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August 3, 2006
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DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
During those years, she would come home to the Philippines to spend her
two-month summer vacation in her hometown in Davao City. Being single,
she would usually stay in Mandug, Davao City, in the house of her niece,
respondent Arlene Pernes, a daughter of her younger sister, Rosario.
Back in the U.S.A. sometime in 1986, she received news from Arlene that
Mandug at the outskirts of Davao City was infested by NPA rebels and
many women and children were victims of crossfire between government
troops and the insurgents. Shocked and saddened about this development,
she immediately sent money to Araceli, Arlenes older sister, with
instructions to look for a lot in Davao City where Arlene and her family
could transfer and settle down. This was why she bought the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-123125.
Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of letting
Arlene move from Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted the
property to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle
in Davao City. Petitioner made known this intention in a document she
executed on July 21, 1986.[3] The document reads:
I, MERCEDES VIA MORALIDAD, of legal age, single, having been born on the
29th day of January, 1923, now actually residing at 8021 Lindbergh Boulevard,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., wishes to convey my honest intention
regarding my properties situated at Palm Village Subdivision, Bajada, Davao
City, 9501, and hereby declare:
1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may
build their house therein and stay as long as they like;
3. That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and
may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to
the purpose thereof;
The MTCC, resolving the ejectment suit in petitioners favor, declared that
the respondent spouses, although builders in good faith vis--vis the house
they built on her property, cannot invoke their bona fides as a valid excuse
for not complying with the demand to vacate. To the MTCC, respondents
continued possession of the premises turned unlawful upon their receipt of
the demand to vacate, such possession being merely at petitioners
tolerance, and sans any rental.Accordingly, in its decision dated November
17, 1999,[4] the MTCC rendered judgment for the petitioner, as plaintiff
therein, to wit:
a) Directing the defendants, their agents and other persons acting on their
behalf to vacate the premises and to yield peaceful possession thereof to
plaintiff;
Defendants counterclaim are hereby dismissed except with respect to the claim
for reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses which should be litigated in
an ordinary civil actions. (sic)
SO ORDERED.[8]
With the CAs denial of her motion for reconsideration in its Resolution
of February 28, 2002, petitioner is now before this Court raising the
following issues:
The Court is inclined to agree with the CA that what was constituted
between the parties herein is one of usufruct over a piece of land, with the
petitioner being the owner of the property upon whom the naked title
thereto remained and the respondents being two (2) among other
unnamed usufructuaries who were simply referred to as petitioners kin.
The Court, however, cannot go along with the CAs holding that the action
for unlawful detainer must be dismissed on ground of prematurity.
Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following
wise:
ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the
obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or
the law otherwise provides.
From the foregoing provision, it becomes apparent that for an action for unlawful
detainer to prosper, the plaintiff [petitioner] needs to prove that defendants
[respondents] right to possess already expired and terminated. Now, has
respondents right to possess the subject portion of petitioners property expired or
terminated? Let us therefore examine respondents basis for occupying the same.
We disagree with the CAs conclusion of law on the matter. The term
or period of the usufruct originally specified provides only one of the bases
for the right of a usufructuary to hold and retain possession of the thing
given in usufruct. There are other modes or instances whereby the
usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished. For sure, the Civil
Code enumerates such other modes of extinguishment:
Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the
petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and humiliation she was
made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail condition, are enough
factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been terminated.
If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579 and
580. In case like this, the terms of the contract and the pertinent provisions of law
should govern (3 Manresa215-216; se also Montinola vs. Bantug, 71 Phil.
449).[14] (Emphasis ours.)
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such
useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper,
provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be
indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it
be possible to do so without damage to the property.(Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have
made on the property against any damage to the same.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
REYNATO S .PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with then Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (now
ret.) and Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring; Rollo, pp. 51-58.
[2]
Id. at 59-64.
[3]
Id. at 65.
[4]
Id. at 33-42.
[5]
Later changed to P20,000.00 as per Order dated December 16, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 1, rectifying the clerical error found on page 10 of the Decision dated November 17, 1999 in Civil
Case No. 5938-A-98.
[6]
Rollo, p. 44.
[7]
Id. at 45-50
[8]
Id. at 50.
[9]
Hemedes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107132, October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 309.
[10]
Eleizegui vs. Manila Lawn Tennis Club, 2 Phil. 309 (1909); cited in De Leon & De Leon, Jr., Comments & Cases
on Property, 2003 ed., p. 397.
[11]
Art. 581, Civil Code.