China Vs Vietnam An Analyysis of The Competing Claims in The SCS

A CNA Occasional Paper
China versus Vietnam:

An Analysis of the Competing Claims
in the South China Sea
Raul (Pete) Pedrozo
With a Foreword by CNA Senior Fellow Michael McDevitt
August 2014
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FOREWORD
Thislegalanalysiswascommissionedaspartofaprojectentitled,U.S.policyoptionsin
the South China Sea. The objective in asking experienced U.S international lawyers, such as
CaptainRaulPetePedrozo,USN,JudgeAdvocateCorps(ret.),1theauthorofthisanalysis,isto
provide U.S. policy makers access to work that tests the various legal arguments that the
respective claimants make in support of their claims, and weigh them against the relatively
limitedbodyofinternationalcaselawassociatedwithmaritimedisputesofthissort.

Importantly,thisanalysisofVietnameseclaimsversusChineseclaimstotheParaceland
SpratlyarchipelagoeswasnotundertakenasapreludetoarecommendationthattheUnited
States depart from its long held position of not taking a position on competing sovereignty
claimsintheSouthChinaSea.Thatisnottheintent,norisitoneoftherecommendationsof
theproject.

CaptainPedrozosfindingsaresummarizedbelow:
Based on the arguments and evidence submitted by the claimants and general
principles of international law related to the acquisition of territory, it would appear
thatVietnamclearlyhasasuperiorclaimtotheSouthChinaSeaislands.

VietnamstitletotheParacelsiswellfoundedinbothhistoryandlaw.Beginninginthe
early18thcentury,Vietnamdemonstratedaclearintenttoassertsovereigntyoverthe
islandsthroughtheestablishmentofagovernmentsponsoredcompanytoexploitand
managetheresourcesofthearchipelago.Thatintentwasconfirmedbytheannexation
of the islands and symbolic acts of sovereignty in the early 19th century, followed by
peaceful,effective,andcontinuousadministrationoftheislandsbysuccessiveNguyen
dynastiesuntiltheadventoftheFrenchcolonialperiod.Francecontinuedtoeffectively
administertheislandsonbehalfofVietnamandphysicallytookpossessionandoccupied
the Paracels in the 1930s. Thereafter, France continued to assert its sovereignty over
the Paracels until its departure from Indochina in 1956. Following the French
withdrawal, South Vietnam (and subsequently a united Vietnam) effectively
administered the islands and never ceased to assert Vietnamese sovereignty over the
archipelago,evenafterChinaillegallyoccupiedaportionoftheislandsin1956andthe
entirearchipelagoin1974.

Ontheotherhand,thefirstdemonstrationofChinesesovereigntyovertheParacelsdid
notoccuruntil1909,twocenturiesafterVietnamhadlegallyandeffectivelyestablished
1
CaptainRaul(Pete)Pedrozo,U.S.Navy(Ret.).FormerProfessorofInternationalLaw,U.S.NavalWarCollege;Staff
JudgeAdvocate,U.S.PacificCommand;andSpecialAssistanttotheUnderSecretaryofDefenseforPolicy.The
viewsexpressedinthispaperdonotreflecttheviewsoftheU.S.government,theU.S.DepartmentofDefense,or
theU.S.Navy.
itstitletotheislands.Moreover,ChinasillegaloccupationofWoodyIslandin1956,and
itsoccupationoftheentirearchipelagobyforcein1974,clearlyviolateArticle2(4)of
theUNCharterandaccordinglydonotconferaclearlegaltitletotheParacels.

WithregardtotheSpratlys,Franceannexedtheislandsasterranulliusinthe1930sat
the time, occupation by force was a valid method of acquiring sovereignty over
territory.GreatBritain,whichhadcontrolledsomeoftheSpratlyIslandsinthe1800s,
abandoned its claims following the French annexation and effective occupation, so
French title to the Spratlys was legally and soundly established. Frances title to the
archipelago was ceded to South Vietnam in the 1950s and the South Vietnamese
government(andsubsequentlyaunitedVietnam)effectivelyandpeacefullycontrolled
the islands until ROC forces illegally occupied Itu Aba Island in 1956 and PRC forces
illegallyoccupiedanumberofisletsinthearchipelagoin1988.

TheROCsoccupationofItuAbaIslandin1946and1956,andthePRCsinvasionofthe
Spratlysin1988,violateArticle2(4)oftheUNCharterandcannotconfercleartitleto
the Spratlys to either Taiwan or China. The fact that China may have challenged
Vietnamese sovereignty over the Spratlys between 1951 and 1988, rights that were
legallycededbyFrancetoVietnam,doesnotinandofitselfcreateacleartitleforChina.
The Pedrozo analysis differs in part from two other third party analyses, one by Dr.
MarwynS.Samuels,anAmericanscholar,whowrotethefirstdetailedstudyontheoriginsof
the disputes among China, Vietnam and in the Philippines. A meticulous scholar who used
VietnamandChinesesources,hisContestfortheSouthChina,holdsupverywellsome40years
later.2SamuelsconcludedthatChinahadthebetterclaimtotheParacels,butthatChinasclaim
totheSpratlyswashighlyquestionable.3HisjudgmentswerepartiallyechoedbyAustralian
scholar Dr. Greg Austin, who has legal training. In his wellregarded Chinas Ocean Frontier,
publishedin1998.4AustinfoundthatChinahadsuperiorrightsintheParacels,butthelegal
complexityofthedisputedSpratlyclaimsmeantthat,PRCclaimstotheentireSpratlygroup
areatleastequaltoanyother.5

Pedrozos findings are supported by Professor Monique ChemillierGendreau in her
work,SovereigntyovertheParacelandSpratlyIslands.ProfessorChemllierGendreauisalegal
scholarandProfessorEmeritusatParisUniversityDiderot.6

Inreviewingalloftheseworks,itiscleartomethatintheunlikelyeventtheseclaims
areevertakentotheInternationalCourtofJusticetoresolvethedisputesoversovereigntythe
2
MarwynS.Samuels,ContestfortheSouthChinaSea,MethuenNewYork,1982.
3
Ibid,p.68.
4
GregAustin,ChinasOceanFrontier:InternationalLaw,MilitaryForce,andNationalDevelopment,Allenand
Unwin,NSW,Australia,1998.
5
Ibid,p.161.
6
MoniqueChemilleirGendreau,SovereigntyovertheParacelandSpratlyIslands,Springer(Englishtranslation),
2000.
ii
processwillbelonganddifficult.Noneoftheclaimantshaswhatmightbecalledanopenand
shutlegalcasealthoughtheconsensusamongscholarsseemstobethatChinasclaimsinthe
SpratlysareweakerthanthosetotheParacels.

The reality on the ground is that China has occupied the entire Paracel group for 40
years, and short of military action by Vietnam to recapture the archipelago, will never leave.
The issue is more complicated in the Spratlys. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the
Philippines all permanently occupy features in the Spratly group. Resolution of the dispute is
likelyinonlyfourways:judicialarbitrationthatallpartiesagreetoundertake;allpartiesagree
to freeze in place while tabling the issue of ultimate sovereignty in favor of a cooperative
regimeforresourceexploitationandmanagement;individualclaimantsreachanunderstanding
withChinacedingsovereigntyclaimsinreturnforeconomicpreference;ortheuseofforceby
themostpowerfultoexpelrivalclaimants.
MichaelMcDevitt
SeniorFellowandProjectDirector
iii
Thispageintentionallyleftblank
iv
TableofContents
I.INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................1

II.ACQUISITIONOFTERRITORY...................................................................................................................3

III.CHINA....................................................................................................................................................5

A.ChineseClaims.............................................................................................................................5
1.HistoricalEvidence............................................................................................................................5
2.EconomicDevelopment....................................................................................................................8
3.EffectiveAdministration.................................................................................................................12
a.NavalPatrols................................................................................................................................12
b.AdministrativeControl.................................................................................................................14
c.PersistentObjector.......................................................................................................................19
d.ReaffirmingSovereignty...............................................................................................................23
e.MilitaryIntervention.....................................................................................................................24
4.InternationalRecognition...............................................................................................................25
a.TheSinoFrenchTreatyof1887....................................................................................................25
b.FrenchRecognitionbeforeWorldWarII......................................................................................26
c.FrenchRecognitionafterWorldWarII.........................................................................................28
d.JapaneseRecognition...................................................................................................................29
e.WorldWarIIDocuments..............................................................................................................30
f.PostWarOccupation....................................................................................................................30
g.SanFranciscoPeaceConference..................................................................................................31
h.InternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO)Conference.......................................................33
i.NorthVietnameseIndifference......................................................................................................34
j.OtherSupportingPublications.......................................................................................................35
IV.VIETNAM.............................................................................................................................................37

A.VietnamClaims..........................................................................................................................37
1.HistoricalEvidence..........................................................................................................................37
2.EconomicDevelopment..................................................................................................................40
3.EffectiveAdministration.................................................................................................................43
a.FrenchColonialRule.....................................................................................................................45
b.ReturntoSouthVietnameseControl............................................................................................53
c.PostunificationAdministration....................................................................................................58
4.RightofCession...............................................................................................................................61
V.CONCLUDINGANALYSIS........................................................................................................................64

A.EvaluationofChinasPosition....................................................................................................64
1.DiscoveryversusAwareness...........................................................................................................64
2.ProbativeValueofHistoricMaps....................................................................................................67
3.InchoateTitleandEffectiveOccupation.........................................................................................69
a.RemoteandUninhabitedTerritories............................................................................................76
b.SuzerainandVassal......................................................................................................................79
4.PersistentObjector.........................................................................................................................80
a.TheSinoFrenchTreatyof1887....................................................................................................85
b.FrenchRecognitionbeforeWorldWarII......................................................................................87
c.FrenchRecognitionafterWorldWarII.........................................................................................93
d.JapaneseRecognition...................................................................................................................94
e.WorldWarIIDocuments..............................................................................................................96
f.PostWarOccupation....................................................................................................................98
g.SanFranciscoPeaceConference..................................................................................................99
h.InternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO)Conference.....................................................104
i.NorthVietnameseIndifference....................................................................................................104
j.OtherSupportingPublications.....................................................................................................108
B.EvaluatingVietnamsPosition..................................................................................................108
1.HistoricalEvidenceandMaps.......................................................................................................109
2.EconomicDevelopment................................................................................................................111
3.EffectiveOccupationandAdministration.....................................................................................112
a.EffectiveAdministrationDuringtheFrenchColonialPeriod......................................................113
b.EffectiveAdministrationbySouthVietnam...............................................................................119
c.PostunificationAdministration..................................................................................................122
4.RightofCession.............................................................................................................................124
5.InternationalRecognition.............................................................................................................128
C.FinalThoughts..........................................................................................................................130
vi
I. INTRODUCTION*
The South China Sea stretches from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca in the
southwest,totheStraitofTaiwaninthenortheast.ItisboundedontheeastbythePhilippine
Islands,onthesouthbyBorneo,onthewestbyVietnam,andonthenorthbymainlandChina.
Theareaincludesseveralhundredsmallislands,rocks,atolls,islets,cays,shoals,sandbars,and
reefs.Manyareunderwaterathightide,whileothersarepermanentlysubmergedevenatlow
tide.Thesefeatures,mostofwhichareuninhabitable,aresituatedinthreeislandchains(the
Spratly,Paracel,andPratasIslands),theMacclesfieldBank,andScarboroughShoal.
The South China Sea links the Pacific and Indian oceans and is home to some of the
worldsbusiestandmoststrategicallyimportantsealinesofcommunication.Morethanhalfof
the worlds oil tanker traffic and over half of the worlds merchant fleet (by tonnage) sail
throughthesewaterseveryyear.Inaddition,theSouthChinaSeaisrichinnaturalresources,
including abundant fisheries and potentially large oil and natural gas deposits.1 Sovereignty
over the various land massesand the resulting maritime zones that would flow from these
featureswould place many of these resources under the exclusive control of one nation.
Competingclaimstotheseresourcescouldresultinconflict,which,inturn,couldaffectthefree
flowofcommercethroughtheregion.Peacefulresolutionofthedisputeis,therefore,criticalto
maintainingregionalpeaceandstability,aswellasavibrantworldeconomy.
PratasIsland2andtheMacclesfieldBank3areclaimedbyTaiwanandChina.Nonation
haschallengedChinasorTaiwansclaimtoPratasIsland.However,MacclesfieldBankandits
surrounding shoals are located beyond the territorial sea of any nation and are permanently
submerged, even at low tide. Accordingly, these features may not be claimed by any nation.
AlthoughtheInternationalCourtofJustice(ICJ)hasstatedthatinternationallawissilenton
thequestionwhetherlowtideelevationscanbeconsideredtobeterritory,andthatthereis
no customary rule which unequivocally permits or excludes appropriation of lowtide
elevations,thefewrulesinthelawoftheseathatgovernlowtideelevationsdonotjustifya
general assumption that lowtide elevations are territory in the same sense as islands.4
Moreover,theCourtnotedthatithasneverbeendisputedthatislandsconstituteterrafirma,
andaresubjecttotherulesandprinciplesofterritorialacquisition;[however,]thedifferencein
*
ThisanalysisisauthoredbyCaptainRaul(Pete)Pedrozo,U.S.Navy(Ret.).FormerProfessorofInternationalLaw,
U.S.NavalWarCollege,StaffJudgeAdvocate,U.S.PacificCommand,andSpecialAssistanttotheUnderSecretary
ofDefenseforPolicy.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperdonotreflecttheviewsoftheU.S.government,theU.S.
DepartmentofDefense,ortheU.S.Navy.
1
SouthChinaSeaReport,U.S.ENERGYINFORMATIONADMINISTRATION,lastupdatedFeb.7,2013.
2
PratasIsland(2042'N.,11643'E.)lies160milessoutheastofHongKongandiscomposedofsandcoveredwith
scrubbybrush.TheislandisgovernedbyTaiwanandishometoaweatherstationlocatednearthecenterofthe
eastpartoftheisland.NATIONALGEOSPATIALINTELLIGENCEAGENCYPUBLICATION161,SailingDirections(Enroute),South
ChinaSeaandtheGulfofThailand,ThirteenthEdition(2011)[hereinafterPUB.161].
3
MacclesfieldBank(1545'N.,11420'E.)isasubmergedatollabout75mileslongonitsnortheastsouthwestaxis
andabouthalfthatwideatitsbroadestpart.Pub.161.
4
MaritimeDelimitationandTerritorialQuestionsbetweenQatarandBahrain,Merits,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports
2001,p.40,atpp.101103;accordSovereigntyoverPedraBranca/PulauBatuPutehMiddleRocksandSouthLedge
(Malaysia/Singapore),Judgment,I.C.J.Reports2008,p.12,atpp.99101.
effectswhichthelawoftheseaattributestoislandsandlowtideelevationsisconsiderable.5
Accordingly, the Courtconcluded that it is thus not established that in the absence of other
rules and legal principles, lowtide elevations can, from the viewpoint of the acquisition of
sovereignty, be fully assimilated with islands or other land territory.6 A similar, albeit more
persuasive, argument could be made with regard to completely submerged features, such as
MacclesfieldBank.7Nonetheless,becauseChinasclaimtoMacclesfieldBankisnotcontested
byVietnam,itisnotdiscussedindetailinthispaper.
ScarboroughShoal8isclaimedbyChina,Taiwan,andthePhilippines.Thetotalareaof
theshoal,includingitsinnerlagoon,is150squarekilometers.9Thereefissituatedabout170
nautical miles (nm) east of Macclesfield Bank, 115 nm off the Philippine island of Luzon
(ZambalesProvince),and472nmfromtheChinesecoast.10Chinaarguesthatitdiscoveredthe
shoalandhasexercisedeffectivecontroloveritforhundredsofyears.ThePhilippinesclaims
thatithaseffectivelyoccupiedtheshoalsince1946.11Becausethedisputeovertheshoaldoes
notinvolveVietnam,itisnotdiscussedindetailinthispaper.
TheParacelIslands12arespreadoveraseaareaof15,000to16,000squarekilometers
andareclaimedbyVietnam,Taiwan,andChina,buthavebeenoccupiedbyChinasince1974.
MostofthefeaturesintheSouthChinaSeaareintheSpratlyIsland13chainandarespreadover
160,000to180,000squarekilometersofoceanarea.TheSpratlysareclaimedintheirentirety
byChina,Taiwan,andVietnam,andpartiallybythePhilippines,Malaysia,andBrunei.Allofthe
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
RobertBeckman,ScarboroughShoal:FlashpointforConfrontationorOpportunityforCooperation,RSIS
COMMENTARIES,No.072/2012,Apr.24,2012(underinternationallaw,MacclesfieldBankmaynotbecapableof
beingsubjecttoaclaimofsovereigntybecauseitiscompletelysubmerged.)[hereinafterRSISCOMM.No.
072/2012].
8
ScarboroughReef(ScarboroughShoal)(1508'N.,11745'E.)consistsofanarrowbeltofbarelysubmergedreef
enclosingalagoon.Onthebeltarescatteredrocks,withover20rocksstanding1.5to2.5metershigh.Fishing
vesselsfromChinaandthePhilippinesfrequentthereeftoexploittheabundantlivingresourcesaroundtheshoal.
Theruinsofanirontowerstandclosetotheabovechannelopening.PUB.161.
9
ZouKeyuan,ScarboroughReef:ANewFlashpointinSinoPhilippineRelations?,INTERNATIONALBOUNDARIESRESEARCH
UNITBOUNDARYANDSECURITYBULLETIN71,Summer1999,atp.71[hereinafterIBRUBULL.71].
10
Id.
11
ThePhilippinesclaimisbasedonanumberofactivities,includingbuildingandoperatingofalighthouseonthe
shoalin1965,conductinganumberofhydrographicsurveysandmarinescientificresearchinthewatersaround
theshoal,usingtheshoalasanimpactrangeformilitaryexercisesandenforcingitslawsonsmugglingandillegal
fishing.RSISCOMM.No.072/2012;seealsoIBRUBULL.71,atp.74.
12
TheParacelIslands(1640'N.,11220'E.)aremadeupoftheAmphitriteGroup,theCrescentGroup,andseveral
offlyingislandsandcoralreefs,someofwhicharecoveredwithtreesorvegetation.TheAmphitriteGroup
(1653'N.,11217'E.)isthenortheasternmostclusterofislands,reefs,andshoalsintheParacels.TheCrescent
Grouplies45milessouthwestoftheAmphitriteGroupandconsistsofseverallowsandisletsandnumerousreefs.
Theprincipalislandsarecoveredwiththickvegetation.PUB.161.
13
TheSpratlyIslandslieinthesoutheastpartoftheSouthChinaSeaalonganoblongareaabout52,000square
milesinextent,northwestofthestrategicPalawanPassage.Theareaisdottedwithsunkenreefsandcoralatolls.
Themajoraxisoftheareabearsabout045225foradistanceof340mileswithamaximumbreadthalongits
minoraxisof175miles.PUB.161.
claimants, except Brunei, have established military outposts on a number of features.14

Vietnamoccupiesthemostfeatures,followedbythePhilippines,China,Malaysia,andTaiwan.
TheParacelandSpratlyIslandsaresituatedbeyondthegeologicalcontinentalshelfof
anyoftheclaimantstates.WatersaroundtheParacelscanreachadepthofover1,000meters
(3,280 feet), while the Spratlys are separated from any mainland or major island by ocean
trenchesover3,000meters(9,842feet)deep.Consequently,noneoftheclaimantstatescan
claim sovereignty over the islands on the grounds that they belong, in geomorphological
terms,tothecontinentalshelfofanyparticularcountry.15
ThispaperwillonlyexaminetheclaimsofChina/TaiwanandVietnamwithregardtothe
ParacelandSpratlyIslands,asalloftheactivitiesoftheotherclaimantsoccurredwellpastthe
criticaldateandcanthereforenotbeusedasabasistoclaimsovereigntyoveranyoftheSouth
ChinaSeaislands.ThatisnottosaythatMalaysia,Brunei,orthePhilippinesmaynothavevalid
claims to some of the submerged features situated on their respective continental shelves
undertheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS);rather,itmeansthatan
analysisofthosepotentialclaimsisbeyondthescopeofthispaper.ThePhilippinesmayalso
haveavalidclaimtoScarboroughShoal,whichisnotconsideredpartoftheSpratlyIslands.16
II. ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY

Ingeneral,territorialsovereigntycanbeacquiredinoneoffiveways:accretion,cession,
conquest, occupation, and prescription. Accretion involves the expansion of existing territory
under the sovereignty of a state through geographical or geological process (e.g., volcanic
activity). Cession occurs when one state transfers its territory to another state pursuant to a
treaty.However,thetransfereecannotreceiveanygreaterrightsthanthosepossessedbythe
transferor.17 Conquestthe acquisition of territory by forcewas historically considered a
lawful mode of acquiring sovereignty, but has been illegal since October 1945 following the
entry into force of the United Nations Charter (see Article 2(4)).18 Prescription involves the
occupationofanotherstatesterritoryoveralongperiodoftime.Inorderforprescriptionto
apply, the occupying state must show that its display of state authority ( titre de souverain)
14
TheSouthChinaSeaOnlineResource,availableatwww.southchinasea.org/;seealsoMichaelBennett,The
PeoplesRepublicofChinaandtheUseofInternationalLawintheSpratlyIslandsDispute,28STAN.J.INTLL.425,at
pp.439440(1997).
15
MoniqueChemillierGendreau,SovereigntyovertheParacelandSpratlyIslands(Brill/MartinusNijhoff
Publishers,2000),atp.16andAnnex18(Notedated8March1928fromMrBourgouin).
16
PUB.161.
17
D.POConnell,Territory,INTERNATIONALLAW437,Vol.1(2nded.),Stevens&Sons,1970[hereinafterOCONNELL
INTERNATIONALLAW(2nded.)];seealsoJamesCrawford,AcquisitionandTransferofTerritorialSovereignty,BROWNLIES
PRINCIPLESOFPUBLICINTERNATIONALLAW217(8thed.),OxfordUniversityPress,2012[hereinafterBROWNLIE(8thed.)].
18
CharteroftheUnitedNations,June26,1945,Article2(4)providesthatallmembersshallrefrainintheir
internationalrelationsfromthethreatoruseofforceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceof
anystate.AccordM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra.(Warsofconquest,asasourceofnewsovereignty
overaterritory,arenowprohibited.Conquestbyforceentailsasituationofmilitaryoccupationwhichisalways
illegalandwhich,failinganagreementconcludedbetweentheStatesconcerned,cannotbetransformedintolaw,
evenwiththepassageoftime.).
over the other states territory was public, peaceful, and uninterrupted for a long period of
time.19
Finally, a state may acquire sovereignty over territory that is not under the control of
any other state (terra nullius) to the extent that the state effectively occupies the territory.
Discovery alone, however, without subsequent acts of effective occupation, does not confer
titletoterritoryaninchoatetitleofdiscoverymustbecompletedwithinareasonableperiod
byeffectiveoccupationoftheregionclaimedtobediscovered.20Moreover,aninchoatetitle
willnotprevailoverthecontinuousandpeacefuldisplayofauthoritybyanotherState;for
suchdisplaymayprevailevenoveraprior,definitetitleputforwardbyanotherState.21
A claim to sovereignty based on effective occupation involves two elements each of
which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual
exerciseordisplayofsuchauthority.22AsdiscussedintheClippertonIslandcase,besidesthe
animus occupandi, effective occupation requires the actual, and not the nominal, taking of
possession.Thistakingofpossessionconsistsinacts,orseriesofacts,bywhichtheoccupying
state reduces to its possession the territory in question and takes steps to exercise exclusive
authoritythere.23
The degree of actual administration (effectivits) that must be established by the
occupying state, however, may vary, particularly in cases of remote and uninhabited areas.
Undersuchcircumstances,tribunalshaverecognizedthatsovereigntycannotbeexercisedin
fact at every moment on every point of a territory and that [t]he intermittence and
discontinuity compatible with the maintenance of the right necessarily differ according as
inhabited or uninhabited regions are involved.24 Accordingly, some tribunals have been
satisfiedwithverylittleinthewayoftheactualexerciseofsovereignrights,providedthatthe
other State could not make out a superior claimparticularlyin the case of claims to
sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled countries.25 This exception to the
generalrulethattheremustbeanactualandcontinuousdisplayofauthoritybytheoccupying
stateisexplainedindetailintheClippertonIslandcase.26
19
OCONNELLINTERNATIONALLAW(2nded.),atp.423;seealsoBROWNLIE(8thed.),atp.216.
20
IslandofPalmasCase(Netherlands/U.S.A.),U.N.Rep.,Vol.II,p.829(1928),atp.846.
21
Id.
22
LegalStatusofEasternGreenlandCase(Denmarkv.Norway),P.C.I.J.,SeriesA/B,No.53(1933),atp.45.
23
ClippertonIslandArbitration(Mexicov.France),2R.I.A.A.1105(1931),atp.393.[Thecitedpagesarefromthe
Englishtranslationat26Am.J.IntlL.390,at393394(1932).]
24
IslandofPalmasCase(Netherlands/U.S.A.),U.N.Rep.,Vol.II,p.829(1928),p.831,atp.840.
25
LegalStatusofEasternGreenlandCase(Denmarkv.Norway),P.C.I.J.,SeriesA/B,No.53(1933),atp.46.Seealso
WesternSaharaAdvisoryOpinion,I.C.J.Reports1975,p.12,atp.43.
26
ClippertonIslandArbitration(Mexicov.France),2R.I.A.A.1105(1931),atpp.393394.[Thecitedpagesarefrom
theEnglishtranslationat26Am.J.IntlL.390,at393394(1932).](Itisbeyonddoubtthattheactualtakingof
possessionisanecessaryconditionofoccupation.Strictlyspeaking,andinordinarycases,thatonlytakesplace
whenthestateestablishesintheterritoryitselfanorganizationcapableofmakingitslawsrespected.Theremay
alsobecaseswhereitisunnecessarytohaverecoursetothismethod.Thus,ifaterritory,byvirtueofthefactthat
itwascompletelyuninhabited,is,fromthefirstmomentwhentheoccupyingstatemakesitsappearancethere,at
theabsoluteandundisputeddispositionofthatstate,fromthatmomentthetakingofpossessionmustbe
consideredasaccomplished,andtheoccupationistherebycompleted.)
III. CHINA
A. Chinese Claims
Chinas position regarding its sovereignty claims to the Paracel (Xisha) and Spratly
(Nansha) Islands was most recently published in June 2000 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA)ofthePeoplesRepublicofChina(PRC)inadocumententitledTheIssueofSouthChina
Sea.27 In short, Chinas claim of indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands
and their adjacent waters is based on several factors, including historical evidence, economic
development,effectiveadministration,andinternationalrecognition.28
1. Historical Evidence
AccordingtotheMFA,ChinawasthefirstnationtodiscoverandnametheSouthChina
Seaislands.ReferencestotheislandsappearinanumberofbooksdatingasfarbackastheHan
Dynasty(206BC220AD).YangFudescribedthegeographicfeaturesoftheSouthChinaSea
Islandsinhisbook,YiwuZhi(RecordsofRarities).29AfamousChinesenavigatoroftheEast
Wu State of the Three Kingdoms Period (220280)General Kang Taialso mentions the
islandsinhisbookentitledFunanZhuan(JourneystoandfromPhnom).Thegeneral,alongwith
Zhu Ying, had been dispatched by Emperor Huangwu on a diplomatic mission to Funan
(presentdayCambodia)viatheSouthChinaSeatomeetwithenvoysfromanumberofstates,
including the State of Tianzhu (presentday India).30 Similarly, hundreds of books published
during the Jin (265410), Tang (618907), Song (9601279), Yuan (12711368), Ming (1368
1644),andQing(16441911)DynastiesrefertotheSouthChinaSeaislands.Theseincludethe
Dao Yi Zhi Lue (Abridged Records of Islands and Barbarians) written by Wang Dayuan, a
prominentChinesenavigatoroftheYuanDynastywhomadenumerousvoyagestotheSouth
ChinaSea,andtheNanzhouYuouZhi(RecordsofRaritiesinSouthernBoundary)byWanZhen,
which documents the encounters of Chinese sailors of theHan era(206 BC220 AD) with the
27
MinistryofForeignAffairsofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea(June2000),
[hereinafterMFA,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea],availableathttp://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5767.html;
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5765.html;http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5773.html;
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5747.html;andhttp://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5766.html.Apreviousversion
ChinasIndisputableSovereigntyovertheXishaIslandsandNanshaIslandswaspublishedbytheMFAinJanuary
1980.
28
MFA,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea;seealsoSuHao,ChinasPositionsandInterestsintheSouthChinaSea:A
RationalChoicesinitsCooperativePolicies,CENTERFORSTRATEGIC&INTERNATIONALSTUDIES,SOUTHASIAPROGRAM,Sept.
12,2011;JianmingShen,InternationalLawRulesandHistoricalEvidenceSupportingChinasTitletotheSouth
ChinaSeaIslands,21HASTINGSINTL&COMP.L.REV.175(19971998)[hereinafterShenI];andJianmingShen,Chinas
SovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaIslands:AHistoricalPerspective,CHINESEJIL(2002),pp.94157[hereinafter
ShenII].
29
ShenI,atp.18.SeealsoBrianK.Murphy,DangerousGround:TheSpratlyIslandsandInternationalLaw,1OCEAN
&COASTALL.J.187(19941995),atp.200;Dr.BarryHartDubner,TheSpratlyRocksDisputeARockapelago
DefiesNormsofInternationalLaw,9TEMP.INTL&COMP.L.J.291(1995),atp.309;M.Bennett,note14supra,atp.
434.
30
ShenI,atp.19.
SouthChinaSeaislandsontheirreturntriphomefromtheMalayPeninsula.31Abookpublished
duringtheSouthSongDynasty(11271279)QiongGuanZhi(RecordsoftheQiongPrefecture
anditsJurisdiction)likewisereflectsthattheSpratlysandParacelswereunderthejurisdiction
oftheQiongPrefecture(todaysHainanProvince).32
AccordingtotheMFA,EmperorZhenyuanoftheTangDynasty(785805)includedthe
SouthChinaSeaislandsintheadministrativemapsoftheEmpire.Referencetotheislandscan
alsobefoundinanumberofmaps,includingtheHunyiJiangliLidaiGuoduzhiTu(Consolidated
MapofTerritoriesandGeographyandCapitalsofPastDynasties),publishedduringtheMing
Dynasty,andtheGengLuBu(RoadMap)oftheQingDynasty.33
ChinesescholarslikewiseattributegreatimportancetoChineseeffortsduringtheSong,
Yuan,Ming,andQingDynastiestoincludetheSouthChinaSeaislandsinthecountrysofficial
maps as a demonstration of sovereignty. For example, Zhu Fan Tu (Maps of the Various
Barbarian Peoples) of the North Song Dynasty is a collection of ancient Chinese maps that
referred to the South China Sea Islands as being subject to the Chinese rulers.34 More
specifically,theZhuFanTu(MapsandChartsoftheVariousBarbarianPeoples,theNorthSong
Dynasties)referredtotheSpratlysandtheseaareawestoftheParacelsastheouterlimitsof
Chinasmaritimeboundary.35Thus,boththeParacelsandSpratlyswerewithintheboundary
oftheSongEmpire.36
AccordingtoChinesescholars,mapspublishedintheYuanDynastyincludedtheParacel
andSpratlyIslandsasChineseterritory.37Similarly,duringtheMingDynasty,officialChinese
maps [such as the Hunyijiangli Hdai Guodu zhi Tu (Consolidated Map of Territories and
Geography and Capitals of Past Dynasties (1402))] continued to indicate China's sovereignty
overtheSouthChinaSeaIslands.38MingeramapswereusedbyAdmiralZhengHeduringhis
Seven Voyages. Official records of the Ming Dynasty, such as Qiong Guan Gu Zhi (Ancient
RecordsontheJurisdictionofQiongzhouFu),alsorefertoChinesejurisdictionovertheSpratlys
andParacels.39InZhengdeQiongTaiZhi(RecordsofQiong[zhou]andTai[wan]DuringtheReign
31
MFA,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea;seealsoShenII,atpp.111and113116;ShenI,atpp.19,2728.Historical
evidenceoftheearliestChinesepresenceintheParacelscanalsobefoundintheChroniclesoftheSungDynasty,
whichstatesthatthelastSungEmperor,pursuedbyaYuan(Mongol)Dynastygeneral,fledtotheParacelsinan
attempttoreachIndoChina.TaoCheng,TheDisputeOvertheSouthChinaSeaIslands,10TEX.INTLL.J.265
(1975),atp.273.
32
ReferencestotheSpratlysandParacelscanalsobefoundinotherSongrelatedbooks,suchasSongHuiYaoJi
Gao(SelectedManuscriptsoftheDigestsoftheSongDynasties),SongShi(TheHistoryoftheSongDynasties)and
ZhuFanTu(MapsandChartsoftheVariousBarbarianPeoples,theNorthSongDynasty).ShenII,atpp.132133;
seealsoShenI,atpp.2324.
33
MFA,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea;seealsoShenII,atp.106.
34
ShenII,atp.126.
35
ShenI,atp.24.
36
Id.,atp.26.
37
Someofthesemapsinclude:YuandaiJiangyuTuXu(MapoftheTerritoryoftheYuanDynastyIllustrated);
ShengjiaoChiangBeiTu)of1330byLiZemin,theHunyiJiangliTu(ConsolidatedMapsoftheTerritory[oftheYuan
Dynasty])of1380,andtheYuDiTu(TheMapsoftheTerritory[ofYuan])drawnandillustratedbyZhuSiben
(Yuan).ShenII,atpp.126127;seealsoShenI,atpp.2829.
38
ShenII,atp.127.AsimilarreferenceiscontainedintheWubeiMishuDiliFuTu(AGeographicalMapAnnexedto
theSecretManualonDefensePreparations(1637)).ShenI,atp.30.
39
ShenII,atp.133.
of Emperor Zhengde), Tan Zhou recorded that the sphere of jurisdiction of the Qiongzhou
PrefectureincludedtheXishaIslandsandNanshaIslands.40
QingDynastymaps,suchastheSihaiZongtu(GeneralMapsoftheFourSeas),published
in1730byChenLunjiong,continuedtodepictthepositionoftheParacelsandSpratlyswithin
the Qing boundary.41 Chen also published a book in 1730Haikuo Wenchien Lu (Notes on
Lands Across the Sea)that described the geographic positions of the Spratly and Paracel
Islands.42 Qingera records (e.g., Records of Wanzhou Subprefecture, Records of Qiongzhou
PrefectureandGuangdongTongZhi(GeneralRecordsofGuangdongProvince))likewisereflect
thattheSouthChinaSeaislands,includingtheseaareassurroundingtheislands,werewithin
thejurisdictionofWanzhou.43
AnumberofChinesescholarsplacediscoveryandnamingoftheSouthChinaSeaislands
muchearlierinChinesehistoryasfarbackastheXiaDynasty(21001660BC).Abookwritten
during the Qin Dynasty (221206 BC)Yi Zhou Shu (Scattered Books of the Zhou Dynasties)
speaks of tributes from the South Sea being paid by the southern barbarians (including
presentday Vietnam) to the rulers of the Xia Dynasty, and says that these tributes (turtles,
pearlcarrying shellfish, hawksbill turtles, and other rarities) continued through the Shang
Dynasty(16001050BC),theZhouDynasties(1046256BC),theQinDynasty(221206BC)and
40
ShenI,atpp.2930.
41
OtherQingeramapscitedinsupportofChinesesovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislandsinclude:
(1)DaQingZhongWaiTianxiaQuanTu(TheCompleteSinoForeignMapsoftheGreatQing)of1709;
(2)QinghiShengFenTu(IndividualMapsoftheProvincesDirectlyundertheAdministrationoftheQing
Empire)of1724;
(3)HuangQingGeZhiShengFenTu(IndividualMapsoftheProvincesDirectlyundertheAdministrationofthe
RoyalQing)of1755;
(4)DaQingWanManTitongQuanTu(TheCompleteMapsoftheUnifiedGreatQingforTenThousandYears)
of1767chartedbyZhuXilingandrevisedbyHuangZhengsun;
(5)QingHuiFuZhouXianTingZpngTu(TheQingChartedGeneralMapsoftheCapitalCities,Prefectures,
CountiesandTings)of1800chartedbyXiaoFeng;
(6)DaQingWanManTitongTianxiaQuanTu(TheCompleteMapsoftheWholeUnifiedCountryofGreatQing
forTenThousandYears)of1803chartedbyYangSenzhong;
(7)DaQingWanManTitongDiliQuanTu(TheCompleteGeographicalMapsoftheUnifiedGreatQingforTen
ThousandYears)of1810;
(8)DaQingTitongTianxiaQuanTu(TheCompleteMapsoftheWholeUnifiedCountryofGreatQing)of1817;
(9)GuJinDiTuQuanTu(TheCompleteMapsoftheLandsandTerritoriesThenandNow)of1895;
(10)DaQingTianxiaZhonghuaGeShengFuZhouXianTingDiliQuanTu(TheCompleteGeographicalMapsof
theProvinces,CapitalCities,Prefectures,CountiesandTingsoftheWholeChinaoftheGreatQing)of1904
chartedbyWuChangfa;and
(11)DaQingTianxiaZhonghuaGeShengFuZhouXianTingDiliQuanTu(TheCompleteGeographicalMapsof
theProvinces,CapitalCities,Prefectures,CountiesandTingsoftheWholeChinaoftheGreatQing)of1905
chartedbyWangXingshun.
ShenII,atpp.127128.AbookwrittenbyYangBingnanin1844HaiLu(IllustrationsoftheSea)recordsthe
orationofXieQinggao,aQingofficial,inwhichtheSouthChinaSeaislandsweredescribedinfourgroupsand
aseachart(YibanLu(ParticularIllustrations))preparedbyZhengGuangzuduringthesametimeperiodcontains
thelocationsoftheDongsha,Zhongsha,XishaandNanshaIslands.ShenI,atpp.3335.
42
ShenI,atp.32;seealsoHungdahChiuandChoonHoPark,LegalStatusoftheParacelandSpratlyIslands,OCEAN
DEV.&INTLL.,3:1(1975),128,atp.10.
43
ShenII,atpp.133134;seealsoShenI,atp.30.
theHanDynasty(206BC220AD).44ReferencestotheSouthChinaSeaislandsalsoappearin
ShiJing(TheClassicsofPoems),acollectionofpoemsoftheSpringandAutumnPeriod(475
221BC)andtwosetsofclassicsoftheSpringandAutumnPeriodauthoredbyZuoQiuming
ZuoZhuan(ZuosCommentaries)andGuoYu(StatementsoftheStates)bothofwhichindicate
thattheZhoustateappeasedthebarbarianstomakeexpeditionstotheSouthChinaSea.45
Based on these early works, Chinese scholars argue that the South China Sea Islands
weredestinations of Chinese expeditions and targets of conquests during the East Zhou
Dynasty (770221 BC) and that such discovery and conquestnaturally led the Chinese
rulers and people to believe that the South China Sea Islands were part of China throughout
history,fromtheXiaDynastytotheQingDynasty.46
IrrespectiveofwhethertheSpratlysandParacelswerediscoveredduringtheXiaorHan
Dynasty, China maintains that it had the earliest recorded contact with the islands.47
Accordingly, some Chinese and western scholars argue that discovery of the South China Sea
islands,attheveryleast,vestedChinawithaninchoatetitletotheislands,whichChinacould
perfectwithinareasonableamountoftimebytakingfinalanddecisivesovereignactionover
theclaimedterritory.48
2. Economic Development
According to the MFA, Chinese fishermen have been exploiting the South China Sea
islandssincetheJinDynasty(265420).49Inhisarticle,ChroniclesofGuangzhou,FeiYuanmakes
reference to fishing and collection of coral samples by Chinese fishermen.50 These activities
became more organized during the early days of the Ming Dynasty (13681644). Fishermen
from Haikou, Puqian, and Qinglan Ports, as well as Wenchang County, went to the islands to
fish for sea cucumbers and other sea produce. Accounts of these fishing expeditions can be
foundinthe1868GuidetotheSouthChinaSea.51ThesefishermenwereguidedbytheRoad
Map, which showed the navigational routes and courses from Hainan Island and mainland
ChinatotheParacelandSpratlyIslands.
ChinesescholarsindicatethatfishingboatsfromHainanIsland(WenchangandQionghai
Counties)andLeizhouPeninsulahavecontinuedtofishthewatersoftheSouthChinaSeaonan
annualbasissincethefoundingoftheRepublicofChinain1912.EvidenceofthesepostQing
44
ShenII,atpp.102103;seealsoShenI,atpp.1516.
45
ShenII,atpp.103104;seealsoShenI,atp.17.
46
ShenII,atpp.104105;seealsoShenI,atpp.1517.
47
M.Bennett,note14supra;seealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atp.200(ThereislittledoubtthattheChinese
werethefirsttodiscovertheSpratlys.);B.Dubner,note29supra,atp.309(Despitethedisputeddates,China
mayclaimtheearliestrecordedcontact[withtheSpratlys].).
48
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atpp.1718;seealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atp.200.
49
AccordingtosomeChinesescholars,economicexploitationoftheSouthChinaSeabeganasearlyastheXia
Dynasty(21001600BC).ShenII,atpp.111and130.SeealsoTaoCheng,note31supra,atp.274.
50
ShenI,atp.20.
51
MFA,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea(fishermenfromHainanIslandwenttoZhenheIslesandReefsandlivedon
seacucumberandshellstheygotthere.ThefootmarksoffishermencouldbefoundineverysideoftheNansha
Islandsandsomeofthefishermenwouldevenlivethereforalongperiodoftime.Everyyear,thereweresmall
boatsdepartingfromHainanIslandfortheNanshaIslandstoexchangericeandotherdailynecessitiesforsea
cucumberandshellsfromthefishermenthere.TheshipsusedtoleaveHainanIslandinDecemberorJanuary
everyyearandreturnwhenthesouthwesterlymonsoonstarted.).SeealsoShenII,atpp.130131.
DynastyactivitiescanbefoundinanumberofChineseandforeignsources,includinga1918
bookwrittenbyOkuraUnosukeentitledStormyIslands(aboutaJapaneseexpeditiontoBeizi
Island) and A Survey of the New South Islands (a Japanese publication that indicates Chinese
fishermen resided on the islands and grew coconuts, papaya, sweet potato and vegetables).
Records from a 1933 investigative trip to the Paracel Islands by Miyoshi and Matuo of Japan
also discuss the presence of Chinese fishermen on Beizi (North) and Nanzi (South) Islands.52
Similarly, an account written in 1933 by Chinese historian and geographer Ling Chunsheng
makesreferencetothepresenceofChinesefishermenonAmboynaCay,SpratlyIsland,ItuAba
Island,LoaitaIsland,ThituIsland,NortheastCay,SouthwestCay,NamyitIsland,andWestYork
IslandintheSpratlyarchipelago.53
AlthoughtheMFAacknowledgesthatearlyChineseactivitiesontheSpratlyswerenot
state sponsored, it indicates that subsequent fishing and other productive activities were
organized with the approval and support of the Chinese government. In addition, fishermen
were required to pay taxes and fees to the Chinese government in order to exploit the
resourcesoftheSpratlys.
Chinese scholars additionally emphasize that in 1910 the Qing government invited
Chinesemerchantstosubmitcontractstoadministerthedevelopmentandexploitationofthe
South China Sea Islands, indicating that the government would provide protection to the
merchants and maintain order to strengthen [Chinas] territorial sovereignty andprotect
[Chinese] titles and interests in the two island groups.54 This practice was expanded by the
Republic of China (19121949), although Chinese scholars acknowledge that most of the
developmentandexploitationactivitiesoccurredintheParacels,nottheSpratlys.55Following
52
53
ShenII,atpp.141142.
54
Id.,atp.135;seealsoShenI,atp.36.
55
ExamplesofdevelopmentandexploitationactivitiesintheParacelsinclude:
In1917,aChinesebusinessmanoftheHaiLiCompany,HeCheng'en,appliedtotheOfficeofthe
GovernorofGuangdongProvinceforpermissiontominephosphorusore.
In1919,aChinesebusinessman,DengShiying,appliedtodevelopselectedislandsintheParacelsfor
plantingandfarming.
In1921,theMinistryofInternalAffairsoftheRepublicofChinaapprovedtheapplicationofa
businessmanfromGuangdong,HeRuinian(HoShuinien),toengageinfishing,reclamationand
cultivation,aswellastodevelopandexploitminerals.ThelicensewasrevokedwhentheChinese
governmentdiscoveredthatMr.HehadassignedhislicensetoaJapanesecompanytheNanxingShiye
Company.
Between1929and1931,theGuangdongProvincialgovernmentgrantedlicensestoChinesebusinessmen,
includingSongXiquanandYanJingzhi,toexploitguano.
In1932,theChinesegovernmentcontractedwiththeChinaNationalFertilizerCompany(Zhonghua
GuochanFeitianGongsi)todevelopandexploitnaturalresourcesintheParacels.
In1932,theIndustrialTestingInstituteoftheDepartmentofConstructionoftheGuangdongprovincial
governmentbeganminingguanoontheParacelIslands.
In1933,theDepartmentofConstructionoftheGuangdongprovincialgovernmentmadepreparationsto
constructaGuanoFertilizerProducingPlantontheParacelsandmadeplanstodevelopalloftheParacel
Islands.
In1947,theCommitteeonNaturalResourcesofChinarequestedthecentralgovernmenttoconsider
entrustingtheZhongyuanQiyeGongsi(ZhongyuanEnterpriseCo.)withminingguanointheParacel
Islands.
theestablishmentofthePeoplesRepublicofChinain1949,thenewgovernmentcontinuedto
economically exploitation the South China Sea islands.56 Again, most of these activities were
conductedintheParacels.
The MFA and Chinese scholars assert that China has continued to assert its exclusive
resourcerightsintheSouthChinaSea.Forinstance,inJune14,1976,theMFAreaffirmedthat
ChinahasmaintainedindisputablesovereigntyovertheXishaIslandsandNanshaIslandsand
theirsurroundingseaareas,andthenaturalresourcesintheseareasareChina'sproperty.57A
similar statement was made in September 1979 when the MFA reiterated that China has
indisputable sovereignty over the Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands and their surrounding sea
areas,andthenaturalresourcesintheseareasareChina'sproperty.58Thefollowingyear,on
July 21, 1980, the MFA issued a statement condemning an agreement between Vietnam and
the Soviet Union to jointly explore and exploit oil and gas deposits on Vietnams southern
continental shelf. The statement reiterated that the Xisha and Nansha Islands, just like the
Dongsha and Zhongsha Islands, have always been part of Chinese territory; the natural
resourcesintheaboveareasbelongtoChinaandthattheSovietVietnameseagreementand
the like are invalid.59 A similar position was taken in April 1996 after Petro Vietnam and
ShenI,atpp.3839,45.SeealsoTaoCheng,note31supra,atp.274;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atpp.11
12;SteinTnnesson,AnInternationalHistoryoftheDisputeintheSouthChinaSea,EASTASIANINSTITUTEWORKING
PAPERNO.71,Mar.16,2001note55,atp.8;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.101102,Annex10(Note
of29September1932fromtheLegationoftheChineseRepublicinFrancetotheMinistryofForeignAffairs,Paris),
Annex14(Letterof6October1921,fromtheofficialinchargeoftheConsulateofFranceinCantontothePrsident
duConseil,MinisterforForeignAffairs).
56
ThefollowingareexamplesofeconomicdevelopmentoftheSouthChinaSeaislandsfollowingthe
establishmentofthePeoplesRepublicofChina:
From1950to1952,thegovernmentsofWenchangCounty,QionghaiCounty,LingshuiCounty,andothers
organizedfishermenofHainantoexploitthewaterssurroundingtheXishasandNanshas;thispracticehas
continuedeversince.
In1953,theAquaticProductsCorporationoftheHainanSpecialAdministrativePrefecturebegantomine
andexploitguanointheXishaIslands.
InMayandJune1955,theHainanSpecialAdministrativePrefecturedispatchedasurveyand
reconnaissancegrouptotheXishastoassessthenaturalresourcesontheislands.
InApril1956,theAquaticProductsDepartmentofGuangdongProvinceorganizedareconnaissanceteam
toinvestigatetheaquaticresourcesintheXishaIslands.Acentralworkingstationwasestablishedon
YongxingIsland,andbranchstationsweresetuponotherislands.Morethan200teammembersworked
allovertheislands.TheteamalsosetupSupplyandMarketingCooperatives(smallshops),medical
clinics,clubs,andpowerstations.
In1957,theGuanoCorporationoftheHainanSpecialAdministrativePrefectureminedguanoand
phosphaterocksontheYongxingIsland,withmorethan100workersparticipating.
Fromthewinterof1959toApril1960,theAquaticProductsBureauoftheHainanSpecialAdministrative
Prefectureorganized131fishingboatsand1,752fishermenfromthecoastalcountiestoengageinlarge
scalefishinginthewaterssurroundingtheXishaandNanshaIslands.
ShenI,atp.47.
57
Id.,atp.67.OnJanuary1,2014,newregulationstookeffectthatrequireforeignfishingvesselstoobtainprior
approvalfromChinatofishinthe2millionkm2seaareaadministeredbyHainanProvinceintheSouthChinaSea
(watersencompassedbythesocalledninedashline).BrianSpegele,BeijingMovestoBolsterClaiminSouth
ChinaSea,THEWALLSTREETJOURNAL,Jan.9,2014,atp.A9.
58
ShenI,atpp.6768.
59
Id.,atp.68.
10
Conoco announced that they had signed a contract for joint exploration and drilling in the
VanguardBank(WananTan).Inthatcase,theMFAreassertedthatChinahasincontestable
sovereigntyovertheNanshaIslandsandtheiradjacentwaters.60
Continuedforeigninvestmentintheregioninthe21stcenturyhaspromptedChinato
reiterateitsoppositiontoanyoilandgasexploitationintheSouthChinaSeawithoutBeijings
permission.OnSeptember22,2011,theChineseForeignMinistrycondemnedadealbetween
IndiasstateownedOilandNaturalGasCorporation(ONGC)VideshLtd.andPetroVietnamto
explore and develop oil and gas blocks in the South China Sea within Vietnams claimed EEZ.
The MFAs statement indicated that any hydrocarbon exploration in the South China Sea
withoutBeijingsapprovalwasaninfringementonPRCsovereigntyand,therefore,illegaland
invalid.61ChinareactedsimilarlyinApril2012toanannounceddealbetweenaRussiannatural
gasproducer(Gazprom)andVietnamOil&GasGrouptodeveloptwogasblocksintheSouth
China Sea.62 Then, in May 2014, stateowned China National Offshore Oil Corporataion
(CNOOC)deployeditsdeepseadrillingrigHD981tothedisputedwaterssouthoftheParacels
toconductexploratorydrillingforoil.Alargenumberofgovernmentvessels,includingseven
PLANwarships,weredeployedtosupporttheoperation.63
Chinahasadditioinallyuseditsnavyandcivilianmaritimelawenforcementagenciesto
directlyinterferewithVietnameseandFilipinoresourceexplorationandexploitationactivities
within their respective claimed EEZs in the South China Sea. On March 2, 2011, for example,
twoChinaMaritimeSurveillance(CMS)patrolboats(No.71and75)forcedthesurveyshipM/V
VeritasVoyagerthatwasconductingaseismicsurveyforoilandgasonbehalfofthePhilippine
DepartmentofEnergyinthevicinityofReedBank(80nmwestofPalawanIsland)towithdraw
fromthearea.ForumEnergytheUKbasedcompanythathadbeenawardedthecontractto
conductseismicsurveysintheSampaguitagasfieldcompletedthesurveyattheendofMarch
with the assistance of a Philippine Coast Guard vessel that was deployed to deter further
Chinese interference with the Voyagers work. Following completion of the survey, the
Philippinesinvitedforeigninvestorsandoilcompaniestobidfortherighttoexploreforoiland
gasin15differentblocksoffthewestcoastofPalawan.BeijingimmediatelyprotestedManilas
actions,allegingthattwoareas(Blocks3and4)fallunderChinasindisputablesovereignty.64
AsimilarincidentoccurredoffthecoastofVietnamonMay26,2011,whenthreeCMS
patrol vessels confronted the Binh Minh 02, a survey ship being operated by Petro Vietnam
approximately116nmoffDaiLanh,withinVietnamsclaimedEEZandsome600kmsouthof
ChinasHainanIsland.TheincidentendedwhenoneoftheCMSpatrolvesselsintentionallycut
the cable being towed by the survey ship.65 Two weeks later, on the 9th of June, a Chinese
fishingvessel(No.62226)thatwasoperatingwithtwoCMSpatrolvesselsintentionallyrammed
60
Id.,atp.71.
61
MichaelMartina,ChinapapercondemnsVietnamIndiaenergycooperation,REUTERS,Sept.22,2011.
62
ChinaReaffirmsPositiononOil,GasExploitation,CHINADAILY,Apr.11,2012.
63
ErnestBower&GregoryPoling,CriticalQuestions:SeparatingFactfromFictionaboutMyanmarsRohingya,
CENTERFORSTRATEGIC&INTERNATIONALSTUDIES,May7,2014.
64
ManilaRejectsNewChineseClaimToTerritoryJust50MilesAwayFromPhilippineProvince,THEWASHINGTON
POST,Nov.14,2011;IanStorey,ChinaandthePhilippines:ImplicationsoftheReedBankIncident,ChinaBrief,
Volume11,Issue8,THEJAMESTOWNFOUNDATION,May6,2011.
65
VNDemandsChinaStopSovereigntyViolations,VIETNAMPLUS,May29,2011.
11
the survey cable of the Viking II. The Petro Vietnam ship was conducting a seismic survey
approximately60nmoffthesoutherncoastofVietnam,withinVietnamsclaimedEEZandover
1,000 km from Hainan Island.66 Chinas official response to the Binh Minh incident indicated
that:
China holds a consistent and clearcut position on the South China Sea issue. China
opposes Vietnam's oil and gas exploration activities within the waters under the
jurisdictionofChinawhichundermineChina'srightsandinterestsaswellasjurisdiction
over the South China Sea and violate the bilateral consensus on the South China Sea
issue. Actions taken by China's competent authorities are regular maritime law
enforcementandsurveillanceactivitiesinthewatersunderthejurisdictionofChina.67
Fifteen months later, on November 30, 2012, Chinese vessels once again took action
against the Vietnamese seismic research vessel Binh Minh 02, which was operating within
Vietnams claimed EEZ about 43 miles southeast of Con Co Island off the Vietnamese coast
(QuangTriProvince).68TheBinhMinh02wasconductingaseismicsurveyinBlock113,whichis
jointlyownedbyPetroVietnamandRussiasGazprom,whenitwassurroundedbyanumberof
Chinese vessels. When the Binh Minh ordered the Chinese ships to depart the area, two of
themcutthesurveyshipsexplorationcable.69
3. Effective Administration
TheMFAclaimsthatChinahasexercisedsovereigntyandeffectivejurisdictionoverthe
SouthChinaSeaislandssincetheYuanDynasty(12711368).70Tosupportitsclaims,theMFA
citestheGeographyBookoftheHistoryoftheYuanDynastyandtheMapoftheTerritoryofthe
Yuan Dynasty with Illustration, both of which describe the islands as sovereign Chinese
territory.71
a. Naval Patrols
TheMFAnotesthepresenceofnavalpatrolsasfurtherevidencethatChinaexercised
effective administration and control over the South China Sea islands beginning in the 13th
century. For example, the History of the Yuan Dynasty has accounts of naval patrols and
inspectionactivitiesbythenavyontheislands.72
Chinese scholars indicate that the practice of conducting naval patrols in the South
ChinaSeaoccurredmuchearlier,beginningwiththeHanDynasty(206BC220AD)duringthe
firstcentury.In43AD,AdmiralMaYuanconqueredtheterritoryoftheNanmanregions/Rinan
66
SeaspatraisesChinaVietnamtensions,NAMVIETNEWS,June10,2011.
67
PeterLee,SoutheastAsiarisesinUSreset,ASIATIMESONLINE,June4,2011.
68
JeremyPage,VietnamAccusesChineseShips,THEWALLSTREETJOURNAL,Dec.4,2012.
69
BenBlandandLeslieHook,Beijingaccusedofoilsabotage,FINANCIALTIMES,Dec.4,2012,p.2.
70
SomeChinesescholarsplaceChineseauthorityandcontrolovertheSouthChinaSeaislandsasfarbackasthe
HanDynasties(206BC220AD).ShenII,atp.132.
71
MFA,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea.
72
Id.
12
Prefecture (present day central/northern Vietnam).73 The Han government also conducted
navalexpeditionstotheMalayPeninsulaviatheSpratlyIslands,andtheWuStateoftheThree
KingdomsPeriodsentenvoystoIndiaviatheSouthChinaSea.74Navalpatrolscontinuedduring
theJin,Song,Yuan,MingandQingDynastiestotheRepublicanera.75 Evidence of naval
patrols during the Jin Dynasty can be found in Hao Yulins Guangdong Tong Zhi (The General
Records of Guangdong).76 Similar patrols were undertaken during the Song Dynasty and
recordedbyXeiLingyuninWudiLei(InMemoryofEmperorWudi)andLiDaoyuaninShuiJing
Zhu (Commentaries on the Books of Waters), as well as during the Yuan Dynasty (Yuan Shi
(HistoryoftheYuanDynasty),ShiBiZhuan(Historyabout[General]ShiBi),andDaoYiZhiLue
(AbridgedRecordsofIslandsandBarbarians).77
Additionally, according to Chinese scholars, the Emperor of the Yuan Dynasty
dispatched theastronomer Gu Shoujingto the South China Sea [in 1279] to survey and
measure the Xishaand Nansha islands and the adjacent sea area.78 Gus base camp was in
theParacelIslands,andhisresearchisrecordedintheYuanShi(HistoryoftheYuanDynasty).79
Twodecadeslater,in1292,anexpeditionaryforceoftheYuanEmpire,underthecommandof
ShiBi,wasdispatchedtoJavaandreportedlysailedthroughtheParacelandSpratlyIslands.80
During the Ming Dynasty, the MFA notes that the Hainan Garrison Commandwas
responsible for inspecting and patrolling as well as exercising jurisdiction over the Xisha
[Paracel], Zhongsha [Macclesfield Bank] and Nansha [Spratly] Islands.81 To support its claim,
theMFApointstotheinscriptionontheMemorialTabletoftheTombofGeneralQianShicaiof
theHainanGarrisonCommand,whichreads:
Guangdong [Province] is adjacent to the grand South China Sea, and the territories
beyondtheSeaallinternallybelongtotheMingState.GeneralQianledmorethanten
thousand soldiers and 50 huge ships to patrol tens of thousands of lis82 on the South
ChinaSea.83
73
InhisHouHanShu(BooksoftheLatterHanDynasty),XieChengrecordedthatChenMao,theBiejaofJiaozhi
Province,accompaniedZhouChang,theCishiofJiaozhouProvince,intheirnavalinspectionandpatrolling
cruisetotheislandsintheSouthChinaSea.ShenII,atp.122;seealsoShenI,atp.18.
74
ShenII,atp.111.
75
Id.,atp.122;seealsoSuHao,note28supra.
76
ShenII,atp.122(BaoJing,theAdministratorofnanHai,wentonpatrollingandinspectionvoyagesinthe
SouthChinaSea.).SeealsoShenI,atpp.2021.
77
ShenII,atpp.123124.TheShiBiZhuan(SupplementaryHistory)oftheYuanShiindicatesthatChinesenaval
forcessailedthroughtheParacelsandtheSpratlysandlandedontheislandsofHundunDayang,Ganlan,
JialimadaandJulan,wheretheycutdownlumberstobuildsmallboats.ShenI,atp.27.
78
ShenII,atpp.126.
79
ShenI,atp.27.
80
ShenII,atpp.111112;seealsoShenI,atp.27;TaoCheng,note31supra,atp.273;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42
supra,atp.10.
81
ShenII,atp.125;seealsoMFA,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea.
82
AliisaChineseunitofdistanceequaltoabout500meters.
83
13
Chinese sources reflect that the areas patrolled by General Qian included the Paracels, the
Spratlys,andMacclesfieldBank.84AwellknownnavigatorandhighrankingofficialoftheMing
imperialcourt,ZhengHe,[also]ledsevenlargescalevoyagesthroughandbeyondtheSouth
China Sea between 1405 and 1433, recording the location of the islands on detailed maps
drawnbetween1425and1430.85ZhengpurportedlyusedtheParacelsandotherSouthChina
Sea islands as stopover points during voyages to and from the Indian Ocean and other
destinations.86HealsosurveyedallthemajorSouthChinaSeaislands.87
Chinese scholars contend that the Qing Dynasty (16441911) continued to patrol the
South China Sea and exercise administrative jurisdiction over the South China Sea islands.
Between 1710 and 1712, Vice Admiral Wu Sheng of the Guangdong Navy personally led his
fleettotheSouthChinaSeaIslandsandthevicinitytopatroltheseaarea:[thefleet]started
from Qiongya [on Hainan Island] by way of Tonggu, passing through Qizhou Yang and Sigeng
Sha, traveling three thousand lis.88 The Qing Dynasty additionally depicted the islands as
Chineseterritoryonanumberofofficialmaps,includingAMapofAdministrativeDivisionsof
the WholeChinaof the 1724 Map of Provinces of the Qing Dynasty, AMap ofAdministrative
Divisions of the Whole China of the 1755 Map of Provinces of the Imperial Qing Dynasty, the
1767MapofUnifiedChinaoftheGreatQingforTenThousandYears,the1810Topographical
MapofUnifiedChinaoftheGreatQingforTenThousandYearsandthe1817MapofUnified
ChinaoftheGreatQingforTenThousandYears.89
b. Administrative Control
The MFA states that there is a wealth of official government documents, as well as
Chinesehistorybooksandofficialmaps,whichrecordtheexerciseofjurisdictionbysuccessive
ChinesegovernmentsovertheSouthChinaSeaislandsandrecognizetheseislandsasChinese
territory. The MFA further asserts that up until the beginning of the 20th century, China had
exercisedpeacefuljurisdictionovertheSouthChinaSeaIslandswithoutanydisputes.90
Chinese scholars supplement the MFAs White Paper with additional evidence to
support Chinas claims. One example cited by these scholars as evidence of Chinas effective
administration and control of the archipelagoes is the charting and opening of sea lanes
throughtheSouthChinaSea.TheWestHanrulerspurportedlyestablishedclosenavigational
andcommercialtieswithSoutheastAsia,SriLankaandIndiathroughtheusageofsearoutesin
theSouthChinaSea.91ChineseshipsenroutetoSriLankaandotherportswouldnecessarily
passthroughtheSouthChinaSeaandtheSouthChinaSeaislands.Itwasduringthereignof
EmperorWudiofWestHanthattheSouthChinaSeawasrenamedZhanghai.92Asetofbooks
written by a South Song official, Zhao Rukuo, in 1225Zhu Fan Tu (Maps and Charts of the
Various Barbarian Peoples) and Zhu Fan Zhi (Records of the Various Barbarian Peoples)
84
ShenI,atpp.3132.
85
ShenII,atp.112;seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.10.
86
ShenI,atp.31.
87
TaoCheng,note31supra,atp.273.
88
ShenII,atp.125;seealsoShenI,atp.35;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.62.
89
90
Id.
91
ShenII,atp.118.
92
ShenI,atp.18.
14
similarly depict navigational sea lanes from and to the Chinese mainland through the South
ChinaSeaIslands93AnothersetofbooksfromtheSongera,writtenbyZhoQufeiLingwai
Daida(SubstituteRepliesfromLingwai)containasimilardepictionofthesearoutesthrough
theNanshaIslandsbetweenChinaandotherpartsoftheworld.94Thesesearoutes,which
wereusedbyZhengHetoconducthisrenownedsevenvoyagesthroughandbeyondtheSouth
China Sea between 1405 and 1433, greatly facilitated Chinas interactions with the outside
world.95
OtheractsofsovereigntycitedbyChinesescholarstosupportChinasclaimtotheSouth
China Sea islands include the installation of facilities for fishing, forecasting and navigation,
rescues of Chinese and foreign vessels in distress at sea,96 granting and revoking licenses to
private companies for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, and organizing
largescalefishingandotherproductionactivitiesaroundtheSpratlysandParacels.97
The Qing Ji Waijao Shi Liao (Historic Materials of the Diplomacy of the Qing Dynasty)
makes reference to plans by the Qing Customs and General Revenue Office between 1862
and1874toerectlighthousesintheDongsha[Pratas]Islandsforfacilitatingnavigationinthe
South China Sea.98 Similar plans were made in 1908 by the Qing Customs Office to build
lighthousesontheXisha[Paracel]Islandsupontherequestofforeigncountries.99
Followingthe1911Revolution,thenewgovernmentofGuangdongProvinceplacedthe
Paracels under the jurisdiction of Ya County (Ya Xian) of Hainan Province. This decision was
reaffirmedbytheSouthernMilitaryGovernmentin1921onMarch30,1921,theGovernorof
Guangdong Province annexed the Paracel Islands and placed them under the jurisdiction of
HainanIsland.100TheMFAassertsthattheRepublicofChinatookanumberofothermeasures
todemonstrateChinesesovereigntyovertheSouthChina Seaislands.Someofthemeasures
citedbytheMFAinclude:(1)furnishingnationalflagstoChinesefishermenandfishingboats
engaged in fishing in the Spratly Islands; (2) organizing trips to the Spratlys to survey their
history andgeography;and (3) authorizing amapprinting and toponymic agency to rename
and approve the names of all the islands on the South China Sea including the Nansha
Islands.101
In May 1928, the government of Guangdong Province deployed a team of military
officers, government officials and scientific and technological personnel to the Paracels to
conduct field surveys and investigations.102 Between 1932 and 1935, the Republic of China
establishedaninteragencyCommitteefortheReviewofMapsofLandsandWatersofChina,
93
ShenII,atp.118.
94
Id.,atpp.119120.
95
Id.,atp.121;seealsoSuHao,note28supra.
96
ExamplesofChinesesearchandrescueoperationscitedbyChinesescholarsincludethe1755rescueof16
foreignsailorswhowereshipwreckedbyastormandthe1762rescueofshipsfromXianluo(currentdayThailand)
thathadbeendamagedinthevicinityoftheParacels.ShenI,atp.35.
97
ShenII,atp.134.
98
Id.
99
Id.,atpp.134135;seealsoShenI,atp.36.
100
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.101.
101
MFA,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea;seealsoSuHao,note28supra.
102
TheteamproducedadetailedReportofSurveysontheXisha[Paracel]Islands.ShenI,atp.38.SeealsoTao
Cheng,note31supra,atpp.273274.
15
which included officials from the Headquarters of the General Staff, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs,theMinistryofForeignAffairs,theNavyCommand,theMinistryofEducationandthe
MongolianandTibetanAffairsCommission.Thiscommitteeexaminedandapprovedthenames
for 132 of the land features located in the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes, as well as
Macclesfield Bank.103 The committee subsequently depicted these features on the 1935
ZhongguoNanHaiGeDaoyuTu(MapoftheIslandsintheSouthChinaSea).104Thefollowing
year,BaiMeichuafamousChinesegeographerdrewupTheWholeMapofChinaAfterthe
SouthwardExpansionoftheSeaBorder,whichforthefirsttimedepictedJamesShoalatfour
degreesnorthlatitudeChinassouthernmostpoint.105Also,in1936,theChinesegovernment
constructed meteorological observatories, radio stations, lighthouses and similar types of
structuresintheParacelsinaccordancewitharesolutionadoptedbythe1930HongKong
ConferenceonMeteorologyintheFarEast.106
FollowingWorldWarII,theMinistryofInternalAffairs,inconsultationwiththeChinese
Navy and the government of Guangdong Province, appointed Xiao Ciyi and Mai Yunyu as
Special Commissioners for the Paracel and Spratly Islands, respectively, in 1946. According to
theMFA,thecommissionersweretaskedwithtakingoverthetwoarchipelagoesanderecting
sovereigntymarkersontheislands.107InOctoberandNovember1946,ROCnavalunitsvisited
the Paracels and Spratlys and assisted in setting up radio and meteorological stations,
including a weather station on Itu Aba (Taiping) Island.108 Ministry of Internal Affairs officials
alsoconductedsurveysandotheradministrativefunctionswithregardtoselectedislandsand
reefsofbothislandgroups.109Additionally,NationalisttroopswerestationedonItuAbaIsland
tooverseeandpatrolneighboringislandsandadjacentwaters.110
In 1947, the islets were temporarily placed under the administration of the ROC Navy
andtheMinistryofInternalAffairsrenamed159islands,reefs,isletsandshoalsintheSouth
China Sea, including the Nansha Islands and subsequently publicized all the names for
administrative purposes in 1948.111 Also, in June 1947, the government of Guangdong
ProvinceorganizedtheExhibitionFairofItemsandRaritiesfromtheXishaandNanshaIslands.
According to Chinese scholars, the exhibit contained more than 1,300 artifacts that provided
further evidence of Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea islands.112 Archeological
103
In1983,theChineseToponymyCommitteepublicizedtheapprovednamesof287islands,reefs,islets,and
shoalsontheSouthChinaSea.MFA,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea.
104
Id.;seealsoShenII,atp.128(ThiswaspurportedlythefirstofficialmappublishedbytheRepublicofChina.);
ShenI,atp.39;XuZhiliang,LiLixin,FanHong,andZhouXin,TheBorderSignificanceoftheSouthChinaSeaNine
DashLineinChineseHisotricalMapsAlsoaDiscussionofJurisdictionalRightsOverIslands,Reefs,andWaters
WithintheNineDashLine,BEIJINGTAIPINGYANGXUEBAO(PACIFICJOURNAL)7984,Feb.25,2013.
105
XuZhiliang,LiLixin,FanHong,andZhouXin,note104supra.
106
ShenI,atp.39.
107
108
ShenII,atp.137;seealsoShenI,atpp.4445.
109
Id.
110
Id.SeealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atp.192;B.Dubner,note29supra,atp.310.
111
MFA,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea;seealsoShenII,atpp.107,145;ShenI,atp.45.AccordingtoChinese
scholars,nonation,includingFranceandVietnam,protestedtheseactions.H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,at
p.14.
112
ShenI,atp.45.OtherarcheologicaldiscoveriescitedbyChinesescholarstodemonstrateChinashistoricalties
totheParacelIslandsandotherareasintheSouthChinaSeainclude:
16
reportsthatpurportedlydocumenttheexistenceofaChinesepagodaonPattleIslandhavealso
beencitedinsupportofChinasclaimtotheSouthChinaSeaislands.However,thepagodawas
destroyed,sothereisnowaytoverifytheaccuracyofthesereports.113
TheoriginsofChinasninedashline(then11dashline)intheSouthChinaSeacanbe
tracedtotheKuomintanggovernmentoftheRepublicofChinathelinefirstappearedin1947
andwasdepictedonamapoftheSouthChinaSeain1948.AccordingtoChinesescholars,this
mapNanHaiZhudaoWeizhiTu(MapofLocationsofSouthChinaSeaIslands)wasintended
to indicate the traditional boundary of Chinas territory in the South China Sea.114
Additionally,inFebruary1948,theMinistryoftheInteriorapprovedandpublishedtheRepublic
of China Administrative Region Map, which also depicted Chinas 11dash line claim in the
SouthChinaSea.115Therightsconveyedbythelineincludedsovereigntyovertheislandsinthe
South China Sea andwater resource development and jurisdiction, namely fishing rights.116
AncientChinesecoinsdiscoveredintheParacelsbyJapanesefishermenin1920andProfessorWang
GuangweiofZhongshanUniversityin1947.
AncientChinesecoinsdiscoveredbyFangJun,DirectoroftheRadioStationinthePratasIslands,in1935.
Between1974and1975,archaeologistsofGuangdongProvinceuncoveredthousandsofpiecesof
historicalrelicsontheParacelIslands,includingpotteryandporcelainitemsdatingfromtheSouthern
Dynasty(420589),theSuiDynasty(581618),theTangDynasty(618907),theSongDynasty(9601279),
theYuanDynasty(12061368),theMingDynasty(13681644),theQingDynasty(16441911),andmodem
times(1912).
BetweenMayandJune1991,agroupofexpertsledbyProfessorWangHengjieuncoveredhistorical
ChineserelicsintheParacelIslands,includingpotteryandstonewaremadeintheprimitiveera(pre21st
centuryB.C.),theSpringandAutumnPeriod(770476B.C.),theWarringStatesPeriod(476221),theQin
Dynasty(221206B.C.),theHanDynasty(206B.C.220A.D.),theTangDynasty(618907),theSong
Dynasty(9601279),theYuanDynasty(12791368),theMingDynasty(13681644),andtheQingDynasty
(16441911).
ArchaeologistsdiscoveredresidentialhousesoftheMingandQingdynasties(13681911)ontheParacel
Islandsin1995.
BetweenAprilandMay1996,aresearchteamdiscoverednumerousstonesculptures,granitepillars,
beamsandotheritemsinthemiddlewestoftheSouthChinaSea,tothenortheastofShanhuIslandof
theXishaIslands,morethan200nauticalmilesofftheChinesemainland,includinga300yearold
headlessstonesculptureofamandressedasanancientminister,asmallsculptureofastonelionand
othersculptures,aswellasagreatnumberoffragmentsofpotteryandporcelainfromtheSong(960
1279),Yuan(12711368),Ming(13681644)andQing(16441911)dynasties.
Id.,atpp.4850.
113
114
ShenII,atp.129.
115
XuZhiliang,LiLixin,FanHong,andZhouXin,note104supra.The11dashlinewasreaffirmedbythenewly
establishedgovernmentofthePeoplesRepublicofChinain1949,butwassubsequentlyreplacedbyaninedash
linein1953afterZhouEnlaiauthorizedtheeliminationoftwoofthedashesintheGulfofTonkin.LiJinmingand
LiDexia,TheDottedLineontheChineseMapoftheSouthChinaSea:ANote,OCEANDEVELOPMENT&INTERNATIONAL
LAW,34:287295,2003.
116
Id.ReferencetotheUshapedlinewasalsoincludedinChinas2009protesttotheUNregardingVietnamsand
MalaysiassubmissionstotheCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelf(CLCS),whichclaimedextended
continentalshelvesintheSouthChinaSea.Inbothofthesedemarches,Beijingreaffirmsthatithasindisputable
sovereigntyovertheislandsintheSouthChinaSeaandtheadjacentwaters,andenjoyssovereignrightsand
jurisdictionovertherelevantwatersaswellastheseabedandsubsoilthereof[asdepictedontheUshaped
map].TheexecutivesummaryofVietnamssubmissiontotheCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelf
isavailableathttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/vnm_clcs37_2009e.pdf.The
17
Then, in March 1948, over 100 ROC marines were deployed to the Paracels, Spratlys, and
MacclesfieldBanktorelievepreviouslystationedtroops.117
AfterthePeoplesRepublicofChinawasfoundedin1949,thegovernmentadoptedthe
Ushaped line in all official Chinese maps depicting the South China Sea.118 Within this line,
BeijingclaimsthatithasindisputablesovereigntyovertheislandsintheSouthChinaSeaand
the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as
wellastheseabedandsubsoilthereof[asdepictedontheUshapedmap].119AlloftheSouth
ChinaSeaislandstheSpratly,Paracel,andPratasIslands,MacclesfieldBank,andScarborough
Shoalarecontainedwithintheline.
InAprilMay1950,TaiwanwithdrewallofitsforcesfromtheSouthChinaSeaislands,
includingWoodyIslandandItuAbaIsland,afterChineseCommunistforceslandedonHainan
Island.120Communistforces,however,didnotoccupyWoodyorItuAbaIslandsaftertheywere
abandonedbytheNationalists.Frenchgarrisonsmaintainedcontrolofanumberoftheislands
intheCrescentGroupoftheParacels,buttheytoofailedtooccupyItuAbaorWoodyIslands
followingthedepartureoftheChineseNationalisttroops.121
Chinese scholars maintain that the intensity of the Chinese Civil War during the late
1940sandtheharshconditionsprevalentintheSouthChinaSeaislandspreventedChinafrom
pursuingamoreactiveprogramforthedevelopmentandadministrationoftheSouthChina
SeaIslands.122ThesescholarsarguethatTaiwanswithdrawalfromtheregionshouldnotbe
viewedasanabandonmentofChinassovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislandsforseveral
reasons. First, even if Taiwanese authorities had intended to abandon the South China Sea
islands,theycouldhavedonesoonlyonbehalfoftheirownpoliticalforces,notonbehalfof
Chinaasacountry,forthenewGovernmentinBeijinghadreplacedtheNationalistsasthesole
legitimateGovernmentofChina.123Second,Taiwanswithdrawalwasinfactbasedsolelyon
military and political considerationsfear of a Chinese Communist invasion of the islands
andthatTaiwanhadnointentionofabandoningtheislandsonbehalfofChina.124
executivesummaryofthejointVietnam/MalaysiasubmissiontotheCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinental
Shelfisavailableat
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/mysvnm_clcs33_2009e.pdf.Copiesof
ChinasproteststotheVietnameseandtheMalaysiansubmissionsareavailableat
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdfand
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_vnm.pdf.
117
ShenI,atp.45.
118
Id.
119
NoteVerbale,PermanentMissionofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,CML/17/2009andCML/18/2009,May7,
2009,availableathttp://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm.
120
MartinH.Katchen,TheSpratlyIslandsandtheLawoftheSea:DangerousGroundforAsianPeace,ASIAN
SURVEY,Vol.17,No.12(Dec.1977),pp.11671181,atp.1178;M.Bennett,note14supra,atp.438;M.Chemillier
Gendreau,note15supra,atp.116.
121
122
ShenI,atp.45.
123
Id.,atp.46.
124
Id.
18
TaiwaneseforcesreturnedtoItuAbain1956,afterTomasCloma125claimedaportionof
the Spratly Islands, and have maintained a presence on the island ever sincethe longest
continuousoccupationofanyoftheSpratlyssincethedisputeovertheislandsbegan.126PRC
forcesoccupiedWoodyIslandaroundthesametime.127Taiwanalsopurportedlycontinuedto
periodicallyinspectandsurveytheSpratlyarchipelagoduringthisperiod.InOctober1963,for
example, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Naval
GeneralHeadquartersconductedajointinspectionofItuAbaIsland,SpratlyIsland,Amboyna
Cay,ThituIsland,SouthwestCay,NortheastCay,WestYorkIsland,LoaitaIsland,SandyCay,and
Namyit Island.128 Three years later, a naval contingent deployed to Southwest Cay,Northeast
Cay, Thitu Island, and Namyit Island to reerect Chinese national boundary tablets.129
Notwithstanding continued opposition to its claims, the Chinese government subsequently
incorporatedtheSpratlysintoGuangdongProvinceandHainanProvince.AccordingtotheMFA,
Chinahascontinuedtotakeeffectiveactionstomaintainitssovereigntyovertheislands.
c. Persistent Objector
Chinese scholars additionally point to Chinas persistent and resolute objections to all
foreignclaimstotheSouthChinaSeaislandsasevidenceofBeijingseffectiveadministrationof
thetwoislandgroups.130ThefirstcasecitedbyChinaisan1883incidentinvolvingaGerman
surveyvessel.AfterlearningthatGermanswereconductingsurveysintheSpratlysandParacels
without Chinas consent, the Qing government lodged strong protests with Berlin and the
Germansterminatedthesurvey.131
Chinese scholars claim that China similarly protested French efforts to occupy the
ParacelandSpratlyIslandsinthe1930s.FollowingFrancesattempttooccupytheParacelsin
December1931,ChinalodgedadiplomaticprotestwiththeFrenchForeignMinistryonJuly27,
1932, denying Frances claims to the archipelago.132 Two months later, on September 29th,
ChinadeliveredadiplomaticnotetotheFrenchgovernmentcitingthe1887SinoFrenchTreaty,
highlightinglongtimeuseoftheisletsbyChinesefishermenandindicating:
125
TomasClomawasaFilipinolawyerandbusinessmanwhoconductedaprivateexpeditiontotheSouthChina
SeaandclaimedanumberofislandsinhisownnameasFreedomland.Id.,atp.1179.SeealsoM.Bennett,note
14supra,atp.438.
126
B.Murphy,note29supra,atp.193;seealsoM.Katchen,note120supra,atpp.11791180;S.Tnnesson,note
55supra,atp.11.
127
S.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.14andnote28(On21February1956,theFrenchwarshipFrancisGarnier
wentnearWoodyIslandandspottedthepresenceofelementshostingthePRCflag,aroundthirtypeople,four
engines,threebarracksunderconstructionandasmallshipwiththePRCflag.).
128
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.16.
129
Id.
130
ShenII,atpp.134and140152.Itisimportanttonote,however,thatneithertheMFAnorChinesescholarscite
anyreferencetoChineseprotestsofVietnameseeconomicexploitationoftheParacelsandSpratlysinthe17th,
18th,and19thcenturies.SuchanomissionclearlyundercutsChinasargumentthatitwasapersistentobjector.
131
ShenII,atp.140;seealsoSuHao,note28supra;ShenI,atp.35;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.11.
132
Frenchclaimswerepurportedlybasedonthealleged1816occupationofthe[Paracels]bytheemperorof
Vietnamandhisallegedconstructionoftemplesandmonumentstherein1835.ShenI,atp.40.SeealsoTao
Cheng,note31supra,atp.268;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.12.
19
that the Guangdong Provincial Government of China had granted applications to

Chinese nationals to develop and exploit natural resources in the Xisha Islands, that
Chinahadlongexercisedsovereigntyovertheseislands,thattheChineseGovernment
was skeptical about the alleged Vietnamese activities in the Xisha Islands in 1816 and
1835, and that the Chinese Government would require the French to provide
confirmation of the locations of the alleged Vietnamesebuilt monuments and
temples.133
Frencheffortstoresolvethematterdiplomaticallyfailed.134AsubsequentChinesediplomatic
exchangeclaimedthatitwouldhavebeenimpossibleforVietnamtoannextheParacelsin1816
because,atthetime,VietnamwasaChinesevassalstate:
Based on our research and investigation, in 1816, Annam was subject to China.
Whetherintermsofmightorintermsofreason,itwasimpossibleforAnnamtoinvade
Chinasterritory.Whatsmore,inthehistoryandbooksofChina,thereisnorecordation
whatsoeverthattheXishaIslandswereonceoccupiedby[Chinas]vassalStateAnnam.
TherecordsoftheVietnamesehistorymusthavebeeninconsistentwiththefacts.135
ChinalikewiseprotestedFrancessubsequentoccupationoftheParacelIslandsonJuly
3,1938.AccordingtoChinesescholars,ChinasambassadorinParis,WilliamKoo,delivereda
diplomatic note (dated July 18, 1938) to the French government objecting to the French
invasionoftheislands.136
China repeated its objections after France renewed its claims to the South China Sea
islandsattheconclusionoftheSecondWorldWar.OnJanuary19,1947,theChineseEmbassy
in Paris issued a public notice stating that the Xisha [Paracel] Islands are Chinese territory
afterFrancereasserteditsclaimstothearchipelagoandlandedtroopsonPattleIsland.137Two
dayslater,theMinistryofForeignAffairsdeliveredadiplomaticnotetotheFrenchEmbassyin
NanjingtorejecttheFrenchclaims,statingthattheXishaIslandsbelongtoChina.138Aweek
later, on January 28, the Foreign Ministry delivered another diplomatic note to the French
Embassy protesting Frances occupation of Pattle (Shanhu) Island in the Paracels.139 Talks
aimed at resolving the dispute were held in Paris between February 25 and July 4, 1947;
133
ShenI,atp.40;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.12;M.Bennett,note14supra,atp.437;ToddC.Kelly,
VietnameseClaimstotheTruongSaArchipelago[Ed.SpratlyIslands],EXPLORATIONSINSOUTHEASTASIANSTUDIES,Vol.3
(Fall1999),UniversityofHawaiiManoa,availableathttp://www.hawaii.edu/cseas/pubs/explore/todd.html.
134
T.Kelly,note133supra.
135
ShenI,atpp.41and58.Francepurportedlydidnotrespondtothisnoteformorethanayear.H.ChiuandC.
Park,note42supra,atp.12.SeealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,Annex10(Noteof29September
1932fromtheLegationoftheChineseRepublicinFrancetotheMinistryofForeignAffairs,Paris)(100yearsago
IndochinawasunderChinesetutelage.SincetheParacelIslandsalreadyformedpartofChinasterritory,Indochina
hadnorighttocarryoutactsofoccupationonthepossessionsofitssuzerain.).
136
ShenI,atp.43.
137
ShenII,atp.145;seealsoShenI,atp.45;TaoCheng,note31supra,atpp.269270,276;M.Chemillier
138
Id.
139
Id.
20
however, China rejected Frances suggestion that the issue be resolved by an arbitral
tribunal.140
The MFA claims that China also protested Frances occupation of nine of the Spratly
Islandsin1933.141AccordingtoChinesescholars,Chinasprotestswerewidelyreportedinthe
Chinese media. On July 26, 1933, Shen Bao reported that the Chinese Foreign Ministry had
protestedFrancesformaloccupationoftheSpratlyIslands:
The[Spratly]islandshavebeeninhabitedbyChinesefishermenonly,andhavebeen
recognized by the international community as Chinas territories. We are shocked to
havereceivedtheofficialFrenchjournalannouncingFrancesformaloccupation.The
ForeignMinistrywillputforwardseriousprotestsovertheFrenchactions.142
Aweeklater,onthe2ndofAugust,thenewspaperreportedthatasimilarprotestwasfiledby
theGuangdongprovincialgovernment:
The Southwest Commissioner is seriously concerned with the incidents of France

occupying the[Spratly] islands, and will do everything he can to preserve Chinas
sovereignty over these island groups. the Yue [Guangdong] Provincial
GovernmenthasalreadylodgedproteststotheFrenchauthorities.143
Two days later the Chinese government delivered a diplomatic note to French
authorities reserving its position on Chinas rights to the Spratlys pending an investigation of
theFrenchactions:
The Chinese Government is very much concerned with[the Frenchdeclared

occupation of and sovereignty over nine islands in the South China Sea]. She hereby
requeststhe Minister of the French Legation to inquire into and ascertain the name,
theexactlocationandthelongitudeandlatitudeofeachislandandreportthesameto
the Chinese Government. Pending such investigation, the Chinese Government
reserveshertitlesvisvisthedeclarationoftheFrenchGovernment.144
After confirming that the islands in question were in fact part of the Spratlys, the Chinese
AmbassadortoFranceWellingtonKoo(GuWeijun)protestedFrancesoccupation,stating
that those islands and the entire Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands) were the territory of the
140
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.40andAnnex35(TelegramfromMinistryofForeignAffairs,
Nanking,8March1947).
141
TheninefeaturesoccupiedbyFrancewere:AmboynaCay,SpratlyIsland,ItuAbaIsland,LoaitaIsland,Thitu
Island,NortheastCay,SouthwestCay,NamyitIsland,andWestYorkIsland.
142
ShenII,atp.143;seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.18;B.Murphy,note29supra,atpp.191,
203.
143
ShenII,atpp.143144.
144
Id.,atp.144;seealsoShenI,atp.41.
21
RepublicofChina.145TheMFAadditionallyarguesthatitisabasicnormofinternationallaw
thatinvasiondoesnotentailsovereignty.146
The MFA claims that, since 1949, the PRC has maintained its position as a persistent
objector, challenging each and every foreign claim to and invasion ofthe South China Sea
Islands.147 For example, in April 1956, after South Vietnamese troops relieved the French
forcesonPattleIslandintheParacels,Chinarespondedbydeployingtroopstotheeasternpart
of the archipelago (Amphitrites Group).148 Then in May 1956, the Chinese government
protestedthePhilippineclaimtosevenoftheSpratlyIslands,reiteratingthattheseislands
have always been a part of Chinese territory and that China has indisputable, legitimate
sovereigntyovertheseislands.149Laterthatmonth,onMay29th,theChineseForeignMinistry
issuedaDeclarationofSovereigntyovertheNansha(Spratly)Islands,emphasizingthatChina's
legitimatesovereigntyovertheNanshaIslandsshallundernocircumstancesbeviolatedbyany
country on any ground or by any means.150 Without going into detail, the MFA claims that
145
ShenII,atp.144;seealsoShenI,atp.42;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.13.
146
ChineseForeignMinistrysMemorandumonQuestionofXishaandNanshaIslands,XINHUAGEN.OVERSEASNEWS
SERV.,May12,1988,quotedinM.Bennett,note14supra,atnotes15and93.
147
ShenII,atpp.145152.
148
149
ShenI,atp.66;seealsoJeanetteGreenfield,ChinaandtheLawoftheSea,inTHELAWOFTHESEAINTHEASEAN
PACIFICREGION22(JamesCrawford&DonaldR.Rothwelleds.,MartinusNijhoffPublishers1994),atp.33;Xu
Zhiliang,LiLixin,FanHong,andZhouXin,note104supra;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.135;B.Murphy,
note29supra,atp.193.
150
SimilarprotestsweremadeinJanuaryandFebruary1974againstSouthVietnamsclaimstoTaiping(ItuAba)
Island,Nanwei(Spratly)Island,andotherislandsintheSpratlys:TheNanshaIslands,XishaIslands,Zhongsha
IslandsandDongshaIslands,areallpartofChineseterritory.ThePeople'sRepublicofChinahasindisputable
sovereigntyovertheseislandsandtheirsurroundingseaarea.ShenI,atpp.6667.InApril1984,Chinaprotested
VietnamsillegaloccupationofsomeoftheSpratlyIslandsandrequestedtheVietnamesetowithdrawfromall
islandswhichithadoccupiedillegally.Id.,atp.69.Similarly,inNovember1982andMay1995,Chinaprotested
MalaysiasoccupationofSwallowReef(DanwanJiao).Id.,atpp.69,71.SeealsoM.Bennett,note14supra,atp.
439;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.43.OtherexamplesofclaimedChineseadministrativecontrol
overtheSouthChinaSeaislandsinclude:
In1958,theHainanSpecialAdministrativePrefectureestablishedanAdministrativeBureauoftheXisha,
NanshaandZhongshaIslandswithitsheadquartersstationedontheislandofYongxing,oneoftheXisha
Islands,thelargestislandintheSouthChinaSea.
InFebruaryandApril1959,ChinaprotestedSouthVietnamsmaltreatmentofChinesefishermeninthe
vicinityofChenhang(Duncan)IslandandJinqing(Drummond)Island,reiteratingthattheXishaIslands
areChina'sterritory.
InMarch1969,theAdministrativeBureauoftheZhongsha,XishaandNanshaIslandswasrenamedThe
RevolutionaryCommitteeoftheXisha,ZhongshaandNanshaIslandsofGuangdongProvince.Atthe
sametime,aPeople'sArmedForcesDepartmentandalocalPublicSecurityStationweresetupon
YongxingIsland.
In1979,TheRevolutionaryCommitteeoftheXisha,ZhongshaandNanshaIslandsofGuangdong
Province"wasrenamedTheCommitteeofGuangdongProvinceontheAffairsoftheXisha,Nanshaand
ZhongshaIslands,placingtheseislandsunderthedirectjurisdictionofGuangdongProvince.
InApril1988,upontheestablishmentofHainanProvince,theadministrativeorganfortheSouthChina
SeaislandswasrenamedTheCommitteeofHainanProvinceontheAffairsoftheXisha,Nanshaand
ZhongshaIslands,transferringthejurisdictionovertheseislandsfromGuangdongProvincetoHainan
Province.
22
Chinahascontinuedtoassertindisputablesovereigntyoverthetwoarchipelagoesintothe21st
century.
d. Reaffirming Sovereignty
Following the Republic of Vietnams occupation of Spratly Island in 1956 and Robert,
Pattle, and Money Islands in the Paracel archipelago in 1957, China reaffirmed its claim of
sovereigntyoveralloftheSouthChinaSeaislandswhenitdeclareda12nauticalmileterritorial
sea in 1958.151 Similar assertions were made in Article 2 of the 1992 territorial sea law,152 in
ChinasdeclarationuponratifyingUNCLOSin1996,153inArticle2ofthe1996straightbaseline
law,154andinthe2009LawofthePeoplesRepublicofChinaonIslandProtection.155
ChinaadditionallyreaffirmeditssovereigntyoveralloftheSouthChinaSeaislandsand
their adjacent waters and continental shelves in a demarche filed with the United Nations in
2009. The demarche protested the enactment of Republic Act 9522, which defines the new
Philippine archipelagic baselines and reasserts Filipino sovereignty over the Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island) in the South China Sea.156 Specifically,
BeijingassertedthatthenewPhilippinelawillegallyclaimsHuangyanIslandandsomeislands
andreefsofNanshaIslandsofChinaasareasoverwhichthePhilippinesexercisessovereignty
andjurisdiction.157BeijingthenreiteratedthatHuangyanIslandandNansha[Spratly]Islands
InAugust1988,anOceanicMeteorologicalObservationStationwassetupontheYongshuReefinthe
NanshaIslands.
ShenI,atpp.4748,6571.
151
TheGovernmentofthePeople'sRepublicofChinadeclares:
1.ThebreadthoftheterritorialseaofthePeople'sRepublicofChinashallbetwelvenauticalmiles.This
provisionappliestoallterritoriesofthePeople'sRepublicofChinaincludingtheChinesemainlandandits
coastalislands,aswellasTaiwananditssurroundingislands,thePenghuIslands,theDongshaIslands,the
XishaIslands,theZhongshaIslands,theNanshaIslandsandallotherislandsbelongingtoChinawhichare
separatedfromthemainlandanditscoastalislandsbythehighseas.
DeclarationoftheGovernmentofthePeoplesRepublicofChinaonChinasTerritorialSea(Sept.4,1958),reprinted
inU.S.DEPT.OFSTATELIMITSINTHESEANO.43,StraightBaselines:PeoplesRepublicofChina,July1,1972.The
RepublicofVietnamallegedlydidnotprotestthedeclaration.H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.15.Other
examplesofChineseprotestsofforeignincursionsintotheParacelandSpratlyIslandsincludethearrestof82
ChinesefishermenonDuncanIslandintheParacelsbytheRepublicofVietnamNavyin1959andU.S.
reconnaissanceactivitiesintheterritorialseaandairspaceoftheParacelsbetween1960and1971.Id.,atp.1516.
152
LawoftheTerritorialSeaandtheContiguousZoneof25Feb.1992.
153
DeclarationofthePeoplesRepublicofChinauponratifyingUNCLOS,Jun.7,1996,availableat
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#ChinaUponratification.
ChinasdeclarationisconsistentwithitspositiononthedisputedislandsduringthenegotiationsofUNCLOS.On
July2,1974,theheadoftheChinesedelegation(CaiShupan)stated:TheXishaIslandsandNanshaIslandsinthe
SouthChinaSeahavealwaysbeenaninalienablepartofChineseterritory.TheChinesegovernmentandthe
ChinesepeopleshallundernocircumstancesallowtheSaigonAuthoritiestoviolateChina'sterritorial
sovereignty.ShenI,atp.67.
154
StatementoftheChineseGovernmentontheBaselineoftheTerritorialSeaofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,
May15,1996,availableathttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/CHN.htm.
155
LawofthePeoplesRepublicofChinaonIslandProtection,Dec.26,2009,availableat
http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/201001/t20100110_300174.html.
156
REPUBLICACTNO.9522,Mar.10,2009,AnActtoAmendCertainProvisionsofRepublicActNo.3046,asAmended
byRepublicActNo.5446,toDefinetheArchipelagicBaselinesofthePhilippinesandforOtherPurposes.
157
ThePermanentMissionofthePeoplesRepublicofChinatotheUN,NoteCML/12/2009,13April2009.
23
havebeenpartoftheterritoryofChinasinceancienttimeandthatChinahasindisputable
sovereigntyovertheislands.158
ReferencetotheChinasSouthChinaSeaclaimsalsoappearsina2009protesttothe
United Nations regarding Vietnams and Malaysias submissions to the Commission on the
LimitsoftheContinentalShelf(CLCS)claimingextendedcontinentalshelvesintheSouthChina
Sea.159Inbothofthesedemarches,Beijingreaffirmsthatithasindisputablesovereigntyover
the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and
jurisdictionovertherelevantwatersaswellastheseabedandsubsoilthereof[asdepictedon
theUshapedmap].160
InJune2012,BeijingestablishedanewprefecturelevelcitySanshaCity(thecityof
threesands)toadministertheParacels(Xisha),MacclesfieldBank(Zhongsha),andtheSpratlys
(Nansha). The seat of government for the new city is on Woody Island (Yongxing) in the
Paracels.161Then,onNovember29,2013,the5thMeetingoftheStandingCommitteeofthe5th
HainanPeoplesCongressadoptedtheHainanProvincesMeasurestoImplementtheFisheries
LawofthePRC.162Thesenewregulation,whichtookeffectonJanuary1,2014,requireforeign
fishing vessels to obtain prior approval from Chinese authorities to operate in the sea area
administered by Hainan Provincean area that includes over 2 million square kilometers of
ocean space in the South China Sea (i.e., the waters contained within Chinas ninedash
line).163Shipsthatfailtocomplywiththenewregulationswillbeforcedoutofthearea,will
havetheircatchandequipmentconfiscated,andcanbefinedupto500,000(about$82,000);
inmoreseriouscases,thevesselmayalsobeconfiscated.164
e. Military Intervention
Whendeemednecessaryandstrategicallyopportune,Chinahasalsousedmilitaryforce
toadvanceitssovereigntyclaimsintheSouthChinaSea.OnJanuary20,1974,Chineseforces
expelled the South Vietnamese garrison from Pattle Island after a brief naval and land
158
Id.
159
TheexecutivesummaryofVietnamssubmissiontotheCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelfis
availableathttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/vnm_clcs37_2009e.pdf;The
executivesummaryofthejointVietnam/MalaysiasubmissiontotheCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinental
Shelfisavailableat
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/mysvnm_clcs33_2009e.pdf.
160
CopiesofChinasproteststotheVietnameseandMalaysiansubmissionsareavailableat
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdfand
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_vnm.pdf.
161
PiaLeeBrago,ChinaTighteningGriponSpratlys,THEPHILIPPINESTAR,June23,2012.
162
XinhuaWang,PRCApprovesMeasuresRequiringApprovalofForeignFishinginHainanAdministeredWaters,
December1,2013,citedinCRAIGMURRAY&KIMBERLYHSU,U.S.CHINAECONOMICANDSECURITYREVIEWCOMMISSIONSTAFF
REPORT,CHINASNEWFISHINGREGULATIONSSEEKTOJUSTIFYANDCONSOLIDATECONTROLINTHESOUTHCHINASEA1n.1(Jan.27,
2014).
163
FisheriesLawofthePeoplesRepublicofChina(2004Amendment)(promulgatedbytheStandingComm.Natl
PeoplesCong.byOrderNo.34ofthehPresidentofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,Jan.20,1986;Amendedforthe
secondtimebytheStandingComm.NatlPeoplesCong.,Aug.28,2004),art.35,availableat
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=3663&lib=law.
164
Id.,art.46.
24
engagement.165 A second clash between Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces occurred on
March14,1988,inthevicinityofJohnsonSouthReef.166Theskirmishresultedinthesinkingof
several Vietnamese ships and the death of over 70 Vietnamese sailors.167 Following the
engagement,ChinaoccupiedanumberofkeyisletsintheSpratlyarchipelagoCuarteronReef
(Huayang Reef), Eastern Gate Shoal (Dongmen Reef), Fiery Cross Reef (Yongshu Reef), Gaven
Reefs(NanxunReefandXinanReef),JohnsonSouthReef(ChiguaReef),andSubiReef(Zhubi
Reef).168
In1995,ChinaoccupiedMischiefReef(MeijiReef),whichisclaimedbyVietnamandthe
Philippines,andconstructedaseriesofstructures,purportedlytoprovideshelterforChinese
fishermen.169 China has continued to build up the reef since the mid 1990s, including the
installation of military radars and other monitoring equipment. Photographs taken in June
2012revealseveralnewstructuresonthereef,includingawindmill,solarpanels,aconcrete
platform suitable for use as a helipad and a basketball court.170 There is also evidence that
ChinaisimprovingitsfacilitiesatJohnsonSouthReef.Intelligencephotographsreleasedbythe
PhilippinesinMay2014showdifferentstagesofreclamationworkbeingdonebytheChinese
on[the]reef,apparentlyinpreparationfortheconstructionofanairstrip.171
4. International Recognition
TheMFAandChinesescholarsciteanumberofevents,beginninginthe19thcentury,to
supportChinaspositionthattheinternationalcommunityrecognizesitssovereigntyclaimsto
theSouthChinaSeaislands.ChinaadditionallyreliesonanumberofWorldWarIIandpostwar
documents, statements, and publications to substantiate its position that it has indisputable
sovereigntyoverthetwoislandgroups.
a. The SinoFrench Treaty of 1887

Chinese scholars argue that France relinquished any claims it might have had to the
ParacelandSpratlyIslandswhenitsignedtheSinoFrenchTreatyof1887,whichdelimitedthe
border between China and Tonkin (northern Vietnam).172 The demarcation commission
establishedbythe1885SinoFrenchTreatyofPeace,whichwasresponsiblefordelineatingthe
frontier between China and Tonkin, was unable to agree on all points along the line of
demarcation.Accordingly,pursuanttoArticle3oftheTreaty,thematterwasreferredbackto
therespectivegovernmentsFranceandChinatoresolvethedifferences.
165
ShenII,atpp.146148.
166
Id.,atp.149;seealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atpp.195and202;M.Bennett,note14supra,atp.440;
ChristopherC.Joyner,TheSpratlyIslandsDisputeintheSouthChinaSea:Problems,Policies,andProspectsfor
DiplomaticAccommodation,atpp.7172,availableathttp://www.southchinasea.org/onlinepublications/322/;S.
Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.18;T.Kelly,note133supra.
167
168
Id.;seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra.
169
ChinaExpandingMischiefStructures,THEPHILIPPINESTAR,Sept.3,2012.
170
Id.;seealsoC.Joyner,note166supra,atp.73.
171
PiaLeeBrago,PhotosrevealstagesofChinareclamationatreef,THEPHILIPPINESTAR,May16,2014,availableat
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/05/16/1323659/photosrevealstageschinareclamationreef.
172
ConventionConcerningtheDelimitationoftheBorderbetweenChinaandTonkin,signedatBeijing,June26,
1887,availableathttp://www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/167.
25
Tothatend,paragraph2ofthe1887Treaty(Frenchtext)provides,inpart,that
...Theisleswhicharetotheeastofthemeridianof10543'longitudeeastofParis[i.e.,
the meridian of 10803'08" east of the Greenwich meridian], which is to say of the
northsouthlinepassingthroughtheeasternpointoftheislandofTchaKouorQuan
chan(Traco)[Chagu]andformingtheborder,aresimilarlyassignedtoChina.TheGo
tho[Jiutou]islandsandotherislandswhicharetothewestofthismeridianbelongto
Annam.173
ThetranslationoftheChinesetextissomewhatdifferent,providing,inpart,that
Asfarastheislandsintheseaareconcerned,theredlinedrawnbytheofficialsofthe
two countries responsible for delineating the boundary shall be extended southward
fromtheeasternhilltopofChagushe[orWangzhu]andconstitutesthedividingline.
TheislandslyingeastofthislineshallbelongtoChina.TheislandsofJiutousan[Gotho]
andothersmallislandswestofthislineshallbelongtoVietnam.174
BasedontheTreaty,ChineseofficialsandscholarsarguethatalloftheSouthChinaSea
islands lie east of 10803'08" east longitude and that France, therefore, ceded the islands to
China.Accordingly,theyarguethatVietnammaynotclaimsovereigntyovertheislandsasthe
successorstatetoFrance.175
b. French Recognition before World War II

According to some Chinese scholars, France recognized Chinas sovereignty over the
Paracelsin1921.OnMay21stofthatyear,FrenchPrimeMinisterAristideBriandpurportedly
stated that since the Chinese Government has established her sovereignty since 1909, it is
impossibleforusnowtolayaclaimontheseislands.176ThesescholarscitetheChineseJournal
of Diplomatic Review (No. 4, 1934) to support their position. China claims that the French
GovernorGeneralofIndochinaalsoacknowledgedthattheParacelsbelongedtoChinainthe
1920sandthataFrenchnavigatormadeasimilarstatementintheearly1930s,indicatingthat
Annam(Vietnam)didnothaveanyrelationshipwiththeParacels.177
Additionally, Captain Rmy, the Commander of the Navy in Saigon, disclaimed French
sovereigntyovertheParacelsin1920.OnSeptember20,1920,theJapaneseshippingcompany
Mitsui Bussan Kaisha sent a letter to Captain Rmy indicating that it had discovered a
phosphate deposit on the islands that it intended to exploit and asking whether the Paracels
wereFrenchpossessions.CaptainRmyrespondedonSeptember24thindicatingthat
173
Id.
174
ZouKeyuan,MaritimeBoundaryDelimitationintheGulfofTonkin,30OCEANDEV.&INTLLAW235254(1999),at
p.238.
175
Id.,atp.240;seealsoShenI,supra,atp.35;TaoCheng,note31supra,atp.275;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42
supra,atpp.1819;B.Dubner,note29supra,atp.309;M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.446447;M.Chemillier
Gendreau,note15supra,atp.83,Annex10(Noteof29September1932fromtheLegationoftheChineseRepublic
inFrancetotheMinistryofForeignAffairs,Paris).
176
ShenI,atp.40.
177
26

ThereisnopaperintheofficialdocumentsoftheNavyallowingthenationalityofthe
ParacelIslandstobedetermined.Nevertheless,IthinkIcanassureyouthattheyarenot
aFrenchpossession,butthisassertionisbasedsolelyonmypersonalmemoriesandI
cannotprovideyouwithanyconclusivedocumentinsupportofthis.178
Three months later, an article reporting on the exchange between Captain Rmy and
the Japanese company appeared in the January 2, 1921, edition of the Paris newspaper
L'EuropeNouvelle:
Approximately300kilometresfromthecoastofAnnamliesagroupofdesertedrocks,
theParacelIslands.RecentlytheConsulofJapanwrotetotheGovernmentofIndochina
toaskwhetherFranceclaimedownershipoftheislands.Thereplywasnegative.Didthe
officialwhodraftedthereplynotrealizethatonesubmarinebaseintheParacelIslands
wouldbesufficienttoblockadetheentirecoastlineofIndochina?179
China points out that French ownership of the Paracels had been the subject of
discussionbetweenParisandcolonialauthoritiesinIndochinaearlierinthecentury.In 1909,
the French Consul in Canton (Guangzhou)JeanJoseph Beauvaiswrote a letter to the
MinisterofForeignAffairsinParistodiscusspossibleFrenchclaimstotheParacels.Although
BeauvaisindicatedthatFrancemayhaveavalidclaimtotheislands,hewarnedthatclaiming
sovereignty over the Paracels may not be in best interests of France because it could fuel
Chinesenationalism,whichcouldbemoredamagingtousthanthepossessionoftheParacel
Islandswouldbeuseful.180
China additionally asserts that, by 1921, some French officials were suggesting that
France abandon its claims to the islands in exchange for other French interests in China. On
March30,1921,theGovernorofKwangtungannounced(OrderNo.831datedMarch30,1921,
andpublishedintheOfficialGazetteofKwantung(No.2619ofApril2,1921))thatthemilitary
GovernmentofthesouthhaddecidedtoincorporatetheParacelsintothesubprefectureofYai
Hien, Hainan Island.181 Two weeks later, the Minister for the Colonies sent a letter to the
President du Conseil, Minister for Foreign Affairs, suggesting that [i]t would perhaps not be
excessive,inexchangeforofficialrecognitionthattheParacelsareChinese,torequestaformal
commitmentfromthesovereignGovernmentnevertosetupamilitaryornavalbasethereand
to install no facilities to that end.182 Several weeks later, an official from the Directorate for
PoliticalandIndigenousAffairsindicatedinanotedatedMay6,1921,thataFrenchconcession
178
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.105,Annex12(Notedated6May1921,fromDirectoratefor
PoliticalandIndigenousAffairs,GovernmentGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi).
179
Id.,atp.106,Annex12(Notedated6May1921,fromtheDirectorateforPoliticalandIndigenousAffairs,
GovernmentGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi).
180
Id.;seealsoS.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.7.
181
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex12(Notedated6May1921,fromDirectorateforPoliticaland
IndigenousAffairs,GovernmentGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi).
182
Id.,atAnnex16(Noteof18April1921fromtheMinisterfortheColoniestothePresidentduConseil,Minister
forForeignAffairs).
27
ontheParacelscouldmakeiteasiertosettlethematterofcompensationfortheTunnam
railwayandthatinsuchasituation,theabandonmentbyFranceofallrightstoownershipof
theParacelsmightseemlikethecompensationdemandedbytheChinese.183
DespiteFrancescontinuedinterestsintheParacels,theKwangtungProvisionalCouncil
adoptedaresolutiontomineguanodepositsintheParacelsonFebruary14,1930.Twomonths
later,ChineseofficialsandscholarsassertthatFranceimplicitlyrecognizedChinesesovereignty
overtheParacelsatthe1930HongKongFarEasternMeteorologicalConference.Aresolution
adoptedduringtheconferenceprovidedthat

TheConferencerecognizesthegreatimportancetotheMeteorologyoftheChinaSeas
of the Meteorological Station established at Pratas by the Government of China. It
expresses the hope and voices the desire that similar stations be established in zones
notyetrepresented,especiallyontheMacclesfieldBankandtheParacels.184

ThereisnoevidencethattheFrenchIndochinarepresentativewhoattendedtheconference,
MonsieurBruzon,objectedtotheproposal.Accordingly,Chinaarguesthatthisrequestproves
thatnotonlyaretheParacelIslandsinternationallyrecognizedasbelongingtoChina,butthat
the French themselves share this view.185 The following year, China announced that it was
invitingbidsfromforeigncompaniestoexploitthephosphatedepositsintheParacelsand,in
early1932,publiclycalledforbids.186
c. French Recognition after World War II

SomeChineseandforeignscholarsmaintainthatFrancetacitlyacknowledgedChinese
sovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislandsafterWorldWarII.PursuanttoGeneralOrderNo.
1, Japanese forces in Vietnam north of 16 north latitude were instructed to surrender to
Chinese Nationalist forces. The northern part of Vietnam was subsequently placed under
ChineseoccupationuntilMarch1946,whenNationalistforcesreturnedtheoccupiedportionof
Vietnam to France. Pursuant to an exchange of notes, China and France agreed that French
forceswouldrelieveChinesetroopsstationedinIndochinanorthofthe16thdegreeoflatitude
(whichincludedtheParacelandSpratlyIslands)nolaterthanMarch31,1946.187Atthetime,
France allegedly did not inquire into the status of the Paracels or Spratlys; nor did France or
Vietnam file a diplomatic protest when Nationalist forces remained on Woody Island and
returnedtoItuAbaIslandin1946.Similarly,FrancedidnotobjectwhentheRepublicofChina
183
Id.,atAnnex12(Notedated6May1921,fromDirectorateforPoliticalandIndigenousAffairs,Government
GeneralofIndochina,Hanoi).
184
Resolution4,CONFERENCEOFDIRECTORSOFFAREASTERNWEATHERSERVICES,HONGKONG,1930,atp.58,availableat
http://www.hko.gov.hk/mwginternal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=7sEupYOYvs.SeealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note
42supra,atp.12.
185
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,Annex10(Noteof29September1932fromtheLegationoftheChinese
RepublicinFrancetotheMinistryofForeignAffairs,Paris).
186
WhitePaperOntheHoangSa(Paracel)&TruongSa(Spratly)Islands,RepublicofVietnam,MinistryofForeign
Affairs,Saigon(1974)[hereinafterMFAWhitePaper(1974)].
187
ExchangeofLettersbetweenChinaandFranceRelatingtotheReliefofChineseTroopsbyFrenchTroopsin
NorthIndochina,Chungking,Feb.28,1946,U.N.T.S.Vol.14,1948,atp.151.SeealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note
15supra,atp.40.
28
renamed the South China Sea islands in 1947 and included them in the 1952 ROCJapan
bilateralpeacetreaty.188Moreover,neitherFrancenorVietnamattemptedtoestablishcontrol
overtheSpratlysduringtheabsenceofTaiwaneseforcesfrom1950to1956.Accordingly,even
if France validly occupied the Spratlys in 1933, China maintains that France relinquished its
sovereigntyoverthemafter1945and,asthesuccessorstatetoFrenchrightsinVietnam,the
Republic of Vietnam clearly cannot invoke what was previously relinquished by its
predecessor.189
d. Japanese Recognition
ChinesescholarsarguethatJapanalsorecognizedChinassovereigntyovertheParacels
in 1938 by declaring that French claims to thearchipelago were unjustifiablegiven the fact
thatbothFranceandtheUnitedKingdomhadpreviouslyrecognizedtheXisha[Paracel]Islands
as part of Chinas Hainan Administrative Prefecture.190 Japan also protested Frances
occupationoftheSpratlysin1933.
Some scholars additionally maintain that Japan intended to return the two
archipelagoes to China at the end of World War II, citing the separate agreements formally
ending hostilities between the twoChinas andJapanthe1952 Treaty of Peace between the
RepublicofChinaandJapanandthe1972JointCommuniquoftheGovernmentofJapanand
theGovernmentofthePeoplesRepublicofChina.Article2ofthe1952PeaceTreatyprovides
that
ItisrecognizedthatunderArticle2oftheTreatyofPeacewithJapansignedatthecity
ofSanFranciscoon8September1951,Japanhasrenouncedallright,title,andclaim
to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and
ParacelIslands.191
Chinesescholarsarguethatthisprovision,andaJapanesemappublishedin1952and
endorsed by Foreign Minister Cats Okazaki, clearly reflects Japans intention to return the
Spratlys and Paracels to China under both the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and 1952
Treaty. The Map of Southeast Asia of the Standard World Atlasthe first Japanese official
worldatlasafterthe1951SanFranciscoPeaceTreatyclearlyindicatesthattheParaceland
SpratlyIslandswerepartofChina.192
The1972JointCommuniqureaffirmsthetermsofthePotsdamProclamation:
188
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atpp.1719;seealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atp.204;M.Bennett,note
14supra,atpp.437.
189
Id.;seealsoC.Joyner,note166supra,atp.61(TheFrenchmadenosubsequenteffortstoperfecttitletothe
Spratlysbyoccupation.NordidtheFrenchactbyreturningafterJapansdeparturefollowingWorldWarII,orby
actingafterJapanformallyrelinquishedalltitleandfutureclaimstotheislandsattheSanFranciscoConferenceof
1951.Consequently,FrancepossessednolawfultitletotheSpratlygrouptowhichVietnamcouldsucceed.).
190
ShenII,atp.138;seealsoShenI,atp.43.
191
TreatyofPeacebetweentheRepublicofChinaandJapan,Apr.28,1952,enteredintoforceAug.5,1952,
availableathttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/doc_all.htm.
192
ShenII,atpp.139140;seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.14;B.Dubner,note29supra,atp.310.
29
The Government of the Peoples Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an

inalienablepart of theterritory ofthe Peoples Republic of China. The Government of
Japan full understands and respects this stand of the Government of the Peoples
Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam
Proclamation.193
Asdiscussedbelow,thePotsdamProclamationstatesthatthetermsoftheCairoDeclaration
shall be carried out.194 In turn, the Cairo Declaration provides that Manchuria, Formosa
(Taiwan), and the Pescadores (Penghu Islands) would be returned to China and that Japan
wouldalsobeexpelledfromotherterritoriesthatithadacquiredbyviolence,butitdoesnot
indicatethattheseotherterritorieswouldbereturnedtoChina.195
e. World War II Documents

JapaninvadedandoccupiedtheParacelsandSpratlys,oustingtheFrenchgarrisonson
theislandsatthebeginningofWorldWarII.In1943,China,theUnitedStatesandtheUnited
KingdomagreedinCairo:
JapanshallbestrippedofalltheislandsinthePacificwhichshehasseizedoroccupied
sincethebeginningoftheFirstWorldWarin1914,andthatalltheterritoriesJapanhas
stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan], and the Pescadores
[Penghu],shallberestoredtotheRepublicofChina.Japanwillalsobeexpelledfromall
otherterritories,whichshehastakenbyviolenceandgreed.196
TheMFAnotesthatatthattime,JapanputtheNansha[Spratly]Islandsunderthejurisdiction
of Taiwan and that the territories to be restored to China as identified in the Cairo
Declaration naturally included the Nansha Islands.197 The MFA further asserts that the 1945
Potsdam Proclamation reinforces that all territories taken from China by Japan should be
restored.
f. PostWar Occupation
According to the MFA,China rightfully recovered the South China Sea islands in 1946.
An official map of the Nansha [Spratly] Islands was drawn and printed, the Nansha Islands
wererenamed,andtheearliestbookofthephysicalandgeographyoftheNanshaIslandswas
alsocompiledandprinted.198Additionally,theChinesegovernmentwentthroughaseriesof
193
JointCommuniquoftheGovernmentofJapanandtheGovernmentofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,Sept.29,
1972,availableathttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/japan01.htm.
194
PotsdamProclamation,July26,1945,para.8,availableathttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/doc_all.htm.
195
CairoDeclaration,Nov.1943,releasedDec.1,1943,availableat
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/doc_all.htm.
196
CairoDeclaration,Nov.1943,releasedDec.1,1943,availableat
197
198
30
legal procedures and announced to the whole world that China had resumed the exercise of
sovereigntyovertheNanshaIslands.199
ChinesescholarslikewiseemphasizethatChinawastheonlycountrytodispatchnaval
forces and government officials to the Paracel and Spratly Islands to formally accept the
JapanesesurrenderandwithdrawalintheSouthChinaSeaareas.200Accordingly,itwasonly
logical and natural for China as the legitimate titleholder to recover the South China Sea
Islands from Japan at the end of the Second World War.201 In 1946, Nationalist naval forces
were deployed to Itu Aba to build radio and meteorological stations and patrol neighboring
islands and sea areas. Officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs were also dispatched to
conductsurveysandengageinotheradministrativefunctionswithregardtomajorislandsand
reefsoftheXishaandNanshaIslands.202
g. San Francisco Peace Conference

TheMFAadditionallyclaimsthatChinesesovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislands
wasrecognizedduringthedraftingofthe1951TreatyofPeacewithJapan,citingastatement
bytheHeadoftheDelegationoftheSovietUnion,AndreiGromyko.Inthatstatement,Deputy
MinisterGromykocriticizedtheAmericanBritishdraftofthetreaty,indicating,inpart,that
itisanindisputablefactoriginalChineseterritorieswhichwereseveredfrom[China],
such as Taiwan (Formosa), the Pescadores [Penghu Islands], the Paracel Islands and
other Chinese territories, should be returned to the Chinese Peoples Republic. The
draft contains only a reference to the renunciation by Japan of its rights to these
territoriesbutintentionallyomitsanymentionofthefurtherfateoftheseterritories.203
199
Id.
200
ShenII,atp.138.SeealsoShenI,atpp.4445(JapaneseforceswithdrewfromtheXishaandNanshaIslands
onAugust26,1945.FromOctoberthroughNovember1946,theRepublicofChinaformallyretooktheXisha,
NanshaandotherislandsintheSouthChinaSea,thusreiteratingChinasterritorialsovereignty.);TaoCheng,
note31supra,atpp.269,275(AttheendofthePacificWarin1946,theJapaneseforcesinbothgroupsofislands
formallysurrenderedtotherepresentativesofChina.);M.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1178.
201
ShenII,atp.138.
202
ShenI,atpp.4445.SeealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atpp.1314(InNovember1946,theROC
governmentsentanavalcontingent,withofficialsfromtheMinistryofInternalAffairs,totakeovertheislets.
GarrisonforcesweresubsequentlystationedonseveralisletsandChineseterritorialstonetabletswere
erectedonWoodyandItuAba.Aweatherstationandaradiostationwerealsobuiltonthesetwoislets.);M.
Katchen,note120supra,atp.1178(aftertheJapanesesurrender,theRepublicofChinasentanaval
contingentwithofficialsfromtheMinistryofInternalAffairsandtheKwangtungProvincialgovernmenttotake
overtheislands.);M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.437438(InNovember1946,theChinesegovernmentsent
anavalcontingenttoretaketheislands.Duringthefollowingthreeyears,theGuomindanggovernmenttriedto
developthechainasitssouthernmostterritory.ItgarrisonedtroopsonTaipingIsland.Thenavybuiltasmall
weatherstation.Officialsalsomadeacomprehensivesurveyofthearea,andin1947,theMinistryofInternal
Affairspublishednewnamesformanyoftheislandsinthechain.);S.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.11(the
RepublicofChinasentnavalexpeditionsbothtotheParacelsandtheSpratlysin194647,setupsovereignty
markers,andestablishedapermanentpresenceonItuAbaandWoodyIsland.).
203
StatementoftheFirstDeputyMinisterofForeignAffairsoftheUSSR,A.A.Gromyko,attheSanFrancisco
Conferenceof1951,Sept.8,1951;seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3;Nguyen
BaDien,VietnamContinuouslyExercisesItsSovereigntyOverHoangSa,TruongSaArchipelagos,BienDong.Net,
Aug.9,2012,availableathttp://www.southchinasea.org/documents/studies/note203;Historicaldocumentson
31

GromykothendemandedthattheConferencevoteonhisproposedamendmentstotheTreaty,
which would have required Japan to, inter alia, renounce its rights to Taiwan, the Penghu
Islands,MacclesfieldBank,andtheSpratlyandParacelIslandsinfavorofChina.204
Atthesametime,ChinadownplaystheimportanceofVietnamsstatementduringthe
seventh plenary session of the Conference, which reaffirmed Vietnamese rights to the South
China Sea islands. On September 7, 1951, the head of the Vietnamese delegation to the
Conference, Prime Minister Tran Van Huu, stated as we must frankly profit from all the
opportunitiesofferedtoustostiflethegermsofdiscord,weaffirmourrighttotheSpratlyand
Paracel Islands, which have always belonged to Vietnam.205 None of the 51 nations
represented at the Conference objected to this statement.206 China correctly points out,
however,thatneitherthePeoplesRepublicofChinanortheRepublicofChinawasinvitedto
participateintheSanFranciscoPeaceConference.207Therefore,thetwoChinaswerenotina
positiontoobjecttotheVietnamesestatementattheConference.
Nonetheless,ChinesePremierZhouEnlaiissuedalengthystatementcriticizingtheU.S.
UK draft on August 15, 1951. With regard to the South China Sea islands, in particular, Zhou
reiteratedChinasclaims,stating:
[TheParacelIslandsandSpratlyIslands]havealwaysbeenChinasterritory.Although
they [had] been occupied by Japan for some time during the war of aggressionthey
were all taken over by the then Chinese government following Japans surrender.
WhetherornottheU.S.BritishDraftTreatycontainsprovisionsonthissubjectandno
VietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,June24,2011,availableat
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/specialreports/;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
204
TheSovietamendmentreadasfollows:1.ToArticle2.
(a)Toinclude,insteadofparagraphs(b)and(f),aparagraphreadingfollows:Japanrecognizesfullsovereigntyof
theChinesePeople'sRepublicoverManchuria,theIslandofTaiwan(Formosa)withalltheislandsadjacenttoit,
thePenlinletaoIslands(thePescadores),theTunshatsuntaoIslands(thePratasIslands),aswellasovertheIslands
ofSishatsuntaoandChunshatsuntao(theParacelIslands,thegroupofAmphitrites,theshoalofMaxfield)and
NanshatsuntaoIslandsincludingtheSpratly,andrenouncesallright,titleandclaimtotheterritoriesnamedhere
in.MFAWhitePaper(1974).SeealsoHongThaoNguyen,VietnamsPositionontheSovereigntyovertheParacels
&Spratlys:ItsMaritimeClaims,J.EASTASIAINTLL.,VJEAIL(1)2012,May4,2012,atp.187;NguyenBaDien,note
203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;
NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.41and121.
205
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),at
p.3;T.Kelly,note133supra;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.187;Historical
documentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOF
BORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.41.
206
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atpp.8and14;seealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atpp.192193,201;T.
Kelly,note133supra;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;H.Nguyen,note204
supra,atp.187;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;
NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.41.
207
ChinesescholarspointoutthatJapansrenunciationofclaimsintheSanFranciscoPeaceTreatyoccurintwo
differentwaysintermsoftheirrecipients:(1)inthecaseofKoreaandtheLeagueMandateterritorythe
recipientsarespecificallymentioned;and(2)inthecaseofthoseterritoriesacquiredbyJapanfromRussiaand
Chinathenamesoftherecipientsareleftopen.Thiswasunderstandableinviewofthecoldwarsituationinwhich
theTreatywasmade.TaoCheng,note31supra,atp.276.
32
matter how these provisions are worked, the inviolate sovereignty of the Peoples
Republic of China over Nanwei Islands [Spratly Islands] and Hsisha Islands [Paracel
Islands]willnotbeinanywayaffected.208
Chinese scholars additionally argue that, despite Vietnams statement at the Peace
Conference,thefactthatthePeaceTreatyfailsto
identify[to]whomtheSouthChinaSeaislandsshouldbereturnedisitselfarejectionof
Vietnamsclaims.TheTreatyssilenceonthepostwarstatusoftheXishaandNansha
Islandsshouldnotbeinterpretedashavinglefttheissueofownershipopen.Rather,it
shouldbeinterpretedagainstrecognizinganyconflictingandungroundedclaimssuchas
thoseadvancedbytheVietnamese.209
AsimilarargumenthasbeenadvancedbyChinaregardingFrancesclaimsasoneofthemajor
powers at the Peace Conference, France would not have allowed theTreaty to fail to
specificallymentionFranceastherecipientoftheParacelsandSpratlys.210
h. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Conference

The MFA also believes that action taken at the first ICAO Conference on AsiaPacific
RegionalAviationinOctober1955supportsChinassovereigntyclaimstotheSouthChinaSea
islands. The Conference was held in Manila and was attended by 15 nations, including South
Vietnam and Taiwan.211 According to the MFA, the conference determined that the Spratly,
Paracel, and Pratas Islands were located at the communication hub of the Pacific and
therefore the meteorological reports of these islands were vital to world civil aviation
service.212Accordingly,theconferenceunanimouslyadoptedResolutionNo.24,askingTaiwan
toimprovemeteorologicalobservationontheSpratlyIslandsfourtimesaday.213According
to Chinese sources, none of the delegations present at the conference objected to the
resolution.214
208
ShenI,atp.50;seealsoShenII,atpp.138,145146;J.Greenfield,note149supra,atp.30;XuZhiliang,LiLixin,
FanHong,andZhouXin,note104supra;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.14;B.Murphy,note29supra,at
p.201;M.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1179;M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.447448;H.HarryL.Roque,Jr.,
ChinasClaimtotheSpratlyIslandsunderInternationalLaw,15J.ENERGY&NAT.RESOURCESL.189,1997,atp.196;
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.41,122.
209
ShenI,atpp.51,5859.
210
Id.,atp.58;seealsoTaoCheng,note31supra,atpp.275276;B.Murphy,note29supra,atp.192.
211
Othernationsattendingincluded:Australia,Canada,Chile,Dominica,France,Laos,Japan,NewZealand,the
Philippines,theRepublicofKorea,Thailand,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates.MFA,TheIssueofSouth
ChinaSea.
212
Id.
213
Id.;TaiwansimilarlyasserteditssovereigntyovertheParacelandSpratlyIslandsattwosessionsoftheUnited
NationsCartographicConferenceforAsiaandtheFarEastManila(1964)andTeheran(1970).H.ChiuandC.Park,
note42supra,atp.16andnote88.
214
33
i. North Vietnamese Indifference

China additionally relies on statements and activities by North Vietnamese officials
beginninginthemid1950stosupportitsclaimofsovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislands.
AccordingtotheMFA,onJune15,1956,NorthVietnameseDeputyMinisterofForeignAffairs
Ung Van Khiem reportedly informed Mr. Li Zhiming, Charg d'Affaires ad Interim of the
ChineseEmbassyinVietnam,thataccordingtoVietnamesedata,theXishaandNanshaIslands
are historically part of Chinese territory.215 Mr. Li Lu, Deputy Director of the Asia Division of
the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry,who was present at the meeting,added that judging from
history,theseislandswerealreadypartofChinaatthetimeoftheSongDynasty.216
Chinaalsopointstoa1958letterfromtheNorthVietnamesePrimeMinistertoChinas
Premier that ostensibly supports Chinas claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands. On
September4,1958,Chinaissuedadeclarationextendingthebreadthofitsterritorialseafrom
3to12nauticalmiles(nm).Thedeclarationprovided,inpart,that
1) The breadth of the territorial sea of the People's Republic of China shall be twelve
nauticalmiles.ThisprovisionappliestoallterritoriesofthePeople'sRepublicofChina,
including the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its
surroundingislands,thePenghuIslandsandallotherislandsbelongingtoChinawhich
areseparatedfromthemainlandanditscoastalislandsbythehighseas.
***
4) The principles provided in paragraphs 2) and 3) likewise apply to Taiwan and its
surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha Islands, and Xisha Islands, the
ZhongshaIslands,theNanshaIslands,andallotherislandsbelongingtoChina.217
Tendayslater,PrimeMinisterPhamVanDongsentalettertoPremierZhouEnlaiexpressing
supportforChinasterritorialseaextension:
We would solemnly inform you that the Government of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam recognizes and approves the declaration made on 4 September 1958 by the
GovernmentofthePeoplesRepublicofChinaregardingthedecisiontakenwithrespect
to Chinas territorial sea. The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
respectsthatdecisionandwillinstructitsresponsiblenationalbodiesthat,intheevent
of contact at sea with the Peoples Republic of China, the stipulation regarding the
breadth of the Chinese territorial sea as being 12 nautical miles will be scrupulously
respected.Wewouldliketosendoursincereregards.218
215
ShenI,atp.53;seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra.
216
ShenI,atp.54.
217
DeclarationoftheGovernmentofthePeoplesRepublicofChinaonChinasTerritorialSea(Sept.4,1958),
reprintedinU.S.DEPT.OFSTATELIMITSINTHESEANO.43,StraightBaselines:PeoplesRepublicofChina,July1,1972.
218
LetterfromPrimeMinisterPhamVanDongtoPremierZhouEnlai,Sept.14,1958,M.ChemillierGendreau,
note15supra,atpp.43,129.SeealsoShenI,atp.54;B.Murphy,note29supra,atpp.193,204;B.Dubner,note
29supra,atp.309;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.5;T.Kelly,note133supra;H.Nguyen,note204supra,at
p.190.
34
ChinesescholarsalsociteastatementissuedbytheNorthVietnamesegovernmenton
May 9, 1965, regarding the U.S. declared war zone for Vietnam and its adjacent waters, to
support its position that Vietnam had previously recognized Chinas sovereignty over the
Paracel Islands. The Vietnamese declaration indicated that President Johnson of the United
StateshasdesignatedasthecombatareatheentireVietnamandthewaterareasnearitan
areaabout100nauticalmilesawayfromtheVietnamesecoastandpartoftheterritorialseaof
theXishaIslandsofthePeople'sRepublicofChina.219Inaddition,Chinesesourcesclaimthat,
on May 31, 1969, the Vietnamese daily Nhan Dan published a story that recognized Chinese
sovereigntyovertheParacels:On10May,aUSmilitaryplanepenetratedChineseairspace,
above Yong Xing and Dong dao, two of the Xisha Islands, in the Chinese Province of Guang
dong.220
Based on Vietnams purported recognition of Chinas claims prior to 1975, some
scholars contend that the principle of estoppel precludes Vietnam from taking a position
contrarytoitsearlierstanceregardingChinassovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislandsand
thatChinasclaimisthereforesuperiortothatofVietnam.221
j. Other Supporting Publications

The MFA cites a number of foreign publications in support of its position that the
international community recognizes Chinas claims to the South China Sea islands. These
publicationsinclude:
The China Sea Directory, published in Great Britain in 1867, describes the life of
ChinesefishermenlivingintheSpratlyIslands.222
ChinaSeaPilot,compiledandprintedbytheHydrographyDepartmentoftheRoyal
Navy of the United Kingdom in 1912, has accounts of the activities of the Chinese
peopleontheNanshaIslandsinanumberofplaces.223
219
ShenI,atp.54.TheU.S.declaredWarZonewasdefinedas:Vietnamandcontiguouswaters,asusedherein,is
definedasanareawhichincludesVietnamandthewateradjacenttheretowithinthefollowingspecifiedlimits:
FromapointontheEastCoastofVietnamatthejunctureofVietnamwithChinasoutheastwardto21N.Latitude,
10815'E.Longitude;thence,southwardto18N.Latitude,10815'E.Longitude;thencesoutheastwardto17
30'N.Latitude,111E.Longitude;thencesouthwardto11N.Latitude;111E.Longitude,thencesouthwestward
to7N.Latitude,105E.Longitude;thencewestwardto7N.Latitude,103E.longitude,thencenorthwardto9
30'N.Latitude,103E.Longitude,thencenortheastwardto1015'N.Latitude,10427'E.Longitude,thence
northwardtoapointontheWestCoastofVietnamatthejunctureofVietnamwithCambodia.ExecutiveOrder
11216DesignationofVietnamandwatersadjacenttheretoasacombatzoneforthepurposesofsection112of
theInternalRevenueCodeof1954,Apr.24,1965,availableathttp://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59147.
SeealsoSOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atpp.56;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.44,129.
220
221
ShenI,atp.57;seealsoH.Roque,note208supra,atpp.204205;B.Murphy,note29supra,atp.205.
222
SuHao,note28supra.
223
Hainanfishermen,whosubsistbycollectingtrepangandtortoiseshells,werefounduponmostofthese
islands;someofthemremainforyearsamongstthereefs.JunksfromHainanannuallyvisitthe[Spratly]islands
andreefswithsuppliesofriceandothernecessaries,forwhichthefishermengivetrepangandotherarticlesin
exchange.H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.10.ButseeFranoisXavierBonnet,GeopoliticsofScarborough
Shoal,IRASECSDISCUSSIONPAPER#14,RESEARCHINSTITUTEONCONTEMPORARYSOUTHEASTASIA,Nov.2012,atp.17(A
secretreportpreparedbytheChineseMilitaryCouncilinSeptember1933providesthatthe:ChinaSea
35
TheFarEasternEconomicReview(HongKong)containedanarticleonDecember31,
1973, which quotes the British High Commissioner to Singapore as having said in
1970:SpratlyIsland(NanweiIslandinChinese)wasaChinesedependency,partof
KwangtungProvinceandwasreturnedtoChinaafterthewar.Wecannotfindany
indicationofitshavingbeenacquiredbyanyothercountryandsocanonlyconclude
itisstillheldbycommunistChina.224
Le Monde Colonial Illustre acknowledged the presence of Chinese people on the
Spratly Islands (Nanwei Island, Nanzi Reef, Zhongye Island, and Nanwei Island), as
well as thatched houses, water wells, and holy statues left by Chinese on Nanyue
Island and a signboard with Chinese characters marking a grain storage on Spratly
(Taiping)IslandinitsSeptember1933issue.
AtlasInternationalLarousse,publishedin1965inFrance,markstheParacel(Xisha),
Spratly (Nansha) and Pratas (Dongsha) Islands by their Chinese names and gives
clearindicationoftheirownershipbyChinainbrackets.
YearbookofNewChina,publishedinJapanin1966,describesthecoastlineofChina
as11thousandkilometerslongfromLiaodongPeninsulainthenorthtotheSpratly
(Nansha)Islandsinthesouth,or20thousandkilometersifincludingthecoastlines
ofalltheislandsalongitscoast.
YearbookoftheWorld,publishedinJapanin1972,indicatesthatChineseterritory
includes not only the mainland, but also Hainan Island, Taiwan, Penghu Islands as
well as the Pratas (Dongsha), Paracel (Xisha), and Spratly (Nansha) Islands, and
MacclesfieldBank(Zhongsha)intheSouthChinaSea.
ColumbiaLippincottWorldToponymicDictionary,publishedintheUnitedStatesin
1961, states that the Spratly (Nansha) Islands in the South China Sea are part of
GuangdongProvinceandbelongtoChina.
TheWorldmarkEncyclopediaoftheNations,publishedintheUnitedStatesin1963,
indicates that the islands of the People's Republic of China extend southward to
includethoseislesandcoralreefsintheSouthChinaSeaatthenorthlatitude4.
World Administrative Divisions Encyclopaedia, published in the United States in
1971,indicatesthatthePeople'sRepublicofChinahasanumberofarchipelagoes,
including Hainan Island near the South China Sea, which is the largest, and a few
othersontheSouthChinaSeaextendingtoasfarasthenorthlatitude4,suchas
PilotdoesnotsaytowhomtheseislandsbelonganddoesnotgiveanyevidenceofanyChineseadministration,
thepresenceofanofficialrepresentativeofChina,orChineseequipmentandinfrastructure.Inconclusion,we
haveonlyonepieceofevidence,ourfishermenfromHainan,andwehaveneverdoneanythingontheseislands.).
SeealsoSOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012)(Chinesefishermensearlypresencewasmerelyprivate/individual
activitiesandthuscannotconstituteeffectiveoccupationbyaStateasrequiredbyinternationallaw.);H.Nguyen,
note204supra,atp.169(Occupationbyprivateindividualswillnotcreateatitlefortheircountry.).
224
ThisallegedstatementisinconsistentwithBritainsofficialpositionregardingFrenchoverseaspossessions
duringWorldWarII,whichprovidedthattheFrenchwerehighlysensitiveabouttherestorationofallpartsof
theircolonialempiretothestatusquoante[whichwouldarguablyincludetheSpratlysandParacels]andthatthe
BritishGovernmentwillfirmlysupporttheFrenchpositioninviewofitsdesirefortheclosestpossiblerelations
withFrance.MemorandumbytheDeputyDirectoroftheOfficeofEuropeanAffairs(H.FreemanMatthews),Nov.
2,1944,THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITEDSTATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(19451967),PartV.B.1.,atpp.3738,availableat
http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagonpapers/.
36
thePratas(Dongsha),Paracel(Xisha),andSpratly(Nansha)Islands,andMacclesfield
Bank(Zhongsha)
AstandardVietnamesetextbookongeographypublishedin1974indicatesthatthe
islands from the Spratly (Nansha) and Paracel (Xisha) Islands to Hainan Island and
TaiwanconstituteagreatwallforthedefenseofthemainlandofChina.225
IV. VIETNAM
A. Vietnam Claims
Vietnams official position regarding its sovereignty claims to the South China Sea
islandswasfirstsetoutinaWhitePaperpublishedbytheMinistryofForeignAffairs(MFA)in
1974.LikeChina,VietnamclaimssovereigntyoveralloftheHoangSa(Paracel)andTruongSa
(Spratly) archipelagoes based on several factors, including historical evidence, economic
development,effectiveadministration,andinternationalrecognition.
1. Historical Evidence
VietnamtracesitsinitialpresenceintheParacelstothe17thcentury.Accordingtothe
MFA,evidenceofVietnamesesovereigntyovertheParacelIslandscanbefoundintheworksof
Do Ba in a series of maps of Vietnam in the third part of the Hong Duc Atlas. Notes
accompanying the maps indicate that as far back as the early 17th century, Vietnamese
authoritieshadbeensendingshipsandmentotheParacelsonaregularbasis.226The17th
centuryatlasToanTapThienNamTuChiLoDoThu(RouteMapfromtheCapitaltotheFour
225
TheMFAsimilarlycitesanumberofforeignmapsthatmarktheSouthChinaSeaislandsaspartofChinese
territory,including:
TheWeltAtlaspublishedbytheFederalRepublicofGermanyin1954,1961and1970;
WorldAtlaspublishedbytheSovietUnionin1954and1967;
WorldAtlaspublishedbyRomaniain1957;
OxfordAustralianAtlasandPhilipsRecordAtlaspublishedbyBritainin1957;
EncyclopaediaBritannicaWorldAtlaspublishedbyBritainin1958;
WorldAtlasprintedbythemappingunitoftheHeadquartersoftheGeneralStaffofthePeople'sArmyof
VietNamin1960;
HaackWeltAtlaspublishedbyGermanDemocraticin1968;
DailyTelegraphWorldAtlaspublishedbyBritainin1968;
AtlasInternationalLaroussepublishedbyFrancein1968and1969,respectively;
WorldMapOrdinarypublishedbytheInstitutGeographiqueNationalofFrancein1968;
WorldAtlaspublishedbytheSurveyingandMappingBureauofthePrimeMinister'sOfficeofVietNamin
1972;and
ChinaAtlaspublishedbyNeibonsyaofJapanin1973.
MFA,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea;seealsoShenI,atpp.5455.
226
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoC.Joyner,note166supra,atp.60;T.Kelly,note133supra;SOUTHCHINASEA
STUDIES(2012),atp.2;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyover
ParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
37
Directions)likewise indicates that the Paracel and Spratly Islands were under the control of
theNguyenfamily.227
Othermaps,documents,andpublicationscitedbyVietnaminsupportofitssovereignty
claimsoverthetwoarchipelagoesinclude:iNamthclctinbin(16001775)(TheEarly
Chapter of The Chronicles of i Nam); i Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien (relating to the
subsequent period);Ton tp Thin Nam t ch l th(16301653) (The Collection of the
SouthsRoadMap);GiapNgoBinhNamDo(1774)(TheMapforthePacificationoftheSouthin
theGiapNgoYear);Phbintplc(1776)(MiscellanyonthePacificationattheFrontier);Lich
trieuhienchuongloaichi(1821)(ClassifiedRulesoftheDynasties);TheAuthenticWritingson
i Nam (compiled between 1821 and 1844); i Nam Nhat Thong Toan Do (1838) (The
CompleteMapoftheUnifiediNam);KhamDinhiNamHoiDienSuLe(18431851)(The
iNamAdministrativeRepertory);iNamthclcchnhbin(1848)(TheMainChapterof
The Chronicles of i Nam); i Nam nht thng chthe geography and history of i Nam
(The Record of The Unified i Nam) edited 18651882;Hong Vit d a ch(1833)
(Geography of The Viet Empire);Vit s thng gim cng mc kho lc (1876) (Outline of
The Chronicles of The Viet History); and other official documents of the Nguyen Dynasty on
petitionsandimperialdecrees,aswellasmapsanddocumentsmadebyothercountriesduring
the17th,18th,and19thcenturies.228
SomeVietnameseandWesternscholarsassertthatWesternwritingsdatingbacktothe
th
17 century give some credence to Vietnams historical claims. Portuguese and Dutch maps
from the early 17th century purportedly identify the Paracels as Vietnamese territory.229
Additionally, in 1701, a Western missionary on board the French ship Amphitrite recorded in
Mystere des atollsJournal de voyage aux Paracels (Mystery of the atollsJournal of the
voyagetotheParacelIslands)thattheParacelisanarchipelagobelongingtotheKingdomof
AnNam.230
Westernwritingsfromthe19thcenturylikewisesupportVietnamshistoricalevidence.A
bookpublishedin1837byaFrenchmissionaryinCochinchina,MonseigneurJeanLouisTaberd,
entitled Note on the Geography of Cochinchina, described the Paracel Islands as part of
Cochinchina and said that Cochinchines referred to the Paracels as Cat Vang.231 A second
book published by Monseigneur Taberd in 1838History and Description of the Religion,
Customs, and Morals of All Peoplessimilarly recorded that the Paracels had been a
dependencyofCochinchinafor34years.232AdepictionoftheParacelsadditionallyappearsin
227
M.Bennett,note14supra,atp.434;seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2.
(ThisisthefirstVietnamesedocumentationofformalexerciseofauthorityovertheTruongSa.).
228
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnams
sovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.6667;
NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.174.
229
T.Kelly,note133supra;seealsoSOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2.
230
HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyovertheParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONAL
COMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
231
NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratly
Islands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.177.
232
38
Taberds1838AnNamDaiQuocHoaDo(TabulageographicaimperiaAnamiticiTheMapof
theAnnamEmpire).233
JeanBaptiste Chaigneaus memoires (Memoires sur la Cochinchina) also refer to
EmperorGiaLongsannexationoftheParacelsin1816:
Cochinchina, the sovereign of which has today the title of Emperor, is composed of
Cochinchina proper, Tonquin, a part of the Kingdom of Cambodia, some uninhabited
islands not far from the coast and the Paracels archipelago, composed of uninhabited
reefs and rocks. It is only in 1816 that the present Emperor took possession of this
archipelago.234
Chaigneau was a French naval officer who played a leading role in Vietnam during the 19th
century.
A reference to the Paracels as Vietnamese territory can also be found in Japon, Indo
Chine,EmpireBirman(ouAva),Siam,Annam(ouCochinchine),PninsuleMalaise,etc.,Ceylan
byFrenchexplorerandauthorAdolphePhilibertDuboisdeJancigny.235Additionally,inhis1849
article Geography of the Cochinchinese Empire, German missionary Karl Gtzlaff defined the
Paracels as part of Vietnams territory and noted the islands with the Vietnamese name Cat
Vang.236Gtzlaffadditionallynoted:
WeshouldmentionheretheParacels.Fromtimeimmemorial,junksinlargenumber
from Hainan, have annually visited these shoals, and proceeded in their excursions as
farasthecoastofBorneo.TheAnnamgovernment,perceivingtheadvantageswhich
itmightderiveifatollwereraised,keepsrevenuecuttersandasmallgarrisononthe
spottocollectthedutyonallvisitors,andtoensureprotectionofitsownfishermen.237
Aldriano Balbis The Italian Compendium of Geography (1850) similarly includes the Paracel,
Pirate(HTin),andPuoloCondor(CnSn)IslandswithintheKingdomofAnnam.238
A letter from the Chief Resident of Annam (Le Fol) to the Governor General of
Indochina,datedJanuary22,1929,likewiseconfirmsthatVietnameffectivelyadministeredthe
Paracelsfromtheearly18thcenturyonwards:
TheParacelarchipelagoseemstohaveremainedresnulliusuntilthebeginningofthe
lastcentury.MonsignorJeanLouisTaberdreportstheoccupationoftheParacelsin
233
Islands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
234
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.7;seealsoNguyenBaDien,note203supra;Historicaldocumentson
VietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRS
WhitePaper;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.183;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.69.
235
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.177.
236
237
238
TheParacelsandSpratlysarenotmentionedintheChinesesectionofthesamebook.Id.,atp.183.
39
1816 by Emperor Gia Long. Although doubts may be cast on the authenticity of the
formal taking of possession by Gia Long himself, the occupation was nonetheless
effective.239
Le Fol goes on to describe the detailed information on the administration of the islands by
formerdynastiesfromtheearlyyearsofthe19thcenturyonwards.240
Vietnamese and Western scholars also claim that Chinese writings and geographical
documents confirm the accuracy of the aforementioned Western writings. For example, in
1730,HaiLuwroteinHaiQuocDoChithatTruongSaformsarampartontheperipheryof
the Kingdom of Annam (Vietnam).241 A map of Kwangtung (Guangdong) Province and a
descriptionoftheQuiongzhouPrefecturepublishedin1731donotmentioneithertheParacels
ortheSpratlysaspartofChina.242ThisomissionwasconfirmedinHoangChaos1894Mapof
the Unified Empire, which depicts Chinese territory as extending only as far south as Hainan
Island.Likewise,the1906ZhongguoDilixueJiaokeshu(ManualofGeographyofChina)statesin
the Generalities chapter that the Chinese territory is bound in the South at North latitude
1813',theterminusbeingthecoastofYazhou,islandofHainan.243Asimilarreportisfoundin
LiHanzhungsGeographyofGuandong,publishedin1909Todaythemaritimefrontiersare
limitedintheSouthbytheislandofHainan.244
TheMFAassertsthatsystematicexploitationoftheParacelsresourcesstartedasearly
as the 15th century, but certainly no later than 1653.245 Economic exploitation of the islands
graduallyevolvedfromthe15thcenturyonward,leadingtotheestablishmentoftheHoangSa
CompanybytheNguyenDynastytoensurearationalexploitationofthoseislands.246
AccordingtotheworksofDoBa,eachyearduringthelastmonthofwinter,theNguyen
rulerswouldsendaflotillaof18junkstosalvageforeigncommercialshipsthathadwreckedon
the islands, obtaining large quantities of gold, silver, coins, rifles and ammunitions.247
EvidenceofthesesalvageexpeditionsisrecordedinthehistoricalworkofLeQuiDon248Phu
BienTapLuc(MiscellaneousRecordsonthePacificationoftheFrontiers):

239
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.65,Annex8(Letterof22January1929,fromtheChiefResidentof
Annam,Hu,totheGovernorGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi).
240
Id.
241
Id.,atp.74;seealsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.171.
242
243
Id.,atp.75;seealsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.171.
244
245
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoSOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2.
246
Id.;seealsoH.Roque,note208supra,atp.192;T.Kelly,note133supra.
247
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atp.203;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,at
p.7;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratly
Islands,note203supra;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.174;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
248
LeQuiDonwasamandarinChinesesenttoVietnambytheChineseCourtinordertoserveastheVice
GovernorintherealmrecentlytakenoverbytheCourtfromtheNguyenLords.MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealso
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.64,66,Annex8(Letterof22January1929,fromtheChiefResident
ofAnnam,Hu,totheGovernorGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi).
40
theNguyenhadcreatedaHoangSaCompanyof70men.Everyyeartheytaketurns
in going out to sea, setting out during the first month of the lunar calendar. Each
manis given six months worth of dry food. [I]t takes them three days before they
reach the islands. They are free to collect anything they want, to catchbirdsand to
fishforfood.Theyfindthewreckageofshipswhichyieldsuchthingsasbronzeswords
and copper horses, silver decorations and money, silver rings and other copper
products, tin ingots and lead, guns and ivory, golden beehive tallow, felt blankets,
pottery,andsoforth.Theyalsocollectturtleshells,seaurchinsandstripedconchesin
hugequantities.TheHoangSaCompanydoesnotcomehomeuntiltheeight[h]month
of the year. They go to Phu Xuan (presentday Hue) to turn in the goods they have
collected in order to have them weighed and verified, then get an assessment before
theycanproceedtoselltheirstripedconches,seaturtlesandurchins.Onlythenisthe
Companyissuedacertificatewhich[indicates]theycangohome.249
Members of the Hoang Sa detachments were exempt from paying personal taxes and were
rewardedmonetarilyfortheirefforts.250Bythesametoken,thosewhodidnotcompletethe
taskwerepunishedaccordingtothegravityoftheirfailureorindiscretion.251
By the early 18th century, exploitation of the Paracels had become less profitable. Le
recorded that in 1702, the Hoang Sa Company collected 30 silver ingots; in 1704, 5,100
catties of tine [measures of pewter] were brought in; in 1705, 126 ingots of silver were
collected;andbetween1709and1713,thecompanymanagedtocollectonlyafewcattiesof
tortoiseshellsandseaurchins.252Asaresult,thedurationoftheoperationwasreducedfrom
sixtotwomonths.253
TheMFAclaimsthattheseexpeditionsdemonstratethatbythe18thcenturytheNguyen
Lords were concerned with the economic possibilities of theParacel Islands and the fact
that no counterclaims were made by any other nation isproof that the Nguyens sovereign
rights over the islands were not challenged by any country.254 In fact, the MFA claims that
249
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;Historical
BORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atpp.175,180181;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15
supra,atpp.6465(Lesaccountaccuratelyplacesthearchipelagoesaslyingthreedaysandthreenightsjourney
fromthemainland).
250
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.181;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.67,69.
251
Punishmentsrangedfromfloggings,tothedeathpenalty.Id.
252
MFAWhitePaper(1974);M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.65.
253
AgeographybookwrittenbyPhanHuyChuin1834HoangVietDiaDuChireflectsthattheHoangSa
Companywasstillcomposedof70men.However,theyreceivedryfoodandgoouttoseainthethirdmonth
ofthelunarcalendar(ratherthanthefirst).Theybegintheirreturnjourneyinthesix[th]month[ratherthanthe
eighth].MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoNguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnams
sovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
254
MFAWhitePaper(1974);accordM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.67(Attheveryleast,the
establishmentandoperationoftheHoangSaCompanybyvariouisVietnamesedynastiesforthepurposeof
economicallyexploitingandexploringtheSouthChinaSeaislandsclearlyreflectanationalpolicywithaconcern
formaritimeinterests.).SeealsoNguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereignty
overParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.ButseeB.
41
VietnameseexploitationoftheParacelsduringthistimewascarriedoutopenlyandpeacefully,
and was acknowledged by the Chinese to be an exercise of legitimate rights over the
islands.255
Likeitspredecessor,theTaySonDynasty(17781802)continuedtodeploytheHoangSa
flotillastotheParacelstoexploititsresources.Anorderissuedin1786byMandarinSuperior
ThuongTuongConginstructedtheCommanderoftheHoangSaFlotilla,HoiDucHau,tolead
fourfishingboatstosaildirectlytowardsHoangSa[Paracels]andotherislandsontheseato
collectjewelries,copperitems,gunsofallsize,seaturtles,andvaluablefishes,andtoreturnto
theCapitaltohandoveralloftheseitemsinaccordancewiththecurrentrules.256
TheMFApointsoutthataBritishpublicationfromtheearly19thcenturyconfirmsthat
VietnamwaseconomicallyexploitingtheParacels.AbookwrittenbyJohnBarrowin1806A
VoyagetoCochinchinarecordedthetravelsofCountGeorgeMacartney,theBritishEnvoyto
the Chinese Court, in Cochinchina in 1793. The book contains a detailed description of the
types of boats used by the Cochinchinese in order to reachthe Paracel Islands where they
collectedtrepangandswallownests.257
EconomicexploitationofthephosphatedepositsintheParacelsresumedin1956when
the Ministry of Economy granted a license to Le Van Cang, a Saigon businessman, to exploit
phosphateonMoney,Roberts,andPattleIslands.258Alicensewassubsequentlygrantedtothe
Vietnam Fertilizers Company in 1959 to extract and transport phosphate to a Singaporean
company (Yew Huatt)the company exploited guano under this license until 1963.259 The
followingyear,commercialexploitationoftheParacelswasawardedtotheVietnamPhosphate
Company.Between1957and1962,over24,000metrictonsofphosphatewereextractedfrom
theislands.Productionceasedfor10yearsduetoinsufficientreturns,butinterestinexploiting
the islands resurfaced in 1973 after the Republic of Vietnam experienced a severe fertilizer
shortage. A joint feasibility study was conducted that same year by the Vietnam Fertilizer
Company and its Japanese partnerMarubeni Corporation of Tokyo.260 Following the study,
Vietnamese authorities granted concessions to foreign companies to exploit phosphate
deposits in the Paracels in July 1973.261 These concessions were abruptly terminated when
Chinesenavalforcesinvadedandoccupiedtheentirearchipelagoin1974.
Followingtheunificationofthecountryin197576,thenewgovernmentalsoentered
intocooperativeagreementswithanumberofcountries,includingJapan(July1978)andthe
Soviet Union (July 1980), to explore and exploit hydrocarbon reserves in and around the
Spratlys.262
Murphy,note29supra,atp.203(TheVietnamesegovernmentpresentsnoevidencetoshowthattheteamset
upbytheNguyensintheseventeenthcenturyeverleftmainlandVietnamtoadministerandexploittheSpratlys.).
255
MFAWhitePaper(1974).
256
257
258
Id.;seealsoShenI,atp.52;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.188.
259
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atpp.188189;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.18.
260
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoNguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnams
261
ShenI,atp.53;seealsoSOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3.
262
ShenI,atpp.5556.
42
3. Effective Administration
AccordingtotheMFA,beginningin1802,Vietnamprogressivelyasserteditsrightsover
theParacelIslands.In1815,EmperorGiaLongorderedPhamQuangAnhtosurveyandchart
thesearoutesaroundtheislands.263Thefollowingyear,Vietnamformallytookpossessionof
the archipelago, following a formal flag raising ceremony.264 Legal experts from the French
ForeignMinistrydeterminedthatthisannexation,evenwithouteffectiveoccupation,seemsto
have been carried out in conformity with the international law of the time and that the
annexationthereforeconferredlegaltitletoAnnam.265
The1816flagplantingceremonyisrecordedinReverendJeanLouisTaberds1837Note
ontheGeographyofCochinchina(printedintheJournaloftheRoyalAsiaticSocietyofBengal,
India)In 1816, [Emperor Gia Long]went with solemnity to plant his flag and take formal
possession of these rocks, which it is not likely anybody will dispute with him.266 A similar
reportiscontainedinJeanBaptisteChaigneausNoticesurlaCochinchine:

CochinchinaincludesCochinchinaproper,Tonkin,afewscarcelyinhabitedislandsnot
farfromthecoastlineandtheParacelarchipelago.Itwasin1816thatEmperorGia
Longtookpossessionofthisarchipelago.267
The first map published by the kingdom in 1830 included the Paracels (presumably including
theSpratlys)aspartofVietnameseterritory.268
Threeyearslater,in1833,EmperorMinhMangorderedhisMinisterofPublicWorkto
plant treeson some of the ParacelIslands as aids to navigation to prevent ships from being
wreckedinthesenotverydeepwaters.269AccordingtotheMFA,Vietnamexecutedthisactto
meet its international responsibilities and enhance safety of navigation for the international
community.
The following year, Emperor Minh sent a naval detachment of 20 men under the
commandofGarrisonCommanderTruongPhucSitotheParacelstomakeamapofthearea.270
Subsequently, in 1835, the emperor directed the Elephant Garrison Detachment under the
commandofNavyCommanderPhamVanNguyentobuildanewtempleontheislandofBach
263
Islands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.181;
264
MFAWhitePaper(1974)(TheprogressiveintensificationofVietnamesecontrolovertheHoangSaIslands
reachedadecisiveandirreversiblepointatthebeginningofthe19thcentury,whenthereigningNguyendynasty
developedasystematicpolicytowardcompleteintegrationofthearchipelagointothenationalcommunity.);see
alsoH.Roque,note208supra,atp.192;B.Dubner,note29supra,atp.311;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,at
p.7;T.Kelly,note133supra;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.35.
265
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,Annex38(NotesfromtheLegalDepartment,Paris,6September1946).
266
ReverendTaberdwastheBishopofIsauropolisatthetime.Id.
267
Id.,atp.69,Annex38(NotesfromtheLegalDepartment,Paris,6September1946).
268
H.Roque,note208supra,atp.192.
269
sovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;M.
ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.68.
270
Id.
43
Sa(WhiteSandIsland).271Thetemple,whichincludedastonemarktoitsleftandabrickscreen
in front, was completed in 10 days and was located seven truong (approximately 28 meters)
distantfromtheoldtempleinthesouthwestpartoftheisland.272Atemplededicatedtothe
godsofHoangSawasalsobuiltonthebeachofQuangNgaiin1835.273
Becausetheislandswereconsideredtobeofgreatstrategicimportance,theMinistryof
PublicWorksrecommendedthatsurveymissionsbedispatchedtotheParacelseachyearto
explorethewholearchipelagoandtogetaccustomedtothesearoutesthere.274Accordingly,
beginning in 1836, Emperor Minh developed a plan to systematically survey the entire
archipelago:

Everything shall be noted and described in detail for submission toThe Emperor. As
soon as the junks reach any island or sandbank, they shallmeasure the length,
breadth,height,surfaceareaandcircumferenceofthatislandorsandbank,thedepthof
the surrounding waters, identify any submerged sandbanks or reefs, record whether
access is dangerous or poses no problem, undertake a careful examination of the
terrain,takemeasurementsandmakeasketch.275
That same year, the emperor dispatched a naval team under the command of Navy
Commander Pham Huu Nhat to explore and map the entire Paracels. The team erected 10
sovereigntymarkersonseveraloftheislandsoneachmarkerwastheinscription:
IntheyearBinhThan,17thYearofthereignofMinhMang,NavyCommanderPhamHuu
Nhat,commissionedbytheEmperortoHoangSatoconductmapsurveyings,landedat
thisplaceandplantedthismarkersotoperpetuatethememoryoftheevent.276
DatacollectedduringthedeploymentwassubsequentlyusedtodrawtheDetailedMapofthe
DaiNam(1838),whichclearlyreflectedthattheParacelsandSpratlyswerepartofVietnam.277
Thereafter, a naval detachment was dispatched to the Paracels each spring to improve
knowledgeofthesearoutesaroundthearchipelagoandtolevytaxesonthefishermenofthe
region.278 Reports were also periodically prepared by the Ministry of the Interior, describing
theexpendituresandactivitiesoftheHoangSaCompany.279
271
Id.
272
TheoldtemplehadasignonitwiththeinscriptionVanLyBaBinh.Therewasalsoawellinthemiddleofthe
island.Id.
273
Id.;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.7.
274
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra.
275
276
sovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;H.
Nguyen,note204supra,atpp.176,181182.
277
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.7;T.Kelly,note133supra.Compare
B.Dubner,note29supra,atp.311(Aninaccurate1838Vietnamesemapsubstantiatesthisclaim,depictingthe
SpratlysaspartofVietnameseterritory.).
278
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.176;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.36.
279
44
Vietnamese scholars additionally point to a number of search and rescue operations

conductedbytheNguyenDynastytosupportVietnamsclaimofsovereigntyovertheParacel
Islands.Inthisregard,assistancewasprovidedtotheDutchshipGootebrokin1634afterthe
vessel wrecked in the vicinity of the Paracels.280 Assistance was similarly provided in 1714 to
threeDutchvesselsenroutetoBataviafromJapanafterthevesselswerecaughtbyasevere
stormnearthearchipelago.281AreportoftheGovernorofDaNangalsodocumentsassistance
providedbyVietnameseofficialstoaFrenchmerchantshipthatsunkintheParacelsin1830.282
Likewise,thecrewofaBritishmerchantvesselthatshipwreckedneartheParacelsin1836was
providedshelter,money,andfoodbyVietnameseofficialsfromBnhnhProvincebeforethe
crewwasrepatriated.283
a. French Colonial Rule

Widespread persecution of French missionaries and onerous trade restrictions on
FrenchtraderspromptedFrancetoinvadeVietnamin1858.Frenchnavalforcescapturedthe
cities of Tourane and Gia Dinh (Saigon) in 1858 and 1859, respectively. Two years later the
FrenchgainedcontroloftheprovincessurroundingGiaDinh.Asaresult,Vietnamcededthree
provincesBienHoa,GiaDinh,andDinhTuong(laterknownasCochinchina)andtheislandof
Con Son (Poulo Condore), as well as three ports in Annam (Central Vietnam) and Tonkin
(NorthernVietnam),toFranceintheFirstTreatyofSaigon(1862).284Cochinchinawasformally
declaredaFrenchterritoryin1864.Adecadelater,theFrenchattackedHanoiand,inMarch
1874,forcedtheemperortosigntheSecondTreatyofSaigon,whichrecognizedFrancesfull
andentiresovereigntyoverCochinchina.285ThecityofHufelltoFrenchforcesinAugust1883
and a Treaty of Protectorate was signed the same month at the 1883 Harmand Convention,
establishing a French protectorate over North (Tonkin) and Central Vietnam (Annam) and
formallyendingVietnamsindependence.Thefollowingyear,inJune1884,Vietnameseofficials
signed the Treaty of Hu, which confirmed the Harmand Convention agreement.286 At the
conclusion of the SinoFrench War (18841885), France gained control over northern
Vietnam.287 French Indochinamodernday Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina) and
Cambodiawas subsequently established in 1887. Laos was added to the French colonial
empirein1893,followingtheFrancoSiameseWar.288
According to the MFA, France (as the successor state to the Kingdom of Annam)
continued to exercise sovereignty over the Paracels until Vietnam regained its independence
aftertheSecondWorldWar.Asearlyas1898,therewasalreadyevidencethatFrenchcolonial
authorities envisaged sovereignty over the islandsa memorandum from the Ministry of the
ColoniesandtheGovernmentGeneralofIndochinareportedthat:
280
281
Id.
282
Id.,atpp.182183.
283
Id.,atp.183.
284
LIBRARYOFCONGRESS,FEDERALRESEARCHDIVISION,CountryStudies:Vietnam,availableat
lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/vntoc.html.
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
Id.
45

A journalist, Mr Chabrier, had declared his intention of establishing in the Paracels
storestosellprovisionstofishermen.MrDoumerrepliedthatMrChabriersventure
hadnochanceofsuccessbutthatitmightbeopportunetobuildalighthouse inthe
archipelagoinordertoassertour[French]sovereignty.289
A number of scientific studies of the islands were subsequently conducted by the

French,aswellasafeasibilitystudyfortheconstructionofalighthouseononeoftheParacel
Islands.290Frenchwarshipswerealsotaskedwithsecuringthesealanesformaritimetrafficand
conductingsearchandrescueoperationsforwreckedforeignshipsintheParacels.291By1920,
French customs officials in Indochina were making regular inspections to the islands to stem
illicit traffic in weapons, munitions, and opiumsolid proof of government administration of
the islands.292 In fact, French control was so pervasive in the Paracels that a Japanese
companytheMitsuiBussanKaishaCompanyrequestedpermissionfromFrenchauthorities
inIndochinatoexploitphosphatedepositsonWoodyandRobertIslands.293
French activities in the Paracel Islands continued unabated and unchallenged
throughoutthe1920sand1930s.Colonialinstitutionsandprivateauthorsconductedanumber
ofscientificstudiesontheislands.In1925,thevesselDeLanessan,withanumberofscientists
fromtheOceanographicInstituteofNhaTrang,conductedascientificmissiontotheParacels
that confirmed the existence of rich beds of phosphate, which became the object of many
detailedstudies.294ScientificsurveymissionswerealsoconductedbytheFrenchshipsAlerte,
Astrobale,andIngnieurenChefGirod,andarerecordedin:
Krempf,Laformedesrecifscoralliensetleregimedesventsalternants,Saigon1927.
J.DelacourandP.Jabouille,OiseauxdesilesParacels,Nhatrang,1928.
289
290
AlthoughthelighthouseprojectwassupportedbyIndochinaGovernorGeneralPaulDoumer,theplanwas
abandonedforlackoffunds.MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,supra),atp.37,Annex5
(LetterNo.704AEx,dated20March1930,fromtheGovernorGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi,totheMinisterforthe
Colonies,Paris)(ItisperhapsworthnotingthatGovernorGeneralPaulDoumerrequestedthecolonystechnical
servicestolookintothepossibilityofconstructingalighthouseontheislandsasearlyas1899.Budgetary
considerationsalonepreventedtheactualconstructionfromgoingahead.);SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;
NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,
note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper,note203supra.
291
292
Id.;seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atpp.78;T.Kelly,note133supra;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES
(2012);M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.37,101,104;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;Historical
BORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
293
TheJapanesewouldlaterabandontheminingenterprise.H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;seealsoM.
ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.18,37(Japanesecompaniesminedphosphatesontheislandsbetween
1924and1926.).
294
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15
supra,atpp.37,104;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacel
andSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
46
Notes of the Oceanographic Institute of Indochina in Nhatrang containing valuable

scientificdataabouttheParacels(e.g.,5thNote(192526),22ndNote(1934)).295
In1929,thePierredeRouvilledelegationproposedtheconstructionoffourlighthouses
on Triton and Lincoln Islands and on Da Bac (the North) and Bombay Reefs.296 The following
year,thecrewoftheFrenchshipLaMalicieuselandedonanumberoffeaturesintheParacels
and planted flags and emplaced sovereignty columns, without objection from the Chinese
government.297StudiesontheParacelphosphatebedswerealsoconducted:
MauriceClerget,Contributionl'tudedesilesParacels;lesphosphates.Nhatrang,
Vietnam1932.
Lacroix, Les ressources minrales de la France d'OutreMer, tome IV (Paracels'
phosphate:p.165),Paris1935.
UnitedNations,ECAFE,PhosphateResourcesofMekongBasinCountries;4.Vietnam,
(1):ParacelIslands;Bangkok1972.298
TheMFAadditionallyassertsthatthe1925DeLanessansurveymissionalsoprovedthe
existenceofacontinentalshelfwhichreachesoutinplatformsfromtheVietnamesecoastinto
the sea: the Paracels rest on one of these platforms, and thus are joined to the coast of
Vietnam by a submarine plinth.299 This assertion, however, is highly questionable as the
ParacelsliewellbeyondthegeologicalcontinentalshelfofanyofthesixSouthChinaSea
claimants and therefore cannot be considered to be the natural prolongation of the
Vietnamesemainland.300
France continued to assert its sovereignty over the archipelago, protesting attempted
Chinese incursions in the Paracels. On December 4, 1931, France diplomatically protested a
Chinesegovernmentannouncementthatitintendedtoinvitebidsfromforeigncompaniesto
exploitthephosphatedepositsintheParacels.301TheFrenchprotestwasrenewedonApril24,
1932,afterChinapubliclycalledforbids,citingitsrightsasthesuccessorstatetotheKingdom
ofAnnami.e.,theformerrightsexercisedbytheemperorsofVietnam,theofficialtakingof
possessionbyEmperorGiaLongin1816,andthesendingofIndochinesetroopstoguardthe
islands.302
Attempts by France later that year to have the dispute resolved by an international
tribunal were rejected by China.303 As a result, on June 15, 1932 (Decree No. 156SC), the
295
296
297
Id.;seealsoMFAWhitePaper(1974);M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.38.
298
299
Id.
300
301
Id.,atpp.38,102;seealsoMFAWhitePaper(1974);NguyenBaDien,note203supra;Historicaldocumentson
WhitePaper.
302
Id.
303
47
Governor General of Indochina, Pierre Pasquier, designated the Paracels (Delegation des
Paracels)asanadministrativeunitofThuaThien(Hu)Province.304RenewedeffortsbyFrance
in 1937 to resolve the outstanding dispute with China over the islands through international
arbitration met with Chinese opposition. Following the rebuff by China, the French colonial
government dispatchedthe head of public works (Chief Engineer Gauthier) to theParacels in
ordertostudythepotentialformaritimeandairtrafficfacilities,andtobuildalighthouseon
PattleIsland.305
The following year, Decree No. 156SC was confirmed by Emperor Bao Dai in a
VietnameseimperialordinanceonMarch30,1938.306Vietnamesetroopsunderthecommand
of French officers (Garde Indochinoise) were also sent to occupy the islands and erect
sovereignty columns on a number of the features in the archipelago. The column on Pattle
IslandcontainedthefollowinginscriptioninFrench:
RepubliqueFrancaise[FrenchRepublic]
EmpiredAnnam[KingdomofAnnam]
ArchipeldesParacels1816[ParacelsArchipelago1816]
IledePattle1938[PattleIsland1938]307
A lighthouse, meteorological station, and radio station were also constructed on Pattle
Island.308 Then, on May 5, 1939, Governor General Joseph Jules Brvi divided the Paracel
archipelagointotwodelegationsCrescentetDependences(CrescentGroup)andAmphitrite
et Dependences (Amphitrite Group).309 Additionally, French civil service officers and
Vietnamese police were permanently stationed on PattleIsland (Crescent Group) and Woody
Island (Amphitrite Group) on a regular basis as a further demonstration of French
sovereignty.310
French and Vietnamese forces remained in the Paracels until 1956, with a hiatus of
severalyearsduringJapansoccupationoftheislandsintheSecondWorldWar.Pursuanttoan
exchangeofnotes,FranceandChinaagreedthatFrenchtroopswouldrelieveChinesetroops
stationed in Indochina to the north of the 16th degree of latitude (which includes both the
304
Id.,atpp.39,113;seealsoMFAWhitePaper(1974);H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;H.Nguyen,note
204supra,atp.185.
305
306
Id.;seealsoSOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;Historicaldocumentson
VietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note342supra;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.185;
NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
307
MFAWhitePaper(1974)(ThedatesreflectthetakingofpossessionoftheParacelsbyEmperorGiaLongand
theyearthemarkerwaserected.);seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.39;SOUTHCHINASEA
STUDIES(2012),atp.2.
308
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;seealsoNguyenBaDien,note203supra;Historicaldocumentson
VietnamsSovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRS
WhitePaper.
309
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.185;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;
310
Id.
48
ParacelsandSpratlys)nolaterthanMarch31,1946.311Accordingly,Frenchforcesembarkedon
the Savorgnan de Brazza were dispatched to reoccupy the Paracels in June 1946. However,
events in the ongoing FrenchVietminh war forced the French garrison to withdraw from the
ParacelsinSeptember1946.312Nonetheless,FrenchChiefofStaffofNationalDefenseGeneral
Alphonse Pierre Juin urged the Chairman of the Committee on Indochina to reoccupy the
ParacelsinOctober1946toconsolidateFranceslegalposition:
it is of the utmost importance for France to prevent any sign of occupation by a

foreignpoweroftheislandswhichcommandaccesstothefuturebaseatCamRanhand
dominatethesearouteCamRanhCantonShanghai.Ifittranspiresthattheoccupation
oftheParacelsleadstoaresumptionofthediscussiononourrightsofsovereignty,it
willconsolidateourpositioninanyfuturelegaldebateonthismatterbetweenFrance
andChina.313
Additionally,allshipsplanningtocallontheParacelswererequiredtorequestpermissionfrom
theFrenchHighCommissioninSaigonbeforestoppingatthearchipelago.314
Upon learning that Chinese Nationalist forces sent to the Paracels to accept the
surrenderoftheJapanesegarrisonhadremainedinthearchipelagofollowingthewithdrawalof
Allied occupation forces from French Indochina in 1946, France issued a formal diplomatic
protest on January 13, 1947.315 The warship Le Tonkinois was also deployed to the area on
January17,1947,toejecttheChineseNationalistsfromWoodyIsland.However,realizingthat
they were outnumbered, the FrenchVietnamese forces regrouped and established their
headquarters on Pattle Island.316 Later that year, the weather station that had operated on
Pattle Island from 1938 to 1944 was rebuilt and became operative in late 1947 under
internationalstationcode48860.317
That same year, France again suggested that the dispute be submitted to the
International Court of Justice for resolution, but China refused, insisting that French troops
311
M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.440441;seealsoM.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1179;ExchangeofLetters
betweenChinaandFranceRelatingtotheReliefofChineseTroopsbyFrenchTroopsinNorthIndochina,Chungking,
Feb.28,1946,U.N.T.S.,Vol.14,1948,atp.151;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.40,116.
312
M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.440441;seealsoM.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1179;S.Tnnesson,note
55supra,atp.11;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra),atp.40;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.5.
313
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.116,Annex33(LetterfromGeneralJuin,ChiefofStaffofNational
Defense,totheChairmanoftheCommitteeonIndochina,7October1946).
314
Id.,atpp.117118.
315
M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.440441;M.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1179.
316
Id.;seealsoS.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.11(FrancemadeanunsuccessfulattempttoforceaChinese
garrisontoleaveWoodIsland.WhentheChineserefused,Franceinsteadestablishedapermanentpresence,on
behalfofVietnam,onPattleIslandinthewesternpartoftheParacels.);NguyenBaDien,note203supra(after
theSecondWorldWar,theFrench,followingtheirreturntoVietNam,setwarshipstotheHoangSa
archipelagotorebuildthemeteorologicalstationonthePattleIslandandtoresistChineselandgrabbing
attempts.);HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;
317
M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.440441;M.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1179;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES
(2012),atp.2;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParaceland
SpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
49
immediately withdraw from the islands.318 Consideration was given to unilaterally seek a
judgmentfromtheCourt,buttheLegalDepartmentoftheFrenchMinistryofForeignAffairs
determinedin1950thatitwaspreferabletodefersettlementofthedisputebeforethecourt
untilsuchtimeasasingle,unchallengedgovernmentalauthorityhasbeenestablishedinboth
China and Vietnam.319 The French hydrographic survey ship Ingenieur en chef Girod
subsequentlydeployedtotheParacelsin1953toconductoceanographic,geologic,geographic,
andecologicalstudies.320
Contemporaneously with its activities in the Paracels, France was also solidifying its
sovereignty claims to the Spratly archipelago. In 1927, the De Lanessan conducted an initial
scientific survey of the Spratlys.321 Three years later, the La Malicieuse conducted a second
survey of Spratly Island (Ile de la Tempete (Tempest Island), but this time the French survey
team hoisted the French flag over the islandthe first recorded instance of a sovereignty
markerbeingplacedonanyoftheSpratlyIslands.322OnSeptember23,1930,Francedelivered
acommuniqutotheotherGreatPowersnotifyingthemthatFrancehadoccupiedtheSpratlys
onthegroundsthattheislandswereterranullius.323
InNovember1928,theNewPhosphatesCompanyofTonkinappliedtotheGovernorof
CochinchinaforapermittoexploitphosphatedepositsintheSpratlys.324Subsequently,France
dispatched the Alerte, the Astrobale, and the De Lanessan to the Spratlys in April 1933 to
officiallytakephysicalpossessionofthearchipelago.FrenchauthorH.Cocheroussetpublished
anaccountoftheexpeditioninanewspaperarticleprintedinLEveileconomiquedelIndochine
(No.790ofMay28,1933):
ThethreevesselsfirstvisitedSpratleyandconfirmedFrenchpossessionbymeansofa
document drawn up by the Captains, and placed in a bottle which was subsequently
embedded in cement. Then the Astrolabe sailed south west to a point 70 miles from
Spratley,andarrivedatthecaye(sandyisland)ofAmboine.Possessionwastakenof
theislandinthemannerrelatedabove.Meanwhile,theAlertesailedtowardstheatoll
FieryCross(orInvestigation)atapointabout80milesnorthwestofSpratly.Atthe
same time the De Lanessan proceeded towards the London reefs, at about 20 miles
northeastofSpratly.TheDeLanessanandAstrolabelatersailednorthwhere,about
20milesfromtheTizardbank,issituatedtheLoaitabank,anatollofthesamekind.The
twovesselstookformalpossessionofthemainisland.TheAlerteforitspartvisited
318
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.116,118,Annex35(TelegramfromMinistryofForeignAffairs,
Nanking,8March1947),Annex36(WirefromAgenceFrancePresse,Nanking,of31May1947andtelegramof3
June1947)andAnnex42(Noteof15May1950fromtheDirectorateforAsiaOceania).
319
Id.,Annex11(InternalMinistryofForeignAffairsNoteof25May1950,addressedtotheDirectorateforAsiaby
theLegalAdviser).
320
NguyenBaDien,note203supra;seealsoHistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParaceland
321
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.37;seealsoMFAWhitePaper(1974);H.ChiuandC.Park,note42
supra,atp.8;T.Kelly,note133supra;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnams
322
Id.
323
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.38,97,111.
324
50
theThiThureef,atabout20milesnorthoftheLoaitabank,andtookpossessionofan
islandandofthisatoll,stillbymeansofthesameritual.325
Furthernorth,theAlerteandDeLanessantookpossessionoftheatollnamedNorthDanger
andtwonearbysandycayes.TheFrenchjustifiedtheiroccupationoftheislandsontheneed
toconstructlighthousesandothernavigationalaidsforthesafetyofinternationalnavigationin
thearea,326areasonablegroundforinterventiongiventheunknownhazardstonavigationin
thearchipelago.
Followingtheexpedition,theFrenchMinistryofForeignAffairspublishedanoticeinthe
FrenchJournalOfficiel(July26,1933,page7837):
NoticeconcerningtheoccupationofcertainislandsbyFrenchnavalunits.

TheFrenchgovernmenthascausedtheundermentionedislesandisletstobeoccupied
byFrenchnavalunits:

1.SpratleyIsland,situated839'latitudenorthand11155'longitudeeastofGreenwich,
withitsdependentisles(PossessiontakenApril13,1930).
2.IsletcayeofAmboine,situatedat752'latitudenorthand11255'longitudeeastof
Greenwich,withitsdependentisles(PossessiontakenApril7,1933).
3. Itu Aba Island situated at latitude 102' north and longitude 11421' east of
Greenwich,withitsdependentisles(PossessiontakenApril10,1933).
4. Group of two islands [North East Cay and Shira Island] situated at latitude 11129'
northandlongitude11421'eastofGreenwich,withtheirdependentisles(Possession
takenApril10,1933).
5. Loaita Island, situated at latitude 1042' north and longitude 11425' east of
Greenwich,withitsdependentislands(PossessiontakenApril12,1933).
6. Thi Tu Island, situated at latitude 117' north and longitude 11416' east of
Greenwich,withitsdependentislands(PossessiontakenApril12,1933).

TheabovementionedislesandisletshenceforwardcomeunderFrenchsovereignty
(this notice cancels the previous notice inserted in the Official Journal dated July 25,
1933,page7784).327
Byclaimingtheislandswiththeirdependentislets/islands,itwasFrancesintentiontoclaim
sovereigntyovertheentirearchipelago.328
325
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;M.Chemillier
326
TaoCheng,note31supra,atp.269.
327
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoS.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.8;H.Roque,note208supra,atp.192;
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;T.Kelly,note133supra;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.38,
111.
51
France alsoprovided notice of theoccupation to China, Great Britain(Borneo, Brunei,

and Malaya), Japan, the Netherlands (Indonesia), and the United States (the Philippines)
betweenJulyandSeptember1933.TheUnitedStatesremainedsilentontheissue,asdidthe
Netherlands.329 After several exchanges with the French, Great Britain determined that it did
nothavetitletoSpratlyIslandbecauseinteraliatherehadneverbeenanyformalannexation
or any open display of sovereignty and thatdiscovery giving at most only an inchoate title
wouldbeinsufficient.330
China and Japan, on the other hand, purportedly questioned the French occupation.
China reportedly protested the French action in July and August of 1933, stating that the
Spratlys were sovereign Chinese territory.331 Vietnam denies that these diplomatic exchanges
occurred.JapanprotestedFrancesactions,arguingthat12oftheSpratlyIslandswereJapanese
territory based on discovery in 1920 and economic exploitation of the islands by a Japanese
fertilizercompany.332Sixyearslater,inlateMarch1939,Japanannouncedthatitwasplacing
theSpratlyIslandsundertheadministrativejurisdictionofFormosa(Taiwan).333TheJapanese
declaration was met with a strong protest from the French government on April 4, 1939,
reaffirming that the Spratlys were part of Annam (Vietnam).334 Annamese militia was
additionally deployed to counter a Japanese deployment of Formosan militia that had
establishedacampintheSpratlys,andaFrenchwarshiponpatrolintheSouthChinaSeacalled
on the Spratlys.335 Two years later, Japan invaded the Spratlys and forcibly occupied the
archipelago.336
FollowingtheannouncedannexationoftheSpratlysinJuly1933,aheadquartersforthe
FrenchadministrativeofficeandguarddetachmentforthearchipelagowasestablishedonItu
Aba Island. In December 1933, Governor General Pasquiersigned Decree No. 4762CP (dated
December 21, 1933), assigning the Spratlys to the Cochinchinese province of B Ria (French
Indochina).337 A radio station and weather station were subsequently built on Itu Aba by the
328
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.111,Annex31(Letterof30March1932fromtheMinisterfor
NationalDefence(Navy)totheMinisterforForeignAffairsDirectorateforPoliticalAffairsandTrade(Asia
Oceania)).
329
330
Id.;accordGeoffreyMarston,AbandonmentofTerritorialClaims:TheCaseofBouvetandSpratlyIsland,57BRIT.
Y.INTLL.337(1986),atp.350.SeealsoT.Kelly,note133supra;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;M.
331
ShenII,atp.144;seealsoShenI,atp.42;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.13;T.Kelly,note26supra.
332
ShenI,atp.42;seealsoTaoCheng,note31supra,atp.269;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.12;M.
Katchen,note120supra,atp.1178;M.Bennett,note14supra,atp.437;MFAWhitePaper(1974);H.Roque,
note208supra,atp.192;T.Kelly,note133supra.
333
H.Roque,note208supra,atp.192;seealsoSOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;T.Kelly,note133supra.
334
MFAWhitePaper(1974).SeealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;T.Kelly,note133supra;SOUTH
CHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.39,Annex32(NotefromtheMinistry
ofForeignAffairs,DirectorateforPoliticalAffairsandTrade,(Asia),10August1940).
335
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,Annex32(NotefromtheMinistryofForeignAffairs,Directoratefor
PoliticalAffairsandTrade,(Asia),10August1940).
336
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8.
337
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atp.203;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.
9;T.Kelly,note133supra;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2(ThedecreewasimplementedbytheGovernorof
Cochinchina,JeanFlizKrautheimer);NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnams
52
IndochinaMeteorologicalServicein1938,andoperatedunderFrenchadministrationuntilthe
Japaneseinvasionoftheislandin1941.Themeteorologicalstationwasassignedinternational
codenumber48919anddataprovidedbythestationwaslistedbytheWorldMeteorological
Organization as originating in Cochinchina.338 The French also continued to conduct scientific
surveys in the archipelagofor example, they provided a valuable geographic and aerologic
studyoftheregioninthe22ndReportoftheOceanographicInstituteofIndochina(Rapportsur
lefonctionnementdel'InstitutOceanographiquedel'Indochine,22,Note,Saigon1934).339
FrancesimilarlyengagedinaseriesofactsintheSpratlysaftertheSecondWorldWar,
to include diplomatic and military activities, in order to substantiate French sovereignty over
thearchipelagountilFrenchtroopswerefinallywithdrawnfromIndochinainAugust1956.The
FrenchbattleshipChevreudwasdeployedtotheSpratlysinOctober1946toreassertFrench
interestsinthearchipelagoanditscrewinstalledasovereigntysteleonItuAbaIsland.340When
France learned that Chinese naval units had occupied Itu Aba in November 1946, French
authorities protested the action, demanding that the Nationalist troops withdraw from the
island.341 Similarly, in May 1956, after Tomas Cloma proclaimed his socalled Freedomland,
which encompassed part of the Spratly archipelago, the French Charge d'Affaires in Manila
reminded the Philippine government that the Spratlys had been sovereign French territory
since1933.342Duringthesameperiod,theFrenchNavyvesselDumontdUrvillewasdeployed
to Itu Aba in a demonstration of FrenchVietnamese interest in the archipelago.343
NotwithstandingFrencheffortstomaintaincontroloverthearchipelago,theRepublicofChina
senttroopstoreoccupyItuAbaIslandonJune8,1956,andhasmaintainedagarrisononthe
islandeversince.
b. Return to South Vietnamese Control

VietnamslowlybegantoregainitsindependencefromFranceaftertheSecondWorld
War. On March 11, 1945, Emperor Bao Dai declared Vietnams independence, but abdicated
five months later on August 19, 1945, in favor of the Revolutionary Government of Ho Chi
Minh, which controlled Tonkin and Annam, but not Cochinchina.344 The following month, on
September 2, 1945, Ho proclaimed Vietnams independence and created the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam.345 Subsequently, in March 1946, France signed an agreement with the
DemocraticRepublicofVietnamrecognizingtheVietnameseRepublicasaFreeStatehaving
Nguyen,note204supra,atp.186;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.38,111,Annex30(Decreebythe
GovernorofCochinChina(J.Krautheimer),Saigon,21December1933).
338
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.9;Nguyen
BaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203
supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
339
340
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3;seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra.
341
Id.
342
343
Id.
344
345
DeclarationofIndependence,DemocraticRepublicofVietnam,Sept.2,1945,availableat
http://www.unc.edu/courses/2009fall/hist/140/006/Documents/VietnameseDocs.pdf.
53
itsowngovernment,itsownParliament,itsownArmyanditsownFinances,formingpartofthe
IndochineseFederationandoftheFrenchUnion.346
On June 27, 1947, France established a Provisional Central Government of Vietnam in
Saigon.TheHaLongBayAgreementwassignedonJune5,1948,allowingforthecreationofa
unifiedStateofVietnam(Tonkin,Annam,andCochinchina)associatedwithFrancewithinthe
FrenchUnion(thenincludingLaosandCambodia).347AccordingtotheMFA,thisnewStateof
VietnamincludedboththeParacelandSpratlyIslandsrecallthatin1932,theParacelswere
designatedasanadministrativeunitofThuaThienProvince(Annam)andin1933,theSpratlys
were designated as an administrative unit of B Ria Province (Cochinchina).348 The following
year,onMarch8,1949,FrancesignedthelyseAgreementwiththeStateofVietnamunder
Emperor Bao Dai, agreeing to recognize the independence of Vietnam and transferring
administrative power of the state to the Vietnamese government.349 In April, French High
Commissioner Lon Pignon confirmed that France considered the Paracels to be a crown
dependencyofAnnam.350Laterthatyear,onJuly5th,theFrenchgovernmentproclaimedthe
unification of Tonkin, Annams and Cochinchina into the State of Vietnam within the French
Union.
OnOctober14,1950,FranceformallyturnedoverdefenseoftheParacelstoRepublicof
Vietnamforces,withGeneralPhanVanGiao(governorofCentralVietnam)presidingoverthe
ceremony.351 The following year, Premier Tran Van Huu reaffirmed Vietnamese sovereignty
over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes at the San Francisco Peace Conference: as we
must frankly profit from all the opportunities offered to us to stifle the germs of discord, we
affirmourrighttotheSpratlyandParacelIslands,whichhavealwaysbelongedtoVietnam.352
None of the 51 nations present at the conference, including France, objected to this
statement.353WiththesigningoftheGenevaAccordsinJuly1954,Francerecognizedthefull
independenceoftheStateofVietnam.354
The Vietnamese Navy assumed responsibility for the defense of the archipelago in
August1956.SouthVietnameseforcesoccupiedPattleIslandandRobertIslandinAprilandJuly
1956, respectively.355 That same year, the Department of Mining, Technology, and Small
Industries conducted surveys on Pattle, Money, Robert and Drumond Islands.356 Vietnamese
346
AccordbetweenFranceandtheDemocraticRepublicofVietnam,Mar.6,1946,reprintedinThePentagon
Papers,GravelEdition,Vol.1,Chap.1(Boston:BeaconPress,1971),atpp.1819.
347
ThePentagonPapers,GravelEdition,Vol.1,Chap.2(Boston:BeaconPress,1971).
348
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,pp.89;B.Murphy,note29supra,atp.
203;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2.
349
ThePentagonPapers,GravelEdition,Vol.1,Chap.2(Boston:BeaconPress,1971).
350
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.119,Annex43(Telegramof23April1949fromSaigon).
351
Id.,atpp.41,116;MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoSOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3.
352
p.3;T.Kelly,note133supra;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyover
ParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;H.Nguyen,note
204supra,atp.187;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.41.
353
Id.;seealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atpp.192193,201.
354
TheGenevaAccords.
355
ShenI,atpp.5152.
356
54
Marines subsequently assumed the defense of the islands in 1957; however, the Vietnamese
Navycontinuedtoregularlypatrolthewatersaroundthearchipelagoinordertocheckillegal
occupantsonthemanyislands.357
French scientists were also granted permission to conduct scientific studies of the
Paracels on behalf of Vietnam, including a number of studies on marine and land shells by
EdmondSaurin:
NotessurlesilesParacels(GeologicarchivesofVietnamNo.3),Saigon1955.
AproposdesgaletsexotiquesdesilesParacels(GeologicarchivesofVietnamNo.4),
Saigon1957.
Faune Malacologique terrestre des iles Paracels (Journal de Conchiliologie, Vol.
XCVIII),Paris1958.
GasteropodesmarinsdesilesParacels,FacultyofSciences,Saigon,Vol.I:1960;Vol.
II:1961.358
A study on the islands flora, entitled Contribution de la connaissance de la flore des iles
Paracels (Faculty of Sciences, Saigon 1957), was additionally published in 1957 by French
scientist H. Fontaine, in cooperation with a Vietnamese colleague359 According to the MFA,
thesescientificachievements,accomplishedoveralongperiodoftime,couldonlyhavebeen
achievedbyacountryexercisingsovereigntyovertheseislandstothefullestextent.360
Beginning in 1959, defense responsibilities were transferred to the Regional Forces of
QuangNamProvince.361InFebruary,SouthVietnameseforcesoccupiedDuncanIsland,evicting
over80Chinesefishermenwhowerelivingontheisland.362Then,inMarch,Vietnamesetroops
occupiedDrummondIsland.363
In 1960, the first Vietnamese officials were posted to the Paracels to administer the
islands. Nguyen Ba Thuoc became the first civilian officer appointed by an independent
Vietnam on December 14, 1960 (Arrete No. 24113NV/NV/3).364 The following year, the
Paracels were transferred from the jurisdiction of Thua Thien Province back to Quang Nam
Province (Decree No. 174NV of July 13, 1961) and given the status of a Xa (village of the
mainland).365
357
358
Id.;seealsoHenriFontaine,EdmondSaurin(19041977),ASIANPERSPECTIVESXXIII(1),1980,pp.7198.
359
360
Id.
361
Id.
362
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3;seealsoNguyenBaDien,note203supra;Historicaldocumentson
WhitePaper.ChinaclaimsthatthefishermenwereillegallyabductedbytheVietnamese.ShenI,atpp.5152.
363
Id.
364
365
In1969,theParacelIslandsbecamepartofthevillageofHoaLong,HoaVangDistrict,QuangNamProvince
(DecreeNo.709BNV/HCDP/26datedOctober21,1969).Id.;seealsoShenI,atp.52;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES
(2012),atp.3;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.189;Historicaldocumentson
WhitePaper;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.127.
55
In May 1971, South Vietnamese forces conducted a survey on Triton Island in the
Paracels.366 The Chinese, however, continued to make incursions into the archipelago. As a
result,SouthVietnamissuedastatementonJuly14,1971,reaffirmingitssovereigntyoverthe
archipelago.367
OnJanuary21,1974,PRCforcesinvadedtheParacelsandoustedtheSouthVietnamese
garrison occupying the Crescent Group. In February 1974, the Saigon government issued a
lengthy proclamation condemning the Communist Chinese invasion.368 A diplomaticnote was
alsosenttothesignatoriesoftheParisPeaceAccordsof1973,369callingforaspecialsessionof
the Security Council.370 The Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam likewise
expresseditsconcern,albeitguarded,overtheChineseinvasionofthearchipelagoindicating
thatconsideringthecomplexnatureoftheproblem,itneededtobeexaminedonthebasisof
theprinciplesofequality,mutualrespect,friendshipandgoodneighbourlinessandsettledby
negotiation.371Laterthatyear,SouthVietnamreaffirmeditssovereigntyovertheParacelsat
theMarchmeetingoftheEconomicCommissionfortheFarEastandattheJulymeetingofthe
ThirdUnitedNationsConferenceontheLawoftheSea.372
AtthesametimeitundertooktheseactivitiesintheParacels,SouthVietnamalsobegan
to exercise sovereignty over the Spratly archipelago as the successor state to French claims
aftertheFrenchwithdrewfromIndochina.OnJune1,1956,theRepublicofVietnamsMinistry
ofForeignAffairsissuedastatementconfirmingVietnamesesovereigntyovertheSpratlysafter
366
ShenI,atp.52.
367
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.44.
368
ProclamationbytheGovernmentoftheRepublicofVietnam:
ThenoblestandmostimperativetaskofaGovernmentistodefendthesovereignty,independenceandterritorial
integrityoftheNation.
InthefaceoftheillegalmilitaryoccupationbyCommunistChinaoftheParacelsArchipelagowhichisanintegral
partoftheRepublicofVietnam,theGovernmentoftheRepublicofVietnamdeemsitnecessarytosolemnly
declarebeforeworldopinion,tofriendsandfoesalike,that:
TheHoangSa(Paracel)andTruongSa(Spratly)archipelagoesareanindivisiblepartoftheterritoryofthe
RepublicofVietnam.TheGovernmentandPeopleoftheRepublicofVietnamshallnotyieldtoforceand
renounceallorpartoftheirsovereigntyoverthosearchipelagoes.
AslongasonesingleislandofthatpartoftheterritoryoftheRepublicofVietnamisforciblyoccupiedby
anothercountry,theGovernmentandPeopleoftheRepublicwillcontinuetheirstruggletorecovertheir
legitimaterights.
TheGovernmentoftheRepublicofVietnamisdeterminedtodefendthesovereigntyoftheNationoverthose
islandsbyallandeverymeans.ProclamationbytheGovernmentoftheRepublicofVietnam,Feb.14,1974,
availableathttp://www.nguyenthaihocfoundation.org/lichsuVN/tuyenbo_vnch.htm;seealsoSOUTHCHINASEA
STUDIES(2012),atp.3;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.192;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;Historicaldocuments
onVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRS
WhitePaper;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra),atp.127.
369
ThesignatoriesoftheAgreementonEndingtheWarandRestoringPeaceinVietnam(Jan.27,1973)werethe
DemocraticRepublicofVietnam(NorthVietnam),theRepublicofVietnam(SouthVietnam),theProvisional
RevolutionaryGovernmentofSouthVietnam,andtheUnitedStates.
370
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.45.
371
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.45and128.
372
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.45,127;T.Kelly,
note133supra;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParaceland
56
Tomas Cloma proclaimed his socalled Freedomland in the eastern portion of the
archipelago.373 Then, in mid June, Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau reaffirmed his countrys
sovereigntyovertheislandchain,recallingthatfiveyearsearliertheheadoftheVietnamese
Delegation at the San Francisco Peace Conference had solemnly reaffirmed Vietnamese
sovereigntyovertheTruongSaarchipelagoandthatthestatementwasnotchallengedbyany
participatingcountry,includingChinaandthePhilippines.374InOctober,administrativecontrol
of the Spratlys was assigned to Phuoc Tuy Province (Decree No. 143/NV of October 22,
1956).375
Faced with growing Chinese and Filipino incursions into the Spratlys, the South
Vietnamese Navy launched a series of operations to reassert control over the archipelago. In
August1956,thecrewofthecruiserTuyDong(HQ04)wasdirectedtoerectsovereigntysteles
and build flag poles to hoist the Vietnamese flag on many of the Spratly Islands.376 In 1961,
crewmembersfromtheVietnamesecruisersVanKepandVanDonlandedonSouthwestCay,
Thitu Island, Loaita Island, and Amboyna Cay to erect sovereignty steles and raise the
Vietnameseflag.377ThecruisersTuyDongandTayKetengagedinsimilaractivitiesin1962on
SpratlyIslandandNamyitIsland.378Thefollowingyear,thesovereigntystelesonallofthemain
islandsintheSpratlyswererebuiltbycrewmembersoftheNavyvesselsHuongGiang,ChiLang
andKyHoa:
May19,1963,stelesonTruongSaIsland(Spratlyproper)
May20,1963,stelesonAnBangIsland(AmboynaCay)
May22,1963,stelesonThituandLoaitaIslands
May24,1963,stelesonSongTuDong(NorthEastCay)andSongTuTay(SouthWest
Cay).379
Regularnavypatrolsofthearchipelagocontinuedthrough1964,380althoughthefrequencyof
thepatrolswassignificantlyreducedafter1963asaresultoftheongoingconflictwithNorth
Vietnam.Between1960and1967,SouthVietnamesenavalunitsalsoconductedanumberof
373
Id.;seealsoB.Dubner,note29supra,atp.311;T.Kelly,note133supra.
374
Id.;seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.9.
375
B.Murphy,note29supra),atp.204;accordB.Dubner,note29supra,atp.311.SeealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,
note42supra,atp.9(DecreeNo.143/NV2asreconfirmedandreadjustedin1958(DecreeNo.76/BNV/HC9ND
ofMarch20,1958)and1959(DecreeNo.34/NVofJanuary27,1959));T.Kelly,note133supra;NguyenBaDien,
note203supra;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.189;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacel
andSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;M.ChemillierGendreau,
note15supra,atpp.43,127.
376
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.189(theROVNavylandedonSpratly
IslandsanderectedamonumentassertingsovereigntyonAugust22,1956.);M.ChemillierGendreau,note15
supra,atpp.117,125.
377
Nguyen,note204supra,atp.189.
378
Id.
379
Id.
380
57
surveyandmappingexpeditionson14oftheSpratlyIslandsfeatures,includingAmboynaCay,
ThituIsland,LoaitaIsland,andNorthDangerReef.381
Continued counterclaims by the other Spratly claimants during the 1970s resulted in
sharp protests by the Saigon government. In April 20, 1971, the MFA delivered a diplomatic
note to the Malaysian government outlining Vietnams position in support of its sovereignty
claims to the archipelago.382 Three months later, in a statement issued on July 15, 1971, the
MFAreaffirmedVietnamesesovereigntyoverthetwoislandgroups.383InMay1973,Vietnam
conductedsurveysonPagasaIsland,LoaitaIslandandNortheastCay,and,inJuly,itoccupied
Namyit Island in the Spratlys.384 Also in July, the Ministry of Agricultural Development and
LandsInstituteofAgriculturalResearchconductedasurveyofNamyitIsland.385Subsequently,
on September 6, 1973, the South Vietnamese government transferred administration of
AmboynaCayandSpratly,ItuAba,Loaita,Thitu,Namyit,andSinCoweIslandstothePhuocHai
Commune,DatDoDistrict,PhuocTuyProvince(DecreeNo.420BNV/HCDP/26).386Diplomatic
noteswerealsodeliveredtoTaiwan(January29,1974)andthePhilippines(February12,1974)
rejecting Taipeis and Manilas respective claims to the Spratlys as unfounded.387 Later that
year,SouthVietnamreaffirmeditssovereigntyovertheSpratlysattheMarchmeetingofthe
Economic Commission for the Far East and at the July meeting of the Third United Nations
ConferenceontheLawoftheSea.388
c. Postunification Administration
OnApril30,1975,VietCongandNorthVietnamesetroopscapturedSaigon,bringingan
end to the Vietnam War. The following year, on July 2, 1976, theDemocratic Republic of
VietnamandtheProvisionalRevolutionaryGovernmentoftheRepublicofSouthVietnam(PRG)
merged to form the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Following unification of the country,
theSRVinheritedtheParacelsandSpratlysfromtheRepublicofVietnam/PRG(SouthVietnam)
andcontinuedtoassertsovereigntyoverthetwoarchipelagoes.
North Vietnamese troops replacedthe South Vietnamese garrisons on Southwest Cay,
Sand Cay, Sin Cowe Island, Spratly Island and Amboyna Cay in April 1975.389 The following
month, the Vietnamese government incorporated the Paracel and Spratly Islands into the
territoryofVietnamandrenamedthearchipelagoesHoangSaandTruongSa.390InMarch1976,
381
TheChineseviewedtheseactivitiesasillegal.ShenI,atp.52.
382
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;Historical
383
384
Id.
385
386
Id.;seealsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.189;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.44and127.
387
388
389
ShenI,atp.55;seealsoSOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012);M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.45.
390
HoangSaandTruongSadistrictsarecurrentlyunderthejurisdictionoftheCityofDaNangandtheProvinceof
KhnhHo,respectively.Id.
58
VietnamincorporatedtheSpratlyIslandsintongNaiProvince.391Thefollowingyear,onMay
12,1977,thegovernmentofVietnamissuedaStatementontheTerritorialSea,theContiguous
Zone,theExclusiveEconomicZoneandtheContinentalShelf,whichstated,inpart,that
5.Theislandsandarchipelagoes[i.e.,theSpratlysandParacels],forminganintegralpart
oftheVietnameseterritoryandbeyondtheVietnameseterritorialsea,havetheirown
territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and continental
shelves.392
InSeptember1982,theParacelswereplacedundertheadministrativecontrolofQuang
NamDa Nang Province.393 Two months later, on November 12th, the government of Vietnam
issuedastatementontheterritorialseabaselinesofVietnam,whichincludedtheParaceland
SpratlyIslands:
(4) The baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea of the Hoang Sa and
TruongSaArchipelagoeswillbedeterminedinacominginstrumentinconformitywith
paragraph5ofthe12May1977statementoftheGovernmentoftheSocialistRepublic
ofVietNam.394
Aseriesofdiplomaticprotestswereissuedoverthenext30yearstochallengeChinese,
Taiwanese, Filipino, and Malaysian incursions into the Spratlys.395 Additionally, between
February 1987 and July 1989, Vietnamese forces occupied Bo Reef, West Reef, Ladd Reef,
PigeonReef,EastReef,CornwallisSouthReef,CollinsReef,LansdowneReef,AlisonReef,Petley
Reef, South Reef, Prince of Wales Bank, Bombay Shoal, and Vanguard Bank to counter
continuedChineseforaysintotheSpratlyarchipelago.396
391
ShenI,atp.55.
392
StatementontheTerritorialSea,theContiguousZone,theExclusiveEconomicZoneandtheContinentalShelfof
12May1977,availableathttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/regionslist.htm;seealsoM.
393
AdditionaladministrativemeasuresregardingtheParacelsweretakeninJune1996(annexedtheParacelsinto
thecityofDaNang)andApril2007(establishmentofTruongSatown,SongTuTayandSinhTonCommunesunder
TruongSaDistrict.NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacel
394
Statementof12November1982bytheGovernmentoftheSocialistRepublicofVietNamontheTerritorialSea
BaselineofVietNam,availableathttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/regionslist.htm;see
alsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.46.
395
Forexample,onMarch25,1983,theVietnameseMFAprotestedMalaysiasclaimtothreeoftheislandsinthe
Spratlyarchipelago(seeM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.45).Morerecently,onDecember3,2007,
VietnamstronglyprotestedChinasdecisiontoestablishSanshaCitytoadministertheSpratlyandParacelIslands.
Similarly,onMarch12,2009,VietnamprotestedthePhilippinesnewarchipelagicbaselines,whichreferssosome
oftheSpratlyIslandsasPhilippineterritory.AndonMay8,2009,Vietnamsentadiplomaticnote(No.86/HC2009)
totheUNSecretaryGeneralrejectingChinasUshapedlineintheSouthChinaSea(seeNguyenBaDien,note203
supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONAL
COMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper).
396
ShenI,atp.56;seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra.
59
An economic and scientific complex was constructed in the archipelago in August

397
1989. In addition, Vietnam dispatched the first organized fishing fleetto exploit the East
Seafisheriesandconstructedaseriesofcivilianinstallations,includingscientificstations
andlighthousesonanumberoftheoccupiedislets.398
Official acts, decrees, resolutions, laws, diplomatic correspondence, etc., taken by the
SRVsinceunificationofthecountryhavecontinuedtodemonstratesovereigntyoverboththe
Spratly and Paracels Islands. For example, Vietnams declaration upon ratifying the United
NationsConventionontheLawoftheSeain1994reaffirmedVietnamesesovereigntyoverthe
disputedarchipelagoes:
The National Assembly reiterates Viet Nam's sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and
Truong Sa archipelagoes and its position to settle those disputes relating to territorial
claimsaswellasotherdisputesintheEasternSeathroughpeacefulnegotiationsinthe
spirit of equality, mutual respect and understanding, and with due respect of
international law, particularly the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.399
Similarly, Vietnam delivered a note verbale to the United Nations in August 1998 protesting
Chinas 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the Peoples
RepublicofChina,whichprovides,inpart:
On this occasion, we would like to reiterate that Viet Nam has indisputable
sovereigntyoverthetwoarchipelagoes,namelyParacelsandSpratlys,andpossesses
sufficienthistoricalevidenceaswellaslegalgroundstoassertitssovereigntyoverthese
twoarchipelagoes.400
VietnamsresponsestoChineseandFilipinoprotestsregardingitssubmissiontotheUN
CommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelfclaiminganextendedcontinentalshelfinthe
SouthChinaSea,likewisereiterateVietnamesesovereigntyovertheSpratlyandParacelIslands:
TheParacelsandSpratlysarchipelagoesarepartsofVietNamsterritory.VietNam
has indisputable sovereignty over these archipelagoes. Chinas claim over the islands
and adjacent waters in theSouth China Sea as manifested in the [ninedashed line]
map attached with the Notes Verbale CLM/17/2009 and CLM/18/2009 has no legal,
historicalorfactualbasis,thereforeisnullandvoid.401

397
398
399
SocialistRepublicofVietnamDeclarationuponRatificationofUNCLOS,July25,1994,availableat
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm.
400
VietNam:DisputeregardingtheLawontheExclusiveEconomicZoneandtheContinentalShelfofthePeoples
RepublicofChinawhichwaspassedon26June1998,reprintedinUNLAWOFTHESEABULL.,No.38,1998,atp.55.
401
NoteVerbaleNo.86/HC2009,May8,2009,availableat
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm.
60
VietNamwishestotakethisopportunitytoreaffirmitsconsistentpositionthatViet
NamhasindisputablesovereigntyovertheParacelsandSpratlysarchipelagoes.402

Paracel andSpratly Archipelagoes are integral parts of Vietnamese territory. Viet
Nam has sufficient historical evidences and legal foundation to assert her sovereignty
overthesetwoarchipelagoes.403
More recently, Article 1 of the 2012 Law of the Sea specifically provides that the new law
applies,interalia,totheParacelandSpratlyarchipelagos.404AccordingtotheMFA,these
actions clearly reflect an intent on the part of Vietnam to retain sovereignty over the South
ChinaSeaislands.
4. Right of Cession
VietnamsclaimofsovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislandsisbased,inpart,onthe
rightofcessionfromtheFrenchclaimstothetwoarchipelagoesinthe1930s.405International
lawrecognizesthatastatemaycedesovereigntyoveraparticularterritorytoanotherstate.406
VietnamclaimsthatFrancevalidlyexercisedsovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislandsinthe
1930s, and that France ceded the islands to Vietnam (South Vietnam) after it became an
independent state. As a result, the SRV has an indisputable claim to the islands by right of
cession.407
TheMFAclaimsthat,asearlyas1634,theJournalofBatavia,publishedbytheDutch
East Indies Company, recognized Vietnamese sovereignty over the Paracel Islands.408
Portuguese and Dutch maps from the early 17th century likewise identify the islands as
Vietnameseterritory.409
FurtherevidenceofforeignrecognitionofVietnameseclaimstotheParacelscanalsobe
found in documents from the 18th century. According to the MFA, in 1701, a Western
missionary on board the French ship Amphitrite recorded in Mystere des atollsJournal de
voyageauxParacels(MysteryoftheatollsJournalofthevoyagetotheParacelIslands)that
theParacelisanarchipelagobelongingtotheKingdomofAnNam.410Similarly,a1768note
written by French Admiral Charles Henri dEstaing to M. de la Borde following the admirals
402
NoteVerbaleNo.240/HC2009,Aug.18,2009,availableat
403
404
LawoftheSeaofVietNam,LawNo.18/2012/QH13,June21,2012,availableathttp://vbqppl.mpi.gov.vn/en
us/Pages/default.aspx?itemId=f3ce9fdd4e384a45a2fdd94999684dfa&list=documentDetail.
405
Vietnamalsoclaimssovereigntyovertheislandsbasedondiscoveryandeffectiveoccupation.B.Murphy,note
29supra,atp.203.
406
BROWNLIE217(8thed.).
407
B.Murphy,note29supra,atp.198.
408
Id.
409
410
61
abortedraidagainstthecityofHurecordedthatVietnamesenavalvesselsfrequentlycruised
between the Paracels and the coast and thus would have reportedhis approach to the
city.411AsubsequentmemoirefromAdmiraldEstaingtoM.deMagonin1759indicatedthat
the cannons emplaced on the walls of Lord Vo Vuongs palace had been taken from ships
wreckedontheParacels.412
According to the MFA,Western writings from the 19th centurycontinued to recognize
Vietnams control of the Paracels. A book written by John Barrow in 1806A Voyage to
Cochinchinadocuments the travels of Count George Macartneythe British Envoy to the
ChineseCourtinCochinchinain1793.Thebookcontainsadetaileddescriptionofthetypes
ofboatsusedbytheCochinchineseinordertoreachtheParacelIslandswheretheycollected
trepang and swallow nests.413 Additionally, a book by French missionary Monseigneur Jean
LouisTaberdpublishedin1837NoteontheGeographyofCochinchinadescribedtheParacel
IslandsaspartofCochinchinaandthatCochinchinesreferredtotheParacelsasCatVang.414A
second book published by Taberd in 1838History and Description of the Religion, Customs,
and Morals of All Peopleslikewise recorded that the Paracels had been a dependency of
Cochinchinafor34years.415AdepictionoftheParacelsasVietnameseterritoryalsoappearsin
Taberds1838AnNamDaiQuocHoaDo(TabulaGeographicaImperiiAnnamiticiTheMapof
theAnnamEmpire)andan1862geographybookwrittenundertheauspicesofthe(French)
Ethnography SocietyTableau de la Cochinchine.416 Similarly, French naval officer Jean
Baptiste Chaigneaus memoires (Memoires sur la Cochinchina) refer to Emperor Gialongs
annexationoftheParacelsin1816.417
A reference to the Paracels as Vietnamese territory can also be found in Japon, Indo
Chine,EmpireBirman(ouAva),Siam,Annam(ouCochinchine),PninsuleMalaise,etc.,Ceylan
by Adolphe Philibert Dubois de Jancigny.418 Additionally, in his 1849 article Geography of the
Cochinchinese Empire, German missionary Karl Gtzlaff defined the Paracels as part of
Vietnams territory and noted the islands with the Vietnamese name Cat Vang.419 Gtzlaff
additionallynotedthatthegovernmentofAnnamkeptrevenuecuttersandasmallgarrisonon
theParacelstocollectdutyonallvisitorstothearchipelago,andtoensureprotectionofits
411
Id.
412
Id.
413
Id.
414
Islands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;H.Nguyen,note204supra,p.177.
415
416
417
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.7(Cochinchina,thesovereignofwhichhastodaythetitleofEmperor,
iscomposedofCochinchinaproper,Tonquin,apartoftheKingdomofCambodia,someuninhabitedislandsnotfar
fromthecoastandtheParacelsarchipelago,composedofuninhabitedreefsandrocks.Itisonlyin1816thatthe
presentEmperortookpossessionofthisarchipelago.);seealsoNguyenBaDien,note203supra;Historical
BORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.183;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.69.
418
419
62
own fishermen.420 Aldriano Balbis The Italian Compendium of Geography (1850) likewise
includestheParacel,Pirate(HTin),andPuoloCondor(CnSn)IslandswithintheKingdom
ofAnnam.421
TheMFAadditionallyclaimsthattheJapanesegovernmenttacitlyacknowledgedFrench
sovereigntyovertheParacelsin1927afteradisputearosebetweenFranceandJapanoverthe
Spratly Islands. According to a letter written by the Governor General of Indochina to the
Minister for the Colonies on March 20, 1930, the Japanese Counsel General in Hanoi (Mr.
Kurosawa) was instructed by his government to unofficially inquire of the French authorities
about the status of several groups of islands in the South China Sea. The Paracels, however,
were explicitly excluded from the discussions by the Japanese because the ownership of the
ParacelIslandswasnotindisputewithFrance.422
According to the MFA and some Western scholars, Chinese authors and old Chinese
geographical documents describing the limits of the Chinese Empire confirm the accuracy of
these Western writings. In 1730, Hai Lu wrotein Hai Quoc DoChi that Truong Saforms a
rampartontheperipheryoftheKingdomofAnnam(Vietnam).423A1731mapofKwangtung
(Guangdong)ProvinceandadescriptionoftheQuiongzhouPrefecturedonotmentioneither
the Paracels or the Spratlys.424 This omission is confirmed in Hoang Chaos 1894 Map of the
Unified Empire, which shows Chinese territory as extending only as far as Hainan Island.425
TwentiethcenturyChinesewritingsalsoconfirmthatHainanIslandwasthesouthernmostpoint
of Chinese territory. The 1906 Zhongguo Dilixue Jiaokeshu (Manual of Geography of China)
states in the Generalities chapter that the Chinese territory is bound in the South at North
latitude1813',theterminusbeingthecoastofYazhou,islandofHainan.426Asimilarrecordis
found in Li Hanzhungs Geography of Guandong published in 1909: Today the maritime
frontiersarelimitedintheSouthbytheislandofHainan.427
Following Frances annexation of Spratly Island in 1930, the British Foreign Office
determinedin1932thattheUnitedKingdomdidnothavetitletoSpratlyIslandbecauseinter
aliatherehadneverbeenanyformalannexationoranyopendisplayofsovereigntyandthat,in
420
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.182(WeshouldmentionheretheParacels.Fromtimeimmemorial,junks
inlargenumberfromHainan,haveannuallyvisitedtheseshoals,andproceededintheirexcursionsasfarasthe
coastofBorneo.TheAnnamgovernment,perceivingtheadvantageswhichitmightderiveifatollwereraised,
keepsrevenuecuttersandasmallgarrisononthespottocollectthedutyonallvisitors,andtoensureprotection
ofitsownfishermen.).
421
422
MFAWhitePaper(1974);accordM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,Annex5(LetterNo.704AEx,dated
20March1930,fromtheGovernorGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi,totheMinisterfortheColonies,Paris)(in
1927...[theJapaneseGovernment]requesteditsConsulGeneralinHanoitomakeanunofficialapproachonthe
islandsintheSouthChinaSea.TheParacelswerespecificallyexcludedfromthisinquiry,sinceMr.Kurosawa,on
theinstructionsofhisMinistry,wasawarethathecouldnotdiscussthestatusofthisarchipelagowitha
representativeofFrance.).
423
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.171;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.74.
424
425
Id.,atp.75.
426
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.171;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.75.
427
63
default of this, discovery giving at most only an inchoate title would be insufficient .428
Subsequently, during the negotiations of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Foreign Office
indicatedin1947thattheUnitedKingdomwasnotpreparedtocontesttheFrenchclaimto
sovereignty[totheSpratlyIslands]whichisconsideredtobegoodinlaw.429Australialikewise
supportedtheFrenchposition.430
V. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
A. Evaluation of Chinas Position
China argues that its claims to the South China Sea islands are valid based on its
extensiveandcontinuousdisplayofauthorityoverthearchipelagoesfollowingtheirdiscovery
duringtheHanDynasty.Chinasdiscoveryoftheislandsvesteditwithaninchoatetitle,which
China perfected by its repeated exercise of authority over the archipelagoes throughout
history. These extensive activities, which include governmentsponsored exploitation of the
islands, repeated naval patrols to the region, and numerous scientific surveys of the islands,
demonstrateeffectiveadministrativecontrolandsovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislands.
1. Discovery versus Awareness

China claims to have been the first nation to discover the South China Sea islands as
earlyastheHanDynasty(206BC220AD).Tosupportitsclaim,Chinacitesanumberofancient
books and maps that allegedly describe the geographic features of the Spratlys and Paracels
andplacethedisputedislandswithinthemaritimeboundariesoftheChineseempire.
SomeWesternscholarsagreethatthereisconsiderablehistoricalevidencetosupport
ChinasclaimstotheSouthChinaSeaislands,citingtheuseoftheislandsbyChinesefishermen
andthemappingandnamingoftheislands,aswellasChinasexpressedintentnottoabandon
title to the islands.431 Vietnamese and most Western scholars, however, disagree with this
position, indicating that Chinas historical evidence and isolated and sporadic contact by
Chinese fishermen are insufficient to establish sovereignty over the South China Sea islands
underinternationallaw,andthatthevalidityofChinasclaimisthereforesubjecttodoubt.432
428
G.Marston,note330supra,atp.350.Beginningin1934,SpratlyIslandandAmboynaCaywerenolonger
mentionedintheBritishColonialOfficeList.S.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.7.SeealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,
note15supra,atp.112.
429
G.Marston,note330supra,atp.355.
430
431
J.Greenfield,note149supra,atpp.29,32(formanycenturies,...Chinesefishermenusedtheseislandsas
landingpostsandtheyweremapped.Chinahasalsocontinuouslyexpresseditsintentionnottoabandonitstitle
totheislands.Therearecollectionsofoldmaps,notallChinese,whichwouldbearoutChinesehistoriclinksto
theislands,intermsofdiscovery,explorationandnamingoftheislands.China,therefore,hasquitestrong
historicalargumentsinitsfavour.Chinasmodern(post1945)presenceintheSouthChinaSeaistherefore
regardedbyitasaconsistentreiterationofhistoricrights.);seealsoJeanetteGreenfield,ChinasPracticeinthe
LawoftheSea(Oxford1992),atp.158.
432
M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.434435,446;accordC.Joyner,note166supra,atp.59;,H.Roque,note208
supra,atp.195(AmajorobstacletoastatementofChinaslegaltitletotheSpratlysisthedearthofprimary
sourcesandofficialdocumentsdetailingsuchlegalbasis.)andp.197(TheChinesepositionhassincebeen
64
Whether Chinese navigators actually charted the South China Sea as claimed is
questionable given that Chinese mariners traditionally used the inner sea routes along the
coasts of Hainan Island and mainland Vietnam. However, even if true, this action does not
demonstrate Chinas effective administration and control of the South China Sea islands.
GeneralawarenessofthelocationandexistenceoftheSpratlyandParacelIslandsbyChinese
mariners is insufficient to demonstrate that China actually discovered the islands in a legal
sense.433 Undoubtedly, as evidenced by both Chinese and Vietnamese historical records,
geographers and navigators from various lands were aware of the presence of the islands.434
However, when determining sovereignty over territory, international law makes a clear
distinctionbetweentheconceptofgeographicalawarenessandthatofdiscovery,theirlegal
effectsbeingfundamentallydifferent.435
[A]nislandoranarchipelago,caneasilyhavebeenknownfromtimeimmemorialto
navigatorsfrequentingthoseparts,togeographerskeentoextendtheirworktoinclude
allterritoriesregardlessofwhoownsthem,yetatthesametimeneverhaveformedthe
objectofanydiscoveryproducinglegaleffect.436
Accordingly,mostoftheworkscitedbyChinainsupportofitsclaimsfallintothecategoryof
documentsthatmerelyproveageneralknowledgeofthearea,butarenotusefultothelegal
argument.437
Moreover, the historical evidence provided by China to justify its claims not only is
unconvincingbutalsocontainsanumberofflawsandcontradictions.AncientAsianempiresdid
not exercise sovereignty over territory, but rather were characterized by undefined and
changingborders.Thus,theconceptofeffectiveoccupationdidnotexistintheConfucianlegal
systemapplicableinChinauntilthe1900s.Chineseemperorsruledoverpersons,notterritory,
expoundedonbyscholarsofChinesedescentandwhoseobjectivelyissuspect.);HongThaoNguyen,Vietnams
PositionontheSovereigntyovertheParacels&Spratlys:ItsMaritimeClaims,J.EASTASIAINTLL.,VJEAIL(1)2012,
May4,2012,atp.170(thesourcesaregeographicalmonographs,references,ornauticalbookswrittenby
privategeographersornavigators,ortravelaccountsbyChineseambassadorsabroadtodescribethecountries
outsideChina.ObviouslytheyarenotofficialhistoricalrecordsofChinesedynasties.);FlorianDupuyandPieere
MarieDupuy,ALegalAnalysisofChinasHistoricRightsClaimintheSouthChinaSea,AM.J.INTLL.,Vol.107,No.1
(Jan.2013),pp.124141,atpp.136,141(Mererelianceonallegedhistoricalevidenceofthekindinvokedby
Chinesecommentatorsisinsufficienttoestablishsovereigntyoverthewatersenclosedbytheninedashlineorthe
islandsoftheSouthChinaSea.);SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.4(Chinaassertedthatitwasthefirst
countrytofindthearchipelagoes.Thisargument,however,isnotbackedupbyofficialhistoricaldocuments.
[M]ostofthesedocumentsaretravelaccounts,monographs,andnavigationbooksdemonstratingknowledgeof
ancientpeopleaboutterritoriesbelongtonotonlyChinabutalsoothercountries.Moreover,inthesedocuments,
theterritorieswhichChinanowclaimstobetheParacelsandSpratlysarenamedinconsistently,thusthereareno
convincingargumentsthatthoseterritoriesarereallytheParacelsandSpratlys.).
433
434
Id.
435
Id.
436
Id.,atp.56.
437
Id.,atpp.5960.
65
andmaritimeboundarieswerenonexistent.438AsnotedbyProfessorMohanMalikoftheAsia
PacificCenterforSecurityStudies,

ChinasclaimtotheSpratlysonthebasisofhistoryrunsagroundonthefactthatthe
regions past empires did not exercise sovereignty. In premodern Asia, empires were
characterized by undefined, unprotected, and often changing frontiers. The notion of
suzeraintyprevailed.439

Suzerainty occurs where a dominant statein this case Chinacontrols the foreign
relationsofavassalstateVietnambutallowsthevassalstatetoexercisesovereignauthority
in its internal affairs.440 According to Professor Malik, unlike nationstates, the frontiers of
Chineseempireswereneithercarefullydrawnnorpolicedbutweremorelikecirclesorzones,
taperingofffromthecenterofcivilizationtotheundefinedperipheryofalienbarbarians.441
Moreover, in its territorial disputes with neighboring India, Burma, and Vietnam, Beijing
always took the position that its land boundaries were never defined, demarcated, and
delimited.442
Chinaappearstotaketheoppositepositionwithregardtoitsterritorialdisputesinthe
South China Sea. Chinas claim that its land boundaries were historically never defined and
delimited [therefore] stands in sharp contrast with Chinas position that its maritime
boundarieswerealwaysclearlydefinedanddelimited.443InProfessorMaliksview,hereinlies
the basic contradiction in Chinas untenable position regarding its land and maritime
boundariesin short, sovereignty is a postimperial notion ascribed to nationstates, not
ancientempires.444
ProfessorSteinTnnessonoftheUniversityofOslosCentreforDevelopmentandthe
Environmentreachedasimilarconclusionaboutthepremodernperiodevidenceusedbysome
oftheSouthChinaSeaclaimantstosupporttheirpositions:
First, maritime power was volatile. The hegemony in the South China Sea shifted
betweenseveralstates.Second,theSpratlyandParacelIslandsweremainlyseenasa
source of danger. And third, there was not at the time any concept of national
sovereignty.Islandswerediscovered,described,andtosomeextentexploited,butthey
werenotclaimedordisputedinalegalsense.445
Similarly,ProfessorHerminioRoqueoftheUniversityofthePhilippinesandChairmanof
the Center for International Law in Manila agrees that it is a nonsequitur to say that either
438
SeeMohanMalik,HistoricalFiction:ChinasSouthChinaSeaClaims,WORLDAFFAIRSJOURNAL(MAY/JUNE2013);S.
Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.5;H.Roque,note208supra,atp.204.
439
M.Malik,note438supra.
440
suzerainty.MerriamWebster.com.2014,www.merriamwebster.com(Jan.2,2014).
441
M.Malik,note438supra.
442
Id.
443
Id.
444
Id.
445
S.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.5.
66
China or Vietnam exercised effective occupation of the Spratlys during the premodern
times.446AccordingtoProfessorRoque,theconceptofeffectiveoccupationdidnotexistin
eitheroftheirlegalsystemsduringthepremodernera.447ProfessorRoqueexplains:
The ancient Confucian legal system, applicable to both China and Vietnam until the
1900s,doesnothaveacounterpartofwhatistraditionallynowknownininternational
law as effective occupation. The concept in Chinese law was that a ruler had
jurisdiction over persons, and not over territory. Sovereignty was a function of social
organisation, history and loyalty of subjects. Territorial jurisdiction was measured in
termsofzonesofinfluence,ratherthanphysicalboundaries.Maritimeboundarieswere
unheard of as sovereignty (over persons) was coterminus with the coast. The ocean,
and the islands found therein, were relevant only to navigation, i.e., areas of hazards
which must be avoided. Control over maritime areas was limited to ports and
waterways and merely to guard against smuggling and piracy. Clearly, all these
characterisations of the prevailing law in both countries negate the existence of
effective occupation until recent years when both countries integrated the Western
conceptofterritorialsovereigntyintotheirrespectivelegalsystems.448

Moreover, most Asia experts agree that Chinese mariners were latecomers to the
South China Sea.449 It was the ancestors of todays Indonesians, Malaysians, Filipinos, and
Vietnamesethatdominatedtheseafaringhistoryoftheregionatleastforthefirstmillennium
ofthecurrentera.450MalaysiansailorscrossedtheIndianOcean1,000yearsbeforetheseven
voyagesofAdmiralZhengHeinthe15thcentury.451AnditwastheChamEmpirepresentday
centralVietnamthatdominatedSouthChinaSeatradeuntilitwasconqueredbyVietnamin
the15thcentury.452Bycomparison,thetraditionalrouteusedbyearlyChinesenavigatorswas
the inner passage along the coasts of Hainan Island and Annam (mainland Vietnam), not the
outer passage through Macclesfield Bank and the Paracels.453 Chinas discovery of the two
archipelagoesinalegalsenseisthereforedubiousatbest.
2. Probative Value of Historic Maps

ChinacitesanumberofhistoricmapstosupportitsclaimthattheParacelandSpratly
IslandshavebeenrecognizedasChineseterritorysinceancienttimes.Vietnameseandforeign
scholars,however,rejecttheargumentthattheParacelsandSpratlyswereincludedwithinthe
Chinese Empire, indicating that early Chinese maps and documents depict Hainan Island
(Qiongzhou) as the southernmost part of China. Chinese maps and documents cited by
Vietnamese scholars to support their position include, inter alia, the encyclopedia Gjn
446
447
Id.,atp.203.
448
Id.,atpp.203204.
449
PhilipBowring,ChinasInventedHistory,THEWALLSTREETJOURNAL(OPINIONASIA),June4,2012..
450
Id.
451
Id.
452
Id.
453
F.Bonnet,note223supra,atp.13;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.61.
67
TshJichng(CompleteAtlasonthePastandPresent)completedbytheQingDynastyin1706;
maps included in the encyclopedia Zhfng Din (Dictionary of Administrative Units),
includingZhfngZngbt(GeneralMapoftheAdministrativeUnits,Number1),Gungdng
Jingyt(TerritorialMapofGungdng,Number157),andQingzhufJingyt(Territorial
MapofQiongzhouPrefecture,Number167);andGungdngTngzh(AnnalsofGungdng),
madeduringthereignofEmperorJijngoftheMingDynasty(15221567).454
Moreover, as Vietnamese and Western scholars correctly point out, international
tribunalshavetreatedmapswithaconsiderabledegreeofcautionandhaveconsistentlyheld
thatmaps,particularlythosesubmittedbythepartiestoadispute,carryverylittleprobative
weight in determining ownership of a disputed territory. As stated by the ICJ in the Frontier
Disputecase:
in international territorialconflicts, maps merelyconstitute information which varies

inaccuracyfromcasetocase;ofthemselves,andbyvirtuesolelyoftheirexistence,they
cannotconstituteterritorialtitle,thatis,adocumentendowedbyinternationallawwith
intrinsiclegalforceforthepurposeofestablishingterritorialrights.455
Anexceptiontothisrulemayapplyincaseswhereamapfallsintothecategoryofphysical
expressionsofthewilloftheStateorStatesconcerned,forexample,whenmapsareannexed
toanofficialtextofwhichtheyformanintegralpart.456However,exceptinthisclearlydefined
case,mapsareonlyextrinsicevidenceofvaryingreliabilityorunreliabilitywhichmaybeused,
alongwithotherevidenceofacircumstantialkind,toestablishorreconstitutetherealfacts.457
NoneofthecartographicmaterialcitedbyChinaiseitherpartofalegalinstrumentin
force or part of a boundary treaty concluded between China and Vietnam (or France) and,
therefore, cannot of itself support Chinas claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea
islands.
454
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.4.
455
CaseConcerningtheFrontierDispute(BurkinaFaso/RepublicofMali),I.C.J.Reports1986,p.554,atpp.582583.
AccordIslandofPalmasCase(Netherlands/U.S.A.),R.I.A.A.,Vol.II,p.829(1928),p.831,atpp.852854,available
athttp://legal.un.org/riaa/vol_II.htm;CaseConcerningKasikili/SeduduIsland(Botswana/Namibia),I.C.J.Reports
1999,p.1045,atpp.10961100;CaseConcerningSovereigntyoverPulauLigitanandPulauSipadan
(Indonesia/Malaysia),I.C.J.Reports2002,p.625,atpp.666668;CaseConcerningtheFrontierDispute
(Benin/Niger),I.C.J.Reports2005,p.90,atpp.117120;CaseConcerningTerritorialandMaritimeDisputeBetween
NicaraguaandHondurasintheCaribbeanSea(Nicaraguav.Honduras),I.C.J.Reports2007,p.659,atpp.722724.
SeealsoF.DupuyandP.Dupuy,note432supra,atpp.133134.
456
Id.
457
Id.([M]apscanhavenogreaterlegalvaluethanthatofcorroborativeevidenceendorsingaconclusionat
whichthecourthasarrivedbyothermeansunconnectedwiththemaps.Inconsequence,exceptwhenthemaps
areinthecategoryofaphysicalexpressionofthewilloftheState,theycannotinthemselvesalonebetreatedas
evidenceofafrontier,sinceinthateventtheywouldformanirrebuttablepresumption,tantamountinfactto
legaltitle.Theonlyvaluetheypossessisasevidenceofanauxiliaryorconfirmatorykind,andthisalsomeansthat
theycannotbegiventhecharacterofarebuttablepresumptionsuchastoeffectareversaloftheonusofproof.)
OtherfactorsthattheCourtmaytakeintoconsiderationwhendeterminingtheprobativeweighttobegiventoa
maprelatetotheneutralityoftheirsourcestowardsthedisputeinquestionandthepartiestothatdispute.Id.
68
3. Inchoate Title and Effective Occupation

EvenifChinadiddiscovertheSouthChinaSeaislandsasclaimed,internationaltribunals
have uniformly held that discovery alone, without subsequent acts of effective occupation,
does not confer title to territory. In the Island of Palmas case, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration held that an inchoate title of discovery must be completed within a reasonable
periodbyeffectiveoccupationoftheregionclaimedtobediscovered.458Effectiveoccupation
involvestwoelementseachofwhichmustbeshowntoexist:theintentionandwilltoactas
sovereign,andsomeactualexerciseordisplayofsuchauthority.459Furthermore,aninchoate
titlecannotprevailoverthecontinuousandpeacefuldisplayofauthoritybyanotherState;
forsuchdisplaymayprevailevenoveraprior,definitetitleputforwardbyanotherState.460
Chinaclaimsthatithasmaintainedapeacefulandcontinuousdisplayofauthorityover
the South China Sea islands since at least the 14th century. According to a number of
international scholars, however, the records supporting this claim are sparse and
unconvincing.461
Forthemostpart,ChinareliesonrecordsshowingthatChinesefishermenfromHainan
IslandsporadicallylivedonsomeoftheSpratlyIslandsforshortperiodsoftimewhiletheywere
engagedinfishingactivitiesintheregion.Chinalikewisetracesitseconomicexploitationofthe
archipelagoes to these nonstatesponsored fishing activities, although it claims that later
exploitation activities were organized and approved by the Chinese government. As further
evidence of its effective administration of the archipelagoes, Beijing additionally cites: the
presenceofnavalpatrolsintheSouthChinaSea;searchandrescueoperations;constructionof
meteorological installations, lighthouses and radio stations; and scientific, hydrographic and
topographic surveys of the islands and their surrounding waters. A careful review of Chinas
position reveals that there is simply no credible evidence of peaceful and continuous
occupation of or display of authority over the islands by the Chinese government that is
necessarytoconfersovereigntyunderprevailinginternationallaw.462
Underprevailinginternationallaw,asarticulatedbytheICJintheFisheriesCase,when
determiningissuesofterritorialsovereignty,theindependentactivityofprivateindividualsis
of little value unless it can be shown that theyhave acted in pursuance of a licence or some
otherauthorityreceivedfromtheirGovernmentsorthatinsomeotherwaytheirGovernments
458
IslandofPalmasCase(Netherlands/U.S.A.),U.N.Rep.,Vol.II,p.829(1928),p.831,atp.846.
459
LegalStatusofEasternGreenlandCase(Denmarkv.Norway),P.C.I.J.,SeriesA/B,No.53(1933),atpp.4546.
SeealsoJ.Greenfield,note149supra.,atp.30(IfChinaweretorelyonitsoriginaldiscoveryoftheislands,
modernlawalsorequiresthataninchoatetitleofdiscoverymustbecompletedwithinareasonableperiodbythe
effectiveoccupationoftheregionclaimedtobediscovered.).
460
IslandofPalmasCase(Netherlands/U.S.A.),R.I.A.A.,Vol.II,p.829(1928),atp.846.
461
B.Murphy,note29supra,atp.201.AccordM.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.435and446;C.Joyner,note166
supra,atp.59;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.5664,7374;H.Roque,note208supra,atp.202.
462
B.Murphy,note29supra,atpp.201202;accordM.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.446(AlthoughChinese
fishermenmayhavebeenthefirstoccupantsoftheSpratlys,thereisnoevidenceofthetypeofeffective
authorityovertheislandsrequiredtoconfersovereigntyundertheprevailinginternationallawstandard.);SOUTH
CHINASEASTUDIES(2012)(Chinesefishermensearlypresencewasmerelyprivate/individualactivitiesandthus
cannotconstituteeffectiveoccupationbyaStateasrequiredbyinternationallaw.);H.Nguyen,note204supra,at
p.169(Occupationbyprivateindividualswillnotcreateatitlefortheircountry.).
69
haveassertedjurisdictionthroughthem.463Thus,actsbyprivateindividualsdonotqualifyas
state action unless they are immediately followed up or sanctioned by government
authorities. As the ICJ observed in the Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan case, activities by
privatepersonscannotbeseenaseffectivitsiftheydonottakeplaceonthebasisofofficial
regulationsorundergovernmentalauthority.464
Thereisabsolutelynocredibleevidencethattheprivate,nonproprietaryactsofafew
Chinesefishermenweretakenatthebehestof,orweresubsequentlysanctionedby,Chinese
authorities. Thus, the private activities relied upon by China do not constitute acts titre de
souverain, reflecting the intention and will to act as a sovereign.465 In a similar situation, the
arbitratorintheAvesIslandcasedeterminedthat
[Translation] Having regard to the established fact that the inhabitants of Saint
Eustache, a Dutch possession, fish for turtles and collect eggs on Aves Island, this
practice,implyingasitdoesmerelytemporary,precariousoccupationoftheislandand
beingnottheexerciseofanexclusiveright,buttheconsequenceoftheabandonment
of fishing by the inhabitants of neighbouring countries or by the islands legitimate
owner,cannotfoundtherightofsovereignty.466

Accordingly, the fact that Chinese fishermen temporarily lived on some of the South
China Sea islands for short periods of time does not constitute the effective occupation or
administration by a state that is required to confer sovereignty under international law. This
conclusion is supported by a secret report prepared by the Chinese military in 1933, which
indicatedthatthereisnoevidenceofanyChineseadministration,thepresenceofanofficial
representative of China, or Chinese equipment and infrastructure. [W]ehave never done
anythingontheseislands.467
Although China acknowledges that early Chinese economic development of the South
ChinaSeaislandswasnotstatesponsored,itassertsthat,beginningwiththeQingDynastyin
1910,subsequentactivitiesinthearchipelagoeswereorganizedwiththeapprovalandsupport
oftheChinesegovernment.GovernmentinvolvementwasexpandedbytheRepublicofChina
(19121949)andlaterbythePeoplesRepublicofChina(PRC).Governmentactivitiesincluded
suchthingsasthecollectionoftaxesandfeesfromChinesefishermenandgrantinglicensesto
Chinesemerchantstodevelopandexploittheislands.
463
FisheriesCase(UnitedKingdomv.Norway),I.C.J.Reports1951,p.116,atp.184.
464
SovereigntyoverPulauLigitanandPulauSipadan(Indonesia/Malaysia),Judgment,I.C.J.Reports2002,p.625,
atp.683;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.54.
465
atp.683.
466
ArbitralawardrelatingtotheissueofcontrolandsovereigntyoverAvesisland,raisedbetweenVenezuelaand
theKingdomoftheNetherlands,30June1865,R.I.A.A.,Vol.XXVIII,pp.115124,atp.122.[Originaltext:
Considrantque,silestbientabliqueleshabitantsdeSaintEustache,possessionnerlandaisevontpcherdes
tortuesetcueillirdesufslledAves,cefaitnepeutpasservirdappuiaudroitdesouverainet,carilimplique
seulementuneoccupationtemporaireetprcairedelle,tantdonnquilnestpas,enlespce,lamanifestation
dundroitexclusif,maislaconsquencedelabandondelapcheparleshabitantsdescontresvoisinesouparson
matrelgitime.]
467
F.Bonnet,note223supra,atp.17.
70
Whether these activities actually occurred is open to question, as no independent

evidence has been provided to corroborate that the Chinese government engaged in such
activities.468 Moreover, even if true, virtually all of the examples cited by Chinese scholars
involve economic exploitation of the Paracels and occurred nearly 250 years after the
VietnamesegovernmentauthorizedandorganizedthesystematicexploitationoftheParacels,
and, to a lesser degree, the Spratlys (e.g., Hoang Sa Company). Additionally, the absence of
documented government administration in the Spratlys prior to the founding of the PRC in
1949undercutsChinasclaimsthatiteffectivelyadministered,andhasindisputablesovereignty
over,bothoftheSouthChinaSeaislandsgroups.
Itisalsointerestingtonotethatmanyoftheancientworkscitedbyscholarstosupport
ChinaspositionlinktheSouthChinaSeaislandstothesouthernbarbariannations(presentday
Vietnam). These works describe the exploitation of the islands by the southern barbarians in
order to pay tributes to the rulers of the various Chinese dynasties. This linkage strongly
suggeststhat[theSpratlysandParacels]didnotbelongtoChina.469Moreover,thepayment
oftributesbyVietnamclearlycutsagainsttheMFAsargumentthatChinawasthefirstnation
todiscover,occupy,andexploittheSouthChinaSeaislands.ByacknowledgingthattheNguyen
emperorsoccupiedandexploitedtheParacels,albeittopaytributestotheirprotectoratestate,
China implicitly admits that it neither physically possessed or controlled the Paracels, nor
intended to act as a sovereign over the isletsboth of which are required to demonstrate
sovereigntyoverterritoryunderinternationallaw.470
EvidenceofChinasallegednavalpatrolstotheSouthChinaSea,atbest,demonstrates
nothingmorethanageneralawarenessoftheexistenceoftheSouthChinaSeaislands.Thereis
noevidenceinanyofthedocumentscitedbytheChinesegovernmentorscholarsthatreflects
thatChinaactuallyoccupiedoradministeredtheislandsduringthesepatrols.Inaddition,Asia
experts question the early naval exploits touted by the MFA and Chinese scholars. With the
exceptionofthesevenvoyagesofAdmiralZhengHe,
Chinesenavigatorswerenotbravemarinerswhonamedandtookcontroloftheislands
and reefs of the South China Sea, as depicted by the present Chinese scholars. These
marinersfearedthehighseasandsimplyfollowedthetraditionalroutesalongthecoast
ofHainanandVietnam(Annam)(ortheinnerpassage).471
Foreignmariners,ontheotherhand,usedtheouterpassagethroughMacclesfieldBank,which
the Chinese calledHong Mao Qian (the bank of the barbarians with red hair)the Chinese
translationofBancdesAnglais(EnglishBank],whichappearedonFrenchmapsbeforeitwas
renamedMacclesfieldafterthefirstBritishshipthatdiscoveredthebank.472Referencestothe
bankbyChineseauthorsduringthemid19thcentury,inworkssuchasWangWenTaisHong
468
ButseeShenII,atpp.131132.
469
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.171.AtributeisdefinedintheOxforddictionaryasahistoricalpayment
madeperiodicallybyonestateorrulertoanother,especiallyasasignofdependence.
470
TheMinquiersandEcrehoscase,JudgmentofNovember17th,1953:I.C.J.Reports1953,p.47.
471
F.Bonnet,note223supra,atp.13;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.6162;P.Bowring,
note449supra.
472
71
maofanyingjilikaolue(ToStudytheForeigners1843),weresimplytheresultofinterviewsof
Europeanmarinersandconsultationofforeigncharts.473Moreover,thefactthatMacclesfield
Bank did not have a Chinese name and was outside the traditional route of the Chinese
navigatorsrefutesChinasclaimofdiscovery.474
Vietnamese and Western scholars also downplay the importance of the astronomical
observationstakenbyGuShoujingintheParacelsin1279,assertingthatGusobservations
were only astronomical research activities and can therefore not be used by China to
legitimize any sovereignty status over the territories from which the observations were
made.475 Similarly, Western scholars question whether an expeditionary force under the
commandofShiBiwasactuallydispatchedtoJavain1292.Theinvasionforceallegedlysailed
through the Paracel and Spratly Islands.476 However, Western scholars note that the route of
theinvasionforceandtheislandsrecordedintheYuanShiareunclear.477Moreover,thetextis
devoidofanyreferencetoterritorialcontrolofthetwoarchipelagoesbyChineseauthorities.478
Some Vietnamese and Western scholars likewise argue that the historical evidence
used by China to support its claim is insufficient and weak according to international law
because it fails to demonstrate any occupation, effective administration, or sovereignty.479
TheSongDynastynavalpatrolstotheParacels,recordedinWjngZngyo(MilitaryGeneral
Records), do not demonstrate any Chinese possession of the archipelago, but rather simply
reflect Chinese awareness of the islands.480 Moreover, Chinese naval patrols beyond Hainan
could only be considered as speculation.481 According to some Western scholars, the naval
missionsrecordedintheWjngZngyo(MilitaryGeneralRecords)didnotactuallygotothe
Paracels, but rather were geographical reconnaissance expeditions to the Indian Ocean.482
Similarly, Admiral Wu Shengs alleged patrol to the Paracels between 1710 and 1712 was in
factapatrolaroundHainanIslandanddidnotgoasfarastheParacels.483Thisconclusionis
supported by a close reading of the itinerary noted on the map documenting the patrol
DepartingfromQiongya,hepassedbyTongGuandtraversedQizhouyangandSigengsha,thus
473
Id.
474
Id.
475
476
ShenII,atpp.111112;seealsoShenI,atp.27;TaoCheng,note31supra,atp.273;H.ChiuandC.Park,note
42supra,atp.10.
477
478
Id.
479
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.4;seealsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atpp.171172(thereisno
convincingevidenceaboutChinasstatemanagementoverthesemarinefeatures.Foraperiodoftwothousand
yearsuntil1909,onlyfoureventshavebeencitedbyChineseauthorstoclaimChinesemanagement.Theevents
tookplacearoundtheHainanIsland.Thereisneitherproof,noranamedirectlyrelatingtotheParacels.The
periodofonetotwohundredyearsbetweentheseeventsdonotsupporttheexistenceofacontinuous,non
interruptedperiodofChinesemanagement).AccordM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.6061
(AlthoughnavalpatrolsduringtheNorthernSongDynastyconfirmChinasknowledgeoftheParacels,itdoesnot
showthatChinatookpossessionofthem.).
480
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.4;accordMoniqueChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.6061.
481
482
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.4;accordMoniqueChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.6062.
483
72
covering3,000li.484Qiougyo(Hoihow)isasmalltowninthenorthernpartofHainanIsland;
TongGuisamountainlocatedonthenortheastportionoftheisland;Qizhouyangreferstothe
Taya Islands that lie to the northeast of Hainan; and Sigengsha is a sandbank located to the
westoftheisland.485
ItisalsoimportanttonotethatChinasfirstpurportedactofsovereigncontrolinthe
Paracels did not occur until 1883, when China allegedly protested a German survey of the
[Paracel] Islands,486 although it is questionable whether China, in fact, delivered such a
protest.487ThefirstverifiableactofChinesesovereigntyovertheParacelsdidnot occuruntil
1909,whentheQinggovernmentdeployedthreewarshipsand170menunderthecommand
of Lee Chun to the Paracels in May to erect markers, raise the Chinese flag, and conduct
cannonshootingceremoniesonsomeoftheislandstodemonstrateChinesesovereigntyover
thearchipelago.488Thiseventdemonstrates,however,thatChinawasuncertainastoitsrights
totheParacelsiftheQinggovernmenttrulybelievedthatChinahadindisputablesovereignty
overtheislands,itwouldnothaveneededtoengageinthesesymbolicactsofsovereignty.489
Moreover, the detachment left the islands within 24 hours and Chinese officials would not
return to the archipelago for another 20 years. 490 Furthermore, the naval deployment was
preceded by an exploratory expedition in Apriladditional evidence that the Chinese had
limitedknowledgeoftheislandspriorto1909.491
More importantly, these symbolic acts occurred nearly 100 years after Vietnamese
officials,atthedirectionofEmperorGiaLong,formallytookpossessionofthearchipelagoand
conducted a flagraising ceremony in 1816, and nearly 45 years after Emperor Minh Mang
dispatchedaVietnamesenavalunittobuildapagodaanderectsovereigntytabletsonsomeof
the islets in the Paracels.492 Chinas demonstration of sovereignty, therefore, took place well
after Vietnam had effectively occupied and administered the islands. In addition, given the
chaoticconditionsthatensuedfollowingthesuccessfulconclusionoftheChineseRevolutionin
1911, the abdication of the Qing emperor in February 1912, and the inability of the new
Nationalistgovernmenttounitethecountryforthenext30years,Chinawasclearlynotina
position politically or militarily to uphold its claim to[the Paracels] through effective
occupationandutilization.493Underthesecircumstances,Chinasinchoatetitle,ifitexistedat
484
485
Id.
486
487
SomeWesternscholarshavedeterminedthatthisincidentisnotbasedonverifiablereferences.M.
ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.99.Additionally,Vietnamesescholarsarguethat,eveniftheprotestwas
made,itwasonlyadiplomaticactionanddidnothaveanylegalstatusasChinassovereigntyhadnotbeen
established.SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.4.
488
ShenII,atpp.107and135;seealsoShenI,atp.36;TaoCheng,note31supra,atp.273;M.Chemillier
Gendreau,note15supra,atpp.37,99,Annex10(Noteof29September1932fromtheLegationoftheChinese
RepublicinFrancetotheMinistryofForeignAffairs,Paris),Annex13(Notedated4May1909fromMrBeauvais,
ConsulateofFranceinCanton).
489
490
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.7;seealsoShenI,atp.38;TaoCheng,note31supra,atpp.273274;
491
492
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoM.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1178.
493
73
all,cannotprevailoverthecontinuousandpeacefuldisplayofauthoritybyanotherState[i.e.,
Vietnam]foroveracentury.494
Nevertheless,Chinaarguesthatfollowingthe1911Revolution,thenewgovernmentof
GuangdongProvinceplacedtheParacelsunderthejurisdictionofYaCounty(YaXian)ofHainan
Province. This decision was reaffirmed by the Southern Military Government in 1921on
March30,1921,theGovernorofGuangdongProvinceannexedtheParacelIslandsandplaced
them under the jurisdiction of Hainan Island.495 However, according to the Vietnamese MFA,
this action went unnoticed by the international community because it was recorded only in
provincial records and, therefore, Vietnamese and French officials were not in a position to
protesttheactbecausetheywereunawarethattheannexationoftheislandshadoccurred.496
Additionally,theChineseannexationwasnotfollowedupwithanyphysicaloccupationofthe
islands by the provincial government.497 More importantly, any act taken by the Guangdong
government had little legal effect because the Southern Military Government was not
recognizedbythecentralgovernmentofChinaorbyanyoftheGreatPowers.498Basedonthis
lack of international recognition, when France subsequently learned of the annexation, the
FrenchLegationinChinachosetoignoretheorder,toavoidstirringupChinesenationalism.
Chinaclaimsthataninteragencycommitteeexaminedandapprovedthenamesfor132
landfeaturesintheSouthChinaSeabetween1932and1935.499Thecommitteesubsequently
depictedthesefeaturesonthe1935ZhongguoNanHaiGeDaoyuTu(MapoftheIslandsinthe
SouthChinaSea).500Itshouldbenoted,however,thatwhenthecommitteebeganitsworkin
1932, the Paracels were still considered the southernmost part of China. According to
Vietnamesescholars,aSeptember1932diplomaticnotefromChinatoFranceconfirmedthat
the Paracels form the southernmost part of Chinese territory.501 It was not until the
committeecompleteditsworkin1935thattheSpratlys,MacclesfieldBank,andScarborough
Shoal were included as Chinese territory.502 By that time, France had already occupied the
ParacelsandlegallyannexedtheSpratlysasterranullius.
Chinas subsequent illegal occupation of Woody Island (Amphitrite Group) in 1946503
and the entire archipelago in 1974504 violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter505 and The
494
IslandofPalmasCase(Netherlands/U.S.A.),R.I.A.A.U.N.Rep.,Vol.II,p.829(1928),p.831,atp.846.
495
496
497
Id.
498
499
In1983,theChineseToponymyCommitteepublicizedtheapprovednamesof287islands,reefs,islets,and
shoalsontheSouthChinaSea.MFA,TheIssueofSouthChinaSea.
500
Id.;seealsoShenII,atp.128(ThiswaspurportedlythefirstofficialmappublishedbytheRepublicofChina.);
ShenI,atp.39;XuZhiliang,LiLixin,FanHong,andZhouXin,note104supra.
501
502
503
PursuanttoGeneralOrderNumber1,JapaneseforcesinVietnamnorthof16northlatitudewereinstructedto
surrendertoChineseNationalistforcestheseniorJapanesecommandersandallground,sea,airandauxiliary
forceswithinChina(excludingManchuria),FormosaandFrenchIndoChinanorthof16northlatitudeshall
surrendertoGeneralissimoChiangKaishek.SupremeCommanderfortheAlliedPowers,GeneralOrderNo.
One,Sept.2,1945.ChinaandFranceagreedinFebruary1946thatFrenchtroopswouldrelieveChineseNationalist
forcesstationedinIndochinanorthofthe16thdegreeoflatitude(whichincludedboththeParacelandSpratly
Islands)nolaterthanMarch31,1946.Asanoccupationforce,theNationalisttroopshadalegalobligationto
74
Declarationon Principles of International LawConcerningFriendly Relations andCooperation

among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.506 Accordingly, Chinas
illegal occupation in 1946 and subsequent seizure of the Paracels by force in 1974 does not
createavalidlegaltitletothearchipelagounderinternationallaw.
With regard to the Spratlys, Chinas first verifiable sovereign act did not occur until
1933whenChinaallegedlyprotestedFrancesannexationofthearchipelago,507althoughsome
scholars question whether China actually filed the protest.508 However, even if China did
protesttheannexation,itdidnottakestepstoevicttheFrenchoroccupyanyoftheislands.
ThefactthatChinamayhavediplomaticallychallengedFrancesannexationdoesnot,without
more,createatitleinfavorofChinaovertheSpratlys.NorcanChinasprotestdepriveFrances
occupationoftheSpratlysofitscharacterasaneffectivemanifestationofFrenchsovereignty
overtheislands.
At the time France annexed and effectively and peacefully occupied the Spratlys in
1933,occupation(conquest)wasstillavalidmethodofacquiringterritoryundertheprevailing
internationallaw.ConquestdidnotbecomeillegaluntilOctober1945,aftertheentryintoforce
oftheUNCharter.NationalistChinasoccupationofItuAbaIslandin1946509and1956510and
CommunistChinasoccupationofseveralfeaturesintheSpratlyIslandsin1988511and1995,512
therefore,wereaccomplishedinviolationoftheUNCharterand,likeChinasoccupationand
seizureoftheParacels,donotcreateavalidlegaltitletotheSpratlysunderinternationallaw.
departFrenchIndochinabythe31stofMarchthistheyfailedtodo.ExchangeofLettersbetweenChinaand
FranceRelatingtotheReliefofChineseTroopsbyFrenchTroopsinNorthIndochina,Chungking,Feb.28,1946,
U.N.T.S.Vol.14,1948,atp.151.
504
OnJanuary20,1974,ChineseforcesexpelledtheSouthVietnamesegarrisonfromPattleIsland,thelargest
featureintheCrescentGroupoftheParacel,afterabriefnavalandlandengagement.
505
CharteroftheUnitedNations,signedJune26,1945,enteredintoforceOct.24,1945(Article2(4)prohibits
memberstatesfromusingforceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofanystate.).
506
UNGARes.A/RES/25/2625(Oct.24,1970),TheDeclarationonPrinciplesofInternationalLawConcerning
FriendlyRelationsandCooperationamongStatesinAccordancewiththeCharteroftheUnitedNations(no
territorialacquisitionresultingfromthethreatoruseofforceshallberecognizedaslegal.).
507
508
SomeWesternscholarshavedeterminedthatthisincidentisnotbasedonverifiablereferences.M.
ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.99.;accordB.Dubner,note29supra,atp.309;M.Bennett,note14
supra,atp.439.
509
Seenote743foradiscussionofGeneralOrderNumber1.AsinthecaseoftheParacels,ChineseNationalists
forcesoccupyingItuAbaIslandafterWWIIfailedtowithdrawfromtheislandinMarch1946,asrequiredbythe
ExchangeofLettersbetweenChinaandFranceRelatingtotheReliefofChineseTroopsbyFrenchTroopsinNorth
Indochina,Chungking,Feb.28,1946,U.N.T.S.Vol.14,1948,atp.151.
510
FollowingTomasClomasclaimtosomeoftheSpratlyIslandsin1956,TaiwaneseforcesreturnedtoItuAba
overVietnameseobjectionandhavemaintainedapresenceontheislandeversince.
511
OnMarch14,1988,ChineseandVietnamesenavalforcesclashedinthevicinityofJohnsonSouthReef,
resultinginthesinkingofseveralVietnameseshipsandthedeathofover70Vietnamesesailors.Followingthe
engagement,ChinaoccupiedsixisletsintheSpratlysCuarteronReef(HuayangReef),EasternGateShoal
(DongmenReef),FieryCrossReef(YongshuReef),GavenReefs(NanxunReefandXinanReef),JohnsonSouthReef
(ChiguaReef),andSubiReef(ZhubiReef).
512
ChinaoccupiedMischiefReef(MeijiReef)in1995andovertheyearshasconstructedaseriesofstructures,
includingtheinstallationofmilitaryradarsandothermonitoringequipment,aconcreteplatformsuitableforuse
asahelipad,awindmill,andsolarpanels.
75
Inshort,Chinahasfailedtoproduceanycredibleorverifiableevidencethatitactually
occupied and continuously displayed authority over the disputed islands. Therefore, even if
China was the first to discover the Paracels and the Spratlys, thereby vesting China with an
inchoate title to the islands, it failed to take final and decisive sovereign action within a
reasonableperiodoftimeinordertoperfectthattitle.
a. Remote and Uninhabited Territories

Nonetheless,Chinesescholarsarguethat,eventhoughcontemporaryinternationallaw
requires that there must be an actual and continuous display of authority to perfect an
inchoate title in normal territorial situations, a less stringent standard should apply to the
ParacelsandSpratlysgiventheenormousirregularityandabnormalityoftheSouthChinaSea
islands.513 These scholars cite both the Island of Palmas and the Eastern Greenland cases to
supporttheirposition.Iftheexceptionarticulatedinthesecasesapplies,Chinawouldonlybe
required to demonstrate that it took some symbolic act over the archipelagoes in order to
perfectitssovereigntyclaimstotheislands.
ThearbitratorinthePalmascaseacknowledgedthat
Manifestations of territorial sovereignty assumedifferent forms, according to

conditions of time and place. Although continuous in principle, sovereignty cannot be
exercisedinfactateverymomentoneverypointofaterritory.Theintermittenceand
discontinuitycompatiblewiththemaintenanceoftherightnecessarilydifferaccording
asinhabitedoruninhabitedregionsareinvolved.514
Similarly, the court in the Eastern Greenland case admitted that in cases of claims to
sovereigntyoverareasinthinlypopulatedorunsettledcountries,tribunalshavebeensatisfied
with very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other
Statecouldnotmakeoutasuperiorclaim.515
Chinesescholarsfurtherpointoutthatthisexceptiontothegeneralrulewasappliedby
the arbitrator in the Clipperton Island case in deciding that France had acquired sovereignty
over an island even though it had not taken any action toward the island for 39 years after
discoveringit:
Itisbeyonddoubtthatbesidestheanimusoccupandi,theactual,andnotthenominal,
taking of possession is a necessary condition of occupation. This taking of possession
consists in the act, or series of acts, by which the occupying state reduces to its
possession the territory in question and takes steps to exercise exclusive authority
there. Strictly speaking, and in ordinary cases, that only takes place when the state
establishesintheterritoryitselfanorganizationcapableofmakingitslawsrespected.
There may also be cases where it is unnecessary to have recourse to this method.
Thus,ifaterritory,byvirtueofthefactthatitwascompletelyuninhabited,is,fromthe
513
ShenII,atp.155.
514
IslandofPalmasCase(Netherlands/U.S.A.),R.I.A.A.,Vol.II,p.829(1928),p.831,atp.840.
515
LegalStatusofEasternGreenlandCase(Denmarkv.Norway),P.C.I.J.,SeriesA/B,No.53(1933),atp.46.See
alsoWesternSaharaAdvisoryOpinion,I.C.J.Reports1975,p.12,atp.43.
76
firstmomentwhentheoccupyingstatemakesitsappearancethere,attheabsoluteand
undisputeddisposition ofthatstate,fromthatmomentthetakingofpossession must
beconsideredasaccomplished,andtheoccupationistherebycompleted.516

ChinesescholarsarguethatasimilarsituationexistsintheSouthChinaSeaandthatthe
exceptiontothegeneralruleofactualandcontinuousdisplayofauthorityshouldapplytothe
ParacelandSpratlyislands:
Few territorial features in the worldcan more adequately be described as remote

and/or uninhabited than the South China Sea Islands. Given the high abnormity and
uninhabitability of the South China Sea Islands that China undeniably discovered, it is
clearthatthegeneralruleofterritorialacquisitiondoesnotapply;rather,theexception
tothegeneralrulegoverns.Inotherwords,Chinadidnot,anddoesnot,needtodisplay
suchextensiveactsofsovereigntyasrequiredbythegeneralruleinordertoperfector
maintain her already established sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands. All
thatmayberequiredofChinaundertheexceptionistoexhibitsomeformofsymbolic
authorityovertheseselfdiscovereduninhabitableterritories,atestwhichChinahasfar
morethansatisfiedoveraperiodofmorethantwothousandyears.517
Althoughanexceptiontothegeneralruleofactualandcontinuousdisplayofauthority
exists,itisnarrowandChinacannotrelyonittosubstantiateitsclaimtotheSouthChinaSea
islands.First,andforemost,theClippertonIslandcaserequiressomelevelofstateactioni.e.,
when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at the absolute and undisputed
dispositionofthatstate(emphasisadded).Isolatedand sporadiccontactwiththeislandsby
private individuals does not qualify as state action. Acts by private individuals will only be
consideredasrelevantbyatribunalwhentheyareimmediatelyfolloweduporsanctionedby
government authorities.518 In the instant case, there is simply no reliable evidence that any
ChineseGovernmentevermadeanyactofauthorityovertheislandsatall.519Thus,theprivate
activities relied upon by China do not constitute acts titre de souverain reflecting the
intentionandwilltoactinthatcapacity,520afactacknowledgebytheChineseMilitaryCouncil
inasecretreportpreparedin1933thereisno
516
ClippertonIslandArbitration(Mexicov.France),2R.I.A.A.1105(1931),atpp.393394.[Thecitedpagesare
fromtheEnglishtranslationat26Am.J.IntlL.390,at393394(1932).]
517
ShenII,atpp.155156.
518
atp.683(activitiesbyprivatepersonscannotbeseenaseffectivitsiftheydonottakeplaceonthebasisof
officialregulationsorundergovernmentalauthority.);seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.54.
519
M.Bennett,note14supra,atp.436;accordH.Roque,note208supra,atpp.202203(Chinaalludesmerelyto
thepresenceoffishermenandsightingsoftheislandsbysomeofitsnationals.Certainly,thesearehardlythe
typeofactivitiesacceptedasclearandconvincingindiciaofanimuspossedendi.);SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),
atp.4(Chinesefishermensearlypresencewasmerelyprivate/individualactivitiesandthuscannotconstitute
effectiveoccupationbyaStateasrequiredbyinternationallaw.);H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.169
(Occupationbyprivateindividualswillnotcreateatitlefortheircountry.).
520
atp.683.
77

evidenceofanyChineseadministration,thepresenceofanofficialrepresentativeof
China,orChineseequipmentandinfrastructure[ontheSpratlys].Inconclusion,wehave
only one piece of evidence, our fishermen from Hainan, and we have never done
anythingontheseislands.521
Secondly, the Court in the Eastern Greenland case qualified its pronouncement that
verylittleinthewayoftheactualexerciseofsovereignrightsmayberequiredtoestablish
territorial sovereignty with a very important caveati.e., that the lower standard can be
applied provided that the other State could not make out a superior claim. As discussed
above, the first verifiable act of sovereignty by the Chinese government in the Paracels
occurred in 1909.522 These events occurred nearly 100 years after Vietnam took formal
possessionofthearchipelagoin1816.523
Similarly, there is no credible evidence of official Chinese government activities in the
Spratlys prior to 1933 when France declared sovereignty over nine of the islands (and their
dependentisles)inthearchipelago.ChinasprotestofFrancesannexationoftheSpratlyswas
premised on the presence of Chinese fishermen on some of the islands. These private and
isolated acts of Chinese fishermen are not evidence of official Chinese government
administrationandcontroloftheislands.524Consequently,theexceptiontothegeneralruleof
actualandcontinuousdisplayofauthoritydoesnotapply.
ItisalsoimportanttonotethataChinesemappublishedin1909includedtheParacel
Islands, but not the Spratlys, Macclesfield Bank, or Scarborough Shoal, as part of Guangdong
Province,theimplicationbeingthatChinadidnotconsidertheseotherfeaturestobepartsof
itsnationalterritory.525ThisconclusionissupportedbyaneventthatoccurredaftertheFrench
annexedtheSpratlys.OnJuly26,1933,theChineseconsulinManila(Mr.Kwong)wenttothe
U.S. Coast Guard and Geodetic Survey in thePhilippines to ascertainthe position of the nine
SpratlyIslandsclaimedbyFrance.Tohissurprise,hediscoveredthattheSpratlyIslandsand
theParacelIslandsweredifferentandfarapart.526Thiscompletelackofknowledgeaboutthe
locationoftheSpratlyswasdocumentedinaletterfromMr.WangGongDa,thedirectorofthe
PeipingNews,toChinasforeignaffairssecretary(Mr.Lou):
The Spokesperson of the Foreign Affairs said that a protest was prepared ifit was
proventhatthenineislandswerepartofXisha[theParacels].Dontmakeadiplomatic
blunder;theseislandsarenotpartofXisha.TritonIsland[inXisha]isthesouthernmost
part of our territory. South of Triton Island, there is no connection with the Chinese
521
F.Bonnet,note223supra.
522
ShenII,atpp.107and135;seealsoShenI,atp.36;TaoCheng,note31supra,atp.273.
523
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoM.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1178.
524
FisheriesCase(UnitedKingdomv.Norway),I.C.J.Reports1951,p.116,atp.184;SovereigntyoverPulauLigitan
andPulauSipadan(Indonesia/Malaysia),Judgment,I.C.J.Reports2002,p.625,atp.683.
525
526
Id.,atp.16.
78
territory.Oursocalledexperts,geographers,Navyrepresentative,etc.,areashameto
ourcountry.527
When it was discovered that the Spratlys and Paracels were two separate groups of islands,
theChinese government did not protest theFrenchclaim on the nine islands.528 It was not
until the interagency Committee for the Review of Maps of Lands and Waters of China
(discussed below) completed its work in 1935 that the Spratlys, Macclesfield Bank, and
ScarboroughShoalwereincludedasChineseterritoryonofficialChinesemaps.529
b. Suzerain and Vassal

Chinaalsoarguesthat,in1816,Annam(Vietnam)wassubjecttoChinaandthatitwas
thereforeimpossibleforVietnam,asavassalstate,toinvadeandoccupyChineseterritory(the
Paracels).530Thisargument,however,isflawed.First,althoughVietnamwasincorporatedinto
theHanEmpirein111BCandcolonizedbyChinaforthenext1000years,Vietnamachievedits
independencefromChinain939ADandsuccessfullyrepelledChineseinvasionsoverthenext
900plus years (with one exception) until it was incorporated into the French Empire in the
1800s. Granted, despite its independence, Vietnam remained a vassal state and continued
diplomatic relations with China through the payment of tributes.531 However, when Emperor
GiaLongofficiallytookpossessionoftheParacelsin1816,theformalrelationshipofsuzerainty
withChinadidnotprecludeVietnamfromexercisingsovereignacts,suchastheincorporation
of new territories into the kingdom.532 By definition, suzerainty occurs where a dominant
stateinthiscaseChinacontrolstheforeignrelationsofavassalstateVietnambutallows
thevassalstatetoexercisesovereignauthorityinitsdomesticaffairs.533Asthesuzerain,China
controlled Vietnams international affairs. However, the suzerainvassal relationship still
allowedVietnamtoexerciseitsdomesticsovereignty,suchastheacquisitionofnewterritory.
527
Id.,atp.17.
528
Id.
529
Id.,atp.15.VietnamesescholarspointoutthatadiplomaticnotedeliveredbyChinatoFranceinSeptember
1932confirmedthattheParacelIslandswerethesouthernmostpartofChina.SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.
5.
530
RepublicinFrancetotheMinistryofForeignAffairs,Paris)(100yearsagoIndochinawasunderChinesetutelage.
SincetheParacelIslandsalreadyformedpartofChinasterritory,Indochinahadnorighttocarryoutactsof
occupationonthepossessionsofitssuzerain.).
531
ChinabrieflyseizedcontrolofVietnam,onceagain,in1407.Theoccupationendedwiththedefeatofthe
ChineasearmybyVietnameseresistanceforcesin1428.VietnamssuzeraintyrelationshipwithChinaendedin
1883whenitwasincorporatedintotheFrenchEmpirewiththesigningoftheTreatyofProtectorateatthe1883
HarmandConvention.LIBRARYOFCONGRESS,FEDERALRESEARCHDIVISION,CountryStudies:Vietnam,availableat
lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/vntoc.html.AtributeisdefinedintheOxforddictionaryasanhistoricalpaymentmade
periodicallybyonestateorrulertoanother,especiallyasasignofdependence.
532
MFAWhitePaper(1974);accordM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.7679(TheKingdomof
Vietnamwasfoundedinthe11thcenturybythecreationofapoliticalpowerandadministrationindependentof
China,but(prudently)acknowledgingChinesesuzerainty.).
533
suzerainty.MerriamWebster.com.2014,www.merriamwebster.com(Jan.2,2014).
79
4. Persistent Objector
China additionally points out that its persistent objections to all foreign claims to the
Paracels and Spratlys further demonstrate that it effectively administered the archipelagoes.
ThefirstexamplecitedbyChinaisan1883incidentinvolvingaGermanshipconductingsurveys
intheSouthChinaSeawithoutChinasconsent.AccordingtotheMFA,theQinggovernment
lodgedaprotestwithBerlinandtheGermansterminatedthesurvey.
Western scholars have determined, however, that this incident is not based on
verifiable references and is inconsistent with other Chinese inaction during the same time
period given that, in 1885, the German Admiralty published a twosheet chart entitled Die
ParacelInseln(TheParacelIslands).534ThechartdocumentedtheworkofaGermanexpedition
totheParacelsbetween1881and1884.Forthreemonthseachyearduringthistimeperiod,
the German Navy sent the SMS Freya and the warship Iltis to study and map the Paracel
Islands without either seeking the permission of or incurring protest by the Chinese
government.535Basedontheseevents,itisdoubtfulthatChinalodgedtheprotestasalleged.
Alternatively,iftheprotestwasmade,itwasobviouslyignoredbytheGermangovernment.
TheaccuracyofChinasclaimregardingthe1883incidentisalsocoloredbythefactthat
China did not raise similar objections to other events that occurred around the same
timeframe.536 Scarborough Shoal was first surveyed by the Philippinebased Spanish frigate
SantaLuciainApril1800.Theresultsofthesurveywerepublishedinachartin1808.537Amore
detailedsurveywasconductedbytheBritishshipHMSSwallowinMay1866.538Bothofthese
surveyswereconductedwithoutChineseconsentorobjection.DocumentsheldbytheSpanish
Hydrographic Office (Anuario de la Dirrectin de Hidrografa, ao 4, nmero 56, 1866) also
describe search and rescue operations conducted by Spanish Navy units based in the
Philippinestoassistmarinersindistressontheshoal,aresponsibilitythatwaslatertransferred
to the U.S. Coast Guard after the United States took possession of the Philippines after the
SpanishAmericanWar.539ThereisnoevidencethatChinaobjectedtotheseactivities.
TheBritishwerealsoactivelyengagedintheSpratlysduringthistimeframe.In1877,an
American and two British citizens sought permission from the British Colony of Labuan540 to
hoisttheBritishflagoverSpratlyIslandandAmboynaCay,havingdiscoveredthattheywere
uninhabited and contained workable deposits of guano.541 Permission was granted by the
ActingGovernorofLabuanandActingConsulGeneralinBorneosubjecttotheapprovalofthe
534
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.99.Additionally,Vietnamesescholarsarguethat,evenifthe
protestwasmade,itwasonlyadiplomaticactionanddidnothaveanylegalstatusasChinassovereigntyhadnot
beenestablished.SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.4.
535
F.Bonnet,note223supra,atp.14;accordDavidHancoxandVictorPrescott,AGeographicalDescriptionofthe
SpratlyIslandsandanAccountofHydrographicSurveysAmongstThoseIslands,INTERNATIONALBOUNDARIESRESEARCH
UNIT,MARITIMEBRIEFING,VOL.1,NO.6,atp.36.
536
537
Id.,atpp.89;accordD.HancoxandV.Prescott,note535supra,atp.24.
538
539
Id.(when,onMay8,1913,theSwedishsteamshipNipponwentagroundonScarboroughShoal,theBureau
ofNavigationinManilasenttheCoastGuardcutterMindorotohelpthestrandedcrew.).
540
In1846,theSultanofBruneicededLabuantoBritain.TheislandbecameaCrownColonyin1848.
541
80
SecretaryofStateforForeignAffairs.542Iftheislandswerenotworkedandturnedtoaccount
within ten years, or if they were left unworked for more than five years, the claim would
lapse.543TheclaimwassubsequentlyregisteredwiththeOfficeoftheConsulGeneralinBorneo
andanoticeadvisingofthe1877claimwasdulypublishedintheGovernmentGazettesofthe
Colonies of Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements.544 This is the first recorded evidence in
moderntimesofanystateclaimingsovereigntyoversomeoftheSpratlyIslands,yetthereisno
indicationthatChinaprotestedtheBritishclaim.545
Similarly, in 1889, after an investigation determined that the former licensees had
abandonedtheiroperationsandthattheislandswereuninhabitedandunoccupied,another
guano exploiterthe Central Borneo Companysought permission to work the islands in
1888.546 The Colonial Office, with the concurrence of the Foreign Office, granted the guano
leasetothecompanyin1889onthesametermsasconditionsasthepreviouslease.Asinthe
precedingcase,thereisnoindicationthatChinaobjectedtotheseactivities.Chinasfailureto
interveneintheseevents,whichoccurredoveranextendedperiodoftimeandwerepublicly
notified to the international community, is further evidence that China did not effectively
control or administer the Spratly Islands during the 19th century. On the other hand, it is
understandablethatVietnamdidnotobjecttoanyoftheseeventssince,atthetime,itwasa
vassalstateofeitherChinaorFrance.
Following Frances annexation of Spratly Island in 1930, the British Foreign Office
determinedin1932thattheUnitedKingdomdidnothavetitletoSpratlyIslandbecauseinter
aliatherehadneverbeenanyformalannexationoranyopendisplayofsovereigntyandthat,in
default of this, discovery giving at most only an inchoate title would be insufficient.547
Subsequently, during the negotiations of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Foreign Office
indicatedin1947thattheUnitedKingdomwasnotpreparedtocontesttheFrenchclaimto
sovereignty[totheSpratlyIslands]whichisconsideredtobegoodinlaw.548
Chinas persistent objector argument is also at odds with an incident that occurred in
thelate1890s.In1895theGermanvesselBellonashipwreckedonNorthReefintheParacels.
Thefollowingyear,theJapanesevesselImeguMarusufferedasimilarfateontheAmphitrites.
BothvesselswerecarryingcargoesofcopperinsuredwithBritishcompanies.549Afterefforts
tosalvagethevesselsfailed,Chinesefishermensystematicallylootedthewrecksandoffered
542
543
Id.
544
Id.
545
SpratlyIslandandAmboynaCaywerementionedineveryannualeditionoftheBritishColonialOfficeListfrom
1891to1933.Id.
546
547
Id.,atp.350.Beginningin1934,SpratlyIslandandAmboynaCaywerenolongermentionedintheBritish
ColonialOfficeList.S.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.7;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.112.
548
549
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.3637,98,Annex5(LetterNo.704AEx,dated20March1930,
fromtheGovernorGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi,totheMinisterfortheColonies,Paris),Annex12(Notedated6
May1921,fromtheDirectorateforPoliticalandIndigenousAffairs,GovernmentGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi),
Annex15(Letterdated4May1909fromMr.Beauvais,ConsulofFranceinCanton,totheMinisterforForeign
Affairs,Paris).
81
to sell the looted copper [to the insurance companies] for half its value.550 The insurance
companies refused the offer and requested the Minister of Great Britain in Peking and the
ConsulofGreatBritaininHoihowtointerveneontheirbehalfwiththeChinesegovernment.As
requested, Minister and Consul Mr. OBrien Butler demanded that the Chinese government
impound the copper, stating that Chinese authorities in Hainan had been informed of the
wrecks as soon as they occurred, that they should have taken precautions to prevent the
looting, and that they should be held responsible.551 In response, the Chinese government
denied ownership of the archipelago, indicating that the Paracels were abandoned islands
whichbelongednomoretoChinathantheydidtoAnnam,thattheywerenotadministratively
attached to any district of Hainan and that no special authority was responsible for policing
them.552 A similar response was provided when Britain complained about the lack of
navigational aids on the Paracels after two British ships collided with aChinese fishing vessel
neartheislands.Again,Chinadisclaimedresponsibilityonthegroundthatitdidnotownthe
islands.553 It is apparent from these incidents that China did not intend to claim sovereignty
overtheParacels.
Although the Chinese response in both of these cases did not recognize Vietnamese
sovereignty over the Paracels, it clearly rejected the notion that the islands were part of the
Chinese Empire and undercuts Chinas claims that it has effectively administered the islands
since the Yuan Dynasty (12711368). Furthermore, there is no evidence that China protested
theplantingofflagsandemplacementofsovereigntycolumnsonanumberofthefeaturesin
theParacelarchipelagobythecrewoftheFrenchshipLaMalicieusein1930.554
China challenged Frances subsequent attempt to occupy the Paracels in December
1931, lodging a protest with the French government on July 27, 1932. The July protest was
followeduponSeptember29,1932,byaseconddiplomaticnotechallengingFrancesclaimsto
the islands. A subsequent diplomatic exchange highlighted that Vietnam was under Chinese
tutelage in the early 1800s and therefore could not validly occupy Chinese territory.555 China
repeateditsobjectionswhenFranceformallyoccupiedtheParacelsonJuly3,1938.Itshouldbe
noted, however, that the letter only asserted Chinas claims to the Paracelsthere was no
mentionoftheSpratlysinthediplomaticcorrespondence.556
ChinaalsoclaimstohaveprotestedFrancesoccupationofnineoftheSpratlyIslandsin
1933,butthereisnoindependentevidencetocorroboratethattheprotestactuallywasmade.
The diplomatic note cited by Chinese scholars is not dated; nor is it mentioned in the
Memorandum on Four Large Archipelagoes of the Republic of China in South Sea, which was
550
Id.
551
Id.
552
Id.;seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.7;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.172.
553
H.Roque,note208supra,atp.192.ButseeTaoCheng,note31supra,atp.268(Withregardto
theallegation,theChinesegovernmentwasreportedtohaveproducedallrelevantdocumentstoproveitwasa
fabrication.).
554
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.38.
555
Id.,Annex10(Noteof29September1932fromtheLegationoftheChineseRepublicinFrancetotheMinistryof
ForeignAffairs,Paris)(100yearsagoIndochinawasunderChinesetutelage.SincetheParacelIslandsalready
formedpartofChinasterritory,Indochinahadnorighttocarryoutactsofoccupationonthepossessionsofits
suzerain.).
556
82
issuedbytheMinistryofForeignAffairsoftheRepublicofChinainFebruary1974.557Moreover,
thereisnoevidencethatanyofthepartiestothe1922NinePowerTreatytheUnitedStates,
United Kingdom, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, or China
complainedabouttheallegedillegaloccupation.ArticleIofthetreatyrequiresthecontracting
powers, other than China, to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial
andadministrativeintegrityofChina.558Aspreviouslydiscussed,Chinahasallegedthatboth
GreatBritainandJapanrecognizedChinesesovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislands.Ifthat
istrue,itis logicalthattheBritishandJapanesegovernmentswouldhaveinvoked thetreaty
andobjectedtoFrancesoccupationoftheislandsinthe1930s.
Nonetheless,evenassumingthatthenotewasdelivered,Chinasprotestwasbasednot
on official government activities or regulation of the islands, but rather primarily on the
groundsthattherewereChinese[fishermen]residingonthem.559Thesefishermenwerenot
sponsoredbythegovernmentandresidedontheislandsforonlyshortperiodsoftimegiven
the inhospitableness of the islands.560 As discussed above, this lack of effective government
administration of or official government presence in the Spratlys was acknowledged by the
ChineseMilitaryCouncil(CMC)inaSeptember1933report,whichconcludedthattheChinese
governmenthadneverdoneanythingontheseislandstoassertitssovereignty.561
ThefactthatahandfulofChinesefishermentemporarilylivedonsomeoftheSpratly
Islands does not equate to effective government administration and control and, therefore,
557
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atnote59.
558
TreatyBetweentheUnitedofStatesofAmerica,Belgium,theBritishEmpire,China,France,Italy,Japan,the
Netherlands,andPortugal,Feb.6,1922,availableathttp://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/tr2201.asp.The
disputesettlementprovisionofthetreaty(ArticleVII)providesthatTheContractingPowersagreethat,whenever
asituationariseswhichintheopinionofanyoneoftheminvolvestheapplicationofthestipulationsofthepresent
Treaty,andrendersdesirablediscussionofsuchapplication,thereshallbefullandfrankcommunicationbetween
theContractingPowersconcerned.
559
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.12;seealsoShenI,atp.42(Atthetimeoftheoccupation,theFrench
Governmentstatedthattheislandsinquestionwereterranullius,butconcededthatduringtheiroccupation,the
onlypeoplelivingontheislandswereChinese.);M.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1178.
560
TaoCheng,note31supra,atp.267;accordB.Murphy,note29supra,atp.188(Untilthesecondhalfof[the
20th]century,theSpratlyswerealmostentirelyignoredbytheworldcommunity.Theonlyresourcestheislands
offeredweresmallguanoandphosphatedeposits,seashells,turtlemeat,andfish.Theseresourceswereenough
toattractonlyoccasionalexploitationbyadventurousfishermenandphosphateminers.Thetinysize,remoteness,
andvulnerabilityoftheislandstotropicalstormsmadethemunattractivetopermanentsettlement.);B.Dubner,
note29supra,atp.299(Withoutexternalassistance,theislandshavenopermanentinhabitantsandaretoo
smalltosustainpermanent,independentsettlements.Mostofthemarecoveredbybushes,guano,afewcoconut,
andplantationtrees.);C.Joyner,note166supra,atp.57(TheSpratlysaretoosmallandbarrentosupport
permanenthumansettlementindependently,andfewhavefreshwateroranysignificantlandbasedresources.);
H.Roque,note208supra,atp.190;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.16(theislandsare
uninhabited.Theirsmallsizehasneverallowedanyhumandevelopment.Traditionally,theyhaveservedas
outpostsforseasonalfishermen.Thataside,theyhaveharbouredonlygarrisonsor,veryrecentlyintheParacels,a
populationofadministrativeorigin)andp.20(The[Spratlys]islandsdonothaveandhaveneverhadanative
population.).
561
F.Bonnet,note223supra,atp.17.Seetextaccompanyingnote97supra.
83
doesnotsupportChinasclaimofindisputablesovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislands.562
AsstatedbyJudgeMcNairinhisdissentingopinionintheAngloNorwegianFisheriescase:
Anotherruleoflawthatappearstometoberelevanttothequestionofhistorictitleis
that some proof is usually required of the exercise of State jurisdiction, and that the
independentactivityofprivateindividualsisoflittlevalueunlessitcanbeshownthat
theyhaveactedinpursuanceofalicenceorsomeotherauthorityreceivedfromtheir
Governments or that in some other way their Governments have asserted jurisdiction
throughthem.563
Thus,tobeconsideredrelevant,actsbyprivateindividualsmustbeimmediatelyfollowedupor
sanctioned by government authorities.564 In the instant case, there is no evidence that the
ChineseGovernmenteverauthorizedorapprovedtheseacts.565
Moreover,atthetimeFranceannexedandeffectivelyoccupiedtheSpratlys(1933)and
Paracels (1938), occupation (conquest) was still a recognized method of acquiring territory
under international law.566 Frances actions in the Paracels, as the successor state to Annam,
anditsoccupationofterranulliusintheSpratlys(asGreatBritainhadabandoneditsclaims),
wereaclearmanifestationofFrenchsovereigntyoverthetwoarchipelagoes.Chinasprotestof
theseactscannotdepriveFranceseffectiveoccupationofitslegaleffect.567
TheChineseForeignMinistry,nonetheless,disagreeswiththisposition,arguingthatit
isabasicnormofinternationallawthatinvasiondoesnotentailsovereignty.568Chinasview,
562
C.Joyner,note166supra,atp.59(EvidenceofpermanentsettlementisnotcompellinginthecaseofChinas
claimtotheSpratlys.);accordM.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.434435(Despitetheofficialgovernment
positionthattheSpratlyIslandsformedanintegratedpartofitsterritory,thecontinuousChinesepresenceseems
tohaveconsistedoffishermenfromHainanIsland,whowouldtemporarilysettleontheislandstofishandcollect
tortoiseshells.Thesestaysappeartohavebeenbrief,anditisunlikelythatthehutsandotherstructurestheybuilt
survivedtheirdepartures.[T]hequestionarisesastowhetherisolatedcontactsbyindividualChinesefishermen
aresufficienttoestablishsovereigntyovertheSpratlysunderinternationallaw.ThusthevalidityofthePRCs
officialpositionissubjecttodoubt.).
563
FisheriesCase(UnitedKingdomv.Norway),I.C.J.Reports1951,p.116,atp.184.
564
atp.683;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.54.
565
566
M.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1179.
567
TheMinquiersandEcrehoscase,JudgmentofNovember17th,1953:I.C.J.Reports1953,p.47,atp.66(Bya
BritishTreasuryWarrantof1875,constitutingJerseyasaPortoftheChannelIslands,the"EcrehouRocks"were
includedwithinthelimitsofthatport.ThislegislativeActwasaclearmanifestationofBritishsovereigntyoverthe
Ecrehosatatimewhenadisputeastosuchsovereigntyhadnotyetarisen.TheFrenchGovernmentprotestedin
1876onthegroundthatthisActderogatedfromtheFisheryConventionof1839.Butthisprotestcouldnot
deprivetheActofitscharacterasamanifestationofsovereignty.).
568
ChineseForeignMinistrysMemorandumonQuestionofXishaandNanshaIslands,XINHUAGEN.OVERSEASNEWS
SERV.,May12,1988,quotedinM.Bennett,note14supra,atnotes15and93.
84
however,isclearlyamisinterpretationoftheprevailinginternationallawineffectwhenFrance
occupiedthearchipelagoesinvasionandconquesthavehadsuchapervasiveeffectonthe
creation of modern international boundaries, their legal significance cannot be denied.569
FrenchoccupationoftheSpratlysandtheParacelsoccurredpeacefullyandopenly,atatime
whenneitheroftheislandgroupswasundertheeffectivecontrolofanynation.570Accordingly,
whenJapanrenounceditsrighttotheSouthChinaSeaislandsinthe1951SanFranciscoPeace
Treaty,titletothetwoarchipelagoesrevertedbacktoitsprevioussovereignFrance.
BoththeROCandthePRCrepeatedtheirobjectionsafterFrancereneweditsclaimsto
the South China Sea islands at the conclusion of the Second World War. All of these actions,
however,occurredwellafterthecriticaldate.Consequently,aninternationaltribunalwould
most likely consider the ROCs and PRCs actions as selfserving acts that occurred after the
disputearoseandthereforeareirrelevanttothedeterminationofsovereignty.
China cites a number of events, beginning in the 19th century, to support its position
that the international community recognizes Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea
islands. China also relies on a number of World War II and postwar documents, statements,
andpublicationstosubstantiateitspositionthatithasindisputablesovereigntyovertheisland
groups.Chinasargumentinthisregard,however,isnotpersuasive.
a. The SinoFrench Treaty of 1887

China maintains that France relinquished its claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands
whenitsignedtheSinoFrenchTreatyof1887,whichdelimitedtheborderbetweenChinaand
Tonkin (northern Vietnam).571 Paragraph 2 of the 1887 Treaty (French text) provides, in part,
that[t]heisleswhicharetotheeastofthemeridianof10543'longitudeeastofParis[the
meridianof10803'08"eastoftheGreenwichmeridian]aresimilarlyassignedtoChina.572
Based on the treaty, Chinese officials argue that all of the South China Sea islands lie
east of 10803'08" east longitude and that France, therefore, ceded the islands to China.
Accordingly, they argue that Vietnam may not claim sovereignty over the islands as the
successorstatetoFrance.Whilesomescholarsagreewiththisargument,mostdonot.573
ScholarsthatsupporttheChinesepositionindicatethatneitherVietnamnorFrancehas
persuasively responded to the Chinese invocation of the 1887 SinoFrench Convention,
whichexplicitlyprovidedthattheislandseastofadelimitationlineshouldbelongtoChinaand
that both the Paracels and Spratlys are situated east of that line.574 Chinas position is not,
however,supportedbyaplainreadingofthetreatytextorsubsequentactionsofthepartiesto
569
CertainlythePRCsownboundarieswouldhavetoberedrawnifnoborderestablishedthroughmilitary
conquestwereevervalid.M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.440441;H.Roque,note208supra,atp.201.
570
M.Bennett,note14supra,atp.441.
571
ConventionConcerningtheDelimitationoftheBorderbetweenChinaandTonkin,signedatBeijing,June26,
1887,availableathttp://www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/167.
572
Id.
573
SeeJ.Greenfield,note149supra,atp.32;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.11.CompareM.Chemillier
Gendreau,note15supra,atpp.81,8386;Z.Keyuan,note174supra,atpp.239,245;B.Dubner,note29supra,at
p.309;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atpp.187188.
574
J.Greenfield,note149supra,atp.32;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.11.
85
the dispute. Moreover, it ignores a French diplomatic note by Monsieur Paul Chargueraud
HartmannoftheUnderDirectorateforAsia(datedAugust16,1933),deliveredtotheChinese
legationinParisonSeptember27,1933,thatstated,inpart,thatthe1887Treatydidnotapply
to the Paracels because the islets are 200 mi east of the delimitation line, which should be
consideredasalocaloneapplicableonlytotheMancayareainnorthernVietnam.575
AsimilarpositionwastakenbyFrancein1937andexpressedinadiplomaticnotedated
October10,1937:
Theprovisionsofthe1887Treaty...hadnootherobjectbuttofixthemaritimefrontier
betweenChinaandTonkinintheregionofMonkai,attachingtoChinasometerritories
and islands situated east of the mouth of the River Monkai and which were formerly
under Annam. To simplify matters, the 10543' Paris meridian was chosen as the
demarcationline.However,thetextoftheagreementclearlyshowsthattheclauseat
issuespecificallyreferstotheMonkairegion.ToseektoapplyittotheParacels,which
are situated almost 300 nautical miles southeast, would amount to saying that
everything east of the 10543' meridian belongs to China. China could therefore lay
claimtomostofthecoastalislandsofIndochina,PouloCeciramongthem!Theabsurd
consequencesofsuchanargumentclearlyshowthatonlylocalscopeandsignificance
shouldbegiventotheclauseinthe1887Convention.576
After reviewing the text of the treaty, Professor Zou Keyuan concurs with the French
assessment,notingthat,
upon careful examination of the texts of the Treaty, the meaning of theChinese
versionindicatesthattheredlinedrawnontheattachedmapwasalinetodividethe
islands in the Gulf of Tonkin rather than a line of maritime boundary. The line, which
ended at about 2123' north latitude on the map, involved only the land and coastal
islands of the two sides. Such a line was simply a form of geographical shorthand to
avoid the need to name all the islands, and such a technique was used widely at that
time in state practice. Even from the French version, the wording forming the
borderisactuallyalineequivalenttotheredlinementionedintheChineseversion.577
ProfessorZoufurtherconcludesthatthepurposeofthetreaty
575
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.13;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.84.
576
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.8586.
577
ZouKeyuan,note174supra,atp.239;accordB.Dubner,note29supra,atp.309.SeealsoH.Nguyen,note204
supra,atpp.187188;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.8384(Theobjectandpurposeofthe1887
TreatywerethedelimitationofthefrontierbetweenTonkinandChina.TheConventionrelatestotheland
territories.ThefrontiertobedelimitedwasthatbetweenTonkinandChina.Onlythispartofthepresent
Vietnamwasconcerned.Hence,theinterpretationofthistextmustmeanthatitcanbeseenasanindicationof
theattributionofthecoastalislandsofthetwoStates.Asaconventionintendedtosettlethefateofthemainland,
itsadditionalpurposewastodeterminetheclosestislands.).
86
was to demarcate the boundary between China and Vietnam according to the Sino
FrenchTreatyofJune9,1885.TherewasnomentionoftheGulfofTonkinandonlypart
oftheGulfclosetothelandwasshownontheattachedmap.Thustherepresentatives
from both parties had no authorization and/or intention to delimit the maritime
boundaryintheGulfofTonkin.578
Asimilarargumentcanbemadewithrespecttoadeterminationofsovereigntyofthe
SouthChinaSeaislands.ChineseandFrenchnegotiatorsclearlydidnothavetheauthorization
ortheintenttomakesuchadeterminationin1887.Inshort,asProfessorZoucorrectlypoints
out, the 1887 boundary line decided only the ownership of the coastal islands and did not
includemidoceanislandssuchasBachLongViIslandintheGulfofTonkinorthemoredistant
SouthChinaSeaislands.579
ThisconclusionissupportedbythefactthatBachLongViIsland,whichislocatedwest
ofthe1887boundaryline,washandedovertoVietnamunderadecisionofMaoTsetungin
the 1950s to show solidarity of the SinoVietnamese friendship and brotherhood.580 If the
boundarylinehadbeenintendedtoapplytomidoceanislands,BachLongViIslandwouldhave
alreadybeenVietnameseterritoryandChinawouldnothaveneededtotransfersovereigntyof
theislandtoVietnam.Furthermore,ifChinareallybelievedthatitacquiredtitletotheSpratlys
undertothe1887Treaty,whydiditwaituntil1946tooccupyanyofitsislets?581
Professor Zous conclusions are also supported by the subsequent negotiation of the
SinoVietnameseMaritimeBoundaryAgreementintheGulfofTonkin.582The2000Agreement
delimitstheterritorialsea,exclusiveeconomiczone,andcontinentalshelfofthetwonationsin
theGulfofTonkin.583Hadthe1887Treatyintendedtodelimitthemaritimeboundarybetween
ChinaandAnnam(Vietnam),the2000Agreementwouldnothavebeennecessary.
b. French Recognition before World War II

ChinaclaimsthatFrenchPrimeMinisterAristideBriandrecognizedChinesesovereignty
over the Paracels on May 21, 1921. China also asserts that the GovernorGeneral of French
Indochina and a French navigator likewise purportedly acknowledged that the Paracels
belongedtoChinainthe1920sand1930s,respectively.TheMFAhasnot,however,provided
independent evidence to corroborate these claims. Moreover, Chinas assertions are at odds
578
Id.
579
ZouKeyuan,note174supra,atp.245;accordM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.81.
580
ZouKeyuan,note174supra,atp.245.
581
TaiwaneseforcesoccupiedItuAbaIslandintheSpratlyarchipelagoin1946.Chineseforcesdidnotoccupyany
oftheisletsuntil1988.B.Dubner,note29supra,atp.310.
582
AgreementbetweenthePeoplesRepublicofChinaandtheSocialistRepublicofVietNamonthedelimitationof
theterritorialseas,theexclusiveeconomiczonesandcontinentalshelvesinBeibuBay/BacBoGulf,Dec.25,2000
(entryintoforce:June30,2004),reprintedinCENTREFORINTERNATIONALLAW,NATIONALUNIVERSITYOFSINGAPORE,CIL
SelectedDocumentsonJointDevelopmentandtheSouthChinaSea,Oct.6,2011,atp.81.
583
Duringthenegotiationsoftheboundarytreaty,theheadoftheChinesedelegation(HanNianlong)reiterated
ChinassovereigntyclaimstotheParacelandSpratlyIslands,statingthattheXishaIslandsandNanshaIslands
havealwaysbeenaninalienablepartofChineseterritory.TheVietnamesepartshouldcomebacktoitsoriginal
positionofrecognizingthatfact,respectChina'ssovereigntyoverthesetwosetsofislands,andwithdrawallits
personnelfromthoseislandsoftheNanshaIslandswhichitoccupies.ShenI,atp.68.
87
with other official French declarations, letters, and documents issued during the same time
period.584
The MFA correctly points out that the Commander of the Navy in Saigon disclaimed
French sovereignty over the Paracels in 1920 during an exchange with the Japanese shipping
companyMitsuiBussanKaisha.However,ChinafailstomentionthattheCommanderdidsoin
his personal capacity and without authorization from the Governor of Cochinchina.585 In
addition,asubsequentnewsreportontheexchangebetweenCaptainRmyandtheJapanese
companypromptedtheFrenchgovernmenttoreevaluateitspositiononFrenchrightstothe
archipelagoes.586
FrenchownershipoftheParacelshadbeenthesubjectofdiscussionbetweenParisand
colonial authorities in Indochina earlier in the century. In 1909, the French Consul in Canton
(Guangzhou)JeanJosephBeauvaiswrotealettertotheMinisterofForeignAffairsinParis
todiscusspossibleFrenchclaimstotheParacels.Afterdiscussingthestrategiclocationofthe
islandsthe Paracels are of some importance to France: lying halfway between Saigon and
Hong Kong, they pose a major threat to shipping and may need a lighthouseBeauvais
indicated that France has as many rights to the islands as China.587 Moreover, Beauvais
highlighted that China had previously denied ownership of the Paracels, citing the incidents
discussed above involving the looting of the German vessel Bellona and the Japanese ship
ImeguMaruthathadshipwreckedintheParacelsin1895and1896,respectively.Heconcluded
thatitwouldthereforeseemthat,wereitinourinteresttopreventtheChineseGovernment
fromseizingthisgroupofreefs,wecouldperhaps,withalittleresearch,easilyfindarguments
clearly demonstrating our right as well as irrefutable evidence of its.588 However, Beauvais
warned that claiming sovereignty over the Paracels may not be in best interests of France
because it could fuel Chinese nationalism, which could be more damaging to us than the
possessionoftheParacelIslandswouldbeuseful.589Thus,theFrenchgovernmentbelievedit
had a valid claim to the archipelago, but feared that publicly asserting sovereignty could be
counterproductiveforotherFrenchinterestsinChina.
584
SeeTaoCheng,note31supra,atp.268(TheFrenchcolonialauthoritiesinIndoChinahadshowntheirinterest
intheParacelIslandsandtheSpratlyIslandsasearlyasthefirstdecadeofthepresent[20th]centuryandagainin
the1920s.TheChinesesuspicionofFrenchdesignsontheseislandswasatleastpartiallyresponsibleforAdmiral
LiChuns1907missionandShenPengfeis1928visittotheParacelIslands.).Duringthe1907mission,AdmiralLi
purportedlyestablishedaChineseterritorialmarkeronDrummondIslandtocommemoratetheinspection.H.
ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.11.
585
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,Annex12(Notedated6May1921,fromDirectorateforPoliticaland
IndigenousAffairs,GovernmentGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi)(Thereisnopaperintheofficialdocumentsofthe
NavyallowingthenationalityoftheParacelIslandstobedetermined.Nevertheless,IthinkIcanassureyouthat
theyarenotaFrenchpossession,butthisassertionisbasedsolelyonmypersonalmemoriesandIcannotprovide
youwithanyconclusivedocumentinsupportofthis.)
586
Id.,atp.106,Annex12(Notedated6May1921,fromtheDirectorateforPoliticalandIndigenousAffairs,
GovernmentGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi).
587
Id.,atpp.104105,Annex13(Notedated4May1909fromMrBeauvais,ConsulateofFranceinCanton),Annex
15(Letterdated4May1909fromMr.Beauvais,ConsulofFranceinCanton,totheMinisterforForeignAffairs,
Paris).
588
Id.
589
88
By 1921, some French officials were suggesting that France abandon its claims to the
islands in exchange for other French interests in China. On March 30, 1921, the Governor of
Kwangtung announced (Order No. 831 dated March 30, 1921, and published in the Official
GazetteofKwantung(No.2619ofApril2,1921))thatthemilitaryGovernmentofthesouth
haddecidedtoincorporatetheParacelsintothesubprefectureofYaiHien,HainanIsland.590
Two weeks later, the Minister for the Colonies sent a letter to the President du Conseil,
MinisterforForeignAffairs,suggestingthat[i]twouldperhapsnotbeexcessive,inexchange
forofficialrecognitionthattheParacelsareChinese,torequestaformalcommitmentfromthe
sovereignGovernmentnevertosetupamilitaryornavalbasethereandtoinstallnofacilities
tothatend.591Severalweekslater,anofficialfromtheDirectorateforPoliticalandIndigenous
AffairsindicatedinanotedatedMay6,1921,thataFrenchconcessionontheParacelscould
make it easier to settle the matter of compensation for the Tunnam railway and that in
suchasituation,theabandonmentbyFranceofallrightstoownershipoftheParacelsmight
seemlikethecompensationdemandedbytheChinese.592
ThefactthatFrancewasconsideringnegotiatingtheabandonmentofitsclaimtothe
ParacelsimpliesthatFrenchofficialsbelievedFrancehadrightstotheislands.593Nonetheless,
eitherthenegotiationsdidnottakeplaceorFrancewasunsuccessfulingainingthenecessary
concessions from the Chinese government regarding noncession and nonfortification of the
islands. Accordingly, by 1922, French officials began to realize that complaisance towards
ChinasclaimscouldserveJapaneseinterests.594
ThedecisiontoassertFrenchclaimstotheislandsasthesuccessorstatetotheKingdom
of Annam began to take shape in 1928. Having been informed that the Governor of Hainan
Island, General Gaston Hoang, had intentions of claiming the Paracels as Chinese territory,
ActingGovernorGeneralofIndochinaEugneJeanLouisRneRobininformedtheMinisterfor
theColoniesonDecember17,1928,thatitistimeforustotaketheinitiativeandtoassert
rights which appear to be recognized both in historical documents and by geographical
realities.595 The following month, Chief Resident of Annam Le Fol provided the Governor
General with historical evidence to support Annams prior sovereignty over the archipelago,
citing the actions of Emperors Gia Long and Minh Mang, and the exploits of the Hoang Sa
Company.596Amonthlater,onFebruary26,1929,anotefromtheMinistryforForeignAffairs
informed the Ministry for the Colonies of the change in the French position regarding the
Paracels:
590
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex12(Notedated6May1921,fromDirectorateforPoliticaland
IndigenousAffairs,GovernmentGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi).
591
Id.,atAnnex16(Noteof18April1921fromtheMinisterfortheColoniestothePresidentduConseil,Minister
forForeignAffairs).
592
Id.,atAnnex12(Notedated6May1921,fromDirectorateforPoliticalandIndigenousAffairs,Government
593
Id.,atp.106.
594
Id.
595
Id.,atp.107,Annex20(LetterNo.2276,dated17December1928,fromtheActingGovernorGeneralof
Indochina,Hanoi,totheMinisterfortheColonies,Paris).
596
Id.,atpp.107108,Annex8(Letterof22January1929,fromtheChiefResidentofAnnam,Hu,totheGovernor
89
the Indochinese administration now supports the view that France has sovereignty
overthearchipelagoandtothatendputsforwardhistoricalargumentswhichitintends
to develop in a Note to be sent to you shortly. As you point out, the Indochinese
administration thus appears to advocatea position contrary to that decided upon by
the French Government in 1921, which apparently entailed recognizing Chinese
sovereignty over the archipelago, subject to the application of the FrancoChinese
Agreementsof2and15March1897,andof4and10April1898.597
A letter from the Ministry of the Navy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs likewise
recordedthechangeinFrancesposition,aswellasnotingthatAnnamsclaimstotheParacels
weresuperiortothatofNationalistChina:
Mr.Robincurrentlysupportstheargumentofnationalsovereignty,basedonhistorical
documents whichhave not been mentioned before. [T]he position apparently
agreed, in 1921, was to recognize Chinese rights to the islands under certain
conditions of security and noncession. Annam however possesses historical rights
overthisgroupofuninhabitedislandswhicharemuchlessopentoquestionthanany
NationalistChinamightclaim,andFrance,whichhasadutytosafeguardtheintegrityof
the kingdom under its protection, would do well not to allow itself to be taken by
surprisebythefaitaccompliofChinesepossessionwhichitwouldnodoubtbeobliged
toaccept.598
OnFebruary14,1930,theKwangtungProvisionalCounciladoptedaresolutiontomine
guanodepositsintheParacels.GovernorGeneralPierreMarieAntoinePasquierinformedthe
MinistryoftheColoniesoftheChineseaction,notingthatthe
French Government has never officially recognized Chinese sovereignty over [the]
archipelago,nordefinitivelyabandonedassertinghistoricalandgeographicalrights[of
the]EmpireofAnnam,whichithadonlyconsideredformallyrelinquishingforreasons
[of] political expediency and in exchange [for] guarantees re[ference] nonfortification
and noncession [of the] archipelago to foreign powers. Failing such agreement, we
cannot remain indifferent to [a] fresh assertion [of] sovereignty by Chinese
authorities.599
Two months later, China claims that France implicitly recognized Chinese sovereignty
over the Paracels at the 1930 Hong Kong Far Eastern Meteorological Conference. France
purportedly joined other delegations in requesting that the Republic of China construct a
weatherstationintheParacels.Aresolutionadoptedduringtheconferenceprovidedthat
597
Id.,atp.108,Annex21(NoteNo.268,dated26February1929,fromtheMinisterforForeignAffairs
(DirectorateforAsiaandOceania),Paris,totheMinisterfortheColonies,PoliticalDirectorate,ThirdBureau,Paris).
598
Id.,atp.108,Annex22(Letterof18February1929fromtheMinisterfortheNavy,actingMinisterforthe
Colonies,Paris,totheMinisterofForeignAffairs(DirectorateforPoliticalAffairsandTrade(AsiaOceania),Paris).
599
Id.,atp.109,Annex24(Officialtelegramof14March1930,fromtheGovernorGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi,to
theMinistryoftheColonies,Paris).
90

TheConferencerecognizesthegreatimportancetotheMeteorologyoftheChinaSeas
of the Meteorological Station established at Pratas by the Government of China. It
expresses the hope and voices the desire that similar stations be established in zones
notyetrepresented,especiallyontheMacclesfieldBankandtheParacels.600

ThereisnoevidencethattheFrenchIndochinarepresentativewhoattendedtheconference,
MonsieurBruzon,objectedtotheproposal.Accordingly,Chinaarguesthatthisrequestproves
thatnotonlyaretheParacelIslandsinternationallyrecognizedasbelongingtoChina,butthat
theFrenchthemselvessharethisview.601However,asFrenchauthoritiescorrectlypointedout
inasubsequentdiplomaticnoteregardingthismatter,theconferencewasascientificoneand
didnotdealwithpoliticalquestions.602Inotherwords,Frenchsupportfortheresolutionwas
notatacitrecognitionofChinesesovereigntyovertheParacels.Itshouldalsobenotedthatthe
delegate from the Zikawei Observatory, Father Louis Froc, while expressing support for the
proposal, was ambivalent as to the status of the Paracels, indicating that there has always
beenthedoubtastowhatflagwouldbehoistedoverthestation.603
Subsequently,onJune19,1930,theMinistryofForeignAffairsdeterminedthat,based
ona1929studybyP.A.Lapicque(AproposdesliesParacels(Saigon,Leseditionsd'Extreme
Asie)), the Paracels had not been abandoned and therefore had not become res nullius.604
Fourmonthslater,theGovernorGeneralputanendtoFrancesreluctancetoassertitsrights
totheParacels,informingtheMinisterfortheColoniesthathistoricaldocumentsandmapsin
thepossessionoftheFrenchgovernmentwere
sufficient to establish incontrovertibly that Annam took effective possession of the

archipelago well before 1909, the date on which the Chinese appear first to have
expressed their claims to sovereignty over the Paracels[and that] the French
administrationhasneverceasedtoshowinterestinthearchipelago.605
OnJuly31,1931,atelegramfromtheMinistryoftheColoniesinstructedtheGovernorGeneral
that Frances legal position on the Paracels could be strengthened by [a] surveillance
mission[to the] Paracel archipelago but warned that the mission should have [the]
600
Resolution4,CONFERENCEOFDIRECTORSOFFAREASTERNWEATHERSERVICES,HONGKONG,1930,atp.58,availableat
http://www.hko.gov.hk/mwginternal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=7sEupYOYvs.SeealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note
42supra,atp.12.
601
RepublicinFrancetotheMinistryofForeignAffairs,Paris).
602
603
REPORTOFTHECONFERENCEOFDIRECTORSOFFAREASTERNWEATHERSERVICES,HONGKONG,1930,atp.21,availableat
http://www.hko.gov.hk/mwginternal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=7sEupYOYvs.TheZikaweiObservatorywas
establishedbyFrenchJesuitsinShanghai,China,in1872tocarryoutmeteorologicalobservationsintheSouth
ChinaSea.HongKongObservatoryblog,availableathttp://www.hko.gov.hk/blog/en/archives/00000047.htm.
604
605
Id.,atp.109,Annex26(LetterNo.1512A.Exdated18October1930fromtheGovernorGeneralofIndochina,
Hanoi,totheMinisterfortheColonies,Paris).
91
appearance of [a] simple exercise [of] preexisting sovereign rights and should avoid taking
actionsthatcouldbeperceivedastakingpossessionoftheislands.606
WhenChinaproclaimedlaterthatyearthatitwasinvitingbidsfromforeigncompanies
to exploit the phosphate deposits in the Paracels, France protested the announcement by a
diplomatic note dated December 4, 1931.607 The French filed a second protest on April 24,
1932,afterChinapubliclycalledforbids,citingtheformerrightsexercisedbytheemperorsof
Vietnam, the official taking of possession by Emperor Gia Long in 1816, and the sending of
Indochinese troops to guard the islands.608 Then on June 15, 1932 (Decree No. 156SC),
Governor General Pasquier designated the Paracels (Delegation des Paracels) as an
administrativeunitofThuaThien(Hu)Province.609AFrenchofferonFebruary4,1932,totake
the dispute over the islands to arbitration was rejected by the Chinese government on
September29,1932.610
Failingtoachieveanegotiatedsettlementoftheissue,theFrenchcolonialgovernment
solidified its control over the archipelago between 1937 and 1939. The head of public works
was dispatched to the Paracels in 1937 to study the potential for maritime and air traffic
facilities,andtobuildalighthouseonPattleIsland.611Thefollowingyear,DecreeNo.156SC
wasconfirmedbyEmperorBaoDaiinaVietnameseimperialordinanceonMarch30,1938.612
Then, on May 5, 1939, Governor General Joseph Jules Brvi divided the Paracel archipelago
into two delegationsthe Crescent Group and the Amphitrite Group.613 Additionally, French
civil service officers and Vietnamese police were permanently stationed on Pattle Island
(CrescentGroup)andWoodyIsland(AmphitriteGroup)onaregularbasis.614Takenasawhole,
these French activities clearly contradict Chinas assertion that France recognized Chinese
sovereigntyovertheParacelsduringthe1920sand1930s.
During this timeframe, Frances attitude towards the Spratly Islands was likewise
ambivalent, but official French records reflect that French authorities viewed the islands as
terra nullius.615 On September 23, 1929, France informed the other Great Powers that it had
606
Id.,at109,Annex27(Telegramof4July1931fromtheMinistryoftheColoniestotheGovernmentGeneral[of
Indochina]).
607
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.38;NguyenBaDien,note203
supra;TheIndisputableSovereigntyofVietNamovertheParacelIslands,NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRS,
MINISTRYOFFOREIGNAFFAIRS,SOCIALISTREPUBLICOFVIETNAM,Jan.30,2011,availableat
http://southeastasiansea.wordpress.com/[hereinafterNATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper];
HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note206supra.
608
Id.
609
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.
185;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.39,113.
610
611
Id.,atpp.38,113.
612
Id.;seealsoSOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;Historicaldocumentson
VietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.185;
613
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.185;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;
614
Id.
615
Id.,Annex17(Letterdated26December1927fromtheActingGovernorGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi,tothe
MinisterfortheColonies,Paris),Annex18(Notedated8March1928fromMrBourgouin),Annex19(Notedated
92
occupied the Spratlys on the grounds that the islands were terra nullius. Formal occupation
tookplaceinApril1933andwaspublicizedintheOfficialGazetteonJuly26,1933.TheSpratlys
weresubsequentlyincorporatedintoBRiaProvinceonDecember21,1933bytheGovernorof
Cochinchina.616Basedontheforegoing,itisclearthatFrancedidnotrecognizeChinasclaims
totheSpratlys.
c. French Recognition after World War II

Some Chinese and foreign scholars additionally maintain that France tacitly
acknowledged Chinas sovereignty over the South China Sea islands after World War II. To
support their position, these scholars cite Frances failure to protest the return of Nationalist
ChinesetroopstoItuAbaIslandandWoodyIslandin1946,aswellasFrenchandVietnamese
inactionwhenROCforceswereabsentfromItuAbabetween1950and1956.Accordingly,even
if the French validly occupied the Spratlys and the Paracels in 1930s, France relinquished its
sovereignty over the islands in 1945 and therefore did not possess a lawful title to which
VietnamcouldsucceedasthesuccessorstatetoFrenchrightstothearchipelagoes.
These assertions are clearly inconsistent with French and Vietnamese sovereign
activities in the South China Sea islands following the conclusion of the war. In June 1946, a
Frenchinfantryplatoon,embarkedontheSavorgnandeBrazza,wasdispatchedtoreoccupy
theParacels,butwascompelledtowithdrawfromtheislandsinSeptember1946asaresultof
theongoingFrenchIndochinawar.Nonetheless,whenFrenchofficialslearnedthattheChinese
NationalistoccupationforcehadnotwithdrawnfromtheParacelsinMarch1946asrequiredby
the Exchange of Letters between China and France,617 France lodged a diplomatic protest on
January13,1947.Afewdayslater,onJanuary17,thewarshipLeTonkinoiswasdeployedtothe
Paracels to dislodge the Chinese Nationalists from Woody Island. Realizing that they were
outnumbered, however, those in the combined FrenchVietnamese force regrouped and
establishedtheirheadquartersonPattleIsland.
Later in January 1947, the adviceboat Commandant Duboc, under the command of
Captain Hennequin, deployed to the Paracels to evaluate the condition of the existing
infrastructureonPattleIslandanddeterminetheviabilityofmaintainingFrenchforcesinthe
archipelago. Captain Hennequins report to the Commander of the Navy in Indochina
recommendedthatFranceretainpossessionoftheislandsinlightofthesubstantialfacilities
built on the island by the Government General and their present state of conservation,
sufficient efforts should be undertaken to see that this island remains a possession of
Indochina.618TheexistingweatherstationonPattleIslandwassubsequentlyrefurbishedand
became operational in late 1947 under international station code 48860, and the French
26November1928,addressedtotheUnderDirectorateforAsiaandOceania),Annex29(Encodedtelegramof8
March1929).
616
Id.,Annex30(DecreebytheGovernorofCochinChina(J.Krautheimer),Saigon,21December1933).
617
NorthIndochina,Chungking,Feb.28,1946,U.N.T.S.Vol.14,1948,atp.151.
618
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,Annex34(ConfidentialReportof29January1947onFrenchnaval
missiontoPattleIslandfromCaptainHennequin,Commander,8thdivisionofadviceboatsandCaptain,adviceboat
CommandantDuboc,toRearAdmiral,CommanderoftheNavyinIndochina).
93
hydrographic survey ship Ingenieur en chef Girod conducted oceanographic, geologic,

geographic,andecologicalstudiesinthearchipelagoin1953.
The French similarly engaged in a series of activities in the Spratlys, to include
diplomaticandmilitaryacts,inordertosubstantiateFrenchsovereigntyoverthearchipelago
until French troops were finally withdrawn from Indochina in August 1956. The French
battleshipChevreuddeployedtotheSpratlysinOctober 1946toreassertFrenchinterestsin
the archipelago and install a sovereignty stele on Itu Aba Island. When France learned that
Chinese naval units had illegally occupied Itu Aba in November 1946, French authorities
protestedtheaction,demandingthattheNationalisttroopswithdrawfromtheisland.
FrancelikewiseopposedPhilippineincursionsintotheSpratlyarchipelago.InMay1956,
after Tomas Cloma proclaimed his socalled Freedomland, which encompassed part of the
Spratly archipelago, the French Charge d'Affaires in Manila reminded the Philippine
governmentthattheSpratlyshadbeensovereignFrenchterritorysince1933.TheFrenchNavy
vesselDumontdUrvillealsovisitedItuAbaIslandin1956todemonstrateFrenchVietnamese
interestinthearchipelago.619
Basedontheseextensiveactivitiesdiscussedabove,ChinasassertionthatFrancetacitly
acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea islands after World War II is
tenuous,atbest.
d. Japanese Recognition
ChinesescholarsalsoarguethatJapanrecognizedChinassovereigntyovertheParacels
in 1938 by declaring that French claims to the archipelago were not justified given that both
France and Great Britain had previously recognized that the Paracels were Chinese territory.
Chinas position in this regard is clearly inconsistent with the previously discussed French
activitiesintheSouthChinaSeaduringthefirsthalfofthe20thcentury.Italsoignoresthefact
thatJapanwasatwarwithChinaandhadulteriormotivesforopposingFrenchclaimstothe
South China Sea islands. On September 18, 1931, Japan invaded and occupied Manchuria.
Followinga seriesofskirmishesbetweenJapaneseandChineseforces,Japanlaunchedafull
scaleinvasionofChinaonJuly7,1937.ByrecognizingChinesesovereigntyovertheSouthChina
Sea islands, Japan was free to invade the Spratlys (in March 1939) and the Paracels (in April
1939) because it was at war with China. It is therefore unlikely that Japan truly recognized
ChinesesovereigntyoftheParacelsoverthatofFrance.
Moreover, Chinas position does not comport with Britains official position regarding
French overseas possessions during World War II, which recognized that the French were
highly sensitive about the restoration of all parts of their colonial empire to the status quo
ante[whichwouldarguablyincludetheSpratlysandParacels]andthattheBritishGovernment
willfirmlysupporttheFrenchpositioninviewofitsdesirefortheclosestpossiblerelationswith
France.620ItalsoignoresaBritishdiplomaticnoteprotestingJapansannouncementinMarch
1939 that it was placing the Spratly Islands under the administrative jurisdiction of Formosa
(Taiwan).Thenote,datedApril10,1939,provided:
619
Id.,atp.43.
620
MemorandumbytheDeputyDirectoroftheOfficeofEuropeanAffairs(H.FreemanMatthews),Nov.2,1944,
THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITEDSTATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(19451967),PartV.B.1.,atpp.3738,availableat
94

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom have been notified of the decision of Your Excellency's Government
publishedonMarch31stlasttoincludetheSpratleyIslandsunderthejurisdictionofthe
GovernorGeneralofFormosa.
IaminstructedtoinformyourExcellencythatHisMajesty'sGovernmentareunableto
admit that the claim of the Japanese Government has any legal foundation and that
theydeploretheprocedureadoptedbytheminthismatterasitcanonlycomplicatestill
furtherthesituationintheFarEast.621
The1939BritishnoteisconsistentwithpriorBritishrecognitionofFrenchsovereignty
over the Spratlys during the 1930s. In 1937, the British Admiralty and Air Ministry proposed
leasingItuAbaorThituIslandsfromtheFrenchinordertobuildanairfieldintheSpratlys,a
clearrecognitionofFrenchsovereigntyovertheislands.622Similarly,inthecourseofadebate
intheBritishHouseofCommonsinApril1939,theForeignOfficeindicatedthattheSpratlys
wereclaimedinfullsovereigntybytheFrenchGovernment.623Britainremainedsteadfastinits
support of the French claims to all of the South China Sea islands after the war, requesting
permissiontouseLincolnIslandintheParacelsformilitaryexercisesin1948.624
With respect to the Spratlys, Japan protested Frances 1933 occupation of nine of the
islands in the archipelago, indicating that 12 of the Spratly Islands were Japanese territory
based on discovery in May 1920 and economic exploitation of the islands by a Japanese
fertilizer company.625 Japans protest did not, however, recognize Chinese sovereignty of the
SpratlysandthereforedoesnotsupportChinasclaimtotheislands.
TheargumentthatJapanintendedtoreturntheSouthChinaSeaislandstoChinaatthe
end of World War II, relying on the separate agreements formally ending hostilities between
the two Chinas and Japan, is likewise misplaced. As discussed above, Article 2 of the 1952
TreatyofPeacebetweentheRepublicofChinaandJapansimplystatesthatJapanrenouncedits
621
G.Marston,note330supra,atp.354;seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,
atAnnex32(NotefromtheMinistryofForeignAffairs,DirectorateforPoliticalAffairsandTrade,(Asia),10August
1940);U.S.DEPT.OFSTATE,ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates,SouthwardAdvanceofJapaneseExpansionist
Movement:HainanandtheSpratlyIslands,1939,vol.III,atp.117.TheUnitedStatestookasimilarpositionina
diplomaticnotedeliveredtotheJapaneseAmbassadorinWashingtononMay17,1939:theGovernmentofthe
UnitedStatesdoesnotconsiderthatallislandsorreefswithintheextensiveareadelimitedintheJapanese
memorandumcouldproperlybetreatedasoneislandgrouporthattheactionofJapaninblanketingwithinthe
territoryofJapanislandsorreefswithrespecttowhichtheJapaneseGovernmenthasheretoforeexercisednoacts
whichmightproperlyberegardedasestablishingabasisforclaimtosovereigntyhasanyinternationalvalidity.
Id.,atp.118.
622BobHackett,SanderKingsepp,andAnthonyTully,JapaneseOccupationSouthChinaSeaIslands19371941
(Rev.1),RISINGSTORMTHEIMPERIALJAPANESENAVYANDCHINA(19311941),2012,availableat
http://www.combinedfleet.com/SouthChinaSea_t.htm;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex
32(NotefromtheMinistryofForeignAffairs,DirectorateforPoliticalAffairsandTrade,(Asia),10August1940).
623
624
Id.,atp.118.
625
ShenI,atp.42;seealsoTaoCheng,note31supra,atp.269;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.12;M.
Katchen,note120supra,atp.1178;M.Bennett,note14supra,atp.437;S.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.8.
95
rightstoTaiwan,thePenghuIslands,andtheSouthChinaSeaislands.626Itdoesnot,however,
putforwardanyproposalswithrespecttodevolutionoftheislandgroups.Iftheintentofthis
articlewastotransfertitletoTaiwan,explicitdevolutionofrightsinTaiwansfavorshouldhave
been included in the treaty. In fact, some scholars have argued that Taiwan, by failing to
explicitly include a clear devolution of rights in its favor in the treaty with Japan, in effect
ceasedasserting[its]rightstothedisputedislands.627Moreover,theChinesepositionfailsto
take into account that, following the conclusion of the 1952 Treaty, Japan and France
exchanged diplomatic notes indicating that the new treaty had not, in the view of Japan,
entailedanychangeinrelationtotheSanFranciscoTreaty.628
EvenassumingthatJapanrenounceditsrightstotheSpratlysandParacelsinfavorof
Taiwan, Japan did not have the authority to transfer title of the islands to the ROC. Japans
claimstotheSouthChinaSeaislandswereobtainedbyarmedaggressionagainstFrance.Upon
conclusionofthewar,Japanrenounceditsrightsandthetitletotheislandsrevertedbacktoits
legitimate sovereignin this case, France. Taiwan could not receive any greater rights to the
SouthChinaSeaislandsthanthosepossessedbyJapanattheconclusionofthewar.629
Similarly,the1972JointCommuniquofferslittleinthewayofsupportfortheChinese
position. The Communiqu simply states that Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation would
apply.630Asdiscussedinthefollowingsection,neitherthePotsdamProclamationnortheCairo
DeclarationsupportChinasclaimtotheSouthChinaSeaislands.
e. World War II Documents

TheCairoDeclarationprovidedthat
JapanshallbestrippedofalltheislandsinthePacificwhichshehasseizedoroccupied
sincethebeginningoftheFirstWorldWarin1914,andthatalltheterritoriesJapanhas
stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan], and the Pescadores
[Penghu],shallberestoredtotheRepublicofChina.Japanwillalsobeexpelledfromall
otherterritorieswhichshehastakenbyviolenceandgreed.631
626
TreatyofPeacebetweentheRepublicofChinaandJapan,Apr.28,1952,enteredintoforceAug.5,1952,
availableathttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/doc_all.htm(ItisrecognizedthatunderArticle2oftheTreatyof
PeacewithJapansignedatthecityofSanFranciscoon8September1951,Japanhasrenouncedallright,title,
andclaimtoTaiwan(Formosa)andPenghu(thePescadores)aswellastheSpratlyIslandsandParacelIslands.).
627
628
629
Thecommonlawprincipleofnemodatquodnonhabetprovidesthatthetransfereecannotreceiveany
greaterrightsthanthosepossessedbythetransferor.BROWNLIE217(8thed.).
630
JointCommuniquoftheGovernmentofJapanandtheGovernmentofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,Sept.29,
1972,availableathttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/japan01.htm(TheGovernmentofthePeoplesRepublicof
ChinareiteratesthatTaiwanisaninalienablepartoftheterritoryofthePeoplesRepublicofChina.The
GovernmentofJapanfullunderstandsandrespectsthisstandoftheGovernmentofthePeoplesRepublicof
China,anditfirmlymaintainsitsstandunderArticle8ofthePotsdamProclamation.).
631
CairoDeclaration(November1943),releasedDec.1,1943,availableat
96
The Potsdam Proclamation reaffirmed this commitment, stating that the terms of the Cairo
Declarationshallbecarriedout.632
ChinasrelianceontheWorldWarIIdeclarationstosupportitsclaimtotheSouthChina
Sea islands is clearly misplaced. The Cairo Declaration, as reinforced by the Potsdam
Proclamation, only provides that China would recover Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan), and the
Pescadores(PenghuIslands)afterthewar.ThenextsentencesimplyprovidesthatJapanwould
beexpelledfromotherterritorieswhichithadtakenbyviolence,butitdoesnotindicatethat
theseotherterritorieswouldbereturnedtoChina.Althoughnotspecificallystated,theonly
logical conclusion is that these other territories included the Spratly and Paracel Islands,
which were seized by violence from France, not China.633 These islands would, therefore, be
restoredtoFrance,notChina,attheconclusionofthewar.
China also emphasizes that Japan put the Nansha [Spratly] Islands under the
jurisdiction of Taiwan during the war and that the territories to be restored to China as
identifiedintheCairoDeclaration[andPotsdamProclamation]naturallyincludedtheNansha
Islands.634However,thefactthatJapanplacedtheSpratlysunderthejurisdictionofTaiwanis
irrelevanttoadeterminationofsovereigntyovertheislands.ItwaslogicalforJapantoplace
theSpratlysundertheadministrationofTaiwan,asTaiwanwasJapansclosestterritorytothe
SouthChinaSea.
Moreover, the implication that the Paracels and Spratlys were part of Taiwan and
should, therefore, have been returned to China at the conclusion of the war is clearly
inconsistentwiththetermsoftheTreatyofShimonoseki.TaiwanandthePenghuIslandswere
cededtoJapanbyChinain1895attheconclusionofthefirstSinoJapaneseWar(18941895).
Article2oftheTreatyofShimonosekiprovides,inpart,that
ChinacedestoJapaninperpetuityandfullsovereigntythefollowingterritories:
(b)TheislandofFormosa[Taiwan],togetherwithallislandsappertainingorbelonging
tothesaidislandofFormosa.
(c)ThePescadoresGroup[PenghuIslands],thatistosay,allislandslyingbetweenthe
119thand120thdegreesoflongitudeeastofGreenwichandthe23rdand24thdegreesof
northlatitude.635
ThephraseislandsappertainingorbelongingtoFormosainArticle2bmostlikelyreferstoL
Tao(GreenIsland)andLanY(Lanyu),twosmallislandsthatlietotheeastofTaiwan,aswellas
11othersmallisletsadjacenttothemainislandandthe64islandsthatcomprisethePenghu
(Pescadores) Islands.636 Moreover, both the Paracels and the Spratlys lie well south of 23
632
PotsdamProclamation,July26,1945,para.8,availableathttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/doc_all.htm.
633
634
635
TreatyofShimonoseki,Apr.17,1895,enteredintoforceMay8,1895,availableat
636
ChiaominHsieh,TaiwanIlhaFormosa:AGeographyinPerspective,(London,1964),pp.viii372,atp.6.See
alsoPeterUpton,InternationalLawandtheSinoJapaneseControversyoverTerritorialSovereigntyoftheSenkaku
Islands,52B.U.L.REV763(1972),atp.771.
97
degreesnorthlatitude,andwere,therefore,notconsideredbyJapanorChinatobeapartof
TaiwanorthePenghuIslandsin1895.
Thesamecanbesaidfor1943.HadtheAlliedPowersconsideredtheSouthChinaSea
islandstobepartofTaiwan,theywouldhavebeenmentionedintheCairoDeclarationalong
with Taiwans other outlying island groupthe Pescadores. It is also important to note that
GeneralissimoChiangKaishekwaspresentattheCairoConference,yethedidnothaveany
reference to these islands included in the final Declaration.637 Surely, if the Spratlys and
ParacelswereconsideredtobeChineseterritorypriortothewar,ChiangKaishekwouldhave
demandedthatthearchipelagoesbereturnedtoChinesecontrolattheConference.638
Other World War II documents support this conclusion. In December 1941, President
RooseveltreassuredFrenchMarshalPtainthatthattheUnitedStateswouldrecognizeFrench
sovereigntyoveritsformercoloniesandthattheUnitedStateshadnodesiretoseeexisting
FrenchsovereigntyoveranyoftheFrenchcoloniespasstothecontrolofanyothernation.639
Oneyearlater,onNovember2,1942,theUnitedStatesreassuredFrance
thattherestorationofFrancetofullindependence,inallthegreatnessandvastness
whichitpossessedbeforethewarinEuropeaswellasoverseas,isoneofthewaraims
of the United Nations. It is thoroughly understood that French sovereignty will be re
establishedassoonaspossiblethroughoutalltheterritory,metropolitanandcolonial,
overwhichflewtheFrenchflagin1939.640
In 1939, the French flag flew over the Spratlys and the Paracels. Similarly, at the Tehran
Conference in NovemberDecember 1943, the Allied Powers recognized French sovereignty
overIndochina.641
f. PostWar Occupation
ChinamaintainsthatNationalistforcesacceptedthesurrenderofJapaneseforcesinthe
South China Sea at the end of World War II and rightfully retook possession of the Paracel
andSpratlyIslandsonbehalfofChinain1946.Thispositionisseriouslymisplaced.Nationalist
Chinese troops did, in fact, occupy the islands at the conclusion of the Second World War.
However,thesetroopsweresimplysenttoItuAbaandWoodyIslandstodisarmandacceptthe
637
sovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;M.
638
Id.;accordH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.187(ThesilenceoftheROCattheCairoandPotsdamconferences
regardingtheParacelsandSpratlysconstitutesproofoftheChineseindifferencetotheseislands.).
639
Severalmonthslater,onApril13,1942,theActingU.S.SecretaryofStatedeliveredanotetotheFrench
AmbassadorinWashingtonindicatingthattheU.S.governmentrecognizesthesovereignjurisdictionofFrance
overtheterritoryofFranceandoverFrenchpossessionsoverseas.UnitedStatesPositionwithRespecttoFrench
TerritoryAftertheWar,Jan.7,1944,THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITEDSTATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(19451967),PartV.B.1.,
atpp.2728,availableathttp://www.archives.gov/research/pentagonpapers/.
640
LetterofRobertD.MurphytoGeneralHenriGiraud,Nov.2,1942,THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITEDSTATESVIETNAM
RELATIONS(19451967),PartV.B.1.,atp.16,availableathttp://www.archives.gov/research/pentagonpapers/.
641
MemorandumofConversationbetweenPresidentRooseveltandMarshalStalin,Nov.28,1943,THEPENTAGON
PAPERS,UNITEDSTATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(19451967),PartV.B.1.,atpp.2425,availableat
98
surrenderoftheJapaneseforcesthathadbeenstationedthereduringthewar.GeneralOrder
Number 1, issued by General Douglas MacArthur on September 2, 1945, directed that the
senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China
(excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French IndoChina north of 16 north latitude shall
surrendertoGeneralissimoChiangKaishek,whileJapaneseforcesinFrenchIndoChinasouth
of16degreesnorthlatitudewouldsurrendertotheBritish(SupremeAlliedCommanderSouth
EastAsiaCommand).642TheorderwasnotintendedtotransfertitleoftheSpratlyandParacels
IslandstoChina.
Subsequently, the Republic of China and France agreed in February 1946 that French
troopswouldrelieveChineseNationalistforcesstationedinIndochinanorthofthe16thdegree
of latitude (which included both the Paracel and Spratly Islands) no later than March 31,
1946.643Asanoccupationforce,theNationalisttroopshadalegalobligationtodepartFrench
Indochinabythe31stofMarch,buttheyfailedtodoso.ThefactthatChineseforcesillegally
remainedonItuAbaandWoodyIslandsaftertheAlliedoccupationofIndochinaformallyended
inMarch1946wasaclearviolationofArticle2(4)oftheUNCharterand,therefore,doesnot
provide China with clear title to the two archipelagoes.644 Accordingly, Chinas claim to the
South China Sea islands, based on its postwar occupation, has no legal basis under
internationallaw.
g. San Francisco Peace Conference

The MFA claims that Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea islands was
recognizedduringthedraftingofthe1951TreatyofPeacewithJapan.Inthisregard,theMFA
citesastatementbytheHeadoftheDelegationoftheSovietUnion,AndreiGromyko,which
criticized the AmericanBritish draft of the treaty for failing to return the South China Sea
islandstoChina.645
ChinasrelianceonGromykosstatementtosupportitspositionontheSouthChinaSea
islands,however,isproblematicforanumberofreasons.First,Gromykosdemandforavote
was overwhelmingly defeated by the Conference by a vote of 46 to 3 (with 1 abstention).646
642
SupremeCommanderfortheAlliedPowers,GeneralOrderNo.One,Sept.2,1945,availableat
643
NorthIndochina,Chungking,Feb.28,1946,U.N.T.S.Vol.14,1948,atp.151.SeealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note
15supra,atp.40.
644
CharteroftheUnitedNations,signedJune26,1945,enteredintoforceOct.24,1945.AccordM.Chemillier
Gendreau,note15supra,atp.26(Contemporaryinternationallaw(CharteroftheUnitedNations,Article2,
paragraph4)prohibitstheuseofforceagainsttheterritorialintegrityofaState.Somilitaryoccupationdenounced
assuchcannot,ever,inanyway,becomeavalid,recognizedtitle.).
645
StatementoftheFirstDeputyMinisterofForeignAffairsoftheUSSR,A.A.Gromyko,attheSanFrancisco
Conferenceof1951,Sept.8,1951(originalChineseterritorieswhichwereseveredfrom[China],suchas
Taiwan(Formosa),thePescadores[PenghuIslands],theParacelIslandsandotherChineseterritories,shouldbe
returnedtotheChinesePeoplesRepublic.ThedraftcontainsonlyareferencetotherenunciationbyJapanofits
rightstotheseterritoriesbutintentionallyomitsanymentionofthefurtherfateoftheseterritories.).
646
WesternPowersFoilSovietAttemptToStallSanFranciscoConference,THEEVENINGCITIZEN(OTTAWA,CANADA),
Sept.8,1951.SeealsoH.Roque,note208supra,atp.193;T.Kelly,note133supra;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),
atp.3;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratly
99
Second,thefinaltextofArticle2oftheTreatytreatsJapansrenunciationofrightstoTaiwan
andthePenghuIslandsandtheSpratlyandParacelIslandsintwoseparatesubparagraphs.647
Thus,albeitnotspecificallystatedinthetext,JapanpresumablyrenounceditsrightstoTaiwan
and the Penghus in favor of China and its rights to the Spratlys and the Paracels in favor of
France.Finally,VietnamreaffirmeditsrightstotheSouthChinaSeaislandsduringtheseventh
plenary session of the Conference. On September 7, 1951, the head of the Vietnamese
delegationtotheConference,PrimeMinisterTranVanHuu,statedaswemustfranklyprofit
fromalltheopportunitiesofferedtoustostiflethegermsofdiscord,weaffirmourrighttothe
SpratlyandParacelIslands,whichhavealwaysbelongedtoVietnam.648Noneofthe51nations
representedattheConferenceobjectedtothisstatement.649
Granted, neither the PRC nor the ROC was invited to participate in the San Francisco
Peace Conference. Therefore, the PRC was not in a position to object to the Vietnamese
statement at the Conference. Nonetheless, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai did issue a lengthy
statementcriticizingtheU.S.UKdraftonAugust15,1951,andreiteratingChinasclaimstothe
SouthChinaSeaislands.650SothefactthatthePRCdidnotobjecttotheVietnamesestatement
attheConferenceisoflittleconsequence.
It should be noted, however, that in 1951 not all nations recognizeed the PRC as the
legitimate government of China. The lawful representative of China to the United Nations
between1945and1971wastheRepublicofChina(ROC).651TheROCjoinedtheUnitedNations
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.41and121.
647
Article2oftheTreatyofPeacewithJapan(Sept.8,1951)providesthat:
(a)JapanrecognizingtheindependenceofKorea,renouncesallright,titleandclaimtoKorea,includingtheislands
ofQuelpart,PortHamiltonandDagelet.
(b)Japanrenouncesallright,titleandclaimtoFormosaandthePescadores.
(c)Japanrenouncesallright,titleandclaimtotheKurileIslands,andtothatportionofSakhalinandtheislands
adjacenttoitoverwhichJapanacquiredsovereigntyasaconsequenceoftheTreatyofPortsmouthof5
September1905.
(d)Japanrenouncesallright,titleandclaiminconnectionwiththeLeagueofNationsMandateSystem,and
acceptstheactionoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilof2April1947,extendingthetrusteeshipsystemtothe
PacificIslandsformerlyundermandatetoJapan.
(e)JapanrenouncesallclaimtoanyrightortitletoorinterestinconnectionwithanypartoftheAntarcticarea,
whetherderivingfromtheactivitiesofJapanesenationalsorotherwise.
(f)Japanrenouncesallright,titleandclaimtotheSpratlyIslandsandtotheParacelIslands.
648
649
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atpp.8and14;seealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atpp.192193,201;T.
Kelly,note133supra;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;H.Nguyen,note204
supra,atp.187;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;
650
[TheParacelIslandsandSpratlyIslands]havealwaysbeenChinasterritory.WhetherornottheU.S.British
DraftTreatycontainsprovisionsonthissubjectandnomatterhowtheseprovisionsareworked,theinviolate
sovereigntyofthePeoplesRepublicofChinaoverNanweiIslands[SpratlyIslands]andHsishaIslands[Paracel
Islands]willnotbeinanywayaffected.ShenI,atp.50.SeealsoShenII,atpp.138,145146.
651
UNGARes.A/RES/26/2758(Oct.25,1971),RestorationofthelawfulrightsofthePeoplesRepublicofChinain
theUnitedNations.
100
in1945andretaineditsmembershipandseatontheSecurityCounciluntilOctober25,1971.
On that date, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, recognizing the
People'sRepublicofChinaastheonlylawfulrepresentativeofChinatotheUnitedNationsand
expellingtheRepublicofChinafromtheorganization.652Therefore,ZhouEnlaisstatementdid
notnecessarilyreflecttheChinesegovernmentsofficialpositiononthismatterandthereisno
evidencethattheROCpubliclyobjectedtoPrimeMinisterTransstatement.
Chinese scholars nevertheless argue that, despite Vietnams statement at the Peace
Conference, the fact that the 1951 Peace Treaty fails to identify whom the South China Sea
islandsshouldbereturnedisitselfarejectionofVietnamsclaims.653Asimilarargumenthas
been advanced by China regarding French claimsas one of the major powers at the Peace
Conference,FrancewouldnothaveallowedtheTreatytofailtospecificallymentionFrance
astherecipientoftheParacelsandSpratlys.654
Ofcourse,theseargumentsignorethefactthatArticle2oftheTreatyissilentonthe
postwar status of all the territories over which Japan renounced its rights. Moreover, as
mentionedabove,JapansrenunciationofrightstoTaiwanandthePenghu(Pescadores)Islands
ontheonehand,andtheSpratlyandParacelIslandsontheother,iscontainedintwoseparate
subparagraphsofArticle2ofthe1951Treaty.Hadthedraftersofthetreatyintendedtoreturn
the islands to only one nation, they would not have included them in two separate
subparagraphs.ThisbifurcationisalsoconsistentwiththeCairoDeclaration,whichspecifically
statesthatonlyManchuria,Formosa(Taiwan),andthePescadores(PenghuIslands)wouldbe
returned to China at the end of the war. Thus, as the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry correctly
pointsout,itisclearthateachsubparagraphinArticle2oftheTreatyisrelevanttotherightsof
oneparticularcountry:
subparagraph(b)therightsofChinatoFormosaandthePescadores;
subparagraph(c)therightsoftheSovietUniontotheKurileIslandsandaportion
ofSakhalin
subparagraph(d)thetrusteeshiprightsconferredupontheUnitedStates
652
UNGARes.A/RES/26/2758(Oct.25,1971),RestorationofthelawfulrightsofthePeoplesRepublicofChinain
theUnitedNations.
TheGeneralAssembly,
RecallingtheprinciplesoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations,
ConsideringthattherestorationofthelawfulrightsofthePeoplesRepublicofChinaisessentialbothforthe
protectionoftheCharteroftheUnitedNationsandforthecausethattheUnitedNationsmustserveunder
theCharter,
RecognizingthattherepresentativesoftheGovernmentofthePeoplesRepublicofChinaaretheonlylawful
representativesofChinatotheUnitedNationsandthatthePeoplesRepublicofChinaisoneofthefive
permanentmembersoftheSecurityCouncil,
DecidestorestoreallitsrightstothePeoplesRepublicofChinaandtorecognizetherepresentativesofits
GovernmentastheonlylegitimaterepresentativesofChinatotheUnitedNations,andtoexpelforthwiththe
representativesofChiangKaishekfromtheplacewhichtheyunlawfullyoccupyattheUnitedNationsandin
alltheorganizationsrelatedtoit.
653
ShenI,atpp.51,5859.
654
Id.,atp.58.SeealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atp.192.
101
subparagraph(f)therightsofFrance/VietnamtotheSpratlyandParacelIslands.655
VietnamspositionregardingArticle2oftheTreatyissupportedbystatementsmadein
1952duringadebateintheAssemblyoftheFrenchUnionregardingthemeaningofthePeace
TreatywithJapan.CommentingonthefailureoftheTreatytospecifytowhomtheSouthChina
Sea islands would be returned, the Rapporteur of the Foreign Relations CommitteeNguyen
Khac Sustated that these islands have long formed part of the territory of Vietnam. We
venture to hope that, in the future negotiations which cannot come too soon, their legal
restitution will be effected in a spirit of friendly understanding.656 Maurice Schumann,
Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, similarly stated that the Spratlys and
ParacelsformpartofthedominionoftheFrenchUnionandtheCounseloroftheAssembly,
BuuKinh,alsorecalledVietnamsrightstothearchipelagoes.657
TheabsenceofaspecificreferencetoFranceinthe1951Treatycanalsobeexplained
by the fact that there was a split within the alliance regarding French control over Indochina
after the war, which, in and of itself, is a recognition of French sovereignty over Indochina,
includingtheSouthChinaSeaislands.China,theSovietUnion,andtheUnitedStatesfavored
placing Indochina under a system of trusteeship, while Great Britain favored returning the
former French colony to France. The split was not, however, over the validity of French
sovereignty over Indochina, but rather over Frances collaboration with the Nazis and poor
Frenchadministrationofitsformercolony.658
President Roosevelts position can be traced to the Atlantic Charter, which espoused
supportfornationalselfdeterminationandindependence.659TheUnitedStatesmaintainedits
655
656
657
Id.,atp.42.Itshouldbenoted,however,thattheRapporteurfortheactofratificationoftheTreaty,Maurice
Faure,statedduringthedebatethatheconsideredthattheislandshadbecometerranullius.Thisstatement,
however,isclearlyinconsistentwithFrenchstatementsandactsinboththeParacelsandSpratlysduringthe1950s
discussedbelow.Id.
658
AttheTehranConferencein1943,MarshalStalinindicatedthatFranceshouldnotgetbackIndoChinaand
thattheFrenchmustpayfortheircriminalcollaborationwithGermany.PresidentRooseveltsaidhewas100%in
agreementwithMarshalStalin,thatafter100yearsofFrenchruleinIndoChina,theinhabitantswereworseoff
thantheyhadbeenbeforeandthathehaddiscussedwithChiangKaiShekthepossibilityofasystemof
trusteeshipforIndoChina.MemorandumofConversationbetweenPresidentRooseveltandMarshalStalin,Nov.
28,1943,THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITEDSTATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(19451967),PartV.B.1.,atpp.2425,availableat
http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagonpapers/.TheBritishwereopposedtotheideaofatrusteeship
becausetheyfearedtheeffectitwouldhaveontheirownpossessionsandthoseoftheDutch.TheBritishhave
neverlikedtheideaoftrusteeshipbecauseitisaimedatfutureindependence.MemorandumbyPresident
RoosevelttotheSecretaryofState,Jan.24,1944,THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITEDSTATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(1945
1967),PartV.B.1.,atp.30,availableathttp://www.archives.gov/research/pentagonpapers/.AttheYalta
ConferenceinFebruary1945,PresidentRooseveltsaidhehadinmindatrusteeshipforIndochina.Headded
thattheBritishdidnotapproveofthisideaastheywishedtogiveitbacktotheFrenchsincetheyfearedthe
implicationsofatrusteeshipasitmightaffectBurma.MemorandumofConversationbetweenPresidentRoosevelt
andMarshalStalin,Feb.8,1945,THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITEDSTATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(19451967),PartV.B.1.,at
p.59,availableathttp://www.archives.gov/research/pentagonpapers/.
659
ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesandthePrimeMinister[of]theUnitedKingdomdeemitrighttomake
knowncertaincommonprinciplesinthenationalpoliciesoftheirrespectivecountries.Second,theydesiretosee
noterritorialchangesthatdonotaccordwiththefreelyexpressedwishesofthepeoplesconcerned.Third,they
102
position of ambivalence towards Indochina until shortly before the death of President
RooseveltonApril12,1945.660OnApril3rdofthatyear,SecretaryofStateStettiniusreleaseda
statementregardingtheproposaltoestablishtheUnitedNationsthat,interalia,addressedthe
issueofterritorialtrusteeship:
Astoterritorialtrusteeship,itappeareddesirablethattheGovernmentsrepresentedat
Yalta, in consultation with the Chinese Government and the French Provisional
Government, should endeavor to formulate proposals for submission to the San
FranciscoconferenceforatrusteeshipstructureasapartofthegeneralOrganization.
Thistrusteeshipstructure,itwasfelt,shouldbedesignedtopermittheplacingunderit
of the territories mandated after the last war, and such territories taken from the
enemy in this war as might be agreed upon at a later date, and also such other
territories as might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship. No discussion was had at
Yaltaoriscontemplatedpriorto,orat,SanFranciscoregardingspecificterritories.661
The following day, Secretary Stettinius informed French Ambassador Bonnet that the United
States would provide assistance to French Forces in IndoChinato undertake operations
against the Japanese in IndoChina, provided such action does not interfere with operations
planned elsewhere.662 Thereafter, the issue of trusteeship status for Indochina became a
matterfortheFrenchtodecide.
This policy continued under the Truman administration. In June 1945, the U.S.
AmbassadortoChinawasinformedthattheestablishmentofatrusteeshipinIndochinawould
not occur without the consent of the French government.663 Three months later, the French
overthrewthegovernmentoftheDemocraticRepublicofVietnam,establishedbyHoChiMinh
on the 2nd of September, and declared that French authority had been restored in
respecttherightofallpeoplestochoosetheformofgovernmentunderwhichtheywilllive;andtheywishtosee
sovereignrightsandselfgovernmentrestoredtothosewhohavebeenforciblydeprivedofthem.Atlantic
Charter,Aug.14,1941,availableathttp://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp.
660
SeeMemorandumbyPresidentRoosevelttotheSecretaryofState,Aug.28,1944,THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITED
STATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(19451967),PartV.B.1.,atp.35;MemorandumbyPresidentRoosevelttotheSecretaryof
State,Oct.16,1944,THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITEDSTATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(19451967),PartV.B.1.,atp.37;
MemorandumbyPresidentRoosevelttotheUnderSecretaryofState,Nov.3,1944,THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITED
STATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(19451967),PartV.B.1.,atp.40;ExtractfromUnderSecretaryofStateStettiniusDiary,
Jan.1,1945,THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITEDSTATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(19451967),PartV.B.1.,atp.45;Memorandum
fortheSecretaryofState,Mar.17,1945,THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITEDSTATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(19451967),Part
V.B.1.,atp.30,availableathttp://www.archives.gov/research/pentagonpapers/.
661
StatementbySecretaryofStateStettiniusonRepresentationintheAssemblyoftheProposedUnitedNations
Organization,U.S.STATEDEPT.BULLETIN,Apr.3,1945,availableat
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450403a.html.
662
NotefromtheSecretaryofStatetotheFrenchAmbassador(Bonnet),Apr.4,1945,THEPENTAGONPAPERS,UNITED
STATESVIETNAMRELATIONS(19451967),PartV.B.1.,atp.72,availableat
663
THEPENTAGONPAPERS,VIETNAMANDTHEUNITEDSTATES(19401950),Vol.I,atp.A21,availableat
103
Cochinchina.664 The following month (October 1945), the United States issued its policy
regardingIndochina:
UShasnothoughtofopposingthereestablishmentofFrenchcontrolinIndochinaand
no official statement by US GOVT has questioned even by implication French
sovereignty over Indochina. However, it is not the policy of this GOVT to assist the
FrenchtoreestablishtheircontroloverIndochinabyforceandthewillingnessoftheUS
to see French control reestablished assumes that Frenchclaim to have the support of
thepopulationofIndochinaisborneoutbyfutureevents.665
h. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Conference

China additionally relies on actions taken at the first ICAO Conference on AsiaPacific
RegionalAviationheldinManilainOctober1955tosupportitsclaimstotheSouthChinaSea
islands.666TheConferenceunanimouslyadoptedResolutionNo.24,askingTaiwantoimprove
meteorological observation on the Spratly Islands four times a day.667 According to Chinese
sources,noneofthedelegationspresentattheconference,includingSouthVietnam,objected
totheresolution.
The significance of the ICAO resolution is minimal, at best, and is not international
recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. Clearly, Taiwan was in the best
position geographically and physically to perform the increased meteorological observations
because it occupied both the Pratas Island and Itu Aba Island (albeit illegally) and had
constructedaweatherstationonItuAbain1946.Thatisnottosay,however,thatICAOorits
memberstatesrecognizedTaiwanesesovereigntyovertheseislands.
i. North Vietnamese Indifference

ChinaalsoshouldnotrelyonstatementsandactivitiesbyNorthVietnameseofficialsin
themid1950sandearly1960stosupportitsclaimovertheSouthChinaSeaislands.First,there
isnoindependentevidencetocorroborateChinasassertionthattheNorthVietnameseDeputy
MinisterofForeignAffairsandtheDeputyDirectoroftheAsiaDivisionoftheForeignMinistry
acknowledged at a meeting with Chinese officials in June 1956 that the Spratly and Paracel
IslandswerehistoricallypartofChina.Theallegedstatements,therefore,cannotbeviewedas
legallyvalidpronouncements.668Noristhereevidencethattheseofficialshadtheauthorityto
makesuchapronouncement.AsVietnamesescholarspointout,adeputyforeignministerand
otherlowerrankinggovernmentofficialsgenerallydonothavetheauthoritytorepresenta
Stateinsuchmatters.669Therefore,assumingthatthestatementsweremadeasalleged,they
664
Id.,atp.A22.
665
Id.,atp.A23.
666
Othernationsattendingincluded:Australia,Canada,Chile,Dominica,France,Laos,Japan,NewZealand,the
Philippines,theRepublicofKorea,Thailand,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates.MFA,TheIssueofSouth
ChinaSea.
667
Id.
668
669
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.5;seealsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.190(UngVanKheims
statement,ifithadexisted,wasnotmadeinthecontextofterritorialnegotiations.).
104
would not be legally binding on the government of Vietnam. Nonetheless, given that South
Vietnam (not North Vietnam) was the successor state to Frances title to the Paracels and
Spratlys, no statement made by[North Vietnam] can be said to have been made in the
contextofadisputeornegotiationoverthesearchipelagoesbetweenitandChina.670
Second, Prime Minister Pham Van Dongs letter to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai
concerningChinasterritorialseadeclarationinSeptember1958simplyexpressessupportfor
Chinas 12 nm territorial sea extensionit does not recognize Chinese sovereignty over the
Paracel and Spratly Islands.671 Moreover, even if viewed as a renunciation of rights to the
islands,SouthVietnam(asthesuccessorstatetoFrance),notNorthVietnam,wasincontrolof
theParacelandSpratlyIslandsin1958.TheGenevaAccordsof1954dividedNorthandSouth
Vietnamatthe17thparallelpendingreunificationthroughfreeelectionstobeheldbyJuly20,
1956.672 Both the Paracels (1630'N11200'E) and the Spratlys (10N114E) lie south of the
17thparallel;therefore,bothwereunderSouthVietnameseadministration.673Asaresult,North
Vietnam neither had de jure title nor exercised de facto sovereignty over the Paracels and
Spratlysandwasnotinapositiontorelinquishtheterritory.674In short,NorthVietnamhad
nothingtorenounce.675
AnyNorthVietnameseexpressionofsupportforChinamustalsotakeintoconsideration
thepoliticalrealitiesofthe1950s.676FollowingthedivisionofVietnamin1954,NorthVietnam
reliedalmostexclusivelyonChinaformaterialandpoliticalsupportinitswaragainsttheSouth.
It would have been problematic, at best, for North Vietnam not to express support for its
Communistally,whichwasatthetimefacingitsownmilitarythreatfromU.S.navalactivitiesin
theTaiwanStrait.677ThesamecanbesaidforthestatementissuedbyNorthVietnaminMay
670
Id.
671
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atpp.190,193;accordM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.129130
(DongsdeclarationconfinesitselfstrictlytorecognitionofthebreadthoftheChineseterritorialsea.Soitis
incorrecttoassertthatVietnamhadalsoreaffirmeditsrecognitionofChinasclaimstothearchipelagoes.).
672
AgreementontheCessationofHostilitiesinVietnam,July20,1954[hereinafterTheGenevaAccords],available
athttp://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/inch001.asp.
673
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.191;accordM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.127128(The
territorialpartitionatthe17thparallelplacedbotharchipelagoesinSouthVietnamszone.Itwasthereforeforthe
Saigonadministration,theSaigonadministrationalone,tovoiceitsclaimstotheislands.Itdidsoasthesuccessor
totheformerrightsofFranceoverthetwoarchipelagoes.).
674
Id.
675
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.191;accordSOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.6;M.ChemillierGendreau,
note15supra,atp.130(anydeclarations,statementsorpronouncementsbytheNorthVietnameseauthorities
hadnobearingonthetitleofsovereignty.Thiswasnotthegovernmentwithterritorialjurisdictionoverthe
archipelagos.Onecannotabandonsomethingonehasnoauthorityover.).
676
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.130(thiswasagovernmententirelyinthehandsofitsallies,
engagedasitwasinanalloutstruggleagainstAmericanmight.Thefactthat,forthecommonmilitarycause,one
partyoranothermadeuseofneighbouringterritories,friendlyterritoriesorterritorieswhichwerequitesimply
unabletoputupanyopposition,isanexampleofthesortofprovisionalterritorialarrangementsfoundinother
warsituations.Internationallawcannotdrawanyconclusionsfromthisasregardscontinuityofthelegaltitle.).
677
OnAugust24,1958,afterChineseCommunistsbeganheavyshellingoftheKinmenIslandsandtherewere
renewedindicationsofnavalactivityinTaiwanStraits,unitsoftheSeventhFleetmovedtotheTaiwanareato
supporttheRepublicofChinainafirmstandagainstaggression.Astensionremainedhighandwarlikeaction
continued,shipreinforcements,includingaircraftcarriers,weresenttothearea.ByOctoberthetensionlessened
andthesituationbecamesomewhatstabilized.TheNewNavy(19541959),NavalHistoryandHeritage
105
1965regardingtheU.S.declaredwarzoneforVietnamanditsadjacentwaters,andtheMay
1969 news story in the Vietnamese daily Nhan Dan, both of which purportedly recognized
ChinesesovereigntyovertheParacels.
In 1988, the Vietnamese government acknowledged the existence of Phams letter to
Zhou,buttheMFAexplainedthehistoricalcontextinwhichthestatementsweremade:
thenationwasembroiledinadesperatewarforsurvivalwhenthestatementswere
made; therefore what appeared to be a concession of the Truong Sa to the PRC was
actuallyjustastrategicmovetodenytheUnitedStatesuseofthearchipelagoandthe
East Sea. Hanoi believed that any PRC sovereignty over the Truong Sa would be
temporary: Viet Nam trusted China in all sincerity and believed that after the war all
territorialproblems[betweenthetwocountries]wouldbesuitablyresolved....678
Therefore, when Pham wrote the letter in 1958, Vietnam did not intend to permanently
relinquishitsclaimstotheParacels.
Nevertheless,ChinaarguesthattheprincipleofestoppelprecludesVietnamfromtaking
apositioncontrarytoitsearlierstanceregardingChinesesovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSea
islands.Althoughestoppelisawellsettledprincipleofinternationallawthathasbeenapplied
by the ICJ to resolve a number of territorial disputes, a careful analysis of the Courts
applicationofthisprincipletothefactsofthecurrentdisputedoesnotsupportChinasposition
withregardtoVietnam.
TheICJhasappliedestoppelinlimitedcaseswhere(1)aclearandconsistentstatement,
declaration,orrepresentation(orpastconduct)madebyonepartytoanotheris(2)reliedupon
by the other party to its detriment or to the advantage of the party making the statement,
etc.679Chinahasnotprovidedsufficientevidencetosatisfyeitheroftheseelements.680
Command,p.223,http://www.history.navy.mil/avh1910/PART08.PDF.SeealsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.
194.
678
679
CaseconcerningtheTempleofPreahVihear(Cambodiav.Thailand),I.C.J.Reports1962,p.6,32(Evenifthere
wereanydoubtastoSiamsacceptanceofthemapin1908,theCourtwouldconsiderthatThailandisnow
precludedbyherconductfromassertingthatshedidnotacceptit.France,andthroughherCambodia,reliedon
Thailandsacceptanceofthemap.itisimmaterialwhetherornotthisreliancewasbasedonabeliefthatthe
mapwascorrect.ItisnotnowopentoThailandtodenythatshewaseveraconsentingpartytoit.);NorthSea
ContinentalShelf,I.C.J.Reports1969,p.3,26(itappearstotheCourtthatonlytheexistenceofasituationof
estoppelcouldsufficetolendsubstancetothiscontentionthatistosayiftheFederalRepublicwerenow
precludedfromdenyingtheapplicabilityoftheconventionalregime,byreasonofpastconduct,declaration,etc.,
whichnotonlyclearlyandconsistentlyevincedacceptanceofthatregime,butalsohadcausedDenmarkorthe
Netherlands,inrelianceofsuchconduct,detrimentallytochangepositionorsuffersomeprejudice.);Military
andParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStatesofAmerica)I.C.J.Reports1984,p.
392,415(estoppelmaybeinferredfromtheconduct,declarationsandthelikemadebyaStatewhichisnot
onlyclearlyandconsistentlyevincedacceptancebythatStateofaparticularregime,butalsohadcausedanother
StateorStates,inrelianceonsuchconduct,detrimentallytochangepositionorsuffersomeprejudice.);Land,
IslandandMaritimeFrontierDispute(ElSalvador/Honduras),I.C.J.Reports1990,p.92,118(SofarasNicaragua
reliesonestoppel,theChamberwillonlysaythatitseesnoevidenceofsomeessentialelementsrequiredby
estoppel:astatementorrepresentationmadebyonepartytoanotherandrelianceuponitbythatotherpartyto
hisdetrimentortotheadvantageofthepartymakingit.)
106
To begin, Prime Minister Phams letter to PremierZhou expressed support for Chinas
12nmterritorialseaextension,notChinesesovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislands,and
indicatedthatVietnamwouldrespectthebreadthofChinasterritorialseaasbeing12nm.The
letter, unquestionably, does not represent a clear and consistent recognition of Chinese
sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and therefore fails to meet the first element of
estoppel.Thesameistrueforthestatementspurportedlymadeduringthe1960s.Moreover,
thereisnoevidencethatChinareliedonanyofthesestatementstoitsdetrimentsince1949,
thePRChascontinuedtoassertChinasindisputablesovereigntyoveralloftheSouthChinaSea
islandsandhasprotestedortakenactionagainsteachandeveryforeignclaimtoandinvasion
ofthe South China Sea Islands.681 Accordingly, estoppel does not apply to the current
dispute.
Similarly, it is highly unlikely that the ICJ or other tribunal would find that the
Vietnamesegovernmentsstatementin1965regardingtheU.S.declaredwarzoneforVietnam
anditsadjacentwaterswarrantsapplicationoftheprincipleofestoppel.Inasimilarsituation
involvingSingaporeandMalaysia,theICJheldthatestoppeldidnotapplyeventhoughoneof
thepartiestothedisputehadspecificallystatedthatitdidnotclaimownershipoveradisputed
rock.682
ThePedraBranca(Malaysia/Singapore)caseinvolvedadisputebetweenMalaysiaand
SingaporeregardingsovereigntyoverPedraBranca/PulauBatuPuteh,MiddleRocksandSouth
Ledge. On June 12, 1953, the Colonial Secretary of Singapore wrote a letter to the British
Advisor to the Sultan of Johor requesting information about Pedra Branca, which is situated
about40milesfromSingapore,inordertodeterminetheboundariesofSingaporesterritorial
waters.Specifically,theColonialSecretarysaid,
ItisnowdesiredtoclarifythestatusofPedraBranca.Iwouldthereforebemostgrateful
toknowwhetherthereisanydocumentshowingaleaseorgrantoftherockorwhether
it has been ceded by the Government of the State of Johore or in any other way
disposedof.683
TheletterwaspassedtotheStateSecretaryofJohorandthreemonthslater,onSeptember21,
1953, the Acting State Secretary of Johor replied: I have the honour to refer to your
letterdated 12th June 1953, on the question of the status of Pedra Branca Rockand to
inform you that the Johore Government does not claim ownership of Pedra Branca.684 No
furthercorrespondencewasexchangedbetweenthepartiesandSingaporeanauthoritiestook
nopublicactionuponreceiptoftheletter.
680
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.6;accordH.Nguyen,note204supra,atpp.194195.
681
ShenII,atpp.145152.
682
SovereigntyoverPedraBranca/PulauBatuPuteh,MiddleRocksandSouthLedge(Malaysia/Singapore),I.C.J.
Reports2008,p.12.
683
Id.,atp.73.
684
Id.,atp.74.
107
First,SingaporearguedthatJohorsreplywasaformalorexpressdisclaimeroftitle;
second,Singaporeinvokedtheprincipleofestoppel;andthird,Singaporecontendedthatthe
replywasabindingunilateralundertaking.685
Withregardtothefirstissue,theCourtheldthatitdidnotconsidertheJohorreplyas
having a constitutive character in the sense that it had a conclusive legal effect on Johor.686
Rather, the Court found that the reply was simply a response to an enquiry seeking
information and that its denial of ownership was made in that context.687 Similarly,
regarding Singapores position that the reply was a binding unilateral undertaking, the Court
indicated that when it is claimed that States make statements by which their freedom of
action is tobe limited,a restrictive interpretation is calledfor.688 The Court thenobserved
thatthereplywasnotmadeinresponsetoaclaimbySingaporeorinthecontextofadispute
between them and that, therefore, the denial of ownership could not be interpreted as a
bindingundertaking.689ThesameanalysiswouldapplytoVietnamsstatementaboutthe1965
warzone.
Finally,withregardtotheapplicationofestoppel,theCourtpointedoutthataparty
relyingonanestoppelmustshow,amongotherthings,thatithastakendistinctactsinreliance
ontheotherpartysstatementandthatSingaporehadnotpointedtoanysuchacts.690On
thecontrary,afterreceivingthereply,Singaporehadnoreasontochangeitsbehaviorand
itsactionsafter1953wereacontinuationanddevelopmentoftheactionsithadtakenover
thepreviouscentury.691Therefore,estoppeldidnotapply.Similarly,thereisnoevidencethat
China has relied on the Vietnamese statement or changed its behavior with regard to its
sovereigntyclaimsintheSouthChinaSea.LikeSingapore,ChinasactionsaftertheVietnamese
statementsweremadesimplyconstituteacontinuationofactionsithadtakensincethe1940s.
Consequently,estoppeldoesnotapply.
j. Other Supporting Publications

Chinaadditionallycitesanumberofforeignpublicationstosupportitspositionthatthe
internationalcommunityrecognizesthePRCsclaimstotheSouthChinaSeaislands.Although
the list is extensive, none of the cited documents reflect official government recognition of
Chinas claims; therefore, they are of little probative value in assessing Chinas claimed
sovereigntyoverthedisputedislands.
B. Evaluating Vietnams Position

Vietnam believes that the broad range of actions taken by Vietnamese and French
authorities over several hundred years provides incontrovertible evidence of Vietnams
comprehensive, continuous, peaceful and uncontested effective control of the Paracels.
AccordingtotheMFA,Vietnamesesovereigntywasfirstestablishedbetweenthe15thand18th
685
Id.,atp.81.
686
Id.
687
Id.,atpp.8182.
688
Id.,atp.82.
689
Id.
690
Id.,atp.81.
691
Id.
108
centuries;consecratedbyEmperorsGiaLongandMinhMinginthe19thcentury;temporarily
assumed by the French during the second half of the 19th century and first half of the 20th
century; and finally continued in an open, peaceful and normal manner by an independent
Vietnam.Theseactionsinclude,interalia,(1)approvinginternationalcontractsconnectedwith
theislandseconomy;(2)conductinglawenforcementoperationsagainstillegalChinesealiens
and illicit trafficking in weapons and opium; (3) conducting systematic exploitation of the
islands natural resources; (4) providing guarantees to other states; (5) stationing troops and
civiliangovernmentofficialsontheislands;(6)protestingChineseandJapaneseincursions;(7)
buildingshrinesandtemples;(8)collectingtaxrevenues;(9)organizingandconductingstate
sponsored surveys and scientific studies of the islands; (10) organizing and conducting
hydrographicsurveysofthesearoutesandplantingoftreesontheislandstoenhancesafetyof
navigation;(11)providingassistancetoforeignshipsindistress;and(12)securingthesealanes
formaritimetraffic.
VietnamassertsthatFrance,onbehalfofVietnam,alsoconductedvariousactivitiesthat
confirmed French sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, particularly in 1933 when France
formallyannexedandoccupiedanumberoffeaturesinthearchipelagoonbehalfofVietnam.
At the time, Frances annexation of the islands was strictly in compliance with existing
international law and state practice. Although Japan successfully challenged Frances
occupation between 1941 and 1945, Japan was forced to relinquish her claims to the South
China Sea islands following the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference and sovereignty of the
islands reverted back to France. Thereafter, French and Vietnamese actions, both before and
afterthewar,clearlydemonstrateaneffectiveandactivepresenceinthearchipelago,aswell
asapeacefulexerciseofsovereigntyovertheSpratlyIslands.
1. Historical Evidence and Maps

Vietnam bases its claims to the Paracels and Spratlys, in part, on a series of historical
documents and maps dating back to the 15th century. China counters Vietnams assertions,
noting that the Paracel Islands described in Vietnamese historical records do not include the
Spratlys and are in reality coastal islands off Central Vietnam.692 Similarly, some Western
scholarsbelievethatVietnamshistoricalclaims,likeChina's,aresomewhatvague,andthereis
somedoubtastotheauthenticityandaccuracyofitshistoricalrecordsandmapsinthatthey
failtospecificallyidentifyanddistinguishbetweentheSpratlyandParacelarchipelagoes.693
Nevertheless, there is some independent evidence from nonVietnamese sources that
supports Vietnams assertion that the government has been sending ships and men to the
Paracels on a regular basis as far back as the early 17th century. Portuguese and Dutch maps
fromtheearly17thcenturypurportedlyidentifytheParacelsasVietnameseterritory.694These
mapsareconsistentwiththe1701writingsofaWesternmissionaryonboardtheFrenchship
Amphitrite(MysteredesatollsJournaldevoyageauxParacels(MysteryoftheatollsJournalof
thevoyagetotheParacelIslands)),whichreflectthattheParacelsbelongedtotheKingdomof
692
M.Bennett,note14supra,atp.434;seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra.
693
C.Joyner,note166supra,atpp.6061.AsisthecasewithChinascartographicevidence,Vietnamesehistoric
mapscarryverylittleprobativeweightindeterminingthestatusoftheSouthChinaSeaisland
694
109
Annam.695 Even Chinese writings (Hai Lus Hai Quoc Do Chi) of the same era (1730) confirm
Vietnamese sovereignty over the Paracels.696 Additionally, a Chinese map of Kwangtung
(Guangdong)ProvinceandadescriptionoftheQuiongzhouPrefecturepublishedin1731donot
mentioneithertheParacelsortheSpratlysaspartofChina.697
Western writings from the 19th century likewise support Vietnams historical claims to
theParacelsbasedonoccupationandcontrol.Abookpublishedin1837byFrenchmissionary
Monseigneur JeanLouis TaberdNote on the Geography of Cochinchinadescribed the
Paracel Islands as part of Cochinchina.698 A second book published by the Monseigneur in
1838History and Description of the Religion, Customs, and Morals of All Peoplessimilarly
recorded that the archipelago had been a dependency of Cochinchina for 34 years.699 A
depictionoftheParacelsasVietnameseterritoryadditionallyappearsinTaberds1838AnNam
DaiQuocHoaDo(TabulageographicaimperiaAnamiticiTheMapoftheAnnamEmpire).700
JeanBaptiste Chaigneaus memoires (Memoires sur la Cochinchina) likewise refer to
Emperor Gia Longs annexation of the Paracels in 1816.701 A reference to the Paracels as
Vietnamese territory can also be found in Japon, IndoChine, Empire Birman (ou Ava), Siam,
Annam (ou Cochinchine), Pninsule Malaise, etc., Ceylan by the French explorer and author
Adolphe Philibert Dubois de Jancigny.702 Additionally, in his 1849 article Geography of the
Cochinchinese Empire, German missionary Karl Gtzlaff defined the Paracels as part of
VietnamsterritoryandnotedtheislandswiththeVietnamesenameCatVang.703Thearticle
discusses Vietnamese economic development of the archipelago, as well as the presence of
Vietnamese revenue cutters and a small naval garrison in the Paracels to collect duties from
foreign fishermen and protect Vietnamese fishermen.704 Aldriano Balbis The Italian
Compendium of Geography (1850) similarly includes the Paracel, Pirate (H Tin), and Puolo
695
HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyovertheParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;seealso
NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper(theParacelisanarchipelagobelongingtotheKingdomofAn
Nam.).
696
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.74(TruongSaformsarampartontheperipheryofthe
KingdomofAnnam(Vietnam).).
697
Id.,atp.62.
698
699
700
701
Cochinchina,thesovereignofwhichhastodaythetitleofEmperor,iscomposedofCochinchinaproper,
Tonquin,apartoftheKingdomofCambodia,someuninhabitedislandsnotfarfromthecoastandtheParacels
archipelago,composedofuninhabitedreefsandrocks.Itisonlyin1816thatthepresentEmperortookpossession
ofthisarchipelago.H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.7;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,at
p.69.
702
703
704
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.182(WeshouldmentionheretheParacels.Fromtimeimmemorial,junks
inlargenumberfromHainan,haveannuallyvisitedtheseshoals,andproceededintheirexcursionsasfarasthe
coastofBorneo.TheAnnamgovernment,perceivingtheadvantageswhichitmightderiveifatollwereraised,
keepsrevenuecuttersandasmallgarrisononthespottocollectthedutyonallvisitors,andtoensureprotection
ofitsownfishermen.).
110
Condor (Cn Sn) Islands within the Kingdom of Annam.705 A Chinesemap from 1894Hong
ChaosMapoftheUnifiedEmpirewhichdepictsChineseterritoryasextendingonlyasfaras
HainanIsland,confirmstheaccuracyoftheseWesternwritings.
A letter from Chief Resident of Annam Le Fol to the Governor General of Indochina,
datedJanuary22,1929,confirmsthatVietnameffectivelyoccupiedtheParacelsfromtheearly
18thcenturyonwardsandprovidesdetailedinformationabouttheadministrationoftheislands
byformerVietnamesedynastiesfromtheearlyyearsofthe19thcenturyonwards.706Chinese
writings from the early 20th century confirm the Chief Residents information. The 1906
ZhongguoDilixueJiaokeshu(ManualofGeographyofChina),statesintheGeneralitieschapter
thattheChineseterritoryisboundintheSouthatNorthlatitude1813',theterminusbeing
thecoastofYazhou,islandofHainan.707AsimilarreportisfoundinLiHanzhungsGeography
of Guandong, published in 1909, which indicates that Chinas maritime frontiers in the south
endedatHainanIsland.708
Thus, while the historical evidence submitted by both claimants is subject to doubt,
independentsourcesappeartocorroborateVietnamspositionoverthatofChina,particularly
withregardtotheParacels.
ThereisalsoconsiderablecorroboratedevidencethatVietnamsystematicallyexploited
the Paracels since at least the middle of the 17th century, if not earlier. The exploits of the
HoangSaCompany,underthedirectionofvariousVietnamesedynasties,arewelldocumented
in the historical works of Le Qui Don (Phu Bien Tap Luc (Miscellaneous Records on the
Pacification of the Frontiers), a representative of the Chinese Court in Vietnam.709 Items
recoveredfromshipwrecksduringtheannualgovernmentsponsoredexpeditionswerehanded
overtogovernmentofficialsforassessmentattheconclusionofeachexpedition.Membersof
theCompanywereexemptfrompayingpersonaltaxesandwererewardedmonetarilybythe
government for their efforts.710 These expeditions were conducted openly and peacefully for
over150yearswithoutChineseobjection.
AbookwrittenbyJohnBarrowin1806AVoyagetoCochinchinawhichrecordedthe
travelsoftheBritishEnvoytotheChineseCourt(CountGeorgeMacartney)inCochinchinain
1793, confirms that Vietnam was economically exploiting the Paracels. The book contains a
detaileddescriptionoftheeffortsoftheHoangSadetachments.711
705
706
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex8(Letterof22January1929,fromtheChiefResidentof
Annam,Hu,totheGovernorGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi)(TheParacelarchipelagoseemstohaveremained
resnulliusuntilthebeginningofthelastcentury.MonsignorJeanLouisTaberdreportstheoccupationofthe
Paracelsin1816byEmperorGiaLong.Althoughdoubtsmaybecastontheauthenticityoftheformaltakingof
possessionbyGiaLonghimself,theoccupationwasnonethelesseffective.).
707
Id.,atp.75.
708
H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.172(TodaythemaritimefrontiersarelimitedintheSouthbytheislandof
Hainan.).
709
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex8(Letterof22January1929,fromtheChiefResidentof
Annam,Hu,totheGovernorGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi).
710
Id.,atpp.67,69.
711
111
EconomicexploitationoftheSouthChinaSeaislandscontinuedunderFrenchruleafter
VietnambecameapartoftheFrenchEmpirein1887.FrenchauthoritiesinIndochinagranted
licensesfortheexploitationofphosphatedepositsinboththeParacelsandtheSpratlysinthe
1920sand1930s.AfterVietnamregaineditsindependence,licensesweregrantedbytheSouth
Vietnamese Ministry of Economy to both domestic and international companies to exploit
phosphatedepositsintheParacelsLeVanCang(1956),712VietnamFertilizersCompany(1959
1963),713 Vietnam Phosphate Company (1960),714 and the Vietnam Fertilizer Company and
MarubeniCorporationofTokyojointventure(1973).715
Followingtheunificationofthecountryin197576,thenewgovernmententeredinto
cooperativeagreementswithanumberofcountries,includingJapan(July1978)andtheSoviet
Union(July1980),toexploreandexploithydrocarbonreservesinandaroundtheSpratlys.716
3. Effective Occupation and Administration

Vietnamhasadditionallypresentedconvincingevidencethatiteffectivelyoccupiedand
administeredtheParacels,beginningin1802andculminatingintheformalannexationofthe
archipelago by Emperor Gia Long in 1816.717 In 1946, legal experts from the French Foreign
Ministry determined that this annexation and flagraising ceremony were carried out in
conformitywiththeinternationallawofthetimeandthattheannexationthereforeconferred
legaltitletoAnnam.718
The 1816 annexation and flagplanting ceremony are recorded in Reverend JeanLouis
Taberds 1837 Note on the Geography of Cochinchina (printed in the Journal of the Royal
Asiatic Society of Bengal, India).719 A similar report is contained in JeanBaptiste Chaigneaus
Notice sur la Cochinchine.720 The first map published by the kingdom, in 1830, included the
Paracels(andpresumablyincludedtheSpratlys)aspartofVietnameseterritory.721Searchand
rescue services were also provided to foreign ships that wrecked near the Paracels (e.g., a
Frenchmerchantshipin1830andaBritishmerchantvesselin1836).722
In 1833, Emperor Minh Mang reinforced Vietnams sovereignty and administrative
control of the Paracels by ordering the planting of trees on the islands to enhance safety of
navigation in the hazardous waters around the archipelago.723 A mapping expedition of the
712
Id.;seealsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.188.
713
714
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoHistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratly
Islands,note203supra.
715
Id.;seealsoSOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3.
716
ShenI,atpp.5556.
717
H.Roque,note208supra,atp.192;seealsoB.Dubner,note29supra,atp.311;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42
supra,atp.7;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.35.
718
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex38(NotesfromtheLegalDepartment,Paris,6September
1946).
719
Id.
720
Id.,atp.69.
721
722
EarlyevidenceofVietnamesesearchandrescueeffortsintheislandsdatesbackto1634(assistanceprovidedto
theDutchshipGootebrok)and1714(assistanceprovidedtothreeDutchvessels).H.Nguyen,note204supra,at
pp.182183.
723
112
islandswasconductedthefollowingyearbyanavaldetachmentand,in1835,navalpersonnel
weredeployedtotheParacelstobuildatempleonBachSa(whitesand)Island.724Additionally,
a plan to systematically survey and explore the islands was completed in 1836.725 That same
year,EmperorMinhdispatchedanavaldetachmenttoexploreandmaptheentirearchipelago
anderectsovereigntymarkersonseveraloftheislands.726Datacollectedduringthisexpedition
were used to draw the Detailed Map of the Dai Nam (1838), which clearly reflected that the
ParacelsandSpratlyswerepartofVietnam.727Thereafter,anavaldetachmentwasdeployedto
theParacelseachspringtoimproveknowledgeofthesearoutesaroundthearchipelagoandto
collecttaxesonfishermenexploitingtheregion.728Reportswerealsoperiodicallypreparedby
theMinistryoftheInteriordescribingtheexpendituresandexploitationactivitiesoftheHoang
SaCompanyintheParacels.729
TheseactsofsovereigntybysuccessiveNguyenemperorswereconductedopenlyand
peacefully, without objection by China.730 Therefore, not only did China fail to exercise
sovereignty over the archipelago, but, by its silence, it acquiesced in Vietnams claim to the
islands.
a. Effective Administration During the French Colonial Period

Effective occupation and control over the South China Sea islands continued under
French colonial rule until Vietnam regained its independence after World War II. An 1898
memorandum from the Ministry of the Colonies to the Government General of Indochina
discussedthebuildingofalighthouseintheParacelsinordertoassertFrenchsovereignty.731
Scientificstudiesoftheislandswereconducted,andFrenchwarshipsweretaskedwithsecuring
the sea lanes for maritime traffic and conducting search and rescue operations for wrecked
ships.732By1920,FrenchcustomsofficialsinIndochinahadbegunmakingregulardeployments
totheislandstocounterillegaltraffickinginweapons,munitions,andopium.733
French activities in the Paracel Islands continued unabated and unchallenged
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. French colonial institutions conducted a series of scientific
missionstotheislandsbeginningin1925,whenscientistsfromtheOceanographicInstituteof
Nha Trang, embarked on the French vessel De Lanessan, confirmed the existence of rich
phosphate deposits in the archipelago.734 Subsequent scientific survey missions were
conducted by the French ships Alerte, Astrobale, and IngnieurenChef Girod in 1927, 1928,
724
Id.
725
Id.,atp.69.
726
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoHistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyovertheParacelandSpratly
Islands,note203supra;seealsoNATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
727
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.7;T.Kelly,note133supra.CompareB.Dubner,note29supra,atp.
311.
728
729
Id.,atp.69.
730
Id.,atp.74.
731
Id.,atp.104.
732
733
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atpp.78;T.Kelly,note133supra;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,
atpp.37,101,104.
734
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.37,104.
113
and 1934.735 In 1929, the Pierre de Rouville delegation proposed that lighthouses be
constructed on Triton and Lincoln Islands, as well as on Da Bac (the North) and Bombay
Reefs.736 The crew of the French ship La Malicieuse also landed on a number of islets in the
Paracelsin1930andplantedflagsandemplacedsovereigntycolumns,withoutobjectionfrom
theChinesegovernment.737
Incontrast,duringthissametimeframe,FrancezealouslyprotestedattemptedChinese
incursions in the Paracels. On December 4, 1931, France diplomatically protested an
announcement by the Chinese government that it intended to invite bids from foreign
companiestoexploitthephosphatedepositsintheParacels.738Francereneweditsproteston
April24,1932,afterChinapubliclycalledforbids,citingVietnamsformerrightstotheislands
asitslegalbasis.739
After China rejected Frances offer to have the Paracel dispute settled by an
international tribunal, the Governor General of Indochina designated the Paracels as an
administrative unit of Thua Thien (Hu) Province on June 15, 1932 (Decree No. 156SC).740 In
1937, the head of public works was dispatched to the Paracels by the French colonial
governmenttoevaluatethepossibilityofconstructingmaritimeandairtrafficfacilitiesonthe
islands, as well as build a lighthouse on Pattle Island.741 Also in 1937, a second attempt to
resolvetheoutstandingdisputethroughinternationalarbitrationmetwithChineseopposition.
As a result, Vietnamese troops (Garde Indochinoise) under the command of French officers
occupied the islands and erected sovereignty columns on a number of the islets in the
archipelago.742Alighthouse,meteorologicalstation,andradiostationwerealsoconstructedon
PattleIsland.743
Thefollowingyear,inMarch1938,EmperorBaoDaiconfirmedDecreeNo.156SCina
Vietnamese imperial ordinance.744 Then, on May 5, 1939, the Governor General of Indochina
dividedtheParacelarchipelagointotwodelegationstheCrescentGroupandtheAmphitrite
Group.745 Following the division, French civil service officers and Vietnamese police were
permanentlystationedonPattleIsland(CrescentGroup)andWoodyIsland(AmphitriteGroup)
onaregularbasis.746
French/VietnameseforcesremainedintheParacelsuntil1956,withahiatusofseveral
yearsduringJapansoccupationoftheislandsduringtheSecondWorldWar.InFebruary1946,
France and China agreed that French troops would relieve Chinese troops stationed in
735
736
HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyovertheParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;seealso
737
738
Id.,atpp.38,102.
739
Id.
740
Id.,atpp.39,113.
741
Id.,atpp.38,113.
742
Id.,atp.39
743
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;seealsoNATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;Historical
documentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra.
744
745
Id.,atp.39.
746
Id.
114
Indochinanorthofthe16thdegreeoflatitude(whichincludesboththeParacelsandSpratlys)
nolaterthanMarch31,1946.747Accordingly,Frenchforcesweredispatchedtoreoccupythe
ParacelsinJune1946.AlthoughtheseforceswerewithdrawnfromtheParacelsthreemonths
later due to the ongoing FrenchVietminh War, French Chief of Staff of National Defense
GeneralAlphonsePierreJuinurgedtheChairmanoftheCommitteeonIndochinatoreoccupy
theParacelsinOctober 1946in ordertoconsolidateFranceslegalpositionvisvisChina.748
Additionally, all ships calling on the Paracels were required to request permission from the
FrenchHighCommissioninSaigon.749
Upon learning that Chinese Nationalist forces sent to the Paracels to accept the
surrender of the Japanese garrison had illegally remained in the archipelago following the
withdrawalofAlliedoccupationforcesfromFrenchIndochinain1946,Franceissuedaformal
diplomaticprotestonJanuary13,1947.750ThewarshipLeTonkinoiswasalsodeployedtothe
areaonJanuary17,1947,toejecttheChineseNationalistsfromWoodyIsland.Realizingthat
theywereoutnumbered,however,theFrenchVietnameseforcesretreatedtoPattleIsland.751
Laterthatyear,theweatherstationthathadoperatedonPattleIslandfrom1938to1944was
rebuilt.752Thatsameyear,Franceagainsuggestedthattheongoingdisputebesubmittedtothe
ICJ for resolution, but China refused, insisting that French troops be immediately withdrawn
from the islands.753 The French hydrographic survey ship Ingenieur en chef Girod was
subsequentlydeployedtotheParacelsin1953toconductoceanographic,geologic,geographic
andecologicalstudies.754
As previously discussed, Chinas assertion of sovereignty over the Paracels is also
contrary to its statement in 1896 concerning the vessels Bellona and Imegu Maru. When
confronted by British authorities after the shipwrecked vessels were looted by Chinese
fishermen, the Qing (Ching) government denied ownership of the islands, stating that the
Paracels were abandoned islands which belonged no more to China than they did to Annam,
that they were not administratively attached to any district of Hainan and that no special
authoritywasresponsibleforpolicingthem.755AsimilarresponsewasprovidedwhenBritain
747
Id.,atpp.40,116;ExchangeofLettersbetweenChinaandFranceRelatingtotheReliefofChineseTroopsby
FrenchTroopsinNorthIndochina,Chungking,Feb.28,1946,U.N.T.S.Vol.14,1948,atp.151.
748
M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.440441;M.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1179;S.Tnnesson,note55supra,
atp.11;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.40;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex33
(LetterfromGeneralJuin,ChiefofStaffofNationalDefense,totheChairmanoftheCommitteeonIndochina,7
October1946).
749
Id.,atpp.117118.
750
M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.440441;seealsoM.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1179.
751
Id.;seealsoS.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.11;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.40.
752
M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.440441;M.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1179.
753
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex35(TelegramfromMinistryofForeignAffairs,Nanking,8
March1947),Annex36(WirefromAgenceFrancePresse,Nanking,of31May1947andtelegramof3June1947),
Annex42(Noteof15May1950fromtheDirectorateforAsiaOceania).
754
HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;seealso
755
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex5(LetterNo.704AEx,dated20March1930,fromthe
GovernorGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi,totheMinisterfortheColonies,Paris),Annex12(Notedated6May1921,
fromtheDirectorateforPoliticalandIndigenousAffairs,GovernmentGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi),Annex15
(Letterdated4May1909fromMr.Beauvais,ConsulofFranceinCanton,totheMinisterforForeignAffairs,Paris),
115
complainedaboutthelackofnavigationalaidsontheParacelsaftertwoBritishshipscollided
with a Chinese fishing vessel near the islands. Again, China disclaimed any responsibility,
indicatingthatitdidnotowntheislands.756
Contemporaneously with its activities in the Paracels, France also solidified its
sovereignty over the Spratly archipelago. In 1927, the De Lanessan conducted an initial
scientificsurveyoftheislands.757Thefollowingyear,inNovember1928,theNewPhosphates
CompanyofTonkinappliedtotheGovernorofCochinchinaforapermittoexploitphosphate
deposits in the Spratlys.758 Then in 1930, a French survey team from the La Malicieuse
conductedasecondsurveyofSpratlyIslandandhoistedtheFrenchflagovertheislandthe
first recorded instance of a sovereignty marker being placed on any of the Spratly Islands.759
Thereafter, on September 23, 1930, France notified the other Great Powers that it had
occupied the Spratlys on the grounds that the islands were terra nullius.760 China correctly
pointsoutthattheFrenchfoundChinesefishermenlivingontheislandduringtheexpedition.
However, as previously discussed, the fact that a handful of Chinese fishermen sporadically
lived on the island for short periods of time is irrelevant to the determination of sovereignty
overthearchipelago.761
Subsequently,FrancedispatchedtheAlerte,theAstrobale,andtheDeLanessantothe
SpratlysinApril1933toofficiallytakephysicalpossessionofthearchipelago.762Threemonths
later, the French MFA published a notice in the French Journal Officiel (July 26, 1933, page
7837) notifying the international community that French naval units had effectively occupied
Spratly Island (with its dependent isles), Islet caye of Amboine (with its dependent isles), Itu
Aba Island (with its dependent isles), North East Cay and Shira Island (with their dependent
isles), Loaita Island (with its dependent islands), and Thi Tu Island (with its dependent
islands).763IndividualnotificationswereadditionallyprovidedtoChina,GreatBritain,Japan,the
Netherlands, and the United States.764 By claiming the features along with their dependent
islets/islands,Franceclearlyintendedtoclaimsovereigntyovertheentirearchipelago.765
Annex26(LetterNo.1512A.Exdated18October1930fromtheGovernorGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi,tothe
MinisterfortheColonies,Paris);seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.7.
756
757
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.37;seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;T.Kelly,
note133supra.
758
759
Id.;seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;T.Kelly,note133supra.
760
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.38,97,111.
761
Seetextaccompanyingnotes264272,notes585589,andnotes898902supra.SeealsoB.Murphy,note29
supra,atpp.201202.AccordM.Bennett,note15supra,atpp.434435,446;C.Joyner,note166supra,atp.59;
H.Roque,note208supra,atp.200;DissentingOpinionofJudgeMcNairintheFisheriesCase(UnitedKingdomv.
Norway),I.C.J.Reports1951,p.116,atp.184.
762
763
S.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.8;seealsoH.Roque,note208supra,atp.192;T.Kelly,note133supra;M.
ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.38,111.
764
TheNetherlands(occupyingIndonesia)andtheUnitedStates(occupyingthePhilippines)remainedsilentonthe
issue.GreatBritaindeterminedthatitneverperfecteditsinchoatetitletotheislandsandthereforedidnothave
titletotheSpratlys.ChinaandJapan,however,purportendlyquestionedFrancesoccupation.
765
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex31(Letterof30March1932fromtheMinisterforNational
Defence(Navy)totheMinisterforForeignAffairsDirectorateforPoliticalAffairsandTrade(AsiaOceania)).
116
FollowingtheannouncedannexationoftheSpratlysinJuly1933,aheadquartersforthe
FrenchadministrativeofficeandguarddetachmentforthearchipelagowasestablishedonItu
Aba Island. In December 1933, Governor General Pasquiersigned Decree No. 4762CP (dated
December 21, 1933), assigning the Spratlys to the Cochinchinese province of B Ria (French
Indochina).766 A radio station and weather station were subsequently built on Itu Aba by the
IndochinaMeteorologicalServicein1938dataprovidedbytheweatherstationwaslistedby
the World Meteorological Organization as originating in Cochinchina.767 The French also
continuedtoconductscientificsurveysinthearchipelago.768
On April 4, 1939, France reasserted its sovereignty over the Spratlys, reaffirming that
theislandswerepartofAnnam(Vietnam),afterJapanannouncedthatitwasplacingtheislands
under the administrative jurisdiction of Taiwan.769 The Annamese militia was additionally
deployedtocounteraJapanesedeploymentofFormosanmilitiathathadestablishedacampin
theSpratlys,andaFrenchwarshiponpatrolintheSouthChinaSeacalledontheSpratlys.770
China,ontheotherhand,didnotprotesteithertheJapanesedeclarationorthedeploymentof
AnnameseandFormosanmilitiatotheislands.
In October 1946, the French battleship Chevreud was deployed to the Spratlys to re
assertFrenchinterestsinthearchipelagoanditscrewinstalledasovereigntysteleonItuAba
Island.771 When France learned that Chinese naval units had occupied Itu Aba in November
1946,Frenchauthoritiesprotestedtheaction,demandingthattheNationalisttroopswithdraw
from the island.772 A decade later, when Tomas Cloma of the Philippines proclaimed his so
called Freedomland in May 1956, France (even though it had withdrawn from Indochina),
reminded the Philippine government that the Spratlys were sovereign French territory.773
Duringthesametimeperiod,theFrenchNavyvesselDumontdUrvillewasdeployedtoItuAba
IslandinademonstrationofFrenchVietnameseinterestinthearchipelago.774
Chinese scholars claim that the Shanghai newspaper Shen Bao reported that China
protested Frances formal occupation of the Spratly Islands on July 26, 1933.775 A week later,
thenewspaperreportedthatasimilarprotestwasfiledwithFrenchofficialsbytheGuangdong
766
Id.,atAnnex30(DecreebytheGovernorofCochinChina(J.Krautheimer),Saigon,21December1933).Seealso
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atpp.89;B.Murphy,note29supra,atp.203;T.Kelly,note133supra.
767
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.9;seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra.
768
769
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex32(NotefromtheMinistryofForeignAffairs,Directoratefor
PoliticalAffairsandTrade,(Asia),10August1940).SeealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;T.Kelly,
note133supra.
770
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex32(NotefromtheMinistryofForeignAffairs,Directoratefor
PoliticalAffairsandTrade,(Asia),10August1940).
771
772
Id.
773
774
Id.
775
ShenII,atp.143(The[Spratly]islandshavebeeninhabitedbyChinesefishermenonly,andhavebeen
recognizedbytheinternationalcommunityasChinasterritories.Weareshockedtohavereceivedtheofficial
FrenchjournalannouncingFrancesformaloccupation.TheForeignMinistrywillputforwardseriousprotests
overtheFrenchactions.);seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.18;B.Murphy,note29supra,atpp.
191,203.
117
provincial government.776 Two days later, on August 4th, the Chinese government allegedly
deliveredadiplomaticnotetoFrenchauthoritiesreservingitspositiononChinasrightstothe
SpratlyspendinganinvestigationoftheFrenchactions.777Afterconfirmingthatthenineislands
in question were in fact part of the Spratly archipelago, Ambassador Wellington Koo (Gu
Weijun)formallyprotestedFrancesoccupation,statingthattheSpratlyIslandsweresovereign
Chineseterritory.778ChinasargumentthatitprotestedFrancesoccupationoftheSpratlysin
1933isquestionable,atbest.
Vietnamese officials deny that these diplomatic exchanges occurred. Some scholars
havesimilarlyquestionedwhetherChinaactuallyprotestedFrancesoccupationoftheSpratlys,
observingthattheprotestnotecitedbyChinesescholarsisnotdatedandisnotmentionedin
theFebruary1974MemorandumonFourLargeArchipelagoesoftheRepublicofChinainSouth
Sea.779Nevertheless,evenifChinadidobjecttotheoccupation,itsprotestwasbased,noton
officialgovernmentalregulationoreffectivecontroloftheSpratlys,butrather,primarilyonthe
groundsthatChinesefishermenwerelivingonsomeoftheislets.780
As discussed above, under prevailing international law, when determining issues of
territorialsovereignty,theindependentactivityofprivateindividualsisoflittlevalueunlessit
canbeshownthattheyhaveactedinpursuanceofalicenceorsomeotherauthorityreceived
from their Governments or that in some other way their Governments have asserted
jurisdictionthrough them.781 In the case of theSpratlys, there is simplyno reliableevidence
that Chinese fishermen acted pursuant to government authority or that the Chinese
government subsequently sanctioned these private acts.782 Thus, the private activities relied
uponbyChinadonotconstituteactstitredesouverainreflectingtheintentionandwilltoact
776
ShenII,atpp.143144(TheSouthwestCommissionerisseriouslyconcernedwiththeincidentsofFrance
occupyingthe[Spratly]islands,andwilldoeverythinghecantopreserveChinassovereigntyovertheseisland
groups.theYue[Guangdong]ProvincialGovernmenthasalreadylodgedproteststotheFrenchauthorities.).
777
Id.,atp.144(TheChineseGovernmentisverymuchconcernedwith[theFrenchdeclaredoccupationofand
sovereigntyovernineislandsintheSouthChinaSea].SheherebyrequeststheMinisteroftheFrenchLegationto
inquireintoandascertainthename,theexactlocationandthelongitudeandlatitudeofeachislandandreportthe
sametotheChineseGovernment.Pendingsuchinvestigation,theChineseGovernmentreserveshertitlesvis
visthedeclarationoftheFrenchGovernment.);seealsoShenI,atp.41.
778
ShenII,atp.144;seealsoShenI,atp.42;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.13;T.Kelly,note133supra.
779
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atnote59;seealsoF.Bonnet,note223supra,atp.17(Followingthe
discoverythattheSpratlyIslandsandtheParacelIslandsweretwodifferentgroups,theChinesegovernmentdid
notprotesttheFrenchclaimonthenineislands).
780
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.12;seealsoShenI,atp.42(Atthetimeoftheoccupation,theFrench
Governmentstatedthattheislandsinquestionwereterranullius,butconcededthatduringtheiroccupation,the
onlypeoplelivingontheislandswereChinese.);M.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1178.
781
FisheriesCase(UnitedKingdomv.Norway),I.C.J.Reports1951,p.116,atp.184.AccordSovereigntyoverPulau
LigitanandPulauSipadan(Indonesia/Malaysia),Judgment,I.C.J.Reports2002,p.625,atp.683(activitiesby
privatepersonscannotbeseenaseffectivitsiftheydonottakeplaceonthebasisofofficialregulationsorunder
governmentalauthority.);seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.54.
782
118
inthatcapacityandthereforedonotsupportChinasclaimofindisputablesovereigntyoverthe
Spratlyarchipelago.783
Chinas position also ignores the fact that, at the time of Frances occupation of the
Spratlysin1933,conquestfollowedbyeffectiveoccupationwasavalidmethodofacquiring
territoryunderprevailinginternationallaw.784Chinasprotest,evenifitdidoccur,istherefore
irrelevanttothedeterminationofFrenchsovereigntyovertheSpratlyIslands.
Inshort,thereisconsiderableevidencethatFrancedidnotintendtoabandonitsclaims
in the Spratlys and that it engaged in a series of activities that substantiate French effective
controlofthearchipelagountilFrenchtroopswerewithdrawnfromIndochinaandreplacedby
SouthVietnamesenavalforcesinAugust1956.
b. Effective Administration by South Vietnam

Vietnam started to exercise sovereign control of the South China Sea islands in the
1950s as France slowly began to withdraw from Indochina. On October 14, 1950, France
formally turned over defense of the Paracels to Vietnamese forces.785 The following year,
Premier Tran Van Huu reaffirmed Vietnamese sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly
archipelagoesattheSanFranciscoPeaceConference.786Noneofthe51nationspresentatthe
conferenceobjectedtothisstatement,andthereisnoevidencethattheROCeveropposedthe
statement.787Atthetime,theROCoccupiedtheChineseseatattheUnitedNations.
The Vietnamese Navy assumed responsibility for the defense of the archipelago in
August1956,andSouthVietnameseforcesoccupiedPattleIslandandRobertIslandinApriland
July 1956, respectively.788 That same year, the Department of Mining, Technology, and Small
IndustriesconductedsurveysonPattle,Money,Robert,andDrumondIslandsintheParacels.789
VietnameseMarinessubsequentlytookoverthedefenseoftheislandsin1957;however,the
VietnameseNavycontinuedtoregularlypatrolthewatersaroundthearchipelago.790Beginning
in 1959, defense responsibilities were transferred to the Regional Forces of Quang Nam
Province.791 In February of that same year, South Vietnamese forces occupied Duncan Island,
783
atp.683.Seealso C.Joyner,note166supra,atp.59(Evidenceofpermanentsettlementisnotcompellinginthe
caseofChinasclaimtotheSpratlys.);accordM.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.434435(Despitetheofficial
governmentpositionthattheSpratlyIslandsformedanintegratedpartofitsterritory,thecontinuousChinese
presenceseemstohaveconsistedoffishermenfromHainanIsland,whowouldtemporarilysettleontheislandsto
fishandcollecttortoiseshells.Thesestaysappeartohavebeenbrief,anditisunlikelythatthehutsandother
structurestheybuiltsurvivedtheirdepartures.[T]hequestionarisesastowhetherisolatedcontactsbyindividual
ChinesefishermenaresufficienttoestablishsovereigntyovertheSpratlysunderinternationallaw.Thusthe
validityofthePRCsofficialpositionissubjecttodoubt.);SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.5;H.Nguyen,note
204supra,atp.169.
784
M.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1179;seealsoM.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.440441.
785
786
Id.,atp.41.;seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;T.Kelly,note133supra.
787
Id.;seealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atpp.192193,201.
788
ShenI,atpp.5152.
789
HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;NATIONAL
790
791
Id.
119
evicting over 80 Chinese fishermen that were illegally living on the island.792 And in March,
VietnamesetroopsoccupiedDrummondIsland.793
French scientists were also granted permission to conduct scientific studies of the
ParacelsonbehalfofSouthVietnam(1955,1957,1958,and1961).794In1960,thefirstSouth
Vietnamese officials were posted to the Paracels to administer the islands.795 The following
year,jurisdictionovertheParacelswastransferredbacktoQuangNamProvince(DecreeNo.
174NVofJuly13,1961)andgiventhestatusofaXa(villageofthemainland).796
ContinuedChineseincursionsintheParacelsinthe1970spromptedSouthVietnamto
reaffirm its sovereignty over the archipelago in a statement issued on July 15, 1971.797 That
same year, in May, Vietnamese forces conducted a survey on Triton Islands (Paracels).798 A
lengthy proclamation was issued in February 1974 condemning the Communist Chinese
invasion of the Paracels on January 21, 1974.799 A diplomatic note was also sent to the
signatories of the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, calling for a special session of the Security
Council.800TheProvisionalRevolutionaryGovernmentofSouthVietnamlikewiseexpressedits
concern, albeit guarded, over the Chinese invasion.801 Later that year, South Vietnam
reaffirmeditssovereigntyovertheParacelsattheMarchmeetingoftheEconomicCommission
fortheFarEastandattheJulymeetingoftheThirdUnitedNationsConferenceontheLawof
theSea.802
FollowingtheFrenchwithdrawalfromIndochinain1956,SouthVietnamalsobeganto
exercise sovereignty over the Spratly archipelago as the successor state to French claims. On
June 1, 1956, the Republic of Vietnam confirmed Vietnamese sovereignty over the Spratlys
after Tomas Cloma established his socalled Freedomland in the eastern portion of the
archipelago.803 Then in mid June, South Vietnams Foreign Minister reaffirmed Vietnamese
sovereignty over the island chain.804 In October, administrative control of the Spratlys was
assignedtoPhuocTuyProvincepursuanttoDecreeNo.143/NVofOctober22,1956.805
792
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratly
793
Id.
794
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.Fontaine,note358supra.
795
796
In1969,theParacelIslandsbecamepartofthevillageofHoaLong,HoaVangDistrict,QuangNamProvince
(DecreeNo.709BNV/HCDP/26datedOctober21,1969).MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoShenI,atp.52;H.
Nguyen,note204supra,atp.189;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.127.
797
798
ShenI,atp.52.
799
ProclamationbytheGovernmentoftheRepublicofVietnam,Feb.14,1974,availableat
http://www.nguyenthaihocfoundation.org/lichsuVN/tuyenbo_vnch.htm;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15
supra,atp.127.
800
801
Id.,atpp.45,128.
802
Id.,atpp.45,127.
803
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoB.Dubner,note29supra,atp.311.
804
Id.;seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atpp.89;B.Murphy,note29supra,atpp.192193,201.
805
B.Murphy,note29supra,atp.204;accordB.Dubner,note29supra,atp.311.SeealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,
note42supra,atp.9;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.43,127.
120
FacedwithincreasingChineseandFilipinoincursionsintheSpratlys(ItuAbaIslandand
Freedomland),theSouthVietnameseNavylaunchedaseriesofoperationstoreassertcontrol
overthearchipelago.InAugust1956,thecrewofthecruiserTuyDong(HQ04)wasdirectedto
erect sovereignty steles and hoist the Vietnamese flag on many of the Spratly Islands.806 In
1961,crewmembersfromtheVietnamesecruisersVanKepandVanDonlandedonSouthwest
Cay, Thitu Island, Loaita Island, and Amboyna Cay to erect sovereignty steles and raise the
Vietnameseflag.807ThecruisersTuyDongandTayKetengagedinsimilaractivitiesin1962on
SpratlyIslandandNamyitIsland.In1963,thesovereigntystelesonallofthemainislandsinthe
SpratlyswererebuiltbycrewmembersoftheNavyvesselsHuongGiang,ChiLang,andKyHoa
(SpratlyIsland,May19,1963;AmboynaCay,May20,1963;ThituandLoaitaIslands,May22,
1963; and North East and South West Cays, May 24, 1963).808 Regular naval patrols of the
archipelagocontinuedthrough1964,809althoughthefrequencyofthepatrolswassignificantly
reduced after 1963 as a result of the ongoing conflict with North Vietnam. Vietnamese naval
unitsalsocarriedoutanumberofsurveyandmappingexpeditionsintheregionbetween1960
and1967.810
ContinuedcounterclaimsbyotherclaimantstotheSpratlysduringthe1970sresultedin
sharp protests by the Saigon government. In April 20, 1971, the MFA delivered a diplomatic
note to the Malaysian government outlining Vietnams position in support of its sovereignty
claims in the archipelago.811 Three months later the MFA reaffirmed Vietnamese sovereignty
overtheSpratlysinastatementissuedonJuly15,1971.812InMay1973,Vietnamconducted
surveysonPagasaIsland,LoaitaIsland,andNortheastCay,and,inJuly,occupiedNamyitIsland
intheSpratlys.813AlsoinJuly,theMinistryofAgriculturalDevelopmentandLandsInstituteof
AgriculturalResearchconductedasurveyofNamyitIsland.814Then,onSeptember6,1973,the
Spratlys were incorporated into Phuoc Tuy Province (Decree No. 420BNV/HCDP/26).815
Diplomatic notes were also delivered to Taiwan (January 29, 1974) and the Philippines
(February 12, 1974) rejecting Taipeis and Manilas respective claims to the Spratlys as
unfounded.816Laterthatyear,SouthVietnamreaffirmeditssovereigntyovertheislandchainat
the March 1974 meeting of the Economic Commission for the Far East and at the July 1974
meetingoftheThirdUnitedNationsConferenceontheLawoftheSea.817
806
807
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.189.
808
809
810
ShenI,atp.52.
811
812
Id.,atp.44.
813
ShenI,atp.52.
814
815
816
817
121
Basedontheforegoing,theotherSouthChinaSeaclaimantscannotargueconvincingly
that South Vietnam did not exercise effective control of the South China Sea islands or that
Saigon intended to abandon its claims to the two island groups. Nevertheless, some scholars
havenotedthat,despitetheextensivediplomaticinitiativesbySaigon,SouthVietnamdidnot
physicallyoccupyanyoftheSpratlyIslandsuntil1973.818However,giventheharshconditions
and remote location of the islands, as well as the ongoing civil war on the mainland, it is
understandable that South Vietnamese military units were not deployed to the Spratlys
between1956and1973.819
c. Postunification Administration
FollowingunificationofthecountryonApril30,1975,theSocialistRepublicofVietnam
inheritedSouthVietnamstitletotheParacelsandSpratlysandcontinuedtoassertsovereignty
over the two archipelagoes. In April 1975, North Vietnamese troops replaced the South
Vietnamese garrisons on Southwest Cay, Sand Cay, Sin Cowe Island, Spratly Island, and
AmboynaCay.820
InMay1975,theVietnamesegovernmentincorporatedtheParacelandSpratlyIslands
intotheterritoryofVietnamandrenamedthearchipelagoesHoangSaandTruongSa.821The
following year, Vietnam incorporated the Spratly Islands into ong Nai Province in March
1976.822 On May 12, 1977, the Vietnamese government issued a Statement on the Territorial
Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, which
reaffirmed, in part, that the Spratlys and Paracels formed an integral part of Vietnamese
territory.823
InSeptember1982,theParacelswereplacedundertheadministrativecontrolofQuang
NamDa Nang Province.824 Two months later, on November 12, the Government of Vietnam
issuedastatementontheterritorialseabaselinesofVietnam,whichincludedboththeParacel
andSpratlyIslands.825Then,onMarch25,1983,VietnamprotestedMalaysiasclaimtothree
islets in the archipelago.826 In a further demonstration of sovereignty, Vietnamese forces
subsequentlyoccupiedBoReef,WestReef,LaddReef,PigeonReef,EastReef,CornwallisSouth
818
819
IslandofPalmasCase(Netherlands/U.S.A.),U.N.Rep.,Vol.II,p.829(1928),p.831,atp.840;LegalStatusof
EasternGreenlandCase(Denmarkv.Norway),P.C.I.J.,SeriesA/B,No.53(1933),atp.46;WesternSaharaAdvisory
Opinion,I.C.J.Reports1975,p.12,atp.43;ClippertonIslandArbitration(Mexicov.France),2R.I.A.A.1105(1931),
atpp.393394.[ThecitedpagesarefromtheEnglishtranslationat26Am.J.IntlL.390,at393394(1932).]
820
ShenI,atp.55;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.45.
821
Id.
822
ShenI,atp.55.
823
StatementontheTerritorialSea,theContiguousZone,theExclusiveEconomicZoneandtheContinentalShelfof
12May1977,availableathttps://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/VNM.htm.
824
AdditionaladministrativemeasuresregardingtheParacelsweretakeninJune1996(annexedtheParacelsinto
thecityofDaNang)andApril2007(establishmentofTruongSatown,SongTuTayandSinhTonCommunesunder
TruongSaDistrict.HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;
825
Statementof12November1982bytheGovernmentoftheSocialistRepublicofVietNamontheTerritorialSea
BaselineofVietNam,availableat
https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/VNM.htm.
826
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.45
122
Reef,CollinsReef,LansdowneReef,AlisonReef,PetleyReef,SouthReef,PrinceofWalesBank,
BombayShoal,andVanguardBankbetweenFebruary1987andJuly1989tocountercontinued
Chineseinroadsinthearchipelago.827Aneconomicandscientificcomplexwasalsoconstructed
in the Spratlys in August 1989.828 In addition, a governmentorganized fishing fleet was
dispatched to exploit the East Sea fisheries and the government built a series of civilian
installations,includingscientificstationsandlighthouses,onanumberoftheoccupiedislets.829
Official acts, decrees, resolutions, laws, diplomatic correspondence, etc., taken by the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam since unification of the country have continued to demonstrate
sovereigntyoverboththeSpratlyandParacelsIslands.Vietnamsdeclarationuponratifyingthe
UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSeain1994reaffirmedVietnamesesovereignty
over the disputed archipelagoes.830 Similarly, Vietnam delivered a note verbale to the United
Nations in August 1998 protesting Chinas 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the
ContinentalShelfofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,whichprovides,inpart,thatVietnamhad
indisputablesovereigntyoverthetwoislandgroups.831
OnDecember3,2007,VietnamstronglyprotestedChinasdecisiontoestablishSansha
City to administer the Spratly and Paracel Islands.832 Similarly, on March 12, 2009, Vietnam
protested the Philippines new archipelagic baselines, which refers to some of the Spratly
Islands as Philippine territory.833 On May 8, 2009, Vietnam sent a diplomatic note to the UN
SecretaryGeneral rejecting Chinas Ushaped line in the South China Sea and reaffirming
VietnamesesovereigntyovertheSpratlysandParacels.834AsimilarpositionwastakenbyHanoi
827
ShenI,atp.56.
828
829
830
SocialistRepublicofVietnamDeclarationuponRatificationofUNCLOS,July25,1994,availableat
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm.
831
VietNam:DisputeregardingtheLawontheExclusiveEconomicZoneandtheContinentalShelfofthePeoples
RepublicofChinawhichwaspassedon26June1998,reprintedinUNLAWOFTHESEABULL.,No.38,1998,atp.55.
832
COMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper).
833
Id.
834
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm.Mostinternationalmaritimelawexpertsandforeign
governments(includingtheotherSouthChinaSeaclaimants),however,wouldagreethatChinasUshapedclaim
intheSouthChinaSeahasnobasisininternationallaworstatepractice.Vietnam,forexample,hasassertedthat
ChinasclaimovertheislandsandadjacentwatersintheEasternSea(SouthChinaSea)asmanifestedinthe[U
shaped]mapattachedwithNotesVerbaleCLM/17/2009andCLM/18/2009hasnolegal,historicalorfactualbasis,
[and]thereforeisnullandvoid.NoteVerbale,PermanentMissionoftheSocialistRepublicofVietnamtothe
UnitedNations,No.86/HC2009(8May2009),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm.Similarly,thePhilippineshasstatedthat
theclaimbythePeoplesRepublicofChinaontherelevantwatersaswellastheseabedandsubsoilthereof(as
reflectedinthesocalledninedashlinemapattachedtoNotesVerbalesCML/17/2009and
CML/18/2009)wouldhavenobasisunderinternationallaw,specificallyUNCLOS.NoteVerbale,Philippine
MissiontotheUnitedNations,No.000819(4August2009)and000228(5April2011),at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm.EvenIndonesia,whichisnotapartytothe
dispute,hasprotestedChinasclaim,indicatingthatthesocalledninedottedlinesmapascontainedincircular
noteNumberCML/17/2009clearlylacksinternationallegalbasisandistantamounttoupset[ting]theUNCLOS
1982.834NoteVerbale,PermanentMissionoftheRepublicofIndonesia,No.480/POL703/VII/10(8July2010),
123
inresponsetothePhilippinesprotestofVietnamssubmissiontotheUNCommissiononthe
LimitsoftheContinentalShelfclaiminganextendedcontinentalshelfforVietnamintheSouth
ChinaSea.835Additionally,VietnamsnewLawoftheSea(2012)specificallyappliestoboththe
ParacelandSpratlyarchipelagos.836
Based on the foregoing, it is clearly apparent that the unified Vietnam has not
abandoneditslegitimateclaimstotheSouthChinaSeaislands.
4. Right of Cession
Internationallawrecognizesthatastatemaycedesovereigntyoveraparticularterritory
to another state.837 Therefore, provided that Vietnam can prove that France validlyexercised
sovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeaislandsinthe1930s,andthatFrancecededtheislandsto
Vietnam (South Vietnam) after it became an independent state, the SRV would have an
indisputableclaimtotheislandsbyrightofcession.838
Some scholars, however, are skeptical that the right of cession applies to the Spratlys
because France purportedly did not relinquish control of the islands to Vietnam after it was
grantedindependence.839Aletterwrittenin1951byJeanLetourneau,FrenchMinisterofState
withresponsibilityforrelationswithAssociatedStates,totheMinisterforOverseasTerritories
suggestedthattheSpratlysremainedFrenchterritoryfollowingtheestablishmentofthenew
StateofVietnamandshouldthereforebeplacedunderthecontroloftheFrenchDepartment
ofOverseasTerritories:
Since1933,whentheFrenchGovernmenteffectivelytookpossessionoftheSpratlys
on behalf of France and up to the present day, these islands were included, for
administrativepurposes,undertheformerGovernmentGeneralofIndochina.Political
developments since then in the former Indochinese Federation and which resulted in
the replacement of the latter by the three new Associated States have in no way
prejudicedFrance'srightsoverthisarchipelago.[T]hefactthattheSpratlyswerefora
time attached to Cochin China simply for administrative convenience cannot be relied
onbythenewStateofVietnamasjustificationforrightsitneverpossessed.[U]nlessit
is consideredthat the French High Commissioner in Saigon should retain the
administrationoftheseterritorieswithinhispowers,itwouldappearthattheSpratlys
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm.TheUnitedStateshasalsoquestionedthe
validityoftheninedashedline.OnFebruary5,2014,AssistantSecretaryofStateDanielRusseltestifiedbefore
theHouseCommitteeonForeignAffairsSubcommitteeonAsiaandthePacific.Duringhistestimony,Secretary
Russelindicated,inpart,thatanyuseoftheninedashlinebyChinatoclaimmaritimerightsnotbasedon
claimedlandfeatureswouldbeinconsistentwithinternationallaw.DanielR.Russel,AssistantSecretary,Bureau
ofEastAsianandPacificAffairs,TestimonyBeforetheHouseCommitteeonForeignAffairsSubcommitteeonAsia
andthePacific(Washington,DC),MaritimeDisputesinEastAsia,Feb.5,2014,availableat
http:/www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm.
835
836
LawoftheSeaofVietNam,LawNo.18/2012/QH13,June21,2012.
837
BROWNLIE217(8thed.).
838
839
H.Roque,note208supra,atp.204;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.118,124.
124
should now come under the French Department of Overseas Territories, on the same
basisasotherFrenchterritoriesinthePacific.840
An internal note written by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1957 similarly indicated
thatFrancehadnotclaimedtheSpratlysonbehalfofVietnam,butrather,foritself:
TheFrenchGovernmentconsidersthattheSpratlyislands,takingofficialpossessionof
whichwasthesubjectofanoticepublishedintheOfficialJournalof26July1933,are
French.ThesovereigntyoftheseislandsisalsoclaimedbythegovernmentsofBeijing,
TaipeiandSaigon.Manilacommunicatedsupportforaclaimmadeprivatelyinthelast
yearbyoneofitsnationals.841
Accordingly, although France may have ceded the Paracels to Vietnam, it did not do so with
regardtotheSpratlys.Theefficacyofthisargumentishighlyproblematic,however,giventhe
multitude of official actions taken by the French government dating back to the 1930s that
bring into question the true intent of the 1951 letter and 1957 note and lead to a different
conclusion.
On June 14, 1932, the Governor General of Indochina designated the Paracels as an
administrative unit of Thua Thien (Hu) Province in Annam (Decree No. 156SC).842 The
following year, on December 22nd, Governor General Pasquier assigned the Spratlys to the
Cochinchinese(FrenchIndochina)ProvinceofBRia(DecreeNo.4762CP).843Then,onApril4,
1939, in response to Japans announcement that it was placing the Spratlys under the
administrative jurisdiction of Taiwan, the French government fileda strongly worded protest,
indicatingthattheislandswerepartofVietnam.844
840
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.118,Annex39(Letterof7May1951fromtheMinisterofState
withresponsibilityforrelationswithAssociatedStatestotheMinisterforOverseasTerritories).
841
LegouvernementfranaisconsidrequeleslesSpratly,dontlaprisedepossessionofficielleafaitl'objetd'un
avispubliauJournalOfficieldu26juillet1933,sontfranaises.Lasouverainetdeceslesestgalement
revendiqueeparlesgouvernementsdePkin,deTapeietdeSagon.CeluideManillevientd'appuyerune
revendicationformule,l'andernier,titrepriv,parundesesressortissants.NotepourleSecrtaireGnral
a.s.desIlesSpratly,MinistredesAffairesEtrangres,AsieOcanie,No.20JMB/GM,20.2.57,pp.389392,dos.
522,Chine195667,srieAsieOcanie,MAE,reprintedinS.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.12(note28).
842
EmperorBaoDaiconfirmedtheFrenchdecreeinaVietnameseimperialordinanceonMarch30,1938.MFA
WhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.185;
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnams
sovereigntyoverParacelandSpratlyIslands,note203supra;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.39and
113;NATIONALCOMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper.
843
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoB.Murphy,note29supra,atp.203;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,at
p.9;T.Kelly,note133supra;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2(ThedecreewasimplementedbytheGovernor
ofCochinchina,JeanFlizKrautheimer.);M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atpp.39,111,Annex30(Decree
bytheGovernorofCochinChina(J.Krautheimer),Saigon,21December1933);NguyenBaDien,note203supra;
COMMITTEEOFBORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.186.
844
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.Roque,note208supra,atp.192;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.2;T.
Kelly,note133supra;H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8;M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.39.
125
A decade later, on June 5, 1948, France and Vietnam signed the Ha Long Bay
Agreement,whichallowedforthecreationofaunifiedStateofVietnam(Tonkin,Annam,and
Cochinchina)associatedwithFrancewithintheFrenchUnion.845Thefollowingyear,onMarch
8,1949,FrancesignedthelyseAgreementwiththeStateofVietnam,agreeingtorecognize
the independence of Vietnam and transferring administrative power of the state to the
Vietnamese government.846 Then, on July 5, 1949, the French government proclaimed the
unification of Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina into the State of Vietnam within the French
Union. Based on the assignment of the Paracels to Annam in 1932 and the Spratlys to
Cochinchinain1933,thenewStateofVietnamincludedbothofthearchipelagoes.
French inaction with regard to the Spratlys during the 1950s likewise draws into
question the validity of the 1951 letter and 1957 note. There is no evidence that France
attemptedtoincludeaprovisioninArticle2oftheSanFranciscoPeaceTreatythatwouldhave
returned the Spratly Islands to French control after the war. Nor did France object to the
statement by Prime Minister Tran at the Peace Conference that reaffirmed Vietnamese
sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands.847 France also did not challenge Foreign
Minister Vu Van Maus statement several weeks later that reaffirmed Vietnams sovereignty
over the archipelago,848 or the Vietnamese decree (Decree No. 143/NV of October 22, 1956)
that assigned administrative control of the Spratlys to Phuoc Tuy Province.849 Vietnams
placementofsovereigntystelesonanumberoftheSpratlyIslandsin1956,8501961,8511962,852
and1963853alsowentunchallengedbyFrance.IfFrancehadreallyintendedtoretaintitleover
845
ThePentagonPapers,GravelEdition,Vol.1,Chap.2(Boston:BeaconPress,1971),pp.152.
846
Id.
847
MFAWhitePaper(1974);seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.8.;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),at
BORDERAFFAIRSWhitePaper;B.Murphy,note29supra,atpp.192193,201.
848
Id.
849
B.Murphy,note29supra,atp.204;accordB.Dubner,note29supra,atp.311.SeealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,
note42supra,atp.9(DecreeNo.143/NV2asreconfirmedandreadjustedin1958(DecreeNo.76/BNV/HC9ND
ofMarch20,1958)and1959(DecreeNo.34/NVofJanuary27,1959));T.Kelly,note133supra;NguyenBaDien,
note203supra;H.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.189;HistoricaldocumentsonVietnamssovereigntyoverParacel
850
InAugust1956,thecruiserTuyDong(HQ04)wasassignedthemissionoferectingsovereigntystelesand
buildingflagpolestohoisttheVietnameseflagonanumberoftheSpratlyIslands.MFAWhitePaper(1974);see
alsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.189(theROVNavylandedonSpratlyIslandsanderectedamonument
assertingsovereigntyonAugust22,1956.).
851
In1961,crewmembersfromtheVietnamesecruisersVanKepandVanDonlandedonSouthwestCay,Thitu
Island,LoaitaIslandandAmboynaCaytoerectsovereigntystelesandraisetheVietnameseflag.MFAWhitePaper
(1974);seealsoH.Nguyen,note204supra,atp.189;NguyenBaDien,note203supra;Historicaldocumentson
WhitePaper.
852
In1962,thecruisersTuyDongandTayKeterectedsovereigntystelesandraisedtheVietnameseflagonSpratly
IslandandNamyitIsland.Id.
853
In1963,thesovereigntystelesonallofthemainislandsintheSpratlyswererebuiltbycrewmembersofthe
NavyvesselsHuongGiang,ChiLangandKyHoa:May19,1963stelesonSpratlyIsland;May20,1963steleson
AmboynaCay;May22,1963stelesonThituandLoaitaIslands;andMay24,1963stelesonNorthEastCayand
SouthWestCay.Id.
126
the Spratlys as stated in the two documents, it certainly would have challenged Vietnams
comprehensive,open,andeffectivedisplayofauthorityoverthearchipelago.Thus,regardless
of whether Vietnams historical claims are valid, Hanoi may claim sovereignty over the South
China Sea islands as the successor state to France, which effectively occupied the two island
groupsinthe1930s.854
Nevertheless, some scholars argue that France relinquished its sovereignty over the
South China Sea islands after the Second World War by failing to reoccupy the islands after
1945, and failing to assert a claim to the archipelagoes at the 1951 San Francisco Peace
Conference.855Accordingly,asthesuccessorstatetoFrance,Vietnamhadnothingtosucceed
to because its predecessor had previously relinquished its sovereignty over the islands. This
argument,however,ignoresaseriesofstepstakenbyFranceandVietnamafterthewartore
assertsovereigntyovertheSpratlysandParacels.
French forces did not return initially to the Spratlys or Paracels after 1945 because
Chinese Nationalist forces were tasked with accepting the surrender of Japanese forces in
French Indochina north of 16 degrees north latitude.856 However, in June 1946, the
BougainvilleclassavisoSavorgnandeBrazzawasdispatchedtotheParacelstoreoccupythe
islands.857 Although French forces were withdrawn from the archipelago three months later,
when France learned that the ROC occupation force illegally remained on Woody Island
(Paracels)andItuAbaIsland(Spratlys)aftertheAlliedoccupationofIndochinaofficiallyended
in March 1946, the French government diplomatically protested the incursion on January 13,
1947.858
ThewarshipLeTonkinoiswasalsodeployedtotheParacelsonJanuary17,1947,totry
(albeit unsuccessfully) to eject the Chinese Nationalists from Woody Island.859 Subsequently,
the Frenchestablisheda headquarters on Pattle Island and, in late 1947, the French garrison
rebuilttheweatherstationthathadoperatedontheislandfrom1938to1944.860TheFrench
hydrographicsurveyshipIngenieurenchefGirodwaslaterdeployedtotheParacels,in1953,to
conductoceanographic,geologic,geographic,andecologicalstudies.861
854
855
B.Murphy,note29supra,atp.205;seealsoH.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.18;TaoCheng,note31
supra,atp.272.
856
GeneralOrderNumber1(September2,1945)provided,inpart,thattheseniorJapanesecommandersandall
ground,sea,airandauxiliaryforceswithinChina(excludingManchuria),FormosaandFrenchIndoChinanorthof
16northlatitudeshallsurrendertoGeneralissimoChiangKaishek.SupremeCommanderfortheAlliedPowers,
GeneralOrderNo.One,Sept.2,1945.
857
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.13;seealsoS.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.11;M.Chemillier
Gendreau,note15supra,atpp.39,116;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012).
858
M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.440441;M.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1179;M.ChemillierGendreau,
note15supra,atp.40.
859
M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.440441;seealsoM.Katchen,note120supra,p.1179;S.Tnnesson,note55
supra,atp.11(FrancemadeanunsuccessfulattempttoforceaChinesegarrisontoleaveWoodIsland.When
theChineserefused,Franceinsteadestablishedapermanentpresence,onbehalfofVietnam,onPattleIslandin
thewesternpartoftheParacels.).
860
M.Bennett,note14supra,atpp.440441;M.Katchen,note120supra,atp.1179;SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES
(2012).
861
127
France similarly engaged in a series of activities in the Spratlys to substantiate French

sovereigntyoverthearchipelagountilFrenchtroopswereultimatelywithdrawnfromIndochina
inAugust1956.InOctober1946,theFrenchbattleshipChevreudwasdeployedtotheSpratlys
and installed a sovereignty stele on Itu Aba Island to reassert French interests in the
archipelago.862Thefollowingmonth,whenFrancelearnedthatChinesenavalunitshadillegally
occupied Itu Aba, French authorities protested the action, demanding that the Nationalist
troops withdraw from the island.863 France likewise protested Philippine incursions in the
SpratlysafterTomasClomaproclaimedhissocalledFreedomlandintheeasternpartofthe
archipelago in May 1956, reminding the Philippine government that the Spratlys had been
French territory since 1933.864 The Bougainvilleclass aviso Dumont dUrville was also
dispatchedtoItuAbaIslandtodemonstrateFrenchVietnameseinterestinthearchipelago.865
DiminishedFrenchactivityintheSouthChinaSeaintheearly1950sisunderstandable,
given the remoteness of the islands, French military setbacks in the ongoing war, and the
emergence of an independent Vietnam. Moreover, given its new status as an independent
nation,itwaslogicalforVietnam,notFrance,toassertsovereigntyoverthearchipelagoesat
theSanFranciscoPeaceConferencein1951.Overall,theseeventsdonotdemonstrateintent
on the part of France to abandon its claims to the South China Sea islands until it ceded its
sovereigntyoverthearchipelagoestoSouthVietnamattheconclusionoftheFrenchIndochina
War.
Ample independent evidence exists to support a conclusion that the international
communityhas recognized Vietnamese sovereignty overthe Paraceland SpratlyIslands since
the17thcentury.TheJournalofBatavia,publishedbytheDutchEastIndiesCompanyin1634,
recordedincidentsshowingVietnamesejurisdictionovertheParacels.866PortugueseandDutch
mapsfromtheearly17thcenturylikewiseidentifytheislandsasVietnameseterritory.867
EvidenceofforeignrecognitionofVietnamesesovereigntyovertheParacelscanalsobe
tracedtodocumentsfromthe18thcentury.MysteredesatollsJournaldevoyageauxParacels
(MysteryoftheatollsJournalofthevoyagetotheParacelIslands),writtenin1701,reflects
that the Paracels belonged to the Kingdom of Annam.868 Similarly, a note written by French
Admiral Charles Henri dEstaing in 1768, following his aborted raid against the city of Hu,
recordedthepresenceofVietnamesenavalvesselsintheParacels.869Asubsequentmemoire
fromtheAdmiralin1759indicatedthatthecannonsemplacedonthewallsofLordVoVuongs
palacehadbeentakenfromshipswreckedontheParacels.870
Western writings from the 19th century likewise recognize Vietnams control of the
Paracels.JohnBarrowsAVoyagetoCochinchina(1806)containsadetaileddescriptionofthe
862
SOUTHCHINASEASTUDIES(2012),atp.3;seealsoT.Kelly,note133supra.
863
Id.
864
865
Id.
866
867
868
869
Id.
870
Id.
128
types of boats used by the Hoang Sa Company to exploit the resources of the islands.871
Additionally, books and maps published by French missionary Monseigneur JeanLouis
TaberdNote on the Geography of Cochinchina (1837),872 History and Description of the
Religion, Customs, and Morals of All Peoples (1838), and An Nam Dai Quoc Hoa Do (Tabula
Geographica Imperii AnnamiticiThe Map of the An nam Empire) (1838)describe the
ParacelsaspartofCochinchina.Similarly,JeanBaptisteChaigneausmemoires(Memoiressurla
Cochinchina)refertoEmperorGiaLongsannexationoftheParacelsin1816.873Areferenceto
theParacelsasVietnameseterritorycanalsobefoundinAdolpheDuboisdeJancignysJapon,
IndoChine, Empire Birman (ou Ava), Siam, Annam (ou Cochinchine), Pninsule Malaise, etc.,
Ceylan;874GermanmissionaryKarlGtzlaffsGeographyoftheCochinchineseEmpire(1849);875
Aldriano Balbis The Italian Compendium of Geography (1850);876 and the French geography
bookTableaudelaCochinchine(1862).877
Vietnam has also correctly pointed out that Japan tacitly acknowledged French
sovereigntyovertheParacelsin1927afteradisputearosebetweenFranceandJapanoverthe
Spratly Islands. According to a letter written by the Governor General of Indochina to the
Minister for the Colonies on March 20, 1930, the Japanese Counsel General in Hanoi was
instructedtounofficiallyinquireoftheFrenchauthoritiesaboutthestatusofseveralgroupsof
islands in the South China Sea. The Paracels, however, were explicitly excluded from the
discussionsbytheJapanesebecausethequestionofownershipoftheParacelIslandswasnot
indisputewithFrance.878
Chinese authors and Chinese geographical documents describing the limits of the
Chinese Empire confirm the accuracy of these Western writings. Hai Lus Hai Quoc Do Chi
(1730),879 a 1731 map of Kwangtung (Guangdong) Province, a description of the Quiongzhou
Prefecture,880 Hoang Chaos Map of the Unified Empire (1894),881 Zhongguo Dilixue Jiaokeshu
(ManualofGeographyofChina)(1906),882andLiHanzhungsGeographyofGuandong(1909)all
indicatethattheterminusofChineseterritoryintheSouthwasHainanIsland.883
Finally,theBritishForeignOfficedeterminedin1932thattheUnitedKingdomhadnot
perfecteditsinchoatetitletotheSpratlysandthereforecouldnoteffectivelyclaimsovereignty
over the archipelago.884 Subsequently, during the negotiations of the San Francisco Peace
871
Id.
872
873
H.ChiuandC.Park,note42supra,atp.7;seealsoM.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atp.69.
874
875
876
Id.,atp.183.
877
878
M.ChemillierGendreau,note15supra,atAnnex5(LetterNo.704AEx,dated20March1930,fromthe
GovernorGeneralofIndochina,Hanoi,totheMinisterfortheColonies,Paris).
879
Id.,atp.74.
880
Id.,atp.62.
881
Id.,atp.75.
882
Id.
883
Id.,atp.172.
884
Id.,atp.112;seealsoS.Tnnesson,note55supra,atp.7.
129
Treaty, the Foreign Office indicated in 1947 that the United Kingdom would not contest
FrancesclaimstosovereigntyovertheSpratlyIslands,whichBritainconsideredtobegoodin
law.885AustralialikewisesupportedFrenchclaimstothearchipelago.886
Onbalance,thereissufficientindependentevidencetosupporttheconclusionthatthe
international community recognized French/Vietnamese sovereignty of the South China Sea
islandsoverthatofChina/Taiwan.
C. Final Thoughts
Based on the arguments and evidence submitted by the claimants and general
principles of international law related to the acquisition of territory, it would appear that
VietnamclearlyhasasuperiorclaimtotheSouthChinaSeaislands.
VietnamstitletotheParacelsiswellfoundedinbothhistoryandlaw.Beginninginthe
early18thcentury,Vietnamdemonstratedaclearintenttoassertsovereigntyovertheislands
through the establishment of a governmentsponsored company to exploit and manage the
resourcesofthearchipelago.Thatintentwasconfirmedbytheannexationoftheislandsand
symbolic acts of sovereignty in the early 19th century, followed by peaceful, effective, and
continuousadministrationoftheislandsbysuccessiveNguyendynastiesuntiltheadventofthe
French colonial period. France continued to effectively administer the islands on behalf of
Vietnam and physically took possession and occupied the Paracels in the 1930s. Thereafter,
FrancecontinuedtoassertitssovereigntyovertheParacelsuntilitsdeparturefromIndochina
in1956.FollowingtheFrenchwithdrawal,SouthVietnam(andsubsequentlyaunitedVietnam)
effectively administered the islands and never ceased to assert Vietnamese sovereignty over
the archipelago, even after China illegally occupied a portion of the islands in 1956 and the
entirearchipelagoin1974.
Ontheotherhand,thefirstdemonstrationofChinesesovereigntyovertheParacelsdid
notoccuruntil1909,twocenturiesafterVietnamhadlegallyandeffectivelyestablisheditstitle
totheislands.Moreover,ChinasillegaloccupationofWoodyIslandin1956anditsoccupation
of the entire archipelago by force in 1974 clearly violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and
accordinglydonotconferaclearlegaltitletotheParacels.
WithregardtotheSpratlys,Franceannexedtheislandsasterranulliusinthe1930sat
thetime,occupationbyforcewasavalidmethodofacquiringsovereigntyoverterritory.Great
Britain, which had controlled some of the Spratly Islands in the 1800s, abandoned its claims
following the French annexation and effective occupation, so French title to the Spratlys was
legallyandsoundlyestablished.FrancestitletothearchipelagowascededtoSouthVietnamin
the 1950s and the South Vietnamese government (and subsequently a united Vietnam)
effectively and peacefully controlled the islands until ROC forces illegally occupied Itu Aba
Islandin1956andPRCforcesillegallyoccupiedanumberofisletsinthearchipelagoin1988.
TheROCsoccupationofItuAbaIslandin1946and1956,andthePRCsinvasionofthe
Spratlys in 1988, violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and cannot confer clear title to the
Spratlys to either Taiwan or China. The fact that China may have challenged Vietnamese
sovereigntyovertheSpratlysbetween1951and1988,rightsthatwerelegallycededbyFrance
885
886
130
toVietnam,doesnotinandofitselfcreateacleartitleforChina.Onthecontrary,Chinasclaim
totheSpratlyshasnolegalbasisininternationallaw.
Although Chinas claims to the Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal are not
contestedbyVietnamandhavenotbeendiscussedindetailinthispaper,itshouldbenoted
thatitishighlyquestionablewhetherChina(orTaiwan)canvalidlyclaimsovereigntyoverthese
twofeatures.
Macclesfield Bank and its surrounding shoals are located beyond the territorial sea of
anynationandarepermanentlysubmergedatlowtide.Therefore,thesefeaturesmaynotbe
claimedbyChinaoranyothernation.AlthoughtheICJhasstatedthatinternationaltreatylaw
issilentonthequestionwhetherlowtideelevationscanbeconsideredtobeterritory,and
thatthereisnocustomaryrulewhichunequivocallypermitsorexcludesappropriationoflow
tide elevations, the few rules in the law of the sea that govern lowtide elevations do not
justify a general assumption that lowtide elevations are territory in the same sense as
islands.887Moreover,theCourtnotedthatithasneverbeendisputedthatislandsconstitute
terrafirma,andaresubjecttotherulesandprinciplesofterritorialacquisition;[however,]the
difference in effects which the law of the sea attributes to islands and lowtide elevations is
considerable.888 Accordingly, the Court concluded that it is thus not established that in the
absenceofotherrulesandlegalprinciples,lowtideelevationscan,fromtheviewpointofthe
acquisitionofsovereignty,befullyassimilatedwithislandsorotherlandterritory.889
Chinas claim that it discovered Scarborough Shoal and has exercisedeffective control
overthereefforhundredsofyearssuffersfromthesameinfirmityasitsclaimstotheSpratly
and Paracel Islands discussed herein. There is absolutely no independent evidence to
corroborate Chinas assertion that it discovered and effectively occupied the shoal, which is
situated 170 nautical miles east of Macclesfield Bank and over 470 nautical miles from the
Chinese coast.890 Moreover, Chinas position that Scarborough Shoal is associated with the
MacclesfieldBankisuntenablemostexpertsagreethattheshoalcannotactuallybepartof
thebankfromageographicalstandpoint.891
PhilippineclaimstoScarboroughShoal,ontheotherhand,canbetracedtoSpanishand
American activities in the area during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.892 The shoal was
firstsurveyedbythePhilippinebasedSpanishfrigateSantaLuciainApril1800andtheresults
publishedinachartin1808.893DocumentsheldbytheSpanishHydrographicOffice(Anuariode
la Dirrectin de Hidrografa, ao 4, nmero 56, 1866) also describe search and rescue
operations conducted by Spanish Navy units based in the Philippines to assist mariners in
distressontheshoal,aresponsibilitythatwaslatertransferredtotheU.S.CoastGuardafter
887
MaritimeDelimitationandTerritorialQuestionsbetweenQatarandBahrain,Merits,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports
2001,p.40,atpp.101103;accordSovereigntyoverPedraBranca/PulauBatuPutehMiddleRocksandSouthLedge
(Malaysia/Singapore),Judgment,I.C.J.Reports2008,p.12,atpp.99101.
888
Id.
889
Id.
890
IfthetermZhongshaIslandsisregardedmerelyastheEnglishequivalentofMacclesfieldBank,then
ScarboroughShoaldoesnotformpartofthisgroup.Nevertheless,intheChineseconception,thetermZhonghsa
QundaoisnotlimitedonlytoMacclesfieldBank,butincludesScarboroughReefandothershoals.Id.
891
R.Beckman,note7supra;accordZ.Keyuan,note9supra.
892
F.Bonnet,note223supra.
893
Id.,atpp.89;accordD.HancoxandV.Prescott,note535supra,atp.24.
131
theUnitedStatestookpossessionofthePhilippinesaftertheSpanishAmericanWar.894These
activities occurred without Chinese consent or protest. Manila claims to have effectively
occupied the reef after it gained its independence from the United States in 1946 and
subsequentlybuiltandoperatedalighthouseontheshoalin1965.895Overtheyears,Philippine
authoritieshavealsoconductednumeroushydrographicandscientificresearchsurveysinthe
surrounding waters, have used the shoal as an impact range for military exercises, and have
exercisedlawenforcementjurisdictionoversmugglingandillegalfishingactivities,allofwhich
demonstratePhilippinesovereigntyoverthereef.896
894
Id.
895
R.Beckman,note7supra;accordZ.Keyuan,note9supra,atp.74.
896
Id.
132
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A CNA Occasional Paper

China versus Vietnam:

With a Foreword by CNA Senior Fellow Michael McDevitt

Distribution unlimited. for public release

Distribution unlimited. Specific authority contracting number: E13PC00009.

Approved by: August 2014

Ken E. Gause, Director

Copyright 2014 CNA

claimants, except Brunei, have established military outposts on a number of features.14

II. ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY

that the Guangdong Provincial Government of China had granted applications to

The Southwest Commissioner is seriously concerned with the incidents of France

The Chinese Government is very much concerned with[the Frenchdeclared

a. The SinoFrench Treaty of 1887

b. French Recognition before World War II

c. French Recognition after World War II

The Government of the Peoples Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an

e. World War II Documents

g. San Francisco Peace Conference

h. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Conference

i. North Vietnamese Indifference

j. Other Supporting Publications

Vietnamese scholars additionally point to a number of search and rescue operations

a. French Colonial Rule

A number of scientific studies of the islands were subsequently conducted by the

Notes of the Oceanographic Institute of Indochina in Nhatrang containing valuable

it is of the utmost importance for France to prevent any sign of occupation by a

France alsoprovided notice of theoccupation to China, Great Britain(Borneo, Brunei,

b. Return to South Vietnamese Control

An economic and scientific complex was constructed in the archipelago in August

1. Discovery versus Awareness

2. Probative Value of Historic Maps

in international territorialconflicts, maps merelyconstitute information which varies

3. Inchoate Title and Effective Occupation

Whether these activities actually occurred is open to question, as no independent

Declarationon Principles of International LawConcerningFriendly Relations andCooperation

a. Remote and Uninhabited Territories

Manifestations of territorial sovereignty assumedifferent forms, according to

Few territorial features in the worldcan more adequately be described as remote

b. Suzerain and Vassal

a. The SinoFrench Treaty of 1887

b. French Recognition before World War II

sufficient to establish incontrovertibly that Annam took effective possession of the

c. French Recognition after World War II

hydrographic survey ship Ingenieur en chef Girod conducted oceanographic, geologic,

e. World War II Documents

g. San Francisco Peace Conference

h. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Conference

i. North Vietnamese Indifference

j. Other Supporting Publications

B. Evaluating Vietnams Position

1. Historical Evidence and Maps

3. Effective Occupation and Administration

a. Effective Administration During the French Colonial Period

b. Effective Administration by South Vietnam

France similarly engaged in a series of activities in the Spratlys to substantiate French

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