Manila Prince vs GSIS
s ) . . . . Thus, for the said provision to operate,
Facts:
GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30-
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
Manila Hotel.
The winning bidder is to provie management
expertise and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel.
Only 2 bidders participated, Manila Prince
which offered to buy 51% or 15,300,000 shares
at 41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as its hotel
operator which bid for the same number of
shares at 44 per share.
Pending the declaration of Renong as the
winning bidder and the execution of the
necessary contracts, Manila Prince matched the
bid price of Renong. However, GSIS refused to
accept it.
Manila Prince therefore, came to the SC on
prohibition and Mandamus. The court issued a
TRO regarding the consummation of the sale.
Manila Prince invokes Section 10 Paragraph 2
Art. 12 of the Constitution and submits that
Manila Hotel has become part of the national
patrimony, because it has become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture.
That since 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
carries with it the ownership of the business, the
hotel being part of the tourism industry is part of
the national economy covered by the term
national economy under Sec. 10 Art. 12 of the
Constitution.
That Manila Prince should be preferred after it
has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm,
as stated in the bidding rules.
GSIS contented that, first Sec.10 Art 12 of the
Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self- executing
1
provision and requires implementing legislation(
there must be existing laws "to lay down
conditions under which business may be done
Second, Manila hotel does not fall under the
term national patrimony which only refer to
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils as
cited in the first and second paragraph of Sec 2
Art 12. That the hotel became historic
(according to Manila Prince) was because of the
guests who have slept in the hotel and the events
that have transpired therein, and this alone do
not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of
the nation.
Third, the constitutional provision invoked is
still inapplicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corp, and
not the hotel building nor the land.
ISSUE:
WON Sec.10 Art 12 is self-executing.
RULING:
YES!
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws
for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been dened as t h e f u n d a m e
n t al a n d p a r a m o u n t la w o f t h e n a tio
n.
The fundamental conception in other words is
that it is a supreme law to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, sin c e t h e
C o n s tit u tio n is t h e f u n d a m e n t al p a r
a m o u n t a n d s u p r e m e la w o f t h e n a tio
n, it is d e e m e d w rit t e n in e v e r y s t a t u t
eandcontract
A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufcient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected,
is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision
is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are xed
by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the
legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate
the exercise of powers directly granted by the
constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for
the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The
mere fact that legislation may supplement and
add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of
a self- executing constitutional provision does
not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation.
The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available.
Subsequent legislation however does not
2
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the rst paragraph, and the State
still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph,
then a f o r tio ri , by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in
order to give preference to qualied Filipinos in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in
one part and non-self-executing in another.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put
it in operation. It is p e r s e judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates
that [i] n t h e g r a n t o f rig h t s, p rivile g e s,
a n d c o n c e s sio n s c o v e rin g n a tio n al e
c o n o m y a n d p a t rim o n y, t h e S t a t e s h
all g iv e p r e f e r e n c e t o q u ali e d Filip in o
s , it means just that qualified Filipinos shall
be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specied
circumstances an action may be maintained to
enforce such right notwithstanding the absence
of any legislation on the subject; consequently,
if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must
take their bearings. Where there is a right there
is a remedy. U b i ju s ib i r e m e d iu m
The patrimony of the Nation that should be
conserved and developed refers not only to our
rich natural resources but also to the cultural
heritage of our race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.
Therefore, we should develop not only our
lands, forests, mines and other natural resources
but also the mental ability or faculty of our
people.
the term p a t rim o n y pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of n a tio n al p a t
rim o n y , it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term n a t u r al r e
s o u r c e s , but also to the c ult u r al h e rit a g
e of the Filipinos.

3
Francisco vs HOR
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the
House of Representatives adopted and approved
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives
adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes. The
complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution. The House Committee on
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in
form, but voted to dismiss the same on 22
October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the
second impeachment complaint was filed with
the Secretary General of the House by House
Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. The second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least
1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court
4
against the House of Representatives, et. al.,
most of which petitions contend that the filing of
the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that
[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
Issues:
Whether or not the offenses alleged in the
Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of
the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
Whether the second impeachment complaint is
barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Rulings:
This issue is a non-justiciable political question
which is beyond the scope of the judicial power
of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the
Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable
and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House
of Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that The
Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section. Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited
by the phrase to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section. Hence, these rules
cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific
limitations on its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the
Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making
power, then it would by necessary implication
have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place
by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee
on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may
not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
5
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of
the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred
under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Gonzales vs. Comelec
Facts: The case is an original action for
prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16,
1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following
resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, -
proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so
as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as
provided in the present Constitution, to a
maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the
several provinces as nearly as may be according
to the number of their respective inhabitants,
although each province shall have, at least, one
(1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, - calling a convention to
propose amendments to said Constitution, the
convention to be composed of two (2) elective
delegates from each representative district, to be
"elected in the general elections to be held on
the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, -proposing that Section 16,
Article VI, of the same Constitution, be
amended so as to authorize Senators and
members of the House of Representatives to
become delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without forfeiting
their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which,
upon approval by the President, on June 17,
1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing
that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No.
1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people,
at the general elections which shall be held on
November 14, 1967.
Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress,
acting as a constituent assembly, violates the
Constitution.
Held: In as much as there are less than eight (8)
votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913
and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and
invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must
be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs
therein prayed for denied, without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer
cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto
proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts
be questioned upon the ground that he is merely
a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious:
(1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title
to the office; and
(2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the
competence of his office, are valid, insofar as
the public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof."
6
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by
a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives
voting separately, may propose amendments to
this Constitution or call a contention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part
of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article
XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as
the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits
Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators,
even if they should run for and assume the
functions of delegates to the Convention.
Facts: The case is an original action for
prohibition, with preliminary injunction. On
March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following
resolutions, (1) increasing the number of seats in
the lower house from 120 to 180, (2) calling for
a constitutional convention, and (3) allowing
members of the Congress to run as delegates to
the constitutional convention without forfeiting
their seats. Congress passed a bill, which,
approved by the President on 17 June 1967,
became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that
the amendments to the Constitution proposed in
the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the
general elections on 14 November 1967.
Issue: Whether or not a resolution of Congress,
acting as a constituent assembly, violates the
Constitution pursuant to Section 1 Article XV.
Decision: The power to amend the Constitution
or to propose amendments is not included in the
general grant of legislative power to Congress.
Pursuant to Section 1 Article XV, The
Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote
of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a contention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part
of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification. The said resolutions are null
and void because the Congress may not avail of
both amending and calling a convention at the
same time and the election must be a special
election not a general election for amendment to
the Constitution shall be submitted for
ratification.
Imbong vs. Comelec
Facts:
FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing
separate cases and both interested in running as
candidates for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, question the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their
rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967,
the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
passed Res. No. 2 which called for a
Constitutional Convention which shall have two
delegates from each representative district. On
June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution
No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing
that the convention shall be composed of 320
delegates with at least two delegates from each
representative district. On August 24, 1970, the
Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted
R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and
expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously
implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the
validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a),
and the entire law, while Imbong questions the
constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said
R.A. 6132.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for
a constitutional convention and set the
parameters of such convention?
7
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132
constitutional?
HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a
constitutional convention as the constituent
assembly. The Congress also has the authority to
enact implementing details, contained in Res.
Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details
are within the competence of the Congress in
exercise of its legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of
R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of
Art. XII of the Constitution and does not
constitute a denial of due process or equal
protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed
the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4
regarding the apportionment of delegates. The
challenged disqualification of an elected
delegate from running for any public office in
Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and
not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is
both contested by the petitioners is still valid as
the restriction contained in the section is so
narrow that basic constitutional rights remain
substantially intact and inviolate thus the
limitation is a valid infringement of the
constitutional guarantees invoked by the
petitioners.
Ocena vs. COMELEC
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition
proceedings against the validity of three
Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments, goes further than
merely assailing their alleged constitutional
infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A.
Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar
and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention that framed the present Constitution,
are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox
aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the
1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law,
the Javellana ruling to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, Tolentino vs. COMELEC
and in force and effect when the Batasang FACTS:
Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions After the election of delegates to the
were promulgated and filed, respectively. Constitutional Convention held on November
10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural
Ruling: It is much too late in the day to deny the
session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of
force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution.
September 28, 1971, the Convention approved
In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The
Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend
Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution,
prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its
lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30,
ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a
1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the
vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the
being the vote of the majority, there is no further
plebiscite together with the senatorial elections
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a
considered in force and effect." Such a statement
petition for prohibition against COMELEC and
served a useful purpose. It could even be said
prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in
that there was a need for it. It served to clear the
obedience to the resolution be null and void.
atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17
January 1973, the present Constitution came into
ISSUE:
force and effect. With such a pronouncement by
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the
the Supreme Court and with the recognition of
case?
the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1
Court says is not only entitled to respect but
constitutional?
must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was
removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all
HELD:
doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in
the fundamental law. It is as simple as that.
Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not
What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the
a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent
function of judicial review has both a positive
assembly, violates the constitution is a
and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly
justiciable one and thus subject to judicial
demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy,
review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court
the Supreme Court can check as well as
is superior to the Convention but they are both
legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may
subject to the Constitution.
not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches
2. The act of the Convention calling for a
but may also sustain their validity. In the latter
plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic
case, there is an affirmation that what was done
Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV
cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally
of the Constitution which states that all
deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this
amendments must be submitted to the people in
character suffices. That is the meaning of the
a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the
concluding statement in Javellana. Since then,
voter must be provided sufficient time and
this Court has invariably applied the present
ample basis to assess the amendment in relation
Constitution. The latest case in point is People v.
to the other parts of the Constitution, not
Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During
separately but together.
the first year alone of the effectivity of the
present Constitution, at least ten cases may be
cited. FACTS:

8
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into
being by virtue of two resolutions of the
Congress approved in its capacity as
a constituent assembly convened for the purpose
of calling a convention to propose amendments
to the Constitution. After election of delegates
held on November 10, 1970, the Convention
held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the
morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is
entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING
SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE
VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971,
the COMELEC "resolved" to follow
the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold
the said plebiscite together with the senatorial
elections on November 8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition
for prohibition, its main thrust being
that OrganicResolution No. 1 and
the necessary implementing resolutions
subsequently approved have no force and effect
as laws in so far as they provide for the holding
of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial
elections, on the ground that the calling and
holding of such a plebiscite is, by the
Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in
Congress as a legislative body and may not be
exercised by the Convention, and that, under
Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution,
the proposed amendment in question cannot be
presented to the people for ratification separately
from each and all other amendments to be
drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative to
the Constitution.
HELD:
9
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the
same Convention must be submitted to the
people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In
order that a plebiscite for the ratification of
a Constitutional amendment may be validly
held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient
time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendment per se but as well as its relation to
the other parts of the Constitution with which it
has to form a harmonious whole. In the present
context, where the Convention has hardly started
considering the merits, if not thousands, of
proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to
present to the people any single proposal or a
few of them cannot comply with this
requirement.
Sanidad vs. COMELEC
Facts: On 2 September 1976, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
991 calling for a national referendum on 16
October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
("barangays") to resolve, among other things,
the issues of martial law, the interim assembly,
its replacement, the powers of such replacement,
the period of its existence, the length of the
period for the exercise by the President of his
present powers.
20 days after or on 22 September 1976,
the President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree 1031, amending the
previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring
the provisions of Presidential Decree 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvass
of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies)
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite
of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly,
Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia,
Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991.
On the same date of 22 September 1976,
the President issued Presidential Decree 1033,
stating the questions to he submitted to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16
October 1976. The Decree recites in its
"whereas" clauses that the people's continued
opposition to the convening of the interim
National Assembly evinces their desire to have
such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new
interim legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite of October 16.
The Commission on Elections was
vested with the exclusive supervision and
control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976,
Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father
and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin
the Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar
as they propose amendments to the Constitution,
as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it
directs the Commission on Elections to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum- Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October
1976. They contend that under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent
power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution.
As a consequence, the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or
legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another
action for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction, docketed as L- 44684, was instituted
by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, asserting that the
power to propose amendments to, or revision of
the Constitution during the transition period is
expressly conferred on the interim National
Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the
Constitution. Still another petition for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M.
Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo
Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative
10
to the forthcoming Referendum- Plebiscite of
October 16.
Issue: Whether the President may call upon a
referendum for the amendment of the
Constitution.
Ruling: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1)
Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by the National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2)
The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-
thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a
convention to the electorate in an election."
Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment
to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three
months a after the approval of such amendment
or revision." In the present period of transition,
the interim National Assembly instituted in the
Transitory Provisions is conferred with that
amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory
Provisions reads "The interim National
Assembly, upon special call by the interim
Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its
Members, propose amendments to this
Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect
when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen
hereof." There are, therefore, two periods
contemplated in the constitutional life of the
nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of
transition. In times of normalcy, the amending
process may be initiated by the proposals of the
(1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of
two-thirds of all the Members of the National
Assembly. However the calling of a
Constitutional Convention may be submitted to
the electorate in an election voted upon by a
majority vote of all the members of the National
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments
may be proposed by a majority vote of all the
Members of the interim National Assembly
upon special call by the interim Prime Minister.
The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already
settled that the incumbent President is vested
with that prerogative of discretion as to when he
shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly. The Constitutional Convention
intended to leave to the President the
determination of the time when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly,
consistent with the prevailing conditions of
peace and order in the country. When the
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention
voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were
aware of the fact that under the same, the
incumbent President was given the discretion as
to when he could convene the interim National
Assembly. The President's decision to defer the
convening of the interim National Assembly
soon found support from the people themselves.
In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at
which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution
was submitted, the people voted against the
convening of the interim National Assembly. In
the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens
Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their
sovereign will to withhold the convening of the
interim National Assembly. Again, in the
referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed
question of whether the interim National
Assembly shall be initially convened was
eliminated, because some of the members of
Congress and delegates of the Constitutional
Convention, who were deemed automatically
members of the interim National Assembly,
were against its inclusion since in that
referendum of January, 1973 the people had
already resolved against it. In sensu striciore,
when the legislative arm of the state undertakes
the proposals of amendment to a Constitution,
that body is not in the usual function of
lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in
the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a
peculiar power bestowed upon it by the
fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines,
that power is provided for in Article XVI of the
1973 Constitution (for the regular National
11
Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory
Provisions (for the interim National Assembly).
While ordinarily it is the business of the
legislating body to legislate for the nation by
virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of
the Constitution is not legislative in character. In
political science a distinction is made between
constitutional content of an organic character
and that of a legislative character. The
distinction, however, is one of policy, not of
law. Such being the case, approval of the
President of any proposed amendment is a
misnomer. The prerogative of the President to
approve or disapprove applies only to the
ordinary cases of legislation. The President has
nothing to do with proposition or adoption of
amendments to the Constitution.
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R.
No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president
of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,Modernization
and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a
petition to amend the constitution to liftthe term
limits of elective officials, through Peoples
Initiative. He based this petition on Article
XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides for the right of the people to exercise
the power todirectly propose amendments to the
Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC
issued an order directing the publication of the
petition and of the notice of hearing and
thereafter set the case for hearing. At the
hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-
Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest
Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino appeared as intervenors-
oppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion to
dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that
one which is cognizableby the COMELEC.
The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this
civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court against COMELEC and
theDelfin petition rising the several arguments,
such as the following: (1) The constitutional
provision onpeoples initiative to amend the
constitution can only be implemented by law to
be passed byCongress. No such law has been
passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to
amendments to theConstitution, not to revision
thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a
revision, therefore it isoutside the power of
peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted
the Motions for Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 regarding the conduct of initiative
onamendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective
officials would constitute a revision or
anamendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self e
xecutory, thus, without implementinglegislation
the same cannot operate. Although the
Constitution has recognized or granted the
right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress
does not provide for its implementation.The
portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
which prescribes rules and regulations on
theconduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void. It has been an established
rulethatwhat has been delegated, cannot be deleg
ated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC being
invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate
rules and regulations to implement the
12
exercise of the right to peoples initiative.The
lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a
revision, as it would affect other provisions of
the Constitution such as the synchronization of
elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal
access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot
be done by initiative. However, considering the
Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of
whether or not the petition is a revision
or amendment has become academic.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No.
174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other
groups and individuals, commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and
(c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or
the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition
had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of
all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals. The Lambino Group's initiative
petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of
Article VII (Executive Department) and by
adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory
Provisions." These proposed changes will shift
the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral- Parliamentary form of government.
The Lambino Group prayed that after due
publication of their petition, the COMELEC
should submit the following proposition in a
plebiscite for the voters' ratification. On 30
August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an
Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
ISSUE: Whether the Lambino Group's initiative
petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people's initiative.
HELD: NO. The court declared that Lambino
Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional
because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution that the initiative must be "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition." The essence of amendments "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is
a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a
petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition. These essential elements are present
only if the full text of the proposed amendments
is first shown to the people who express their
assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition" only if the people sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. The full text of the proposed
amendments may be either written on the face of
the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment.
This is an assurance that every one of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had seen
the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible,
given the time constraint, to prove that every one
of the millions of signatories had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does
not expressly state that the petition must set
forth the full text of the proposed amendments.
However, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers
13
intended to adopt the relevant American
jurisprudence on people's initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see the full
text of the proposed amendments before they
sign, and that the people must sign on a petition
containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and
Referendum Act that the Lambino Group
invokes as valid, requires that the people must
sign the "petition x x x as signatories." The
proponents of the initiative secure the signatures
from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as
public officials. The proponents are not
disinterested parties who can impartially explain
the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to
the people and do not present the arguments
against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the
signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that
the proponents observed the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they
complied with the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures - that the petition
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments. For sure,
the great majority of the 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets did not see the full
text of the proposed changes before signing.
They could not have known the nature and effect
of the proposed changes, among which are: 1.
The term limits on members of the legislature
will be lifted and thus members of Parliament
can be re-elected indefinitely; 2. The interim
Parliament can continue to function indefinitely
until its members, who are almost all the present
members of Congress, decide to call for new
parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of
the interim Parliament will determine the
expiration of their own term of office;
3.Within45days fromthe ratification of the
proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution
These three specific amendments are not stated
or even indicated in the Lambino Group's
signature sheets. The people who signed the
signature sheets had no idea that they were
proposing these amendments. These three
proposed changes are highly controversial. The
people could not have inferred or divined these
proposed changes merely from a reading or
rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the
power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the
people even if the members of this Court do not
personally know the people who sign the
petition. However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption: the full text of the
proposed amendment is first shown to the people
before they sign the petition, not after they have
signed the petition.
Lambino vs. Comelec
FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition to change
the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and
(c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or
the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition
had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of
all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.
The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes
the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7
of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and
Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII
entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed
14
changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an
Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing
Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative
petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a peoples initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in
Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the
governing constitutional provision that allows a
peoples initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the
draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment should be ready and shown to the
people before they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that before they sign
there is already a draft shown to them. The
framers also envisioned that the people should
sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must prepare that proposal and pass
it around for signature.
The essence of amendments directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition
is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition
by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must
author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the
full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition
only if the people sign on a petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents
observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear
the burden of proving that they complied with
the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their
present petition with this Court a copy of the
paper that the people signed as their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this
Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they
filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is
Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for
failure to comply with the basic requirements of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
the conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is no need to
revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring
RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
15
essential terms and conditions to cover the
system of initiative to amend the Constitution.
An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago
which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not
comply with the requirements of the
Constitution to implement the initiative clause
on amendments to the Constitution.
CIR vs Rueda
In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier,
Morocco (an international zone [foreign country]
in North Africa). At the time of her death, she was
a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier.
She however left some personal properties
(shares of stocks and other intangibles) in the
Philippines. The designated administrator of her
estate here is Antonio Campos Rueda.
In the same year, the Collector of Internal
Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for deficiency
tax amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda
refused to pay the assessed tax as he claimed that
the estate is exempt from the payment of said
taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax
Code which provides:
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in
respect of intangible personal property (a) if the
decedent at the time of his death was a resident of
a foreign country which at the time of his death
did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any
character in respect of intangible person property
of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country
of which the decedent was a resident at the time
of his death allow a similar exemption from
transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in
respect of intangible personal property owned by
citizens of the Philippines not residing in that
foreign country.
Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is
reciprocity between Tangier and the Philippines.
However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption
in favor of the estate as it averred that Tangier is
not a state as contemplated by Section 22 of the
Tax Code and that the Philippines does not
recognize Tangier as a foreign country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tangier is a state.
HELD: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code,
Tangier is a foreign country.
A foreign country to be identified as a state must
be a politically organized sovereign community
independent of outside control bound by penalties
of nationhood, legally supreme within its
territory, acting through a government
functioning under a regime of law. The stress is
on its being a nation, its people occupying a
definite territory, politically organized,
exercising by means of its government its
sovereign will over the individuals within it and
maintaining its separate international personality.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is
already an existing jurisprudence (Collector vs
De Lara) which provides that even a tiny
principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an
international personality in the sense, did fall
under the exempt category provided for in
Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus, recognition is
not necessary. Hence, since it was proven that
Tangier provides such exemption to personal
properties of Filipinos found therein so must the
Philippines honor the exemption as provided for
by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of
reciprocity.
Magallona vs. Ermita
Facts:
In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the
Congress to comply with the terms of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on
February 27, 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the
validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among
others, that the law decreased the national
territory of the Philippines. Some of their
particular arguments are as follows:
16
1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime
territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine states sovereign power, in
violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution, embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
2. RA 9522 opens the countrys waters
landward of the baselines to maritime
passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and
national security, contravening the countrys
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.
3. RA 9522s treatmentof the KIG as regime
of islands not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of
certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA
9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic
baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
nearby territories.
Issues:
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory
Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.
Discussions:
The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly
affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we
connect the outermost points of our archipelago
with straight baselines and consider all the
waters enclosed thereby as internal waters. RA
9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the
Countrys Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf
Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an
explicit definition in congruent with the
archipelagic doctrine.
Rulings:
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It
is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys
Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under
UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine
Territory. It is a vital step in safeguarding the
countrys maritime zones. It also allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and
continental shelf.
Additionally, The Court finds that the
conversion of internal waters into archipelagic
waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed
in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an
archipelagic State has sovereign power that
extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth
or distance from the coast. It is further stated
that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage
will not affect the status of its archipelagic
waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters
and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources
therein.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws
are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to
precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as
a notice to the international family of states and
it is in no way affecting or producing any effect
like enlargement or diminution of territories.
The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or
UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose,
territory. The treaty and the baseline law has
nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement,
or diminution of the Philippine territory. What
controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of
territory is the international law principle
on occupation, accretion, cession and
prescription and NOT the execution
17
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-
use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the
treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our
territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law
amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered
with the rectangular lines enclosing the
Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994
square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under
9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive
economic zone, the extent of our maritime was
increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image
below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to
the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which
States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with
acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a
codified norm that regulates conduct of States.
On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to
mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as
geographic starting points to measure. it merely
notices the international community of the scope
of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the
legislature can enact legislation designating
routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the
absence of such, international law norms
operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters
are subject to both passages does not place them
in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal
states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary
international law, no modern state can invoke its
sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed
the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact,
it increased the Phils. total maritime space.
Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.
continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction
over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the
UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not

exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we

draw to include them, well breach the rules: that
it should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago.

18