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180291
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)
and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in Present:
his capacity as PRESIDENT
and GENERAL MANAGER
of the GSIS, CORONA, C.J.,
Petitioners,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
DINNAH VILLAVIZA,
ELIZABETH DUQUE, ABAD,
ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ,
RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA VILLARAMA, JR.,
THERESE B. GRACIA,
PEREZ, and
PILAR LAYCO, and
ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA, MENDOZA, JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:
July 27, 2010
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 98952, dismissing the petition for certiorari of
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assailing the Civil Service
Commissions Resolution No. 062177.
THE FACTS:
On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions
finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the penalty of
one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty
of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and
reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied
their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty
of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Instead,
PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went
to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure.[7] The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:
Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is now before us via this Petition for Review
presenting the following:
III
IV
The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners
own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS Amended Policy and Procedural
Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides:
If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5)
working days from receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting
evidence, when requested, he shall be considered to have waived his
right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of Trustees, in
proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the
facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.
Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application
in this case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not
deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial
allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the
complaint.[11]Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean
that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and correct in
their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the
petitioners. We must not forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the
complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with
substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges.[12]
A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case
was resolved against petitioners based, not on the absence of respondents evidence,
but on the weakness of that of the petitioners. Thus, the CA wrote:
Petitioners correctly submitted the administrative cases for
resolution without the respondents respective answer to the
separate formal charges in accordance with Section 4, Rule XI of
the RPAI. Being in full control of the administrative proceeding and
having effectively prevented respondents from further submitting
their responsive answer and evidence for the defense, petitioners
were in the most advantageous position to prove the merit of their
allegations in the formal charges. When petitioner Winston Garcia
issued those similarly worded decisions in the administrative cases
against the respondents, it is presumed that all evidence in their
favor were duly submitted and justly considered independent of the
weakness of respondents evidence in view of the principle that the
burden of proof belongs to the one who alleges and not the one who
denies.[13]
On the merits, what needs to be resolved in the case at bench is the question
of whether or not there was a violation of Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-
1316. Stated differently, whether or not respondents actions on May 27, 2005
amounted to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. Pertinently, the said
provision states:
In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU
office wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted
activity or mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that their actuations can
be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA
found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to
regulate the political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity
or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the intent of effecting work stoppage
or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession. Wearing
similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing
with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the
guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work
stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of
force concession.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person
in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of
their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of
expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the
members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be
reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
A review of PGM Garcias formal charges against the respondents reveals that
he himself was not even certain whether the respondents and the rest of the twenty
or so GSIS employees who were at the GSIS-IU office that fateful day marched there
or just simply appeared there simultaneously.[14] Thus, the petitioners were not even
sure if the spontaneous act of each of the twenty or so GSIS employees on May 27,
2005 was a concerted one. The report of Manager Nagtalon of the GSIS-SD which
was the basis for PGM Garcias formal charges reflected such uncertainty. Thus,
The said report of Nagtalon contained only bare facts. It did not show
respondents unified intent to effect disruption or stoppage in their work. It also failed
to show that their purpose was to demand a force concession.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138, 205478,
205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172 & 207563
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population
growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society,
diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences
freely circulate in various media. From television debates to sticker campaigns, from
rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy -the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of
the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound
and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right
to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude,
among others.
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger
test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to
free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to
due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own
affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer." It ignores the management perogative inherent in
corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own
discretion and judgment.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners,
pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no
actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the
petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court
issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation
of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until
July 17, 2013.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government
sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the
right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over
the controversy; 2) Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.
HELD:
1) In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the
unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case.
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any
actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They
claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and
that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law
is premature.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and
that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier,
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under
the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject
petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not
a speech regulating measure.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of
the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom
of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld
the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned
a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that
the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental
rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH
Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this
Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law
has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective
petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot
prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and
the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi.
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own
rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is
also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.
REMEDIAL LAW: transcendental importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest."
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even
where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally
on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue,
not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act,
provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on
locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than
one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest,
albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public,
but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance
of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the
right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception
and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad
spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More
importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which
is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking
action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights
enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the
life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.
REMEDIAL LAW: declaratory relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state
that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one
title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due
process by concealing its true intent- to act as a population control measure.
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
population control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are separate.
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared
towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and
keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range
of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of
pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the
number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal
care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of
information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortificient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices,
and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH
Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it
and the RH Law loses its very foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive
provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-
natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including
HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
2)
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is
inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law,
custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the
Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled
"An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive
Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and
devices which prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal
ligation, and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has
long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of
contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights
and health and the overall promotion of the family's wellbeing.
Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national
population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle
of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later, these
principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates
from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and
guarantee religious freedom.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the
particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said
reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there
are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is
reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation.
Hence, the issue of when life begins.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much
as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis
non est recedendum -from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it
should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
"conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources,
means that life begins at fertilization.
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life
capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the
Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to
ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life,
recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an
abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on
based on established evidence. From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill
or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to him, "fertilization and
conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They
are not identical and synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
"medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be
medically detected."
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus.
The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object -it is a living human being
complete with DNA and chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only
for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would
constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for
the health of the people, viz:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority
for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug
regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and
research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and selfreliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact
the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is
still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court
agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law
will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the
prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are
made available to the public.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must
consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As
pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by
the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their
use.
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been
submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its
determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the
agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for
public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on
the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives
must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient.
The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative
only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA,
not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of
the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality
innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and
historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State
recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind
the purest principles of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of
religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and
accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church
property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State
would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa.
The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II,
Section 6 ofthe 1987 Constitution, viz:
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.
Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less
question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its
beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand
that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for
the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over
another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its
generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of
God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church"
means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier
to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays
down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of
the 1987 Constitution.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or
prohibition ofa religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal to promote freedom of individual
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and
practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the
two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the
carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe,
and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute.
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State
and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare.
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether
the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive
health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or
wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and
rule of a church...are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts." The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise,
while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH
Law contravenes the guarantee of eligious freedom.
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails
to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the
freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is
violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from
acting according to one's belief.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to
demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could
limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the
respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the
means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.
Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary,
considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action
being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to
demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its
objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health
concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform
reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice
it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the
protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure
that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now,
R.A. No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women,"
amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare
programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an
unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs m exchange for blind conformity.
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in
the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious
beliefs, an exception must be made in life threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the
mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing
the life of a mother in grave danger.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms
the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall
be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to
that of the State.
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the
moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the
importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words
must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in
relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the
qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms
"service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information
and the rendering of medical procedures.
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause
under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them
the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use.
They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH
Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.
Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor,
especially those mentioned in the guiding principles and definition of terms of the
law.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of
a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities."
"In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying
equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class.
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17
can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive
health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving
pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the
powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with Phil Health
being a privilege and not a right.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it
in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the
practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it
directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power
of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades
which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public
safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of
revoking such right altogether.
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers
to render pro bona service. Other than non-accreditation with Phil Health, no penalty
is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government
reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind
of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether
to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them
to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the
same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by
Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be
emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as
their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive
health service, pro bona or otherwise.
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice it to say
that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating
a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution.
While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law,
the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in
conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body.
Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused
by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are
interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present. Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot
serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case
cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty bound to examine
every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural
law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of
life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the
population control program of the government by providing information and making
non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to
the poor.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious
group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine
modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone
should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to
reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the
Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues
is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population
growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in
the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run.
The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations
ago, are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers
is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent
a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and
fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but
they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should
not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against
conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the
consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation
of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
and
8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by
its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A.
No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
KAPISANAN NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS,
Respondent. Promulgated:
December 6, 2006
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and its President and General
Manager Winston F. Garcia (Garcia, for short) assail and seek to nullify the
Decision[1] dated June 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
87220,as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of October 18, 2005 denying Garcias motion
for reconsideration.
The recourse is cast against the following setting:
On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit
issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause
why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally.
In reaction, KMGs counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said
directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work
on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea
for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25,
2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.[4]
Unable to accept the above ruling and the purported speculative factual and
erroneous legal premises holding it together, petitioner Garcia sought
reconsideration. In its equally assailed Resolution[8] of October 18, 2005, however,
the appellate court denied reconsideration of its decision.
It should be stressed right off that the civil service encompasses all
branches and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS,[9] or those
created by special law.[10] As such, employees of covered GOCCs are part of the
civil service system and are subject to circulars, rules and regulations issued by
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general
terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of matters involving self-
organization, strikes, demonstrations and like concerted actions. In fact, policies
established on public sector unionism and rules issued on mass action have
been noted and cited by the Court in at least a case.[11] Among these issuances
is Executive Order (EO) No. 180, series of 1987, providing guidelines for the
exercise of the right to organize of government employees. Relevant also is CSC
Resolution No. 021316 which provides rules on prohibited concerted mass
actions in the public sector.
There is hardly any dispute about the formal charges against the 278 affected
GSIS employees a mix of KMG union and non-union members - having arose from
their having gone on unauthorized leave of absence (AWOL) for at least a day or
two in the October 4 to 7, 2004 stretch to join the ranks of the demonstrators /rallyists
at that time. As stated in each of the formal charges, the employees act of attending,
joining, participating and taking part in the strike/rally is a transgression of the rules
on strike in the public sector. The question that immediately comes to the fore,
therefore, is whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS
employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action. If in the
affirmative, then the denounced filing of the administrative charges would beprima
facie tenable, inasmuch as engaging in mass actions resulting in work stoppage or
service disruption constitutes, in the minimum, the punishable offense of acting
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.[12] If in the negative, then such filing
would indeed smack of arbitrariness and justify the issuance of a corrective or
preventive writ.
Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural
consequence of the service-disrupting rallies and demonstrations staged during
office hours by the absenting GSIS employees, there being appropriate issuances
outlawing such kinds of mass action. On the other hand, the CA, agreeing with the
respondents argument, assumed the view and held that the organized demonstrating
employees did nothing more than air their grievances in the exercise of their broader
rights of free expression[13] and are, therefore, not amenable to administrative
sanctions. For perspective, following is what the CA said:
It matters little that, instead of the 361 alleged by petitioner, only 278
charges were actually filed [and] in the meantime, disposed of and of the
said number, 20 resulted to exoneration, 182 to reprimand and 5 to the
imposition of a penalty of one month suspension. Irrespective of their
outcome, the severe penalties prescribed for the offense with which
petitioners members were charged, to our mind, bespeak of bellicose and
castigatory reaction . The fact that most of the employees [Garcia]
administratively charged were eventually meted with what appears to be
a virtual slap on the wrist even makes us wonder why respondent even
bothered to file said charges at all. xxx.
We are unable to lend concurrence to the above CA posture. For, let alone the
fact that it ignores what the Court has uniformly held all along, the appellate courts
position is contrary to what Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of CSC Resolution No.
021316[17] provides. Besides, the appellate courts invocation of Justice Cruzs
opinion in MPSTA is clearly off-tangent, the good Justices opinion thereat being a
dissent. It may be, as the appellate court urged that the freedom of expression and
assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances stand
on a level higher than economic and other liberties. Any suggestion, however, about
these rights as including the right on the part of government personnel to strike ought
to be, as it has been, trashed. We have made this abundantly clear in our past
determinations. For instance, in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of
Labor and Employment,[18] a case decided under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution,
an en banc Court declared that it would be unfair to allow employees of government
corporations to resort to concerted activity with the ever present threat of a strike to
wring benefits from Government. Then came the 1987 Constitution expressly
guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government personnel to self-
organization[19] to complement the provision according workers the right to engage
in peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law.[20]
It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that
employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and
other forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public
With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what
respondents members launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike
or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The
phrase prohibited concerted activity refers to any collective activity undertaken by
government employees, by themselves or through their employees organization,
with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves,
walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.[26] Indeed, for four straight days,
participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out and
waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep
of the GSIS main office building. The record of attendance[27] for the period material
shows that, on the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per cent
(48%) of the total number of employees in the main office (1,756) took to the streets
during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,[28] leaving the other employees to fend for
themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day.
On the second day, 707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538
participated in the mass action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306
employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.
To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services
remained at the usual level of efficiency at the GSIS main office during those four
(4) days of massive walkouts and wholesale absences would be to understate things.
And to place the erring employees beyond the reach of administrative accountability
would be to trivialize the civil service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of
professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. [29]
The appellate court made specific reference to the parliament of the streets,
obviously to lend concurrence to respondents pretension that the gathering of GSIS
employees on October 4-7, 2004 was an assembly of citizens out only to air
grievances, not a striking crowd. According to the respondent, a strike presupposes
a mass action undertaken to press for some economic demands or secure additional
material employment benefits.
The Court can concede hypothetically that the protest rally and gathering in
question did not involve some specific material demand. But then the absence of
such economic-related demand, even if true, did not, under the premises, make such
mass action less of a prohibited concerted activity. For, as articulated earlier, any
collective activity undertaken by government employees with the intent of effecting
work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force
concessions, economic or otherwise, is a prohibited concerted mass action[31] and
doubtless actionable administratively. Bangalisan even went further to say the
following: [i]n the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to
engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the
authority and responsibility, under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS
Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for
cause.[32] At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of
administrative charges against the absenting participants of the October 4-7,
2004 mass action, merely performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law.
Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when he signed the charge sheet,
his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within his
jurisdiction.
It bears to reiterate at this point that the GSIS employees concerned were
proceeded against - and eventually either exonerated, reprimanded or meted a
one-month suspension, as the case may be - not for the exercise of their right to
assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of grievance, but for engaging in
what appeared to be a prohibited concerted activity. Respondent no less admitted
that its members and other GSIS employees might have disrupted public service.[33]
Moreover, the Court invites attention to its holding in MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., a
case involving over 800 public school teachers who took part in mass actions for
which the then Secretary of Education filed administrative complaints on assorted
charges, such as gross misconduct. Of those charged, 650 were dismissed and 195
suspended for at least six (6) months The Court, however, did not consider the
element of number of respondents thereat and/or the dire consequences of the
charge/s as fatally vitiating or beclouding the bona fides of the Secretary of
Educations challenged action. Then as now, the Court finds the filing of charges
against a large number of persons and/or the likelihood that they will be suspended
or, worse, dismissed from the service for the offense as indicating a strong and clear
case of grave abuse of authority to justify the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
The appellate court faulted petitioner Garcia for not first taping existing
grievance machinery and other modes of settlement agreed upon in the GSIS-KMG
Collective Negotiations Agreement (CAN) before going full steam ahead with his
formal charges.[34]
The Court can plausibly accord cogency to the CAs angle on grievance
procedure but for the fact that it conveniently disregarded what appears to be the
more relevant provision of the CNA. We refer to Article VI which reads:
The absurdities and ironies easily deducible from the foregoing situations are
not lost on the Court.
We close with the observation that the assailed decision and resolution, if
allowed to remain undisturbed, would likely pave the way to the legitimization of
mass actions undertaken by civil servants, regardless of their deleterious effects on
the interest of the public they have sworn to serve with loyalty and efficiency.
Worse still, it would permit the emergence of a system where public sector workers
are, as the petitioners aptly put it, immune from the minimum reckoning for acts
that [under settled jurisprudence] are concededly unlawful. This aberration would
be intolerable.
No Cost.
SO ORDERED.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175,
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The
government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into
cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the
system.
ISSUES:
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A.
10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361,
and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.
HELD:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data
and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without
right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard
required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should
thus be struck down.
The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict
scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system of
another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks
to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and
expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same,
if such a domain name is:
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant,
in case of a personal name; and
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection
clausein that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to
suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire,
parody, or any other literary device.
The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain name in
bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-
motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.
b) Computer-related Offenses:
xxxx
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process
and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
In Morfe v. Mutuc,it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its
identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the
"Zones of Privacy."
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any
form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with
customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises
not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and
"the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." In the Matter of the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon, 535 Phil.
687, 714-715 (2006).
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searchesand seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone,
and (b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence.In assessing the
challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion.
Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse
or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to
acquire anothers personal data.
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that
journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a
person in the news to secure information about him that could be published.
The Court held, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation,
has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain
which is required by this Section.
Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause.They
express fear that private communications of sexual character between husband and
wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code,
would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common
usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right
granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn
conspicuously."This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated
trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms
of married couples or consenting individuals.
The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and
pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and
pornography, i.e., by webcam.
Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived
by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate
white slavery and the exploitation of women.
(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by
Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed
through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1)
one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
The above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009(ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents
the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit
child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child
pornography already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical,
magnetic or any other means."
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is
committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of
penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher
penalty.The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child
pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the
source of the electronic message; and
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited
commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and
network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce
and technology, and interferes with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property.
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending
out spams enters the recipients domain without prior permission. The OSG contends
that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in
such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading
these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to
delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read
his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as
well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of
writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical
exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200
to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.
The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to
form part of it the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:
xxxx
xxxx
(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any
other similar means which may be devised in the future.
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal codeand, in effect, the libel
provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed
malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher
standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction.Petitioners argue that inferring
"presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354
of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is
actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal
code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online
defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the
author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies,
unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture
associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.
Hence, Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with respect
to the original author of the post; but void and unconstitutional with respect to others
who simply receive the post and react to it; and
Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully
abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall
be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to
commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any
person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of
the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a
chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and
laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of
"netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He
points out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of
"aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues
that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times sufficient to guide law
enforcement agencies in enforcing the law.
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the
mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad
news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that
oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous
reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this
cyberspace communication technology to protect a persons reputation and peace of
mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the
area of protected freedoms. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments
await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues.
Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide
reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (Adonis) G.R. No. 203378The
terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on
those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other
messages.
Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5
should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on
Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-
squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on
Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and
Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the
freedom of expression.
Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and
communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act:
Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that
provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case
may be.
Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, or special laws.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on
print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material
cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of
R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same
offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a
new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely
establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the
offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against
double jeopardy.
The Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application
of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised
Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the
crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of
Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as
Section 8 provides:
Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated
in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a
maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the
penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or
both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1)
of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least
Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos
(PhP1,000,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2)
of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No.
9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be
imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No.
9775, if committed through a computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3)
shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty
thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand
pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall
be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed
penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos
(PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00)
or both.
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative
prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what
it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. Judges and magistrates can only interpret and
apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by
the legislative department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due
cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic
data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of
a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date,
size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities
in the collection or recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon
written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been
committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such
crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or
record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide
opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital
messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be
incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected.
Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected from
government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one
another.
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for
there is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public
good. To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able
to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.In
determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has
laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right
must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The
second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 429 U.S. 589 (1977)
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its
application to a particular person or group, petitioners challenge to Section 12
applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the
large segment of the population who use all sorts of electronic devices to
communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be
measured from the general publics point of view. Without reasonable expectation of
privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)the United States Supreme Court classified
privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional
privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions,
while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters. It is the latter rightthe right to informational privacythat those who oppose
government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of
the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with
specified communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since,
evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target
communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement
authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.
The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies
be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the
Constitution guarantees.
Section 13 provides:
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication services provided by a service provider shall
be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the
transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the
date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its
preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6)
months: Provided, That once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a
service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service
provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed
a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the
order and its compliance.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to
their authors or recipients and are to be considered private communications. But it is
not clear that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the
same as they pass its system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13,
however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication services for at least six months from the date
of the transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months from
receipt of the order for their preservation.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service
providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made
inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of
preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.
Section 14 provides:
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon securing
a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person or service provider to
disclose or submit subscribers information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its
possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in
relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the
disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court
warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to
carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would
not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of
communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial
intervention.
Section 15 provides:
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and
seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise
have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in
this Act, and:
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer
or computer and communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has
knowledge about the functioning of the computer system and the measures to
protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the
necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and
examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the
examination of the computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon but
in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by the
court.
The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from
whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search
and seizure rules but merely supplements them.
Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided
in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the
case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of
a preservation and examination.
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is
prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue
an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes
that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of
constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the
freedom and right mentioned.
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on
speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a
combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of
interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely
requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision
of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made
to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of
the three tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the
constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Section 20 provides:
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof
specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in
its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or
both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement
authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is
that the mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard
to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 1829,PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS. Section 20 necessarily incorporates
elements of the offense which are defined therein.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers and
functions:
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave
the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to
formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or
parameters for it to follow.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the
law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection,
investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by
providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation." This policy is
clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as
sufficient standard.