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Science
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of
Secularity: A Difficult Equation
Armando Salvatore
This article probes into the issue of secularity as a main node of the historic constr
tion of modem power and the modem state in Europe. It builds an interpretative arc
ranging from the Spanish Reconquista, stretching through the European Wars of Religio
and the resistance to the "Turkish Threat" of the encroaching Ottoman armies, and rea
ing into the contemporary predicament of the presence of a growing population of Musli
background in the key states of Western Europe, notably those involved in the Reconquist
the resistance to the "Turkish Threat", and in the Wars of Religion. The analysis match
the interpretation of these historical traumata with philosophical and sociological reflections
from Spinoza and Vico to Asad and Casanova. The conclusions point to the inhere
ambivalence and arbitrary character of the modem secular distinction between religion an
politics. They suggest that the philosophical utopia of secularity is still an open issue fo
the European states and that the growing presence of Islam in Europe helps give eviden
of the limits of the secular arrangements reigning in the continent thus far.
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secutan f: A Difficult Equation *413
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414 Armando Sakatore
and conceptual node that affects the place of "religion" and "secularity"
in the Euro-Islamic equation. Reaching its climax in the events of the late
fifteenth century which saw the collapse of Muslim rule, the genocidal
persecution of the Muslim population, the unification of the Spanish crown
and the beginning of colonial exploitation of the Americas this story
provides us with one of the two main segments of the equation. The other
main segment is a result of the intra-Christian Wars of Religion that would
hold sway in Western and Central Europe soon thereafter, in tandem with
the beginnings of colonial enterprises and the deepening of state-building
processes. The first segment of the equation, which is also its necessary
condition, suggests that a specific form of religious fanaticism was func
tional to the mobilization of a new modern type of state-centred violence,
to which earlier forms of tolerance, co-existence, pluralism and cultural
exchange were sheer obstacles. The second segment of the equation, or its
sufficient condition, embraces the sectarianism of the various ramifications
moderate and radical of the Protestant Reformation and the ensu
twentieth century does not invalidate the equation, but points to the inde
terminacy on which the equation rests. Is "religion" structurally on the los
ing side in the construction of modern power? If not, why do we assume
that secularity is quintessentially modern? Does it become essential to the
construction of the modern European state due to its power to erase, mar
ginalize and privatize religion or, instead, its capacity to shape "religion"
in a particularly effective way?
If we merely examine the equation not in terms of a static binary
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation *415
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416* Armando Sahatore
rule and, therefore, as the locus of the care of the souls of the lay peo
ple. Once the modern notion of individual property started to gain ground,
this idea of passage from a self-enclosed religious life building the kernel
of a holistic conception of humanity in the service of God, to an expanded
domain of common life, was transposed into the market realm. Secularization
ended up designating the release of ecclesiastical property into private hands
and market circulation (Asad, 2003:192). On the other hand, the notion
of secularity that crystallizes after the Enlightenment and, in particular,
within anthropological and sociological theory in a singular symbiosis
with the transformations of theological discourse can no longer be under
stood as the outcome of further shifts and transpositions of its medieval
meaning. As a result of an epistemic rupture, the other end of the spec
trum that is, the religious life broke free from its link to the saecu
lum and ended up signifying "a variety of overlapping social usages rooted
in changing and heterogeneous forms of life". Social science discourse,
however, squeezed these "into a single immutable essence" designated "the
object of a universal human experience called 'religious'" [ibid.: 31). Asad
indicts Durkheim for establishing, on the basis of this insulation of "reli
gion", a transhistorical opposition between sacred and profane; hence,
between the "religious" and the "secular".
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation 417
Under the hands of Thomas [Aquinas] the term political begins to assume
its modem meaning; the Gelasian dichotomy of spiritual and temporal pow
ers began to be replaced by the modem dichotomy between religion and
politics. With Thomas, the political sphere, in the modern sense, was still
completely oriented towards the spiritual, but the beginning of the momen
tous evolution that led, through the Lockean privatization of religion and
the assignment of a public monopoly to politics, to the totalitarian integra
tion of an intramundane spirituality into the public sphere of politics can be
discerned {ibid.: 220).
The internal impetus, but also the contradictions of the Axial Renaissance,
are best revealed through its vanguards the new monastic and popu
lar movements whose lan and power climaxed with the activities of the
new mendicant orders that were formed in the early nineteenth century.
The Dominicans and the Franciscans drew their force from the emerging
secular worlds of the towns and from the thriving urban economies, whereby
saeculum was still mainly intended in its above-explained medieval meaning
and was not yet married to the power machinery of the modern state.
Keeping these historic precedents in mind, we need to dismantle and
redefine the loaded notion of secularity by avoiding a pre-emptive cultur
alization of its meaning and by paying all due attention to the power rela
tions it entails between state authorities and religious groups, and also to
the metamorphosed notion of power that it incorporates. The hypothesis
pursued here is that secularity manifests itself in concrete power relations
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418* Armando Sahatore
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation 419
For Spinoza, a sharp critic of priestly power and superstition, the only
criteria for judging the truth of religions is practical, that is, through the
assessment of their capacity to institute justice and caritas. These clearly
do not exist and here he agrees with Hobbes in the state of nature
(Preus, 1989:90-91). Religion is constituted pragmatically for its appeal to
the imagination of the common man and for its capacity to instill in him
the dispositions that support the social link between ego and alter. He sees
the kernel of thus conceived religion in practical action rooted in good dis
positions and, therefore, as separated, in principle, from the external realms
of politics and law: "Inasmuch as [religion] consists not so much in outward
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420 Armando Salvatore
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation 421
The next move was a truly sociopolitical experiment. The king ordered
the construction of a large cathedral with several pulpits for the various
"reconstructed" religious sects. The goal was to ascertain through public
discourse and open dialogue which group was closer to religious truth. The
outcome proved the opposite of what was expected: there was no end to
the mutual attacks among the religious representatives who denounced one
another as false and heretical. An acute threat to public order became
apparent. The wise king had to draw the obvious conclusion, with wisdom
here implying a readiness to take an uncompromising, sovereign decision
to ban all religious disputes from the public sphere, and to grant religious
freedom to all.
The motif that emerges from the story is one of the failed attempt at
instituting a neutral public cult as desired by Spinoza while keeping and
even strengthening the principle that the basic value for the republic is
public order, the sine qua non of res publica. This outcome, however, is
not purely celebratory in the novel. The emerging secular principle pre
vents conflict but suffocates dialogue, and makes diversity invisible. Any
religious identity has to be made private enough so as not to diminish
public loyalty to the state, which is essential to the preservation of the
state's authority and the rights of individual citizens. This is conducive to
a monological political culture. The message is that "religion derives from
the political regime and not the political regime from religion" (quoted in
Israel 2001:321). Outward religion has to comply with political considera
tions. Inward religion cannot go public, however, it cannot be obviously
banned as the subject is sovereign in the inner forum. This motif has
become crucial to modern and contemporary notions of secularity. Secularity
rests, therefore, on a combined idea of inwardness, subjectivity, sovereignty,
agency, and responsibility. As remarked by Talal Asad:
At least as far back as John Locke, 'person' was theorized as a forensic term
that called for the integration of a single subject with a continuous con
sciousness in a single body. The development of property law in a nascent
capitalism was important to this conception. But equally important was the
way attributing an essence to him helped the human subject to become an
object of social discipline. (Asad 2003:74)
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422 Armando Sahiatore
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation *423
the Islam of the philosophers and some Sufis rather than the Islam of the
ulamaThis vision clearly unsetdes traditional telos but strives towards its
arduous, piecemeal and, therefore, potentially revolutionary reconstruction.
Human beings are multitudes, as recognized by Aquinas, but not ineluctably
disintegrated, as asserted by Hobbes. The needed res publica is not neces
sarily a Leviathan that devours all heterogeneity. Ethnic cleansing and cul
tural assimilation are not the markers of such a state.
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424 Armando Sahiatore
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation *425
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426 Armando Sahatore
What we now retrospectively call the social, that all inclusive secular space
that we distinguish conceptually from variables like 'religion', 'state', 'national
economy', and so forth, and on which the latter can be constructed, reformed, and
plotted, didn't exist prior to the nineteenth century. Yet it was precisely the
emergence of society as an organizable secular space that made it possible for
the state to oversee and facilitate an original task by redefining religion's
competence: the unceasing material and moral transformation of its entire
national population regardless of their diverse 'religious' allegiances (Asad,
2003:190-91).
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation *427
No further historical excursions are needed to note that both the diag
nostic and the legally binding dimensions of this trajectory of secularity
and religion in Europe does not fit well into the variety of historical expe
riences of the Muslim world, nor do they cover adequately the history and
vicissitudes of those parts of former Latin Christian Europe where religion
was not so divisive. In those regions, religion did not produce sectarian
radicalism mainly due to the capacity of the Catholic Church to close
ranks and institute state-like instruments of repression and control after the
Reformation.
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428 Armando Sahatore
The root of the idea of public Islam can be found in Jos Casanova's
definition of "public religion" and is strictly related to a discussion of sec
ularity. From his book, Public Religions in the Modern World (1994), to a more
recent essay explicidy embracing Islam as the present and future candi
date for a positive role as a public religion (2001), Casanova has brought
fresh insights into a situation of conceptual deadlock concerning the ques
tion of whether secularity allows or prevents public religion(s) to emerge
and thrive. The kernel of Casanova's argument is interestingly related to
the redefinition of religion that goes back to Spinoza; this redefinition is
eminendy functional (though not functionalist) and, thus, one full step back
from the liberal secular essentialization of religion. For Casanova, justice
and doing-good-to-others (caritas in the Christian terminology of virtues)
are enduring and even expanding parts of the code of most religious groups,
including the established ones. Discourses of justice and human solidarity
increase in importance for those communities and groups that see their
mandate as a global one. These codes do not simply "invade" the arena
of politics, but create an organic link between "social" and "political" fields.
The late-Enlightenment dream of creating a pure field of politics governed
by a discourse of reason mediated in the public sphere is eroded by the
transversal penetration of a religious code that finds ramifications, new
allies and new foes in broad sectors of society.
By reconstructing a Toquevillean model of civil and public religion,
Casanova reinterprets secularity as fair play governed by the rules of the
public democratic game. Therefore, it does not impinge on forms of life,
but facilitates a representation of values in the democratic process within
the public sphere. Among those representing values publicly, religious groups
have probably the best cultural equipment in society. This capacity legit
imizes "public religion" in an institutionally secular environment. At the
very least, this reinterpretation of secularity evidences tensions and cross
currents within it: Is secularity more than sheer rule-setting? Or does it
entail the risk of being value-indifferent or even promoting negative (for
its own stated goals) values if public religion does not come to its rescue?
Can forms of a-religious humanism survive without keeping a religious sub
stratum of cultivation of human values? Is secularity, then, an essentially
contested and contestable concept, or does it predetermine modes of gov
ernance or even life forms even if it is not meant to do that?
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation 429
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430 Armando Sahatore
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation 431
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432 Armando Salvatore
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation 433
the Ottoman state was dubbed, with dubious taste, the "Sick Man of
Europe") was a fragile interlude before the twisting of imperial rivalries at
the turn to the twentieth century. It was again, however, a Grotian idea
to proclaim "infidels were neighbors and so should be the object of protec
tion and love" provided they did not violate natural law as developed from
within Christian European philosophical and legal theories (Asad, 2003:163).
What excluded the Ottomans from the European scene until the balance
of power was definitively tilted in favour of the European powers was no
longer the fact that they were "infidels", but simply that they were not,
or not yet considered, adequate subjects of natural law: they were simply
seen as inferior on a civilizational scale centred on the emerging political
cultures of North-Western Europe (ibid.: 164).
In this long-term process of building secularity and inscribing it not
only into state law but into international law, we see an increasing imma
nentization and essentialization of religion based on transformed Christian
tenets of natural law. This secularity is a far cry from the nostalgic Islamo
Jewish tolerance of Tariq Ali and his Banu Hudayl. Are Tariq Ali's char
acters longing for an "alternative model" of Euro-Islamic secularity? One
thing cannot be denied: it would be a huge misconstruction to try to rein
vent Spinoza, who is the hero of the ethicization and immanentization of
the Andalusian Islamo-Jewish heritage as applied to European Christian
sectarian warfare, as a critic of the modern, optimally republican state that
was on its way to secularity at his time. In many ways, Spinoza was the
apologist of this type of state power. Spinoza metabolized the Euro-Islamic
equation into a purely European one. Indeed, the only alternative for the
Banu Hudayl was not any existing counter-model, but just their dream of
being rescued by the Ottoman Sultan against the genocidal encroachment
performed by the sacred alliance between the cross and the crown. This
help never arrived.
The decline of the political and military power of the Ottoman Empire
in the nineteenth century and the construction of colonial empires by the
European powers secularized the European religious self-understanding into
the racialized idea of the "white man's burden" in the task of civilizing
non-Europe. At the same time, when the imperialistic expansion and conflicts
were spiraling, Europe's dominant classes deepened their ambitions to purify
national cultures from identities and allegiances considered dangerous to
the homogeneity of the polity. The culmination of the rivalry between
European imperial powers in the two devastating world wars and the
Holocaust gave way, in the second half of the twentieth century, to a
process of economic and, later, political integration that was marked, at
its very outset, by a renewed search for a collective European identity that
racial imperialism, Islamophobia and Judeophobia had substantiated in the
era of nationalism and imperialism.
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434 Armando Salvatore
If the secularization thesis no longer carries the conviction it once did, this
is because the categories of 'politics' and 'religion' turn out to implicate each
other more profoundly than we thought. . . Trae, the 'proper domain of
religion' is distinguished from and separated by the state in modern secular
constitutions. But formal constitutions never give the whole story. On the
one hand objects, sites, practices, words, representations even the minds
and bodies of worshippers cannot be confined within the exclusive space
of what secularism names 'religion.' They have their own ways of being. The
historical element of what come to be conceptualized as religion have dis
parate trajectories. . . . The unceasing pursuit of the new in productive effort,
aesthetic experience, and claims to knowledge, as well as the unending strug
gle to extend individual self-creation, undermines the stability of established
boundaries (Asad, 2003:201).
However sharp Asad's critique, it does not confute, but confirms, the pos
sibility or even necessity of public religion as theorized by Casanova, pro
vided we acknowledge: a) that in the case of the Catholic Church, we are
still far away from a fair acknowledgement of the political rules of the
game; and b) that the publicness of public religion can only become legit
imate if it overcomes the post-Christian bias of majority political cultures
and states in Europe. Public Islam can only become viable and legitimate
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation 435
under these two crucial conditions. Such a scenario could develop into a
third segment of the Euro-Islamic equation, potentially including the key
variables in its solution. The condition for public religion to unfold and
thrive would be that all religious groups and institutions are allowed to
play a crucial role within the reproduction and negotiation of value sys
tems on a fair and equal basis.
Nonetheless, we should heed Asad's warnings that the root of the
problem, and the limitation of the solutions currently traded, lie in the fact
that secularity is not easily soluble into post-secular arrangements based on
any type of "cultural dialogue" because its institutional kernel the insti
tutions of modern citizenship within nation-states is intrinsically built
on the European post-Christian, post-Enlightenment and post-imperial, cul
tural self-understanding of majorities. These are intended that is, they
understand themselves not merely as fluctuating political-electoral but
as stable cultural and national, sometimes even civilizational majorities.
Every group that does not belong to such a majority is, therefore, con
sidered a minority to be watched and monitored, and is continuously
required to prove its loyalty. Therefore, hopes for a cultural dialogue and
a fair participation of religious groups in public life depend on whether a
dialogic re-foundation of the European public sphere by eroding the
mythical, ethnic and cultural foundations of the nation-states will dis
solve the idea of cultural majorities and overcome the limitations of polit
ical and religious tolerance as conceived and practiced so far, and open
the way to public Islam as an important instance of public religion as
identified by Casanova to become one of the factors of the new Europe.
Usually, however, a public dialogue and pattern of fairness, as exemplified
by the above-mentioned work of Vico, cannot be established merely by
the intrinsic virtue of a political programme but can only emerge through
conflict.
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436 Armando Salvatore
but created another that exists at a deeper level and appears to be more
intractable, as demonstrated by the current stalemate of the Euro-Islamic
equation. It is difficult to deny that secularity encroaches on the concrete
life forms and modes of governance of populations and their bodies, and
feeds into biopolitical machineries. It is clear that the implications of sec
ularity go beyond this mere reduction and confinement of religion to a
"sphere" of individual or, at most, non-political "community" life. Secularity
presupposes and continuously produces notions of agency, that is, action
and passion. Current liberal secular parlance well reflected in the dis
course of NGOs is entrenched in a specific legal notion of the agent,
pointing to "the act of giving power to someone and to someone's power
to act [that] becomes a metaphysical quality defining secular human agency"
(Asad, 2003:79). There is not enough space in the official legal-public sphere
for notions of empowerment and agency based on less subjectivist and
more relational views. Yet, these alternative notions do gain public space
and make it more complex through the actions and movements of indi
vidual and collective actors who reconstruct religious identities and notions
of justice. In contemporary Europe, these include several Muslim groups
that play on a number of levels by expounding on "their" Islam (or lack
thereof) in various and often conflicting ways.
While European societies appear to be seeking new secular balances,
the institutional mechanisms of the state are at risk of becoming ever more
entrenched in a surpassed and ineffective vision of secularity. The syn
drome of Krinke Kesmes represents the actual predicament of the Euro
Islamic landscape. While Casanova's view of the legitimacy of public religion
is analytically insightful and enriches the Euro-Islamic equation in positive
ways, one cannot turn a blind eye to the dark side of the current predica
ment, as highlighted by Asad's following warning:
Note
1. Rahman, 1958 for the complex relationship between philosophy and "ortho
doxy" in Sunni Islam, in particular with regard to the interpretations of prophecy
that had a crucial impact on Spinoza's approach.
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The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation *437
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