 159, 172 Tennenbaum, D. L., 71, 90
Seidman, E., 205,211 Thorton, M. C, 204,212
Seligman, M.E., 162, 172 Tisak, M., 73, 91
Sellers, R. M., 196, 201,211 Tocqueville, A., 36, 50
Selman, R., 114, 127, 137, 153, 170, 172 Tompsett, C. J., 205, 206,211
Sen, A. K., 26, 50 Torney-Furta, J., 157, 172
Shagle, S. C., 83, 87 Toro, E A., 205,211
Shakespeare, W, 94, 111 Tracz, R. K., 33, 47
Schaps, E., 33, 50 Triandis, H. C.,11, 19
Shekon, J. R, 196,201,211 Tsang, J., 37, 50
Shweder, R. A., 11, 19, 142, 153, 194, 195, Tucker, W.H., 184, 185,192
211 Tugendhat, E., 135, 153
Silver, M., 69, 87 Turiel, E., 5, 6, 12,19, 73, 75, 86, 91, 116,
Silverberg, S. B., 41, 50, 71, 72, 82, 90 118,122,127,142,150,153,
Silzer, M., 161, 164, 171 194,195,196,212
Simon, S. B., 33, 50
Sippolla, L, 118, 126 U
Skinner, E. A., 165, 172
Slomkowski, C., 6, 18 Ulrich-Herman, M., 163, 171
Smetana, J. G., 40, 50, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77,
78,80,82,83,85,86,89,90,91, V
116,127,204,211
Smith, M., 196, 201,211 Van Evrie, J. H., 186,192
Smith, E, 198,211 VanGeest, J. B., 14, 20
Smollar, J., 82, 91 Vaughan, A. T., 174,176, 177,192
Sokol.B., 109,110 Veugelers, W., 131, 133, 153
Solomon, D., 33, 47, 50 Verna, S., 167, 172
Sommers, C. R, 13, 19 Vokey, D., 23, 50
Sparks, E, 33,47, 194,212
Spitz, R. A., 81, 91 W
Spychiger, M., 133, 153
Sroufe, L, 38,49 Wagner, E E., 200,212
Stampp, K. M., 174, 192 Wainryb, C., 12, 19, 196,212
Stangor,C., 116, 117, 126 Walker, K., 194, 197,210
Stegge, H., 200, 209 Walker, L. J., 40, 50
Stein, T. A., 206,209 Wallwork, E., 42, 50
Steinberg, L., 41, 50, 82, 84, 91 Walton, A., 59, 68
Sternberg, R. J., 40, 50, 89 Wang, S., 206,210
Stough, L. M., 206,209 WardJ.V, 194, 197,212
Straus, M. A., 43, 50 Wardlaw, D. M., 205, 206,211
Sturzbecher, D., 158, 160, 172 Wasik, B. H., 204,209
Sueyoshi, L., 80, 89 Watkins, W. H., 173, 174,192
AUTHOR INDEX 219

Watts, D., 40,49 Wilson, W.J., 197,212

Watts, R.J., 194,195, 198,212 Wimbush, D. D., 203,210
Waxman, H. C, 206,212 Wittgenstein, L, 130, 153
Weber, E. K., 80, 89 Wynia, M. K., 14,20
Weinfurt, K. E, 14, 18 Wynne, E. A., vii, viii, xw, 13, 20, 32, 34,
Weinstein, T., 206,212 50, 86, 91
Weiss, B., 84, 88
Weiss, R.H., 167, 172 Y
Weissberg, R. E, 193, 205, 206,211,212
Wentzel, K. R., 34, 50 Yates, M., 205,212
Wernich, J. M., 161, 164,171 Yau,J., 72, 73, 74,80,90,91
Werthamer.L, 206,210 Yeats, W. B., 96, 111
Weston, D. R., 5, 19 Youniss,J.,82,91, 115,126,205,212
White, C, 185, 193 Yule, W, 71, 73, 90
Wigfield, A., 83,88
Wikan.U, 12, 13, 19 Z
Williams, N., 194, 195,212
Wilson, A. D., 37,47 Zan, B., 85, 88
Wilson, I. B., 14,20
This page intentionally left blank
 Subject Index

A B

Adolescence Black Americans

and conflict with parents, 40, 70-72, 74,
and moral stereotypes, 178-180,

81^82 188-190

and defiance, 40
and moral education, 181, 191, 207

and parental authority, 76-78, 84

and school practices, 83-86

C
and risk taking, 94-95, 103-105

and teacher authority, 76, 78-80

Care in classrooms, 33

negative views of, 69-70

Categorical imperative, 22, 136

positive relations with parents, 71-72,

Character, 30-31,38, 42, 53

82
Character education, vii, 29, 31-34, 45,

Affect and morality, 35-36

55, 138

African-Americans Competence promotion

and child competencies, 198-205
with families, 202-205

and social exploitation, 194-195

with schools, 205-207

families and adolescents, 72, 77

Compliance, 39

youth at risk, 193

as behavioral, 38

Agency, 38
as dispositional, 3839
Aggression, 40
Conflict
Assimilationist ideology, 196
in childhood, 63-64

Authority, 5, 12, 38
Conventional domain, see also social con
and authoritative classroom, 34, 45-46
vention, 73, 77, 116, 142

and parenting, 43-44, 77

Culture, 11

Autonomy, 41, 80
and adolescent-parent conflict, 73-74,

and morality, 5, 42
77

as developmental process, 81-82

and race, 195-196

in adolescence, 40, 74, 76

and relativism, 29

221
222 SUBJECT INDEX

and treatment of women, 8-13, 29

Moral competence, 194

and value of person, 24

Moral decay, current period of, vii, viii,

55-56, 70, 93-94, 149-150

D Moral development
as entailing resistance, 3, 11, 6365
Domain theory, 73, 116
Moral discourse ethics, 27

Deontic moral theory, 23-25, 45

Moral domain, 7, 73, 77, 116, 142

Dialectical materialism, 21-23, 44

Moral education
Discourse theory, 97-100
as developmental process, vii, 31, 137,

169-170

E as identity formation, 60-61, 169

and Kohlberg, 142-143

Ethics, 54-55, 64-65

and peer exclusion, 124-125

and teachers, 61, 66

G Morality, 30, 95-96

and agency, 37, 97

German reunification and authority, 5, 42, 96

and neo-Nazism, 157-160

and humanism, 58

and anomie among youth, 161-164

and racism, 174

and religion, 58

H and school rules, 5, 63

and self, 109

Honesty, 13
disengagement from, 37

and deception, 14

and social inequality, 15

N

I
Negative knowledge, 129-132

Negative morality, 129-130, 133-135

Identity
and peer exclusion, 123-124
o
and adolescent neo-Nazism, 161166
racialized identity and morality, Oppression, 26

197-198
and freedom, 9, 16

Individualism and collectivism, 11, 12, 75

and acquisitive individualism, 196

P
Intuitionism, 35-37

Peer exclusion, 113

J and convention, 117-120, 122

and development, 122

Just community school, 130, 143-146

and gender, 116

and realistic discourse, 146-149

and morality, 117, 120

and race, 116-117

L and sexuality, 118-120

Peer groups in adolescence, 113-115

Liberalism, 23
Personal (psychological) domain, 7, 80,

LowriderArt, 105-108
116,142
and social exclusion, 117

M in adolescence, 74-75, 78

Punishment, 43

Montessori classroom, 35
Puritan ideology, 175-176

Moral atmosphere, 34, 45

and race, 175-178

SUBJECT INDEX 223

R Social convention, 5, 64

Social hierarchy, 12

Relativism, 28
Socialization, 42-43

and morality, 29
Standpoint theory, 13, 26-28

and tolerance, 29

Resistance and subversion T

among women, 813
and culture, 12
Taliban, 9, 10, 17

and social change, 4, 9-10, 16-17

Tolerance, 29

as developmental process, 3, 11
Triforial system of moral education,
in adolescence, 76, 81-82
138-141

in childhood, 4-6, 39, 63

in social relationships, 3, 7, 16
U
Rule utilitarianism, 22

Utilitarianism, 23, 25

S
V

Scientific racism, 182-187

Self and consciousness, 97-98

Values clarification, 33

as carnival, 101-102
Violence prevention, 198-200

as novelistic, 99-101, 108-109

Virtue, vii, 13, 21, 25, 31-32, 45, 54-56