HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO and MARIA ROTEA, namely:

ESPERANZA R. EDJEC, BERNARDA R. SUELA, RUBY C.

ROTEA, BERNARDA R. ROTEA, ELIA R. VDA. DE LIMBAGA,
VIRGINIA R. ARBON, ROSALINDA R. ARQUISOLA,
CORAZON ROTEA, FE R. EBORA, CARIDAD ROTEA,
ANGELES VDA. DE RENACIA, JORGE ROTEA, MARIA
LUISA ROTEA-VILLEGAS, ALFREDO R. ROTEA,
represented by his heirs LIZBETH ROTEA and ELEPETH
ROTEA; LUIS ROTEA, represented by his heir JENNIFER
ROTEA; and ROLANDO R. ROTEA, represented by his heir
ROLANDO R. ROTEA JR., petitioners, vs. MACTAN - CEBU
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, respondent.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

THE HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO AND MARIA ROTEA,

petitioners herein, are the successors-in-interest of the former registered
owners of two (2) parcels of land situated in Lahug, Cebu City,
designated as Lot No. 916 with an area of 2,355 square meters under
TCT No. RT-7543 (106) T-13694, and Lot No. 920 consisting of 3,097
square meters under TCT No. RT-7544 (107) T-13695. [1]

In 1949 the National Airport Corporation as the predecessor agency

of respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA)
wanted to acquire Lots Nos. 916 and 920 above described among other
parcels of land for the proposed expansion of Lahug Airport. To entice
[2]

the landowners to cede their properties, the government assured them

that they could repurchase their lands once Lahug Airport was closed or
its operations transferred to Mactan Airport. Some of the landowners
[3]

executed deeds of sale with right of repurchase in favor of the

government but many others, including the owners of Lots Nos. 916 and
920 herein mentioned, refused the offer because the payment was
perceived to be way below the market price. [4]

On 16 April 1952, as the negotiations for the purchase of the lots

necessary for the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport
irredeemably broke down, the Civil Aeronautics Administration as the
successor agency of the National Airport Corporation filed a complaint
with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, for the expropriation of Lots Nos.
916 and 920 and other subject realties, docketed as Civil Case No.
R-1881.
On 29 December 1961 the trial court promulgated its Decision in
Civil Case No. R-1881 condemning Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and other
lots for public use upon payment of just compensation. Petitioners
[5]

predecessors were paid P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for
Lot No. 920 with consequential damages by way of legal interest
from 16 November 1947.No appeal was taken from the Decision on Lots
Nos. 916 and 920, and the judgment of condemnation became final
and executory. Thereafter, the certificates of title for these parcels of
[6]
land were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under
TCT No. 58691 for Lot No. 916 and TCT No. 58692 for Lot No. 920,
which under RA 6958 (1990) were subsequently transferred in favor of
respondent MCIAA. [7]

At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of Lots Nos. 916 and
920 to MCIAA, Lahug Airport ceased operations as
the Mactan Airport was opened for incoming and outgoing flights. Lots
[8]

Nos. 916 and 920 which had been expropriated for the extension
of Lahug Airport were not utilized. In fact, no
[9]
expansion
of Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its
predecessors-in-interest. Hence, petitioners wrote then President Fidel
[10]

V. Ramos and the airport manager begging them for the exercise of their
alleged right to repurchase Lots Nos. 916 and 920. Their pleas were
[11]

not heeded. [12]

On 11 March 1997 petitioners filed a complaint

for reconveyance and damages with RTC of Cebu City against
respondent MCIAA to compel the repurchase of Lots Nos. 916 and 920,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-20015. In the main, petitioners averred
that they had been convinced by the officers of the predecessor agency
of respondent MCIAA not to oppose the expropriation proceedings since
in the future they could repurchase the properties if the airport
expansion would not push through. MCIAA did not object to petitioners
evidence establishing these allegations.
When the civil case was pending, one Richard E. Enchuan filed
a Motion for Transfer of Interest alleging that he acquired through deeds
of assignment the rights of some of herein petitioners over Lots Nos.
916 and 920. The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
[13]

also sought to intervene in the civil case claiming that it leased in good
faith Lot No. 920 from the predecessor agencies of respondent MCIAA
and that it built thereon its Regional Equipment Services and its Region
7 Office.
[14]

On 12 April 1999 the trial court found merit in the claims of

petitioners and granted them the right to repurchase the properties at
the amount pegged as just compensation in Civil Case No. R-1881 but
subject to the alleged property rights of Richard E. Enchuan and the
leasehold of DPWH. The trial court opined that the expropriation
[15]

became illegal or functus officio when the purpose for which it was
intended was no longer there. [16]

Respondent MCIAA appealed the Decision of the trial court to the

Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64456.
On 20 December 2001 the Court of Appeals reversed the
assailed Decision on the ground that the judgment of condemnation in
Civil Case No. R-1881 was unconditional so that the rights
gained therefrom by respondent MCIAA were indicative of ownership in
fee simple. The [17]
appellate court
cited Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan which held
[18]
that mere
deviation from the public purpose for which the power of eminent
domain was exercised does not justify the reversion of the property to its
former owners, and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court
of Appeals which is allegedly stare decisis to the instant case to
[19]

prevent the exercise of the right of repurchase as the former dealt with a
parcel of land similarly expropriated under Civil Case No. R-1881. [20]

On 28 November 2002 reconsideration of the Decision was

denied. Hence, this petition for review.
[21]

Petitioners argue that Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan does not

apply to the case at bar since what was involved therein was the right of
reversion and not the right of repurchase which they are invoking. They
also differentiate Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of
Appeals from the instant case in that the landowners in the MCIAA
[22]

case offered inadmissible evidence to show their entitlement to a right of

repurchase, while petitioners herein offered evidence based on personal
knowledge for which reason MCIAA did not object and thus waived
whatever objection it might have had to the admissibility thereof. Finally,
petitioners allege that their right to equal protection of the laws would be
infringed if some landowners are given the right to repurchase their
former properties even as they are denied the exercise of such
prerogative.
On the other hand, respondent MCIAA clings to our decisions
in Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan and Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals. According to respondent MCIAA
there is only one instance when expropriated land may be repurchased
by its previous owners, and that is, if the decision of expropriation itself
provides [the] condition for such repurchase. Respondent asserts that
the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 is absolute and without conditions,
thus, no repurchase could be validly exercised.
This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin
with, there exists an undeniable historical narrative that the
predecessors of respondent MCIAA had suggested to the landowners of
the properties covered by the Lahug Airport expansion scheme that they
could repurchase their properties at the termination of the airports
venture. Some acted on this assurance and sold their
[23]

properties; other landowners held out and waited for the exercise of
[24]

eminent domain to take its course until finally coming to terms with
respondents predecessors that they would not appeal nor block further
the judgment of condemnation if the same right of repurchase was
extended to them. A handful failed to prove that they acted on such
[25]

assurance when they parted with the ownership of their lands. [26]

In resolving this dispute, we must reckon with the rulings of this

Court
in Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan and Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, which define the rights and
obligations of landowners whose properties were expropriated when the
public purpose for which eminent domain was exercised no longer
subsists. In Fery, which was cited in the recent case of Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, we declared that the government acquires only such rights in
[27]
expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its
title over the properties -

If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that

when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former
owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the
former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If x x x land is
expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition
that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city
abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there
is some statutory provision to the contrary x x x x If, upon the contrary,
however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then,
of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether
it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does
not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation
proceedings x x x x When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the
former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be
abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner
xxxx [28]

In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority,

respondent Chiongbian sought to enforce an alleged right of repurchase
over her properties that had been expropriated in Civil Case No.
R-1881. This Court did not allow her to adduce evidence of her claim, for
to do so would unsettle as to her properties the judgment of
condemnation in the eminent domain proceedings. We also held therein
that Chiongbians evidence was both inadmissible and lacking in
probative value -

The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No.
941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition
imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that
CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it
was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other
than as the Lahug Airport.CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling
in Mactan-Cebu International Airport vs. Court of Appeals wherein the
presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a written
agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve
expropriation proceedings but a contract of sale x x x x To permit
CHIONGBIAN to prove the existence of a compromise settlement which she
claims to have entered into with the Republic of the Philippines prior to the
rendition of judgment in the expropriation case would result in a modification
of the judgment of a court which has long become final
and executory x x x x And even assuming for the sake of argument that
CHIONGBIAN could prove the existence of the alleged written agreement
acknowledging her right to repurchase Lot No. 941 through parol evidence, the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence presented by
CHIONGBIAN was admissible x x x x Aside from being inadmissible under
the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, [the] testimonies are also inadmissible
for being hearsay in nature x x x x[29]

We adhere to the principles enunciated in Fery and

in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, and do not overrule
them. Nonetheless the weight of their import, particularly our ruling as
regards the properties of
respondent Chiongbian in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority,
must be commensurate to the facts that were established therein as
distinguished from those extant in the case at bar. Chiongbian put forth
inadmissible and inconclusive evidence, while in the instant case we
have preponderant proof as found by the trial court of the existence of
the right of repurchase in favor of petitioners.
Moreover, respondent MCIAA has brought to our attention a
significant and telling portion in the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881
validating our discernment that the expropriation by the predecessors of
respondent was ordered under the running impression
that Lahug Airport would continue in operation -

As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be

doubted. Although Mactan Airport is being constructed, it does not take away
the actual usefulness and importance of the LahugAirport: it is handling the air
traffic both civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly
to Mindanao and Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the North
and Manila. Then, no evidence was adduced to show how soon is
the Mactan Airport to be placed in operation and whether
the Lahug Airport will be closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the
other departments of the Government to determine said matters. The Court
cannot substitute its judgment for those of the said departments or agencies. In
the absence of such showing, the Court will presume that
the Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation (emphasis supplied). [30]

While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply
acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the exercise of
eminent domain regardless of the survival of LahugAirport, the trial court
in its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public
purpose upon its understanding that Lahug Airport will continue to be in
operation. Verily, these meaningful statements in the body of
the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties
would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no
longer in operation. This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after
the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated
lots were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights
vis--vis the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between the State
and their former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted;
and, (b) the foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of
the Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic part of
the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since
the dispositive portion is not in accord with the findings as contained in
the body thereof. [31]
 Significantly, in light of the discussion above, the admission of
petitioners during the pre-trial of Civil Case No. CEB-20015
for reconveyance and damages that respondent MCIAA was the
absolute owner of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 does not prejudice petitioners
interests. This is as it should be not only because the admission
concerns a legal conclusion fiercely debated by the parties but more so
[32]

since respondent was truly the absolute owner of the realties until it was
apparent that Lahug Airport had stopped doing business.
To sum up what we have said so far, the attendance in the case at
bar of standing admissible evidence validating the claim of petitioners as
well as the portions above-quoted of the Decision in the expropriation
case volunteered no less than by respondent itself, takes this case away
from the ambit of Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of
Appeals but within the principles enunciated in Fery as mentioned
[33]

earlier. In addition, there should be no doubt that our present reading of

the fallo of the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 so as to include the
statements in the body thereof afore-quoted is sanctioned by the rule
that a final and executory judgment may nonetheless be clarified by
reference to other portions of the decision of which it forms a
part. In Republic v. De Los Angeles we ruled -
[34]

This Court has promulgated many cases x x x wherein it was held that a
judgment must not be read separately but in connection with the other portions
of the decision of which it forms a part. Hence x x x the decision of the court
below should be taken as a whole and considered in its entirety to get the true
meaning and intent of any particular portion thereof x x x x Neither is this
Court inclined to confine itself to a reading of the said fallo literally. On the
contrary, the judgment portion of a decision should be interpreted and
construed in harmony with the ratio decidendi thereof x x x x As stated in the
case of Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans Board, et al., supra, to get the true
intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted
to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling
may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in
the fallo thereof x x x x The foregoing pronouncements find support in the case
of Locsin, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 63 Phil., 87, 91-92, wherein this Court
allowed a judgment that had become final and executory to be clarified by
supplying a word which had been inadvertently omitted and which, when
supplied, in effect changed the literal import of the original phraseology
x x x x This is so because, in the first place, if an already final judgment can
still be amended to supply an omission committed through oversight, this
simply means that in the construction or interpretation of an already final
decision, the fallo or dispositive portion thereof must be correlated with the
body of such final decision x x x x [I]f an amendment may be allowed after a
decision has already become final x x x such amendment may consist
x x x either in the x x x interpretation of an ambiguous phrase therein in
relation to the body of the decision which gives it life.
[35]

We now resolve to harmonize the respective rights of the State and

petitioners to the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920.
 Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is correct in stating
[36]

that one would not find an express statement in the Decision in Civil
Case No. R-1881 to the effect that the [condemned] lot would return to
[the landowner] or that [the landowner] had a right to repurchase the
same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or
abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as
the Lahug Airport. This omission notwithstanding, and while the
inclusion of this pronouncement in the judgment of condemnation would
have been ideal, such precision is not absolutely necessary nor is it fatal
to the cause of petitioners herein. No doubt, the return or repurchase of
the condemned properties of petitioners could be readily justified as the
manifest legal effect or consequence of the trial courts underlying
presumption that Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation when it
granted the complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued
its activities.
The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that
is akin to the implied trust referred to in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, If
[37]

an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the

performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust
by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered
by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand
the reconveyance of the property to him. In the case at bar, petitioners
conveyed Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to the government with the latter
obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport;
failing to keep its bargain, the government can be compelled by
petitioners to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise,
petitioners would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of
affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation
was authorized.
Although the symmetry between the instant case and the situation
contemplated by Art. 1454 is not perfect, the provision is undoubtedly
applicable. For, as explained by an expert on the law of trusts: The only
problem of great importance in the field of constructive trusts is to decide
whether in the numerous and varying fact situations presented to the
courts there is a wrongful holding of property and hence a threatened
unjust enrichment of the defendant. Constructive trusts are fictions of
[38]

equity which are bound by no unyielding formula when they are used by
courts as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of the legal
title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest. [39]

In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in

which the trustees sole duty is to transfer the title and possession over
the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary. Of course, the wronged party
[40]

seeking the aid of a court of equity in establishing a constructive trust

must himself do equity. Accordingly, the court will exercise its
[41]

discretion in deciding what acts are required of the plaintiff-beneficiary

as conditions precedent to obtaining such decree and has the obligation
to reimburse the trustee the consideration received from the latter just
as the plaintiff-beneficiary would if he proceeded on the theory of
rescission. In the good judgment of the court, the trustee may also be
[42]
paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in sustaining the
property, his fixed costs for improvements thereon, and the monetary
value of his services in managing the property to the extent that
plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit from his acts. [43]

The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the
beneficiary, in this case, respondent MCIAA and petitioners over Lots
Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil Code, When the
conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to
give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to
each other what they have received x x x x In case of the loss,
deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with
respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be
applied to the party who is bound to return x x x x
Hence, respondent MCIAA as representative of the State is obliged
to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to petitioners who shall hold the
same subject to existing liens thereon, i.e., leasehold right of DPWH. In
return, petitioners as if they were plaintiff-beneficiaries of a constructive
trust must restore to respondent MCIAA what they received as just
compensation for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 in Civil
Case No. R-1881, i.e., P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot
No. 920 with consequential damages by way of legal interest from 16
November 1947. Petitioners must likewise pay respondent MCIAA the
necessary expenses it may have incurred in sustaining the properties
and the monetary value of its services in managing them to the extent
that petitioners will be benefited thereby. The government however may
keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of
land, in the same way that petitioners need not account for the interests
that the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned
in the meantime. As a matter of justice and convenience, the law
considers the fruits and interests as the equivalent of each other. [44]

Under Art. 1189 of the Civil Code, If the thing is improved by its
nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the
creditor x x x, the creditor being the person who stands to receive
something as a result of the process of restitution. Consequently,
petitioners as creditors do not have to settle as part of the process of
restitution the appreciation in value of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 which is
the natural consequence of nature and time.
Petitioners need not also pay for improvements introduced by third
parties, i.e., DPWH, as the disposition of these properties is governed
by existing contracts and relevant provisions of law. As for the
improvements that respondent MCIAA may have made on Lots Nos.
916 and 920, if any, petitioners must pay respondent their prevailing free
market price in case petitioners opt to buy them and respondent decides
to sell. In other words, if petitioners do not want to appropriate such
improvements or respondent does not choose to sell them, the
improvements would have to be removed without any obligation on the
part of petitioners to pay any compensation to respondent MCIAA for
whatever it may have tangibly introduced therein. [45]
 The medium of compensation for the restitution shall be ready
money or cash payable within a period of three hundred sixty five (365)
days from the date that the amount to be returned by petitioners is
determined with finality, unless the parties herein stipulate and agree
upon a different scheme, medium or schedule of payment. If after the
period of three hundred sixty five (365) days or the lapse of the
compromise scheme or schedule of payment such amount owed is not
settled, the right of repurchase of petitioners and the obligation of
respondent MCIAA to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and/or the latters
improvements as set forth herein shall be deemed forfeited and the
ownership of those parcels of land shall vest absolutely upon
respondent MCIAA.
Finally, we delete the award of P60,000.00 for attorneys fees
and P15,000.00 for litigation expenses in favor of petitioners as decreed
in the assailed Decision of 12 April 1999 of the trial court. It is not sound
public policy to set a premium upon the right to litigate where such right
is exercised in good faith, as in the present case, albeit the decision to
resist the claim is erroneous. [46]

The rule on awards of attorneys fees and litigation expenses is found

in Art. 2208 of the Civil Code -

In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other

than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interests;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the

plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff's valid and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and
skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's

liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

As noted in Mirasol v. De la Cruz, Art. 2208 intends to retain the award

[47]

of attorneys fees as the exception in our law and the general rule
remains that attorneys fees are not recoverable in the absence of a
stipulation thereto.
In the case at bar, considering the established absence of any
stipulation regarding attorneys fees, the trial court cannot base its award
on any of the exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208. The records of the
instant case do not disclose any proof presented by petitioners to
substantiate that the actuations of respondent MCIAA were clearly
unfounded or purely for the purpose of harassment; neither does the
trial court make any finding to that effect in its appealed Decision.
While Art. 2208, par. (4), allows attorneys fees in cases of clearly
unfounded civil actions, this exception must be understood to mean
those where the defenses are so untenable as to amount to gross and
evident bad faith. Evidence must be presented to the court as to the
facts and circumstances constituting the alleged bad faith, otherwise,
the award of attorneys fees is not justified where there is no proof other
than the bare statement of harassment that a party to be so adjudged
had acted in bad faith. The exercise of judicial discretion in the award of
attorneys fees under Art. 2208, par. (11), demands a factual, legal or
equitable justification that would bring the case within the exception and
justify the grant of such award.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for
Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 64456 dated 20 December 2001 and its Resolution of 28
November 2002 denying reconsideration of
the Decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of RTC-Br. 19 of Cebu City dated 12 April 1999 in Civil
Case No. CEB-20015 is MODIFIED IN PART by -
(a) ORDERING respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA) TO RECONVEY to petitioner Heirs
of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea, namely: Esperanza
R. Edjec, Bernarda R. Suela, Ruby
C. Rotea, Bernarda R. Rotea, Elia R. Vda De Limbaga, Virginia
R. Arbon, Rosalinda R. Arquisola, Corazon Rotea, Fe
R. Ebora, Caridad Rotea, Angeles Vda. De Renacia, Jorge Rotea,
Maria Luisa Rotea-Villegas, Alfredo R. Rotea, represented by his heirs,
namely: Lizbeth Rotea and Elepeth Rotea; Luis Rotea, represented by
his heir Jennifer Rotea; and Rolando R. Rotea, represented by his heir
Rolando R. Rotea Jr., Lot No. 916 with an area of 2,355 square meters
and Lot No. 920 consisting of 3,097 square meters in Lahug, Cebu City,
with all the improvements thereon evolving through nature or time, but
excluding those that were introduced by third parties, i.e., DPWH, which
shall be governed by existing contracts and relevant provisions of law;
(b) ORDERING petitioner Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and
Maria Rotea TO PAY respondent MCIAA what the former received as
just compensation for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 in Civil
Case No. R-1881, i.e., P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot
No. 920 with consequential damages by way of legal interest from 16
November 1947. Petitioners must likewise PAY respondent MCIAA the
necessary expenses that the latter may have incurred in sustaining the
properties and the monetary value of its services in managing the
properties to the extent that petitioners will secure a benefit from such
acts. Respondent MCIAA however may keep whatever income or fruits
it may have obtained from the parcels of land, in the same way that
petitioners need not account for the interests that the amounts they
received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime;
(c) ORDERING respondent MCIAA TO CONVEY to petitioners the
improvements it may have built on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, if any, in
which case petitioners SHALL PAY for these improvements at the
prevailing free market price, otherwise, if petitioners do not want to
appropriate such improvements, or if respondent does not choose to sell
them, respondent MCIAA SHALL REMOVE these
improvements WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION on the part of petitioners
to pay any compensation to respondent MCIAA for them;
(d) ORDERING petitioners TO PAY the amount so determined
under letter (b) of this dispositive portion as consideration for
the reconveyance of Lots Nos. 916 and 920, as well as the prevailing
free market price of the improvements built thereon by respondent
MCIAA, if any and desired to be bought and sold by the parties, in ready
money or cash PAYABLE within a period of three hundred sixty five
(365) days from the date that the amount under letter (b) above is
determined with finality, unless the parties herein stipulate a different
scheme or schedule of payment, otherwise, after the period of three
hundred sixty five (365) days or the lapse of the compromise scheme or
schedule of payment and the amount so payable is not settled, the right
of repurchase of petitioners and the obligation of respondent MCIAA to
so reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and/or the improvements shall
be DEEMED FORFEITED and the ownership of those parcels of land
shall VEST ABSOLUTELY upon respondent MCIAA;
(e) REMANDING the instant case to RTC-Br. 19 of Cebu City for
purposes of determining the amount of compensation for Lots Nos. 916
and 920 to be paid by petitioners as mandated in letter (b) hereof, and
the value of the prevailing free market price of the improvements built
thereon by respondent MCIAA, if any and desired to be bought and sold
by the parties, and in general, securing the immediate execution of
this Decision under the premises;
(f) ORDERING petitioners to respect the right of the Department of
Public Works and Highways to its lease contract until the expiration of
the lease period; and
(g) DELETING the award of P60,000.00 for attorneys fees
and P15,000.00 for litigation expenses against respondent MCIAA and
in favor of petitioners.
 This Decision is without prejudice to the claim of intervenor one
Richard E. Enchuan on his allegation that he acquired through deeds of
assignment the rights of some of herein petitioners over Lots Nos. 916
and 920.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.