Salcedo vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-42992.

August 8, 1935]
Ponente: DIAZ, J.

FACTS:

Attorney Vicente Francisco, representing the petitioner-appellant, inserted alleged contemptuous

paragraph in his motion for reconsideration read as follows:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within out power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as
he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because
it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member
thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions
like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase
the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.

The court required him to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving him
a period of ten days for that purpose. In his answer Atty. Francisco, far from regretting having employed
the phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion, reiterated them several times contending that they
did not constitute contempt because, according to him it is not contempt to tell the truth.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent-appellee is guilty of contempt.

HELD:

YES. Atty. Francisco ordered to pay a fine of P200.00 in ten days and reprimanded.

RATIO:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in
duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944
upon him the high privilege, not right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is.
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, vs. ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said Francisco Claravall for respondent.
right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the
courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. OZAETA, J.:
Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor.
Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence
and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide
himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said
advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason
thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics
of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of
justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most
worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period
of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters.
That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and
were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion
and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.
STA. MARIA VS. TUASON 11 SCRA 562 (Ethics)
FACTS:
This is a petition for the disbarment of Atty. Eduardo M. Tuason, instituted by Emilio Sta. Maria.
Sometime in June 1955, Atty. Tuason represented the partnership of Sta. Maria, Guanzon and Chincuanco
in a collection case against Enriqueta de Hidalgo, involving a promissory note of P50,000.00. Defendant
Hidalgo in this case was declared in default and was ordered to pay. By virtue of a writ of execution, the
provincial sheriff of Pampanga was able to obtain the amount of P22,930.64.
Respondent Tuason got the whole amount from the sheriff and applied it in the following manner : P10,000
attorneys fees, P1,648 supposed expenses of litigation which he claimed to have advanced during the
prosecution and the balance of P11,282.64 to Fausto Chincuanco, his uncle.
Despite demands from Sta. Maria to turn over the money to him or to the sheriff, respondent failed to
comply and contempt proceedings were instituted against Tuason. The matter was referred to the Office
of the Solicitor General who made the findings and recommendation that: respondent Tuason was not in
connivance with his uncle Chincuanco in depriving petitioner of his lawful share in the liquidation of
partnership assets, however, the collection of P10,000 as attorneys fees after the case was terminated
after one brief hearing is unreasonable. There was also no evidence presented to show that Tuason
actually spent P1,648 for the expenses.
The Sol. Gen. recommended that instead of a more severe penalty which he would otherwise deserve,
respondent be reprimanded for professional indiscretion, with a warning that a more severe penalty be
imposed for the repetition of the same of similar acts.
ISSUE : Whether respondent committed acts that would merit his disbarment.
RULING:
The fact that the respondent placed his private and personal interest over and above that of his clients
constitutes a breach of the lawyers oath, to say the least. Call it professional indiscretion or any other
name, but the cold fact remains that the act is not conducive to the health growth of the legal profession.
Respondent is hereby admonished that a repetition of similar acts will merit more drastic action.
IN RE: LUIS B. TAGORDA 53 PHIL 37 (3/23/29) Malpractice
FACTS: The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that in the
last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which in translation, read as
follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD MEMBER, Province of Isabela.
(NOTE.- as notaty public, he can execute for a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the
cadastral office, can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites
for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer he can help you collect your loans
although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town
Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his
home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter reads as follow:
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that
my residence as member of the Board will be in Iligan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my
profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to
exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague, I would request
your kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meeting or social
gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer
and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers
in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and
would charge only three pesos for every registration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Luis B. Tagorda is meritorious.
HELD: Application is give to se. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act NO. 2828, providing
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokets, constitutes malpractice, and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent
lawyer. The law is a profession and not a business. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a
ground for disbarment or suspension.
1. Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice of law for 1 month.
2. For advertising his services in the Sunday Tribune respondent attorney is reprimanded.
Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco
G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)

Facts:

Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the
respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of
Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his
position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de
oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as
counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a grave
abuse of discretion?

Holding:

No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal
profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal
profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services are
rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

Ratio:

The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other officials or
employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of
Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them,
remained as counsel of record since he did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellants counsel
after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the
new counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be
required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of an accused in a criminal case
to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the highest importance, and there can be no fair
hearing with due process of law unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity
to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a counsel de officio for
such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge
Muoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)