Sanchez vs. Medicard Phil. Inc.

FACTS:

Medicard Inc. appointed petitioner Sanchez as its special corporate agent and they gave him a
commission based on the "cash brought in." Through Sanchez efforts, Medicard and Unilab executed a
Health Care Program Contract. Unilab paid Medicard the premium for one (1) year. Medicard then
handed Sanchez 18% of said amount representing his commission. Again, through Sanchezs initiative,
the agency contract between Medicard and Unilab was renewed for another year. Prior to the
expiration of the renewed contract, Medicard proposed an increase of the premium which Unilab
rejected for the reason that it was too high. Medicard then requested petitioner to reduce his
commission should the contract be renewed on its third year, but he was obstinate. Unilab confirmed its
decision not to renew the health program. Meanwhile, in order not to prejudice its personnel by the
termination of their health insurance, Unilab negotiated with Dr. Montoya and other officers of
Medicard, to discuss new ways in order to continue the insurance coverage. Medicard did not give
Sanchez any commission under the new scheme. Aggrieved, Petitioner demanded from Medicard
payment of his commission plus damages, but the latter refused to heed his demand.

ISSUE:

WON the contract of agency has been revoked by Medicard hence not entitling him to a commission

HELD:

Yes. The Contract of Agency has been revoked, thus the petitioner is not entitled to any commission. It is
dictum that in order for an agent to be entitled to a commission, he must be the procuring cause of the
sale, which simply means that the measures employed by him and the efforts he exerted must result in
a sale. Based on the facts, it may be recalled that through petitioner's efforts, Medicard was able to
enter into a Contract with Unilab, two times, however before the expiration of the renewed contract,
Unilab rejected the proposal. It is clear that since petitioner refused to reduce his commission, Medicard
directly negotiated with Unilab, thus revoking its agency contract with petitioner. Such revocation is
authorized by Article 1924 of the Civil Code which provides: "The agency is revoked if the principal
directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons."

Sps. Alcantara v. Nido, G.R. No. 165133, Apr. 19, 2010

Facts:

Revelen Srivastava, Nidos daughter, is owner of unregistered land with an area of 1,939 sq. m. Sps.
Alcantara and Sps. Rubi offered to buy a 200-sq. m. portion of the land at P200 per sq. m. paying
downpaymentand the balance in installment. They constructed their houses and occupied an additional
150 sq. m. with respondents consent. Petitioners had already paid P17,500 before defaulting payment.
Nido, as administrator and attorney-in-fact of Revelen, filed a complaint of recovery of possession with
damages and preliminary injunction. RTC declared the sale of land void as it was not in writing under
Art. 1874, CC, and ruled that rescission was proper remedy.
Issue:

Whether or not the contract entered into between the parties was not void, but merely voidable.

Held:

No. Art. 1874, CC, provides that when a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an
agent, the authority shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void. In Art. 1878, special powers of
attorney are necessary to enter into any contract where an immovable is transmitted or acquired either
gratuitously or for a valuable consideration. There is no proof of respondents written authority to sell
the lot to petitioner. Petitioners only knew that Revelen was the owner of the lot during the hearing.
Being void, it cannot be ratified. Although Revelen executed a General Power of Attorney constituting
respondent as attorney-in-fact to enter into any and all contracts and agreements on her behalf,
notarized in California, USA, it cannot be the basis of respondents written authority to sell the lot.

Spouses Fernando Viloria and Lourdes Viloria vs Continental Airlines, Inc.

Facts:

In 1997, while the spouses Viloria were in the US, they approached Holiday Travel, a travel agency
working for Continental Airlines, to purchase tickets from Newark to San Diego. The travel agent,
Margaret Mager, advised the couple that they cannot travel by train because it was already fully
booked; that they must purchase plane tickets for Continental Airlines; that if they wont purchase plane
tickets; theyll never reach their destination in time. The couple believed Magers representations and so
they purchased two plane tickets worth $800.00.

Later however, the spouses found out that the train trip wasnt really fully booked and so they
purchased train tickets and went to their destination by train instead. Then they called up Mager to
request for a refund for the plane tickets. Mager referred the couple to Continental Airlines. As the
couple were now in the Philippines, they filed their request with Continental Airlines office in Ayala. The
spouses Viloria alleged that Mager misled them into believing that the only way to travel was by plane
and so they were fooled into buying expensive plane tickets.

Continental Airlines claimed that the tickets sold to them by Mager were non-refundable; that, if any,
they were not bound by the misrepresentations of Mager because theres no contract of agency existing
between Continental Airlines and Mager.

ISSUE:

WON a contract of agency exists between Continental Airlines and Mager.

HELD:

Yes. All the elements of agency are present, to wit:

there is consent, express or implied of the parties to establish the relationship;

the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;

the agent acts as a representative and not for himself, and

the agent acts within the scope of his authority.

The first and second elements are present as Continental Airlines does not deny that it concluded an
agreement with Holiday Travel to which Mager is part of, whereby Holiday Travel would enter into
contracts of carriage with third persons on the airlines behalf. The third element is also present as it is
undisputed that Holiday Travel merely acted in a representative capacity and it is Continental Airlines
and not Holiday Travel who is bound by the contracts of carriage entered into by Holiday Travel on its
behalf. The fourth element is also present considering that Continental Airlines has not made any
allegation that Holiday Travel exceeded the authority that was granted to it.

Continental Airlines also never questioned the validity of the transaction between Mager and the
spouses. Continental Airlines is therefore in estoppel. Estoppel is primarily based on the doctrine of
good faith and the avoidance of harm that will befall an innocent party due to its injurious reliance, the
failure to apply it in this case would result in gross travesty of justice.

Tuazon v. Hrs. of Ramos GR 156262 July 14, 2005

Facts:

Sps. Tuazon purchased a total of 8,326 cavans of rice from Ramos, predecessor-in-interest of
respondents. Only 4,437 cavans have been paid for so far leaving unpaid 3,889 cavans valued at
P1,211,919.00. In payment therefor, the spouses Tuazon issued Traders Royal Bank checks. But when
these checks were encashed, all of the checks bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Respondents
advanced that before issuing said checks, spouses Tuazon already knew that they had no available fund
to support the checks, and they failed to provide for the payment of these despite repeated demands
made on them.

Sps Tuazon denied having purchased rice from Ramos. They alleged that it was Magdalena Ramos, wife
of said deceased, who owned and traded the merchandise and Maria Tuazon was merely her agent.
They argued that it was Evangeline Santos who was the buyer of the rice and issued the checks to Maria
Tuazon as payments therefor. In good faith the checks were received by Tuazon from Evangeline Santos
and turned over to Ramos without knowing that these were not funded. They assert that they were
merely agents and should not be held answerable.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners are agents of the respondents

Ruling:

In a contract of agency, one binds oneself to render some service or to do something in representation
or on behalf of another, with the latters consent or authority. The following are the elements of agency:
(1) the parties consent, express or implied, to establish the relationship; (2) the object, which is the
execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the representation, by which the one who
acts as an agent does so, not for oneself, but as a representative; (4) thelimitation that the agent acts
within the scope of his or her authority. As the basis of agency is representation, there must be, on the
part of the principal, an actual intention to appoint, an intention naturally inferable from the principals
words or actions. In the same manner, there must be an intention on the part of the agent to accept the
appointment and act upon it. Absent such mutual intent, there is generally no agency.

Petitioners were the rice buyers themselves; they were not mere agents of respondents in their rice
dealership. The question of whether a contract is one of sale or of agency depends on the intention of
the parties.

The declarations of agents alone are generally insufficient to establish the fact or extent of their
authority. The law makes no presumption of agency; proving its existence, nature and extent is
incumbent upon the person alleging it. In the present case, petitioners raise the fact of agency as an
affirmative defense, yet fail to prove its existence.

Sps. Pascual v. CA and Gino

Facts:

Petitioner Consolacion Sioson-Pascual and respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino are the niece and
granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto. Canuto and 11 other individuals, including his sister
Catalina Sioson and his brother Victoriano Sioson, were co-owners of a parcel of land. The property,
known as Lot 2 of Plan Psu 13245, had an area of 9,347 square meters and was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 4207 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Catalina, Canuto, and Victoriano
each owned an aliquot 10/70 share or 1,335 square meters of Lot 2.
On November 1951, Canuto had Lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into eight lots (Lot Nos. 2-A to 2-H)
through Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 which the Director of Lands approved on May 1952. Lot No. 2-A,
with an area of 670 square meters, and Lot No. 2-E, with an area of 2,000 square meters, were placed
under Canutos name. Three other individuals took the remaining lots.
On 26 September 1956, Canuto and Consolacion executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan. Under
the KASULATAN, CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of CONSOLACION for P2,250.00.
CONSOLACION immediately took possession of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. She later declared the land for
taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real estate taxes.
On October 1968, the surviving children of CANUTO, namely, Felicidad and Beatriz, executed a joint
affidavit affirming the KASULATAN in favor of CONSOLACION. They also attested that the lots their
father had sold to CONSOLACION were Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713.
CONSOLACION registered the KASULATAN and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT with the Register of Deeds of
Rizal; Based on these documents, the Register of Deeds issued to CONSOLACION Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (232252) 1321 covering Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 with a total area of
2,670 square meters.
 On February 1988, REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and her spouse Ricardo
Pascual for Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate and Damages. REMEDIOS claimed that she
is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because CATALINA devised these lots to her in CATALINAs last will
and testament. REMEDIOS added that CONSOLACION obtained title to these lots through fraudulent
means since the area covered by TCT (232252) 1321 is twice the size of CANUTOs share in Lot 2.
REMEDIOS prayed for the cancellation of CONSOLACIONs title, the issuance of another title in her name,
and the payment to her of damages.
Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners claimed that
the basis of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS should have filed the action within four years from the
registration of CONSOLACIONs title on October 1968 and not some 19 years later on February 1988.
REMEDIOS opposed the motion, claiming that she became aware of CONSOLACIONs adverse title only in
February 1987. CONSOLACION maintained that she had timely filed her complaint within the four-year
prescriptive on February 1988.

Issue:
Whether prescription bars the action filed by REMEDIOS

Ruling:
Yes. What REMEDIOS filed was an action to enforce an implied trust but the same is already barred by
prescription.
REMEDIOS action is based on an implied trust under Article 1456 since she claims that the inclusion of
the additional 1,335 square meters in TCT No. (232252) 1321 was without basis. In effect, REMEDIOS
asserts that CONSOLACION acquired the additional 1,335 square meters through mistake or fraud and
thus CONSOLACION should be considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the rightful
owner of the property. Clearly, the applicable prescriptive period is ten years under Article 1144 and not
four years under Articles 1389 and 1391.
It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake,
giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is ten years pursuant to Article 1144.
This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied
trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land.
REMEDIOS filed her complaint on February 1988 or more than 19 years after CONSOLACION registered
her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E on October 1968. Unquestionably, REMEDIOS filed the complaint late
thus warranting its dismissal.
REMEDIOS thus had actual notice of petitioners adverse title on 8 November 1977. Even if, for the sake
of argument, the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run upon actual notice of the adverse title, still
REMEDIOS right to file this suit has prescribed. REMEDIOS had until 11 November 1987 within which to
file her complaint. When she did so on 4 February 1988, the prescriptive period had already lapsed.