POLSCI 324 ESSAY

Critical Analysis of the Botswanan and South Africa

as Developmental States

Jacobus Alberts: 19004702

Alberts, JD, Mnr <19004702@sun.ac.za>

[Email address]
Contents
The Developmental State ........................................................................................................................ 2
The Theory of the Developmental State ................................................................................................. 3
Developmental State Model features ...................................................................................................... 3
Critical Analysis of the Botswanan Democratic Developmental State ................................................... 4
Development-Oriented Political Leadership ....................................................................................... 4
Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy ........................................................................ 5
Presence of a Pilot Agency ............................................................................................................. 5
Insulation of Economic Bureaucrats ............................................................................................... 6
Social Embeddedness...................................................................................................................... 6
Meritocratic Recruitment and Compensation of Economic Bureaucrats ............................................ 7
Critical Analysis of South Africa as a Democratic Developmental State ............................................... 7
Development-Oriented Political Leadership ....................................................................................... 7
Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy ........................................................................ 8
Presence of a Pilot Agency ............................................................................................................. 8
Insulation of Economic Bureaucrats ............................................................................................... 9
Social Embeddedness...................................................................................................................... 9
Meritocratic Recruitment and Compensation of Economic Bureaucrats ............................................ 9
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 10
References ............................................................................................................................................. 11

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The Developmental State
This essay, is a critical analysis of the concept of the Developmental State, this essay does this
within the context of sub-Saharan Africa. With regards to this essay, the cases of South Africa
and Botswana will be critically analysed to determine to what extent these countries can be
considered Developmental States. This will be done by analysing these states in order to see if
they subscribe to the set characteristics of a Developmental State. Firstly, this essay will seek
to explore and define the concept of the Developmental State. Secondly, the essay outlines the
criteria for what constitutes a Developmental State with reference to the works if Adrian
Leftwich, Gordon White and various other theorists in this regard. Finally, this essay uses the
criteria, established earlier, to critically assess whether or not South Africa and Botswana can
be considered fully fledged Developmental States.

The term Developmental State is often a general term used to describe states which have
undergone rapid growth with regards to developmental and economic goals, this is achieved
through the involvement of bureaucracies which are both strong and efficient (Stubbs, 2009:
5). The Developmental State as a concept originates from the belief in the existence of a
relationship, with regards to, state actors and non-state actors, which is mutually beneficial. In
such a relationship, the market is influenced by state intervention in order to nurture and
promote societal developmental goals with regards to economic growth and development
(Woo-Cummings, 1999). Chalmers Johnson (1982), coined the term Developmental State in
his description of Japans Miracle economic recovery after the war with regards to the role of
the state in this success (Johnson, 1982).

Japan, due to the Japanese Miracle had effectively become the model for Developmental
States. As a result, scholars have begun to label Developmental States which arose from, the
East Asian experience, which took place from the 1950s to 1980s, Classical Developmental
States (Chang, 2010: 83). Classical Developmental states are usually characterised as having
strong independent bureaucracies, strong economic growth and their economies are usually
industrial based (Routely, 2012:11).Examples of Developmental States who ascribe to this
categorisation are Japan, Taiwan and South Korea (Routely, 2012: 11).

The definition of Developmental State for this essay will be one provided by Leftwich.
Leftwich defines the Developmental State as a state whose politics [] has concentrated
sufficient power, autonomy and capacity [] to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement
of [] specific developmental [] [goals], [] by establishing and the conditions and

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direction of economic growth (Leftwich, 1995: 401). Developmental States are considered
transitional form[s] of the modern state according to Leftwich, and are normally countries
which where late to industrialise (Leftwich, 2000: 167). Leftwich therefore stresses that
Developmental States are subject to change, and that due to their fluidity when the successful
achievement of the goal for economic growth could as a result lead to further transformation
of politics which would intern result in further change both economically and politically
(Leftwich, 2000: 168).

The Theory of the Developmental State

The Developmental State theory arose in the 1980s and 1990s, in accordance with Robert Wade,
the theory emphasises the crucial role of the interaction by a centralised state with the private
sector from a position of [] [superiority] so as to secure development[al] objectives (Wade,
1990). The theory seeks to explain how countries such as Japan among other East Asian
countries experienced rapid growth and development in their economies. It argues that this was
as a result of an interventionist state which took and active role in guiding economic growth
and development. The theory is a unique combination of both a centrally planned economy and
an open market, therefore it is neither socialist nor capitalist, but a union of state supervision
and private capital (Woo-Cummings, 1999: 2).

Developmental State Model features

According to Leftwich the model of the Developmental State is grounded on the notion that
dominant factor which influences the Developmental State and its success is politics (Leftwich,
2000: 154). Therefore, Leftwich argues that the driving force behind the emergence of
Developmental States and their developmental growth is shaped by politics (Leftwich, 2000:
154). He theorised that the political aspects such as nationalism, ideology and a wish to catch
up with the West (Leftwich, 2000: 154), prompt the emergence of such states. Leftwichs
model is built on predominantly on the experiences of South and East Asian countries, however
he also draws from African countries and their experience (Musamba, 2010: 16). Leftwich
(2000), suggests that there are specific features which characterise Developmental States.

The first is, that they are governed by Development-Oriented Political Leadership in reference
to political and bureaucratic elites which are incorruptible and dedicated to economic
transformation and growth (Leftwich, 2000: 160). In addition, the Developmental State is
unique in that the political-administrative interface is structured in the format where

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politicians reign and bureaucrats rule (Johnson, 1981: 12). This results in politicians in such
a state forfeiting their traditional role with regards to policy-making to bureaucrats which limits
their function to oversight with regards to the monitoring developmental policies to ensure they
align with the needs of the citizenry to ensure political stability and autonomy of the state
(Wade, 1990: 26). Autonomy with regards to the operating of state institutions and the elite is
essential in the Developmental State (Leftwich, 2000: 161). Developmental States are however
not totally separated from society despite their strong autonomy, instead the operate with
embedded autonomy, which is a union between strong bureaucracies and social structure,
with regards to and including state and non-state actors (Leftwich, 2000: 162; ). This union
further aids and informs the developmental goals of a Developmental State.

Furthermore, an Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy is a key characteristic of

Developmental States (Leftwich, 2000: 162). The requirement for an effective well-insulated
bureaucracy is the ability to create and administer clear developmental policies, furthermore in
fulfilling this role the bureaucracy should be protected from external political pressures
(Johnson, 1987: 142). In this regard, the coordination and oversight of development falls to
pilot agencies (Leftwich, 2000: 162), an example of which is Japans Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI). Furthermore, an effective well-insulated bureaucracy,
has the ability to manage, successfully, the states private economic interests, thereby enabling
control the state to control the development process with regards to the impact of national and
foreign capital, this is known as social embeddedness, a network of state and non-state actors
(Leftwich, 2000: 164). Finally, meritocracy is an essential feature, individuals who are most
competent are appointed and are regularly promoted based on their merit, and in addition they
are compensated similar rates as their counterparts in the private sector.

Critical Analysis of the Botswanan as a Developmental State

Development-Oriented Political Leadership
Botswanas success since its independence in 1966 has been as a result of its political
leadership with regards to the presidency and the elite have been accredited as the foremost
reason for its developmental success (Musamba, 2010:46). This is due to the pursuit of policies
centred on economic growth and development by the political elite in Botswana, they have
acquired a developmental orientation. The result is that Botswana is now considered a model,
showcasing how a dedicated political leadership can guide an underdeveloped country, to
socio-economic growth and development. Botswanas economic and democratic success was

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as a result of its two-pronged strategy of democratization and economic development which
was only possible due to strong leaders such as Seretse Khama and Quett Masire whose and
their guidance (Sebudubudu, 2010: 33). Seretse Khama as well as Botswanas other founding
leaders strived to eradicate corruption and wastefulness of any form, in the public office
(Sebudubudu, 2010: 37).

Botswanas constitution provides the president with a lot of power, resulting in the president
act[ing] with little review (Bodilenyane, 2012: 188), as all executive power lies with him
(Sebudubudu, 2010: 8). In Botswana the president appoint the judges due to the power the
constitution provides him with, as a result concerns have been raised with regards to the close
ties between the judiciary and the ruling party which brings into question the impartiality of
Botswanas judiciary. Furthermore, despite the presidencys given power, John Holm notes
that Botswanas president have consistently held a dominant power position as a result of the
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) constantly having a huge majority in parliament (Holm,
1996: 101). The result is the rubber stamping of most of the bureaucrats policies by Members
of Parliament (MPs) as they have no choice, a contributing factor to this is a lack of knowhow
by the MPs with regards to evaluating and critiquing policies (Holm, 1996: 102). In addition,
should a policy be contested the BDPs MPs exert strong political pressure (Holm, 1996: 102).
Moreover the presidents have succeeded in exerting complete control over their cabinets, this
is a result of careful selection by the presidency, which usually appoint individuals with a civil
service background, who have few political followers (Holm, 1996: 101). The role of the
appointees is to support the cabinet and parliament with regards to the positions they take
(Holm, 1996: 101).

Subsequently, the President of Botswana has substantial influence over the three branches of
government due to almost uncontested rule of the BDP and the power granted to him by the
constitution (Fakir, 2009: 6), has effectively subverted the principle of the separation of powers
which was supposed to be a mechanism for holding the president accountable Fakir, 2009: 6).
Due to this lack of accountability by the president to state institutions, Botswanas
Development Orientated Political Leadership fails to display the one of the features of
consensual autonomy which is a political leadership which is institutionally accountable.

Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy

Presence of a Pilot Agency
When assessing Botswanas success it is crucial to note the role which an effective, well-
insulated economic bureaucracy played in this transformation (Sebudubudu, 2010: 12).

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Botswana displays substantial levels of unity and centralisation in its internal bureaucratic
ranks, thus Botswanas economic bureaucracy has been safeguarded with regards to its pilot
agency, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP). The MFDP is considered
the, institutional nerve centre of the Botswana state and have guided Botswana towards
development due to power bestowed upon it by the executive which resulted in the other
ministries being held accountable by the MFDP, the consolidation of all of these other bodies
of power under the MFDP aids in creating coherent developmental goals (Sebudubudu, 2005:
83). The MFDPs institutional consolidation of taxation, planning, budgetary and regulatory
powers under one roof makes it a formidable pilot agency (Leftwich, 1995: 412). Furthermore,
in this regard the MFDP is tasked with piloting of Botswanas National Development Plan
(NDP), a crucial document showcasing Botswanas strategy with regards to medium term ( 6
years usually) development projects (Sebudubudu, 2010: 12). In addition, the NDP acts as a
division of power in that they separate the technocrats are given a lot of leeway with regards to
the formulation of policy for the NDP, however such policy still has to receive the approval of
governing officials before implementation. The result of this is further promotion of consensual
autonomy within Botswanas economic bureaucracy, because it is held to account through
political oversight, with regard to supervising politicians (Taylor, 2003: 48).

Insulation of Economic Bureaucrats

Botswanas developmental success has been centralized behind its ability to protect and
insulate its bureaucracy from external pressures both political and societal (Holm, 1996: 98).
This has been successfully done due to the role of the MDFP primarily, which is led by the
Vice president and housed within his office (Thovoethin, 2014: 263). The result of this is that
Botswanas economic and developmental planners have their plans backed by the executive,
therefore providing them with free reign with regard to formulation of policy (Holm, 1996:
100).

Social Embeddedness
The economic bureaucracy in Botswana has relative and consensual autonomy, they have
succeeded in socially embedding themselves into a network wherein they have created an
environment where politicians and bureaucrats, cattle ranchers and key business come together.
The states ability to meld the social and state sphere is characterised by social embeddedness
and is considered a critical factor in Botswanas road to success (Taylor, 2003: 23). The
platform for this convening of both government and private sector actors, in addition to other
important actors in the country is the High Level Consultative Conference (HLCC) and the

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National Business Conference, these actors regularly meet and consult with the government
about economic development through this platform (Taylor, 2003: 43). The result has been
favourable to both the private sector and national development as many developmental policies
in Botswana are informed by these conferences (Taylor, 2003: 43).

Meritocratic Recruitment and Compensation of Economic Bureaucrats

Botswana maintains a profoundly efficient economic bureaucracy through the use of
meritocratic recruitment, with regards to filling positions within its economic bureaucracy
(Thovoethin, 2014: 260). Despite a shortage of civil servants in the 1960s resulting in
Botswana being unable to independently run its civil service, however instead of grasping at
straws like other African countries in a similar position who decided to immediately localise
their bureaucracies to the detriment of meritocracy, Botswana chose to make use of expatriates,
whilst gradually localising their bureaucracy (Thovoethin, 2014: 260). Local bureaucrats where
first trained by expatriates where after they would assume the position held by them, the result
of this is that expatriates aided in the formulation of an economic bureaucracy which is highly
efficient, effective, competent and mostly not corrupt (Thovoethin, 2014: 260). Botswana,
manages to hold onto and attract the best officials through their economic bureaucracys
Parallel Progression (PP) framework, which is a program that provides expanding career
opportunities and incentives for civil services, the program has managed to successfully retain
bureaucrats as they have the same pay as their private sector counterparts (Thovoethin, 2014:
261).

Critical Analysis of South Africa as a Developmental State

Development-Oriented Political Leadership
Nelson Mandela, South Africas first post-apartheid president was regarded as being a
Development-Orientated leader, this was because he had a developmentalist ideological
view which meant he was strongly committed to social and economic development (Ayee,
2013: 265). Since Mandelas presidency South Africa has suffered a deficit of transformational
leadership due to the distinct lack of Development-Orientated leaders, despite claims with
regards to their dedication to development, from those who have followed Mandela in the office
of the president (Ayee, 2013: 266). According to Ayee the incapability of South Africa to
produce leaders who are Development-Orientated is as a result of the following factors. The
first issue according to Ayee is the failure to take a clear stance on political issues deemed
unpopular which has proven to yield negative result whereas a clear stance with regard to policy
would have been more practical (Ayee, 2013: 266). The example Ayee provides is that of

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transformation policy with regard to replacing white government officials immediately with
black employees who in some cases lacked the necessary skills to fulfil their obligations (Ayee,
2013: 266). The second factor, according to Ayee is corruption in the South African
government which are arguably at an all-time high, furthermore the lack of accountability for
these actions, despite established mechanisms of accountability, have been highly critiqued by
the citizenry (Ayee, 2013: 266). In addition the current president has been connected to various
allegations of corruption and nepotism with regards to Nkandlagate and Guptagate, the
result of all of this is the limiting of the emergence of Development-Oriented leaders in SA
(Ayee, 2013: 266). The third limitation to the emergence of Development-Orientated leaders
in SA is the promotion of patronage, an example of this is constant reshuffling of and expansion
of the cabinet by president Zuma on the basis of patronage (Ayee, 2013: 267). The fourth factor
is the failure to effectively manage the economy by political leaders, which has effectively
regressed any previous advances SA has made with regard to macroeconomics. Further
contribution to this regression is wasteful spending and misuse of government resources which
Ayee lists as the fifth factor, has resulted in high public debt (Ayee, 2013: 267).

The biggest factor with regards to SAs failure to produce Development-Orientated leaders is
the almost complete failure by parliament to hold the executive accountable, this failure is a
result of the ANC overwhelming hold on the National Assembly due to controlling the majority
of seats. The result is the compromising of the separation of powers, thereby subjecting
parliament to the wishes of the ANC executive, and therefore fail to operate with consensual
autonomy. Due to the aforementioned reasons SA is unable to pursue the Developmental State
model, as it is incapable of producing the required Development-Orientated leadership required
to successfully do so, as the leadership only seek to further their own interests and effectively
side-line national development (Ayee, 2013: 267).

Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy

Presence of a Pilot Agency
Post-apartheid South Africa did not have a Pilot Agency, however with the Zuma
administration coming to power they key development was the formation of the National
Planning Commission (NPC) in 2010 (Kraak, 2011: 350 & 355). The NPC consists of 26
individuals who are experts in the fields of finance, industry and development among others,
these individuals are appointed by the president and housed within his Office, and they
originate from outside the government (Ayee, 2013: 274). The responsibility of the NPC is to
manage, public-sector spending, budgeting and development planning (South Africa Vision

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2025), and any and all previous functions which the National Treasury fulfilled (Kraak, 2011:
356). The NPC is in a position to function as a pilot agency with regards to SAs
Developmental State, the NPC is afforded leverage over other departments providing it the
authoritative power to penetrate SA socioeconomic sphere effectively. However despite this
the NPC has failed to coordinate work done by other departments and therefore has failed to
establish institutional coherence in the economic bureaucracy of South Africa (Khuzwayo,
2013). This failure to establish institutional coherence, is indicative of divides in SAs
economic bureaucracy, with regards to the different departments (Khuzwayo, 2013).

Insulation of Economic Bureaucrats

The fact that the NPC consists of members outside of government has been a key positive
feature as it has afforded commissioners the necessary insulation, with regards to shielding
them from political pressures, when creating developmental plans as they can focus on the
national interest of development instead of political considerations (Republic of South Africa,
2011: 2). Furthermore these long-term policies have to be cleared by the Ministerial Committee
on Planning and by cabinet before they are implemented (Kraak, 2011: 356).

Social Embeddedness
South Africas economic bureaucracys autonomy both relative and consensual is socially
embedded within the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC)
which is a network that brings both state and private business actors among other important
actors together to discuss socioeconomic policy (Ayee, 2013: 269). The NEDLAC functions
as an important means of communication between state and non-state actors with regards to
creation and coordination of South Africas developmental policy (Ayee, 2013: 269).

Meritocratic Recruitment and Compensation of Economic Bureaucrats

Post 1994 South Africas government has sought to implement meritocracy within the civil
service (Naidoo, 2013: 261). To do so the New Public Management (NPM) reforms were
introduced, this included the formation of the Senior Management Service (SMS) in 2001
(Ayee, 2013: 270). However the SMS has failed in its goal of attracting and retaining skilled
individuals, this is evident in the high vacancy rate of senior positions in management (Naidoo,
2013: 261). The vacancies in economic departments is attributed to inadequate compensation
of senior managers by the South African economic bureaucracy in comparison to their counter
parts in the private sector. Furthermore, despite reforms promoting meritocracy the
appointment of civil servants remains very political, the ANC has justified the appointment of
cadres by stating loyal party hands are whats needed (Naidoo, 2013: 266). This resulted in

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the appointment of incompetent appointees who lack managerial experience and the necessary
skill to fulfil their obligations.

Conclusion
In conclusion, this essay has established certain features which is required for a state to be
considered a Developmental State and has critically analysed both Botswana and South Africa
with regards to this criteria. In this regard, this essay has determined that both of these states
do not fully comply with the determined criteria for what constitutes a Developmental State.
Despite this Botswana does showcase a number of the set criteria, however South Africa is a
long way off before it can be considered a Developmental State.

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