Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
JASMINE WILEY
Plaintiff,
v.
Defendants.
corporation, Police Officer Michael Babicz and Police Officer George Adamidis (Officers), by
and through its attorneys, KLEIN, THORPE AND JENKINS, LTD., and in support of their Rule
INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiff filed her four-count Complaint at Law (Complaint) in this matter against
the Village and the Officers alleging (1) Section 1983 unlawful search and seizure; (2) Section
1983 Excessive Force; (3) Section 1983 False Arrest; and (4) Illinois State law claim
indemnification against the Village of Maywood. A true and accurate copy of the Complaint is
All counts of the Complaint should be dismissed because they fail to allege facts giving
rise to a plausible right to relief against the Defendants. Further, all federal counts of the
Complaint should be dismissed against the Village of Maywood because there is no Monell
claim alleged and a municipality cannot be held liable for its employees actions under Section
371092_1
Case: 1:16-cv-07935 Document #: 9 Filed: 10/07/16 Page 2 of 11 PageID #:18
1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Finally, any State law claims against the Defendants are
The allegations of the Complaint are sparse. The allegations consist of (1) the Plaintiff
was driving in Maywood; (2) the Plaintiff was stopped by the Officers with no legal basis; (3)
the Plaintiff was arrested with no legal basis; (4) the Plaintiff was nine months pregnant; and (5)
the Plaintiff was forcibly removed from her vehicle, thrown to the ground and injured, all with
ARGUMENT
After excising the Plaintiffs unsupported legal conclusions, the Complaint is nothing
more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of its various Section 1983 claims. Therefore,
A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what theclaim is and
the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
which, when accepted as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 570. A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable of the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556.
The allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. at 555.
A complaint that merely alleges facts demonstrating the possibility that a claim exists is
371092_1 2
Case: 1:16-cv-07935 Document #: 9 Filed: 10/07/16 Page 3 of 11 PageID #:19
insufficient. Moreover, a claim containing allegations that are merely consistent with a
defendants liability, stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief. Id. at 557; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action will
not do. Trombly, 550 U.S. at 555. [A] court considering a motion to dismiss canbegin by
identifying allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. After excising the allegations not entitled to a
presumption of truth, the role of the court is to determine whether the remaining factual
In this case, after excising the legal and factual conclusions from the Complaint, all that
the Complaint alleges is that: (1) the Plaintiff was driving in Maywood; (2) she was nine months
pregnant; (3) she was stopped by the Officers; (4) she was forcibly removed from her vehicle and
thrown to the ground causing injuries; and (5) she was arrested. Complaint, 8-11. These
allegations do not give rise to a plausible entitlement to relief for any count in the Complaint.
These allegations are the only allegations of the Complaint entitled to a presumption of
truth. Even assuming these allegations are true, they leave the Court speculating as to whether
the force used was reasonable, whether the arrest was justified and whether the search and
seizure were justified. Accordingly, the Complaint should be dismissed because the Plaintiffs
right to relief, as currently pled, does not rise above the speculative level.
371092_1 3
Case: 1:16-cv-07935 Document #: 9 Filed: 10/07/16 Page 4 of 11 PageID #:20
While it is not entirely clear, the Complaint could be construed as seeking liability
against the Village under Section 1983. However, any such claims should be dismissed because
As this Honorable Court is well aware, municipality liability under Section 1983 must be
direct and not vicarious. Monell v. N.Y. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018
(1978). A municipality may not be sued under 1983 for an alleged injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents. Id. Rather, a 1983 claim can stand only when execution of a
governments policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or those whose edicts or act may
fairly be said to represent the official policy, inflicts the injury. Id. The Seventh Circuit has
(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2)
a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express
municipal policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or
usage with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury
was caused by a person with final policymaking authority.
Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 205 F.3d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In this case, through Count IV, the Plaintiff is arguably seeking relief directly against the
Village for the acts of the Officers. To the extent this is true, the claims against the Village
should be dismissed because the Plaintiff has not alleged municipal liability based on an express
Village policy, a widespread, permanent and well-settled practice, or that the Plaintiffs injury
371092_1 4
Case: 1:16-cv-07935 Document #: 9 Filed: 10/07/16 Page 5 of 11 PageID #:21
III. State law claims asserted by the Plaintiff are barred by the statute of limitations
Employees Tort Immunity Act, no civil actionmay be commenced in any court against a local
entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the
date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued. 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a).
Count IV of the Complaint is labeled a State law claim. The injury at issue in this case
was allegedly received on September 16, 2014, and the Plaintiffs cause of action accrued at that
time. Complaint, 8. On August 8, 2016, the Complaint was filed. To the extent that the
Complaint alleges any State law claims against the Village and/or the Officers, the claims are
respectfully request that this Honorable Court grant the Defendants Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss and dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint at Law in its entirety, and for further relief as may be
Respectfully submitted,
DEFENDANTS
Jason A. Guisinger
Klein, Thorpe and Jenkins, Ltd.
20 N. Wacker Drive, Ste. 1660
Chicago, IL 60606
(312) 984-6400
jaguisinger@ktjlaw.com
ARDC No. 6286291
371092_1 5
Case: 1:16-cv-07935 Document #: 9 Filed: 10/07/16 Page 6 of 11 PageID #:22
Case: 1:16-cv-07935 Document #: 9 Filed: 10/07/16 Page 7 of 11 PageID #:23
Case: 1:16-cv-07935 Document #: 9 Filed: 10/07/16 Page 8 of 11 PageID #:24
Case: 1:16-cv-07935 Document #: 9 Filed: 10/07/16 Page 9 of 11 PageID #:25
Case: 1:16-cv-07935 Document #: 9 Filed: 10/07/16 Page 10 of 11 PageID #:26
Case: 1:16-cv-07935 Document #: 9 Filed: 10/07/16 Page 11 of 11 PageID #:27