D. O'Meara I.
The Transformation of Metaphysics in late Antiquity Turning Aristotle's Metaphysics into Metaphysical Science
The theme which I would like to discuss in this paper is that of the development of
metaphysics understood as a philosophical discipline or science. Perhaps as humans
we have always had some interest in metaphysical questions - questions about the
ultimate constitution of reality, about the reasons for the existence of things and of
ourselves. But the treatment of such questions within the framework provided by a
conception of rational scientific knowledge: this is a development which we can trace
back to Greek philosophy. In this paper I would like to propose that the last period of
Greek philosophy, that going from about the 3rd to the 6th centuries A.D., made new
and interesting contributions to metaphysics as a philosophical discipline, indeed
made metaphysics into a metaphysical science, while also bringing out the limits of
such a science.
This thesis may seem at first somewhat exaggerated. After all, one might object,
Greek philosophical metaphysics was founded much earlier, by Plato and by
Aristotle, perhaps even before them, by Parmenides. However, it is only in a very
special way that we can say that Parmenides provides us with a metaphysical science,
and the great metaphysical works of Plato and Aristotle, in particular Plato's Republic
and Aristotle's Metaphysics, present what are more in the way of sketches of what a
metaphysical science might be like, its subject-matter, its methods, some central
propositions. These texts provide programmatic projects and preliminary explorations
rather than a worked-out metaphysical science comprising a unified system of
theorems. I would like to suggest that, as far as we know, such a system is first to be
found in the philosophical schools of late Antiquity. The late Professor Grard
Verbeke gave a lecture in 1978 in the Machette lecture series on this topic and I have
myself worked on it over the years. I would like to bring together this research and
that done by others, so as to sketch here the overall picture which, it seems to me, is
beginning to emerge.1
The paper has four parts. In part I, I introduce the way in which the great
Aristotelian commentator of the early 3rd century, Alexander of Aphrodisias, in
interpreting Aristotle's metaphysical treatise, sought to find in it a metaphysical
science. In part II of the paper, I attempt to show how the Neoplatonist philosopher of
the early 5th century Syrianus, not only adopted Alexander's reading of Aristotle, but
was also inspired by it in finding this same metaphysical science already in Plato.
Syrianus, as a Platonist, was acutely aware, however, of the problem of
transcendence: if the first principles of reality transcend human knowledge, then how
could there be a science of them? I would like to describe how Syrianus dealt with
this problem, then showing, in part III of the paper, how all of this resulted in a
masterpiece of metaphysics, the Elements of Theology written by Syrianus' pupil
Proclus. Finally, in part IV, I would like to refer to what is perhaps the last great
metaphysical work of Greek philosophy, the Treatise on First Principles written by
Proclus' ultimate successor as the last head of the Platonist school of Athens in the
early 6th century, Damascius, a work in which the limits of metaphysical science are
explored with extraordinary sublety and insistence.
Let us then begin with Alexander of Aphrodisias. We can take it that the commentary
Alexander wrote on Aristotle's metaphysical treatise was connected with his work as a
professor in Athens of Aristotelian philosophy. Indeed all the philosophers we will be
considering in this paper were teachers and their works were connected with their
teaching. The significance of this becomes clearer if we consider the fact that these
teachers saw themselves as representatives of the philosophy they taught, Alexander
representing Aristotelian philosophy, Syrianus, Proclus and Damascius representing
Platonic philosophy. They were representatives in the sense that they thought of the
work of the philosopher they taught, be it Plato or Aristotle, as containing the best, the
true, philosophy. Thus Alexander, for example, felt that to find philosophical truth we
could do no better than read Aristotle's work.2 A consequence of this approach was
the canonization, so to speak, of the works of Plato or of Aristotle, both in the sense
that they were given great authority and in the sense that their works were organized
so as to constitute a unified systematic body of knowledge. In the case of Alexander,
this was facilitated by the fact that Aristotle's works, when published some two
centuries before, had already been given some sort of systematic order, being
arranged in groups dealing with logic, physics, metaphysics, ethics and politics. In
teaching this corpus of texts, Alexander did not hesitate to assume its systematic
unity, with consequences, as we will now see, both for how he saw metaphysics as a
science and for what he thought metaphysics was about.
Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, as it has come down to us in
Greek, covers only the first five books of Aristotle's treatise.3 In these books, Aristotle
speaks of a supreme science which he calls wisdom and which would deal with the
first principles or causes of all things. Aristotle also speaks of a universal science of
being, of being as being, of substance, of a science called first philosophy, of a
science which concerns the axioms that ground all demonstrations, in particular the
Principle of Non-Contradiction, of a science of divine substance which he calls
theology. Alexander, in explaining these books of Aristotle's treatise, takes it that
Aristotle has a unified conception and is speaking throughout of one and the same
science. Thus wisdom is first philosophy, which is theology. 4 Not only do these
different designations refer to one science, but the various objects they deal with must
also be unified, as we will see shortly.
Taking it thus that Aristotle is speaking of one and only one science - let us call it
"metaphysics" for convenience -, Alexander makes another important move in
supposing also that this science is to be conceived along the lines of a demonstrative
science as such a science is formalized in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. This is a
very significant step.5 Since, if we, on the one hand, read Aristotle's treatise as we
often do today, as exploratory, dialectical, aporetic, a work in progress, Alexander, on
the other hand, expects to find in it a science structured with the full rigour of what is
stipulated for demonstrative science in Aristotle's Analytics. Thus, as a demonstrative
science, metaphysics, according to Alexander, uses axioms, it has a subject-matter (a
hupokeimenon genos), and, starting from definitions, it elaborates demonstrative
syllogisms proving the essential properties of its object. 6 Alexander identifies the
axioms of metaphysics as those discussed by Aristotle in book *, in particular the
Principle of Non-Contradiction, and takes it that these foundational axioms are the
concern of metaphysics since they have to do with all being and metaphysics deals
with all being.7 The subject-matter, the hupokeimenon genos, of metaphysics is thus
all being, or being as being. However the genus of being at issue is not a genus of the
type which subsumes coordinate species. Rather it is a kind of genus constituted by
beings which are beings as relating to a central kind of being, as coming from it and
relating to it, the relation of aph'henos, pros hen. Thus beings form the genus of being
as relating to a central type of being, that of substance. 8 This relation is both
definitional and existential: the senses of being other than substance logically
presuppose that of substance; and other beings, i.e. beings in categories other than
substance, derive their existence (huparxis) from substance.9 There is furthermore a
hierarchy of substances, such that higher primary substances are the causes of
existence of lower secondary substances. And primary substances are being in its
primary and most intense form. This primary substance is Aristotelian divine
substance, the transcendent Intellect of Book /.10 Unfortunately, it is not clear how
divine substance, in Alexander's view, is the cause of the existence of the lower
members of the genus of being, lower substances and being in the other categories.
Finally, Alexander identifies the essential properties demonstrated by metaphysics as
those of which Aristotle speaks in book *: unity/multiplicity, sameness/difference, the
equal/ unequal.
From what has been said above it would seem to be the case that Alexander takes a
distinctive and very influential position on a central problem concerning the subject-
matter of metaphysics on which Aristotle himself seems unclear, the problem as to
whether metaphysics is a universal science dealing with being as being, a sort of
general ontology, or whether it is a specialized science dealing with divine being or
substance, a philosophical theology. Alexander's position would be that being is not a
genus in the ordinary sense, subsuming species, but constitutes a series of prior and
posterior terms in which the primary term is the cause of being for the terms that
follow it and is that to which they refer.11 And this primary term is divine substance,
cause of the being of all other members of the genus of being. Thus the science of
divine substance is the science of all being as the science of being in its primary form,
cause of all secondary sorts of being.12 Yet in her excellent book in which she brings
out so well the way in which Alexander uses Aristotle's Posterior Analytics to
formalize Aristotelian metaphysics, M. Bonelli suggests that Alexander leaves the
issue open, sometimes distinguishing the universal science of being from theology,
sometimes identifying them.13 However, I do not see how Alexander, if he thinks of
the genus of being in the way that he does, as a series of prior and posterior terms,
could hold that there could be a science of being in general subsuming specialized
sciences of species of being. For being is not, for Alexander, a genus which subsumes
species, and so the corresponding sciences will not be a universal science subsuming
specialized sciences. In this I find myself in agreement with Verbeke's interpretation
as he presented it already in 1978.14
II.
Platonizing Aristotelian Metaphysical Science
Let us change schools and visit the Platonists of late Antiquity. Here Plato's dialogues
form the authoritative canon. Yet Aristotle is by no means absent from the
curriculum. If we frequent, a little later, in the mid 3rd century, Plotinus' school in
Rome, we will find him reading and using Aristotle's Metaphysics and Alexander of
Aphrodisias' commentaries.15 Aristotle was also discussed by Plotinus' pupil Porphyry
and by Porphyry's pupil Iamblichus. Iamblichus, who headed a philosophical school
in Syria in the early 4th century, seems to have inspired the elaborate curriculum that
would be followed in the Platonist schools of Athens and of Alexandria in the 5th and
6th centuries. This curriculum consisted of two cycles. The first cycle, described as
the "minor mysteries", was based on a reading of texts by Aristotle and it was
followed by the second cycle, the "major mysteries", which involved study of selected
dialogues of Plato.16 We have a description of this curriculum as the young Proclus
experienced it in Athens in 432 under the direction of the head of the Athenian school
at the time, Syrianus. 17 In the first cycle, Proclus read Aristotle's works in logic,
ethics, politics, physics and metaphysics. Then Proclus moved on to the second cycle,
to the study of Platonic dialogues arranged according to the same series of sciences.
We should note here two aspects of this curriculum. (1) The series of sciences is
regarded as an ascending scale of philosophical knowledge, starting from practical
knowledge and ending with the highest theoretical knowledge, metaphysics. This
highest knowledge constituted the goal of the curriculum and of philosophy itself, as
bringing human soul nearer to divine life. (2) The first Aristotelian cycle, in ascending
the scale of knowledge, remained preliminary, preparatory, imperfect with regard to
the second, Platonic cycle. What this means, as regards Aristotle's metaphysical
treatise, is that it constituted the highest level of knowledge as corresponding to the
summit reached in the first cycle. Yet is was merely preparatory and imperfect in
comparison with the Platonic dialogue regarded as representing metaphysics at the
summit of the second, Platonic cycle, Plato's Parmenides. There were thus good
reasons for Platonists of the 5th and 6th centuries to take an interest in Aristotle's
metaphysical treatise. Yet this treatise, considered as containing the highest
theoretical knowledge, was seen as an imperfect foreshadowing of Plato's
Parmenides.
As luck would have it, we can still read Syrianus' commentary on Aristotle's
Metaphysics and so we can have an impression of the way in which he presented it to
his young pupil Proclus.18 On closer inspection, however, we notice that Syrianus'
commentary is not really a commentary at all, in the ordinary sense. Syrianus
comments on books B*MN of Aristotle's treatise and explains his purpose as
follows.19 In books MN Aristotle is essentially concerned with criticizing Platonic and
Pythagorean metaphysics. It is Syrianus' purpose to refute these criticisms, so that the
pupil will not end up having contempt for Platonic/Pythagorean metaphysics. In book
B Aristotle presents and argues for conflicting positions on various metaphysical
issues: Syrianus wishes to show which positions are correct and which are incorrect,
the correct ones being those of the Platonist. And finally, in book *, Aristotle presents
a general account of metaphysics which Syrianus on the whole accepts: he will
therefore content himself with a paraphrase of the text, referring the pupil to
Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary for detailed explanation of particular
passages. Thus, for commentary on Aristotle's work, the pupil is referred to
Alexander.20 But since the pupil is to be led in the direction of Platonic metaphysics,
he will need Syrianus' work as an antidote to the criticisms of Platonism that come up
in Aristotle and in Alexander's texts.
The implications of this use of Aristotle and Alexander in Syrianus' teaching are
considerable. We may think that Aristotle and Alexander are simply being
instrumentalized, made subservient to Platonist interests. But what in fact happens, as
we can see in Syrianus' commentary, is that Syrianus takes over Alexander's
interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysical science and uses it to interpret Plato. Thus
Syrianus thinks that the highest science of which Plato speaks in the Republic, the
knowledge of Forms and of the Form of the Good which Plato calls "dialectic", is the
same as Aristotelian wisdom, first philosophy or theology.21 And hence he assumes
that Alexander's formalization of Aristotelian metaphysics applies to Platonic
metaphysics or dialectic. As a consequence, in Syrianus, Platonic metaphysics is a
demonstrative science of the type stipulated in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. It is
definitory and demonstrative. To these methodes Syrianus adds the Platonic methods
of analysis and division.22 Metaphysics, furthermore, deals with universal axioms, in
particular with the Principle of Non-Contradiction.23 It concerns a underlying genus,
that of being as being. But this genus is of a specal type: it constitutes a series of prior
and posterior beings such that primary being, divine substance, is the highest form of
being and the cause of the existence of derivative kinds of being.24 Divine being, for
Syrianus, corresponds to the transcendent Platonic Forms, which are the thought of a
divine Intellect responsible for the making of the world, a divine Intellect which
recalls Aristotle's divine intellect. In dealing with divine being, metaphysics, by doing
so, is also a science of all being.25 Finally metaphysics demonstrates the essential
properties of being which include both those mentioned by Aristotle and the major
kinds mentioned in Plato's Sophist, in particular rest and motion.26 In a very curious
way, then, Alexander's formalization of Aristotelian metaphysics, in entering the
curriculum of Syrianus' school, showed the way to formalizing a new Platonic
metaphysical science which Syrianus supposed to be imperfectly present in Aristotle's
metaphysical treatise and fully developed in Plato's Parmenides.
However, although the fit between Alexander's formalization of metaphysical
science, as a science of divine substance, and Plato's dialectic, as a science of the
transcendent Forms, seemed so good, Syrianus was aware of a major difficulty which
Theophrastus had already formulated in connection with Aristotle's metaphysics: how
is knowledge of transcendent divine being possible?27 This difficulty is made more
intense for Syrianus by the conflict between his Platonist conviction that divine
Intellect and it object of thought, the Forms, transcend the limits of human discursive
reasoning, 28 and his adoption of Alexander's formalization of metaphysics, which
makes of it an eminently discursive science. The fundamental question then is this:
how can there be a human science of realities which transcend the level of objects that
can be known by human science?
The solution to this difficulty that we can find in Syrianus' commentary on
Aristotle's Metaphysics can be summarized as follows. 29 According to Plato's
Timaeus, the divine Intellect (or demiurge) which makes the world also makes soul,
world-soul and individual souls, composing them from certain formal principles, in
particular mathematical laws.30 If then the human soul does mathematics, it discovers
in its very nature an innate knowledge of mathematical laws, which it articulates in
mathematical demonstrations. And these mathematical laws correspond to the laws of
the universe, since they are also what are followed in the divine Intellect's ordering of
the world.31 The items of innate knowledge in human soul, named "substantial logoi"
by Syrianus, 32 which include mathematical laws, are themselves images of their
creator, the divine Intellect and its object of thought, the transcendent Forms. Thus
human soul has access, through its innate knowledge, to images of divine Intellect and
the Forms. Consequently, in developing scientific knowledge, such as pure
mathematics, the human soul is projecting images of transcendent divine being. Thus
there can be scientific, discursive knowledge of divine being in the sense that there
can be scientific articulation of innate concepts which image this being. 33
Consequently, metaphysics, as an eminently discursive, scientific form of knowledge,
does not directly think transcendent being, which escapes discursive knowledge, but it
works with innate knowledge in the soul, concepts which can be articulated and
which express, as images, this transcendent being. In this way there can be science of
what is beyond science.34
We will not, however, find in Syrianus' commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics an
expos of this Platonized Aristotelian metaphysical science. For, as we have seen,
Syrianus is concerned mostly with refuting Aristotelian criticisms of Platonism.
Syrianus presupposes a canon of Pythagorean and Platonic texts in which he assumes
this metaphysical science is to be found. But he does not himself give an expos of
this science. To judge from the curriculum he followed, we would imagine that the
best place to find this science would be Plato's Parmenides. However, we do not have
access to a commentary by Syrianus on the Parmenides.
III.
Unfolding Metaphysical Science
But we can turn to the work of Syrianus' last and most important pupil, who had
studied Aristotle's Metaphysics with him, Proclus. We still have access to a
commentary by Proclus on Plato's Parmenides. And we also have an enormous work
of his having the title Platonic Theology. But I would like to suggest that to find a
presentation of metaphysical science elaborated along the lines suggested by Syrianus'
adaptation of Alexander's formalization of Aristotle, we should turn to Proclus'
Elements of Theology.35 This work had considerable success in medieval philosophy:
there are medieval Arabic, Latin and Georgian versions of it. And it is often the first
work of Proclus to be read today. I would like to show now that it presents us with
metaphysical science as it was conceived by Syrianus. But first perhaps a few
preliminary words about Proclus' book.
The title of the book refers to "theology", theology understood here in its
Aristotelian sense, as indicating the science of divine substance. Indeed Syrianus
refers to Aristotle's metaphysical work as a "theological treatise". 36 The word
"elements" in the title of Proclus' text suggests that it is a manual for the use of
students, evoking also more specifically Euclid's Elements. The Euclidean echo has
led some scholars to describe Proclus' book as being a metaphysics demonstrated
more geometrico. But in fact a quick glance shows that the work does not have a
Euclidean form:37 it does not open with a list of definitions, common notions and
axioms, as does Euclid's Elements, but consists of a chain of demonstrations proving
conclusions each of which is also placed at the head of its corresponding
demonstration. If the work has a mathematical or geometrical air to it, this may be
because mathematical science is a fundamental inspiration to the concepts of
scientific knowledge developed by Aristotle and by Syrianus. Finally, - and this is
really exceptional -, no ancient authority is cited in the text, there is no appeal to
quotations taken from Plato and Aristotle. However, in his edition, Dodds has shown
that there is an implicit presence in the text of Plato's Parmenides, of which we will
see an example shortly.
Looking now more closely at Proclus' Elements of Theology, I would like to show
that this text is indeed an expos of metaphysical science as Syrianus conceived it. To
do this I need to show that it exhibits certain features. It should articulate innate
concepts concerning transcendent realities, it should use axioms, it should develop
demonstrations, it should have to do both with divine realities as the causes of being
and with being in general, it should deal with essential properties of being.
It is not hard to see that some of these features do in fact characterize Proclus' text.
We are indeed dealing in it with the realm of the divine, which, for the Platonist, goes
from the first cause of all things, the One, through Intellect, down to soul.38 In dealing
with these divine realities, Proclus is also speaking of the causes of being. And a
number of the propositions which are formulated, for example Proposition 1 ("All
multiplicity in some way participates unity"), are of a generality which covers all
being. Certain essential properties of being are examined, in particular unity and
multiplicity. We can also see that conclusions are established on the bases of rigorous
demonstrative arguments, and that the conclusions of some arguments are then used
as premises in arguments establishing further conclusions, the whole making an
impressive demonstrative chain which mirrors the constitutive chain of being. We can
also detect the use of axioms in the demonstrations. For example, the demonstration
of Proposition 1, which consists in the refutation of its negation (modus tollens), rests
ultimately on two axioms to which Proclus appeals at the end of the demonstration:
that the whole is greater than the part, and that nothing comes from nothing.39 But is
this demonstrative science, as presented in Proclus' Elements of Theology, a scientific
articulation, not of transcendent beings, but of our innate concepts about these beings,
as this is required by Syrianus' explanation of the possibility of metaphysical science
as he conceives it? This is perhaps the least obvious feature detectable in Proclus'
book, but I would like to suggest that it is indeed there.
For this, we need, however, to refer first to a passage in another work by Proclus,
his Platonic Theology. There, in book II, ch. 12, we find the folowing passage:
What then would be the very first concept (noma) of the science [i.e.
"theology"] which proceeds from [divine] Intellect and reveals itself? What
other concept would we say it is but that which is the most simple and most
knowable of the concepts in this science? For this concept is also what is most
especially like the knowledge in Intellect. What is it then? "The One",
Parmenides says, "if it is one, would not be many". For the many necessarily
participate the One, but the One does not participate the One, but is the One
itself.40
Proclus here asks what is the absolutely primary concept (noma) of theology, and
finds it in a proposition he takes from Plato's Parmenides: "That the one, if it is one,
would not be many" (137c4-5). This quotation comes from the first hypothesis of the
second part of the Parmenides which Platonists in late Antiquity read as referring to
the highest metaphysical principle, the cause of all being, the One. We note that the
concept is expressed as a proposition and that it is the first concept of theology.
If we come back now to Proclus' Elements of Theology, we find in Proposition 1
that all multiplicity is unified in some way, and, in Proposition 4, that all that which is
unified, i.e. all multiplicity, is other than the One as one. In other words, Proposition 4
turns out to be equivalent to the first concept of theology as specified in Proclus'
Platonic Theology. We can see in this way that the conclusions of the demonstrations
in the Elements of Theology, which appear as propositions at the head of their
respective demonstrations, are in fact concepts, concepts which are expressed as
propositions about beings. Proposition 4, which distinguishes all unified multiplicities
from what is one in itself, is introduced on the basis of the preceding three
propositions, and itself marks an important stage in the argument, since it separates
out unified multiplicities from that which unifies them and which itself, ultimately,
cannot be a unified multiplicity and must be a one in itself. We thus reach the claim
that all reality, as unified multiplicity, depends in its being on a prior cause of its unity
which is not a unified entity, but a pure transcendent One. Proclus can then develop a
series of arguments which concern the way in which the various levels of beings
derive from a very first principle, the transcendent One.
We have, I conclude, in Proclus' Elements of Theology, an expos of metaphysical
science as this science was conceived by Syrianus, inspired by Alexander of
Aphrodisias' reading of Aristotle. This metaphysical science is not a direct knowledge
of transcendent being, but a discursive articulation of innate concepts which yield
propositions about transcendent being. 41 One can also sense that the philosopher
might wish to use this discursive knowledge so as to go beyond it, to reach, in a mode
of knowledge beyond that of scientific discursivity, divine being itself. In this
connection it might be appropriate to recall the suggestion in Plato's Parmenides
(135d-136a) that the second part of the dialogue is intended as an exercise for the
young inexperienced Socrates. Proclus takes up this idea in his commentary on the
Parmenides and Syrianus describes the conflicting arguments of book B of Aristotle's
Metaphysics as exercises. Proclus' Elements of Theology, I believe, can also, as a
manual, be considered to be an exercise in metaphysical thinking.42 It is not the last
word in metaphysical knowledge, but a stage leading ultimately, we can suppose, to a
grasp of divine being transcending discursivity.
IV.
Transcending Metaphysical Science
The last part of this paper concerns the last head of the school of Athens, Damascius,
who, less than half a century after Proclus' death, was obliged by the emperor
Justinian's anti-pagan policies to leave Athens in the early 530's and exile himself
with other philosophers in Persia. As regards our present concerns we can still consult
two works of Damascius, a commentary on Plato's Parmenides and a Treatise on First
Principles whose full title is Puzzles and Solutions concerning the First Principles.43
This latter work is very remarkable. It proposes, with reference to the first principles
or causes of reality, i.e. the subject-matter of metaphysics, an elaborate panorama of
difficulties and contradictions in the various claims we make about such principles. It
may seem, on reading this book, that anything that is said about such first principles is
subject to contradiction and that nothing firm remains. In contrast to the clear and
straight path traced by Proclus' Elements of Theology through metaphysical questions,
Damascius' work appears as a sea of uncertainty, conflicting positions, confusion,
doldrums, with no clear direction and no horizon. 44 This impression given by
Damascius' work has led some scholars to find in it an expression of despair, of the
declining and darkening world of the pagan intellectual who could find little room to
breathe in Justinian's Christianized empire. More philosophically, we can notice that
the conflicting arguments developed by Damascius, one argument overturning
another, recall the conflicting arguments orchestrated by the philosophical sceptic
who finds himself obliged in consequence to suspend judgement. Is this where of, knowledge of the transcendent. Proclus knew it too, even if his Elements of
Damascius is going? Metaphysics, pushed hard enough in its contradictions, destroys Theology, in presenting metaphysical science with such systematic beauty, could give
itself and becomes scepticism? Or, to use an image Damascius himself exploits, are the impression of being a definitive statement. And, lest we have any illusions about
we, in metaphysics, walking in the void? 45 Is not purely theoretical, conceptual the adequacy of our metaphysical science, Damascius could cure us of these, opening
rumination, devoid of any empirical grounding, destined to come to nothing? our minds to what lay behind, or above, our own metaphysical efforts.53
However, none of these judgements concerning the meaning of Damascius' approach
1
correspond to the way in which Damascius himself understands his enterprise. 46 I G. Verbeke, "Aristotle's Metaphysics viewed by the Ancient Greek Commentators,"
would like to show this, after having given first an example of the aporetic, Studies in Aristotle, ed. D. O'Meara (Washington, D. C. 1981), pp. 107-127; D.
conflicting arguments presented in this extraordinary book. O'Meara "Le problme de la mtaphysique dans l'Antiquit tardive," Freiburger
At the beginning of his book, Damascius discusses the very first metaphysical Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie 23 (1986), pp. 3-22; K. Kremer, Der
principle, the One, in terms of the concepts of part and whole, concepts exploited Metaphysikbegriff in den Aristoteles-Kommentaren der Ammonius-Schule (Mnster
already in what was supposed to be the corresponding part of Plato's Parmenides. 1961). I will refer to more recent studies in what follows. It is a pleasure to be able to
Damascius argues that the One is (1) part of a whole and (2) not part of a whole. Let offer these pages to John Wippel as a small token of my appreciation of the man and
us take first the claim (1) that the One is part of a whole. The concept of the whole the metaphysician.
can be defined in various ways. For example, by "whole" we may mean that which
2
lacks nothing. Or "whole" may mean the order of causes and effects. Or "whole" may Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, ed. I. Bruns (Berlin 1887), p. 2, 4-9.
mean all that which can be thought.47 On any of these accounts of the whole it is clear
3
the the One is part of a whole. Now let us take the contradictory claim, (2) that the Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck
One is not part of a whole. Damascius shows this by arguing that if the whole is a (Berlin 1881), The commentary on book A is translated by W. Dooley (London 1989)
series of causes and effects, these causes and effects are coordinated as a series. But if on books D and B by W. Dooley and A. Madigan (London 1992), and on book * by
the very first principle, the One, is the cause of everything, then it will be the cause of A. Madigan (London 1993).
the coordinated series as a whole and therefore cannot be a member of the series. So it
4
is not part of the whole.48 Damascius then, shortly after, goes on to argue that the One Alexander, pp. 15, 32-33; 18, 10-11; 171, 5-11.
is one, and not one. It is one as the primary degree of unity in the series of things
5
which are unified multiplicities, and it is not one, as not being a member of the It has been brought out by M. Bonelli, Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisica come
series.49 scienza dimostrativa (Naples 2001). In the following I refer to Bonelli's study, in
But how does Damascius himself understand these contradictions through which which the relevant passages of Alexander's commentary are fully and carefully
he brings his reader? What does he think is going on in these difficulties. A number of discussed.
times, Damascius refers to the Socratic image of the pains associated with giving
6
birth, the labour pains of a soul trying to give birth to the knowlege within it.50 So too Bonelli, ch. 2.
do we suffer in trying to bring out in our thinking the One within us. In trying to
7
articulate in our thought (in our concepts and reasonings) and in our discourse what Bonelli, pp. 249-250.
cannot be so known and said, we lose it in what comes from it. And yet we want to
8
find it, to return to it. Projecting the unknowable onto the level of the knowable, we Bonelli, p. 122.
both distance ourselves from the unknowable and yet are seeking a way to return to it.
9
The labour-pains from which we suffer are the difficulties, the puzzles, the Bonelli, pp. 116-117, 120-121
contradictions which arise as we reason from our concepts about the unknowable.51
10
And at the same time they are the way in which we can think discursively about the Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria, pp. 138, 17-23;
unknowable. What Damascius is offering us then is an exercise in discursive 147, 3-148, 10.
reasoning about metaphysical principles which reveals the limits, the inadequacy of
11
such reasoning in relation to the transcendent, while being the means to discover this Alexander, p. 249, 28-33.
transcendent within and beyond our thinking about it.52 Damascius thus shows the
12
limits of metaphysical science, and, in pushing it to its limits, shows how it can impel Alexander, p. 251, 24-38 and the references given in note 10.
the reasoning soul beyond itself towards the transcendent. Far from being a work of
13
despair, a confession of the ultimate failure of Greek metaphysics, Damascius' work is Bonelli, ch. 5 (note pp. 232-233).
the crowning achievement of the development of metaphysical science which started
14
with Alexander of Aphrodisias and continued with Syrianus and Proclus. Verbeke, p. 121. See Alexander, pp. 250, 20-33; 266, 5-14.
In adapting Alexander's formalization of Aristotelian metaphysical science to
15
Platonism, Syrianus knew that such a science was a means towards, not the equivalent Porphyry, Vita Plotini, ch. 14, 5-7 and 13.
16
On this curriculum cf. L. G. Westerink, J. Trouillard and A.-Ph. Segonds, context seems to go back to Iamblichus (cf. A. Sheppard, "Phantasia and
Prolgomnes la philosophie de Platon (Paris 1990), pp. XLIII-LXXVI. Mathematical Projection in Iamblichus", Syllecta Classica 8 [1997], pp. 113-120; D.
O'Meara, Pythagoras Revived. Mathematics and Philosophy in late Antiquity [Oxford
17
Marinus, Vita Procli, ch. 13. 1989], pp. 133-134) and it is thus not unlikely that Syrianus' conception of
metaphysics also goes back to Iamblichus.
18
Syrianus, In metaphysica commentaria, ed. W. Kroll (Berlin 1902); an English
35
translation has been published by J. Dillon and D. O'Meara (London 2006, 2008). Proclus, Elements of Theology, ed. with English translation by E. R. Dodds (Oxford
1963). Proclus' commentary on the Parmenides is the the course of being published in
19
On what follows see my introduction to the translation of Syrianus' commentary on a new edition by C. Steel (Procli iin Platonis Parmenidem commentaria, Oxford
B* (London 2008), pp. 3-5, where references are collected. 2007, 2008) and has been translated by G. Morrow and J. Dillon (Princeton 1987).
20 36
A useful philological study of Syrianus' use of Alexander's commentary can be Syrianus, p. 80, 17.
found in C. Luna, Trois tudes sur la tradition des commentaires anciens la
37
Mtaphysique d'Aristote ((Leiden 2001). See my discussion in Pythagoras Revived, pp. 196-198.
21 38
Syrianus, p. 55, 27-33. Proclus, Platonic Theology, ed. H.-D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink (Paris 1968-
1997), I, 26, vol. 1, pp. 114, 23-116, 3.
22
Syrianus, pp. 3, 30; 4, 26-29; 12, 10-12.
39
Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 1, p. 2, 11-13.
23
See my study, "Le Fondement du principe de non-contradiction chez Syrianus",
40
Syrianus et la mtaphysique de l'Antiquit tardive, ed. A. Longo (Naples 2009). Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 22, vol. 2, p. 66, 4-9.
24 41
Syrianus, pp. 57, 23-24; 61, 19-24. See also Proclus, Commentary on the Parmenides, 895, 24-896, 17; 981, 20-982,
30; 986, 7-29.
25
Syrianus, p. 57, 29-30.
42
Cf. , D. O'Meara, "La Science mtaphysique (ou thologie) de Proclus comme
26
Syrianus, p. 5, 16-33. exercice spirituel", Proclus et la Thologie Platonicienne, ed. A.-Ph. Segonds and C.
Steel (Paris 2000), pp. 279-290; for Syrianus see my introduction to the English
27
Theophrastus, Metaphysics, ed. A. Laks and G. Most (Paris 2002), 4 (4b); 25 (9b). translation of Syrianus' commentary on B*, p. 8.
28 43
Syrianus, pp. 4, 34-37; 100, 28-29; 147, 14-15. Published under the title Trait des premiers principes with a French translation by
L. G. Westerink and J. Combs (Paris 1986-1991). Damascius' commentary on the
29
See my article cited above n. 1. Parmenides has also been edited and translated by Westerink and Combs (Paris
1997-2003).
30
Syrianus, p. 4, 5-11
44
Damascius' treatise has been discussed, for example, by A. Linguiti, L'Ultimo
31
Syrianus, pp. 27, 31-37; 88, 24-27. Platonism greco. Principi e conoscenza (Florence 1990) and by S. Rappe, Reading
Neoplatonism. Non-discursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus and
32
Syrianus, 91, 29-34.; 161, 30-34. Damascius (Cambridge 2000), ch. 9. Cf. V. Napoli, Epekeina tou henos. Il principio
totalmente ineffabille tra dialettica ed esegesi in Damascio (Catania 2008).
33
I have attempted to examine in what sense concepts "image" transcendent being in
45
"Intentional Objects in Later Neoplatonism", Ancient and Medieval Theories of For example, Damascius, Puzzles, p. 8, 1.
Intentionality, ed. D. Perler (Leiden 2001), pp. 115-125.
46
This has been argued in detail by C. Tresson, L'Aporie ou l'exprience
34
One might wonder if Syrianus himself developed his conception of metaphysical mtaphysique de la dualit dans le Peri Archn de Damascius (unpublished PhD.
science as the discursive articulation of innate concepts imaging transcendent being, thesis, Fribourg 2009).
or if he inherited this conception, for example, from Iamblichus. In the absence of
47
adequate information about Iamblichus, it is difficult to be sure about this. However, Damascius, Puzzles, pp. 1, 9-2, 6.
the theory of mathematical science which seems to play an important role in this
48
Damascius, p. 2, 9-18.
49
Damascius , p. 4, 1-12.
50
Damascius, p. 86, 10-16, for example, and Tresson's thesis (above note 46), ch. 7.
51
Damascius indicates fairly frequently that his critical analysis concerns the
concepts (ennoia, epinoia) we use in thinking about the transcendent (cf., for
example, p. 2, 5 and 19; 4, 14; 6, 9; 7, 18-21). He thus works in the context of the
conception of metaphysical science we have found in Syrianus. I believe that the
anonymous commentary on the Parmenides which has been attributed by P. Hadot to
Porphyry presupposes the theory of metaphysics as the discursive articulation of
concepts (see Commentarium in Platonis "Parmenidem", ed. A. Linguiti, Florence
1995, I, 25-30; II, 1-4, 13, 20; IV, 17; VI, 23-26; IX, 11-20) that we find in Syrianus
and Damascius and thus that it should be dated rather later, to the fourth or fifth
century. But this suggestion requires a separate investigation.
52
Damascius, p. 8, 12-20. For indications of how the critique of metaphysical
concepts can become a means for going beyond them, cf. C. Tresson and A. Metry,
"Damaskios' New Conception of Metaphysics", History of Platonism. Plato
Redivivus, ed. R. Berchman and J. Finamore (New Orleans 2005), pp. 222-226.
53
I am grateful for the helpful questions posed when this paper was given as a lecture
in Washington and as part of a seminar directed by E. Afonasin in Novosibirsk