256 Phil.

485

PADILLA, J.:
Petition for certiorari assailing the Orders[1] of the City Court of San Carlos
City, Pangasinan, dated 13 August 1981, finding reasonable ground to
believe that petitioners Pedro Tandoc, Rogelio Ercella, Rudy Diaz, Juan
Rosario and Fred Menor had probably committed the crimes of "Trespass
to Dwelling", "Serious Physical Injuries", "Less Serious Physical Injuries"
and "Grave Threats", docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2105, 2106, 2107 and
2108: and the Order[2] dated 21 October 1981, denying petitioners' motion
for a re-investigation of the complaint by the Office of the City Fiscal of San
Carlos City. The incident which gave rise to the petition at bar is as follows:
On 19 October 1980, a criminal complaint docketed as I.S. No. 80-198 was
lodged with the Office of the City Fiscal of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
with the charges of "Serious Physical Injuries", filed
by Bonifacio Menor against respondent Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay; "Slight
Physical Injuries", filed by Fred de la Vega against respondent Beda Acosta,
and "Trespass to Dwelling", filed by Pacita Tandocagainst
respondents Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay, Beda Acosta,
Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez and Arturo Syloria.
Pending the resolution of said complaint, Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay and his
father Conrado Payopay, Sr., together with Manuel Cancino, also filed a
complaint on 2 December 1980[3] with the Office of the City Fiscal, San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, against Pedro Tandoc, PacitaTandoc, Rudy Diaz,
Fred Menor, Rogelio Ercella, Juan Rosario and Fred de la Vega, with the
charges of "Trespass to Dwelling", "Serious Oral Defamation", "Grave
Threats" and "Physical Injuries", docketed as I.S. No. 80-233.
On 10 December 1980, the investigating fiscal found reasonable ground to
believe that respondents Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay, BedaAcosta,
Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez and Arturo Syloria comitted the
crimes charged in I.S. 80-198,[4] thus:
"The evidence in the above-cited complaints tend to show that at about 6:35
o'clock in the afternoon of October 19, 1980, at the house
of Pacita B. Tandoc, situated at Rizal Avenue, SCC, the respondents entered
the store and dinning [sic] room of the complainant without her
permission. There was a sort of altercation between the complainant and
respondent. Arnold Payopay, regarding the stoning of the store and house
of complainant, Tandoc. In the course of their altercation, respondent
Arnold Payopay picked up stones and struck the complainant Tandoc but
instead her helper Bonifacio Menor was hit and suffered physical injuries
which according to the medico-legal certificate will heal for [sic] more than
thirty days. She further declared that respondent, Beda Acosta, who was
behind Arnold Payopay picked up stone (sic) struck her but unfortunately
her helper, Fred de la Vega, was hit and suffered injuries which injury will
heal in less than nine days according to the medical certificate. The matter
was reported to the BarangayChairman of the place and to the Office of the
Station Commander. In support of the complaint are the sworn statements
of Bonifacio Menor, Fred de la Vega,
and Barangay Chairman Hermogenes Salangad.
xxx xxx xxx
"After evaluating the evidence on hand and the entries in the police blotter
the undersigned finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
crime of Trespass To Dwelling, has been committed by all respondents;
Serious Physical Injuries, has been committed by respondent
Arnold Payopay; and Slight Physical Injuries, has been committed by
respondent Beda Acosta. The latter case has not been referred to
the Barangay Chairman as the case will soon prescribe and that the affidavit
of complainant was just endorsed on November 28, 1980. I most
respectfully recommend that the corresponding Informations be filed in
Court.
From the aforequoted resolution, respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied in a resolution dated 5 January
1981.[5] Consequently, the corresponding informations for "Slight Physical
Injuries", "Trespass to Dwelling" and "Serious Physical Injuries" were filed
with the City Court of San Carlos City, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
1992, 2000 and 2001, respectively.[6]
With respect to the criminal complaint docketed as I.S. No. 80-233 filed
by Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay and Manuel Cancino against petitioners for
"Serious Oral Defamation", "Grave Threats" and "Physical Injuries", the
Office of the City Fiscal recommended the dropping of said charges on the
ground that they "were found to be in a [sic] nature of a countercharge, the
same having been filed after more than one (1) month from the date of the
alleged incident of 19 October 1980." However, as to the charge of
"Trespass to Dwelling" filed by Conrado Payopay, Sr. against Pedro Tandoc,
a prima facie case was found by the investigating fiscal.[7] Thus, on 28
January 1981, an information[8] for "Trespass to Dwelling" was filed with
the City Court of San Carlos City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2017.
On 28 July 1981, respondents Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay, Conrado Payopay,
Sr. and Manuel Cancino, directly lodged with the City Court of San Carlos
City the following criminal complaints against herein petitioners,[9] to wit:
- Criminal Case No. 2105, entitled "People v. Pedro Tandoc, Rogelio Ercella,
Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred Menor", for Serious Physical Injuries,
filed by Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay as private complainant.
- Criminal Case No. 2106, entitled "People vs. Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and
Fred Menor", for Trespass to Dwelling, filed by ConradoPayopay, Sr. as
private complainant.
- Criminal Case No. 2107, entitled "People vs. Pedro Tandoc, Rudy Diaz,
Juan Rosario and Fred dela Vega", for Less Serious Physical Injuries, filed
by Manuel Cancino as private complainant.
- Criminal Case No. 2108, entitled "People vs. Pedro Tandoc, Rudy
Diaz, Rogello Ercella, Juan Rosario & Fred Menor", for Grave Threats to
Kill, with Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay as private complainant.
On 13 August 1981, the City Court of San Carlos City issued several
Orders[10] which are the subject of the petition at bar, whereby the
court a quo, after conducting a preliminary examination of the four (4)
aforementioned cases, found reasonable ground to believe that the offenses
charged may have been committed by the accused (now petitioners) and
that the latter were probably guilty thereof. The issuance of warrants of
arrest was ordered against herein petitioners, although said warrants were
later suspended upon motion of the petitioners. A motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution was filed by petitioners, but it
was denied.[11] They moved for a reinvestigation of the cases by the Office of
the City Fiscal. On 21 October 1981, the court a quo denied said motion.
[12]
Petitioners sought a reconsideration of said order, but it was likewise
denied,[13] hence, this petition.
The sole issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the city
court has the power and authority to conduct anew a preliminary
examination of charges, which were, previously the subject of a preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the City Fiscal and thereafter
dismissed by the latter.
A preliminary investigation is intended to protect the accused from the
inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial
unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first
ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer. It is
also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and
expensive trials.[14]
There are two (2) stages in a preliminary investigation; first, the
preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses prior to the
arrest of the accused to determine whether or not there is ground to issue a
warrant of arrest; second, preliminary investigation proper, wherein the
accused, after his arrest, is informed of the complaint filed against him and
is given access to the testimonies and evidence presented, and he is also
permitted to introduce evidence in his favor. The purpose of this stage of
investigation is to determine whether or not the accused should be released
or held before trial.[15]
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. [16] It is
not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not
place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.[17]
Under Section 10, Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior
court, as well as in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city courts
or municipal courts with Courts of First Instance, the accused was not
entitled to be heard in a preliminary investigation proper.[18] The reason
behind this rule is as follows:
"Indeed, balancing the considerations, the withholding of the right of the
preliminary investigation from the accused in cases triableby the inferior
courts involving offenses with lower penalties than those exclusively
cognizable by courts of first instance, could not be termed an unjust or
unfair distinction. The loss of time entailed in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, with the consequent extension of deprivation of
the accused's liberty, in case he fails to post bail, which at times outlasts the
period of the penalty provided by law for the offense, besides the mental
anguish suffered in protracted litigations, are eliminated with the assurance
of a speedy and expeditious trial for the accused, upon his arraignment
(without having to undergo the second stage of the preliminary
investigation), and of a prompt verdict on his guilt or innocence. On the
other hand, the so-called first stage of preliminary investigation or the
preliminary examination, conducted by the duly authorized officer, as
borne out by the examination and sworn written statement of the
complainants and their witnesses, generally suffices to establish the
existence of reasonable ground to charge the accused with having
committed the offense complained of."[19]
The preliminary examination prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest
and the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses are
sufficient to establish whether "there is a reasonable ground to believe that
an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof ",
to prevent needless waste or duplication of time and effort.[20]
In the case at bar, the offenses charged against petitioners for "Trespass to
Dwelling", "Grave Threats" and "Physical Injuries" were all within the
jurisdiction of the City Court of San Carlos City. Under the circumstances,
the complaints could be filed directly with the City Court which is
empowered to conduct a preliminary examination for purposes of issuance
of warrants of arrest, and thereafter to proceed with the trial of the cases on
the merits. The preliminary investigation proper conducted by the Office of
the City Fiscal could have been dispensed with. Neither did the earlier
order of dismissal of the complaints by the investigating fiscal bar the filing
of said complaints with the city court on the ground of double jeopardy.
"x x x. The result of a preliminary investigation can neither constitute nor
give rise to the defense of double jeopardy in any case, because such
preliminary investigation is not and does not in itself constitute a trial or
even any part thereof. The only purpose of a preliminary investigation is to
determine, before the presentation of evidence by the prosecution and by
the defense, if the latter party should wish to present any, whether or not
there are reasonable grounds for proceeding formally and resolutely against
the accused (People vs. Peji Bautista, G.R. No. 45739, April 25, 1939; U.S.
vs. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil., 209). In order that the defense of jeopardy may lie,
there must be a former judgment, either of acquittal or of conviction,
rendered by a court competent to render the same, not only by reason of
the offense committed, which must be the same or at least comprised
within it, but also by reason of the place where it was committed. Under
the established facts it cannot be stated that the same circumstances exist
in the case under consideration. Consequently, the defense of double
jeopardy is untenable."[21]
As long as the offense charged has not prescribed, the city court has the
power and authority to conduct a preliminary examination and proceed
with the trial of the case properly within its jurisdiction. The prescriptive
period of a crime depends upon the penalty imposed by law. The penalty
of arresto mayor is imposed by law for the crimes of "Trespass to Dwelling",
[22]
"Grave Threats", which is not subject to a condition[23] and "Less Serious
Physical Injuries" which has incapacitated the offended party for ten days
or shall require medical attendance for the same period; [24] for "Serious
Physical Injuries" which has caused illness or incapacity for labor for more
than thirty (30) days, the penalty is arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period.[25] The prescriptive period of
offenses punishable by arresto mayor is five (5) years, while crimes
punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years. [26]The
incident at bar occurred on 19 October 1980, while the complaints were
filed with the City Court nine (9) months from said occurrence or on 28
July 1981, thus, the crimes charged had not yet prescribed under the given
facts.
From the order of the City Court finding reasonable ground to believe that a
crime was committed and the accused probably guilty thereof, petitioners
cannot seek a re-investigation by the Office of the City Fiscal. The re-
investigation sought by petitioners applies only instances where a case is
cognizable by the Court of First Instance but filed with the City Court for
purposes of preliminary investigation only and thereafter dismissed by the
latter on the ground that no prima facie case exists. However, for cases
cognizable by inferior courts and filed with the same not only for purposes
of preliminary investigation but for trial on the merits, the Office of the City
Fiscal has no authority to re-investigate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado,

JJ., concur.

[1]
Penned by Judge Ricardo P. Resultan, Rollo, pp. 39, 41, 43 & 45
[2]
Ibid., pp. 48-51
[3]
Rollo, p. 29
[4]
Ibid., pp. 19-20
[5]
Ibid., p. 24
[6]
Ibid., pp. 25-28
[7]
Ibid., p. 35
[8]
Ibid., p. 36
[9]
Ibid., pp. 38, 40, 42 and 44
[10]
Ibid., pp. 39, 40, 42 and 44
[11]
Ibid., p. 24
[12]
Ibid., pp. 48-51
[13]
Ibid., pp. 56-58
[14]
Salta vs. CA, L-41395, 31 July 1986, 143 SCRA 228;
[15]
Biron vs. Cea, G.R. No. 48110, 16 Sept. 1942, 73 Phil.
673; Hashim vs. Boncan, 24 Phil. 116
[16]
People vs. Badilla, L-23792, 17 February 1926, 48 Phil. 718;
[17]
U.S. vs. Yu Tuico, L-1115, 10 March 1916, 34 Phil. 209;
People vs. Medted, L-46108, 22 Sept. 1939, 68 Phil. 485;
[18]
Under Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, cases
not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and
those covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure do not require a
preliminary investigation, to wit:
"Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
(a) Where filed with the fiscal. -If the complaint is filed directly with the
fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3(a) of this Rule
shall be observed. The fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant.
(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court. - If the complaint or
information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure
provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall likewise be observed. If the
judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall
dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant
of arrest after personally examining in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers, (n)"
[19]
Banzon vs. Cabato, L-31447, 27 June 1975, 64 SCRA 419;
[20]
Fabie v. Ong, L-46773, 16 July 1979, 91 SCRA 451;
[21]
People v. Medted, G.R. No. L-46108, 22 Sept. 1939, 68 Phil. 489
[22]
Revised Penal Code, Art. 280
[23]
Ibid., Art. 282
[24]
Ibid., Art. 265
[25]
Ibid., Art. 263
[26]
Ibid., Art. 90
 G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014

NORBERTO CRUZ Y BARTOLOME, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does
not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely
climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis
being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.

The Case

This appeal examines the decision promulgated on July 26, 2004, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the conviction for attempted rape of the petitioner by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in
Balaoan, La Union (RTC), and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum,
and ordering him to pay moral damages of P20,000.00 to AAA, 2 the victim.

Antecedents

The petitioner was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving different
victims. At arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the respective informations, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Criminal Case No. 2388

Attempted Rape

That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, along the Bangar-
Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and by means of force and intimidation commenced the commission of rape directly by overt
acts, to wit: While private complainant AAA, an unmarried woman, fifteen (15) years old, was sleeping
inside the tent along Bangar-Luna Road, the said accused remove her panty and underwear and lay on top
of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast with intent of having carnal knowledge of her by
means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the
said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but because the said offended party succeeded in
resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Criminal Case No. 2389

Acts of Lasciviousness

That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning, along the Bangar-
Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touch the vagina of [BBB] 4 against the latter's will and with no
other purpose but to satisfy his lascivious desire to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Version of the Prosecution

The CA summarized the version of the Prosecution as follows: 6

xxx [Petitioner] Norberto Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling of plastic wares
and glass wares in different municipalities around the country. On December 20, 1993, Norberto and Belinda
employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating
its fiesta. From Libsong East, Lingayen, Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, AAA and BBB boarded a passenger
jeepney owned by Norberto. The young girls were accompanied by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez
(driver) and a sales boy by the name of "Jess".

Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December 20, 1993, they parked in front
of Maroon enterprises. They brought out all the goods and wares for display. Two tents were fixed in order
that they will have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order to get more goods
to be sold.

On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less than an
hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her
breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she was
totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she'll be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and
pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice.

Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not to tell the
incident to her mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the
house boy) but she failed to wake him up.

Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB.
AAA saw her companion awake but her hands were shaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left
and went outside.

Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that early morning. Later still,
while they were on their way to fetch water, AAA and BBB asked the people around where they can find the
municipal building. An old woman pointed to them the place.

In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to the municipal hall where they met a
policeman by the name of "Sabas".

They told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto was summoned to the police
station where he personally confronted his accusers. When Norberto's wife, Belinda, arrived at the police
station, an argument ensued between them.

On December 22, 1993, at around 2:20 o'clock in the morning, the police investigator ordered the
complainants to return at 6:00 o'clock in the morning. Norberto and Belinda were still able to bring AAA and
BBB home with them and worked for them until December 30, 1994, after which they were sent back to
Lingayen, Pangasinan.

On January 10, 1994, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their respective sworn statements
against Norberto.

Version of the Defense

The petitioner denied the criminal acts imputed to him. His version was presented in the assailed decision of
the CA,7 as follows:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different version of the story. The accused
maintains that it was not possible for him to commit the crimes hurled against him. On the date of the
alleged incident, there were many people around who were preparing for the "simbang gabi". Considering
the location of the tents, which were near the road and the municipal hall, he could not possibly do the
dastardly acts out in the open, not to mention the fact that once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen
in the municipal hall could hear them. He believes that the reason why the complainants filed these cases
against him was solely for the purpose of extorting money from him.

Judgment of the RTC

After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment on April 6, 2000 finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388 and acts of
lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 2389,8 to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the accused
NORBERTO CRUZ Y BARTOLOME guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and penalized in Article 335 in relation with (sic) Article 6, par. 3 and
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code respectively.

With respect to the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS PRISION MAYOR as Maximum and the accessory penalties
provided for by law and to pay the victim AAA the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages.

With regard to the crime of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) MONTHS ARRESTO MAYOR as Minimum to FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Maximum and the accessory penalties provided
for by law, and to pay the victim BBB the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages.

The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused by reason of the two cases is counted in his favor.

SO ORDERED.9

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of attempted rape despite
the dubious credibility of AAA, and of acts of lasciviousness despite the fact that BBB did not testify.

On July 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner for attempted
rape in Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness charged in Criminal Case
No. 2389 due to the insufficiency of the evidence, 10 holding thusly: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In sum, the arguments of the accused-appellant are too puerile and inconsequential as to dent, even
slightly, the overall integrity and probative value of the prosecution's evidence insofar as AAA is concerned.

Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two
(2) degrees" prescribed by law for the consummated felony. In this case, the penalty for rape if it had been
consummated would have been reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penalty Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua is prision
mayor.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be the medium period
of prision mayor in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance and the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense which in this case is prision
correctional in any of its periods.

We also find that the trial court correctly assessed the amount of P20,000.00 by way of moral damages
against the accused-appellant. In a rape case, moral damages may be awarded without the need of proof or
pleading since it is assumed that the private complainant suffered moral injuries, more so, when the victim
is aged 13 to 19.

Insofar as the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against BBB, the accused argues that there is not
enough evidence to support such accusation. BBB did not testify and neither her sworn statement was
formally offered in evidence to support the charge for acts of lasciviousness.

In this case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution is insufficient to substantiate the charge of acts of
lasciviousness against the accused-appellant. The basis of the complaint for acts of lasciviousness is the
sworn statement of BBB to the effect that the accused-appellant likewise molested her by mashing her
breast and touching her private part. However, she was not presented to testify. While AAA claims that she
personally saw the accused touching the private parts of BBB, there was no testimony to the effect that such
lascivious acts were without the consent or against the will of BBB. 11

Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner posits that the CA's decision was not in accord with law or with jurisprudence,
particularly:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

I.

In giving credence to the incredulous and unbelievable testimony of the alleged victim; and

II.

In convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt.

Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails the behavior and credibility of AAA. He argues that AAA still
continued working for him and his wife until December 30, 1994 despite the alleged attempted rape in the
early morning of December 21, 1994, thereby belying his commission of the crime against her; that he
could not have undressed her without rousing her if she had gone to sleep only an hour before, because her
bra was locked at her back; that her testimony about his having been on top of her for nearly an hour while
they struggled was also inconceivable unless she either consented to his act and yielded to his lust, or the
incident did not happen at all, being the product only of her fertile imagination; that the record does not
indicate if he himself was also naked, or that his penis was poised to penetrate her; and that she and her
mother demanded from him P80,000.00 as settlement, under threat that she would file a case against him. 12

On the second issue, the petitioner assails the glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA that cast
doubt on her veracity.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is partly meritorious.

In an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,13 the Court reviews only questions of law. No review of the
findings of fact by the CA is involved. As a consequence of this rule, the Court accords the highest respect
for the factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative
weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from its factual findings, particularly when they are
affirmed by the CA. Judicial experience has shown, indeed, that the trial courts are in the best position to
decide issues of credibility of witnesses, having themselves heard and seen the witnesses and observed
firsthand their demeanor and deportment and the manner of testifying under exacting examination. As such,
the contentions of the petitioner on the credibility of AAA as a witness for the State cannot be entertained.
He thereby raises questions of fact that are outside the scope of this appeal. Moreover, he thereby proposes
to have the Court, which is not a trier of facts, review the entire evidence adduced by the Prosecution and
the Defense.

Conformably with this limitation, our review focuses only on determining the question of law of whether or
not the petitioner's climbing on top of the undressed AAA such that they faced each other, with him mashing
her breasts and touching her genitalia with his hands, constituted attempted rape, the crime for which the
RTC and the CA convicted and punished him. Based on the information, supra, he committed such acts "with
intent of having carnal knowledge of her by means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish his
purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but
because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage
and prejudice of said offended party."

There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.
In People v. Lamahang,14 the Court, speaking through the eminent Justice Claro M. Recto, eruditely
expounded on what overt acts would constitute an attempted felony, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a
logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense
by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit
an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical
fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code, xxxx But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal
sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to
establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the
deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code;
it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its
natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense, x x x x.

"It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is
wanting, the nature of the action intended (action fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be
inferred from the nature of the acts of execution (action medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be
such that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons
performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show without any doubt, that they
are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well
as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish
grounds by themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted
for appreciation and the offense of which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention
must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instance of
injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a
particular injury. This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt
to exist, the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say,
that the acts performed must be such that, without the intent to commit an offense, they would be
meaningless."15

To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted rape, we have to determine
the law on rape in effect on December 21, 1993, when the petitioner committed the crime he was convicted
of. That law was Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provided as follows:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. By using force or intimidation; chanrobleslaw

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in
the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

xxxx

The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply
as "the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman," 16 which explains why the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the
penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female. 17 In People v.
Campuhan,18 the Court has defined the extent of "touching" by the penis in rape in the following terms: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

[T]ouching when applied to rape cases docs not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or
grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's
vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the
penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias,
which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath
the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of
penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or
the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.

The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal
area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal
orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly
visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed
of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair
follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many
sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that
the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the
surface of the female organ, xxxx Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching
the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any
showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of
the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. [Bold emphasis supplied]

It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita,19 the Court clarified that the ruling in People v. Erihia20 whereby the
offender was declared guilty of frustrated rape because of lack of conclusive evidence of penetration of the
genital organ of the offended party, was a stray decision for not having been reiterated in subsequent cases.
As the evolving case law on rape stands, therefore, rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility,
considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code are that:
(1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the
felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will. Obviously, the offender attains
his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because from that moment all the
essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by him. 21

Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the character of the overt acts for
purposes of the attempted stage has been explained in People v. Lizada:22

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison
d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the
accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is
necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must
be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the
commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been
committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can
say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have
been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some
subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are
made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however,
that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the
overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. (Bold emphasis
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of
execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates
rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly
by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the
only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to
rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that
intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law, 23 that showing must be through his overt
acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such overt acts
demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show
that his overt acts, should his criminal intent be carried to its complete termination without being thwarted
by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape,24 for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.:25 "The
cralawre d

gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of
the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and
mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet,
inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be highly
unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such
circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People
v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape
as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to
continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he should
employ deceit to have her yield to him)26 could also be ultimate felony.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did not
include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly connected to rape as
the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended
crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to
commit such felony.27 His preparatory acts could include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being
for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for
Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape.
As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Codefor as long as they remained
equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with certainty
what the perpetrator's intent really was.28

If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of lasciviousness?

It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the
offender's intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this
element is not required in acts of lasciviousness.29 Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the
"touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is
manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the
external genitalia of the female.30 Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
committed.31

Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is consummated when
the following essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed
either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of age. 32 In that regard, lewd is defined as
obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral impurity;
or that which is carried on a wanton manner.33

The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on top of said
AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the information being
competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of
lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly
manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to
penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his
acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.

The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration
of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good illustration of this can be seen
in People v. Bugarin,34 where the accused was charged with attempted rape through an information alleging
that he, by means of force and intimidation, "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commence the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples
and the vagina of the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her
will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Rape
by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, undersigned complainant
push[ed] him away." The accused was held liable only for acts of lasciviousness because the intent to
commit rape "is not apparent from the act described," and the intent to have sexual intercourse with her
was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also pointed out that the "act imputed to
him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse."35

Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of acts of lasciviousness, is
punished with prision correccional. In the absence of modifying circumstances, prision correccional is
imposed in its medium period, which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months and one day to four (4)
years and two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should
come from arresto mayor, the penalty next lower than prision correccional which ranges from one (1) month
to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court fixes the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto
mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as the
maximum.

In acts of lasciviousness, the victim suffers moral injuries because the offender violates her chastity by his
lewdness. "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act for omission."36 Indeed, Article 2219, (3), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the
victim in acts of lasciviousness to recover moral damages.37 Towards that end, the Court, upon its
appreciation of the record, decrees that P30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral damages. 38 In addition,
AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of P20,000.00.39

Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, the courts are vested with the discretion to impose interest as a part of
the damages in crimes and quasi-delicts. In that regard, the moral damages of P20,000.00 shall earn
interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment. 40

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOMEguilty
of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, and, ACCORDINGLY, PENALIZES him with the indeterminate sentence
of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day
of prision correccional, as the maximum; ORDERS him to pay moral damages of P30,000.00 and civil
indemnity of P20,000.00 to the complainant, with interest of 6% per annum on such awards reckoned from
the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 38-49; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. Delos Santos (deceased), and concurred in by
Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired) and Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a Member of
the Court).

2
The real name of the offended party is withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act); Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004); and A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC effective November 15, 2004
(Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children). See also People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,
September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA419, 421-423.

Rollo, p. 51.
3

4
The real name of the offended party is also withheld for the reason stated in note 2.

Rollo, pp. 51-52.

5

6
Supra note 1, at 39-41.

7
Supra note 1, at 41.

Rollo, pp. 51-58.

8

9
Id. at 57-58.

10
Supra note 1.

11
Id. at 47-49.

12
Id. at 19-23.

13
Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court states:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.A party desiring to appeal by certiorarifrom a judgment,
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction
or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same
action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.

14
61 Phil. 703(1935).

15
Id. at 705-707.

People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990, 184 SCRA 105, 1 13, citing Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth
16

Edition, p. 193.

17
People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-876, November 16, 2001, 369 SCRA 179, 202.

18
G.R. Nos. 129433, March 30, 2000, 329 SCRA 270, 280-282.

19
Supra note 16.

20
50 Phil. 998 (1927).

21
Id. at 114.

22
G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62, 94-95.

23
Feria & Gregorio, Comments on the Revised Penal Code, First Edition (1958), Central Book Supply, Inc.,
Manila, p. 29., to wit:
An act is defined as any bodily movement or a process whereby an individual puts his organism into motion.
In order to produce some change or effect in the external world, it being unnecessary that the same be
actually produced as the possibility of its production is sufficient. Mere thoughts and ideas, no matter
how immoral or heinous they may be, cannot constitute a felony because the act must be
external, and internal acts are beyond the sphere of criminal law.
24
Id. at 78-79.

25
cralawred G.R. No. 180914, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 134, 158.

26
Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code defines simple seduction as the seduction of a woman who is single
or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means of deceit.

27
People v. Lizada, supra note 22 at 95.

28
I Feria & Gregorio, supra note 23, at 78-79, which opines that equivocal preparatory acts remain
unpunished unless the Revised Penal Code penalizes them (e.g., conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony
in certain cases (Article 8, Revised Penal Code); mere possession with intent to use of instruments or
implements adaptable for the commission of counterfeiting (Article 176, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code);
and possession of picklocks or similar tools adapted to the commission of robbery (Article 304, Revised
Penal Code).

29
People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 152589 and 152758, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 328, 333.

30
People v. Jalosjos, supra, note 17.

People v. Dadulla, G.R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 432, 443; citingPeople v. Collado, G.R.
31

Nos. 135667-70, March 1, 2001, 353 SCRA 381,392.

32
People v. Lizada, supra note 22 at 93.
 ABINO LOZADA and ISIDRO LOZADA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE FERNANDO HERNANDEZ, ETC.,
ET AL., Respondents.

Vicente Abalajon, for Petitioners.

First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro
for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; ITS NATURE. A preliminary investigation is not

properly a trial or any part thereof but is merely preparatory thereto, its only purpose being to determine
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty
thereof. The right to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. At most,
it is statutory. And rights conferred upon accused persons to participate in preliminary investigations
concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which such rights are specifically secured,
rather than upon the phrase "due process of law."

2. ID.; ID.; WHEN FISCAL IS REQUIRED TO GIVE NOTICE THEREOF. The fiscal is required to give to the
accused notice of the preliminary investigation after the accused has requested to be present thereat.

3. ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF RIGHT THERETO. The right to preliminary investigation is waived by failure to
claim it before the accused pleads guilty.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul an order of the Court of First Instance of Capiz denying petitioners
motion to dismiss an information against them for robbery with homicide.

It appears that on July 1, 1952, the provincial fiscal of Capiz filed an information in that court, charging the
petitioners with the crime of robbery with homicide, the fiscal certifying under oath that he had conducted a
proper preliminary investigation of the case on the 27th of the preceding month. Arrested on the strength of
this information, petitioners asked the court to fix the amount of their bail, and the court did so on July 16.
Some three weeks thereafter petitioners were arraigned, and they then pleaded not guilty. This they did
with the assistance of counsel.

With trial scheduled for August 20 but postponed to September 19 at their own request, petitioners moved
to have the case against them dismissed on the grounds that they had been deprived of their right to a
preliminary investigation without due process of law, and when this motion was denied, they brought the
present action for certiorari.

There is no question that before filing the information the provincial fiscal first conducted an investigation as
the law requires. But petitioners contended that they were not given the right to participate in that
investigation for they were not even notified thereof.

It has been said time and again that a preliminary investigation is not properly a trial or any part thereof but
is merely preparatory thereto, its only purpose being to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof. (U.S. v. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil. 209; People
v. Badilla, 48 Phil. 716). The right to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the
constitution. At most, it is statutory. (II Moran, Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 673). And rights conferred upon
accused persons to participate in preliminary investigations concerning themselves depend upon the
provisions of law by which such rights are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase "due process of
law." (U.S. v. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122).
At present the law conferring upon the accused the right to participate in the preliminary investigation is
contained in section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Section 2 of Republic Act No.
732, approved on June 18, 1952. It says: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 1687. Authority of Fiscal to conduct investigation in criminal matter. A provincial fiscal shall have
authority to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary
information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged with the commission of the same. If the
offense charged falls within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, the defendant shall not be
entitled as a matter of right to preliminary investigation in any case where the provincial fiscal himself, after
due investigation of the facts made in the presence of the accused if the latter so requested, shall have
presented an information against him in proper form and certified under oath by the said provincial fiscal
that he conducted a proper preliminary investigation. To this end, he may, with due notice to the accused,
summon reputed witnesses and require them to appear before him and testify and be cross- examined
under oath by the accused upon the latters request. The attendance or evidence of absent or recalcitrant
witnesses who may be summoned or whose testimony may be required by the provincial fiscal under the
authority herein conferred shall be enforced by proper process upon application to be made by the provincial
fiscal to any Judge of First Instance of the Judicial Districts. But no witness summoned to testify under this
section shall be compelled to give testimony to incriminate himself." cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioners construe the above provision as requiring the provincial fiscal conducting the preliminary
investigation to give notice thereof to the accused so that he could be present thereat. The Solicitor General,
on his part, contends that such notice is required only after the accused has requested to be present at the
investigation, for "To hold that the provincial fiscal is required to give notice to the accused before
conducting the investigation would make it impossible for him to conduct such investigation in cases where
the whereabouts of the accused is unknown, since the law has not provided for notice by publication, nor
allows him to dispense with such notice in a case similar to that just mentioned." There is weight to this
reasoning. And in any event, even supposing that petitioners had a right to be notified of the preliminary
investigation so that they could participate in it despite the fact that they had not "so requested", such right
was waived when they pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. For it is now settled that the right to
preliminary investigation is waived by failure to claim it before the accused pleads not guilty. (People v.
Magpale, 70 Phil., 176; People v. Solon, 47 Phil., 443.)

In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied, with costs against the petitioners.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
 [G.R. No. 143032. October 14, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SEGUNDINO

VALENCIA y BLANCA, JOHNNY TADENA y TORDA, and
DOMINGO DEROY, JR. y SAROCAM, accused-appellants.

DECISION
Per Curiam:

Accused-appellants Segundino Valencia y Blanca, Johnny Tadena y Torda and

Domingo Deroy, Jr. y Sarocam were charged and convicted by the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City for violation of Section 15 of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act, for unlawfully selling or offering to sell 634.0 grams of
Psuedophedrine Hydrochloride which is a regulated drug. The trial court sentenced
each of the accused to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. Hence, the case is now before us on automatic review.
It appears from the prosecution evidence that on September 22, 1998, a
confidential informant of the PNP Narcotics Group confided to the group that he was
able to negotiate the purchase of one kilo of drugs from a certain Junior and
Johnny. The information was passed to the operatives team leader, Insp. Ramon
Arsenal and then to their commanding officer, Supt. Arturo Castillo. Supt. Castillo
immediately formed a buy-bust operation team composed of P/Insp. Arsenal, P/Insp.
Beasa, SPO2 Estrada and SPO1 Facto. SPO1 Larry Facto was designated as the
poseur buyer. He was to buy the one kilo of drugs for the agreed price of P800,000.00.
SPO1 Facto was given ten P100.00 bills which he used in preparing the boodle money. [1]

The team proceeded to the corner of Baler and Miller Streets in San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City. SPO1 Facto and the informant waited at the corner of Baler and
Miller Streets, while the other members of the team stayed about ten meters away. At
about 10:50 in the evening, a white Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. UET 384
arrived. The driver, Johnny Tadena, called the informant. The informant, together with
SPO1 Facto, approached him. SPO1 Facto was introduced by the informant to Johnny
Tadena as the buyer. SPO1 Facto asked Tadena where the stuff was. The latter replied,
Its here. He told him not to worry because their boss, a certain Dodong (Segundino
Valencia), was present. SPO1 Facto saw three persons inside the car. Valencia was
seated beside the driver while their other companion, Domingo Deroy, was at the
backseat. Tadena then asked SPO1 Facto about the money and the latter showed him
a plastic bag containing the money. When SPO1 Facto asked Tadena to show him the
stuff, Valencia ordered Deroy to hand him the bag containing the drugs. Deroy did as
instructed.Valencia then handed the stuff to SPO1 Facto in exchange for the
money. SPO1 Facto examined the content of the bag and when he saw the white
substance inside, he scratched his head to signal his companions that the transaction
had been consummated. SPO1 Facto then introduced himself as a police officer and
grabbed the car key from the ignition switch. SPO1 Facto arrested Johnny Tadena while
his companions seized the other accused. The three accused were brought to Camp
Crame for investigation. The substance was submitted for examination at the PNP
[2]

Crime Laboratory. It tested positive for psuedo-ephedrine, a regulated drug.[3]

The defense, on the other hand, alleged that in the evening of September 22, 1998,
Johnny Tadena went to see Segundino Valencia in Caloocan City to ask him if he knew
anyone who would be interested in buying a 1995 Mitsubishi Lancer. Valencia was
allegedly engaged in the business of buying and selling used cars. On the way home,
Valencia rode with Tadena to go to Bago Bantay, Quezon City. As they were crossing an
intersection along Iligan Street, an Isuzu van suddenly blocked their way. The
passengers of the van who appeared to be police officers approached them. They took
Valencias gun which he bought from a police asset. The police brought Valencia and
Tadena to Camp Crame. Tadena was placed in a jail cell while Valencia was brought
before Col. Castillo. Col. Castillo showed Valencia a plastic bag and said that he would
use it as evidence against him. Valencia claimed that the police mauled him and
extorted from him the amount of P20,000.00. They also took his necklace worth
P5,000.00 and his wallet containing P1,200.00. Meanwhile, Domingo Deroy claimed
[4]

that in the evening of September 22, 1998, he was picked up by the police without any
reason at the house of Valencias parents. [5]

On September 24, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Danilo B. Vargas filed the
following information against the accused:

That on or about the 22nd day of September 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring, confederating with and mutually helping one another, not
having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale 634.0
grams of white crystalline substance containing Pseudoephedrine Hydrochloride
which is a regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [6]

Giving more weight to the testimony of the police officers who conducted the buy-
bust operation, the trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged. It held that
the denial and alibi of the accused were not sufficient to overturn the prosecution
evidence which established the guilt of the accused. The dispositive portion of the
[7]

decision read:

WHEREFORE, finding that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby sentences each of them (1) to
suffer the penalty of Death; (2) to pay a fine of P500,000.00; and (3) to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. [8]
 In this appeal, accused-appellants raise the following errors:
1. The court a quo gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellants for
the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the improbable
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution.
3. The court a quo gravely erred in finding that there was conspiracy in the case at bar.
[9]

The appeal is without merit.

Accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in a buy-bust operation. A buy-
bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
plan. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust
team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty,
their testimony on the operation deserves full faith and credit. When the police officers
involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to falsely testify against the accused,
the courts shall uphold the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly.
The trial court in this case correctly upheld the testimony of the prosecution
[10]

witnesses, the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It did not err in
applying the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by law enforcement
agents. We laid down in the case of People vs. Doria the test in determining the
[11]

credibility of the testimony of police officers regarding the conduct of buy-bust

operations.The Court said:

It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the

performance of official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor
General be applied with studied restraint. The presumption should not by itself prevail
over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the
individual. It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the
prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. Courts should not allow
themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person
be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.

We therefore stress that the objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the
details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must
start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the
sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the
initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase
the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug,
whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict
scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to
commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time,
however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring
the accuseds predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of
habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be
considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an
accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of
the defense of inducement. [12]

In the case at bar, SPO1 Facto, the poseur-buyer, gave the complete details of how
the transaction was conducted from beginning to end -- the negotiation between the
confidential agent and the drug dealers, the preparation made by the buy-bust team
before conducting the operation, when the informant introduced him as the supposed
buyer to the drug dealers, the exchange of the stuff and the payment between the
pushers and the poseur buyer, and the arrest of said drug dealers. SPO1 Facto
positively identified accused-appellants as the drug dealers. His testimony went as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Can you recall, Mr. Witness, if you reported for duty on September 22, 1998?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: What time did you report?
A: Nine oclock in the morning, maam.
Q: Now, while you were on duty was there any specific assignment given to you by your
chief?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that assignment?
A: To conduct surveillance against drug traffic in Quezon City.
Q: Was there any specific person whom you were supposed to conduct surveillance on
December 22 ... September 22, 1998?
A: Yes, maam. The group of a certain Johnny alias Paniki group.
Q: And who ordered you or instructed you to conduct the surveillance?
A: Our team leader, Police Inspector Ramon Arsenal.
Q: Now, how did you know the group of Paniqui would be the subject of surveillance?
A: Through our confidential agent, maam.
Q: Were you able to talk to this confidential agent?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And what is the gender of this confidential agent?
A: A male, maam.
Q: What did he tell you, if any?
A: He told me that he was able to negotiate the one kilo drug deal to a certain Junior and
Johnny, maam.
Q: And upon receiving this information, what did you do?
A: We informed our team leader, Police Inspector Ramon Arsenal the information of our
confidential agent, maam.
Q: And what happened after giving that information to your team leader?
A: Our team leader Ramon Arsenal told our CO Col. Castillo about that drug transaction.
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: Inspector Arsenal formed a team to conduct buy bust operation.
Q: Was there any briefing?
A: There was a briefing in our office, maam.
Q: What was taken up in that briefing?
A: In the briefing, I would pose as poseur buyer.
Q: And how much were you supposed to buy?
A: Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos per kilo, maam.
Q: So, what else were taken up during the briefing?
A: Inspector Arsenal furnished me ten (10) pieces of One Hundred Peso-bill. Then I prepared
the three bundles with numbers inside and make it appear, parang tingnan mo
P800,000.00, parang may boodle sa loob.
Q: After that ... By the way who are the members of the team?
A: P/Insp. Arsenal, P/Insp. Beasa, SPO2 Estrada, myself and others.
Q: You mentioned of a confidential informant, was he present during that briefing?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And after preparing the boodle money and 10 pieces of P100-bill, what else happened?
A: After I prepared the boodle on the night, we proceeded to the area.
Q: Where is this area?
A: Corner Baler and Miller Streets, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City.
Q: Were you able to reach the area?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened next if any?
A: Around 10:30 p.m., 22 September 1998, minutes later, around 10:50, pm., there was an
automobile, Mitsubishi Lancer color white UET 384 arrived at the corner of Baler-Miller
Streets.
Q: Where were you at that time when that Mitsubishi Lancer arrived?
A: I was at the corner of Baler and Miller Street.
Q: Who were with you at that time?
A: Our confidential agent.
Q: How about the other members of the team where were they?
A: They were away from us at least 3 meters ... 10 meters, away from us.
Q: Ten meters away from you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When this Mitsubishi Lancer arrived, what happened next?
A: The driver called for me and our CI, together with the CI.
Q: And then what happened?
A: The CI introduced me as buyer.
Q: And then what happened after the CI introduced you to the occupants or to the driver,
what happened next?
A: After I was introduced as the buyer, I asked the driver where the stuff was. The driver said,
Its here and he also admonished me not to worry because their boss is there, a certain
Dodong, seated in front, in the front seat beside the driver.
Q: How many occupants were there in that Mitsubishi Lancer?
A: Three persons, maam.
Q: And where was the other one?
A: One at the back seat, maam.
Q: And when the driver told you that his boss was there, a certain Dodong, what happened
next?
A: He asked me where was the money, and I said, Its here, and while I was holding the
money which was placed inside a plastic wrap.
Q: What happened next?
A: I told him to show me the stuff first because the money was with me.
Q: And what happened?
A: The man seated in the front seat called the man at the back and said Dalhin mo dito,
bigay mo dito. The person at the back seat handed the green bag to the person seated
in the front seat.
Q: And then what happened?
A: And then he handed it to me sabay kaliwaan.
Q: Who handed to you the stuff?
A: The man beside the driver.
Q: And when it was handed to you, what did you do?
A: I gave the money, kaliwaan na. And then I quickly looked at the stuff and I saw that there
was white substance inside so right away I made the pre-arranged signal.
Q: What was that pre-arranged signal?
A: I scratched my head which means the deal was, the drug deal was positive.
Q: And when you scratched your head what did you do?
A: I introduced myself to the suspect as a police officer. And I grabbed the key of the vehicle.
Q: Where was the key at that time?
A: It was a(t) the ignition switch.
Q: And then what did you do?
A: I said, Arestado kayo and arrested the driver.
Q: By the way, Mr. Witness, where were you at the time, while you were talking with the
driver?
A: Beside the driver.
Q: There (sic) were still inside that car?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when you told the driver, you are arrested, what else happened?
A: I got the key.
Q: And then, after that?
A: I said, Arestado kayo.
Q: After that what happened?
A: My companions alighted from the Tamaraw FX and arrested his other companions.
Q: And then what happened?
A: After that we brought them to Camp Crame, maam, for investigation.
Q: If you will be able to see this driver again of that vehicle with whom you had that
transaction, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If he is inside the courtroom will you please point him to us?
A: That one is Johnny Tadena (the person pointed to by the witness by tapping his shoulder
when asked to identify himself gave his name as Johnny Tadena).
Q: How about that man who handed to you that green bag containing the white substance?
A: (Witness pointing to a man seated inside the courtroom who when asked to identify
himself gave his name as Segundino Valencia).
Q: How about the man seated at the back of the car who handed the green bag to Mr.
Segundino Valencia?
 A: (Witness pointing to a man who when asked to identify himself gave his name as Domingo
Deroy)
xxx xxx xxx.
SPO1 Factos testimony withstood the rigorous cross-examination by the defense
counsel and was corroborated by SPO2 Estrada, also a member of the buy-bust team. [13]

Accused-appellants contend that it is incredible that the alleged vendors of the

drugs would readily do business with the alleged poseur-buyer whom they met only on
September 22, 1998, considering that the transaction involved the huge amount of
P800,000.00. We are not impressed. It has been shown that the appellants have
previously negotiated with the confidential agent. Prior to September 22, they have
already closed the deal for the purchase of drugs for the price of P800,000.00. Hence, it
is not as if the appellants were dealing with strangers. They knew the informant. When
they met with the poseur-buyer, the latter was accompanied by the informant who
introduced them to each other. Nonetheless, the Court has observed that drug pushers
sell their prohibited articles to any customer, be he a stranger or not, in private as well
as in public places, whether daytime or nighttime. Indeed, drug pushers have become
increasingly daring, dangerous and openly defiant of the law. Hence, it is immaterial
whether the vendor and the vendee are familiar with each other. It is only necessary to
prove the fact of agreement and the acts constituting sale and delivery of the prohibited
drugs. These facts have been sufficiently proved in this case.
[14]

Accused-appellants also argue that the prosecution has not shown by clear and
convincing evidence whether the sale was voluntary or whether this was a case of
instigation. The argument deserves scant consideration. A buy-bust operation is a form
of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police officers as an
effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-
bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody
inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Its opposite is instigation or
inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the
offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and
considered an absolutory cause. In this case, accused-appellants, apparently, have,
[15]

for some time, been engaged in drug dealing. They were in fact the subject of a
surveillance conducted by the operatives of the PNP Narcotics Group. The police
engaged the services of a confidential informant to lead them to transact with them. The
confidential agent facilitated the meeting of accused-appellants and the poseur
buyer. Hence, it was not the police nor the confidential agent who induced accused-
appellants to commit a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. They were already
violating the law and the police only used the buy-bust operation to apprehend them in
the act of unlawfully selling drugs. This is certainly a legitimate entrapment operation
and not instigation.
Finally, accused-appellants alleged that the prosecution failed to prove the
existence of a conspiracy among the three accused, as it did not show a common plan
or design among them. Again, we find otherwise. There is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. The existence of a conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence
[16]

because it may be inferred from the parties conduct indicating a common understanding
among themselves with respect to the commission of the crime. Neither is it necessary
to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement
setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or object to be carried out. It may be
deduced from the mode or manner in which the crime was perpetrated or from the acts
of the accused showing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. The existence of a conspiracy among the three accused is very
[17]

much apparent from the narration of SPO1 Facto about how the transaction went. Upon
the arrival of the Mitsubishi Lancer bearing plate no. UET 384 at the corner of Baler and
Miller Streets, the driver, Tadena, called the informant and SPO1 Facto, the supposed
buyer. Tadena asked SPO1 Facto about the money. When SPO1 Facto asked for the
stuff, Valencia, who was occupying the front passenger seat, ordered Deroy, who was
seated at the back of the car, to hand him the bag containing the drugs. Valencia gave
the bag to SPO1 Facto as the latter handed him the money. This demonstrates the
concerted effort of the three accused in drug dealing. Conspiracy among them is
obviously present in this case.
As regards the penalty, the Court agrees with the conclusions of the trial court, thus:

Section 20, Article IV of R.A. 6425, as amended, provides that The penalties for
offense under x x x Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Art. III of this Act shall be
applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities: 8. In the
case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity which is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and promulgated by the DDB, after
consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose. In Section 15, the penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos. The crime is aggravated when committed by any person or persons
belonging to an organized or syndicated crime group (Section 30, R.A. 7659; and
People vs. Esparas, G.R. No. 120034, July 10, 1998). In such a case, the death penalty
shall be imposed.An organized or syndicated crime group has been defined as a group
of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another
for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. (Section 30, R.A. No. 7659; and
People vs. Esparas, G.R. No. 120034, July 10, 1998)

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in
Criminal Case No. Q98-78878 is AFFIRMED. [18]

In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section

25 of Republic Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of these cases
be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
 Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Austria-Martinez,
JJ., on official leave.
SALONGA vs PAO
APRIL 9, 2014 | KAAARINA
SALONGA vs PAO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and
liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case
has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion
against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents
from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a
member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro
Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor
Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner
Salonga as one of those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a
Notice of Preliminary Investigation in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al.
(which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that the preliminary
investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on
December 12, 1980 and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of
the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-
evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on
January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received
any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting
evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed
by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39
other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and
PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss
the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima
facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied
the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing
of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended,
against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2
December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for
certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been
established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him.
He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence
against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision
from the Supreme Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on
the Courts judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating
for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985,
respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal
Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to
instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and
decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused
in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent
Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and
signatures and to place it once again in the Courts crowded agenda for further
deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion
charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by
the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the cases moot and
academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in
similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal
from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity
on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the
Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the
Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by
Presidential Decree No. 15, the Centers new charter pursuant to the Presidents
legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture
for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that
the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of
its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions
ever printed in the Reports.
 [G.R. No. 121422. February 23, 1999]

NOEL CRUZ y DIGMA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH VI, MANILA, respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The case before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] denying
for lack of merit the petition for certiorari filed by the accused to annul the following orders
issued by the Regional Trial Court, Manila[2] in Criminal Case No. 90-85059, to wit:

(a) The order dated January 18, 1993, made in open court admitting the formal offer
of evidence of the prosecution;

(b) The order dated December 20, 1993, denying the petitioners demurrer to evidence;

(c) The order dated July 8, 1994, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

On June 19, 1990, police officers arrested petitioner without warrant for illegal possession of
a .38 caliber revolver with six (6) rounds of ammunition while waiting outside the Manila
Pavilion Hotel along U.N. Ave., Manila.
On June 25, 1990, Assistant Prosecutor Tranquil P. Salvador, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, an information[3] against the accused for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866[4], the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about June 19, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) firearm .38 cal. Colt revolver bearing Serial Number
376420 with six (6) live ammunitions, without first having secured the necessary
license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.

On June 26, 1990, before the arraignment of the accused, his parents, Timoteo and Ana
Cruz, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, a petition [5] for habeas corpus in his
behalf. Thereafter, the accused was arraigned in the Manila court and pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
The trial court proceeded to try the case. After the prosecution presented and formally
offered its evidence, the trial court issued an order [6] dated January 18, 1993, admitting in
evidence the gun and ammunition seized from the accused, over his objections. After the
prosecution had rested its case, petitioner, on motion and upon leave of court, filed a demurrer to
evidence. On December 20, 1993, the trial court denied the demurrer, and ordered the accused to
present his evidence.[7] Instead, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial
court denied in an order[8] dated July 8, 1994.
On October 27, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari to annul the three (3) orders, namely: the order admitting the prosecutions formal
offer of evidence; the order denying his demurrer to evidence; and the order denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration, for being issued capriciously, arbitrarily and whimsically, in utter
disregard of controlling law and jurisprudence, and with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On November 7, 1994, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and ordered the
trial court to temporarily refrain from further proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 90-
85059.
On August 8, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision[9] denying the petition for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals ruled that the assailed orders were interlocutory in nature and not
reviewable by certiorari. Petitioner should wait until the trial court has decided the case on its
merits and if aggrieved, appeal from his conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the trial
courts order admitting the allegedly inadmissible evidence involved questions of facts, which are
not reviewable in petitions for certiorari. There being no error in jurisdiction, whatever error in
judgment committed by the trial court can not be corrected by certiorari.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial courts order admitting
in evidence the gun and ammunition, which are allegedly inadmissible for being the fruits of an
illegal warrantless arrest and search. He further claims that the prosecutions evidence is
insufficient to sustain a conviction. Petitioner contends that the questioned orders, while
admittedly interlocutory in nature, are no longer subject to amendment or correction by the trial
court, hence, a review thereof is warranted to prevent extreme prejudice to petitioner. Petitioner
prays for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain the trial court from proceeding with the
criminal case pending this petition; a writ of preliminary injunction after the expiration of the
TRO; and to reverse the questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals.
We resolve to deny the petition.
We find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition
for certiorari. The rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of
evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a
separate appeal or review on certiorari, but may be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal
properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case. [10] When the
court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the accused, any error in the application of the
law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court after it has acquired jurisdiction over
a case, may be corrected only by appeal.[11]
Regarding the denial of the demurrer to evidence, we have likewise ruled that the question
of whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to convince the court that the
defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt rests entirely within the sound discretion
of the trial court. The error, if any, in the denial of the demurrer to evidence may be corrected
only by appeal. The appellate court will not review in such special civil action the prosecutions
evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The orderly procedure prescribed by the Revised Rules of
Court is for the accused to present his evidence, after which the trial court, on its own assessment
of the evidence submitted, will then properly render its judgment of acquittal or conviction. [12] If
judgment is rendered adversely against the accused, he may appeal the judgment and raise the
same defenses and objections for review by the appellate court.[13]
Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available
to challenge interlocutory orders of the trial court may be subject to exceptions. When the
assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous[14] or issued with grave abuse of discretion,
[15]
the remedy of certiorari lies.
Petitioner insists that he falls within the above exceptions, warranting a review of the denial
of his petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner stresses that he was
illegally arrested, and consequently any evidence taken after the subsequent search on his person
is inadmissible in evidence. He points to alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses to show that he was illegally arrested. He maintains that the evidence
presented is insufficient to sustain a conviction due to the inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses. He likewise claims that the prosecution has failed to establish that the gun and
ammunition presented during the trial were the same items confiscated from him.
We disagree. The trial court, in resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration, squarely
addressed the above contentions. The trial court ruled that the seized evidence was admissible,
and that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction, if the accused presented no
contrary evidence.
We find neither error nor patent abuse of discretion in the rulings of the trial court on these
issues. Thus, upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, he may present his evidence.
[16]
After trial on the merits, and the court issues a verdict of conviction, petitioner may
seasonably appeal such decision, raising once again his defenses and objections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby DENIES the petition. We order the trial court to
continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-85059, with deliberate dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

[1]
CA-SP G. R. No. 35586, promulgated on August 8, 1995, Rollo, pp. 47-54.
[2]
Presided over by Judge Roberto M. Lagman.2
[3]
Rollo, p. 60.
[4]
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
[5]
SP No. 90-5898, Court of Appeals Record, pp. 94-98; the records, however, do not indicate the ruling of the court
on the petition.
[6]
Rollo, p. 55.
[7]
Rollo, p. 56.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 57-59.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 47-54, penned by Justice Austria-Martinez.
[10]
Peza v. Alikpala, 160 SCRA 31.
[11]
Day v. RTC of Zamboanga City, Br. XIII, 191 SCRA 610.
[12]
Cruz v. People, 144 SCRA 677.
[13]
Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 145.
[14]
Salcedo-Ortaez v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111.
[15]
Villon, Jr. v. IAC, 144 SCRA 440.
[16]
Rule 120, Section 15, Revised Rules of Court.
 [G.R. No. 76922. February 21, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMEO A. CORRALES, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Amado S. Duran for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; FORCE AND INTIMIDATION SUFFICIENT FOR A WOMAN NOT TO PUT UP ANY
RESISTANCE; NOT ONLY A FIREARM CAN PRODUCE INTIMIDATION WHICH IS ADDRESSED TO THE MIND.
The records, thus, clearly show that force and intimidation were employed on Milagros Miranda so that
she was overcome with fear. Force and intimidation are sufficient for a woman not to put up any resistence.
In the case of People v. Poculan, 167 SCRA 176, [1988], it was held that not only a firearm can produce
intimidation. In fact, intimidation is addressed to the mind.

2. ID.; ID.; NOT NEGATED BY FAILURE OF VICTIM TO SUSTAIN ANY INJURY. The issue regarding the
absence of injury is likewise of no moment. The fact that the victim did not sustain any injury does not
negate rape. The accused found no need to employ force on the woman because she had already submitted
out of fear. (People v. Poculan, supra; People v. Alfonso, 153 SCRA 487 [1987]).

3. ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF STRONG RESISTANCE ON PART OF WOMAN, SUFFICIENTLY EXPLAINED. The
absence of strong resistance on the part of the woman is sufficiently explained. She could not physically
resist her attacker due to the fact that her hands were held back and also because it was very difficult for
her to move considering her condition where she was on her seventh month of pregnancy.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES; DELAY IN REPORTING CRIME, JUSTIFIED IN

CASE AT BAR AND NOT SUFFICIENT TO DESTROY COMPLAINANTS TESTIMONY. The accused-appellant
claims that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He cites the delay in reporting as one of
the reasons which could raise a doubt, thus, necessitating a decision favorable to him. The reason for the
delay is justified and is not sufficient to destroy the complainants testimony. The threat on the
complainants life immobilized her. The testimony already cited shows that the life of the victim was
threatened if she reported the incident. Moreover the delay was not considerable. The rape happened on
December 29. It was reported on January 1. The victim wanted to wait for her husband who was in Tanay,
Rizal but her brother convinced her to go to the police.

5. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; MINOR INCONSISTENCIES FOUND IN COMPLAINANTS

TESTIMONY DO NOT AFFECT HER CREDIBILITY; IN A PROSECUTION FOR RAPE, ACCUSED MAY BE
CONVICTED ON SOLE BASIS OF COMPLAINANTS CREDIBLE TESTIMONY. Inconsistencies found in the
complainants testimony as to the circumstances of her being awakened are minor ones and do not affect
her credibility. Considering the shock she was then suffering from, the inconsistencies as to the reason for
her waking up and the duration of the sexual act are too minor to affect her credibility (People v. Partulan,
156 SCRA 489 [1987]). The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the
sole basis of the complainants testimony if credible. (People v. Tabago, 167 SCRA 65 [1988]; People v.
Taduyo, 154 SCRA 349 [1987]).

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF MARRIED WOMAN WHO WENT THROUGH SHAME AND HUMILIATION OF A
PUBLIC TRIAL, CREDIBLE. The alleged bad blood between the two families pales in comparison with the
degree of seriousness of the crime charged against the accused. Mere bad blood between the families over a
petty thing could not be the reason for a woman to file a charge as serious as rape. The complainant would
not risk her reputation and expose herself to ridicule if the charge was not true (People v. Carino, Sr., 167
SCRA 285 [1988]). More so a married woman who was seven months pregnant and who could lose the love
and regard of her husband. The testimony of a married woman who went through all the shame and
humiliation of appearing in a public trial in order to exact justice for what she suffered at the hands of the
accused-appellant deserves credence (People v. Partulan, supra).

7. ID.; ID.; MOTIVE; ESSENTIAL WHEN THERE IS DOUBT AS TO IDENTITY OF CULPRITS AND NOT WHEN
THEY ARE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED; MOTIVE IN RAPE INHERENT IN CRIME. Moreover, the alleged bad
blood, according to the trial court, does not really exist. The testimony of the mother-in-law of the accused
shows that the victims brother and cousin were at the mother-in-laws store having a drinking spree for
several hours that night and early morning of the incident. Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to
the identity of the culprits and not when they are positively identified (People v. Aliocod, 167 SCRA 665,
[1988]). Unlike in homicide or murder, the motive in rape is inherent in the crime. It is the lust of the
accused for the victim.

8. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; UNAVAILABLE IN LIGHT OF VICTIMS POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT AND
WHERE IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ACCUSED TO HAVE BEEN AT PLACE WHERE CRIME WAS COMMITTED.
The victim testified that she was able to recognize her assailant not only from his voice but from the light
coming from the outside which illumined his face. She could not be mistaken as to his identity because she
knew him well, being the collector of their "paluwagan" and being their neighbor. The appellants defense of
alibi is therefore, unavailing in the light of his positive identification by the victim and where it is not
impossible for the accused to have been at the place where the crime was committed (People v. Andres, 155
SCRA 290, [1987]).

9. ID.; ID.; FACTUAL FINDINGS ACCORDED GREAT RESPECT ON APPEAL; REASON. We find no
compelling reason for us to overturn the judgment of the trial court. The factual findings, particularly the
Trial Judges assessment of the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses are accorded great respect on
appeal for, as repeatedly held, the trial judge enjoys the advantage of directly and at first hand observing
and examining the testimonial and other proof as are present at the trial and is, therefore, better situated to
form accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof (People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 68422, Dec. 29,
1989 citing Cortez v. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 139 [1988]); People v. Jarzi, 163 307 [1988]; and People
v. Traya, 147 SCRA 381). The Judge stated that the testimony of the complainant was clear, positive, and
unequivocal. The appellant has shown no strong reasons why we should ignore or disregard the Judges
impressions and findings.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The accused-appellant Romeo Corrales was charged with the crime of rape as a result of the following
complaint filed by the victim Milagros Miranda:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 29th day of December, 1983, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force
and intimidation employed upon the person of one MILAGROS TABAQUERO DE MIRANDA, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with the latter, against her will and
without her consent." (Original Records, p. 1)

Upon arraignment, the accused assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits
followed.

Having been convicted as charged, Romeo Corrales now appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City. The dispositive portion of the aforementioned decision reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Romeo Corrales y Anuevo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua." (Original Records, p. 106)

The prosecution evidence upon which the decision of conviction was based is summarized by the appellee as
follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On December 29, 1983, at about 1:00 a.m., Milagros Miranda was alone, sleeping, in her house at 126
Pangako St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City (p. 3, 77, TSN, May 17, 1984).

She was awakened by the presence of Romeo Corrales and was about to stand when appellant poked a
pointed instrument at the left side of her body and warned her not to shout, otherwise he would kill her (pp.
4, 5, L6, id.).
Milagros Miranda was instructed to remove her clothes. Totally naked, the victim pleaded, noting that she is
seven months pregnant. Appellant stated that he will not do anything, rather, he will just touch the victims
private parts and masturbate. Not long after his masturbation, however, appellant inserted his penis inside
Milagros Mirandas vagina and consummated the act (pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, TSN, id.).

Milagros Miranda was warned not to report the incident to the police under threats of death (pp. 9-10, id.).

The threats notwithstanding, she reported the matter to her parents (p. 10, id.), and upon advice of her
mother, they went to the police headquarters to report the incident (p. 11, id.).

On the basis of the complaint filed, a team was dispatched to follow up and apprehend herein appellant.
Arrest was effected on January 4, 1985 (p. 5, TSN, January 16, 1984)." (Appellees Brief, pp. 1-3)

In an effort to prove his innocence, the accused-appellant assigns the following errors: chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED THAT THE ACCUSED USED FORCE AND INTIMIDATION IN RAPING THE VICTIM.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. (Rollo, p. 29)

On his first assignment of error, the accused-appellant alleges that there was no force and intimidation used
on the victim. The records show that the victim reiterated at least three times in her testimony that she did
not resist because the accused threatened to kill her if she shouted or resisted.

Hence, the complainant testified: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

Q. When you were pocked (sic) by that man and something was pocked on you, what happened?

A. He told me not to shout because if I shout, he will kill me.

Q. Then, what transpired?

A. And, he threatened me. I was not able to shout because I was afraid that he might kill me." (TSN, May
17, 1984, p. 5)

x x x

"FISCAL: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q. When the accused inserted his male organ to your female organ, did you not make any resistance?

WITNESS: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A. Because of my fear that I might be killed, I was not able to shout and do anything.

x x x

Q. Do we understand from you that the accused left your house after that you were ordered to sit in the
corner completely naked?
A. Yes, sir, I was told not to report the incident because he will kill me." (TSN, May 17, 1984, pp. 9-10)

The records, thus, clearly show that force and intimidation were employed on Milagros Miranda so that she
was overcome with fear. Force and intimidation are sufficient for a woman not to put up any resistence. In
the case of People v. Poculan, 167 SCRA 176, [1988], it was held that not only a firearm can produce
intimidation. In fact, intimidation is addressed to the mind.

The issue regarding the absence of injury is likewise of no moment. The fact that the victim did not sustain
any injury does not negate rape. The accused found no need to employ force on the woman because she
had already submitted out of fear. (People v. Poculan, supra; People v. Alfonso, 153 SCRA 487 [1987]).

The absence of strong resistance on the part of the woman is sufficiently explained. She could not physically
resist her attacker due to the fact that her hands were held back and also because it was very difficult for
her to move considering her condition where she was on her seventh month of pregnancy.

The accused-appellant claims that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He cites the delay
in reporting as one of the reasons which could raise a doubt, thus, necessitating a decision favorable to him.
The reason for the delay is justified and is not sufficient to destroy the complainants testimony. The threat
on the complainants life immobilized her. The testimony already cited shows that the life of the victim was
threatened if she reported the incident. Moreover the delay was not considerable. The rape happened on
December 29. It was reported on January 1. The victim wanted to wait for her husband who was in Tanay,
Rizal but her brother convinced her to go to the police.

Inconsistencies found in the complainants testimony as to the circumstances of her being awakened are
minor ones and do not affect her credibility. Considering the shock she was then suffering from, the
inconsistencies as to the reason for her waking up and the duration of the sexual act are too minor to affect
her credibility (People v. Partulan, 156 SCRA 489 [1987]). The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the
accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the complainants testimony if credible. (People v.
Tabago, 167 SCRA 65 [1988]; People v. Taduyo, 154 SCRA 349 [1987]).

The accused-appellant claims that he was asleep in his mother in-laws house from 9:00 P.M. on December
29, 1983 up to 6:00 A.M. of the following day. He stated that the reason why the complainant brought the
action against him was because of the existing bad blood between his in-laws and the family of the
complainant. He supports this contention by saying that there was an altercation between Milagros and his
mother-in-law on account of his wifes lost wristwatch which was allegedly found in the possession of the
complainant. He further tries to strengthen the contention by citing a case which was brought by his in-laws
against the family of the complainant when one of the members of the latters family stoned them and
hacked their door.

This alleged bad blood between the two families pales in comparison with the degree of seriousness of the
crime charged against the accused. Mere bad blood between the families over a petty thing could not be the
reason for a woman to file a charge as serious as rape. The complainant would not risk her reputation and
expose herself to ridicule if the charge was not true (People v. Carino, Sr., 167 SCRA 285 [1988]). More so a
married woman who was seven months pregnant and who could lose the love and regard of her husband.
The testimony of a married woman who went through all the shame and humiliation of appearing in a public
trial in order to exact justice for what she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant deserves credence
(People v. Partulan, supra).chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Moreover, the alleged bad blood, according to the trial court, does not really exist. The testimony of the
mother-in-law of the accused shows that the victims brother and cousin were at the mother-in-laws store
having a drinking spree for several hours that night and early morning of the incident. Motive is essential
only when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprits and not when they are positively identified (People
v. Aliocod, 167 SCRA 665, [1988]). The victim testified that she was able to recognize her assailant not only
from his voice but from the light coming from the outside which illumined his face. She could not be
mistaken as to his identity because she knew him well, being the collector of their "paluwagan" and being
their neighbor. The appellants defense of alibi is therefore, unavailing in the light of his positive
identification by the victim and where it is not impossible for the accused to have been at the place where
the crime was committed (People v. Andres, 155 SCRA 290, [1987]). Furthermore, unlike in homicide or
murder, the motive in rape is inherent in the crime. It is the lust of the accused for the victim.

Premises considered, we find no compelling reason for us to overturn the judgment of the trial court. The
factual findings, particularly the Trial Judges assessment of the credibility of the testimonies of the
witnesses are accorded great respect on appeal for, as repeatedly held, the trial judge enjoys the advantage
of directly and at first hand observing and examining the testimonial and other proof as are present at the
trial and is, therefore, better situated to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof
(People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 68422, Dec. 29, 1989 citing Cortez v. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 139 [1988]);
People v. Jarzi, 163 307 [1988]; and People v. Traya, 147 SCRA 381). The Judge stated that the testimony
of the complainant was clear, positive, and unequivocal. The appellant has shown no strong reasons why we
should ignore or disregard the Judges impressions and findings.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the lower court finding the accused Romeo Corrales guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellant is further ordered to indemnify
the offended party the sum of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J., Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

HILARIO P. SORIANO, G.R. NO. 163400

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, J., Chairman,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CORONA,

AZCUNA, and

HON. CAESAR A. CASANOVA, GARCIA, JJ.

Presiding Judge, Branch 80,

Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan;

HON. BASILIO R. GABO, JR.,

Presiding Judge, Branch 11, Regional

Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan;

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS

(BSP), PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE

CORPORATION (PDIC), Public Prosecutor

NICERETA LOURDES Q. VITUG, and

State Prosecutor JOSEFINO A. SUBIA, March 31, 2006

Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision [1] of the Honorable Court of
Appeals (Fifteenth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 70519 dated August 15, 2003, which
affirmed the trial courts Order[2] denying the quashal of the four (4) separate
informations filed against petitioner for estafa in Criminal Case Nos. 1178-M-2001,
1179-M-2001, 1180-M-2001 and 1181-M-2001 before Branch 80, Regional Trial
Court, Malolos, Bulacan, as well as its Resolution [3] dated April 28, 2004, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of said decision
provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding that no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
was committed by Branch 80, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, in the issuance of
its assailed December 4, 2001 and April 19, 2002 Orders in Criminal Cases Nos. 1178
to 1181-M-2001, the said Orders are AFFIRMED and UPHELD. Accordingly,
the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

 Petitioner Hilario P. Soriano was the president of the Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM), a domestic banking institution organized under
Philippine laws. On May 31, 2000 and June 2, 2000, the Office of Special
Investigation (OSI) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and the Litigation and
Investigation Services (LIS) of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC),
through their respective officers, transmitted two (2) letters[4] to Hon. Jovencito
Zuo, Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ), containing as
annexes the sworn affidavits of the following persons: (1) Joan M. Cortez, Director,
Department of Loans and Credit, BSP; (2) Marcos Perez, Jr.; (3) Rosalinda E. Ilagan;
(4) Joseph P. Lara; (5) Noli B. Santos; (6) Lourdes J. Reynaldo; and (7) Belinda C.
Benito and Ma. Socorro N. Bartolome (joint affidavit). These affidavits, along with
other documents, contained narrations of how the criminal offense of estafa was
committed on various occasions by the petitioner.

The first transmittal letter elaborated upon details concerning petitioners

failure to account for the aggregate amount of P21.0 million RBSM funds, of
which P10.0 million was used to purchase five (5) Managers Checks payable to
Soriano Holdings Corporation (SHC) of which petitioner was Chief Executive
Officer and Treasurer-in-Trust and P11.0 million was deposited on various
occasions to the PCI Bank Account of SHC.

The second letter described how petitioner failed to account for the amount
of P12.6 million, which was part of the approved emergency loan granted to
RBSM by the BSP, which, upon his instructions, was delivered to him and was
never placed under the custody of RBSM nor reflected on its books.

The letters of transmittal, which were not filed under oath, requested that a
preliminary investigation be conducted and the corresponding criminal charges be
filed against petitioner.
 Acting on these letters and their annexes, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia
filed, on May 2, 2001, four (4) separate informations for estafa as penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner for
allegedly defrauding RBSM of various amounts through false pretenses and
misrepresentations committed on different occasions during the year 1999. The
same were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1178 to 1181-M-2001 and raffled off to
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by respondent
Hon. Caesar A. Casanova.

In Criminal Case No. 1178-M-2001, the information alleged that petitioner

converted the P12.6 million emergency loan approved by the BSP to RBSM to his
own personal use and which amount was never recorded in the books of RBSM.

In Criminal Case No. 1179-M-2001 and Criminal Case No. 1181-M-2001,

petitioner was alleged to have caused the withdrawal of P7.0 million and P4.0
million, respectively, from the RBSM account on the strength of his representation
that said amounts would be invested. Instead of being invested, these amounts
were deposited to SHC, where petitioner was the Treasurer-in-Trust and Chief
Executive Officer, and was purportedly converted by the latter to his own personal
use.

In Criminal Case No. 1180-M-2001, petitioner allegedly caused the

purchase of P10.0 million worth of managers checks payable to SHC from

RBSMs account and, instead of using the same for investment purposes,
converted the same to his own personal use.

On August 27, 2001, petitioner moved to quash these informations on the

ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. [5] It was
petitioners contention that the letters sent to the DOJ by the BSP and PDIC
constituted the complaint and hence were fatally defective for not being filed
under oath or sworn to before the investigating prosecutor as required under
Section 3(a) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, he argued that said
letters contravened Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7653, otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act, which requires that the
complaint must be filed under the delegated authority of the Governor of the BSP
or pursuant to a Monetary Board Resolution.

Respondents filed an opposition[6] contending that the letters of transmittal

did not constitute the complaint and were merely transmittal or covering
letters. They argued that what comprised the criminal complaints were the
affidavits and since these were made under oath and supported by evidence,
there was substantial compliance with the Rules. Moreover, it was their
contention that since estafa is a public crime, any person may institute the
complaint and that the letters were mere indorsements routinely done by one
government office to another and need not bear the written authorization of the
head of office.

In an order dated December 4, 2001, the trial court denied the motion to
quash filed by the petitioner for lack of merit ruling that it had jurisdiction over
the case since from the record there are affidavits and supplemental affidavits
executed and sworn to by complaining witnesses. Thereafter, petitioners motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied on April 19, 2002.[7]

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 to the Court of Appeals claiming that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of the case.[8] On August 15, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners
petition finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial
court and ruled that the order denying petitioners motion to quash is an
interlocutory order and that the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after an
adverse decision has been rendered on the merits.
 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present
petition. Petitioner contends that the two letters transmitted by the legal
departments of the BSP and PDIC to the DOJ constituted the complaints. The
letters were not subscribed under oath and were signed by BSP and PDIC officers
without authorization from the BSP governor. These letter-complaints, petitioner
argues, do not comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 112, Section 3(a),
of the Rules of Court, thus the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
offense.
Petitioners contention is not well-taken.

Section 3(a), Rule 112, of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Procedure - The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as
well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They
shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2)
copies for official file. The affidavit shall be subscribed and sworn to
before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer
oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each
of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that
he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits.

While Section 18(c) and (d) of R.A. No. 7653 read:

Section 18 - Representation of the Monetary Board and the Bangko Sentral. The Governor of the
Bangko Sentral shall be the principal representative of the Monetary Board and of the
Bangko Sentral and, in such capacity and in accordance with the instruction of the
Monetary Board, shall be empowered to:

xxx
 (c) represent the Bangko Sentral, either personally or through counsel, including
private counsel, as may be authorized by the Monetary Board, in any
legal proceedings, action or specialized legal studies; and

(d) delegate his power to represent the Bangko Sentral, as provided in

subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this section, to other officers upon his own
responsibility: Provided, however, that in order to preserve the integrity
and the prestige of his office, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral may
choose not to participate in preliminary discussions with any multilateral
banking or financial institution on any negotiations for the Government
within or outside the Philippines. During the negotiations, he may
instead be represented by a permanent negotiator.

A close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP and PDIC to the DOJ
shows that these were not intended to be the complaint envisioned under the
Rules. It may be clearly inferred from the tenor of the letters that the officers
merely intended to transmit the affidavits of the bank employees to the
DOJ. Nowhere in the transmittal letters is there any averment on the part of the
BSP and PDIC officers of personal knowledge of the events and transactions
constitutive of the criminal violations alleged to have been made by the
accused. In fact, the letters clearly stated that what the OSI of the BSP and the LIS
of the PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the DOJ for preliminary
investigation the affidavits and supplemental affidavits of the employees who had
personal knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. [9] These affidavits were
subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary
public. Since the affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, were intended to
initiate the preliminary investigation, we hold that Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court was substantially complied with.

Citing the ruling of this Court in Ebarle v. Sucaldito,[10] the Court of Appeals
correctly held that a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the
fiscal need not be filed by the offended party. The rule has been that, unless the
offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may
be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. The
crime of estafa is a public crime which can be initiated by any competent
person. The witnesses who executed the affidavits based on their personal
knowledge of the acts committed by the petitioner fall within the purview of any
competent person who may institute the complaint for a public crime. Section 18,
paragraphs (c) and (d), of R.A. No. 7653 does not apply in this case because the
BSP did not institute the complaint but merely transmitted the affidavits of the
complainants to the DOJ.

Finally, there is no dispute that as a general rule, the remedy of an accused

from the denial of his motion to quash is for him to go to trial on the merits, and if
an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law.[11] Indeed, basic is the doctrine that "the denial of a motion to dismiss or to
quash, being interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari; it cannot be [the]
subject of appeal, until final judgment or order is rendered." [12] Petitioner cites the
case of Morales v. Court of Appeals[13] as an exception to this rule, claiming that
certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of when the lower court has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying a
motion to quash.

The Morales ruling does not apply. Since the requirements of the Rules of
Court were substantially complied with, the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction
over the offense and it did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners motion to quash.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed August
15, 2003 Decision and the April 28, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP NO. 70519 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 25-33. The courts opinion was written by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestao and
concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente.
[2]
Id. at 72.
[3]
Id. at 36.
[4]
Id. at 56-64.
[5]
Id. at 51-55.
[6]
Id. at 65-71.
[7]
Id. at 86.
[8]
Id. at 87-100.
[9]
Annexes 1 and 2 of petitioners motion to quash; Id. at 56-64.
[10]
G.R. Nos. L-33628 and L-34162, December 29, 1987, 156 SCRA 803.
[11]
Petitioners petition for certiorari; rollo, p. 18.
[12]
Santiago Land Development Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103922, July 9, 1996,
258 SCRA 535, 540-541, per Torres, J.
[13]
G.R. No. 126623, December 12, 1997, 283 SCRA 211.
Rules of Procedure - Part V - Rule 34
Approved: 15 February 1993

G. ELECTION OFFENSES
Prosecution of Election Offenses
Section Guide

Sec. 1. Authority of the Commission to prosecute election offenses

Sec. 2. Continuing delegation of authority to other prosecution arms

of the government

Sec. 3. Initiation of complaint

Sec. 4. Form of complaint and where to file

Sec. 5. Referral for preliminary investigation

Sec. 6. Conduct of preliminary investigation

Sec. 7. Presumption of existence of probable cause

Sec. 8. Duty of investigating officer

Sec. 9. Duty of the Law Department, State Prosecutor, Provincial or

City Fiscal upon receipt of records

Sec. 10. Appeals from the action of the State Prosecutor, Provincial
or City Fiscal

Sec. 11. Duty of State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal to render

reports

Sec. 12. Private prosecutor

 Section Details

Section 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election

Offenses. - The Commission shall have the exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same,
except as may otherwise be provided by law.

Sec. 2. Continuing Delegation of Authority to Other Prosecution

Arms of the Government. - The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial
and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants are hereby given
continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses
under the election laws which may be filed directly with them, or
which may be indorsed to them by the Commission or its duly
authorized representatives and to prosecute the same. Such
authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the Commission
whenever in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is
necessary to protect the integrity of the Commission, promote the
common good, or when it believes that successful prosecution of
the case can be done by the Commission.

Sec. 3. Initiation of Complaint. - Initiation of complaint for election

offenses may be done motu proprio by the Commission, or upon
written complaint by any citizen of the Philippines, candidate,
registered political party, coalition of political parties or
organizations under the partylist system or any accredited citizens
arms of the Commission.

Sec. 4. Form of Complaint and Where to File. -

 a. When not initiated motu proprio by the Commission, the
complaint must be verified and supported by affidavits and/or
any other evidence. Motu proprio complaints may be signed by
the Chairman of the Commission, or the Director of the Law
Department upon direction of the Chairman, and need not be
verified;

b. The complaint shall be filed with the Law Department of the

Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars,
Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election Directors,
or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal. If filed
with any of the latter three (3) officials, investigation thereof
may be delegated to any of their assistants.

c. If filed with the Regional Election Directors or Provincial

Election Supervisors, said officials shall immediately furnish
the Director of the Law Department a copy of the complaint
and the supporting documents, and inform the latter of the
action taken thereon.

Sec. 5. Referral for Preliminary Investigation. - if the complaint is

initiated motu proprio by the Commission, or is filed with the
Commission by any aggrieved party, it shall be referred to the Law
Department for investigation. Upon direction of the Chairman of the
Commission, the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any
lawyer of said Department, or to any of the Regional Election
Directors or Provincial Election Supervisors, or any lawyer of the
Commission.

Sec. 6. Conduct of Preliminary Investigation. -

a. If on the basis of the complaint, affidavits and the supporting

evidence, the investigating officer finds no ground to continue
 with the inquiry, he shall recommend the dismissal of the
complaint and shall follow the procedure prescribed in Section
8(c) of this Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a subpoena to the
respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint,
affidavits and other supporting documents giving said
respondent ten (10) days from receipt within which to submit
counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. The
respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant.

b. Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence

submitted by the respondent shall be furnished by him to the
complainant.

c. If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, doe

not submit counter-affidavits within the ten day period, the
investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence
presented by the complainant.

d. If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to

be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory
questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the
parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but
without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so
desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer
which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses
concerned.
 e. Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and
the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10)
days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the
investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.

Sec. 7. Presumption of Existence of Probable Cause. - A complaint

initiated motu propio by the Commission is presumed to be based
on sufficient probable cause and the investigating officer must
forthwith issue the subpoena mentioned in the immediately
preceding section.

Sec. 8. Duty of Investigating Officer. - The preliminary investigation

must be terminated within twenty (20) days after receipt of the
counter-affidavits and other evidence of the respondents, and
resolution thereof shall be made within five (5) days thereafter.

a. If the investigating officer finds no cause to hold the

respondent for trial, he shall recommend dismissal of the
complaint.

b. If the investigating officer finds cause to hold the respondent

for trial, he shall prepare the resolution, and the corresponding
information wherein he shall certify under oath that he has
examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against him and that he was given an
opportunity to submit controverting evidence.

 c. In either case, the investigating officer shall, within five (5)
days from the rendition of his recommendation, forward the
records of the case to:

1. The Director of the Law Department of the Commission in

cases investigated by any of the Commission lawyers or
filed personnel, and

2. The State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal, as

the case may be, pursuant to the continuing authority
provided for in Section 2 of this Rule.

Sec. 9. Duty of the Law Department, State Prosecutor, Provincial or

City Fiscal Upon Receipt of Records. -

a. Within ten (10) days from receipt of the records stated in

paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding section, the State
Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal shall take appropriate
action thereon, immediately informing the parties of said
action.

b. In cases investigated by the lawyers or the field personnel of

the Commission, the Director of the Law Department shall
review and evaluate the recommendation of said legal officer,
prepare a report and make a recommendation to the
Commission affirming, modifying or reversing the same shall
be included in the agenda of the succeeding meeting en banc
of the Commission. If the Commission approves the filing of an
information in court against the respondent/s, the Director of
the Law Department shall prepare and sign the information for
immediate filing with the appropriate court.
 c. In all other cases, if the recommendation to dismiss or the
resolution to file the case in court is approved by State
Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal, they shall likewise
approve the Information prepared and immediately cause its
filing with the proper court.

d. If the recommendation to dismiss is reversed on the ground

that a probable cause exists, the State Prosecutor, or the
Provincial or City Fiscal, may, by himself prepare and file the
corresponding information against the respondent or direct
any of his assistants to do so without conducting another
preliminary investigation.

Sec. 10. Appeals from the Action of the State Prosecutor, Provincial
or City Fiscal. - Appeals from the resolution of the State Prosecutor,
or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution of
investigating officers may be made only to the Commission within
ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution of said officials,
provided, however that this shall not divest the Commission of its
power to motu proprio review, revise, modify or reverse the
resolution of the chief state prosecutor and/or provincial/city
prosecutors. The decision of the Commission on said appeals shall
be immediately executory and final.

Sec. 11. Duty of State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal to Render

Reports. - The State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal shall,
within five (5) days from the rendition of their resolution on
recommendation or resolution of investigating officers, make a
written report thereof to the Commission. They shall likewise
submit a monthly report on the status of cases filed with and/or
prosecuted by them or any of their assistants pursuant to the
authority granted them under Section 2 of this Rule.
Sec. 12. Private Prosecutor. - The appearance of a private
prosecutor shall be allowed in cases where private rights involving
recovery of civil liability are involved.

F. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Accreditation of Citizens' Arms of the Commission

Section Guide

Sec. 1. Who may be accredited as citizens' arms of the Commission

Sec. 2. Petition to be accredited

Sec. 3. Contents of the petition

Sec. 4. Notice of hearing

Sec. 5. Opposition

Sec. 6. Decision

Sec. 7. Certificate of accreditation

Sec. 8. Submission of names and addresses of local representatives

Sec. 9. Appointment of watchers by election registrars

Sec. 10. Revocation of accreditation

Sec. 11. Expiration of accreditation

 Section Details

Section 1. Who May Be Accredited as Citizens' Arms of the

Commission. - Any bona fide non partisan group, association or
organization from the civic, youth, professional, educational,
business or labor sectors with indentifiable leadership, membership
and structure, and with demonstrated capacity to promote the
public interest and assist the Commission in the performance of its
functions and activities as mandated by the Constitution and by
law, may be accredited as citizens' arms of the Commission.

Sec. 2. Petition to be Accredited. - The group, association or

organization mentioned in Section 1 hereof may file a petition for
accreditation duly verified by its President, Chairman of the Board
of Directors, or any of its duly authorized officer.

Sec. 3. Contents of the Petition. - The petition shall state the

following:

a. The constituency to which petitioner seeks accreditation;

b. That it is not supporting any candidate, political party,

organization or coalition of political parties, in the
constituency where it seeks accreditation;

c. Nature of its membership (whether civic, youth etc.); names of

its officers or organizers, location of principal office or place
of business and an assurance of its capability to undertake a
coordinated operation and activity to assist the Commission;
d. That it shall submit itself to the direct and immediate control
and supervision and comply with the orders of the Commission
in the performance of its specific functions and activities
provided by law, and such other functions and activities
provided by law, and such other functions and activities which
the Commission may assign;

e. That it shall strictly remain non-partisan and impartial during

the registration and election periods;

f. That it is not supported by or under the influence of any

foreign government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities;
or of any foreigner, whether natural or juridical person;

g. That it shall not solicit or receive, directly or indirectly, any

contribution or aid of whatever form or nature from any foreign
government, or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, or
from any foreigner, a natural or juridical person;

h. That it does not seek to achieve its objectives, goals or

programs through violence or other unlawful means, nor aim to
propagate any ideology opposed to the principles of a
republican and democratic government; and
 i. That it undertakes to police its ranks and prevent infiltration
by persons or groups of persons who may, directly or
indirectly, destroy its character of non-partisanship and
impartially.

Sec. 4. Notice of Hearing. - Upon the filing of the petition, the

Commission en banc shall immediately set it for hearing. The
Commission may, if it deems necessary, order the publication of the
petition in a newspaper of general circulation at the expense of the
petitioner.

Sec. 5. Opposition. - Any person, group, association or organization,

political party or coalition of political parties possessing relevant
information or evidence against the petitioner may oppose its
accreditation by filing a verified opposition. Notwithstanding the
absence of any opposition, the Commission may motu proprio
require the petitioner to present evidence to support its petition.

Sec. 6. Decision. - The decision of the Commission granting the

petition may provide conditions to be strictly complied with by the
petitioner.

Sec. 7. Certificate of Accreditation. - If the decision is for the

accreditation of the petitioner, the Commission shall issue a
certificate of accreditation containing the following:

a. The name of the group or organization;

b. The constituency to which it is accredited; and

c. The political exercise for which it is accredited.

Sec. 8. Submission of Names and Addresses of Local
Representatives. - After its accreditation, the petitioner shall submit
to the Election Registrars in the constituency where it is
accredited, the names and addresses of its local representatives
who shall act as non-partisan watchers and substitute watchers
therein during the entire electoral exercise.

Sec. 9. Appointment of Watchers by Election Registrars. - Unless the

impartiality or non-partisanship of the members concerned is
questioned in writing, the Election Registrar shall extend the
corresponding appointments to such members as poll watchers
stating therein the precincts to which they are assigned. The
members so appointed shall have the same duties, functions, and
rights as watchers of registered political parties, organization or
coalition of political parties.

Sec. 10. Revocation of Accreditation. - The accreditation of any

group, association or organization as Citizens' Army may be revoked
by the Commission after notice and hearing, whenever it shows or
acts with partiality in any political issue or to any political party,
organization or coalition of political parties, or has performed acts
in excess of its duties and functions as provided by law, or has
failed to comply with the conditions imposed upon it in the decision
granting accreditation.

Sec. 11. Expiration of Accreditation. - The accreditation shall

automatically lapse at the end of the election period of the political
exercise for which the petitioner was accredited as citizens' arm.