CENITA M.

CARIAGA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:

In issue in the present petition for review is one of jurisdiction.

By Resolutions of May 28, 2007 and September 27, 2007, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514, "People of the
Philippines v. Cenita Cariaga," dismissed the appeal of Cenita Cariaga (petitioner) for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Petitioner, as the municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with a Salary Grade of 24, was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cauayan City in Isabela with three counts of malversation of public funds, defined under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.

RTC found Cariaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner appealed but CA said that it is the Sandiganbayan which has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereon. Hence, petitioner asked to relax the Rules to afford her opportunity to ventilate her
appeal on the merits and for the Court to transmit the records of the case to Sandiganbayan.

Issue:

WON the petitioner can still appeal the case to Sandiganbayan despite having approached the Court of Appeals first

Ruling:

YES. Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty due to a procedural lapse
militates against the Courts dispensation of justice, the Court grants petitioners plea for a relaxation of the Rules.

In Ulep v. People,10 the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it found that

x x x petitioners failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent. The omission did not appear to be a
dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose had that been the case as her appeal could be dismissed outright
for lack of jurisdiction which was exactly what happened in the CA.

The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to the proper forum, the Sandiganbayan.
In Ulep v. People,10 the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it found that

x x x petitioners failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent. The omission did not appear to be a
dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose had that been the case as her appeal could be dismissed outright
for lack of jurisdiction which was exactly what happened in the CA.

The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to the proper forum, the Sandiganbayan.

TIJAM v SIBONGHANOY

FACTS:

The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00,
exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19,
1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect
depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse
decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court
along with the records of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:

NO. It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the
rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of
the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could
have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law
then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the
merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up
to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19,
1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of
this is not only patent but revolting.

Antiporda vs Garchitorena (1999) G.R. 133289

Facts:
Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of kidnapping, the case was
filed in the first division of Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court ordered the prosecution to submit
amended information, which was complied evenly and the new information contained the place where
the victim was brought.
The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be conducted and the
issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied by the Ombudsman. The accused
thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall
warrant of arrest issued but the same was also denied. Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to
Quash Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, which was ignored for
their continuous refusal to submit their selves to the Court and after their voluntary appearance which
invested the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over their persons, their motion for reconsideration was again
denied.
Issue (1): WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Held: No. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense
committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the prosecution
belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.

The petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the
supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation filed with the same
court, it was they who challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and
clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected.

It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction.

SC therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was
thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.

Issue (2): WON reinvestigation must be made anew.

Held: No. A reinvestigation is proper only if the accuseds substantial rights would be impaired. In the
case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is
filed without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the Information merely describe
the public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated where the victim was brought when he
was kidnapped.

It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons accused
in jeopardy.

Here, the purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no cogent nor
compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.

MIRANDA v TULIAO

Facts:
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were
later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.

Two Information for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2 Maderal
in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The
RTC convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua
except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large. Upon
automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
 In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and
identified the petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao
filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge
Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

The petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to

reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent
motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order
denying the urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.

Issues:
Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court. IMMATERIAL, because this is a form of
waiver already.

Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over

the person of the accused. NO.

Held: NO. One who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
Jurisdiction of the Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires
neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of
the accused.

Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law
and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought
by the dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the
defence of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused

ZALDIVIA v REYES

Court is to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of
municipal ordinances.

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in
violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of
Rizal.

The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the police
was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The
corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990. 3
Petitioners motion to quash the information on the ground of prescription was denied. RTC
sustained the denial.

Petitioner: In the petition for review on certiorari, she first argues that the charge against her is
governed by Section 1 and 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure. She then invokes Section 1, 2
and 3 of Act. No. 3326.

Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge
against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.

Defendant: Prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of
the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the
respondent judge, the SG also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

Issue: WON the present violation has prescribed

Ruling: YES. That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the
rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not
apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing
in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those
offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the
canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the
measure, to discover the true legislative intent.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers
are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule
and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

The prescriptive period for the violation commenced from its alleged commission on May 11,
1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act
No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that
could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court
of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already
prescribed.

PANAGUITON v DOJ

Facts:
A petition for Review of CA resolutions dismissing Panaguiton, Jr.
petition for certiorari and motion for reconsideration.

In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from petitioner and later issued

checks as payment both signed by Cawili and his business associate
Tongson. But checks were dishonored either for insufficiency of
funds or closure of account.

Despite formal demands, Cawili did not pay Panaguiton.

So Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for

violating BP Blg. 22 before QC Prosecutor's Office.

During PI, Tongson averred that he had been unjustly included as

party-respondent since Cawilis obligation to petitioner was sole
and personal, and denied that his checks bounced as well as the
signatures therein.

Panaguiton presented documents showing Tongson's signature which

was the same as the signatures on the checks, as well as affidavits
supporting that Cawili was a closely affiliated with Tongson. The
signatures were proven otherwise by the Chief Prosecutor and was
due for investigation.

December 1995, Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili

and dismissed the charges against Tongson.

Panaguiton filed a partial appeal before DOJ even the case against
Cawili was filed before the proper court.

Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Tongson

without referring to the NBI, holding that the case had already
prescribed pursuant to Act. No. 3326, stating that in this case the
4 year period started on the date the checks were dishonored and
that the filing of complaint in QC prosecutor's office did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period as the law
contemplates judicial and not administrative proceedings.

Petitioner appealed to DOJ but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a

motion for reconsideration of DOJ and ruled in his favor and
declared that the prescription period was interrupted by the filing
of the complaint in the Prosecutor's office.

Issue: On the substantive aspect: WON the crime imputed to Tongson

has prescribed

Ruling: YES. It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was
passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the
phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the
time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the
peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the
offense is halted.

Prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed

with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation
inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution
of the criminal proceedings against the accused.

PEOPLE V. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012
Perez, J:

FACTS:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an
aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos
(P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Consequently the case was modified, and only on February 3, 2000 that two counts for violation of BP
Blg. 22 were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City. On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal
liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.

In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said that the prevailing law that governs the prescription of special
penal law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act No. 3326 (An Act To Establish Periods Of Prescription For Violations
Penalized By Special Acts) where the right to file an action to a proper court and not to merely to
prosecution office for B.P. 22, prescribes four (4) years from the commission of the crime. The imputed
violation occurred sometime in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000 that a case was formally filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore the action already prescribes. RTC granted the motion.

On the other hand, the complainant argued that the filing with the office of city prosecutor constitutes
an interruption to the prescription.

ISSUE:

Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered a judicial proceeding that can interrupt
prescription of crime under B.P. 22?

HELD:

YES. Based on the jurisprudences on the prescription of crimes and violations, there is no more
distinction between cases under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by special laws with
respect to the interruption of the period of prescription; that the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation in the office of prosecutor against accused interrupts the period of
prescription.

Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft
of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws
with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is not
controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,[20] Brillante v.
CA,[21] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[22] cases involving special laws, this Court held that the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of
prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,[23] the
Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for
violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the
prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,[24] which is in all fours with the instant
case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the
offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep
on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further
simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay
and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

Following the factual finding the crime was committed sometime in 1995, the filing of complaint on
September 1997, two (2) years from the commission of the crime validly interrupts the running of
prescription. Therefore the action against the respondent Pangilinan did not prescribe.

DISINI v SANDIGANBAYAN

Doctrine: The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving
petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is
intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family,
subordinates and close associates.

Facts:

Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari there solutions promulgated by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled People v.
Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his motion to quash the informations)1 and August
10, 2005 (denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash),2 alleging that
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, for lack of jurisdiction to try the case.
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in Criminal Case
No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that
the charges were being filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14
and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A because the allegations in the informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth, nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman
instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal, accomplice
or accessory of a public officer, he should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the
Sandiganbayan.

Issue:

WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person of Disini

Ruling:

YES. The Supreme Court holds that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and defined its
jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

xxxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. x x x x

It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the
Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini only after
the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office
of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its finding
of a prima facie case being established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No.
0013.

Contrary to Disinis argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 824922
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249.
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned
only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting the
qualifying clause to such public officials. To include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the
persons covered by Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring
the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A (so
dapat, under the Eos, wala nay criteria na salary grade 27 or else walay makasuhan ana
under Sandiganbayan. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of Criminal
Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disinis being a private individual, and
despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
official in the commission of the offenses charged.

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION v. JUDGE

NELSON F. LIDUA SR.

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and
Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on
May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe
dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure
with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and [left]
unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was
allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is 26,250.00. The fines of 500.00 for illegal parking and
the declamping fee of 500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.

The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found
probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner.

In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued among others that:

1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.

2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
prescription of the crime

3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides:

"Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."

Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No.
3763, does not apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a
municipal ordinance.
Issue:

WON the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the
prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John
Does," and "Peter Does."

Ruling:

YES. The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner
on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.

The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

SECTION 1. Scope This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

xxxx

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances

Section 11 of the Rules provides that:

Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule
shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan
Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.

There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the
Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued
to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the
judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the
preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of
the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in
arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of the offense
before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court

BONIFACIO ET AL., VS RTC MAKATI AND JESSIE JOHN GIMENEZ

GR No 184800
May 5, 2010

Facts:
Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed in behalf of Yuchenco Family of
Yuchenco Group of Companies (YGC) and Malayan Insurance Co.,
(Malayan), a criminal complain for 13 counts of libel under Art.
355 in relation to Art. 353 of the RPC against the members of
Paents Enabling Parents Coalition Inc (PEPCI), a group of
discontented planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI) which is owned
by the Yuchengcos, for they previously purchased traditional pre-
need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail
of the benefits of such after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed
for corporate rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments.

That PEPCI members owns and moderates a website and a blog with web
domains: www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, www.pepcoalition.com, and
no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. Gimenez alleged that upon accessing
such websites in Makati he red various article containing highly
derogatory statements and false accusations attacking the Yuchengco
Family.

Since the article was first published and accessed by Gimenez at

Makati City, pursuant to Art. 360 of the RPC as amended by RA 4363.

Issue:
How should an online article be treated in relation to a written
defamation/libel with respect to jurisdiction of the case provided
by law specifically Art. 360 of the RPC?

Ruling:
When jurisdiction of courts is a question of law and not that of
fact, it admits of certain exceptions from the strict construction
of the law on conferring court jurisdiction. One is when the venue
of the commission of the crime is an essential element of the
crime. As stated under Article 360 of the RPC, the venue of libel
cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited only
to:

1. Where the complainant actually resides at the time of the

commission of the offense; or
2. Where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first

published were used as basis for the venue of the action, the
Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory
article was printed and first published, and not just merely
published. The same measures cannot be reasonably expected when
it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the
internet as there would be no way of determining the point of its
printing and first publication. TO give credence to Gimenezs
argument would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Art. 360
of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It would do chaos
wherein website author, writer, blogger or anyone who post messages
in websites could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines.

The information is quashed and the case is dismissed.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 192565. February 28, 2012.
FACTS:

Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury when she falsely declared under oath in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping. Tomas filed a motion to quash citing that the Makati MTC has no
jurisdiction as the document was submitted and used in Pasay and that there was no crime
committed as not all of the elements of perjury was present.

The lower courts denied the motion saying that Makati has jurisdiction as it was notarized there and
ruled that she was sufficiently charged with perjury.

ISSUE: Whether, in a crime of perjury, the proper venue is where it was notarized or where it was
used.

RULING:

The SC ruled that Makati was the right venue.

The SC cites Rule 110, Sec. 15 of the Rules of Court where it was stated that criminal action shall be
instituted where the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements occurred.

The SC, one-by-one stated the elements of perjury and provided that Tomas did all things in Makati,
thus making Makati the right venue for the case. The Ilusurio ruling has proper application in the
case. If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then
only that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as
the other portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which is not a civil proceeding. As a
perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath
was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City. Under the
circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue
should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who make[s] an affidavit, upon
any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which
the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus,
the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn
before a duly authorized person.