Limbona vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 186006. Oct. 16, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Norlanie Mitmug Limbona, her husband, and respondent Malik Bobby T. Alingan
were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte. After filing their certificate of candidacy,
respondent filed a petition to disqualify the husband of petitioner for non-
compliance with the one-year residence requirement.
Subsesuently, respondent also filed the same petition, this time against thepetitioner. Petitioner
filed for withdrawal of her candidacy which the COMELEC
granted. The COMELEC granted the disqualification of petitioners husband.
Petitioner filed a new certificate of
candidacy as substitute candidate for herhusband which was approved by the COMELEC. Resp
ondent yet again sought Petitioners disqualification. Petitioner claimed that she has been
staying, sleeping and doing business in her house !or more than 20 months in Lower -Alangaan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner satisfied the one-year residency requirement
HELD:
Petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency re$uirement. In order toacquire a domicile by
choice, there must be residence or bodily presence in the new locality, an intention to remain
there, and an intention to abandon the old domicile. A persons domicile once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to
excludea stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community
and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community. Petitioners
claim that she has been physically present and actually residing
in Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the elections, is self-serving and
unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the court finds no other act that would indicate petitioners
intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of certi!fcate of candidacy in
Pantar is not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new residence. In SPA No.
07-611, the commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said
municipality warranting her disqualfication as a candidate. The court noted the findings of the
COMELEC that petitioners domicile of origin is Maguing , Lanao del norte, which is also her
place of birth; and that her domi cle, by operation of law by virtue of marriage, is Rapasun,
Marawi City. The"COMELEC found that petitioners husband effected the change of his
domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11,2006. Since it is presumed
that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows that Petitioner
effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006.
Hence, failure to comply with the residency requirement, Petitioner is disquali!ied to run for the
office of mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte
MITRA VS COMELEC
Nature: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) canceled the certificate of
candidacy(COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly misrepresenting that he is a
resident of theMunicipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where he ran for the position of
Governor. Mitra came to thisCourt to seek the reversal of the cancellation.
Facts:-
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the
incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan.- This district then included, among
other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto PrincesaCity.-He was elected
Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented thelegislative district
for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.-On March 26, 2007 (or before the
end of Mitras second term as Representative), Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a
"highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of theProvince of Palawan.-The
direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa Cityresidents
from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.-

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied
for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica,
PuertoPrincesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of
Palawan. Hesubsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident
of Aborlan.- Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the
respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.

Issue: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.Held: YES. Mitra is
qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled thatMitra did
not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by
theConstitution.

RATIO:-
The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections
wasupheld in a vote of 11-3.- The respondents were not able to present a convincing case
sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the
validity of his representationon this point in his COC.-

Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that
Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."- Mitras
domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as Governor in light
of the relatively recent change of status of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a
highly urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for provincial officials he had to
abandon his domicile of origin and acquire a new one within the local government unit where he
intended to run; this would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile of
choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the following:
(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality, (2) on intention to remain there; and (3)
oon intention to abandon the old domicile.

Mitra, presented sworn statements of various persons (including the seller of the land he
purchased, the lessor of the Maligaya Feedmill, and the Punoing Barangay of the site of his
residence attesting to his physical residence in Abartan; photographs of the residential portion
of Maligaya Feedmill where he resides, and of his experimental pineapply plantation, farm,
farmhouse and cock farm; the lease contract over the Maligaya Feedmill and the deed of saleof
the lot where he has started constructing his house. He clarified, too, that he does no claim the
residence in Abartan at the the house under construction; his actual residence is the mezzanine
portion of Maligaya Feedmill building. Mitra has been proclaimed winner in the electoral
constest and has therefore the mandate of the electorate to serve.

MAQUILING VS COMELEC

Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republicof the
Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took hisOath of
Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate,
filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national
elections.Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte andthat he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as USA-American. The
COMELEC FirstDivision ruled that the petition for disqualification be granted because he is still
using his US passport after his renunciation of his US citizenship which negates his Affidavit of
Renunciation.Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc.
Petitioner Casa nMacode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan,
and who garneredthe second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the
case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an
Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for Reconsideration. The COMELEC En Banc granted
the Motion for Reconsideration of Arnado on the ground that the use of a US passport.
does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is
no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to
unrenounce what he has earlier on renounced. Maquiling files a petition before the Supreme
Court to assail the decision of the COMELEC En Banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects
ones qualifications to run for public office.

RULING: Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and
30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that
runcounter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign
passport,Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect
declaring beforeimmigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all
attendant rightsand privileges granted by the United States of America. The renunciation of
foreign citizenshipis not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be
violated the next day. Itrequires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship
and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted
the citizenship. Whilethe act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No.63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino
citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status
as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado
represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign
passport effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. The
citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not
just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which
violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public
office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 election.

LCP VS COMELEC

League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No.
176951, G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056; 24 August 2010

Facts: The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, it did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. Subsequently, the
12th Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 20 June 2001,
amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20million to P100million.
Thereafter, 16 municipalities filed their individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100million income requirement
of RA 9009. The cityhood bills were approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate,
and lapsed into law without the Presidents signature. Said Cityhood Laws directed the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in
each municipality approved of the conversion. Petitioners sought to declare the 16 Cityhood
Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal
protection clause, lamenting that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities would
reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). On 18 November
2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be in
violation of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no city shall be
created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. The
Supreme Court held that since respondent municipalities did not meet the P100million income
requirement under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, the
Cityhood Laws converting said municipalities into cities were unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court also declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be in violation of the equal protection clause since
there was no valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from
the P100million income requirement: (1) there was no substantial distinction between
municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted and
municipalities that did not have such pending bills; (2) the classification criterion mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress was not germane to the purpose of the law,
which was to prevent fiscally nonviable municipalities from converting into cities; (3) the
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limited the exemption to a specific condition
existing at the time of passage of RA 9009 a condition that would never happen again,
violating the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) limiting the exemption only to the 16 respondent municipalities violated the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated; municipalities with the
same income as the 16 respondent municipalities could not convert into cities. On 31 March
2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, also by a majority vote, denied the respondent
municipalities first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc,
by a split vote, denied the respondent municipalities second motion for reconsideration. The 18
November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries
of Judgments on 21 May 2009. However, on 21 December 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc
reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws.
The Court reasoned that: (1) When Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the
local government code, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let
alone the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. It would be noted that at the time of the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in
effect. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the
criteria only in the LGC, they would have referred to BP 337. Also, they would not have provided
for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Section 3, Article X of the
Constitution. Accordingly, the criteria for creation of cities need not be embodied in the LGC.
Congress can impose such criteria in a consolidated set of laws or a single-subject enactment
or through amendatory laws. The passage of amendatory laws, such as RA 9009, was no
different from the enactment of the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political
subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting laws,
effectively decreased the already codified indicators. (2) Deliberations on RA 9009, particularly
the floor exchange between Senators Aquilino Pimentel and Franklin Drilon, indicated the
following complementary legislative intentions: (a) the then pending cityhood bills would be
outside the pale of the proposed P100million minimum income requirement; and (b) RA 9009
would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the pending cityhood bills were concerned. That
said deliberations were undertaken in the 11th and/or 12th Congress (or before the cityhood
laws were passed during the 13th Congress) and Congress was not a continuing legislative
body, was immaterial. Debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken
in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa,
were part of its legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the
interpretation of the law. (3) Petitioners could not plausibly invoke the equal protection clause
because no deprivation of property resulted by the enactment of the Cityhood Laws. It was
presumptuous on the part of petitioner LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA,
as if it were their property, as the IRA was yet to be allocated. Furthermore, the equal protection
clause does not preclude reasonable classification which (a) rests on substantial distinctions; (b)
is germane to the purpose of the law; (c) is not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d)
applies equally to all members of the same class. All of these requisites had been met by the
subject Cityhood Laws: (a) Respondent municipalities were substantially different from other
municipalities desirous to be cities. They had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA
9009, and years before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondent municipalities
had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991. However,
due to extraneous circumstances (the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related
jueteng scandal investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the
aborted impeachment), the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. To
impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they had gone through would
appear to be unfair; (b) the exemption of respondent municipalities from the P100million income
requirement was meant to reduce the inequality, occasioned by the passage of the amendatory
RA 9009, between respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities whose cityhood
bills were enacted during the 11th Congress; and (c) the uniform exemption clause would apply
to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were
compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of
P20 million. (4) The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the Cityhood Laws in
the plebiscites held in the affected municipalities is now an operative fact. New cities appear to
have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees.
Pursuant to the operative fact doctrine, the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in question
should be upheld. Petitioners moved for reconsideration (ad cautelam) and for the annulment of
21 December 2009 Decision. Some petitioners-in-intervention also moved for reconsideration
(ad cautelam).

Issues: Whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws violated Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution and the equal protection clause.

Held: The 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. (1) Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is
clear the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria
necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city.
Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of
the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units follows the same
uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. From the
moment RA 9009 took effect (on 30 June 2001), the LGC required that any municipality desiring
to become a city must satisfy the P100million income requirement. Section 450 of the LGC, as
amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement, even for
municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress when RA 9009 was passed. The uniform
exemption clause in the Cityhood Laws, therefore, violated Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and
not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local
Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Since the law is
clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the
increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover,
where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one. (2) Under the
operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the
law is unconstitutional. Respondent municipalities theory that the implementation of the
Cityhood Laws, which resulted in 16 municipalities functioning as new cities with new sets of
officials and employees, operated to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws, was a
misapplication of the operative fact doctrine and would set a gravely dangerous precedent. This
view would open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad
rush for their immediate implementation before the Court could declare them unconstitutional.
The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under
the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of
the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a
matter of equity and fair play. Accordingly, the 16 Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional
because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the
implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the
payment of salaries and supplies by the new cities or their issuance of licenses or execution of
contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective, as a matter of equity and fair play, to
innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
Courts declaration of their unconstitutionality. (3) There is no substantial distinction between
municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not
have pending bills. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or
determine the level of income of a municipality. In short, the classification criterion mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the
law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Moreover,
the pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress, as a criterion, limits the exemption to a
specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never
happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to
existing conditions only. Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities
violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated; municipalities
with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the
16 respondent municipalities can. * Re: the split or tie-vote on the second motion for
reconsideration of the 18 November 2008 Decision. The dissenting opinion stated that a
deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does not constitute a rule with
precedential value. However, Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides that when, in
appealed cases, the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority
cannot be had, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed and on all incidental
matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the
second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for
reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18
November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or directive. The tie-vote
plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and
31 March 2009 Resolution denying reconsideration, and thus the second motion for
reconsideration must be denied. Hence, the 18 November 2008 judgment and the 31 March
2009 resolution stand in full force. These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can only be
overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior
affirmative action. The 18 November 2008 Decision, declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional, was reinstated.

APRIL 12 2011 RULING

YES, the 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional.

ARNAULT VS NAZARENO

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation

This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be
examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a
lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During
the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the
same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a
resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.
Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus

ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a
congressional hearing in aid of legislation.

HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to
conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses
to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing
said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness right to due
process of law.
Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591which
creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A.violates the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in acity. Before the May
1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congressthrough 4 legislative districts.
Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162(later converted to House Bill 3693) and
Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a populationof 223, 069 in 2007.House Bill 3693 cites the
undated Certification, as requested to be issued to MayorDomingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by
Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030
by the year 2010.Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative district for the City ofMalolos,
Bulacan is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos hasat least 250,000
actual or projected.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for being
violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of theOrdinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the1987 Constitution, a
city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this,Regional Director Miranda
issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without
legal effect because the Regional Director has no basisand no authority to issue the
Certification based on the following statements supported bySection 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by
President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:The certification on demographic projection can be
issued only if such are declaredofficial by the Natl Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it
was not stated whetherthe document have been declared official by the NSCB.The certification
can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designatedcertifying officer, in which case,
the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO isunauthorized.The population projection must be
as of the middle of the year, which in this case, theCertification issued by Director Miranda was
undated.It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if
compounded,the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333
as ofAugust 1, 2010.

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim oflegislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.
NAVARRO VS ERMITA
FACTS: Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly
part of Surigao DelNorte. It was questioned for constitutionality
for not being in compliance with the population or theland area requirements
of the Local Government Code under Sec. 461. Previous decisionsrelating to this
case declared the creation of the province as unconstitutional.
Issue:
Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional?
Held:
YES. SC now looked at the central policy considerations
in the creation of provinces. Theycompared the LGC provisions on the creation of municipalities
and cities and how they allow anexception to the land area requirement in cases of non-
contiguity as provided for under Sections442 and
450 of the LGC.SC concluded that it must have been the intent of the legislators to
extend such exception to provinces especially considering the
physical conguration of thePhilippine archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was
absent under Section 461 of the LGC(provision relating to creation of provinces), such was
incorporated under the LGC
IRR thuscorrecting the congressional oversight in said provision and reecting the true legislativ
e intent.Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very
restrictive construction which could trench on theequal protection clause, as it actually defeats
the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization nas enshrined in the
Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with
territorial contiguity.