Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 126

..




- , . .
- , .
..

Nonsense, brother, what do you want with documents? There


are orders for dealing with them. The point is to take away his estate
without any regard to law and leave him a beggar.
Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin. Dubrovsky

.
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,
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..

and the secretary began in a high-pitched voice to read


the courts decision. We quote it in full, believing that everyone will
be pleased to learn one of the methods whereby in Russia a man can
lose an estate to which he has incontestable rights.
Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin. Dubrovsky

..

1
RAIDERSTVO
CORRUPT RAIDING AND HOSTILE TAKEOVERS

Ararat L. Osipian

2
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.., 2011

3
Referees:

V. B. Supyan, Professor
Deputy Director and Head of the Department of Economics
Institute of the USA and Canada Studies RAN

A. V. Apanasenok, Professor
Department of History
Southwest Federal University

Osipian, Ararat L. Raiderstvo: Corrupt raiding and


hostile takeovers. Kramatorsk: KEHI Press, 2011. 840 p.

This book presents theoretical and empirical


investigation of the socio-economic and legal nature of
corporate, property and land raiding and its impact on the
process of creation of new economic structures in Russia and
Ukraine. This research defines raiding as well as its place and
role in the process of transition from plan-directive to market
economy. It also addresses major foundations and main forms of
raiding. A substantial part of the book is devoted to the
integrative scholarly synthesis with the special emphasis on
theoretical aspects of raiding.
Key words: corruption, economic transition, hostile
takeover, property rights, corporate raiding, raiders
JEL codes: I22, K42, P26, P31, P37

The book is intended for professors, scholars, post-


graduate students, students, public officials, leaders of NGOs
and businesses, all who are interested in issues of raiding,
corruption, and privatization.

Osipian, A.L., 2011

5
- , . .
- , .
.. . 1841.

Nonsense, brother, what do you want with documents?


There are orders for dealing with them. The point is to take
away his estate without any regard to law and leave him a
beggar.
Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin. Dubrovsky. 1841.


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12

1
1.1.
82

3
3.1. ( %
), 1999-2004 . 275

4
4.1.
, 2000-2006 . 298
4.2. , 2000-2007 .
( ; ;
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4.3. , 2000-2007
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5.1.

, 1999-2003 . 422

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, 1995-2007 ., . 482
6.2. ( %
), 2004 . 510
6.3. ,
( %
), 2004 . 511

13
6.4. , ( %
), 2008, 2009 . 515
6.5.
( % ), 2007-2009 517

7
7.1. ,
, 1980-1990 ., . 542
7.2.

1 1991 . 544
7.3. ,
, 1980-
1990 546
7.4.
, 1980-1990, . 548
7.5.
, 2000-2001 552
7.6.
1992-2009 559
7.7. 1992-
2009 563
7.8.
1992-2009 567
7.9.
1992-2009 571
7.10.
2007-2009 574
7.11.
1998-2009 578
7.12.
1998-2009 :
582
7.13.

14
1998-2009 :
585
7.14.
1998-2009 :
591
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, %, 2006-2010 . 597
7.16.

, 2008
2009 . 650

15

2
2.1. 143

3
3.1. 230

7
7.1.
558
7.2.
1992-2009 561
7.3.
1992-2009 , 562
7.4. 1992-
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565
7.5.
1992-2009 569
7.6.
1992-2009 573
7.7.
2007-2009 575
7.8.
1998-2009 580
7.9. ,

1998-2009 584
7.10.


1998-2009 587

16
7.11.



1998-2009 588
7.12.


1998-2009 590
7.13.
1998-2009 :
592
7.14.

,
2008 2009 . 651

17
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword 7
LIST OF TABLES 13
LIST OF FIGURES 16

INTRODUCTION 39

I. PHENOMENON OF RAIDING: THEORY, HISTORY


AND MODERNITY 66
1.1. Corporate raiding as we know it 66
Raiding in foreign research 66
Defensive strategies of western firms 80
Problem of raiding in post-soviet research 91
1.2. Historical roots of raiding: from Dubrovsky to
Raider 99
Historical terms and examples of raiding 99
Raiding in western classics 108
Raiding in Russian classics 117
1.3. Concluding remarks 127

II. THEORY OF RAIDING 133


2.1. Theoretical explanation of raiding in transition
economy 133
Am I a trembling creature or do I have the right?
Defining raiding 133
Alienation-appropriation: the inversion character of
raiding 144
Nature, causes and basis of raiding 155
Chronology of raiding: waves of privatisation 167
2.2. Takeovers without mergers: a culture of raiding 184
Raiding at the highest levels 184
Takeovers without mergers 190
Anti-raiding culture: if cant pay with money, pay with

18
respect 201
2.3. Concluding remarks 211

III. ORGANIZATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL


ASPECTS OF RAIDING 217
3.1. Organizational forms of raiding: client, organizer, and
executor 217
This bastard knows how to handle the business 217
Client, organizer, and executor 225
Chronicles of ancient sieges or the war of high fences 231
ChOPs and MVD: the right to defend 238
3.2. Institutional aspects of raiding: Legitimacy of
property and illegality of raiding 246
Transaction costs and forest wolfs 246
Western investors and post-soviet polycentrism 255
Legitimacy of property and re-nationalisation 263
Everyone to Barnaul! Or Where to search for Lonia
Golubkov 278
3.3. Concluding remarks 284

IV. STATE AND RAIDER AND STATE-RAIDER 290


4.1. State and raider 290
Optimization of the state 290
Economically active bureaucracy 298
State against raiding 307
4.2. State-raider 313
Amorphous state: who owes whom 313
A pair of each animal: Noah Ark of court bailiffs 328
Non-economic factors of influence 340
State as an instrument 355
Revision of privatization results as a gift to the raiding
movement 366
4.3. Concluding remarks 382

19
V. RAIDING IN THE POSTSOVIET SPACE 390
5.1. Problem of raiding in the transition economy 390
Ways of hostile takeovers: reforging robber wooden
clubs into baseball bats 390
Objects of raiding: risks and victims 400
Scale of raiding 405
5.2. Big cases and spheres of raiding 413
Should a thief(?) sit in jail?: One more thought about
YUKOS 413
Big cases: TogliattiAzot, Vympelkom 426
Unusual spheres of raiding 432
Workforce reserves of the raiders movement 439
Discussion and condemnation of raiding 443
5.3. Concluding remarks 447

VI. CORRUPTION AND RAIDING 453


6.1. Links between corruption and raiding: not a thief if
not caught 453
The fact that you dont have a criminal record is not
your merit but our mishap 453
Ties between corruption and raiding 466
Crime in the Soviet era as a basis for modern raiding 472
Prices on raiding and related services 476
6.2. Bureaucracy, corruption, raiding and struggle against
it 480
Post-Soviet bureaucracy and corruption 480
Offered a bribe to the state official equal in value to the
bribe established by the law 485
Corruption in law enforcement agencies: control of
controllers? 496
Anti-corruption efforts 518
6.3. Concluding remarks 530

VII. COURTS AND RAIDING 536

20
7.1. Court system and raiders: victors are not judged? 536
Court system in the USSR 536
Complexity of the court system 549
Commercial arbitration courts 554
Bankruptcy 577
Court bailiff services 594
7.2. Court system in raiding and against raiders 604
Court system against raiders 604
Insufficiency of the legal system 609
And who are the judges? Corruption in courts 618
Corrupt court as an instrument of raiding 624
Defamation in respect to: defensive reflexes of the
authorities 635
Judiciary centralism and anti-raiding regionalism 642
Corruption in court bailiff services 648
7.3. Concluding remarks 657

VIII. PERSPECTIVES OF RAIDING 665


8.1. Prospects of raiding evolution: from merchant ship to
court takeovers 665
Perspectives of raiding movement: prognosis is
optimistic 665
From Lenin to Sonin: a revolutionary theory of
permanent lawlessness 675
Economic sociology of raiding or Faberge eggs from
David Woodruff 683
From collector lids to collector agencies: evolution of
grey markets 697
Private interest versus social responsibility 704
8.2. Future of raiding: battle for land 712
Reactive character of raiding and anti-raiding 712
Post-privatization and crisis raiding 721
Battle for land: take no prisoners 735
Pulling the rug out from under their feet: land as an

21
instrument of raiding 744
From invisible hand of the market to the iron fist of
raiders 755
Horses on the river crossing: from Russel to Rossel 768
8.3. Concluding remarks 776

CONCLUSION 784

BIBLIOGRAPHY 796
Domestic sources 796
Foreign sources 807
Statistical and data sources 831

APPENDICES 833
Appendix I 833

About the author 839

22
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE Page
PART I
1.1. Main firms defense strategies against hostile
takeovers 82

PART III
3.1. Sources of income of population in Russia
(percentage of respondents), 1999-2004 275

PART IV
4.1. State budget revenues from the oil and gas industry
in Russia, 2000-2006 298
4.2. National wealth in Russia, 2000-2007 (billion
rubles) 378
4.3. National wealth in Ukraine, 2000-2007 (billion
rubles) 379

PART V
5.1. Official and real tax rate for some oil companies in
Russia, 1999-2003 422

PART VI
6.1. Number of employees of local authorities in Russia,
1995-2007, thousand 482
6.2. Major obstacles to overcome crisis in Russia
(percentage of respondents), 2004 510
6.3. Events and processes in Russia that worry
population most (percentage of respondents), 2004 511
6.4. Most important problems for Russia, percent of the
respondents, 2008, 2009 515
6.5. Most crucial problems that impede business in
Russia, percent of the respondents, 2007-2009 517

23
PART VII
7.1. Number of civil cases considered by courts in the
USSR, 1980-1990, thousand 542
7.2. Number of employees in courts and the justice
system in the USSR, by category, as of January 1,
1991 544
7.3. Number of notary acts, performed by the state
notaries in the USSR, 1980-1990 546
7.4. Legal aid to citizens in the USSR, 1980-1990,
thousand 548
7.5. Legal aid to citizens in the Russian Federation,
2000-2001 552
7.6. Work of the Commercial Arbitration Court system
in the RF, 1992-2009 559
7.7. Cases resolved in the Commercial Arbitration Court
system in the RF, 1992-2009 563
7.8. Work of the Commercial Arbitration Courts of
Appeals in the RF in 1992-2009 567
7.9. Work of the Federal Commercial Arbitration Circuit
Courts in the RF, 1992-2009 571
7.10. Work of the Commercial Arbitration Court of
Moscow oblast in 2007-2009 574
7.11. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration
Court system in the RF, 1998-2009 578
7.12. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration
Court system in the RF, 1998-2009: financial
recovery and external management 582
7.13. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration
Court system in the RF, 1998-2009: auctioning and
liquidation 585
7.14. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration
Court system in the RF, 1998-2009: complaints and
petitions 591

24
7.15. Major indicators of the work by the Federal
Services of Court Bailiffs of the RF, 2006-2010 597
7.16. Distribution of criminal cases on corruption and
malfeasance in the Federal Services of Court Bailiffs
of the RF, 2008 and 2009 650

25
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE Page
PART II
2.1. Relation of raiding to other similar themes 143

PART III
3.1. Structure of a raiding organization 230

PART VII
7.1. Structure of the RF Commercial Arbitration Court
system 558
7.2. Work of the Commercial Arbitration Court system
in the RF, 1992-2009 561
7.3. Workload per judge per month in the Commercial
Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1992-2009 562
7.4. Civil and administrative cases resolved in the
Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF,
1992-2009 565
7.5. Work of the Commercial Arbitration Courts of
Appeals in the RF in 1992-2009 569
7.6. Work of the Federal Commercial Arbitration Circuit
Courts in the RF, 1992-2009 573
7.7. Work of the Commercial Arbitration Court of
Moscow oblast in 2007-2009 575
7.8. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration
Court system in the RF, 1998-2009 580
7.9. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration
Court system in the RF, 1998-2009: external
management 584
7.10. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration
Court system in the RF, 1998-2009: auctioning and
liquidation 587
7.11. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration

26
Court system in the RF, 1998-2009: auctioning and
liquidation of state and municipal enterprises 588
7.12. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration
Court system in the RF, 1998-2009: bankruptcies
rejected and cases closed due to settlement 590
7.13. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration
Court system in the RF, 1998-2009: complaints and
petitions 592
7.14. Distribution of criminal cases on corruption and
malfeasance in the Federal Services of Court Bailiffs
of the RF, 2008 and 2009 651

27

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Osipian, A. (2010). Corporate Raiding Russian Style: Hostile Takeovers via
Corruption and Fraud. Annual Conference of the American Political Science
Association (APSA), Washington, DC, September 2010.
5
Osipian, A. (2012). Predatory Raiding in Russia: Institutions and Property
Rights after the Crisis. Annual Conference of the Association for
Evolutionary Economics / American Economic Association (AFEE/AEA),
Chicago, IL, January 2012.
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We want these assets to be productive. We buy them.


We own them. To say we care only about the short term is wrong.
What I care about is seeing these assets in the best hands.
Carl Icahn

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slova/rejderstvo
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831

()
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AEF89315D675_4.pdf

()
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centr/news/totals/bankrot98/index.htm

()
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centr/news/totals/bankrot99/index.htm

()
2001 . http://www.arbitr.ru/press-
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()
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http://www.fssprus.ru/

http://www.arbitr.ru/e-justice/
Osipian, Ararat. (2011). Documented evidence of corruption in
the former Soviet Union (video materials).
Osipian, Ararat. (2011). Documented evidence of corporate,
property and land raiding in the former Soviet Union
(video materials).

832

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, 1989-2009 . (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 .), :
(: ,
2007 .), :

(: , 2001 .),
Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization,
Research in Comparative and International Education,
European Education: Issues and Studies, Canadian and
International Education Journal, Economics of Education
Review, Prospects: Quarterly Review of Comparative Education,
International Journal of Educational Development, Transition
Studies Review, Innovation: The European Journal of Social
Science Research, Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, Global Crime,
Journal of Eurasian Studies, Brigham Young University
Education and Law Journal, FedUni Journal of Higher
Education, European Dialog,
,
, , , .
,
,
.

839
About the author:
Ararat L. Osipian holds a PhD in Political Economy
from Kharkov National University (Ukraine) and an MA in
Economics from Vanderbilt University, where he came as a
fellow of The US Department of State. Dr. Osipian served as an
Assistant Professor of Economics at Kharkov University of
Construction and Architecture before he came to the US. His
publications include three books, including The Impact of
Human Capital on Economic Growth: A Case Study in Post-
Soviet Ukraine, 1989-2009 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2009), Economic Growth: Education as a Factor of Production
(Ukraine, 2007), and Economy of the Welfare State (Ukraine,
2001). His articles appeared in Demokratizatsiya: The Journal
of Post-Soviet Democratization, Research in Comparative and
International Education, European Education: Issues and
Studies, Canadian and International Education Journal,
Economics of Education Review, Prospects: Quarterly Review
of Comparative Education, International Journal of Educational
Development, Transition Studies Review, Innovation: The
European Journal of Social Science Research, Soviet and Post-
Soviet Review, Global Crime, Journal of Eurasian Studies,
Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal, FedUni
Journal of Higher Education, European Dialog, Business-
Inform, and Region. He is also a winner of several awards,
including grants from Soros Foundation, Open Society Institute,
Edmund Muskie/FSA, Yale, Vanderbilt, and Central European
University. His research interests include corruption in higher
education and inequalities in access to higher education in
international perspective, corporate, property and land raiding,
nexus of education and economic growth, modern welfare states,
and political economy of transition.

840

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