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a. Facts.

The result of GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) invalidated contract of lease between Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) to be in
violation of the charter of PCSO. In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (the rental of
4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35, 000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts
were allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and
responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25
million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract
of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease. It is still violate of PCSO's
charter. It violated the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Article 9-D of the 1987
Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case
Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power
to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have
funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because
they were not parties to the contract.

b. Issues
Whether the petitioners are real parties in the interest.

c. Held

No. Stare decisis was not applicable in this case. The previous ruling which sustains the stand of the
petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional
issues were actually involved. The law of the case was also not applicable. Since the present case is not
the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any
sense is regarded as the law of this case. Yes, parties are the same but the case is not. The rule of
conclusiveness was not also applicable since issue were actually and directly passed upon and determine
in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. The Court is free in the second proceeding to make an
independent examination of the legal matters at issue as long as the second proceeding involves an
instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first
proceeding. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of
the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
question is actually involved.


a. Facts

The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a
petition for the cancellation of all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
The case was filed because of the appellants right as taxpayers and also suing in behalf of succeeding
generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

With the help of Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), petitioners presented scientific
evidences that deforestation had caused the most environmental tragedies, because deforestation
reduces the capacity of the earth to process carbon dioxide or also known as the greenhouse effect.

Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands
will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all
administrative remedies with the defendants office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The
defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.

b. Issues
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case.

Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render
a valid judgment in accordance to the prayer of the complaints
Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that
these cancellation of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the
c. Held

Petitioners have the legal standing on the case as a taxpayers suit. The subject matter of the
case is very common and a general interest to all Filipino citizens. The petitioners to a balanced and
healthful ecology was been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. The granting
of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be
renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF
ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these
actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially.

Despite the Constitutions non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus,
the said clause cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked
if the public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No.
705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: The State
shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the DENRs duty under its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.


a. Facts
In 1918, Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took the
custody of 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and
knowledge. He forcibly, put them on a ship, and sent to Davao as laborers. A writ of
habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted
the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the
stipulated date.
b. Issues
Whether the Mayors act was illegal or legal.
c. Held

According to the Supreme Court, the acts of the mayor were illegal. There was no law saying
that he could force Filipino citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another place. The women,
said the Court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still Filipino citizens and as such they were
entitled to the constitutional guarantees enjoyed by all other Filipino citizens. The right to freedom of
domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could be considered amount to slavery. The
Supreme Court upheld the right of Filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode.
"Ours is a government of laws and not of men.


a. Facts
In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions
on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of Public Works
adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission that resolves that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along some major streets such a Rizal Ave. in
Manila for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic. The Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on August 10, 1940. The
Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the rules and
regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick

up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners
but of the riding public as well.
b. Issue
Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice? What is Social Justice?
c. Held
No. The rule aims for the safety of the transits and to avoid obstructions on
national roads and provide convenience to the public. All things may be subjected to
burdens and pains in order to secure comfort, health and prosperity of a state. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of Salus Populi est Suprema Lex.(Justice Laurel) The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is
to be predicated.

a. Facts
Erlinda Matias was married to Avelino Parangan Dagdag and had two children.
Avelino would disappear for months without explanation and attend to drinking sprees
with friends and return home drunk. He forces his wife to have sexual intercourse and if
his wife resists, he would beat her and make his wife injured. Dagdag left his family
again and never heard any news about him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job to
fend for them. Erlinda then learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and
that he escaped from jail that remains at-large at date. Erlinda filed for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of
Appeals rising that the lower court erred in declaring the apellee's marriage to Avelino
Dagdag null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter, pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychological incapacity of the nature contemplated
by the law not having been proven to exist. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.

b. Issues
Do immaturity and irresponsibility, habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice
constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code to declare the
marriage null and void?
c. Held
No. The ruling in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina case is reiterated
herein in which the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code: The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Psychological incapacity is caused by medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. That incapacity must be proven medically, clinically
permanent and incurable. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.


a. Facts
Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili (a group of Filipino traitors
aiding the Japanese cause). Manayao conspired together with his Japanese comrade
soldiers to inflict terror upon the barrio of Banaban in Bulacan where they killed 60 to
70 residents. The residents they killed were alleged to be supporters, wives and relatives
of guerillas fighting the Japanese forces. Manayao was positively identified by credible
witnesses and he was later convicted with the high crime of treason with multiple
murders. He was sentenced to death and to pay the damages. Manayaos counsel
argued that his client cannot be tried with treason because Manayao has already lost his
Filipino citizenship due to his swearing of allegiance to support the Japanese cause.
Hence, Manayao cannot be tried under Philippine courts for any war crimes for only
Japanese courts can do so.

b. Issue
Is Manayao guilty of treason?
c. Held
The accused were found guilty. The Makapili is not a part of the Japanese army.
It was an organization of Filipino traitors. Moreover, there is no evidence that the
accused swore to an oath of allegiance when they entered the said organization.
Furthermore, it is the lone prerogative of the State to allow or deny ones change of
a. Facts

In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60
of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman
refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does
not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.

b. Issues Does National Defense Law is constitutional.

c. Held
The Constitutionality of said law was upheld. The appellants do not deny the
facts, but they alleged in defense that they have not registered in the military service
because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother to support and
Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does not
wish to kill or be killed. Under Sec. 2 of Article II of the Philippine Constitution, The
defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty
all citizens may be required by law to rend erpersonal military or civil service.
The National Defense Law, insofar as it establishes compulsory military service,
does not go against the constitution, but in the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed
except through an army, and to leave the organization of an army to the will of the
citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there would
be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. It was also held by the court that
the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of
its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty,
and property of the citizen. Citing the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts, the
court said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled
by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even
against his religious or political convictions, to take place in the ranks of the army of his
country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In US vs. Olson, it was
also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of the law since in
its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment. These justify
that compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether
in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the
appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty
to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such

circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all
events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family

VIII. HIGENORI KURODA vs. Major General Rafael Jalandoni (83 Phil 171)
a. Facts
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines is charged
before the military commission with war crimes. The petitioner tenders that National
War Crimes Office established by Executive Order 68 has no jurisdiction over his case
since the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention. He also claimed that
Melville Hussey and Robert Port are not attorneys authorized to practice law in the
Philippines and that they do not have personality as prosecution since the United Stated
is not a party in interest in the case.
b. Issues
Is Executive Order No. 68 illegal on the ground that the Philippines is not a signatory of
the Hague Convention?
c. Held
The Supreme Court held that the order is valid and constitutional in pursuant to
Section 3 Article 2 of the Constitution. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation
of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part and are wholly based on generally
accepted principles of international law. Such rules and procedures therefore form part
of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed in
the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States and thus were equally
bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation
contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. This rights and obligations
were not erased by the assumption of full sovereignty. Military Commission is a special
military tribunal governed by special law and not by the rules of court. There is nothing
in the said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before the said
commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines.


a. Facts
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts
No.2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private
schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and was amended by
Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds
that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents
of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of
their Natural Right sand duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions
conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules
and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers. Section 1 of Act
No. 2706 It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general
standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same
shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of
instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized
representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges
in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same, The petitioner also
complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school is not
originally included in the original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the
petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own
and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit
before such person could exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal
Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented
no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional

question;2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the
Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court.
b. Issues
Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no.
180 maybe declared void and unconstitutional
c. Held
The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in
the formthey seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented
before the court. Its an established principle that to entitle a private individual
immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has
merely invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive and legislative
action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the
public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare law unconstitutional arises only
when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual
cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental
to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under
the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the
last resort and it must be necessary to determine a real and vital controversy between
litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual
positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to
satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be
sufficiently sustained and states that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the
regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse
by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude
that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners
appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they
fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for
being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for


a. Facts
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his
sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor,
the proceeds shall be administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when
the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of Florentinos
benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabaas filed
a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself
to be the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and
contended that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only
to the parties and intended beneficiaries.
b. Issue
Was the mother is the rightful trustee for the minor beneficiary?
c. Held
Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code states that "The father, or in his absence
the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under
parental authority. The property which the emancipated child has acquired or may
acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in
ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under
parental authority and whose company he lives. With the added circumstance that
the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of
maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is
further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the
trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case
of an uncle. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as
she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother

shows more care towards the child than an uncle. It is a mother asserting priority.
Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens
patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.


a. Facts
Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union who later resigned
from his affiliation to the said union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its
members to become affiliated with any labor organization. The union has subsisting
closed shop agreement in their collective bargaining agreement with their employer
that all permanent employees of the company must be a member of the union and later
was amended by Republic Act No. 3350 with the provision stating "but such agreement
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization".. By his resignation, the union wrote a letter to
the company to separate the plaintiff from the service after which he was informed by
the company that unless he makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will be
dismissed from the service. The union contends that RA 3350 impairs obligation of
contract stipulated in their CBA and discriminatorily favors religious sects in
providing exemption to be affiliated with any labor unions.

b. Issue
WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association.
c. Held
The court held that what the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize
and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations which involves two broad
notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power,
whereby an employee may join or refrain from joining an association. Therefore the
right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. The exceptions
provided by the assailed Republic Act is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members
of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on
the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. Thus this
exception does not infringe upon the constitutional provision on freedom of association
but instead reinforces it.