CASE DIGESTS COMPILATION ON:

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS LAW

(LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW)
PART 3

PATRICIO TAN, ET AL. vs COMELEC ; G.R. No. 73155 ; July 11, 1986

FACTS:

Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte ,
petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein filed with this Court a case for
Prohibition to stop COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite in implementation of the aforesaid law.

Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit
and these requisites are: Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a
population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million
pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. The average
estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring
income.

The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte,. Petitioners asked that the effects of the plebiscite which they sought to
stop be suspended until the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision.

Respondents Arguments:

1. That the challenged statute.-Batas Pambansa 885, should be accorded the presumption of legality
2. That the said law is not void on its face and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical and undeniable demonstration of the supposed
infringement of the Constitution.
3. That the powers of the Batasang-Pambansa to enact the assailed law is beyond question. They claim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe
the Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code have been complied with.
4. That this case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte.
5. Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of
Negros del Norte, do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our
Constitution.
a. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate the Constitution, invoking and citing the case
of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128
SCRA 61), particularly the pronouncements therein, hereunder quoted:

1. Admittedly,this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway. There is indeed an element of
ambiguity in the use of the expression 'unit or units affected'. It is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when certain Barangays are
separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much more persuasive, however, to
contend as respondents do that the acceptable construction is for those voters, who are not from the barangays to be separated, should
be excluded in the plebiscite.

2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of
unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy,
commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. ...

3. ... Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are indications that the inhabitants of several barangays are
inclined to separate from a parent municipality they should be allowed to do so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will in a
plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New
burdens will be imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a matter of choice-their choice. They
should be left alone then to decide for themselves. To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will. They
may even frustrate it, That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority. That is not to
abide by the fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To rule as this
Tribunal does is to follow an accepted principle of constitutional construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision
that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned from provisions in pari materia.

Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally with force in the case at bar. Respondents also maintain that the requisites under the
Local Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte have all been duly complied with, Respondents discredit
petitioners' allegations that the requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers as so prescribed in the Local Government Code for a new province to be created has
not been satisfied.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS: Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte, would only be about 2,856.56
square kilometers and which evidently would be lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this regard, point out and
stress that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an
area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less.

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As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered moot and academic considering that a plebiscite has been already conducted
on January 3, 1986.

ISSUE:

WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or
barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected? NO

RULING:

1. Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the
plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the
division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province). Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units
would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity
would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. Paredes vs. Executive
(G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit: when
the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at
bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised
by the petitioners. SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity

On the merits of the case.

Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of Negros del Norte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the present case
revolves around in the interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, which being brief and for convenience, We
again quote: SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained " the approval of a majority of votes in the
plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus
inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its
existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two
political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other
affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.

We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of
these two component political units.

What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support to respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and pronouncements
made by this Court in the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus The Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984
(128 SCRA 6). In said case relating to a plebiscite held to ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing barangays, this Court upheld the legality of the
plebiscite which was participated in exclusively by the people of the barangay that would constitute the new municipality.

This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents. What is, however, highly significant are the prefatory statements therein stating
that said case is "one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway" and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the
use of the expression unit or units affected." The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise its discretion on
the matter. It did not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of the Constitution should be correctly interpreted. The ruling in the aforestated case
of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein that "it is
plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are
affected."

It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find very lucidly expressed
the strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his opinion, which We hereunder quote:

2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be
divided such as in the case at bar or an of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the
Constitutional provision.

This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the forerunner of the ruling which We now consider applicable to the case at bar.

We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now
provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected." We are not disposed to agree
that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and
municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people necessarily affected.

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In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They must have
entertained apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In
anticipation of a possible strong challenge to the legality of such a plebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-serving
phrase that the new province constitutes the area affected. Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous and far
from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not
to mention the other adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.

Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long
established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that
the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which contribute to
the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros
Occidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the case of Negros
what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary.

As contended by petitioners, Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in the constitutional provision do not contemplate distinct
situation isolated from the mutually exclusive to each other. A Province maybe created where an existing province is divided or two provinces merged. Such
cases necessarily will involve existing unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being substantially altered.

It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its boundary substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only some
and not all the voters in the whole unit which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true. It is
also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of this case can depend on the mere discretion that this Court may exercise,
nevertheless, it is the petitioners' case that deserve to be favored.

It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive pronouncements in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive
Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already here express, We now state that the ruling in the two mentioned cases sanctioning the exclusion of the voters
belonging to an existing political unit from which the new political unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of
determining the formation of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned.

In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the respondent Commission
on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall
participate and that this Court make a pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. The Court is
prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court
is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject
Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist.

Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the new province of Negros del Norte because of the appointment of the
officials thereof, must now be erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should be announced. Its existence should be put to an end as quickly as
possible, if only to settle the complications currently attending to its creation. As has been manifested, the parent province of Negros del Norte has been
impleaded as the defendant in a suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional Trial Court of Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case
No. 169-C, for the immediate allocation, distribution and transfer of funds by the parent province to the new province, in an amount claimed to be at least
P10,000,000.00.

The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province
does not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government Code.

It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits submitted by the petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the new
province has a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This assertion is made to negate the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area of the
new province cannot be more than 3,500 square kilometers because its land area would, at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers, taking into account
government statistics relative to the total area of the cities and municipalities constituting Negros del Norte. Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the
Local Government Code speaks of the territory of the province to be created and requires that such territory be at least 3,500 square kilometers, what is
contemplated is not only the land area but also the land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even the submission of the
respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within the three mile limit should be considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new
province. Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect, and fallacious.

The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects
that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.

Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near,
text, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when
it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference
to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence
above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous
if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the
first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning
intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p.
664).

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The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the
words of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result.

It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land area but which has a long, narrow, extended coast line, (such as La Union
province) can be said to have a larger territory than a land-locked province (such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose land area manifestly exceeds the province first
mentioned.

Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the Province of Negros Occidental and even by our Nation. Commendable is the
patriotism displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to preserve the continued existence of their historic province. They were inspired
undoubtedly by their faithful commitment to our Constitution which they wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite the setbacks and the hardships which
petitioners aver confronted them, they valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A happy destiny for our Nation is assured as long as among our
people there would be exemplary citizens such as the petitioners herein.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the
officials thereof are also declared null and void.

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 HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ; G.R. No. 103328 ;
October 19, 1992

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of
Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo,
same province.
WHEREAS under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution the creation of a municipality shall be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) 2 said plebiscite shall be
conducted by the Commission on Elections;
WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155 provides that the expenses in holding the plebiscite shall be take out of the Contingent Fund under the
current fiscal year appropriations;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves, to promulgated (sic) the following guidelines to govern the conduct of said
plebiscite:
1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or units affected, namely the barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labor, Camarines Norte (Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986).
xxx xxx xxx
In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the
creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and
disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes.

Petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays
that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA 7155.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:
1. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the
plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12
barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan,
Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area of the mother unit of the
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
2. Petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, particularly Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan v.
COMELEC relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe, thus reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary which held that where a
local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated should be included in the plebiscite.
3. Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our
earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973
Constitution our ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, especially since the latter
provision deleted the words "unit or."

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently, whether or not the
plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.

RULING:
We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected the creation of the
proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.

We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973
Constitution not affected our ruling in Tan vs. Comelec as explained by then CONCOM Commissioner, now my distinguished colleague, Associate Justice Hilario
Davide, during the debates in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:

Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the Committee that under the formulation in the present Local
Government Code, the words used are actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words. Maybe there will be
no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about this.

Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the part of the two Gentlemen from the floor?

Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If
it is the creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.

It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the
political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is
contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be
included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2312.

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 DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS ET AL. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; G.R. No. 89651 ; November 10, 1989

The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, scheduled for November 19, 1989, in
implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao." These consolidated
petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management
from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional .

PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:
1. that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
2. that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and Moro National
Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the
Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines within the
realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of
autonomy."

In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided for regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here
shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.
1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the
provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.

Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a binding international agreement . The
Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign
state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.

ISSUE:
1) W/N RA 6734 run in conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
2) W/N RA 6734 is unconstitutional
RULING:

1. We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government
whether under public international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus,
any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the
Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the
law of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same
class as the latter Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that
R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought.

2. Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the
Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite. In support of his argument,
petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be
composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution." Petitioner
contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of
autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.

The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.
a. the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of the Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessary for the
creation of the autonomous region. The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of
the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements.
b. there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements
embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus: SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be
held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and
cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in
the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that
even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734

6
shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there
shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.

3. As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been raised as to what this majority
means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent
units, or both?

If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus,
in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region, which reads: The creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec,
18, para, 2].

It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will
of the majority in each of the constituent units. For if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the
votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." It is thus clear that what is
required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the
votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.

4. Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other hand, maintains that only those areas which, to his view, share
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics should be properly
included within the coverage of the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and
nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics . By
including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the
others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be
limited.Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should
constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes
is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion.

After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the extreme view that
other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that since the Organic Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its scope
should be further broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas
equal protection of the law, and therefore is violative of the Constitution. Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional
provision he had earlier invoked. Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should compromise the autonomous region, taking into
account shared historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics, would necessarily carry with it
the exclusion of other areas. As earlier stated, such determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for the
autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.

5. Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of RA 6734 which states: . . . Provided, that only the provinces and cities
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite
do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that the President may, by
administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Petitioners claim that the provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution. This is in
conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution which provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The Court says that what is referred to in RA 6734 is the merger of administrative regions (i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region)
which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. Administrative regions are not territorial and political
subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for
in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of general supervision over local
governments. Thus, there is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision
requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces,
cities, municipalities or barangays NOT to administrative regions.
6. Finally, petitioner assert that while the Constitution states that the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite,
the requirement of organizing an Oversight Committee as provided in RA 6734 would in effect cause delay.
The Court held that if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the
autonomous region immediately takes effect. The provision in RA 6734 requiring an Oversight Committee does not provide for a different date of
effectivity. Further, the purpose of the Oversight Committee is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government
much less to cause delay.

7
 MEL LOPEZ et al vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ; G.R. No. L-56503; April 4, 1981

FACTS:

Similar to the previous 2 cases filed, the petitioners insist that the present Constitution is not in force and effect. There is this variation. The plea is made for
the holding of a plebiscite so that the people may vote on the ratification of the Constitution, now in force, but as, to them still in the stage of proposal. In the
event it is rejected, so their thinking goes, then the 1935 Constitution, which in the view of petitioners was suspended by the establishment of an authoritarian
regime by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces after the proclamation of martial law, could be once more operative with the lifting of martial law on
January 17, 1981.

A similar judgment is thus indicated. The petition must be dismissed. If there is a further expression of view on the part of the Court, it is to clear the
misapprehension that seems to be current in certain legal quarters about the import of the Javellana decision 4 and the role of the President as Commander-in-
Chief during the period of martial law.
Issue:
Was the 1973 constitution not operative because of the lack of the conduct of a plebiscite?

Ruling: No
- Court noted that It is in fact self-defeating, for if such were indeed the case, petitioners have come to the wrong forum. We sit as Court duty-
bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. To contend otherwise as was done here would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility.
o A similar judgment is thus indicated. The petition must be dismissed
- According to the Javallena ruling, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."
- Four (4) members of the Court hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof
- Four (4) members of the Court, cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial
certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution
- Two (2) members of the Court voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that
there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force
- The scholarly opinion of then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, while in dissent, acknowledged that even without valid ratification, a new
Constitution could come into force and effect by the acquiescence of the people
- Once the fact of acceptance by the people of a new fundamental law is made evident, the judiciary is left with no choice but to accord it
recognition
- Even petitioners must be aware that aside from the referendum that led to the ratification of the present Constitution, there was a second one held
on July 27 and 28 in 1973, and another on February 27 and 28 in 1975.
- The 1976 amendments to the Constitution were adopted in the referendum held on October 16 and 17 of the year. Then on December 17, 1977,
there was again held a referendum
- The fact that the people went to the polls would be indicative oftheir acquiescence in the present Constitution. Nor could petitioners be unaware
that two elections have been held under the present Constitution
o manifested recognition of the force and effect of the present Constitution, by the people, including those in the opposition.

8
 Sultan Osop Camid vs. The office of the President; G.R. No. 161414 January 14, 2005

Facts:
The factual antecedents derive from the ruling in Pelaez vs.Auditor General in 1965. Then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders
creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao.
President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Sec.68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Then VP Emmanuel Pelaez filed a
special civil action for a writ of prohibition alleging that the EOs were null and void, Sec. 68 having been repealed by RA 2370, and said orders constituting an
undue delegation of legislative power.
After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were null and void since Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code did not meet the well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch.
Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the Municipality of Andong.
Petitioner represents himself as a current resident of Andong and alleged that Andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set
of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents, despite the fact that no person has been appointed, elected or
qualified to serve any of the local government offices of Andong since 1968.
Camid imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not including said
municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular municipality. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events
consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence, particularly citing Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez wherein the court affirmed the unique status of
the Municipality of San Andres as a de facto municipal corporation. Camid also cites Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the
recognition of the impugned municipality.

Issue:
1. Whether the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong continues despite the petitioners allegation that Andong has thrived into a full-
blown municipality
2. whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or
reimplementing statute

Held:
1. Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription . What is
clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the
acquiescence thereto by instrumentalities of the state. Camids plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was
done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations.
Petitioners seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant
prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced.
The question as to whether a municipality previously annulled by the Supreme Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative/reimplementing
statute has never been decided before. The effect of Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation.
EO 107 which established Andong was declared null and void ab initio in 1965 by the Supreme Court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), along
with 33 other EOs. The phrase ab initio means from the beginning. Pelaez was never reversed by the SC but was rather expressly affirmed in the cases of
Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. No subsequent ruling declared Pelaez as
overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating the Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any
reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.
Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities
challenged in actual cases before this Court. With the promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by
executive order but not judicially annulled Sec. 442(b) of the LGC deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under.

There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the EO creating
Andong was expressly annulled by the SC in 1965. Court decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.
Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm/reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities which had been previously created by presidential
issuances/EOs. The provision only affirms the legal personalities of those municipalities which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were
fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent unless recreated through
specific legislative enactments.
The legal effect of the nullification of a municipality in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back to their original municipalities.
If there is only a strong impulse for the reconstitution of the municipality nullified in Pelaez, the solution is through the legislature and not judicial confirmation
of void title.

2. Section 442. Requisites for Creation

o (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such . Existing municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities
- Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the case is not a fit subject forthe special civil
actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of factual questions
- The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the legal principles governing the recognition
of de facto municipal corporations

9
- What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as
well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state
- Indeed, the factual deficiencies aside, Camids plaint should have undergonethe usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have
been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations
- It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camids present action. The assailed issuance is the Certification issued by the DILG. But
such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or revalidate a municipality.
o there is nothing in the document that comments on the present status of Andong
- The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the petition, merely by pointing out that the Municipality of
Andong never existed.

o Still, its sweeping adoption may not be advisedly appropriate in light ofSection 442(d) of the Local Government Code and our ruling
in Municipality of San Narciso, both of which admit to the possibility of de facto municipal corporations.
- The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still is, not empowered to create municipalities through
executive issuances. The Court therein recognized that the President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations,
and that the same have beenorganized and in actual operation . . . . [36]However, the Court ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33)
municipalities, including Andong,
- Two years after Pelaez was decided, the issue again came to fore in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva. Lawigan was not one of the municipalities
ordered annulled in Pelaez. Lawigan was upheld
- In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito what was challenged is the validity of the constitution of the Municipality of Balabaganand
which, similar to Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities annulled
o This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked de facto status as a municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from nullifying
action
o the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even though it had been organized prior to the Courts decision
in Pelaez
o It cited conflicting American authorities on whether a de facto corporation can exist where the statute or charter creating it is
unconstitutional
- In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated , the
decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the
organization
o there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. [44]
- In the case at bar, Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act of Andong prior to its judicial dissolution.
- Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and whichhave their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the)
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities
- The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature
- we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its
nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court.
- However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarlycreated by
executive order but not judicially annulled.
- Andong is not similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation
o executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965
o Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code
Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all
o The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four decades are
eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town
o DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, both
these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid, to support the restoration or re-operation of the
Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur
o We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied upon in Jimenez and San
Narciso
Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that matter
o How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the DILG Certification presented by
Camid
DILG certified the existence of these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities
enumerated in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution., ANDONG IS NOT

10
 SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ et al vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., et al

Facts:

Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to
be known as the City of Santiago,claimingthat the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.

Issue: Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes
of its conversion into an independent component city

Contention:
Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices
falls below the required annual income of P20,000,000.00 for its conversion into a city.
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual
income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation . Petitioners
asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and! or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or
decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.

Ruling:

Petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.
IRA are funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the
part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance properly certified that the municipality had an average
annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices where it included the IRAs in its
computation of said average annual income.
Section 450 (c),LGC provides that the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers,
and non-recurring income. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer ,
since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or
transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled
corporations.
Department of Finance Order No. 3593 13 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be
revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment
and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial
assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others.

11
 LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC; G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008 (En Banc)

Facts:

This is a consolidated petition for prohibitions commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog and Jerry Treas
a) assailing the constitutionality of 16 laws each of them converting the municipality covered thereby into a city for violating Sec. 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
b) This petition also seeks to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.

1. During the 11th Congress, 57 cityhood bills were filed before the House of Representatives. Of the 57, 33 became laws, the other 24 were not
enacted. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009).
2. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a
city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush"
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence.
3. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12 th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11 th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
4. During the 13th Congress the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate
for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities
filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
5. The House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu
which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the
President's signature.
6. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.
7. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well
as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities
under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
WON the cityhood laws violate Sec. 10 Article X of the Constitution - yes

RULING:

We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

1. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
which now provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally
generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos ( P100,000,000.00) for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

2. Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.
3. Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before
the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11 th Congress.
4. During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100 million in
RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during the 11 th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However,
the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
5. During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December
of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
a. Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act
No. 9009.
b. This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100 million prescribed in

12
 Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from
March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
c. Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or
during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007 . Thus,
respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws. This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an
earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively.

Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
(Emphasis supplied)

1. The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in
any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the
criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other
law, like the Cityhood Laws.
2. The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can
govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same
uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in
the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
3. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation
of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to
become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
contain any exemption from this income requirement.
4. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress
when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from
the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national
taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)

1. If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes
to local government units.
2. A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an
annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in
national taxes.
3. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution
of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear, Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations of Congress if the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the
intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four corners. 19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply
apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic
aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law.

1. Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any exemption from the increased income
requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009.
2. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and
unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the
letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.

The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the 11 th
Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law.
1. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because
such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
2. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be
written in the Local Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law.
3. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government
Code.
4. Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by a
general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides: The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the
interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied)

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 5. Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private corporations in a general law applicable to
all without discrimination. Congress cannot create a private corporation through a special law or charter.

Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable

1. Congress is not a continuing body. The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11 th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the
adjournment of the 11th Congress.
2. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11 th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the
11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13 th or subsequent Congresses.
3. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed terminated.
4. Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12 th and 13th Congresses
on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in
construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.

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 LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC; G.R. NO. 176951, December 21, 2009 (On Reconsideration)

FACTS: (refer to previous case)

ISSUE: WON the cityhood laws violate Sec. 10 Article X of the Constitution no.

RULING:

Petitioners threshold posture, characterized by a strained interpretation of the Constitution, if accorded cogency, would veritably curtail and cripple Congress
valid exercise of its authority to create political subdivisions.
By constitutional design and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character.
But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or
municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent case, Sema v. CIMELEC. The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless provides for the creation
of LGUs, thus: Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. (Emphasis supplied.)

As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political subdivisions in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code, subject to the approval of the voters in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area,
population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that these indicators or
criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute. Doubtless, the code they are referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they
conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution.
Petitioners posture does not persuade.

1. It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or
codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991. Be it noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337,
the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the
LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they
did in Art. X, Sec. 3[35] of the Constitution.
2. Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject
enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the
ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law,
adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same.
3. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million . At the end of the day,
the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political
subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.
a. Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if
we pursue their contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and increased income criterion would, in a way,
also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they
in fact use said law as an argument for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.
4. As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly decreased the income criterion vis--vis the respondent LGUs, but without
necessarily being unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed shortly, by reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it earlier raised to
PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the
following uniform provision of the cityhood laws: Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
5. In any event, petitioners constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we were to assume purely ex hypothesi the correctness of their
underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a municipality to a city shall be in accordance with, among other things, the income criterion set forth
in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We shall explain.
6. Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less,
intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws,
which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final analysis, to the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution.

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 PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008. DECISION:
CARPIO MORALES

TOPIC: The extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process.

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating
panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation
Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be
discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Pin ol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters
of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation
thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.

This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the City of Zamboanga, Mayor
Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray
that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD
be declared null and void.

Meanwhile, the City of Iligan filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that respondents be enjoined from
signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners
herein additionally implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent.

The Province of Zamboanga del Norte, Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, docketed as
G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from
executing the MOA-AD.

Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and
permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and
nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel
represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA); and
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait
accompli with the finalization of the draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state
policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act
No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991) ; If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an
appropriate remedy;
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by
law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
d) If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;

16
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon,
Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance.
1. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
accepted as Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including
Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their
spouses. Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only "Moros" as traditionally understood even by
Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall
be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.

The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of
their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.

The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality. The
MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the
territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a
Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme
over the others. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of
government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations."

The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory, particularly those known as Indians. In Canada,
each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First Nation," hence, all of them are usually described collectively by the plural
"First Nations." To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" - suggesting its exclusive entitlement to that
designation - departs from the Canadian usage of the term.

The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the
Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

2. TERRITORY

The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including
the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.

More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for
inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.

Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories, Category A and
Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are
to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD. Category B areas, also called "Special
Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement - the
Comprehensive Compact.

The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its "internal waters," defined as extending
fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal
waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial
waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. Notably,
the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."

The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the
latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation agreement. The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial
waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the
enforcement of police and safety measures. There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internal
waters of the BJE.

3. RESOURCES

The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option
to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the GRP. The
BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements.

17
 The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take
necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the
UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for
environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming
part of the ancestral domain.

With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas,
the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries the
proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires," the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under
reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources.

The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.

The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and
Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine
Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.

4. GOVERNANCE

The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact.
This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation" of the
MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between
the Central Government and the BJE.

The "associative" relationship between the Central Government and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by shared authority and
responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with
defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within
the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education,
legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in
the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later
initialed the MOA-AD?
2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?

RULING ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people
in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation so that they may be able to criticize and participate in
the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-
informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people.

The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern

In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. Examples of matters of public concern:
the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds,
the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws,
the civil service eligibility of a public employee,
the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials,
the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and
the identity of party-list nominees

18
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which
directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing
as to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled: The right to information "contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."

Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if
no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. Requiring a consummated contract will keep the
public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State
policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended.

The policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.

The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found
in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to
give information even if nobody demands.

Both provisions are self-executing provisions as they go hand in hand. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an
excuse in not effecting such policy.

The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty
to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. 133 The preambulatory
clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing
the people's participation.

One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and
principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one
community." Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes " continuing
consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's
participation in the peace process."

Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations, contrary to respondents' position that
plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation."

Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum
(NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the
progress of the comprehensive peace process." E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be " the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and
seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the
comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives." In fine, E.O. No. 3
establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.

PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion

The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority , and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
exercise thereof.

The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may, however, require him to comply with the law
and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the President. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient
provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct toward
token provisos that border on classic lip service. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the premises. The argument defies sound reason when
contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order even
recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the GRP makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers its definite
propositions. It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue.

AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft

19
of the MOA-AD.

Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before
any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions" is well-taken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this
avowed policy: Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in
Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained.

In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao, the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply only to national programs or projects which
are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the environment and
human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented . The
MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people , which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are
adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect
their rights, lives and destinies. The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms
ordained in said Act, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.

Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by
mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or "consensus
points" necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the
TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority.

ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned
provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. The
relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and
responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government
and the BJE.

Keitner and Reisman state that an association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state,
the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations
represent a middle ground between integration and independence. x

The MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity
to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings
and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the
BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues
pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and
the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other
things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it .

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national government.
Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall
be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the

20
ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population,
a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily
sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it
is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and
the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region."

As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the
present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite
- Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under
Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion
therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their
inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.

The MOA-AD, moreover, would not comply with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution (Powers of autonomous regions)
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.

Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the above-
quoted provision. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of
the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however,
that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our
constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary instructs:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's
sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision
states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development." An
associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the
national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054 or the
Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.

Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1
on Concepts and Principles states:
1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro
people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time
of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of
choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected.
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the

21
identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as
follows:
"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and
political institutions."

Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains . The MOA-AD's manner of delineating
the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure.

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land." Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights162 which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."

The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be
made between the right of internal and external self-determination.
a. internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an
existing state.
b. right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises
in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN
DRIP). The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-
government. Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the
near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows: Nothing in this Declaration
may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the
United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity
or political unity of sovereign and independent States.

Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the
validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as presently
worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their
part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. Notwithstanding
the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government, have already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states
that the "negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
(Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already discussed, a preparation
for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing.

SUMMARY
1. The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
2. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the
petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo.
3. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the
present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave
violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
4. The prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official
copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.
5. The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive
the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
6. The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to
information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
7. An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of

22
 these public rights.
8. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant
matters relating to the peace agenda.
a. One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
b. Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any
project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of
a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
c. Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government
agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
9. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is
untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it
unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
10. The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation
process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
11. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws . Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying
them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
12. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until
that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001,
addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make
such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of
the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
13. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law,
respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.

23
 MIRANDA VS. AGUIRRE

FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by
the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the
approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component
city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the
petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
2. Whether or not RA 8528

RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a
justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang
Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a
plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.

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 UMALI vs. COMELECG.R. No. 203974

FACTS:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No.183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion
of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding tothe request, the President
issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012,proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by
thequalified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991."Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued
the assailed Minute Resolution No.12-0797, for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from componentcity to highly-urbanized
city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City shouldparticipate in the said plebiscite.In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of
Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion forReconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily anddirectly affect the
mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of theLGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
He argues thatwhile the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of anexisting city, the spirit of the Constitutional
provision calls for the people of the local governmentunit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in theirrights and
responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGCshould then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly
affected by theconversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umalijustified his position by enumerating the
various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan Citysconversion and how it will cause material change not only in the political and economic rights ofthe city
and its residents but also of the province as a whole.To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city mayorof
Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply toconversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that
a specific provision of theLGC, Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in theplebiscite. Lastly, private respondent
pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in 1994from a municipality to an independent component city pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720,the
plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.COMELEC rule against petitioner maintaining that Cabanatuan City is
merely being convertedfrom a component city into an HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the conversionwill only be the city itself. It argues that
in this instance, no political unit will be created, mergedwith another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that no boundaries will be altered.
Theconversion would merely reinforce the powers and prerogatives already being exercised by thecity, with the political units probable elevation to that of an
HUC as demanded by its compliancewith the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the participation of the voters of the entireprovince in the plebiscite will
not be necessary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nueva Ecija should be included in the plebicit not only those in Cabanatuan City.

RULING:

Yes."Political units directly affected" defined. In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what shouldprimarily be
determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be"directly affected" by the change.Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis fordetermining the qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec.10, Art. X
reads:Section 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteriaestablished in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes castin a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarilyencompasses not only
Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all theregistered voters in the province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the
proposedconversion of Cabanatuan City.On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their claim that only theCity of Cabanatuan
should be allowed to take part in the voting. Sec. 453 states:Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be the duty of the President
todeclare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimumrequirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section,
upon proper application thereforand ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec.
453 as referring only to theregistered voters in the city being converted, excluding in the process the voters in theremaining towns and cities of
Nueva Ecija.In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination onwhether or not the requirements under Sec. 4521 of
the LGC are complied with. Theprovision makes it ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare acomponent city as highly urbanized
once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatorylanguage
"shall" used in the provision leaves the President with no room for discretion.In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite
for purposes ofconversions once the requirements are met. No further legislation is necessary before the cityproposed to be converted becomes eligible to
become an HUC through ratification, as the basisfor the delegation of the legislative authority is the very LGC.The plebiscite requirement under the
constitutional provision should equally apply toconversions as well.While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution wenevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantialalteration of boundarie

25
 MARIANO VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No.
7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:
1 Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government
Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions
2 Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new
citys acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by
the Constitution
3 Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law

HELD/RULING:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be
known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in
Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of
Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.

Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was
under court litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to
decide.

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that: Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall
continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly
elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive
officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city
government of the City of Makati.

Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected. xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law,
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This challenge on the controversy cannot be
entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig
and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise
provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law.

26
 Aquino III and Robredo vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed R.A. 9716, which reapportioned the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur to create an additional legislative district. The first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Sen. Aquino III and Naga Mayor Robredo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
o Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

ISSUES:
1. Procedural: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi
2. Procedural: Whether or not certiorari and prohibition were the correct remedies
3. Substantive: Whether or not R.A. 9716 was unconstitutional

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi):

(1) Yes:
o Absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of
transcendental importance.
(2) No:
o The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or
quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
o BUT the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
(3) No:
o Section 5(3) of Art VI clearly distinguished a province from a city. Meaning a province is automatically entitled to one representative
while a city has to meet the 250,000 population requirement first.
o The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the formula and constant number of
250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled to
two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment.
o Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district (i.e. Local Govt Codes
requisite for creating a province: not less than Php 20,000,000 annual income, plus at least 2,000 sq. m. OR at least 250,000 inhabitants).

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

DISSENTING: Carpio, J.
The R.A. violates the constitutional standard of Legislators Represent People, not Provinces or Cities,

The constitutional standard of proportional representation is rooted in equality in voting power -- that each vote is worth the same as any other
vote, not more or less. Translated in terms of legislative redistricting, this means equal representation for equal numbers of people or equal voting
weight per legislative district.
The Consti already provides for the standards with regard to the reapportionment of legislative districts. First is the rule on proportional
representation, which is the universal standard in direct representation in legislatures. Second is the rule on a minimum population of 250,000
per legislative district, which was not present in our previous Constitutions. Third is the rule on progressive ratio, which means that the number of
legislative districts shall increase as the number of the population increases in accordance with the rule on proportional representation. Fourth is
the rule on uniformity, which requires that the first three rules shall apply uniformly in all apportionments in provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area.
I DECLARE THIS LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

27
 Municipality of Jimenez vs. Hon. Vicente Baz, Jr.

Facts:
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 by then Pres. Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara, Baja, and
Sinara Alto, based on the technical dedcription in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of
Jimenez.
While conceding that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the Municipality of Jimenez, in its answer, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an
agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement, which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental in its Resolution No.
77 dated February 18, 1950, fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.
On October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement
between the parties was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. 258, that power being vested in Congress
pursuant to the Constitution and the LGC of 1983 (BP 337), Sec. 134. The Provincial Board denied the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration.
On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the RTC of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 against Sinacaban, the Province
of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and the Executive
Secretary.

Issues:
1. Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim
2. Whether R.A. 7160, Sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not conforming to the constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation
of new municipalities.
3. If it has legal personality, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. 258 or in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial board of Misamis Occidental which
should be used as basis for adjudicating Sinacabans territorial claim.

Held:
1. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the creation
of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of
Sinacaban. However, where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity , its
creation can no longer be questioned.
A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation where its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced
publicly and officially.
A quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years from the act complained of was done/committed.
Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years, yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned . Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that
its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that is apparently desired for its revenue. The State and even the Municipality of
Jimenez itself has recognized Sinacabans corporate existence. Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs in
the country. Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary.
The Municipality of Sinacaban attained a de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts
throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991
must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban since it states that:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such . Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances/executive orders and which have their respective set of municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be regular municipalities.

2. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. The plebiscite
requirement for the creation of municipalities applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution it cannot be applied to
municipalities created before.

3. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that Sinacaban contains those
barrios. The reason for this is that the technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a municipalitys territory, is controlling. The trial court
correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of determining the boundaries of the municipality & consequently to which municipality the
barangays in question belong.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law is not the carrying into effect of the law but its amendment and a resolution of a provincial
Board declaring certain barrios part of one or another municipality that is contrary to the technical description of the territory of the municipality is not binding .
If Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by
Jimenez as basis for opposing Sinacabans claim.
In case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute should be elevated to the RTC of the province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983). Jimenez properly brought
to the RTC for review the Decision and Resolution of the Provincial Board. This was in accordance with the LGC of 1983, the governing law when the action
was brought by Jimenez in 1989. The governing law now is Secs. 118-119, LGC of 1991 (RA 7160).
Jimenezs contention that the RTC failed to decide the case within 1 yr from the start of the proceedings as required by Sec. 79 of the LGC of 1983 and the 90-
day period provided for in Art.VIII, Sec.15 of the Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision rendered. Failure of a court to decide within the period
prescribed by law does not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the case but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible administrative sanction.

28
 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR.

FACTS:
On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive
Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of
San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios. EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the
President and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October
1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class
municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that (t)he conversion of this municipal
district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives.

Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo warranto with RTC which petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 Invoking the
ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General.Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality and
that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 (Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. . . .(d) Municipalities existing
as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.)

Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and
not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.

ISSUE: W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto municipal corporation.

HELD:
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05
June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a
status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it
to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on
24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the States recognition of the continued
existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San
Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning
the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12)
municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded.

29
 Municipality of Candijay, Bohol vs CA

FACTS
The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is within its territorial jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the Municipality of
Alicia.
Lower Court: Barangay Pagahat as within the territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part
and parcel of its territory and further permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia to respect plaintiffs control, possession and political
supervision of barangay Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the same barrio.
Court of Appeals: rejected the boundary line claimed by petitioner because it would place practically all of barrio Pagahat and other barrios within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Candijay. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction
under the law creating her. After an examination of the respective survey plans of petitioner and respondent submitted as exhibits, that both plans
are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between Candijay and the Municipality of Mabini.
After weighing and considering the import of certain official acts, including EO 265 (creating municipality of Alicia and Mabini) dated September 16,
1949 and Act No. 968 of the Philippine Commission dated October 31, 1903, concluded that Barrio Bulawan from where Barrio Pagahat originated
is not mentioned as one of the barrios constituted as part of the Municipality of Alicia. Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of
Candijay. Therefore the CA, applying the equiponderance rule, dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE
W/N the respondent lacked juridical personality as a result of having been created under a void executive order? NO.

RATIO
Citing the case of Municipality of San Narciso v. Mendez:
Petitioners theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonable brought. EO 353 s validity was only contested after almost 30
years from its issuance. Granting that the EO was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, peculiar
circumstances obtaining this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status
uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Equally significant is Section 442 (d) of the
Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts organized pursuant to the presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. The de
jure status of the Municipality must now be conceded.
The above-cited case is strikingly similar to the present case. Respondent municipality of Alicia should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 of
the Local Government Code, and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.

30
 NAVARRO vs EXEC SECRETARY BOARD
FACTS:
Based on the official 2000 Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO), the population of the Province of Surigao del
Norte as of May 1, 2000 was 481,416. Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, a province may be created if it has
an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less
than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of
the province. The Office of the President, through its Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Surigao del Norte of the deficient population in the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands. the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special
census, with the assistance of an NSO District Census Coordinator, in the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual population in support of the house bill creating
the Province of Dinagat Islands. The special census yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the proposed province. The NSO, however, did not
certify the result of the special census.Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor Robert Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which declared as official,
for all purposes, the 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371,576. The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the
average annual income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was P82,696,433.23.
The land area of the proposed province is 802.12 square kilometers.the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, passed the bill creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

A plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to determine whether the local government units directly affected approved of the creation
of the Province of Dinagat Islands into a distinct and independent province. The result of the plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative
votes. the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct province was ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. a new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their appointment by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Another set of provincial officials was elected during the synchronized national and local elections held on May 14, 2007. On July 1,
2007, the elected provincial officials took their oath of office; hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its corporate existence.
Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not valid because it failed to comply with either the
population or land area requirement prescribed by the Local Government Code and prayed that R.A. No. 9355 be declared unconstitutional.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT Republic Act No. 9355, CREATING THE NEW PROVINCE OF DINAGAT ISLANDS, COMPLIED WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 461 OF Republic Act No. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.

Ruling: The petition is granted.

The Local Government Code requires a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau.
However, the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities that do not
contribute to the income of the province.The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the
very last sentence thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over
which the political unit exercises control.Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b)
touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, [n]ext, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). " Contiguous," when employed as an
adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter.
There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area
but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with
"land area" only.

The IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized portion above stating that "[t]he land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands." Nowhere in the Local Government Code is the said
provision stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the only instance when the territorial or land area requirement need not be
complied with is when there is already compliance with the population requirement. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a
province, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy
between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic law. Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that "[t]he land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" is null and void.

R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains an approximate land area of eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares
(80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less, including Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47) islets . . . ." R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to
comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of
not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the NSO, the population of the Province of
Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951.Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in
Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code.
Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte)
would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the new province. Although the NSO
representative to the Committee on Local Government deliberations dated November 24, 2005 did not object to the result of the provincial government's
special census, which was conducted with the assistance of an NSO district census coordinator, it was agreed by the participants that the said result was not
certified by the NSO, which is the requirement of the Local Government Code. Moreover, the NSO representative, Statistician II Ma. Solita C. Vergara, stated that
based on their computation, the population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants would be attained by the Province of Dinagat Islands by the year 2065. The
computation was based on the growth rate of the population, excluding migration.

To reiterate, when the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an official population of only 106,951 based on the NSO
2000 Census of Population. Less than a year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the 2007 Census of Population. The NSO certified
that as of August 1, 2007, Dinagat Islands had a total population of only 120,813, which was still below the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
In fine, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the population requirement for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands.

31
32
 RODOLFO G. NAVARRO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA[G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011.]
Motion for Reconsideration

FACTS:
On February 10, 2010, Supreme Court declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the
creation of a province under the LGC. The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Decision.

ISSUES:
WON the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the
minimum land area requirement.
WON the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC

RULING:
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and
capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to
accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on
which of them should enjoy preferential consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a
province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC.
The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than the House version, because we also believe that economic viability is really a minimum.
Land area and population are functions really of the viability of the area, because you have an income level which would be the trigger point for economic
development, population will naturally increase because there will be an immigration. However, if you disallow the particular area from being converted into a
province because of the population problems in the beginning, it will never be able to reach the point where it could become a province simply because it will
never have the economic take off for it to trigger off that economic development
Now, we're saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a floor area where it could pay for overhead and provide a minimum of basic services to the
population. Over and above that, the provincial officials should be able to trigger off economic development which will attract immigration, which will attract
new investments from the private sector. This is now the concern of the local officials. But if we are going to tie the hands of the proponents, simply by telling
them, "Sorry, you are now at 150 thousand or 200 thousand," you will never be able to become a province because nobody wants to go to your place.

Why? Because you never have any reason for economic viability. It must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1)
or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under
Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical
configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created
province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption
was expressly provided in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to
reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had
already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But
Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full- fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land
area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC- IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary
legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No.
9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.

Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of
Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation
of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the
enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.

33
 Cagas v. COMELEC

FACTS:

Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second
legislative district of the same province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law
as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite.
Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in this Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the
voters of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of
the effectivity of this Charter.
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in
view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite
for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses.
Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is without authority to amend or modify section 46 of RA 10360 by mere resolution
because it is only Congress who can do so thus, COMELEC's act of suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
resolved to hold the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October 2013, simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?

HELD:

No. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

The COMELECs power to administer elections includes the power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law. The conduct of a plebiscite is
necessary for the creation of a province. Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the Constitution provide that:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject toa plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retaintheir basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative
assemblies.The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination.

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution emphasizes the direct exercise by the people of their sovereignty. After the legislative branchs enactment of a law to
create, divide, merge or alter the boundaries of a local government unit or units, the people in the local government unit or units directly
affected vote in a plebiscite to register their approval or disapproval of the change.

The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held. This is incontrast with its provisions for the election of members of the
legislature in Section 8, 4, Article VII. The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix date of elections is legislative in nature, which is
shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local government officials.

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 MUNICIPALITY OF STA. FE VS. MUNICIPALITY OF ARITAO

FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC a Civil Case for the Determination of Boundary Dispute involving the barangays of
Bantinan and Canabuan.
The trial was almost over when the court realized its error and ordered the suspension of the proceedings and referred the case to the
SangguniangPanlalawigan (SP) of Nueva Vizcaya. The Sangunian adopted Resolution No. 64 (1979) to adjudicate the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan as
parts of the territorial jurisdiction of Municipality of Aritao and enjoin Santa Fe from exercising its governmental functions within the same. The SP also
approved the Committees recommendation but endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for further proceedings, as per Resolution No. 357
Respondent moved to consider Res. 64 as final and executory. RTC however denied the motion and ruled that since there was no amicable settlement in the SP,
the latter cant issue a decision favoring a party. Under the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an opportunity to amicably
settle with the intervention & assistance of the provincial board and since no sech settlement is setlled, court proceddings shall be resumed.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction since the power to try & decide municipal boundary disputes already belonged to the SP. RTC
granted the motion and affirmed by the CA stating that a new legislation can be given retroactive effect so long as it is curative in nature. The LGC vesting
jurisdiction in the SP was given retroactive effect.

ISSUES:
1. Under the present law, 1987 Constitution and LGC of 1991, who settles boundary disputes?
2. Which law applies: the law at the time of the filing of the case or the present law? Otherwise stated:
WON CA erred in affirming the trial courts dismissal of the instant case for lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:
Trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint since the prevailing law at the time of the initiation of the complaint was RA 6128, which states
that CFI has jurisdiction. Municipality of Sogod applies because as what happened in Sogod, this case was overtaken by the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and the enactment of the LGC of 1991, requiring the application of the new provisions.
Under the LGC of 1991, the SP is now specifically vested with original jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures
laid down in the law and its implementing rules and regulations. In the LGC, if the SP fails to effect a settlement, it shall not only issue a certification but must
also formally hear and decide the case within the reglamentary period. Under LGC, trial court losses its power to try, at the first instance, cases of municipal
boundary disputes and only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can the RTC decide the case. RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
As to the issue of whether the provisions of the 1987 Consti and LGC of 1991 should apply prospectively, the Court held that a law may be given retroactive
effect if it so provided expressly or if retroactivity is necessarily implied therefrom and no vested right or obligation of contract is impaired and it does not
deprive a person of property without due process of law.

It is readily apparent from the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the LGC of 1991 that their new provisions and requirements regarding changes in the
constitution of political units are intended to apply to all existing political subsidiaries immediately, i.e., including those with pending cases filed under the
previous regime, since the overarching consideration of these new provisions is the need to empower the local government units without further delay.

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