Section 13- Right To Bail

(1) (Basco v. Rapatalo, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-96-1335 (Resolution), March 05, 1997)
(10) (People v. Donato, G.R. No. 79269, June 05, 1991)
(21) (People v. Fortes y Garra, G.R. No. 90643, 91155, June 25, 1993)
(29) (Comendador v. De Villa, G.R. No. 93177, 95020, 96948, 97454, August 02, 1991)
(36) (Baylon v. Sison, A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, April 06, 1995)
(41) (Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986)
(45) (Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002)
(61) (Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, December 17, 2002)
(63) (Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19,
2007)
(67) Rule 114, Revised Rules of Court- BAIL http://www.lawphil.net/courts/rules/rc_110-127_crim.html

prosecution has the burden of showing that the

(Basco v. Rapatalo, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-96-1335
(Resolution), March 05, 1997)
SECOND DIVISION
[Adm. Matter No. RTJ-96-1335. March 5, 1997.]
INOCENCIO BASCO, complainant, vs. JUDGE LEO H.
RAPATALO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Agoo,
La Union, respondent.
Rogelio A. Ajes for complainant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL;
DEFINED. "Bail" is the security required by the
court and given by the accused to ensure that the
accused appears before the proper court at the
scheduled time and place to answer the charges
brought against him or her.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FUNCTION THEREOF. In theory, the
only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of
the defendant at the time set for trial. The sole
purpose of confining the accused in jail before
conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his
presence at the trial. In other words, if the denial of
bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in
theory that the proof being strong, the defendant
would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than
face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception
to the fundamental right to be bailed should be
applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability of
evasion of the prosecution. In practice, bail has also
been used to prevent the release of an accused
who might otherwise be dangerous to society or
whom the judges might not want to release." It is in
view of the abovementioned practical function of
bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the
person is charged with a capital offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, states, "No person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN THE GRANT IS DISCRETIONARY;
REQUIREMENT FOR THE PROPER EXERCISE THEREOF.
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the
1|CONSTI2_Section 13_Right To Bail
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial
discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by
the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised
only after the evidence is submitted to the court at
the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, it is obvious that a
proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that
the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross-examination and
to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal." To be
sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute
nor beyond control. It must be sound, and
exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial
discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of
the judge's individual opinion and the law has
wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-
known rules which, while allowing the judge's
rational latitude for the operation of his own
individual views, prevent them from getting out of
control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable
discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is
a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the discretion
to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But
discretion when applied to a court of justice, means
sound discretion guided by law. It must be
governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be
arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and
regular."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HEARING REQUIRED; RATIONALE.
In the application for bail of a person charged
with a capital offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of
the court, must actually be conducted to
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. Since the
determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to
conduct a hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave
the application for bail to the discretion of the
court. Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a
petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from
the abovecited case, is for the court to take into
consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of
bail. This Court, in a number of cases held that even
if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in
opposition to an application for bail of an accused,
the court may still require that it answer questions in
order to ascertain not only the strength of the
state's evidence but also the adequacy of the
amount of bail. After hearing, the court's order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of
the evidence for the prosecution. On the basis
thereof, the judge should then formulate his own
conclusion, as to whether the evidence so
presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt
of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or
denying the application for bail may be invalidated
because the summary of evidence for the
prosecution which contains the judge's evaluation
of the evidence may be considered as an aspect
of procedural due process for both the prosecution
and the defense.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUMMARY HEARING,
CONSTRUED. "A summary hearing means such
brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable
and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of evidence for the
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does
not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice
inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to
the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-
examination." If a party is denied the opportunity to
be heard, there would be a violation of procedural
due process.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENUMERATION OF PROCEDURES TO BE
FOLLOWED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE IN CASE OF BAIL
APPLICATION. In the light of the applicable rules
on bail and the jurisprudential principles just
enunciated, this Court reiterates the duties of the
trial judge in case an application for bail is filed: (1)
Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, as amended); (2) Conduct a hearing of
the application for bail regardless of whether or not
the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra); (3) Decide
whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA 284 [1995]);
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition
should be denied. The above-enumerated
procedure should now leave no room for doubt as
to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail
applications. So basic and fundamental is it to
2|CONSTI2_Section 13_Right To Bail
conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of
bail in the proper cases that it would amount to
judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to
disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof.
7. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; JUDGES;
REQUIRED TO KNOW MORE THAN JUST A CURSORY
ACQUAINTANCE WITH STATUTE AND PROCEDURAL
RULES. A judge owes it to the public and the
administration of justice to know the law he is
supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is
called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
rules. There will be faith in the administration of
justice only if there be a belief on the part of
litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot
justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of
legal principles.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J p:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated August 14, 1995,
complainant Inocencio Basco charged respondent
Judge Leo M. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La
Union with gross ignorance or willful disregard of
established rule of law for granting bail to an
accused in a murder case (Criminal Case No. 2927)
without receiving evidence and conducting a
hearing.
Complainant, who is the father of the victim,
alleged that an information for murder was filed
against a certain Roger Morente, one of three
accused. The accused Morente filed a petition for
bail. The hearing for said petition was set for May 31,
1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the
respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset
to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent Judge
reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22,
1995, however, did not materialize. Instead, the
accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again,
the petition for bail was not heard on said date as
the prosecution's witnesses in connection with said
petition were not notified. Another attempt was
made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.
In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the
accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995. He
later learned that the accused was out on bail
despite the fact that the petition had not been
heard at all. Upon investigation, complainant
discovered that bail had been granted and a
release order dated June 29, 1995 1 was issued on
the basis of a marginal note 2 dated June 22, 1995,
at the bottom of the bail petition by Assistant
Prosecutor Manuel Oliva which stated: "No
objection: P80,000.00," signed and approved by the
assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent
Judge. Note that there was already a release order
dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal
note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22,
1995 (when the hearing of the petition for bail was
aborted and instead arraignment took place)
when another hearing was scheduled for July 17,
1995.
In his comment dated October 16, 1995,
respondent Judge alleged that he granted the
petition based on the prosecutor's option not to
oppose the petition as well as the latter's
recommendation setting the bailbond in the
amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the
prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for
bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it
or not. He further declared that when he approved
the petition, he had a right to presume that the
prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was
more familiar with the case, having conducted the
preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private
prosecutor was not around at the time the public
prosecutor recommended bail.
Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the
bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and a
warrant for his arrest was issued on account of
complainant's motion for reconsideration. The
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently
conformed to and approved the motion for
reconsideration. 3 To date, accused is confined at
the La Union Provincial Jail.
A better understanding of bail as an aspect of
criminal procedure entails appreciating its nature
and purposes. "Bail" is the security required by the
court and given by the accused to ensure that the
accused appears before the proper court at the
scheduled time and place to answer the charges
brought against him or her. In theory, the only
function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the
defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose
of confining the accused in jail before conviction, it
has been observed, is to assure his presence at the
trial. 4 In other words, if the denial of bail is
authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that
the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if
he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict
of the court. Hence the exception to the
fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in
direct ratio to the extent of probability of evasion of
the prosecution. 5 In practice, bail has also been
used to prevent the release of an accused who
might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom
the judges might not want to release." 6
It is in view of the abovementioned practical
function of bail that it is not a matter of right in
cases where the person is charged with a capital
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, states, "No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the
3|CONSTI2_Section 13_Right To Bail
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial
discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by
the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised
only after the evidence is submitted to the court at
the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, 7 it is obvious that a
proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that
the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross examination and
to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal." 8
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not
absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and
exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial
discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of
the judge's individual opinion and the law has
wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-
known rules which, while allowing the judge rational
latitude for the operation of his own individual
views, prevent them from getting out of control. An
uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the
part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord
Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be
exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But
discretion when applied to a court of justice, means
sound discretion guided by law. It must be
governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be
arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and
regular." 9
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person
charged with a capital offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, must actually be conducted
to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. "A summary hearing
means such brief and speedy method of receiving
and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing,
the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter
into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to
be allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of
the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be
left to the discretion of the court which may confine
itself to receiving such evidence as has reference
to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination." 10 If a party is denied the opportunity
to be heard, there would be a violation of
procedural due process.
That it is mandatory for the judge to require a
hearing in a petition for bail is emphasized in the
following cases:
(1) People v. Sola decided in 1981. 11 In this case
seven separate informations for murder were filed
against the accused Sola and 18 other persons.
After preliminary investigation, the municipal trial
court issued warrants for their arrest. However
without giving the prosecution the opportunity to
prove that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong, the court granted them the right
to post bail for their temporary release. Citing
People v. San Diego, 12 we held: "We are of the
considered opinion that whether the motion for bail
of a defendant who is in custody for a capital
offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in
the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must
be given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire
to introduce before the court should resolve the
motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in
the instant special civil action, the prosecution
should be denied such an opportunity, there would
be a violation of procedural due process, and the
order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground."
(2) People v. Dacudao decided in 1989. 13 In this
case, an information was filed against the accused
for murder, a non-bailable offense. The judge,
without conducting any hearing, granted bail on
the ground that there was not enough evidence to
warrant a case for murder because only affidavits
of the prosecution witnesses who were allegedly
not eyewitnesses to the crime were filed. We held:
"Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued
the questioned ruling was intended only for prima
facie determining whether or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well founded belief that the
crime was committed and pinpointing the persons
who probably committed it. Whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong for each individual
accused still has to established unless the
prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has
already presented. To appreciate the strength or
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution
must be consulted or held. It is equally entitled to
due process."
(3) People v. Calo decided in 1990. 14 In this case,
the prosecution was scheduled to present nine
witnesses at the hearings held to determine
whether the evidence against the private
respondents was strong. After hearing the fifth
witness, the respondent judge insisted on
terminating the proceedings. We held: "The
prosecution in the instant case was not given
adequate opportunity to prove that there is strong
evidence of guilt and to present within a
reasonable time all the evidence it desired to
present."
(4) Libarios v. Dabalo decided in 1991 15 which
involved an administrative complaint against the
respondent judge for ignorance of the law and
grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the
respondent judge, without conducting any prior
hearing, directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against the accused charged with murder, fixing at
the same time the bail at P50,000.00 each on the
ground that the evidence against them was merely
4|CONSTI2_Section 13_Right To Bail
circumstantial. We held: "Where a person is
accused of a capital offense, the trial court must
conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding to
allow the prosecution to present, within a
reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to
produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong before resolving the issue of
bail for the temporary release of the accused.
Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the
instant case amounted to a violation of due
process." The respondent judge was ordered to pay
a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise more
care in the performance of his duties.
(5) People v. Nano decided in 1992. 16 In this case,
the judge issued an order admitting the accused in
a kidnapping and murder case to bail without any
hearing. We held: "The prosecution must first be
given an opportunity to present evidence because
by the very nature of deciding applications for bail,
it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial
discretion is weighed against in determining
whether the guilt of the accused is strong." cdasia
(6) Pico v. Combong, Jr. decided in 1992. 17 In this
administrative case, the respondent judge granted
bail to an accused charged with an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, without notice
and hearing and even before the accused had
been arrested or detained. We held: "It is well
settled that an application for bail from a person
charged with a capital offense (now an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua) must be set for
hearing at which both the defense and the
prosecution must be given reasonable opportunity
to prove (in case of the prosecution) that the
evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong, or (in
the case of the defense) that such evidence of
guilt was not strong." The respondent judge was
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to
exercise greater care and diligence in the
performance of his duties.
(7) De Guia v. Maglalang decided in 1993, 18 the
respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest and
also fixed the bail of an accused charged with the
non bailable offense of statutory rape without
allowing the prosecution an opportunity to show
that the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. Respondent judge alleged that the only
evidence on record the sworn statements of the
complaining witness and her guardian were not
sufficient to justify the denial of bail. We held: "It is
an established principle that in cases where a
person is accused of a capital offense, the trial
court must conduct a hearing in a summary
proceeding, to allow the prosecution an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
evidence it may desire to produce to prove that
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong,
before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary
release of the accused. Failure to conduct a
hearing before fixing bail amounts to a violation of
due process." It was noted that the warrant of arrest
was returned unserved and that after the case was
re-raffled to the complainant judge's sala, the
warrant was set aside and cancelled. There was no
evidence on record showing whether the
approved bail was revoked by the complainant
judge, whether the accused was apprehended or
whether the accused filed an application for bail.
Hence, the respondent judge was ordered to pay a
fine of P5,000.00 instead of the usual P20,000.00 that
the court imposes on judges who grant the
application of bail without notice and hearing.
(8) Borinaga v. Tamin decided in 1993. 19 In this
case, a complaint for murder was filed against five
persons. While the preliminary investigation was
pending in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, a
petition for bail was filed by one of the accused
before the respondent judge in the Regional Trial
Court. The respondent judge ordered the
prosecutor to appear at the hearing to present
evidence that the guilt of the accused is strong. At
the scheduled hearing, the public prosecutor failed
to appear prompting the respondent to grant the
application for bail. We held: "Whether the motion
for bail of an accused who is in custody for a
capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present within a reasonable time all evidence it
may desire to introduce before the court may
resolve the motion for bail." The respondent judge
was fined P20,000.00 and was warned that the
commission of a similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
(9) Aurillo v. Francisco decided in 1994. 20 In this
administrative case, the respondent judge issued
two separate warrants of arrest against two persons
charged with murder and parricide, but fixed the
amount of bail for each accused without notifying
the prosecution of any motion to fix bail nor of any
order granting the same. Citing People v.
Dacudao, 21 we held: "A hearing is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can properly
determine whether the prosecution's evidence is
weak or strong. Hence, a denial of the prosecution's
request to adduce evidence, deprives it of
procedural due process, a right to which it is
equally entitled as the defense. A hearing is
required to afford the judge a basis for determining
the existence of those factors set forth under Rule
114, Sec 6." The respondent judge was ordered to
pay a fine of P20,000 with a warning that the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
(10) Estoya v. Abraham-Singson decided in 1994 22
In this case, an administrative complaint was filed
against the respondent judge, alleging, among
others, that she granted an application for bail filed
by the accused charged with murder. The grant
was made over the objection of the prosecution
which insisted that the evidence of guilt was strong
and without allowing the prosecution to present
evidence in this regard. We held: "In immediately
granting bail and fixing it at only P20,000.00 for
5|CONSTI2_Section 13_Right To Bail
each of the accused without allowing the
prosecution to present its evidence, the respondent
denied the prosecution due process. This Court had
said so in many cases and had imposed sanctions
on judges who granted applications for bail in
capital offenses and in offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua without giving the prosecution
the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt
is strong." The respondent judge was dismissed from
service because the erroneous granting of bail was
just one of the offenses found to have been
committed by her in the aforesaid complaint.
(11) Aguirre v. Belmonte decided in 1994. 23 In this
administrative case the respondent judge issued
warrants of arrest and, at the same time and on his
own motion. authorized the provisional release on
bail of the accused in two criminal cases for
murder. The accused were still at large at the time
the order granting bail was issued. We held: "A
hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to
an accused who is charged with a capital offense."
The judge was ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00
with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely. He was meted a fine in a higher amount
than the usual P20,000.00 because it involved two
criminal cases wherein the respondent judge, "was
not only the grantor of bail but likewise the
applicant therefor."
(12) Lardizabal v. Reyes decided in 1994. 24 In this
administrative case, the respondent judge issued
an order directing the arrest of the accused
charged with rape and, motu proprio, fixed the bail
of the accused in the amount of P80,000.00 without
application on the part of the accused to be
admitted to bail. When the accused filed a motion
to reduce bailbond, the respondent judge again,
without any prior notice and hearing, reduced the
bail to P40,000.00. We held: "The rule is explicit that
when an accused is charged with a serious offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, such as rape,
bail may be granted only after a motion for that
purpose has been filed by the accused and a
hearing thereon conducted by a judge to
determine whether or not the prosecution's
evidence of guilt is strong." The respondent judge
was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a
warning that a repetition of similar or the same
offense will be dealt with more severely.
(13) Guillermo v. Reyes decided in 1995 25 involving
an administrative complaint against the respondent
judge for granting bail to the two accused charged
with serious illegal detention. When the two
accused first filed a joint application for bail, the
petition for bail was duly heard and the evidence
offered by the accused and the prosecution in
opposition thereto were properly taken into
account. However, the respondent judge denied
the application for bail on the ground that it was
premature since the accused were not yet in
custody of the law. In a subsequent order, the
respondent judge, without conducting any hearing
on the aforestated application and thereby
denying the prosecution an opportunity to oppose
the same, granted said petition upon the voluntary
appearance in court of the two accused.
Respondent judge insisted that there was a hearing
but the proceeding he adverted to was that which
was conducted when the motion for bail was first
considered and then denied for being premature.
We held: "The error of the respondent judge lies in
the fact that in his subsequent consideration of the
application for bail, he acted affirmatively thereon
without conducting another hearing and what is
worse, his order concededly lacked the requisite
summary or resume of the evidence presented by
the parties and necessary to support the grant of
bail." The respondent judge was reprimanded
because despite the irregularity in the procedure
adopted in the proceeding, the prosecution was
undeniably afforded the benefit of notice and
hearing. No erroneous appreciation of the
evidence was alleged nor did the prosecution
indicate its desire to introduce additional evidence
in an appropriate challenge to the aforestated
grant of bail by the respondent.
(14) Santos v. Ofilada decided in 1995. 26 In this
case, an administrative complaint was filed against
the respondent judge, who, without notice and
hearing to the prosecution, granted bail to an
accused charged with murder and illegal
possession of firearm. We held: "Where admission to
bail is a matter of discretion, a hearing is mandatory
before an accused can be granted bail. At the
hearing, both the prosecution and the defense
must be given reasonable opportunity to prove, in
case of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt
of the applicant is strong, and in the case of the
defense, that evidence of such guilt is not strong."
The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of similar
acts will warrant a more severe sanction.
(15) Sule v. Biteng decided in 1995. 27 In this
administrative case, the respondent judge, without
affording the prosecution the opportunity to be
heard, granted with indecent haste the petition for
bail filed by the accused charged with murder
because the accused ". . . voluntarily surrendered
to the authorities as soon as he was informed that
he was one of the suspect (sic) . . ." We held: "With
his open admission that he granted bail to the
accused without giving the prosecution any
opportunity to be heard, the respondent
deliberately disregarded decisions of this court
holding that such act amounts to a denial of due
process, and made himself administratively liable
for gross ignorance of the law for which
appropriate sanctions may be imposed." The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and warned that commission of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
(16) Reymualdo Buzon, Jr. v. Judge Tirso Velasco
decided in 1996. 28 In this administrative case, the
respondent judge, without hearing nor comment
from the prosecution, granted bail to an accused
6|CONSTI2_Section 13_Right To Bail
charged with murder. Notably, no bail was
recommended in the warrant of arrest. We held:
"When bail is a matter of discretion, the judge is
required to conduct a hearing and to give notice
of such hearing to the fiscal or require him to submit
his recommendation. . . . Truly, a judge would not
be in a position to determine whether the
prosecution's evidence is weak or strong unless a
hearing is first conducted." A fine of P20,000.00 was
imposed on the respondent judge with the stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The aforecited cases are all to the effect that when
bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first
be conducted to determine the existence of strong
evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to
enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment
of the evidence presented by the parties.
Since the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated
to conduct a hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave
the application for bail to the discretion of the
court. Hence:
(1) In the case of Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr., 29 an
administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge for granting bail to one of the
accused in a robbery with homicide case without
affording the prosecution a chance to be heard.
The respondent judge explained that he issued an
order for the motion to fix bail but the public
prosecutor filed a comment instead which
respondent judge thought was adequate
compliance with law. Respondent added that the
evidence of guilt of the accused, as disclosed by
the records, was not so strong as to deny the
application for bail. In fact, the accused who filed
for bail, together with three others, were later
dropped by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
from the information for failure of the witnesses to
positively identify them. We held: "The grant of bail is
a matter of right except in cases involving capital
offenses when the matter is left to the sound
discretion of the court. That discretion lies, not in the
determination whether or not a hearing should be
held but in the appreciation and evaluation of the
prosecution's evidence of guilt against the
accused. . . . A hearing is plainly indispensable
before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position
to determine whether the evidence for the
prosecution is weak or strong." Although the
respondent judge's explanation was not enough to
completely exculpate him, the circumstances,
coupled with his sincere belief in the propriety of his
order warranted a mitigation of the usual sanction
the Court imposes in cases of this nature. The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P5,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
(2) In the case of Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 30 an
administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge for granting bail to a person
charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and
estafa in five separate information. The accused
filed a motion to fix bail and the respondent judge
instead of setting the application for hearing,
directed the prosecution to file its comment or
opposition. The prosecution submitted its comment
leaving the application for bail to the discretion of
the court. The respondent judge, in granting the
bail of the accused rationalized that in ordering the
prosecution to comment on the accused's motion
to fix bail, he has substantially complied with the
requirement of a formal hearing. He further claimed
that he required the prosecution to adduce
evidence but the latter refused and left the
determination of the motion to his discretion. This
Court held, "It is true that the weight of the
evidence adduced is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. However, such discretion
may only be exercised after the hearing called to
ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
purpose of determining whether or not he should
be granted liberty. . . In the case at bar, however,
no formal hearing was conducted by the
respondent judge. He could not have assessed the
weight of evidence against the accused Gatus
before granting the latter's application for bail." The
respondent judge was dismissed from service
because he was previously fined for a similar
offense and was sternly warned that a repetition of
the same or similar offense would be dealt with
more severely.
(3) In the case of Baylon v. Sison, 31 an
administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge for granting bail to several
accused in a double murder case. The respondent
judge claimed that he granted the application for
bail because the assistant prosecutor who was
present at the hearing did not interpose an
objection thereto and that the prosecution never
requested that it be allowed to show that the
evidence of guilt is strong but instead, submitted
the incident for resolution. The respondent judge
further claimed that the motion for reconsideration
of the order granting bail was denied only after due
consideration of the pertinent affidavits. We held:
"The discretion of the court, in cases involving
capital offenses may be exercised only after there
has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight
of the evidence against the accused. Peremptorily,
the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not
there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and
evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt
against the accused." The respondent judge was
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a stern
warning that the commission of the same or similar
offense in the future would be dealt with more
severely.
7|CONSTI2_Section 13_Right To Bail
A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail. "The importance of
a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases
wherein the court ruled that even if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an
objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory
for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching
questions from which it may infer the strength of the
evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the
accused." 32
In the recent case of Tucay v. Domagas, 33 an
administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge for granting bail to an accused
charged with murder. The application for bail
contained the annotation "No objection" of the
provincial prosecutor and the respondent judge,
without holding a hearing to determine whether the
evidence of the prosecution was strong, granted
bail and ordered the release of the accused from
detention with instructions to the bondsman to
register the bond with the Register of Deeds within
ten days. It was later found out that the assessed
value of the property given was short of the amount
fixed for the release of the accused. We held:
"Although the provincial prosecutor had interposed
no objection to the grant of bail to the accused,
respondent judge should have nevertheless have
set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently
ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter
was not really contesting the bail application . . .
Only after satisfying himself that the prosecution did
not wish to oppose the petition for bail for justifiable
cause (e.g., for tactical reasons) and taking into
account the factors enumerated in Rule 114, Sec. 6
for fixing bail should respondent judge have
ordered the petition for bail and ordered the
release of the accused." Respondent judge herein
was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and was
given a stern warning that the commission of a
similar offense in the future would be dealt with
more severely.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition
for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the
abovecited case, is for the court to take into
consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of
bail. 34 This Court, in a number of cases 35 held that
even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in
opposition to an application for bail of an accused,
the court may still require that it answer questions in
order to ascertain not only the strength of the
state's evidence but also the adequacy of the
amount of bail.
After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing
bail must contain a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution. 36 On the basis thereof, the judge
should then formulate his own conclusion as to
whether the evidence so presented is strong
enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused.
Otherwise, the order granting or denying the
application for bail may be invalidated because
the summary of evidence for the prosecution which
contains the judge's evaluation of the evidence
may be considered as an aspect of procedural
due process for both the prosecution and the
defense.
This court in the case of Carpio v. Maglalang 37
invalidated the order of respondent judge granting
bail to the accused because "Without summarizing
the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court
merely stated the number of prosecution witnesses
but not their respective testimonies, and concluded
that the evidence presented by the prosecution
was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escano."
With the mounting precedents, this Court sees no
reason why it has to repeatedly remind trial court
judges to perform their mandatory duty of
conducting the required hearing in bail
applications where the accused stands charged
with a capital offense.
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar
reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the
accused without first conducting a hearing to
prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite
his knowledge that the offense charged is a capital
offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in
Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94. cda
Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition
for bail based on the prosecution's declaration not
to oppose the petition. Respondent's assertion,
however, that he has a right to presume that the
prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of
the latter's familiarity with the case due to his having
conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty.
Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the
prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion
to determine whether the guilt of the accused is
strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge
before whom the petition for provisional liberty will
be decided. The mandated duty to exercise
discretion has never been reposed upon the
prosecutor.
In the case of Montalbo v. Santamaria, 38 this Court
held that the respondent judge is duty bound to
exercise judicial discretion conferred upon him by
law to determine whether in the case at bar, the
proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong
against the defendant and to grant or deny the
petition for provisional liberty. It also held that a writ
of mandamus will lie in order to compel the
respondent judge to perform a duty imposed upon
him by law.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is
never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is
the court's determination after a hearing that the
guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the
basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should
not have relied solely on the recommendation
made by the prosecutor but should have
8|CONSTI2_Section 13_Right To Bail
ascertained personally whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. After all, the judge is not bound by
the prosecutor's recommendation. Moreover, there
will be a violation of due process if the respondent
Judge grants the application for bail without
hearing since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that
whatever evidence presented for or against the
accused's provisional release will be determined at
the hearing.
The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to
the accused when the prosecutor refuses or fails to
present evidence to prove that the evidence of
guilt of the accused is strong can be traced to the
case of Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons 39
where this Court gave the following "instructions" to
the People's Court, 40 thus:
"1) In capital cases like the present when the
prosecutor does not oppose the petition for release
on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the
proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release
after the approval of the bail which it should fix for
the purpose;
2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the
special prosecutor's attitude is not justified, it may
ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the
state's evidence or to judge the adequacy of the
amount of bail;
3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to
answer any particular question on the ground that
the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the
success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the
public interest, the court may not compel him to do
so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that
effect of the Solicitor General, who, as head of the
Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the
direction and control of the prosecution, and may
not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to
present evidence which he does not want to
introduce provided, of course, that such refusal
shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or
detainee." 41
The rationale for the first instruction was stated by
this Court, as follows:
"If, for any reason, any party should abstain from
introducing evidence in the case for any definite
purpose, no law nor rule exists by which he may be
so compelled and the court before which the case
is pending has to act without that evidence and, in
so doing, it clearly would not be failing in its duties. If
the Constitution or the law plots a certain course of
action to be taken by the court when certain
evidence is found by it to exist, and the opposite
course if that evidence is wanting, and said
evidence is not voluntarily adduced by the proper
party, the court's clear duty would be to adopt that
course which has been provided for in case of
absence of such evidence. Applying the principle
to the case at bar, it was no more within the power
nor discretion of the court to coerce the
prosecution into presenting its evidence than to
force the prisoner into adducing hers. And when
both elected not to do so, as they had a perfect
right to elect, the only thing remaining for the court
to do was to grant the application for bail."
As for the second instruction, this Court stated that:
"The prosecutor might not oppose the application
for bail and might refuse to satisfy his burden of
proof, but where the court has reasons to believe
that the prosecutor's attitude is not justified, as
when he is evidently committing a gross error or a
dereliction of duty, the court must possess a
reasonable degree of control over him in the
paramount interest of justice. Under such
circumstance, the court is authorized by our second
instruction to inquire from the prosecutor as to the
nature of his evidence to determine whether or not
it is strong, it being possible for the prosecutor to
have erred in considering it weak and, therefore,
recommending bail."
As for the third instruction, this Court declared:
"It must be observed that the court is made to rely
upon the official statement of the Solicitor General
on the question of whether or not the revelation of
evidence may endanger the success of the
prosecution and jeopardize the public interest. This
is so, for there is no way for the court to determine
that question without having the evidence
disclosed in the presence of the applicant,
disclosure which is sought to be avoided to protect
the interests of the prosecution before the trial."
It is to be recalled that Herras Teehankee was
decided fully half a century ago under a
completely different factual milieu. Haydee Herras
Teehankee was indicted under a law dealing with
treason cases and collaboration with the enemy.
The said "instructions" given in the said case under
the 1940 Rules of Court no longer apply due to the
amendments introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court.
In the 1940 Rules of Court of the Philippines, the
applicable provisions on "Bail" provides, as follows:
"Sec. 5. Capital offenses defined. A capital
offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an offense
which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission, and at the time of the application to
be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offenses not bailable. No person
in custody for the commission of a capital offense
shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt
is strong.
Sec. 7. Capital offense Burden of proof . On
the hearing of an application for admission to bail
made by any person who is in custody for the
commission of a capital offense, the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is on the
prosecution."
9|CONSTI2_Section 13_Right To Bail
The above-cited provisions have not been adopted
in toto in the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 12-94, since some
phrases and lines have been intercalated, as shown
by the underscored phrases and statements below:
"Sec. 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital
offense, as the term is used in these rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application to
be admitted to bail, may be punished with death.
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital
offense, of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the
hearing of an application for admission to bail filed
by any person who is in custody for the commission
of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution has
the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is
strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearings shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either
party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the witness is dead,
outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to
testify."
It should be noted that there has been added in
Section 8 a crucial sentence not found in the
counterpart provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the
1940 Rules of Court. The above-underscored
sentence in Section 8, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of
Court, as amended, was added to address a
situation where in case the prosecution does not
choose to present evidence to oppose the
application for bail, the judge may feel duty-bound
to grant the bail application. In such a case, the
judge may well lose control of the proceedings. In a
sense, this undermines the authority of a judge since
all that the prosecution has to do to "force" the
judge to grant the bail application is to refrain from
presenting evidence opposing the same. In effect,
this situation makes Sections 6 and 7 of the 1940
Rules of Court on "Bail" meaningless since whether
or not the evidence of guilt of a person charged
with a capital offense is strong cannot be
determined if the prosecution chooses not to
present evidence or oppose the bail application in
a hearing precisely to be conducted by the trial
judge for that purpose, as called for in the two
sections. In the event that the prosecution fails or
refuses to adduce evidence in the scheduled
hearing, then a hearing as in a regular trial should
be scheduled. In this regard, a hearing in the
application for bail necessarily means presentation
of evidence, and the filing of a comment or a
written opposition to the bail application by the
prosecution will not suffice.
The prosecution under the revised provision is duty
bound to present evidence in the bail hearing to
prove whether the evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong and not merely to oppose the grant of bail
to the accused. "This also prevents the practice in
the past wherein a petition for bail was used as a
means to force the prosecution into a premature
revelation of its evidence and, if it refused to do so,
the accused would claim the grant of bail on the
ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong."
42
It should be stressed at this point, however, that the
nature of the hearing in an application for bail must
be equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the
bailability of the accused. If the prosecution were
permitted to conduct a hearing for bail as if it were
a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose of the
proceeding, which is to secure provisional liberty of
the accused to enable him to prepare for his
defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of
a summary hearing, the prosecution witnesses
could always be recalled at the trial on the merits.
43
In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the
jurisprudential principles just enunciated, this Court
reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court as amended);
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses
to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and
8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison,
supra);
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition
should be denied.
The above-enumerated procedure should now
leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial
judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and
fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in
connection with the grant of bail in the proper
cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for
any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge
or awareness thereof. 44 A judge owes it to the
public and the administration of justice to know the
law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy.
He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
10 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
rules. There will be faith in the administration of
justice only if there be a belief on the part of
litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot
justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of
legal principles. 45
Respondent judge herein insists that he could
exercise his discretion in granting bail to the
accused since the Assistant Prosecutor signified in
writing that he had no objection to the grant of bail
and recommended, instead, the bailbond in the
sum of P80,000.00. It is to be emphasized that
although the court may have the discretion to
grant the application for bail, in cases of capital
offenses, the determination as to whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong can only be reached
after due hearing which, in this particular instance
has not been substantially complied with by the
respondent Judge.
While it may be true that the respondent judge set
the application for bail for hearing three times, thus
showing lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail
to the accused, nonetheless, this does not
completely exculpate him because the fact
remains that a hearing has not actually been
conducted in violation of his duty to determine
whether or not the evidence against the accused is
strong for purposes of bail. Normally, the Court
imposes a penalty of P20,000.00 fine in cases where
the judge grants the application for bail without
notice and hearing. In view however of the
circumstances of this case, a reprimand instead of
the P20,000.00 would suffice. cdtai
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La
Union, is hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
(People v. Donato, G.R. No. 79269, June 05, 1991)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 79269. June 5, 1991.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.
PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XII,
Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander
Bilog, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity,
Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for Rodolfo Salas.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO
BAIL; GOVERNED BY THE LAW AT THE TIME THE
COURT RESOLVED THE PETITION FOR BAIL. At the
time the original and the amended Informations for
rebellion and the application for bail were filed
before the court below the penalty imposable for
the offense for which the private respondent was
charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During
the pendency of the application for bail EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 187 was issued by the President, by
virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally
provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code was restored. The restored law was the
governing law at the time the respondent court
resolved the petition for bail.
2. ID.; ID.; ABSOLUTE WHEN THE OFFENSE CHARGED
IS PUNISHABLE BY ANY PENALTY LOWER THAN
RECLUSION PERPETUA. We agree with the
respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the
private respondent for he is charged with the crime
of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00.
It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution and provides
thus: Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. Therefore, before conviction bail is either
a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of
right when the offense charged is punishable by
any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that
extent the right is absolute.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE DENIED EVEN IF THE
SECURITY OF THE STATE SO REQUIRES; PEOPLE VS.
HERNANDEZ, ET AL. (99 PHIL. 515) CITED. And so,
in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez,
et al., 99 Phil 515, despite the fact that the accused
was already convicted, although erroneously, by
the trial court for the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and
sentenced to life imprisonment, We granted bail in
the amount of P30,000.00 during the pendency of
his appeal from such conviction. To the vigorous
stand of the People that We must deny bail to the
accused because the security of the State so
requires, and because the judgment of conviction
appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt
of Hernandez is strong, We held: . . . Furthermore,
individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental
and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be
derived upon mere general principles and abstract
consideration of public safety. Indeed, the
preservation of liberty is such a major
preoccupation of our political system that, not
satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very
first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the
framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3),
(4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16),
(17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the
protection of several aspects of freedom."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED EVEN WHEN
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS
SUSPENDED. The 1987 Constitution strengthens
further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it
11 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. This
overturns the Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs.
Enrile, et al., supra., to wit: "The suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed,
carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the
government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is
to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right
to bail may be demanded during the continuance
of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and
detained in the course thereof will be released,
they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their
comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the
success of government efforts to bring to an end
the invasion, rebellion or insurrection."
5. ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF
THE COURT IF THE OFFENSE CHARGED IS PUNISHABLE
BY RECLUSION PERPETUA. If the offense charged
is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong. (Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons [76
Phil. 756, 770] But once it is determined that the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right. In the same case, We held: "The
provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned
after similar provisions contained in the Constitution
of the United States and that of many states of the
Union. And it is said that: 'The Constitution of the
United States and the constitution of the many
states provide that all persons shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where
the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is
great, and, under such provisions, bail is a matter of
right which no court or judge can properly refuse, in
all cases not embraced in the exceptions. Under
such provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases
of capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is
evident or the presumption thereof is great!"
6. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF PROSECUTION TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE TO DENY THEREOF; WHEN AVAILABLE.
The prosecution does not have the right to present
evidence for the denial of bail in the instances
where bail is a matter of right. However, in the
cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due
process requires that the prosecution must be given
an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time,
all the evidence that it may desire to introduce
before the court should resolve the motion for bail.
7. ID.; ID. ; GUIDELINES IN FIXING BAILBOND. We
agree with petitioner that it was error for the
respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then
later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution.
The guidelines for the fixing of the amount of bail
provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court are not matters left entirely to the discretion
of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao,
et al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495: "Certain guidelines in the
fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature
and circumstances of the crime, character and
reputation of the accused, the weight of the
evidence against him, the probability of the
accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the
accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or
not the accused is under bond in other case. . . ."
8. ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATION THAT PERSON
APPLYING FOR ADMISSION TO BAIL SHOULD BE IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE LAW; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT
BAR. He further admits that, in the light of Section
1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled
jurisprudence, the "constitutional right to bail is
subject to the limitation that the person applying for
admission to bail should be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty." When the
parties in G. R. No. 76009 stipulated that: "b.
Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody
and face trial before the court having custody over
his person." they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas,
herein respondent, will remain in actual physical
custody of the court, or in actual confinement or
detention, as distinguished from the stipulation
concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be
released in view of the recall of the warrants of
arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to
submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction
over their persons." Note should be made of the
deliberate care of the parties in making a fine
distinction between legal custody and court having
custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas
and court having jurisdiction over the persons of his
co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely
intended to emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo
Salas will not be released, but should remain in
custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or
had this been unclear to private respondent and his
counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a
clearer language. It must be remembered that at
the time the parties orally manifested before this
Court on 14 October 1986 the terms and conditions
of their agreement and prepared and signed the
Joint Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest
had already been issued by the trial court against
private respondent and his co-accused. The
stipulation that only the warrants of arrest for
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be
recalled and that only they shall be released,
further confirmed the agreement that herein
petitioner shall remain in custody of the law, or
detention or confinement.
9. ID.; ID.; MAY BE WAIVED BY THE ACCUSED. It is
"competent for a person to waive a right
guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to
action which would be invalid if taken against his
will." This Court has recognized waivers of
constitutional rights such as, for example, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; the
right to counsel and to remain silent; and the right
to be heard. Even the 1987 Constitution expressly
recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill
of Rights. Section 12(1) of Article III thereof on the
right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice
states : ". . . These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel." This
12 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
provision merely particularizes the form and manner
of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests that
the other rights may be waived in some other form
or manner provided such waiver will not offend
Article 6 of the Civil Code. We hereby rule that the
right to bail is another of the Constitutional rights
which can be waived. It is a right which is personal
to the accused and whose waiver would not be
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.
10. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; IMPOSABLE PENALTY
AS AMENDED BY R. A. NO. 6968. It must be
stressed that under the present state of the law,
rebellion is no longer punishable by prision mayor
and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act
No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990 and which
took effect after publication in at least two
newspapers of general circulation, amended,
among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalty for rebellion such
that, as amended, it now reads: "Article 135.
Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat.
Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a
rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Any person merely
participating or executing the commands of others
in a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua."
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR.
Republic Act No. 6968 cannot apply to the private
respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its
effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same."
12. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL;
DEFINED AND PURPOSE. In defining bail as: ". . .
the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, . . ." Section 1 of Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or
interpretation for the term "in custody of the law"
than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is
to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his
conviction and yet secure his appearance at the
trial. It presupposes that the person applying for it
should be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of liberty.
13. CIVIL LAW; WAIVER OF RIGHT; CONSTRUED.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing
legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege,
which except for such waiver the party would have
enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender,
by a capable person, of a right known by him to
exist, with the intent that such right shall be
surrendered and such person forever deprived of its
benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference
of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional
doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it."
14. ID.; ID.; RULE. As to what rights and privileges
may be waived, the authority is settled: ". . . the
doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges
of any character, and, since the word 'waiver'
covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule
that a person may waive any matter which affects
his property, and any alienable right or privilege of
which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to
which he is legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest
in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit,
do not infringe on the rights of others, and further
provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not
forbidden by law, and does not contravene public
policy; and the principle is recognized that
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive,
the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the
benefit and protection of the individual in his
private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished without infringing on any public right,
and without detriment to the community at large. . .
. Although the general rule is that any right or
privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation
of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will
be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of
others, or would be against public policy or morals
and the public interest may be waived. While it has
been stated generally that all personal rights
conferred by statute and guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, it has also been said
that constitutional provisions intended to protect
property may be waived, and even some of the
constitutional rights created to secure personal
liberty are subjects of waiver."
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
The People of the Philippines, through the Chief
State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the
City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge a Advocate
General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for restraining order/
preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of
respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail
to the accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander
Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 for Rebellion, 1
and the subsequent Order dated July 30, 1987
granting the motion for reconsideration of 16 July
1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's supplemental
motion for reconsideration of July 17, 1987 which
asked the court to allow petitioner to present
evidence in support of its prayer for a
reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.
The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether
the right to bail may, under certain circumstances,
be denied to a person who is charged with an
13 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
otherwise bailable offense, and whether such right
may be waived.
The following are the antecedents of this petition:
In the original Information 2 filed on 2 October 1986
in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, later amended in an Amended
Information 3 which was filed on 24 October 1986,
private respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias
"Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were
charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134,
in relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code
allegedly committed as follows:
"That in or about 1968 and for some time before
said year and continuously thereafter until the
present time, in the City of Manila and elsewhere in
the Philippines, the Communist Party of the
Philippines, its military arm, the New People's Army,
its mass infiltration network, the National
Democratic Front with its other subordinate
organizations and fronts, have, under the direction
and control of said organizations' leaders, among
whom are the aforenamed accused, and with the
aid, participation or support of members and
followers whose whereabouts and identities are still
unknown, risen publicly and taken arms throughout
the country against the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of
overthrowing the present Government, the seat of
which is in the City of Manila, or of removing from
the allegiance to that government and its laws, the
country's territory or part of it;
That from 1970 to the present, the above-named
accused in their capacities as leaders of the
aforenamed organizations, in conspiracy with, and
in support of the cause of, the organizations
aforementioned, engaged themselves in war
against the forces of the government, destroying
property or committing serious violence, and other
acts in the pursuit of their unlawful purpose, such as
. . . ."
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts
committed before and after February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private
respondent and his co-accused were in military
custody following their arrest on 29 September 1986
at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila;
he had earlier escaped from military detention and
a cash reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his
capture. 4
A day after the filing of the original information, or
on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus for
private respondent and his co-accused was filed
with this Court 5 which, as shall hereafter be
discussed in detail, was dismissed in Our resolution
of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the agreement
of the parties under which herein private
respondent "will remain in legal custody and will
face trial before the court having custody over his
person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-
accused are deemed recalled and they shall be
immediately released but shall submit themselves to
the court having jurisdiction over their person.
On November 7, 1986, private respondent filed with
the court below a Motion to Quash the Information
alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court
has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished, 6 to which petitioner filed
an Opposition 7 citing, among other grounds, the
fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion
dated October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private
respondent categorically conceded that:
xxx xxx xxx
"Par. 2 (b) Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in
legal custody and face trial before the court
having custody over his person."
In his Order of March 6, 1987, 8 respondent Judge
denied the motion to quash.
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said
Order, private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a
petition for bail, 9 which herein petitioner opposed
in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987 10 on the
ground that since rebellion became a capital
offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death on those who
promote, maintain, or head a rebellion, the
accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of
his guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and
effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it
existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the
original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 187 was published in the
Official Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83,
No. 24) which was officially released for circulation
on June 26, 1987.
In his Order of 7 July 1987 11 respondent Judge,
taking into consideration EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
187, granted private respondent's petition for bail,
fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed
upon private respondent the additional condition
that he shall report to the court once every two (2)
months within the first ten (10) days of every period
thereof. In granting the petition respondent Judge
stated:
". . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity
of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 187, the offense of
rebellion, for which accused Rodolfo Salas is herein
14 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
charged, is now punishable with the penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00,
which makes it now bailable pursuant to Section 13,
Article III, 1986 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114,
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Unlike the old rule,
bail is now a matter of right in non-capital offenses
before final judgment. This is very evident upon a
reading of Section 3, Rule 114, aforementioned, in
relation to Section 21, same rule. In view, therefore,
of the present circumstances in this case, said
accused-applicant is now entitled to bail as a
matter of right inasmuch as the crime of rebellion
ceased to be a capital offense."
As to the contention of herein petitioner that it
would be dangerous to grant bail to private
respondent considering his stature in the CPP-NPA
hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal is to
wipe out all vestiges of our democracy and to
replace it with their ideology, and that his release
would allow his return to his organization to direct its
armed struggle to topple the government before
whose courts he invokes his constitutional right to
bail, respondent Judge replied:
"True, there now appears a clash between the
accused's constitutional right to bail in a non-
capital offense, which right is guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights and, to quote again the prosecution, 'the
existence of the government that bestows the right,
the paramount interest of the state.' Suffice to state
that the Bill of Rights, one of which is the right to
bail, is a 'declaration of the rights of the individual,
civil, political and social and economic,
guaranteed by the Constitution against impairment
or intrusion by any form of governmental action.
Emphasis is placed on the dignity of man and the
worth of individual. There is recognition of certain
inherent and inalienable rights of the individual,
which the government is prohibited from violating'
(Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine Constitutional
Law, 1984 Edition, p. 77). To this Court, in case of
such conflict as now pictured by the prosecution,
the same should be resolved in favor of the
individual who, in the eyes of the law, is alone in the
assertion of his rights under the Bill of Rights as
against the State. Anyway, the government is that
powerful and strong, having the resources,
manpower and the wherewithals to fight those
'who oppose, threaten (sic) and destroy a just and
orderly society and its existing civil and political
institutions.' The prosecution's fear may or may not
be founded that the accused may later on jump
bail and rejoin his comrades in the field to sow
further disorders and anarchy against the duly
constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear can
not be a reason to deny him bail. For the law is very
explicit that when it comes to bailable offenses an
accused is entitled as a matter of right to bail. Dura
est lex sed lex."
In a motion to reconsider 12 the above order filed
on 16 July 1987, petitioner asked the court to
increase the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00
alleging therein that per Department of Justice
Circular No. 10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail for the
provisional release of an accused should be in an
amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of
imprisonment based on the medium penalty
imposable for the offense and explaining that it is
recommending P100,000.00 because the private
respondent "had in the past escaped from the
custody of the military authorities and the offense
for which he is charged is not an ordinary crime, like
murder, homicide or robbery, where after the
commission, the perpetrator has achieved his end"
and that "the rebellious acts are not consummated
until the well-organized plan to overthrow the
government through armed struggle and replace it
with an alien system based on a foreign ideology is
attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration 13 indirectly asking the
court to deny bail to the private respondent and to
allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the
accused will not comply with this main condition of
his bail to appear in court for trial," a conclusion it
claims to be buttressed "by the following facts
which are widely known by the People of the
Philippines and which this Honorable Court may
have judicial notice of:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for
thirteen years and was an escapee from detention
when arrested;
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had
no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado
Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a
Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite,"
turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private
vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and
address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11
January 1982,a reward of P250,000.00 was offered
and paid for his arrest,"
which "clearly indicate that the accused does not
entertain the slightest intention to appear in court
for trial, if released." Petitioner further argues that
the accused, who is the Chairman of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and head of its
military arm, the NPA, together with his followers,
are now engaged in an open warfare and rebellion
against this government and threatens the
existence of this very Court from which he now
seeks provisional release," and that while he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 187 which restored the
original penalty for rebellion under Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, yet, when the interest of the
State conflicts with that of an individual, that of the
former prevails for "the right of the State of self-
15 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
preservation is paramount to any of the rights of an
individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents
in the United States of America holding "that there is
no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of
potentially dangerous resident aliens pending
deportation proceedings, 14 and that an arrestee
may be incarcerated until trial as he presents a risk
of flight; 15 and sustaining a detention prior to trial
of arrestee charged with serious felonies who are
found after an adversary hearing to pose threat to
the safety of individuals and to the community
which no condition of release can dispel." 16
On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down
the Orders 17 adverted to in the introductory
portion of this decision the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, the Court finds the 'supplemental'
motion for reconsideration to be without merit and
hereby denies it but finds the first motion for
reconsideration to be meritorious only insofar as the
amount of bail is concerned and hereby
reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987 only to increase
the amount of bail from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00,
subject to the approval of this Court, and with the
additional condition that accused Rodolfo Salas
shall report to the court once every two (2) months
within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof
(Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al., L-31665, August 6,
1975, 66 SCRA 58)."
In denying the supplemental motion for
reconsideration the respondent Judge took into
account the "sudden turn-about" on the part of the
petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein it conceded the right of
the private respondent to bail but merely asked to
increase the amount of bail; observed that it is only
a reiteration of arguments in its opposition to the
petition for bail of 25 May 1987; asserted that the
American precedents are not applicable since the
cases involved deportation of aliens and,
moreover, the U.S. Federal Constitution does not
contain a proviso on the right of an accused to bail
in bailable offenses, but only an injunction against
excessive bail; and quoted the concurring opinion
of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the cases of
Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez vs.
Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108,
October 11, 1951, 90 Phil. 172.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner
commenced this petition submitting therein the
following issues:
"THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J.
DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL
DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING REALITIES, WHEN HE
DENIED PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
ITS OPPOSITION TO THE GRANT OF BAIL TO THE
RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J.
DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE
GRANTED BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO
SALAS."
in support of which petitioner argues that private
respondent is stopped from invoking his right to bail,
having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when
he agreed to "remain in legal custody and face trial
before the court having custody of his person" in
consideration of the recall of the warrant of arrest
for his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose
Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in non-
capital offenses, is not absolute when there is prima
facie evidence that the accused is a serious threat
to the very existence of the State, in which case the
prosecution must be allowed to present evidence
for the denial of bail. Consequently, respondent
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when
he did not allow petitioner to present all the
evidence it may desire to support its prayer for the
denial of bail and when he declared that the State
has forfeited its right to do so since during all the
time that the petition for bail was pending, it never
manifested, much less hinted, its intention to
adduce such evidence. And that even if release on
bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in fixing
the amount of bail at P50,000.00 (originally
P30,000.00 only), failed to take into account the
lengthy record of private respondents' criminal
background, the gravity of the pending charge,
and the likelihood of flight. 18
In Our resolution of 11 August 1987 19 We required
the respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a Temporary Restraining Order ordering
respondent Judge to cease and desist from
implementing his order of 30 July 1987 granting bail
to private respondent in the amount of P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987, 20 private
respondent asks for the outright dismissal of the
petition and immediate lifting of the temporary
restraining order on the following grounds:
I provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on
RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
BAIL; NEITHER IS HE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SAID
RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS PETITIONER WHO IS
ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
II
RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT
BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.
III
RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A
CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION PERPETUA), HENCE HE
HAS THE RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.
IV
16 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS CORRECT.
PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
IS NONEXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED.
V
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER IN THIS CASE VIOLATES NOT ONLY
RESPONDENT SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment
of private respondent. 21 The reply was filed on 18
September 1987. 22
In Our resolution of 15 October 1987 23 We gave
due course to the petition and required the parties
to file simultaneously their memoranda within
twenty days from notice.
In their respective manifestations and motions
dated 5 November 24 and 23 November 1987 25
petitioner and private respondents asked to be
excused from filing their Memoranda and that the
petition and reply be considered as the
Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as
the Memorandum for private respondent, which
We granted in Our resolutions of 19 November 1987
26 and 1 December 1987, 27 respectively.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required
the Solicitor General to express his stand on the
issues raised in this petition, 28 which he complied
with by filing his Manifestation on 30 May 1990 29
wherein he manifests that he supports the petition
and submits that the Order of respondent Judge of
July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be annulled
and set aside asserting that private respondent had
waived the right to bail in view of the agreement in
G.R. No. 76009; that granting bail to him is
accepting wide-eyed his undertaking which he is
sure to break; in determining bail, the primary
consideration is to insure the attendance of the
accused at the trial of the case against him, which
would be frustrated by the "almost certainty that
respondent Salas will jump bail of whatever
amount"; and application of the guidelines
Criminal Procedure on the amount of bail dictates
denial of bail to private respondent. The Solicitor
General likewise maintains that the right of the
petitioner to hearing on the application of private
respondent for bail cannot be denied by
respondent Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the
amended Informations for rebellion and the
application for bail were filed before the court
below the penalty imposable for the offense for
which the private respondent was charged was
reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency
of the application for bail EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which
the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored.
The restored law was the governing law at the time
the respondent court resolved the petition for bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail
cannot be denied to the private respondent for he
is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is
attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not exceeding P20,000.00. 30 It is, therefore, a
bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides thus:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required."
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, also provides:
"Bail, a matter of right: exception. All persons in
custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to
bail as a matter of right, except those charged with
a capital offense or an offense which, under the
law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong."
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter
of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the offense charged is punishable by any penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua. 31 To that extent the
right is absolute. 32
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs.
Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact that
the accused was already convicted, although
erroneously, by the trial court for the complex crime
of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons and
robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment, We
granted bail in the amount of P30,000.00 during the
pendency of his appeal from such conviction. To
the vigorous stand of the People that We must deny
bail to the accused because the security of the
State so requires, and because the judgment of
conviction appealed from indicates that the
evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong, We held:
". . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic,
too transcendental and vital in a republican state,
like ours, to be derived upon mere general
principles and abstract consideration of public
safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a
major preoccupation of our political system that,
not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the
very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of
Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted
paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13),
(14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1)
to the protection of several aspects of freedom."
17 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to
bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the
Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al.,
supra., to wit: LexLib
"The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the government's
campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be
enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to
bail may be demanded during the continuance of
the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and
detained in the course thereof will be released,
they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their
comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the
success of government efforts to bring to an end
the invasion, rebellion or insurrection."
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong. 33 But once it is determined that the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right. In Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons,
supra., We held:
"The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned
after similar provisions contained in the Constitution
of the United States and that of many states of the
Union. And it is said that:
'The Constitution of the United States and the
constitution of the many states provide that all
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offenses, where the proof is
evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and,
under such provisions, bail is a matter of right which
no court or judge can properly refuse, in all cases
not embraced in the exceptions. Under such
provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases of
capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident
or the presumption thereof is great!" 34
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the
right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the
instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in
the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary,
due process requires that the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire
to introduce before the court should resolve the
motion for bail. 35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error
for the respondent court to fix the bond at
P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing
the prosecution. The guidelines for the fixing of the
amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely
to the discretion of the court. As We stated in
People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495:

"Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for
the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among
them are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the accused,
the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial,
whether or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused is under
bond in other case . . . ."
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made
out allegations which necessitate a grant of an
opportunity to be heard for the purpose of
determining the amount of bail, but not for the
denial thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule
114 does not authorize any court to deny bail.
II.
It must, however, be stressed that under the present
state of the law, rebellion is no longer punishable by
prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October
1990 and which took effect after publication in at
least two newspapers of general circulation,
amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code by increasing the penalty for rebellion
such that, as amended, it now reads:
"Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or
coup d'etat. Any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
"Any person merely participating or executing the
commands of others in a rebellion or insurrection
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua."
xxx xxx xxx
This amendatory law cannot apply to the private
respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its
effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same."
36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent
has, however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No.
76009. LLpr
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of
the original information in Criminal Case No. 86-
48926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas
corpus for herein private respondent, and his co-
accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was
filed with this Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida
Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas against Juan
18 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato
de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao, and Col.
Saldajeno praying, among others, that the petition
be given due course and a writ of habeas corpus
be issued requiring respondents to produce the
bodies of herein private respondent and his co-
accused before the Court and explain by what
authority they arrested and detained them. The
following proceedings took place thereafter in said
case:
1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ
of habeas corpus, required respondents to make a
return of the writ on or before the close of office
hours on 13 October and set the petition for hearing
on 14 October 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Return To The
Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging therein that private
respondent and Josefina Cruz alias "Mrs. Mercado",
and Jose Milo Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora"
were apprehended by the military on September
29, 1986 in the evening at the Philippine General
Hospital Compound at Taft Ave., Manila, being
leaders or members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, New People's Army and National
Democratic Front, organizations dedicated to the
overthrow of the Government through violent
means, and having actually committed acts of
rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. After their arrest they were
forthwith charged with rebellion before Branch XII
of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region
in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 and on 3 October
warrants for their arrest were issued and
respondents continue to detain them because of
the warrants of arrest and the pendency of the
criminal cases against them. Respondents further
allege that, contrary to the allegation in the
petition, herein private respondent was not a
member of the NDF panel involved in peace
negotiations with the Government; neither is he and
his companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by
any safe conduct pass issued by competent
authorities.
3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties
informed the Court of certain agreements reached
between them. We issued a resolution reading as
follows:
"When this case was called for hearing this morning,
Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren
H. Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano Sabile,
Ramon Cura, and William Chua appeared for the
petitioners with Atty. Capulong arguing for the
petitioners. Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez,
Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and
Trial Attorney Josue E. Villanueva appeared for the
respondents, with Solicitor General Ordoez
arguing for the respondents.
Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong,
manifested in open Court that in conformity with
the agreement reached with the government, the
petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn with
detainee Rodolfo Salas to remain under custody,
whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcion will be released immediately.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez, also in open
Court, confirmed the foregoing statement made by
petitioners' counsel regarding the withdrawal of the
petition for habeas corpus, declaring that no
objection will be interposed to the immediate
release of detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, and that no bond will be required of
them, but they will continue to face trial with their
co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further, that they will not
be rearrested on the basis of the warrants issued by
the trial court provided that they manifest in open
Court their willingness to subject themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Court and to appear in court
when their presence is required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with
petitioners' counsel today relative to the
compromise agreement that they have previously
undertaken to submit. prcd
Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty.
Romeo Capulong, that on his oath as member of
the Bar, the detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion have agreed to subject themselves to
the jurisdiction of the trial court, the Court ordered
their immediate release.
Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing
manifestations and statements and required both
parties to SUBMIT to the Court their compromise
agreement by 4:00 o'clock this afternoon.
Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave."
4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October
1986 the parties submitted a Joint Manifestation
and Motion duly signed by Atty. Romeo Capulong,
counsel for petitioners, and Solicitor General
Sedfrey Ordoez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo
C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva,
counsel for respondents, which reads as follows:
"COME NOW petitioners and the respondents,
assisted by their respective counsel, and to this
Honorable Tribunal respectfully manifest:
1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong,
petitioners' counsel, and Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordoez on October 13, 1986 exploratory talks were
conducted to find out how the majesty of the law
may be preserved and human considerations may
be called into play.
2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to
the following terms of agreement:
a. The petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn
by petitioners and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be immediately released but shall
appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion
(People v. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No.
4886 [should be 86-48926], Regional Trial Court,
19 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
National Capital Judicial Region) filed against them
under their personal recognizance.
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.
c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby deemed
recalled in view of formal manifestation before the
Supreme Court that they will submit themselves to
the court having jurisdiction over their person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was
able to obtain the conformity of the Government to
the foregoing terms which were likewise accepted
by petitioner (sic) and their counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted their oral
manifestation during the hearing on October 14
and the present manifestation in compliance with
the resolution announced in court this morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas
corpus be dismissed."
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following
resolution:
"G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce
Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de
Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao and Col. Virgilio
Saldajeno] Considering the Joint Manifestation
and Motion dated October 14, 1986 filed by
Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren
H. Mercado and Ricardo Fernandez, Jr. as counsel
for petitioners and Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordoez and Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C.
de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva as
counsel for respondents which states that they
have entered into an agreement whereby: [a] the
petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by
petitioners, and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be immediately released but shall
appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion
[People vs. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No.
4886, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch XII, Manila], filed against them, on
their personal recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo
Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial
before the court having custody over his person;
and [c] the warrant of arrest for the person of
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby
deemed recalled in view of the formal
manifestation before this Court that they will submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their
person and in view of the said agreement, the
petition for habeas corpus be dismissed, the Court
Resolved to DISMISS the petition for habeas corpus
but subject to the condition that petitioners' lead
counsel, Atty. Capulong, upon his oath as member
of the Bar, shall abide by his commitment to ensure
the appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion at the trial of the criminal case for
rebellion filed against them. Teehankee, C.J., is on
official leave."
It is the stand of the petitioner that private
respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal custody
even during the pendency of the trial of his criminal
case, [he] has expressly waived his right to bail." 37
Upon the other hand, private respondent asserts
that this claim is totally devoid of factual and legal
basis, for in their petition for habeas corpus they
precisely questioned the legality of the arrest and
the continued detention of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which was not
resolved by this Court or by the compromise
agreement of the parties but left open for further
determination in another proceeding. Moreover,
the matter of the right to bail was neither raised by
either party nor resolved by this Court, and the legal
steps promptly taken by private respondent after
the agreement was reached, like the filing of the
motion to quash on 7 November 1986 and the
petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were clear and
positive assertions of his statutory and constitutional
rights to be granted not only provisional but final
and permanent liberty. Finally, private respondent
maintains that the term "legal custody" as used in
the Joint Manifestation and Motion simply means
that private respondent agreed to continue to be
in the custody of the law or in custodia legis and
nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
"'Custody' has been held to mean nothing less than
actual imprisonment. It is also defined as the
detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful authority,
or the 'care and possession of a thing or person.'
(Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed, Vol. I, pp. 741-742
citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland v. Com.
82 Pa. 306)"
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled
jurisprudence, the "constitutional right to bail is
subject to the limitation that the person applying for
admission to bail should be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty." 38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
"b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person."
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein
respondent, will remain in actual physical custody
of the court, or in actual confinement or detention,
as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his
co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of
the recall of the warrants of arrest against them;
they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the
court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note
should be made of the deliberate care of the
parties in making a fine distinction between legal
20 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
custody and court having custody over the person
in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having
jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such
a fine distinction was precisely intended to
emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will
not be released, but should remain in custody. Had
the parties intended otherwise, or had this been
unclear to private respondent and his counsel, they
should have insisted on the use of a clearer
language. It must be remembered that at the time
the parties orally manifested before this Court on 14
October 1986 the terms and conditions of their
agreement and prepared and signed the Joint
Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had
already been issued by the trial court against
private respondent and his co-accused. The
stipulation that only the warrants of arrest for
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be
recalled and that only they shall be released,
further confirmed the agreement that herein
petitioner shall remain in custody of the law, or
detention or confinement. cdrep
In defining bail as:
". . . the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, . . ."
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court
admits no other meaning or interpretation for the
term "in custody of the law" than that as above
indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an
accused from imprisonment until his conviction and
yet secure his appearance at the trial. 39 It
presupposes that the person applying for it should
be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived
of liberty. 40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to
remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
"Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law."
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing
legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege,
which except for such waiver the party would have
enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender,
by a capable person, of a right known by him to
exist, with the intent that such right shall be
surrendered and such person forever deprived of its
benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference
of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional
doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it." 41
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the
authority is settled:
". . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and
privileges of any character, and, since the word
'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the
general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right
or privilege of which he is the owner or which
belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled,
whether secured by contract, conferred with
statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided
such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the
rights of others, and further provided the waiver of
the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and
does not contravene public policy; and the
principle is recognized that everyone has a right to
waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a
law or role made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if
it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment
to the community at large. . . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or
privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation
of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will
be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of
others, or would be against public policy or morals
and the public interest may be waived. prcd
While it has been stated generally that all personal
rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, it has also been said
that constitutional provisions intended to protect
property may be waived, and even some of the
constitutional rights created to secure personal
liberty are subjects of waiver." 42
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo, 43 it was held:
"Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall
naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the
state, as well as the accused, is interested; and (b)
those which are personal to the accused, which
are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the
first class cannot be waived; those of the second
may be."
It is "competent for a person to waive a right
guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to
action which would be invalid if taken against his
will." 44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional
rights such as, for example, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; 45 the right to
counsel and to remain silent; 46 and the right to be
heard. 47
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a
waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of Rights.
Section 12(1) of Article III thereof on the right to
remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice
states:
". . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel."
21 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
This provision merely particularizes the form and
manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly
suggests that the other rights may be waived in
some other form or manner provided such waiver
will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of
the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a
right which is personal to the accused and whose
waiver would not be contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law. prLL
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with
grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the
private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of
July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case No.
86-48926 entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry,
Josefina Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo
Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion,
are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.
(People v. Fortes y Garra, G.R. No. 90643, 91155,
June 25, 1993)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 90643. June 25, 1993.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
AGUSTIN FORTES Y GARRA, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 91155. June 25, 1993.]
AGUSTIN G. FORTES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE EUGENIO C. GUAN,
JR. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Irosin,
Sorsogon, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gavino L. Barlin for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED;
RIGHT TO BAIL; RULES THEREON. It is clear from
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, that: ". . . before conviction bail is either
a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of
right when the offense charged is punishable by
any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that
extent the right is absolute. Upon the other hand, if
the offense charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It
shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The
court's discretion is limited to determining whether
or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is
determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong,
bail also becomes a matter of right. . . ."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVICTED ACCUSED NOT ENTITLED
THERETO WHEN CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE
OR AN OFFENSE PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this
Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991
in People vs. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that: "Pursuant to
the aforecited provision, an accused who is
charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer
be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the
offense charged is strong."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the instant
case, the rape for which the accused was indicted
is punishable by reclusion perpetua pursuant to
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code; he was
convicted therefor and subsequently sentenced to
serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the trial
court correctly denied his application for bail during
the pendency of the appeal.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; NOT DISPROVED BY
ABSENCE OF SPERMATOZOA. It is settled that the
absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the
consummation of rape. The important
consideration is not the emission of semen, but the
penetration by the male organ.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; Presidential Decree 1508;
REFERRAL TO BARANGAY LUPON; RAPE, EXEMPTED
THEREFROM. Under P.D. No. 1508, the governing
law then, rape was not among the crimes which
required referral to the Barangay Lupon for the
purpose of seeking an amicable settlement. As a
matter of fact, it was among those excepted from
such a referral considering that the penalty
imposable is more than thirty (30) days
imprisonment.
6. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; ALIBI; UNAVAILING
WHERE IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE ACCUSED TO BE AT
THE SCENE OF THE CRIME DURING ITS COMMISSION.
The appellant's contention that the trial court
erroneously characterized his defense as one of
alibi, is without any basis. The trial court actually
characterized the appellant's defense as one of
"alibi and absolute denial." Besides, the "alibi"
aspect thereof is not entirely inaccurate for in fact,
as shown by his own story, the appellant went back
to the ricefield to retrieve his bottle of drinking water
before returning to the nipa hut at around 12:00
o'clock noon. In effect, he suggested that he was
22 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
not at the scene of the crime at the time the sexual
assault was committed.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN A WOMAN ADMITS THAT SHE
HAS BEEN RAPED, SHE SAYS IN EFFECT ALL THAT IS
NECESSARY TO SHOW THAT RAPE HAD BEEN
COMMITTED. When a woman admits that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape had been committed. A
complainant would not make public the offense,
undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial
and endure the ordeal of testifying to all the gory
details if she had not in fact been raped, for no
decent Filipina would publicly admit that she has
been raped unless it is the truth.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; BOLSTERED BY ABSENCE OF IMPROPER
MOTIVE ON THE PART OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES
TO TESTIFY FALSELY AGAINST ACCUSED. When
there is no evidence to show any improper motive
on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify
falsely against an accused, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive existed, and their
testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.
Indeed, if an accused had really nothing to do with
the crime, it is against the natural order of events
and of human nature and against the presumption
of good faith that the prosecution witness would
falsely testify against the former.
9. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; INDEMNITY FOR RAPE
RAISED TO P40,000.00. We thus affirm the decision
appealed from except as to the matter of the
indemnity, which is hereby increased from
P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 pursuant to the current
policy of the Court.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
The conviction of Agustin Fortes y Garra for the rape
of a young girl described the trial court as "a
guileless lass of only 13 [a] sixth grade pupil, bred in
a barangay of rural atmosphere," and the denial by
the trial court of his application for bail pending his
appeal from the judgment of conviction are
questioned in these consolidated cases. LexLib
In G.R. No. 90643, the accused appeals from the
decision of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) at Irosin, Sorsogon, in Criminal Case No. 219.
The court a quo, in its Decision dated 18 November
1988 but promulgated on 25 January 1989, found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and pay the victim the sum of
P20,000.00 to answer for damages and costs. 1
In G.R. No. 91155, the accused seeks to annul and
set aside two (2) related orders of the said trial court
denying his application for bail, filed after his
conviction, to secure his provisional liberty pending
the resolution of his appeal.
The records disclose these antecedents:

On 26 November 1983, Agripino Gine of Barangay
Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of
Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter,
Merelyn, to the police station of the said
municipality to report a rape committed against
the latter by the accused at around 11:00 o'clock in
the morning of that day. Following this, the accused
was forthwith apprehended.
Thereupon, on 5 December 1983, Agripino Gine
filed on behalf of Merelyn a complaint 2 for rape
against the accused before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Matnog-Sta. Magdalena in
Matnog, Sorsogon. 3 The accusatory portion
thereof reads as follows:
"That on or about 11:00 in the morning of November
26, 1983, at Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of
Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with deliberate intent and
without the consent of the victim MERELYN GINE,
and by means of force and intimidation did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic)
armed with a bolo threatened (sic) and dragged
(sic) the victim MERELYN GINE, and there the said
accused committed the acts of rape inside the
nipa hut owned by Leobehildo (sic) Garra, to the
damage and prejudice of the undersigned
offended party.
Act contrary to law." 4
Finding probable cause to exist after a preliminary
examination was conducted, the MCTC issued on 9
December 1983 an order for the arrest of the
accused. 5 The bond for the latter's temporary
liberty was initially fixed at P30,000.00 but was later
reduced to P25,000.00 6 upon motion of the
accused. The latter then put up the required bond;
upon its approval, the court ordered his release on
15 December 1983. 7
When the case was finally called for preliminary
investigation on 5 December 1984, the accused,
through his counsel de oficio, informed the court
that he was waiving his right thereto. The court then
ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon. 8
On 25 January 1985, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal, through 1st Assistant Provincial Fiscal Manuel
C. Genova, filed with Branch 55 of the RTC at Irosin,
Sorsogon a complaint for rape against the
accused, the accusatory portion of which reads:
"That on or about the 26th day of November, 1983,
in the Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by
means of force and intimidation and with lewd
design (sic), and armed with a bolo and (sic)
threatened her with harm and dragged to a hut
the victim and there have (sic) carnal knowledge
23 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
with one Merelyn Gine against her will and consent,
to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 9
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 219.
Accused pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment
on 28 February 1985. 10 The protracted trial began
on 26 June 1985 and ended nearly three (3) years
later when the case was finally submitted for
decision on 22 February 1988. 11 The witnesses
presented by the prosecution were Merelyn Gine,
her father Agripino and Dr. Eddie Dorotan. The
witnesses for the defense, on the other hand, were
the accused himself, Leovegildo Garra and Celso
Gardon, the Barangay Captain of Naburacan,
Matnog, Sorsogon.
On 25 January 1989, the trial court promulgated its
decision convicting the accused of the crime
charged. 12 The dispositive portion thereof reads:
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify Merelyn Gine
the sum of P20,000.00 as damages and to pay the
costs. The accused is ordered committed to the
Sorsogon Provincial Jail through the Provincial
Warden or through any of his provincial guards and
eventually committed to the National Penitentiary
in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED." 13
On the same day, the accused filed his notice of
appeal 14 wherein he requested that the amount
of the appeal bond be fixed by the trial court. The
following day, 26 January 1989, the trial court gave
due course to the appeal 15 but did not resolve the
request to fix the amount of bail. Thus, on 11 April
1989, the accused filed an "Application for Bail on
Appeal" 16 reiterating his earlier request that the
bail bond for his provisional liberty pending appeal
be set. This was subsequently denied by the trial
court in its Order of 19 June 1989 on the ground that
". . . the accused has already been found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of rape
and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and his
appeal from the decision already approved by the
Court . . ." 17 Thereupon, on 10 August 1989, the trial
court issued a Commitment of Final Sentence
turning over the person of the accused to the
Director of Prisons in Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. 18
On 25 August 1989, the accused filed a motion to
reconsider the RTC's 19 June 1989 Order denying his
application for bail pending appeal, 19 but the
same was denied in the Order of 6 September 1989.
20
In the meantime, the trial court, on 12 September
1989, transmitted to this Court the records of
Criminal Case No. 219. We received the same on 16
November 1989 and docketed the appeal as G.R.
No. 90643.
On 9 December 1989, the accused filed with this
Court a special civil action for certiorari to set aside
the aforementioned orders of the trial court
denying his application for bail and his motion to
reconsider the said denial. The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 91155. In the Resolution of 20
December 1989, 21 this Court required the
respondents to comment on the petition. Then, on
18 June 1990, the said case was ordered
consolidated with G.R. No. 90643. 22 The records of
G.R. No. 91155 do not disclose if the respondents
had actually filed the required comment.
G.R. No. 91155
We shall first resolve G.R. No. 91155. Accused assails
the trial court's refusal to grant his application for
bail pending appeal on the ground that the same
amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional
right to bail. He contends that before his conviction
by final judgment, he enjoys the constitutional
presumption of innocence, and is therefore entitled
to bail as a matter of right.
There is no merit in the said petition.
It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution 23 and Section 3, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, 24 that:
". . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right
or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is
absolute.
xxx xxx xxx
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right. . . ." 25
The clear implication, therefore, is that if an
accused who is charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court
and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is
neither a matter of right on the part of the accused
nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a
situation, the court would not have only determined
that the evidence of guilt is strong which would
have been sufficient to deny bail even before
conviction it would have likewise ruled that the
accused's guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to
the accused during the pendency of his appeal
from the judgment of conviction. Construing
Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc
24 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo
Cortez, 26 ruled that:
"Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused
who is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer
be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the
offense charged is strong."
In the instant case, the rape for which the accused
was indicted is punishable by reclusion perpetua
pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code;
he was convicted therefor and subsequently
sentenced to serve that penalty. It is thus evident
that the trial court correctly denied his application
for bail during the pendency of the appeal.
G.R. No. 90643
We now turn to the accused's appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
The inculpatory facts, proven by the prosecution
and upon which the trial court based its judgment
of conviction, are summarized by the trial court in its
decision. Finding the same to be fully supported by
the evidence adduced, We hereby adopt the said
summary as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"(3) The evidence for the prosecution shows that in
the morning of 26 November 1983, Merelyn Gine
accompanied her father Agripino Gine to
Barangay Naburacan, Matnog, Sorsogon, where
he was going to work in the farm of Patrolman
Nonito Galeria. Her father left her in the nipa hut of
one Leovegildo Garra so she can cook his meal for
lunch. She was alone in the hut.
(4) While she was preparing to cook the meal,
accused appeared from nowhere and inserted his
T-shirt inside her mouth. Accused also held her
hands and tore her pedal pant (sic). She tried to
kick him but to no avail. After he was able to
remove her pedal, she was threatened with a bolo
and was warned that he will kill her if she shouted.
The bolo which was presented in evidence as
Exhibit C (sic) was 23 1/2 inches long including the
handle. The sharp end of the bolo was pointed by
the accused to her throat. Accused laid her down
and it was in this position when (sic) the accused
had sexually abused her by inserting his penis
through her (sic) panty she was wearing which was
torn and stained with her blood (Exhibits B, B1 and
B2). She suffered extreme pain and her vagina
started bleeding. She cried and wished that her
father were around so that she could ask him to kill
the accused.
(5) Just as the accused consummated the rape, her
father returned from the farm to inquire whether his
meal was cooked already. He called for his
daughter but she did not answer during the first call
and on the second call he heard her answer 'po'
(meaning yes). Suddenly, the accused jumped out
of the window with his short pants on but leaving
behind in his hurry to escape, the T-shirt which he
inserted inside the mouth of the victim and the bolo
he used to threaten her. Her father gave chase but
was not able to catch up with the accused.
(6) When her father went inside the hut, he found
her in a state of shock and (sic) was trying to get up
but was swaying for she could hardly stand. It was
at this instance when his daughter narrated to him
the dastardly act perpetrated upon her by the
accused.
(7) On the same day, she and her father reported
the incident to the police authorities in Matnog,
Sorsogon, and an investigation was made. On that
same day, the accused was apprehended.
(8) From the police, she went to the Irosin District
Hospital for medical examination. Thereat, she was
subjected to a medical examination by a certain
Dr. Tito Garrido but he did not issue her a medical
certificate. So she had another medical
examination by Dr. Eddie Dorotan of the same
hospital who issued her a medical certificate which
was introduced in evidence as Exhibit E and E1.
(9) At the time she was sexually abused, Merelyn
Gine was only 13 years old (Exhibit D). She
demonstrated to the Court the position in which she
was raped by the accused. She felt so ashamed
after the rape and underwent so much suffering
and pain like her father, which could not be
compensated with money alone and wants justice
done." 27
On the other hand, the accused capsulated his
version of the incident in this manner:
"On November 26, 1983 at about 8:30 in the
morning, accused Fortes on his way to the Nipa Hut
which he used as a rest house met Agripino Gine,
father of Complainant Merelyn Gine in the ricefield
at Bgy. Naburacan, Matnog, Sorsogon where they
both work and cultivate their respective ricelands.
In that meeting Agripino asked permission from
accused if her (sic) daughter, Merelyn, could cook
their lunch at the Nipa Hut ('Payag' in local dialect),
owned by the grandfather of accused Leovegeldo
(sic) Garra. Accused who is a neighbor and family
friend of Agripino (sic) in Bgy. Camachilis where
they both reside gave his permission. Accused
proceeded to the Nipa Hut owned by his
grandfather for the purpose of preparing his own
lunch. When accused arrived in the Nipa Hut, he
saw Merelyn preparing their lunch.
Accused waited for his turn while Merelyn was
preparing their lunch. Accused spent his waiting
time in repairing the plow (araro) which he used in
the cultivation of the riceland. At this point in time
his grandfather Leovegeldo (sic) Garra arrived.
Merelyn Gine and accused who are known to
each other being neighbors and family friends
exchanged pleasanties (sic) and jokes. In the
25 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
process, accused accidentally dropped the fish
which he was about to cook for lunch outside the
window. Accused passed through the window
which is about half (1/2) meter from the ground to
pick-up the fish.
At this juncture, Agripino (sic) arrived from the
ricefield at about 11:00 in the morning and called
his daughter, Merelyn, to inquire if lunch was ready.
Merelyn answered in the negative, Agripino got
angry and scolded his daughter, Merelyn for failing
to cook the lunch on time.
In the meantime, accused-appellant returned to
the ricefield to pick-up his bottle of drinking water.
He returned back to the Nipa Hut at about 12:00
noon and he saw inside the nipa hut, the following
people: Agripino Gine, Joel, Mondoy, sons of
Agripino and Dick Galeria son of the owner of the
riceland being cultivated by Agripino Gine eating
their lunch." 28
To bolster his defense, the accused presented two
(2) other witnesses, namely Leovegildo Garra, his
grandfather, and Celso Gardon, the Barangay
Captain of Naburacan, Matnog.
The trial court accorded full faith and credit to the
prosecution's version; it was convinced beyond
reasonable doubt that Merelyn fell victim to a
sexual assault on the morning of 26 November 1983
which was perpetrated through force and
intimidation. On that same day, both she and her
father immediately reported the incident to the
police authorities. She then submitted to a medical
examination.
There seems to be no logical reason for her or her
father to concoct the charge of rape against the
accused. During her testimony, Merelyn "showed an
unmistakable determination to exact justice, from
the man who had forcibly violated her and caused
her early loss of virginity." She "has no motive other
than to bring to justice the culprit who had
grievously wronged her." 29
In his Brief, the accused, hereinafter referred to as
the Appellant, urges this Court to reverse his
conviction and acquit him on the ground that the
trial court erred in:
"I . . . GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE
UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
II . . . NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE MEDICAL
CERTIFICATE SHOWING THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WAS NOT SEXUALLY ABUSED ON NOVEMBER 26,
1983.
III . . . NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY
OF THE BGY. CAPTAIN WHERE THE ALLEGED CRIME
WAS COMMITTED.
IV . . . NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BECAUSE HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT." 30
For his first assigned error, the appellant contends
that the rape for which he was charged and
subsequently convicted was not established by
clear, positive and convincing evidence. He claims
that the complainant's statement that she had her
panty on while she was being raped is incredible,
as "[E]experience will show that it is physically
[I]impossible to perform and execute the act of
sexual intercourse to a woman with her panty on."
31
In support of the second assigned error, he asserts
that the medical examination conducted by Dr.
Eddie Dorotan, a government physician assigned to
the Irosin District Hospital, which revealed that
"there was no bleeding" and "no spermatozoa" 32
present, conclusively proved that the accused did
not commit the crime of rape. The latter further
contends that the trial court erred in believing the
complainant's declaration that her panty was
stained with her blood because, as he points out,
there was no "corroborated (sic) evidence to prove
that indeed the alleged blood stain is indeed the
blood coming from the vagina of complainant." 33
As to his third ascribed error, the appellant faults the
trial court for not giving due weight to the testimony
of the Barangay Captain of the locality wherein the
rape was committed. He further contends that
since Barangay Captain Celso Gardon testified that
he (Gardon) passed by the nipa hut and saw the
complainant and her father Agripino together with
other persons at around lunch time the time of
the commission of the alleged rape Agripino
should have immediately reported the sexual
assault to him as he is the barangay captain. LLjur
The appellant additionally assails the credibility of
Agripino Gine, claiming that the latter failed to
corroborate his daughter's story that there was
blood on the spot where she was purportedly
raped and that her panty and pants were torn by
the appellant. Moreover, it is averred that Agripino
did not even describe to the court his daughter's
attire when he found her in the nipa hut. Appellant
then faults the trial court for concluding that he had
presented the defense of alibi when the records
reveal that no such defense was offered by him.
LLpr
Appellant's last assigned error is but a summation of
the previous three (3) errors; he concludes that the
totality of the prosecution's evidence creates
sufficient doubt as to his guilt. Hence, he concludes
that he is entitled to an acquittal.
Our careful review of the records and painstaking
evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties
yield nothing to support the assigned errors, and
lead Us to the inevitable conclusion that the
culpability of the appellant has been proven
26 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
beyond reasonable doubt. This appeal must
therefore be dismissed for palpable lack of merit.
The victim narrated her ordeal in a simple, yet
candid and straightforward manner as evidenced
by the transcripts of her testimony, the pertinent
portions of which read:
"FISCAL GENOVA
What happened while you were getting the kettle
preparatory to cooking your meal?
A Suddenly, this Agustin Fortes appeared from
nowhere and tried to embrace me.
Q In what part of your body?
A He tried to insert his T-shirt in my mouth.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened after you were held and a
piece of T-shirt put (sic) inside your mouth?
A He had sexual intercourse with me.
Q Before he had sexual intercourse with you, what
did he do?
A He torn (sic) my panty and my pedal.
Q Do you mean to tell this Court that you were
dressed during that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q And how did Agustin Fortes tried (sic) to torn (sic)
your pedal and panty?
A When he was trying to hold my hands, he was
pulling my panty at the same time tearing my
pedal and I was kicking him.
Q I am showing to you clothes from the Police
Station labeled 'Criminal Case No. 3226' which I
presumed is the criminal case number connection
to what you just stated. This is from the Police
Station of Matnog.
A This is the pedal I was wearing at the time.
Q When you were wearing this, was it already torn?
A Not yet.
Q How about this panty of yours, is this already in
this kind (sic)?
A No, sir.
Q What is this dark stain here . . . which you could
see?
A That is blood.
Q Whose blood?
A Mine.
Q How was this torn? The pedal . . . no the panty?
A He was the one who torn (sic) my panty.
Q And in the process this was removed from your
body?
A Yes sir.
Q What happened now after this pedal also was
removed?
A I was able to shout but he warned me that he is
going to kill me.
Q When he stated that he was going to kill you,
what was in his possession?
A A bolo.
Q I am showing to you a bolo wrapped in a
coupon bond, 23 1/2 inches labelled 'People of the
Philippines versus Agustin Fortes November 26, 1983.'
What is the relation of this bolo to the bolo that was
used?
A This is the bolo that was used.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, how was this bolo being used in your body?
A He was trying to thrust it below my neck.
Q With what hand was the accused using this?
A Left.
Q When you say it was being poked in your body,
which part of the bolo?
A The sharp end.
Q On what part of your body was it being poked?
A On my neck.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you said you were sexually abused by
Agustin Fortes, how was this sexual abuse made in
(sic) your body?
A By holding my hands and laying me down on the
floor and he lied (sic) down on top of me . . . and
then he performed the sexual intercourse.
Q When you said 'ikiti' (sexual intercourse), my
question is, did the penis of the accused penetrate
your vagina?
A Yes sir.
27 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
Q And while he was on that act of sexual
intercourse with his penis inside your vagina, what
happened then?
A I felt pain. And my vagina started bleeding.
Q And what happened next?
A And then I cried and I remembered that if only
my father is there I will ask him to kill the accused.
Q Did your father arrive?
A Yes sir and Agustin Fortes jumped out of the
window." 34
The jumping of the appellant out of the window
was witnessed by Merelyn's father whose testimony
thereon was further bolstered during cross-
examination:
"ATTY. ZULUETA:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you returned to the hut of Leovegildo
Garra, what happened?
A When I was about in a distance of (sic) three
meters from the house of Leovegildo (sic) Garra, I
called for my daughter. My first call, there was no
answer, and on my second call, there was an
answer 'po', then, suddenly, somebody jumped out
of the window in the person of Agustin Fortes.
Q When you saw the alleged accused in this case
jumped (sic) out of the window of the hut of
Leovegildo Garra, what did you do?
A Instead of trying to run after Agustin Fortes, I felt
apprehensive, and so, I went to the succor of my
daughter which (sic) was speechless.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After you went to the house of Leovegildo Garra,
what happened there?
A That (sic) my daughter was raped.
Q How come that you knew that your daughter
was raped?
A Because my daughter herself told me." 35
Agripino's daughter was in a sitting position and
could hardly stand when he saw her. 36 He thus
decided to report the incident to the police
authorities immediately. Thus, both he and Merelyn
proceeded to the police station where they were
consequently interrogated. Thereafter, the
appellant was apprehended. 37
From Merelyn's testimony, it is evident that the
appellant had carnal knowledge of her through
force and intimidation. He gagged her first with a t-
shirt and then forced her into the sexual act by
threatening to kill her with his bolo. Her testimony on
this point was even further strengthened and
enhanced when, during cross-examination, counsel
for the appellant gambled on the fate of the latter
by asking Merelyn to show how the rape was
committed. Merelyn then demonstrated how the
appellant gripped her hands and pointed the bolt
to her neck. 38
As to the alleged impossibility of the commission of
the sexual act because of the fact that Merelyn's
panty was not actually removed, the appellant
seems to have forgotten that it was he, through the
cross-examination of his lawyer, who elicited from
Merelyn the declaration that his penis was inserted
through a hole in the said panty. Thus:
"ATTY. ZULUETA:
xxx xxx xxx
Q You have said that the accused had forcefully
made sexual intercourse with you. How come that
(sic) the penis penetrated your vagina?
A When his right hand was holding my hands he
unzipped his pants and put out his penis and
inserted his penis to (sic) my vagina.
Q When the accused conducted sexual intercourse
with you, do (sic) you have your panty?
A Yes sir. There is a hole in my panty where he
inserted his penis to (sic) my vagina.
Q While the accused was having sexual intercourse
with you, what happened next?
A My vagina was bleeding because it was very
painful." 39
Neither may the medical certificate (Exhibit "E")
issued by Dr. Eddie Dorotan be of any help to the
appellant. The said certificate does not, contrary to
the latter's claim, prove that Merelyn did not have
sexual intercourse because of the findings therein
reported that there was no bleeding, the vagina
admitted two (2) fingers and the vaginal fluid
contained no spermatozoa. Again, the appellant
conveniently forgot that Dr. Dorotan examined
Merelyn only on 28 November 1983 at 9:45 o'clock
in the morning, 40 or two (2) days after the incident.
By that time, the bleeding, which had taken place
earlier, may no longer have been noticeable and
the spermatozoa may no longer have been
present. It is settled that the absence of
spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation
of rape. The important consideration is not the
emission of semen, but the penetration by the male
organ. 41 It must likewise be emphasized that Dr.
Tito Garrido of the District Hospital of Irosin, the
physician who examined Merelyn in the afternoon
of 26 November 1983, did not issue a medical
28 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
certificate, although he promised to deliver one to
Matnog. It has been shown that Dr. Garrido
reneged on this pledge. Furthermore, during trial,
complainant's father claimed that he had later
learned that Dr. Garrido is related to the appellant.
42 This assertion was not even rebutted by the
defense.
Moving on, this Court is not persuaded by the
appellant's contention that if Merelyn had in fact
been raped, then either she or her father should
have first informed the barangay captain about the
incident. Suffice it to say, reporting the commission
of a crime to a barangay captain is not a
prerequisite for the formal institution of criminal
charges. Even under P.D. No. 1508, the governing
law then, rape was not among the crimes which
required referral to the Barangay Lupon for the
purpose of seeking an amicable settlement. As a
matter of fact, it was among those excepted from
such a referral considering that the penalty
impossible is more than thirty (30) days
imprisonment. 43 If the complainant and her father
seemed to have "by-passed" the barangay captain
and instead reported the incident directly to the
police, it is quite obvious that they wanted
immediate action to ensure the appellant's arrest
and forestall any possible escape on his part. LexLib
Finally, the appellant's contention that the trial court
erroneously characterized his defense as one of
alibi, is without any basis. The trial court actually
characterized the appellant's defense as one of
"alibi and absolute denial." 44 Besides, the "alibi"
aspect thereof is not entirely inaccurate for in fact,
as shown by his own story, the appellant went back
to the ricefield to retrieve his bottle of drinking water
before returning to the nipa hut at around 12:00
o'clock noon. In effect, he suggested that he was
not at the scene of the crime at the time the sexual
assault was committed.
All told, We have in this case a 13-year old barrio
lass who: immediately revealed the commission of
the heinous crime to her father just as the appellant
consummated the act and jumped out of the
window to escape; forthwith reported it to the
police authorities who, after having heard her story,
apprehended the appellant; thereafter, in the
afternoon of the same day, voluntarily submitted to
a medical examination of her private parts;
submitted again to a second medical examination
of her private parts on 28 November 1983;
underwent the ordeal of a public trial; and, upon
demand by the appellant's counsel, even
demonstrated as part of the cross-examination
how she was raped. We need no further
evidence to convince Us that indeed, the
complainant was raped by the appellant. We have
repeatedly held that when a woman admits that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape had been committed.
A complainant would not make public the offense,
undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial
and endure the ordeal of testifying to all the glory
details if she had not in fact been raped, for no
decent Filipina would publicly admit that she has
been raped unless it is the truth. 45 Moreover, the
appellant has not shown that the complainant and
her father were actuated by any ulterior motives
which could have induced them to falsely
implicate him in the commission of the crime. It is
settled that when there is no evidence to show any
improper motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses to testify falsely against an accused, the
logical conclusion is that no such improper motive
existed, and their testimonies are worthy of full faith
and credit. 46 Indeed, if an accused had really
nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural
order of events and of human nature and against
the presumption of good faith that the prosecution
witness would falsely testify against the former. 47
We thus affirm the decision appealed from except
as to the matter of the indemnity, which is hereby
increased from P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 pursuant to
the current policy of the Court.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) In G.R. No. 90643, AFFIRMING the appealed
Decision in Criminal Case No. 219 of Branch 55 of
the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, at
Irosin, Sorsogon, with the modification of the
indemnity which is increased from P20,000.00 to
P40,000.00; and
2) In G.R. No. 91155, DENYING, for lack of merit, the
petition.
Costs against appellant Agustin Fortes y Garra in
both cases.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ ., concur.
(Comendador v. De Villa, G.R. No. 93177, 95020,
96948, 97454, August 02, 1991)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 93177. August 2, 1991.]
BGEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, BGEN. MARIELO
BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL
ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO
GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ,
LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO,
LTC. JACINTO LIGOT, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ.
ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PEA, MAJ.
LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES,
CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT.
ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY
SARROZA, petitioners, vs. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA,
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL
COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL.
VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA, MAJ. FELIX V.
BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA, and
GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF:
BGEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMINIO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI,
29 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA
and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.
[G.R. No. 95020. August 2, 1991.]
BGEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMINIO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI,
COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA,
and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners, vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge,
Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC.
JACINTO LIGOT, PA., respondents.
[G.R. No. 96948. August 2, 1991.]
BGEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, BGEN. MARCELO
BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT.
MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M),
LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA,
LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO
PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT, PA, LTC. FRANKLIN
BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ.
CESAR DE LA PEA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO
VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT.
JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA CAPT. ELMER
AMON PAF, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY
SARROZA, petitioners, vs. BGEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA,
COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU,
COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL.
DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL
COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.
[G.R. No. 97454. August 2, 1991.]
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN.
CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO,
Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention
Center/Jail, petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO P.
SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S.
RAFAEL. 1LT. SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1LT.
WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF, 1LT. ATANACIO T.
MACALAN, JR PM(M), 2LT. ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT.
JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT. JAIRUS JS. GELVEZON III PM
M), 2LT. JOSELITO CABREROS PM(M), 2LT. MEMEL
ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT. HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC,
respondents.
Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for
petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson
Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Amon, Vergel
Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey
Sarroza.
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny
Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson.
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo
Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for
Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson
Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for A.L. Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and
Ison.
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pea.
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for
petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
These four cases have been consolidated because
they involve practically the same parties and
related issues arising from the same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the
private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454
are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
facing prosecution for their alleged participation in
the failed coup d'etat that took place on
December 1 to 9, 1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of
War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW
94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning
the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel
constituted to investigate the charges against them
and the creation of the General Court Martial
(GCM) convened to try them.
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides
challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek
certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to
peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent
judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are
assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no
30 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either
to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private
respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the
release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional
objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
I
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a
Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been
constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated
January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948.
The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated
January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the
petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person
before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall,
Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to
submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of
your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of
the charge/charges against you for viol of AWs
________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-
affidavits on the date above specified shall be
deemed a waiver of your right to submit
controverting evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged
receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical
certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners
challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days
within which to file their objections in writing. This
was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal
dated February 21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27, 1990, the PTI
Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5
days from notice to submit their respective counter-
affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved
for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the
PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce
their motion to writing. This was done on March 14,
1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial
investigation of the charges as mandated by Article
of War 71, which provides:
ARTICLE 71. Charges; Action upon. Charges and
specifications must be signed by a person subject
to military law, and under the oath either that he
has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the
matters set forth therein and that the same are true
in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-
martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial
investigation thereof shall have been made. This
investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of
the matter set forth in said charges, form of
charges, and what disposition of the case should
be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At
such investigation full opportunity shall be given to
the accused to cross-examine witnesses against
him if they are available and to present anything he
may desire in his own behalf either in defense or
mitigation, and the investigating officer shall
examine available witnesses requested by the
accused. If the charges are forwarded after such
investigation, they shall be accompanied by a
statement of the substance of the testimony taken
on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the
charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no
prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm
their affidavits. While the motion for summary
dismissal was denied, the motion for
reconsideration remains unresolved to date and
they have not been able to submit their counter-
affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in
G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were
exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges
against the president and members of GCM No. 14.
They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this
purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that
peremptory challenges had been discontinued
under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail
on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by
GCM No. 14. He thereupon filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty
and a writ of preliminary injunction. After
considering the petition and the answer thereto
filed by the president and members of GCM No. 14,
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order
granting provisional liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus
motion to enforce the order for his release and to
declare in contempt the commanding officer of
the PC/INP Jail for disobeying the said order. He
later also complained that Generals De Villa and
Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final
resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for
the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of
intervenors Ltc. Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio
Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of
additional intervenors Ltc. Romelino Gojo and
Capt. Manuel Ison.
31 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered
judgment inter alia.
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons
with the defined exception is applicable and
covers all military men facing court-martial
proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of
General Court-Martial No. 14 denying bail to
petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken
assumption that bail does not apply to military men
facing court-martial proceedings on the ground
that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside
and declared null and void. Respondent General
Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct
proceedings on the applications of bail of the
petitioner, intervenors and which may as well
include other persons facing charges before
General Court-Martial No. 14
Pending the proceedings on the applications for
bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court
reiterates its orders of release on the provisional
liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as
intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in
G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that they were being
detained in Camp Crame without charges. The
petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent
Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that
no formal charges had been filed against the
petitioners after more than a year after their arrest,
the trial court ordered their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case
and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177
and 96948 were given several opportunities to
present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at
the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and
then again after the denial of their motion of
February 21, 1990, when they were given until
March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On
that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to
submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990.
The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel
resolved to recommend that the charges be
referred to the General Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have
been denied due process because the
investigation was resolved against them owing to
their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits.
They had been expressly warned in the subpoena
sent them that "failure to submit the
aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date
above specified shall be deemed a waiver of
(their) right to submit controverting evidence." They
chose not to heed the warning. As their motions
appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified
in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without
waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense.
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is
accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not
availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without
violation of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with
Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is
now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-
trial investigation does not deprive a general court-
martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino,
1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial
investigation does not deprive a general court-
martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial
investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory,
and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-
martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed
986 (1949), the Court said:
"We do not think that the pre-trial investigation
procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine counterpart
is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can
properly be construed as an indispensable pre-
requisite to the exercise of Army general court
martial jurisdiction. The Article does serve important
functions in the administration of court-martial
procedures and does provide safeguards to an
accused. Its language is clearly such that a
defendant could object to trial in the absence of
the required investigation. In that event the court-
martial could itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military reviewing authorities
could consider the same contention, reversing a
court-martial conviction where failure to comply
with Article 70 has substantially injured an accused.
But we are not persuaded that Congress intended
to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments
wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short
of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That
Congress has not required analogous pre-trial
procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication
that the investigatory plan was not intended to be
exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the
Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that
where there had been no pre-trial investigation,
court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But
this holding has been expressly repudiated in later
holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later
interpretation has been that the pre-trial
requirements of Article 70 are directory, not
mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of
a court-martial. The War Department's
interpretation was pointedly called to the attention
32 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended
Article 70 but left unchanged the language here
under consideration."
A trial before a general court-martial convened
without any pretrial investigation under article of
war 71 would of course be altogether irregular; but
the court-martial might nevertheless have
jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one
obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to
the effect that absence of preliminary investigation
does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but
merely to the regularity of the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the
preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved
more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2
where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of
petitioners, there was substantial compliance with
the requirements of law as provided in the Articles
of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
911. The amended charge sheets, charging
petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny
and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed
by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military
law, after he had investigated the matter through
an evaluation of the pertinent records, including
the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers,
and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies
on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj.
Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the
manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of
War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory application, the
fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the
manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the
officer administering the oath has personally
examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood his
affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets.
Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted
by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant
to P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911,
petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file
their counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing
so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the
dismissal of the charges against them. That
petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses
against them was their own doing, for they never
even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said
witnesses so that they may be made to answer
clarificatory questions in accordance with P.D. No.
77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not
been constituted in accordance with Article 8 of
the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6,
which supposedly convened the body, was not
signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
ARTICLE 8. General Courts-Martial. The President
of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary
and, when empowered by the President, the
commanding officer of a major command or task
force, the commanding officer of a division, the
commanding officer of a military area, the
superintendent of the Military Academy, the
commanding officer of a separate brigade or body
of troops may appoint general courts-martial; but
when any such commander is the accuser or the
prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the
court shall be appointed by superior competent
authority . . .
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not
signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he
authorized it because the order itself said it was
issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has
not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the
Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form
showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP,
actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its
president and members. It is significant that General
De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any
way disowned the said order, as he would certainly
have done if his authority had been improperly
invoked. On the contrary, as the principal
respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he sustained General
Order No. M-6 in the Comment filed for him and the
other respondents by the Solicitor General.
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge,
we note that this was originally provided for under
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as
amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to
wit:
ARTICLE 18. Challenges. Members of general or
special courts-martial may be challenged by the
accused or the trial judge advocate for cause
stated to the court. The court shall determine the
relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not
receive a challenge to more than one member at
a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall
ordinarily be presented and decided before those
by the accused are offered. Each side shall be
entitled to the peremptory challenge, but the law
member of the court shall not be challenged
except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in
Martelino v. Alejandro, 3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine
Army, after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth
Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense
Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout
officers and graduates of the United States military
and naval academies who were on duty with the
Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of
officers learned in military law, this aside from the
fact that the officer corps of the developing army
was numerically inadequate for the demands of
the strictly military aspects of the national defense
program. Because of these considerations it was
33 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
then felt that peremptory challenges should not in
the meanwhile be permitted and that only
challenges for cause, in any number, would be
allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War
(Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on
September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of
the Act, made no mention or reference to any
peremptory challenge by either the trial judge
advocate of a court-martial or by the accused.
After December 17, 1958, when the Manual for
Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became
effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of
the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and
intensive program of training and education in
military law, encompassing the length and breadth
of the Philippines. This program was pursued until
the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific on
December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of
Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a
very large number, and a great many of the
officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It
was in these environmental circumstances that
Article of War 18 was amended on June 12, 1948 to
entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge,
with the sole proviso that "the law member of court
shall not be challenged except for cause."
On September 27, 1972, President Marcos issued
General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to
try and decide cases of military personnel and such
other cases as may be referred to them."
On November 7, 1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39
(Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction,
Procedure, and other matters relevant to Military
Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory
challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed.
Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure
impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall
immediately be heard and determined by a
majority of the members excluding the challenged
member. A tie vote does not disqualify the
challenged member. A successfully challenged
member shall be immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated
P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code, which
was a compilation and codification of decrees,
general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet
the continuing threats to the existence, security and
stability of the State." The modified rule on
challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this
decree.
On January 17, 1981, President Marcos issued Proc.
No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of
martial law throughout the Philippines. The
proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and
declared the dissolution of the military tribunals
created pursuant thereto upon final determination
of the cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order
No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned
therein. With the termination of martial law and the
dissolution of the military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No.
39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that
when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This
principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis
est anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of
the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39
became ineffective when the apparatus of martial
law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045. As a result, the old rule
embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was
automatically revived and now again allows the
right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No.
96948 that the right to peremptory challenge
remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for
emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when
martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed,
even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered
no longer operative, having been cast out under
the new dispensation as, in the words of the
Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges
of the previous regime."
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive
instruments of martial law. It is curious that the
present government should invoke the rules of that
discredited body to justify its action against the
accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to
peremptory challenge may be exploited by a
respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the
proceedings and defer his deserved punishment. It
is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at
bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the
wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present
circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-
makers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only
interpret and apply the laws without regard to its
own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a
problem only the political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454
question the propriety of the petition for certiorari
and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus
filed by the private respondents with the Regional
Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since
the private respondents are officers of the Armed
Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War,
the respondent courts have no authority to order
their release and otherwise interfere with the court-
martial proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3)
of BP 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
34 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards
of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather
irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of
Yang v. Court of Appeals, 4 where this Court held
that "appeals from the Professional Regulation
Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the
Court of Appeals."
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and
the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to
the remedies employed by the accused officers
before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no
supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors
in their proceedings are not open to consideration.
The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is
equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted
discretion, courts-martial may commit such an
abuse of discretion what in the language of Rule
65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" as
to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is
precisely the point at issue in this action suggested
by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition . . .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies
and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo
warranto. 5 In the absence of a law providing that
the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or
the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned
only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can
exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private
respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not
been recognized and is not available in the military,
as an exception to the general rule embodied in
the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula,
where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial
is given more emphasis in the military where the
right to bail does not exist."
The justification for this exception was well
explained by the Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be
enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note
that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework
of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use
of firearms by the government for the discharge of
their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of
revenues collected from the people. All other
insurgent elements carry out their activities outside
of and against the existing political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also impress
upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of
respondents constitutes a damaging precedent.
Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming
the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the
assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on
'provisional' bail. The sheer number alone is already
discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is
that they could freely resume their heinous activity
which could very well result in the overthrow of duly
constituted authorities, including this Honorable
Court, and replace the same with a system
consonant with their own concept of government
and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the
right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires
equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of
the treatment is substantially different from others.
The accused officers can complain if they are
denied bail and other members of the military are
not. But they cannot say they have been
discriminated against because they are not
allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in
G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged
after more than one year from their arrest, our
finding is that there was substantial compliance
with the requirements of due process and the right
to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed
with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was
referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on
February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where
the petitioners submitted the charge memorandum
and specifications against the private respondents
dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991,
pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel
was created and initial investigation was scheduled
on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991,
the private respondents received the copies of the
charges, charge sheets and specifications and
were required to submit their counter-affidavits on
or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay
of more than one year in the investigation and
preparation of the charges against the private
respondents. However, this was explained by the
Solicitor General thus:
. . . The AFP Special Investigating Committee was
able to complete its pre-charge investigation only
after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and
thousands of enlisted men were involved in the
failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses,
had to be interviewed or investigated, and these
inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge
investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the
35 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
fact that those involved were dispersed and
scattered throughout the Philippines. In some cases,
command units, such as the Scout Rangers, have
already been disbanded. After the charges were
completed, the same still had to pass review and
approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court
nevertheless must reiterate the following
admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people,
must stress the point that if the participation of
petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is
confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge
Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges
can be filed against him or the existence of a prima
facie case warranting trial before a military
commission is wanting, it behooves respondent
then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General)
to release petitioner. Respondents must also be
reminded that even if a military officer is arrested
pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War,
indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article
71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must be
taken to try the person accused or to dismiss the
charge and release him. Any officer who is
responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or
carrying the case to a final conclusion may even
be punished as a court martial may direct. 6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision
was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26,
1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad
cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the
latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on
March 4, 1991. The 48-hour period for appeal under
Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run
until after notice of such denial was received by the
petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the
private respondents' contention, therefore, the
decision had not yet become final and executory
when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was
filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is
well to reiterate the following observations of the
Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves
the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A
petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be
based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as
the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error
committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment
which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient
by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R.
No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of
discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to
justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal
of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such
action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948,
where we find that the right to peremptory
challenge should not have been denied, and in
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private
respondents should not have been ordered
released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are
DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the
right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of
the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454,
the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of
the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C .J ., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ .,
concur.
(Baylon v. Sison, A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, April 06, 1995)
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 92-7-360-0. April 6, 1995.]
RE: FIRST INDORSEMENT DATED JULY 21, 1992 OF
HON. FERNANDO DE LEON, CHIEF STATE
PROSECUTOR, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. ALICIA A.
BAYLON, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City,
complainant, vs. JUDGE DEODORO J. SISON,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City,
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTIONS;
RULE ON NOTICE; VIOLATED IN PETITION FOR BAIL
FILED IN CASE AT BAR. Complainant alleges that
the prosecution was not given notice of the petition
for bail at least three (3) days prior to the scheduled
hearing thereof. It bears emphasis that the petition
for bail was filed in court and a copy thereof served
on the prosecution on December 21, 1991, a
Saturday, and was craftily set for hearing on
December 23, 1991, thereby giving the prosecution
only one day, a Sunday at that, to prepare its
opposition thereto. The stratagem employed by the
defense which virtually deprived the prosecution of
an opportunity to adequately counter the
representations in its petition is too obvious to be
ignored. Yet respondent judge condoned the same
and aggravated the situation by the unusual and
precipitate haste with which the petition was
granted by respondent judge. On top of that, he
exacerbated his disregard of settled rules of
procedure by justifying his non-observance of the
three-day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court on the theory that the petition for bail
is an urgent motion and may therefore be heard on
shorter notice. Such ratiocination, which espouses
36 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
and reveals a distorted notion as to the true nature
and conditions of the right to bail, does violence to
the well-established rule of law that bail is not a
matter of right and requires a hearing where the
accused is charged with an offense which is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Given this contingency, respondent
judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity
of the petition for bail and the veracity of its
allegations, rather than cavalierly considering it
outright as an urgent motion.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. We reject the first tenuous
proposition that time was of the essence, since the
ambient circumstances obtaining prior to the grant
of bail could not but have cautioned respondent
judge to be more circumspect in entertaining and
resolving the petition therefore. First, the accused
were charged with double murder, each of which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, hence
bail is not a matter of right. Second, no bail was
recommended in the information which was filed
on the bases of the sworn statements of several
eyewitnesses to the incident, thus constituting clear
and strong evidence of the guilt of all the accused.
Third, at the time of the application for bail, there
was still pending a reinvestigation of the case being
conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor. It
must be noted that the reinvestigation was at the
instance of the accused themselves, hence any
resultant delay caused by the conduct thereof is
naturally and logically attributable to them. And,
finally, the guileful setting of the hearing of the
petition for bail on December 23, 1991, when the
same was filed only on December 21, 1991 which
was a Saturday, readily casts doubt on the good
faith in and the regularity of the procedure
adopted by the defense. On the basis of the
foregoing considerations alone, we find no cogent
reason whatsoever to justify respondents alacrity in
ordering the immediate release of the accused
despite their somewhat extended confinement
and, much less, could respondents pretensions
validly support a grant of bail.
3. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; DISCHARGE OF DUTIES;
RULE. While the Court does not require perfection
and infallibility, it reasonably expects a faithful and
intelligent discharge of duty by those who are
selected to fill the position of administrators of
justice. Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct
requires judges to act with competence, integrity
and independence and should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It is true
that, generally, a judge cannot be held liable to
account or answer criminally, civilly or
administratively, for an erroneous judgment or
decision rendered by him in good faith. However,
good faith may be negated by the circumstances
on record, as we have hereinbefore demonstrated.
phil
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL;
ADMISSION TO BAIL; DISCRETION OF COURT MUST BE
GUIDED BY APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES. While
the determination of whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, this
discretion, by the nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to
the court at such hearing. Whether the motion for
bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital
offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in
the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must
be given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire
to introduce before the court may resolve the
motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied
such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process, and the order of the court
granting bail should be considered void on that
ground." (Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-93-
936, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 206).
Quintessentially, and as a matter of law, the
discretion of the court, in cases involving capital
offenses may be exercised only after there has
been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of
the evidence against the accused. Peremptorily,
the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not
there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and
evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt
against the accused. It follows that any order issued
in the absence thereof is not a product of sound
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and
outright arbitrariness.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHEN ACCUSED IS CHARGED
WITH A SERIOUS OFFENSE PUNISHABLE WITH
RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH; HEARING, A
REQUISITE; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. The rule
is explicit that when an accused is charged with a
serious offense punishable with reclusion perpetua
to death, such as murder, bail may be granted only
after a motion for that purpose has been filed by
the accused and a hearing thereon conducted by
a judge to determine whether or not the
prosecutions evidence of guilt is strong. Whether
the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody
for a capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence
that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt
of the accused, before the court resolves the
motion for bail. It is accordingly settled that an
order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence offered by the
prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should
then formulate his own conclusion as to whether
the evidence so presented is strong enough as to
indicate the guilt of the accused. In fact, such a
summary with his evaluation of the evidence may
be considered as an aspect of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense.
The importance of a hearing has been emphasized
in not a few cases wherein this Court has ruled that
even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence
or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for
bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions
from which it may infer the strength of the evidence
of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.
37 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
The present administrative matter was initiated by a
sworn letter-request1 of Alicia A. Baylon, City
Prosecutor of Dagupan City, dated June 18, 1992,
charging Judge Deodoro J. Sison, presiding judge
of Branch 40, Regional Trial Court, Dagupan City,
with utter disregard of judicial decorum by
excessive display of interest in handling a case
assigned to and then pending in his branch. The
said letter was sent to Chief State Prosecutor
Fernando P. de Leon of the Department of Justice
who, in turn, indorsed the same to this Court for
appropriate action as requested therein.
The records of this case show that on October 24,
1991, the Office of the City Prosecutor in Dagupan
City filed an information for double murder against
several accused which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. D-10678, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Manolo Salcedo, et al.," and
thereafter raffled to respondent judge.
Subsequently, the accused filed on November 8,
1991 a petition for reinvestigation which was
granted by the trial court in an order dated
November 20, 1991, and the Office of the City
Prosecutor was given until December 23, 1991 to
resolve the same. The reinvestigation was finally
concluded by the said prosecutor on March 31,
1992. A petition for review interposed therefrom by
the accused was later dismissed by the Department
of Justice in a resolution dated May 8, 1992.
During the pendency of the reinvestigation,
however, the accused filed a petition for bail on
December 21, 1991, a Saturday, and requested
that it be set for hearing on December 23, 1991, the
immediately following Monday. On this latter date,
according to an order handed down by
respondent judge on June 8, 19922 the prosecution
filed an opposition to the petition for bail signed by
Third Assistant City Prosecutor Chita Estrella D.N.
Bonifacio and noted by First Assistant City
Prosecutor Silverio Q. Castillo, alleging inter alia,
that the information was filed on the bases of the
sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the
incident which constitutes clear and strong
evidence of the guilt of all the accused; that to
grant the petition for bail would preempt the
outcome of the reinvestigation which was then
being conducted by the Office of the City
Prosecutor at the instance of the accused, and also
necessarily defeat the purpose of said
reinvestigation; and that the accused should at
least wait for the outcome of the reinvestigation,
which they themselves sought, before any motion
of the same import could be filed.
Nevertheless, on the very day and time specified by
the accused, December 23, 1991 at 1:30 P.M., a
hearing on the petition was purportedly held by the
trial court. Then, reportedly on the basis of a joint
counter-affidavit of the accused, an affidavit of
one Oscar Villaga, a certification of entry in the
police blotter, and the position paper submitted by
the accused, and allegedly because there was no
objection on the part of the prosecution which was
supposedly represented by Third Assistant
Prosecutor Rosita Castro, the court forthwith
granted bail for the provisional liberty of each
accused in the amount of P40,000.00.
A motion for reconsideration of said order of
December 23, 1991 was duly filed by the
prosecution but the same was denied by
respondent judge on January 10, 1992. In his
aforecited order of June 8, 1992 reiterating his
denial of a motion for his inhibition, he maintained
that he had granted bail ostensibly "after due
hearing and after a careful and deliberate
consideration of the pertinent affidavits and
counter-affidavit, position papers and arguments
advanced by the parties." Respondent judge
further stated therein that the prosecution did not
ask for an opportunity to show that the evidence of
guilt against the accused was strong.
Significantly, the aforestated orders of respondent
judge of December 23, 1991 granting bail, and that
dated January 10, 1992 denying reconsideration
thereof, became the subject of a petition for
certiorari filed by the prosecution and were
subsequently annulled and set aside by the Court
of Appeals in its judgment handed down in CA-G.R.
SP No. 28384 on January 19, 1993.
In the meantime, immediately after the court had
issued its order granting bail, Roberto Untalan, the
private complainant in Criminal Case No. D-10678,
filed with the assistance of counsel on March 11,
1992 a motion for respondent judge to inhibit
himself from the case,3 contending that such act of
respondent judge "had invited our serious doubt
and less expectation of (an) impartial disposition of
this case," and "that the instant case had plunged
(sic) into (a) network of intrigue and distrust creating
thereby an animosity between us (litigants-
complainants) and the judicial system represented
by the Honorable Court and in the last analysis, our
grievance of justice is in grave peril."
In an order dated March 25, 1991 (sic, should be
1992), respondent judge denied the motion to
inhibit on the ground that during the hearing on the
petition for bail, the prosecution was represented
by Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita Castro who
supposedly "interposed no objection to the granting
of bail in the amount of P40,000.00 which she
considered reasonable." He also argued therein
that time was of the essence considering that all of
the accused, except for one Joel Doe, had been
under detention since October 21, 1991 and that
the City Prosecutor had not yet terminated the
reinvestigation as of December 23, 1991, hence
"without determining whether the proper charge
could be double homicide," he granted said bail for
the provisional liberty of the accused. 4
Private complainant moved for the reconsideration
of said order contending that, aside from the
courts non-observance of the three-day notice rule
before the hearing, Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita
Castro who happened to be present during said
hearing in Branch 40 was not duly authorized to
appear for and in behalf of the prosecution in
Criminal Case No. D-10678 or to comment on the
38 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
proceedings for bail, since she actually was sent by
her office to Branch 42 to move for the
postponement of another case therein.5 Attached
thereto was an affidavit to that effect by said
assistant prosecutor. 6
On June 8, 1992, in an order of respondent judge
denying the motion for reconsideration and which
has been earlier adverted to, he insisted that in its
opposition to the petition for bail and its motion for
reconsideration of the order granting bail, the
prosecution never asked for an opportunity to show
that the evidence of guilt against the accused was
strong; that during the hearing on the petition for
bail, the assistant prosecutor did not raise any
objection and instead left the matter to the sound
discretion of the court; that the alleged lack of due
process had been cured by the filing of the motion
for reconsideration and the motion to inhibit; that
the motion to inhibit constituted forum shopping;
and that from the narration of facts and events, the
prosecution failed to convince the court that the
evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.
Respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison stands
charged with the now familiar malfeasance of
granting bail in a non-bailable offense without
benefit of notice and hearing. Specifically, it is
averred that the prosecution was not given notice
of at least three days before the scheduled hearing
on the petition for bail, in violation of the mandate
under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court and,
worse, with two non-working days between the
filing and the hearing of the petition. It is likewise
contended that during the controverted hearing
on December 23, 1991, the prosecution, which was
not even duly represented, was not given the
opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of
the accused was strong.
Required to comment thereon, respondent judge
tried to justify his assailed orders by claiming that he
honestly believes that he did not commit a serious
and grave abuse of discretion; that he granted the
petition for bail because the assistant prosecutor
present at the hearing did not interpose any
objection thereto; that the prosecution never
requested, either in its opposition to the petition for
bail or in its motion for reconsideration of his
adverse order, that it be allowed to show that the
evidence of guilt against the accused was strong
but, instead, submitted the incident for resolution;
that the motion for reconsideration of the order
granting bail was denied only after due hearing
and after a careful and judicious consideration of
the pertinent affidavits, counter-affidavit, position
papers and arguments submitted by the parties;
that the lack of previous notice was cured by the
filing of the motion for reconsideration since, in the
application of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not the lack of previous notice but
the denial of the opportunity to be heard; that the
claim of Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita Castro that
there was no hearing held on December 23, 1991 is
negated by the testimonies given in A.M. No. RTJ-
92-822 by defense counsel Atty. Constante Rueca,
Officer-in-Charge Gloria Beltran, Court
Stenographer Tripina Tigno, and herein respondent;
that a judge cannot be held administratively liable
for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith;
and that the filing of the complaint is pure and
simple harassment. 7
In a resolution8 dated May 4, 1993, this Court
referred the administrative matter at bar to the
Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation within sixty (60) days
from receipt of the records of this case. However, it
was only two (2) years thereafter, or on February 10,
1995 when, after repeated inquiries, the said office
submitted its report and recommendation with the
explanation that it had to verify whether the issue
raised in the instant case is pertinent to another
pending administrative case involving the same
parties. It made no manifestation or submission in
the interim.
The Court views with displeasure and chagrin the
chronology of events which, even if true, caused
the supervenience of a grossly unreasonable delay
in the resolution of this simple administrative matter,
to the inevitable prejudice and frustration of the
offended parties and the prosecution in the
criminal case involved. This is a situation which this
Court has assiduously tried to avoid and obviate,
since it tarnishes the judicial image, fuels suspicions
and speculations, and creates an unfair climate of
misperception and distrust. We shall not clutter this
decision with the pointless mea culpae of the
parties responsible, but this Court is not beyond
expressing its profound regrets for this distressing
episode and shall redouble its efforts to prevent any
repetition thereof.
Nonetheless, prescinding from the regrettably
lackadaisical manner with which this case was
handled by the Office of the Court Administrator,
we are constrained to agree with its finding that
respondent judge is indeed guilty as charged, as
well as its recommendation for a much belated
administrative sanction to be imposed on him.
Complainant alleges that the prosecution was not
given notice of the petition for bail at least three (3)
days prior to the scheduled hearing thereof. It bears
emphasis that the petition for bail was filed in court
and a copy thereof served on the prosecution on
December 21, 1991, a Saturday, and was craftily set
for hearing on December 23, 1991, thereby giving
the prosecution only one day, a Sunday at that, to
prepare its opposition thereto. The stratagem
employed by the defense which virtually deprived
the prosecution of an opportunity to adequately
counter the representations in its petition is too
obvious to be ignored. Yet respondent judge
condoned the same and aggravated the situation
by the unusual and precipitate haste with which
the petition was granted by respondent judge.
On top of that, he exacerbated his disregard of
settled rules of procedure by justifying his non-
observance of the three-day notice rule under
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on the
theory that the petition for bail is an urgent motion
and may therefore be heard on shorter notice.
Such ratiocination, which espouses and reveals a
distorted notion as to the true nature and
conditions of the right to bail, does violence to the
well-established rule of law that bail is not a matter
of right and requires a hearing where the accused
39 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
is charged with an offense which is punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. 9
Given this contingency, respondent judge should
have carefully scrutinized the validity of the petition
for bail and the veracity of its allegations, rather
than cavalierly considering it outright as an urgent
motion.
There are two main arguments invoked and relied
on by respondent judge to support and justify his
grant of bail to the accused, namely, that time was
of the essence, considering that the accused had
been detained since October 21, 1991; and that
the prosecution failed to interpose an objection to
the granting of bail and to ask for an opportunity to
prove the strength of the evidence of guilt against
the accused.
We reject the first tenuous proposition that time was
of the essence, since the ambient circumstances
obtaining prior to the grant of bail could not but
have cautioned respondent judge to be more
circumspect in entertaining and resolving the
petition therefore. First, the accused were charged
with double murder, each of which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death, hence bail is not a
matter of right. Second, no bail was recommended
in the information which was filed on the bases of
the sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the
incident, thus constituting clear and strong
evidence of the guilt of all the accused. 10 Third, at
the time of the application for bail, there was still a
pending reinvestigation of the case being
conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor. It
must be noted that the reinvestigation was at the
instance of the accused themselves, hence any
resultant delay caused by the conduct thereof is
naturally and logically attributable to them. And,
finally, the guileful setting of the hearing of the
petition for bail on December 23, 1991, when the
same was filed only on December 21, 1991 which
was a Saturday, readily casts doubt on the good
faith in and the regularity of the procedure
adopted by the defense.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations alone,
and even without the further elaboration correctly
advanced by complainant in representation of her
office, we find no cogent reason whatsoever to
justify respondents alacrity in ordering the
immediate release of the accused despite their
somewhat extended confinement and, much less,
could respondents pretensions validly support a
grant of bail.
Respondent judge asseverates that he honestly
believes that he did not commit a serious and
grave abuse of discretion. He hastens to add the
handy and oft-invoked defense that he cannot be
held administratively liable for an erroneous
decision rendered in good faith.
Respondent should not hide behind that axiom so
often resorted to, it may be now be said, to the
point of abuse. While the Court does not require
perfection and infallibility, it reasonably expects a
faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by those
who are selected to fill the position of administrators
of justice. Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct
requires judges to act with competence, integrity
and independence and should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 11 It is true
that, generally, a judge cannot be held liable to
account or answer criminally, civilly or
administratively, for an erroneous judgment or
decision rendered by him in good faith. However,
good faith may be negated by the circumstances
on record, 12 as we have hereinbefore
demonstrated. LLphil
We agree that bail in this case, not being a matter
of right, must be addressed to the sound discretion
of respondent judge. But this does not mean,
however, a lubricious and untrammeled exercise of
such discretion. We have held that admission to bail
as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise
thereof in accordance with law and guided by the
applicable legal principles, to wit:
". . . The prosecution must first be accorded an
opportunity to present evidence because by the
very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on
the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is
weighed against in determining whether the guilt of
the accused is strong. In other words, discretion
must be exercised regularly, legally and within the
confines of procedural due process, that is, after
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution. Any order issued in the absence
thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion
but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
"Accordingly, while the determination of whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion, this discretion, by the nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at such hearing.
Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of a regular
trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity
to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court may resolve the motion for bail. If the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity,
there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and the order of the court granting bail
should be considered void on that ground."13
Quintessentially, and as a matter of law, the
discretion of the court, in cases involving capital
offenses may be exercised only after there has
been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of
the evidence against the accused. Peremptorily,
the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not
there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and
evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt
against the accused. It follows that any order issued
in the absence thereof is not a product of sound
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and
outright arbitrariness. 14
This brings us to the second and main contention of
respondent judge. He would want to impress upon
this Court that it was incumbent upon the
prosecution to seek permission from the trial court
to prove that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong, and that when it failed to do so
40 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
in any of its pleadings filed with the court,
respondent judge was left with no other recourse
but to grant the application for bail. He likewise
asserts that the prosecution failed to interpose an
objection during the hearing on the petition for bail.
Such arguments are deplorably specious and
lamentably absurd.
The rule is explicit that when an accused is charged
with a serious offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua to death, such as murder, bail may be
granted only after a motion for that purpose has
been filed by the accused and a hearing thereon
conducted by a judge to determine whether or not
the prosecutions evidence of guilt is strong.
Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of a regular
trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity
to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may wish to introduce on the
probable guilt of the accused, before the court
resolves the motion for bail. 15
It is accordingly settled that an order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence offered by the prosecution. On the basis
thereof, the judge should then formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence so
presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt
of the accused. 16 In fact, such a summary with his
evaluation of the evidence may be considered as
an aspect of procedural due process for both the
prosecution and the defense.
The importance of a hearing has been emphasized
in not a few cases wherein this Court has ruled that
even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence
or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for
bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions
from which it may infer the strength of the evidence
of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.
Thus, in the aforecited case of Borinaga vs. Tamin,
etc., 17 it was there held that even where the
prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail,
the court may ask the prosecution such questions
as would ascertain the strength of the Peoples
evidence or judge the adequacy vel non of the
amount of bail. This was reiterated in the recent
case of Aguirre, et al., vs. Belmonte, etc. 18 where
we said that the error committed by the therein
respondent judge in granting bail cannot be
corrected by the mere failure of the prosecution to
file a motion for cancellation thereof or a
clarification of his order.
In Libarios vs. Dabalos, 19 we emphasized that
irrespective of respondent judges opinion that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong,
the law and settled jurisprudence demands that a
hearing be conducted before bail can be fixed for
the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all
justified. LLpr
Where the prosecutor does not oppose the
application for bail and refuses to satisfy his burden
of proof, but the court has reasons to believe that
the prosecutors attitude is not justified, as when he
is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction
of duty, it has been ruled in the early case of Herras
Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, et al. 20 that, in
the paramount interest of justice, the court must
inquire from the prosecutor as to the nature of his
evidence to determine whether or not it is strong, it
being possible for the prosecutor to have erred in
considering it weak and, therefore, in
recommending bail.
Finally, in the most recent case of Tucay vs.
Domagas 21 it was categorically stressed that
although the provincial prosecutor had interposed
no objection to the grant of bail to the accused,
the respondent judge therein should nevertheless
have set the petition for bail for hearing and
diligently ascertained from the prosecution whether
the latter was not really contesting the bail
application. Additionally, it must be borne in mind
that a hearing is also necessary for the court to take
into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section
6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount
of bail. Only after respondent judge has satisfied
himself that these requirements have been met can
he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant
bail.
The obstinate persistence of respondent judge in
posturing that he did conduct a hearing on
December 23, 1991 is belied by the fact that the
order granting bail, the contents of which could
merely be deduced after a careful perusal of the
records of the case and the other orders issued by
him in view of the parties failure to present the
same, leaves much to be desired. For one, it does
not contain the requisite summary of the evidence
presented by the parties and necessary to support
the grant of bail. What appears from the records is
that the petition for bail was granted on the basis
merely of the joint counter-affidavit of the accused,
and possibly of a witness, and the position paper of
the accused. The prosecution was not even given
the chance to cross-examine the accused on their
counter-affidavit. Mere affidavits or recitals of their
contents are not sufficient since they are mere
hearsay evidence, hence they cannot legally form
the basis of an order granting bail. 22
As a final note, we take judicial cognizance of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
28384, promulgated on January 19, 1993, which
annulled and set aside the orders dated December
23, 1991 and January 10, 1992 issued by herein
respondent judge. The disquisitions therein of said
appellate court serve to further strengthen the
merits of our findings and the necessity for the
present administrative disciplinary proceeding.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison is
hereby found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and grave abuse of discretion. He is hereby
ORDERED to pay a FINE of P20,000.00 with a STERN
WARNING that the commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will definitely be dealt
with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to the personal records of respondent
Judge Deodoro J. Sison. cdll
Considering that the offense involved in this
administrative matter was committed way back on
41 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
December 23, 1991, this judgment is immediately
final and executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J ., concurs but votes for a reduced fine of
P10,000.
(Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100,
May 30, 1986)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-62100. May 30, 1986.]
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E. CAMILON
and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judges of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branches, THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M.
REYES, as Commissioner of Immigration, and the
Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM), respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL;
PROHIBITION AGAINST LEAVING THE PHILIPPINES, A
NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE THEREOF. A court
has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail
from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
make himself available at all times whenever the
court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in
People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935). ". . . the
result of the obligation assumed by appellee
(surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times
to the orders and processes of the lower court, was
to prohibit said accused from leaving the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise,
said orders and processes will be nugatory, and
inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from
which they issued does not extend beyond that of
the Philippines they would have no binding force
outside of said jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused
were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the
reach of the courts.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED. Rule 114, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court defines bail as the security required
and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law, that he will appear before any
court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECT. Its object is to relieve the
accused of imprisonment and the state of the
burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at
the same time, to put the accused as much under
the power of the court as if he were in custody of
proper officer, and to secure the appearance of
the accused so as to answer the call of the court
and do what the law may require of him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT. The effect of a
recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or
filed of record, and the prisoner released
thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the
accused from the public officials who have him in
their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such
custody has been regarded merely as a
continuation of the original imprisonment. The
sureties become invested with full authority over the
person of the principal and have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state. If the
sureties have the right to prevent the principal from
leaving the state, more so then has the court from
which the sureties merely derive such right, and
whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal
remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the
latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is
recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding
his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the
country, for he would not have filed the motion for
permission to leave the country in the first place, if it
were otherwise.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SHEPHERD CASE (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-
R, February 13, 1980) DIFFERENTIATED FROM CASE AT
BAR. To support his contention, petitioner places
reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in
People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R,
February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following
passage: ". . . The law obliges the bondsmen to
produce the person of the appellants at the
pleasure of the Court. . . . The law does not limit
such undertaking of the bondsmen as demandable
only when the appellants are in the territorial
confines of the Philippines and not demandable if
the appellants are out of the country. Liberty, the
most important consequence of bail, albeit
provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty
operates as fully within as without the boundaries of
the granting state. This principle perhaps accounts
for the absence of any law or jurisprudence
expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not
transcend the territorial boundaries of the country."
The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-
quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced.
The rather broad and generalized statement suffers
from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed,
neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring
that liberty under bail does not transcend the
territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the
reason suggested by the appellate court. Also,
petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd
case. In the latter case, the accused was able to
show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the
duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties
to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court
that she would comply with the conditions of her
bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case has not
satisfactorily shown any of the above.
6. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; LACK OF
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE DENIAL OF
42 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY
WAS PREMISED ON THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO
SATISFY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE URGENCY OF HIS
TRAVEL. As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial
courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his
travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent
of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no
abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied
petitioner's motion for permission to leave the
country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary
results, that We found no reversible error to have
been committed by the appellate court in allowing
Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied
itself that she would comply with the conditions of
her bail bond.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; LIBERTY OF
ABODE AND TRAVEL; IMPAIRED BY ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT RELEASING PETITIONER ON BAIL. The
constitutional right to travel being invoked by
petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution states: "The liberty of
abode and of travel shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in
the interest of national security, public safety or
public health." To our mind, the order of the trial
court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the above-
quoted constitutional provision.
DECISION
FERNAN, J p:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for
review may be stated thus: Does a person facing a
criminal indictment and provisionally released on
bail have an unrestricted right to travel?
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two
principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management,
Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock
brokerage house. Having transferred the
management of the latter into the hands of
professional men, he holds no officer-position in said
business, but acts as president of the former
corporation. LexLib
Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by
stock broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction,
petitioner, who was then in the United States, came
home, and together with his co-stockholders, filed a
petition with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the appointment of a management
committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc.,
but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The
petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc.,
docketed as SEC Case No. 001826, entitled, "In the
Matter of the Appointment of a Management
Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro
Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was
granted and a management committee was
organized and appointed.
Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the
Securities and Exchange Commission requested the
then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes,
not to clear petitioner for departure and a
memorandum to this effect was issued by the
Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of
the Immigration Regulation Division.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by
Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a
fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal
complaints against petitioner and one Raul
Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president,
respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due
course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa
were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to
respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases
Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove. In
all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the
total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Insurance
Corporation as surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of
the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country", stating as ground
therefor his desire to go to the United States,
"relative to his business transactions and
opportunities." 1 The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges
denied the same. The order of Judge Camilon
dated March 9, 1982, reads:
"Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for
the United States on the all embracing ground that
his trip is '. . . relative to his business transactions and
opportunities.'
"The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No
matter of any magnitude is discerned to warrant
judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip.
"In view thereof, permission to leave the country is
denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. now or in the future
until these two (2) cases are terminated." 2
On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove
dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:
"6. Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's
contention that if the Court would allow the
accused to leave the Philippines the surety
companies that filed the bail bonds in his behalf
might claim that they could no longer be held
liable in their undertakings because it was the Court
which allowed the accused to go outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Court, should
the accused fail or decide not to return.
"WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED."
3 right to travel.
It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the
Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the
recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum
43 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
dated February 4, 1980, but said request was also
denied in a letter dated May 27, 1982.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the then Court of Appeals 4
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26,
1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively,
as well as the communication-request of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his
leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the
issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the
Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the
Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear
him for departure.
On October 5,1982, the appellate court rendered a
decision 5 dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition to
which we gave due course on April 14, 1983 6
petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for
leave to go abroad pendente lite. 7 In his motion,
petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana,
U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the obtention
of foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc." 8
He attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of the
chief executive officer of the Exploration Company
of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W. Miller 9 requesting
his presence in the United States to "meet the
people and companies who would be involved in
its investments." Petitioner, likewise manifested that
on August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (formerly Nos.
45542-45545) had been dismissed as to him "on
motion of the prosecution on the ground that after
verification of the records of the Securities and
Exchange Commission . . . (he) was not in any way
connected with the Manotoc Securities, Inc. as of
the date of the commission of the offenses imputed
to him." 10 Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, however,
remained pending as Judge Camilon, when
notified of the dismissal of the other cases against
petitioner, instead of dismissing the cases before
him, ordered merely the informations amended so
as to delete the allegation that petitioner was
president and to substitute that he was
"controlling/majority stockholder," 11 of Manotoc
Securities, Inc. prLL
On September 20, 1984, the Court in a resolution en
banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go
abroad pendente lite. 12
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to
bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange
Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty,
could prevent him from exercising his constitutional
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
A court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is
a necessary consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail
as the security required and given for the release of
a person who is in the custody of the law, that he
will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the
bail bond or recognizance.
"Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment
and the state of the burden of keeping him,
pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the
accused as much under the power of the court as
if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to
answer the call of the court and do what the law
may require of him." 13
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
on his right to travel. As we have held in People v.
Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
". . . the result of the obligation assumed by
appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at
all times to the orders and processes of the lower
court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving
the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because,
otherwise, said orders and processes will be
nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the
courts from which they issued does not extend
beyond that of the Philippines they would have no
binding force outside of said jurisdiction."
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
"The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when
fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner
released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of
the accused from the public officials who have him
in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such
custody has been regarded merely as a
continuation of the original imprisonment. The
sureties become invested with full authority over the
person of the principal and have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state." 14
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal
from leaving the state, more so then has the court
from which the sureties merely derive such right,
and whose jurisdiction over the person of the
principal remains unaffected despite the grant of
bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the
court is recognized by petitioner himself,
notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total
liberty to leave the country, for he would not have
filed the motion for permission to leave the country
in the first place, if it were otherwise.
44 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
To support his contention, petitioner places reliance
upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People vs.
Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980)
particularly citing the following passage:
". . . The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the
person of the appellants at the pleasure of the
Court. . . . The law does not limit such undertaking
of the bondsmen as demandable only when the
appellants are in the territorial confines of the
Philippines and not demandable if the appellants
are out of the country. Liberty, the most important
consequence of bail, albeit provisional is indivisible.
If granted at all, liberty operates as fully within as
without the boundaries of the granting state. This
principle perhaps accounts for the absence of any
law or jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty
under bail does not transcend the territorial
boundaries of the country."
The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-
quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced.
The rather broad and generalized statement suffers
from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed,
neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring
that liberty under bail does not transcend the
territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the
reason suggested by the appellate court.
Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the
Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was
able to show the urgent necessity for her travel
abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of
her sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying
the court that she would comply with the conditions
of her bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case
has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As
aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his
comment:
"A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to
Leave the Country' will show that it is solely
predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the
United States where he will, allegedly attend to
some business transactions and search for business
opportunities. From the tenor and import of
petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling reason
can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial
imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently
shown that there is absolute necessity for him to
travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no
indication that the alleged business transactions
could not be undertaken by any other person in his
behalf. Neither is there any hint that petitioner's
absence from the United States would absolutely
preclude him from taking advantage of business
opportunities therein, nor is there any showing that
petitioner's non-presence in the United States would
cause him irreparable damage or prejudice." 15
Petitioner has not specified the duration of the
proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed
to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has
agreed to his plans as he had posted cash
indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to
leave the country without the assent of the surety
because in accepting a bail bond or
recognizance, the government impliedly agrees
"that it will not take any proceedings with the
principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or
affect their remedies against him. Under this rule,
the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be
discharged by a stipulation inconsistent with the
conditions thereof, which is made without his
assent. This result has been reached as to a
stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until
after the final disposition of other cases, or to permit
the principal to leave the state or country." 16 Thus,
although the order of March 26, 1982 issued by
Judge Pronove has been rendered moot and
academic by the dismissal as to petitioner of the
criminal cases pending before said judge, We see
the rationale behind said order.
As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and
the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the
duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety
to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial
discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion
for permission to leave the country, in much the
same way, albeit with contrary results, that We
found no reversible error to have been committed
by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to
leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she
would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by
petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or
when necessary in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health."
To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing
petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision.
Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in
accordance with law and jurisprudence, the Court
finds that no gainful purpose will be served in
discussing the other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Yap, Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and
Paras, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., no part.
45 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
(Government of the United States of America v.
Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002.]
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G.
PURGANAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a.
MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
Mario Luza Bautista for Mark Jimenez.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner US government filed this Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the procedure
adopted by the trial court of first hearing a
potential extraditee, Mark Jimenez, before issuing a
warrant for his arrest under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Petitioner contended that the procedure gives
Jimenez notice to escape and to avoid extradition.
Petitioner also assailed the trial court's granting of
Jimenez's prayer for bail, which allows him to go on
provisional liberty while extradition proceedings are
pending.
Petitioner no longer filed a Motion for
Reconsideration in the Extradition Court, but
resorted directly to the Supreme Court instead of
the Court of Appeals to obtain relief.
The Supreme Court allowed a direct invocation of
its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to
settle once and for all the issue of bail in extradition
proceedings,
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court held
that the present extradition case validates the
premise that persons sought to be extradited have
a propensity to flee. Prior acts of respondent
eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in
the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to
avoid them at all costs.
Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC judge to set the hearing for the issuance of
the warrant of arrest when it was already evident
from the Petition for Extradition itself and its
supporting documents that a prima facie finding
did exist and he may issue a warrant for the
immediate arrest of the accused; that there is no
requirement to notify and to hear the accused
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest under the
Constitution which requires only an examination
under oath or affirmation of complainants and the
witnesses they may produce; and that since
accused were allowed to be heard and to present
evidence at this early stage, the procedure could
convert the determination of a prima facie case
into a full-blown trial, which is discordant with the
rationale for the entire system and anathema to the
summary nature of extraditions.

The Court also held that extraditee's immediate
detention prior to his being heard does not violate
the due process clause; that the right to bail applies
only in ordinary criminal proceedings; but that in
extradition proceedings, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested, bail may be applied
for and granted as an exception. DScTaC
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI; SUPREME COURT MAY ALLOW A DIRECT
INVOCATION OF ITS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO
ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI WHEN THERE ARE
SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS THEREFOR; CASE
AT BAR. [T]his Court has allowed a direct
invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari when there are special and important
reasons therefor. In the interest of justice and to
settle once and for all the important issue of bail in
extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take
cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings
constitute a matter of first impression over which
there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide
lower courts.
2. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW;
EXTRADITION TREATY; PERSONS TO BE EXTRADITED
ARE PRESUMED TO BE FLIGHT RISKS; CASE AT BAR.
Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight
risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience of the executive
branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure
that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition
to the requesting state. The present extradition case
further validates the premise that persons sought to
be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only
the accused were willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent
(1) leaving the requesting state right before the
conclusion of his indictment proceedings there;
and (2) remaining in the requested state despite
learning that the requesting state is seeking his
return and that the crimes he is charged with are
bailable eloquently speak of his aversion to the
processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at all cost: These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying
high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has
the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once,
what is there to stop him, given sufficient
opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEITHER TREATY NOR THE EXTRADITION
LAW REQUIRE A HEARING BEFORE ISSUING A
WARRANT OF ARREST OF PROBABLE EXTRADITEE;
REASONS; CASE AT BAR. It is significant to note
that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses
the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be rendered
nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the
arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to
the opposing parties, receiving facts and
46 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
arguments from them, and giving them time to
prepare and present such facts and arguments.
Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be
considered "immediate." The law could not have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the
whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency
and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued. By using the
phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that
accuracy is not as important as speed at such early
stage. The trial court is not expected to make an
exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and
actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the
petition. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get
a good first impression a prima facie finding
sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as
regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a
hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure
of the accused to answer after receiving the
summons. In connection with the matter of
immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing" is
notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had
the holding of a hearing at that stage been
intended, the law could have easily so provided. It
also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary in nature. Hence, the
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that there is no intention
to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the
entire proceedings. aECTcA
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;
CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; SETTING
FOR HEARING A REQUEST FOR THE ARREST OF AN
EXTRADITEE AFTER HAVING ALREADY DETERMINED
FROM SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS THAT A PRIMA
FACIE FINDINGS EXISTS, A CASE OF; CASE AT BAR.
It is evident that respondent judge could have
already gotten an impression from these records
adequate for him to make an initial determination
of whether the accused was someone who should
immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the
ends of justice." He could have determined whether
such facts and circumstances existed as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that the extradition request was prima facie
meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded
from these supporting documents that "probable
cause" did exist. We stress that the prima facie
existence of probable cause for hearing the
petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant
was already evident from the Petition itself and its
supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding
did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez.
5. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF
AN ACCUSED; NOTICE AND HEARING NOT
REQUIRED BEFORE ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF
ARREST. Even Section 2 of Article III of our
Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not
require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of
a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause
for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution
itself requires only the examination under oath or
affirmation of complainants and the witnesses
they may produce. There is no requirement to notify
and hear the accused before the issuance of
warrants of arrest.
6. ID.; INTERNATIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY;
PROPER PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE
JUDGE UPON RECEIPT OF A PETITION FOR
EXTRADITION. Since this is a matter of first
impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper
procedure: Upon receipt of a petition for
extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
must study them and make, as soon as possible, a
prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in
form and substance, (b) they show compliance
with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the
person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the
judge may require the submission of further
documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of
this study and examination, no prima facie finding is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the
discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the
presence of a prima facie case is determined, then
the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for
the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time
summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance
of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify
the potential extraditee of the pendency of the
petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to
escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our
opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve
the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
7. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN
ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BAIL; APPLIES ONLY TO
ORDINARY CRIMINAL CASES AND NOT TO
EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS. As suggested by the
use of the word "conviction," the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when
a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional
right to bail "flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should
not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless
his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It
follows that the constitutional provision on bail will
not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue. IaSAHC
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. The rule, we repeat,
is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional
duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny,
as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect
47 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we
believe that the right to due process is broad
enough to include the grant of basic fairness to
extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process
extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every
person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to
every situation calling for its application."
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice,
we believe and so hold that, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested or placed under the
custody of the law, bail may be applied for and
granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances
including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by
the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; SUFFICIENCY
OF A SUBSEQUENT OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
ONCE EXTRADITEE IS PLACED UNDER THE
EXTRADITION COURT'S CUSTODY, EXPLAINED; CASE
AT BAR. Contrary to the contention, of Jimenez
his detention prior to the conclusion of the
extradition proceedings does not amount to a
violation of his right to due process. We reiterate the
familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is
the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time,
point out that the doctrine does not always call for
a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the
circumstances such as those present in an
extradition case call for it, a subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present
case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be
heard subsequently, when the extradition court
hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no
violation of his right to due process and
fundamental fairness. Contrary to his contention,
we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate
deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard.
That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is
sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ's filing in court
the Petition with its supporting documents after a
determination that the extradition request meets
the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty;
(2) the extradition judge's independent prima facie
determination that his arrest will best serve the ends
of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the
court's custody, to apply for bail as an exception to
the no-initial-bail rule.
BELLOSILLO, J., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED;
RIGHT TO BAIL; POWER TO ADMIT BAIL EXISTS IN
EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS UNDER "EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES." The government maintains
that an extradition court has no power to authorize
bail in the absence of any law conferring such
power; and that the 1987 Constitution, as well as
the Rules of Court, as amended, applies only to
persons arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine Laws, but not to extradition proceedings
in which courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal. The argument is as
ingenious as it is fallacious. It is settled that the
power to admit to bail exists in extradition
proceedings, although as a matter of policy it may
only be granted under "exceptional
circumstances." This, quintessentially, has been the
doctrine advocated in a cavalcade of American
cases starting with Wright v. Henkel, 190 US 40
(1902); and worth mentioning, of course, are Paretti
Y. United States, 112 F. 3d 1363 (1977), Bealieu v.
Hartigan, 430 F. Supp. 915 (1977), and In re Kirby, et
al., 106 F. 3d 855 (1996); which are also discussed
extensively by Mr. Justice Puno. . . . Truly, there is
neither logic nor persuasion to the suggestion that
bail should only be allowed in criminal cases, or that
class of cases where courts must "render judgments
of conviction or acquittal." Bail as a remedy is
available where there is deprivation of liberty prior
or during trial. In the 1909 case of United States v.
Go Siaco, akin to the situation confronting us, but
involving a deportation proceeding, this Court
allowed the potential deportee to post bail
although a deportation proceeding is not criminal
in nature and there was then no law providing for
bail in deportation cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RISK OF FLIGHT DOES NOT IPSO FACTO
CALL FOR DENIAL OF BAIL; CASE AT BAR. We
cannot curtail a citizen's right to freedom on
speculations and fears where there exist reasonable
mechanisms appropriate to address them. To my
mind, the risk of flight does not ipso facto call for
denying his right to bail. Trial judges must
henceforth weigh carefully and judiciously other
methods to assure the presence of the accused
during the proceedings and right after, when he
ought to be deported already. Bail may be set at
huge amounts or passports cancelled and hold-
departure orders issued or border patrols
heightened, in order that the extraditee may not
flee from our jurisdiction. In this regard, while I agree
that it is the extraditee's burden to prove the least
likelihood of flight, the extradition court is also
entitled to presume that the executive branch has
done all it can to forestall his sudden
disappearance. The executive branch cannot
plead its helplessness and inutility to defeat the
grant of bail to the extraditee. In any event, all
things being equal, the personal circumstances of
respondent Jimenez would negate any idea of
flight risk. He is a popular, even notorious, fellow
whose face is more frequently than others plastered
in the tri-media. His stature as representative for a
congressional district in Manila makes escape from
Philippine jurisdiction not only embarrassing for him
but also constitutive of the offense of
abandonment of duty. His family and business
interests are said to be strategically placed in this
country. Indeed, where respondent Jimenez has
more to lose from flight, the possibility thereof
appears remote and speculative. CIaHDc
PUNO, J., separate opinion:
48 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
1. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW;
EXTRADITION TREATY; EXTRADITING JUDGE HAS THE
DISCRETION TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO NOTIFY AND
HEAR A POTENTIAL EXTRADITEE 'BEFORE ORDERING
HIS ARREST. I submit that the decision whether to
send notice to an extraditee and hear him before
ordering his arrest should be left to the sound
discretion of the extraditing judge. This is crystal
clear from section 6 of P.D. No. 1069. . . . Under this
provision, the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
dependent on a big "if" or to an all important
condition . . . if it will serve the ends of justice. The
determination of whether a warrant of arrest
against an extraditee will serve the ends of justice is
certainly not a cut and dried duty. It involves the
appreciation of highly contentious facts, both
objective and subjective in nature. Their
appreciation requires a judicial mind honed in the
law of evidence. The history of extradition will reveal
that, initially, the task of determining whether an
extraditee should be immediately arrested was
given to the executive authorities of the extraditing
state. The matter, in other words, was treated purely
as an executive function but unfortunately, the
practice was given to abuses. Recognizing that
certain human rights are universal in nature and
beyond violation, the task of adjudging whether a
potential extraditee should be immediately
arrested pending his extradition proceeding was
transferred to judges. The office of the judge was
called upon to insure that fundamental fairness is
not denied to a potential extraditee. The extraditing
judge is not to act as a stamp pad but has to
exercise his sound discretion on whether to issue the
warrant. Under our law on extradition, P.D. No. 1069,
Section 6, the discretion of the extradition judge on
whether to order the arrest of the extraditee is
guided by the following consideration . . . whether
the arrest will serve the ends of justice. The grant of
this judicial discretion will be rendered naught if we
subject the action of the extraditing judge to
unnecessary fetters.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE SILENCE OF OUR EXTRADITION
TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OUR
EXTRADITION LAW (P.D. No. 1069) DOES NOT
NEGATE THE RIGHT TO BAIL OF A POTENTIAL
EXTRADITEE. The mere silence of our extradition
treaty with the United States and our extradition law
(P.D. No. 1069) does not negate the right to bail of
a potential extraditee. Our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
as well as international norms, customs and
practices support an extraditee's right to bail. But
while an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant
depends on presentation of clear and convincing
evidence that the extraditee will not frustrate the
ends of justice by fleeing from our jurisdiction.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; TREATIES;
TREATY LAWS, LIKE ALL OTHER MUNICIPAL LAWS, ARE
SUBJECT TO THE PARAMETERS SET FORTH IN THE
CONSTITUTION. Treaty laws, particularly those
which are self-executing, have equal stature as
national statutes and, like all other municipal laws,
are subject to the parameters set forth in the
Constitution. The Constitution, being both a grant
and a circumscription of government authority by
the sovereign people, presents the ultimate
yardstick of power and its limitation upon which an
act of government is justly measured. This
instrument contains a rule for all agencies of the
government and any act in opposition thereto can
only be struck down as being invalid and without
effect. When the great Charter gives a mandate,
the government can do no less than to accept it; its
rejection would be an act of betrayal. The edict in
its Bill of Rights granting to all persons, without
distinction, the fundamental right to bail, is clear. No
statute or treaty can abrogate or discard its
language and its intent. . . . Nowhere in the
Extradition Treaty with the United States is the grant
of bail mentioned but so also it is not prohibited. This
obscurity must not be held to negate the right to
bail; on the contrary, it should be viewed as
allowing, at the very least, the evident intendment
and spirit of the fundamental law to prevail. aSDCIE
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED;
RIGHT TO BAIL; MUST APPLY TO EXTRADITION
PROCEEDINGS WHICH HAS ALL THE EARMARKS OF A
CRIMINAL PROCESS. The draft ponencia would
assume that the Constitution confines the grant of
provisional liberty to criminal cases, and that it has
no application to extradition proceedings. This
assumption would have reason for being if it were
solely in criminal cases that a person could face an
imminent threat of deprivation of his right to life or
liberty, for indeed, it is this threat, rather than the
case nomenclature, that must be the focus, and it
would be superficial to think otherwise. While
defying a neat definition, extradition has all the
earmarks of a criminal process an extraditee
would suffer deprivations, be denied his freedom
and restricted in his movements, not much unlike a
criminal indictee. Extradition proceedings involve
an extended restraint of liberty following arrest,
peculiar to an accused in a criminal case, which
can even be more severe than an accompanying
detention in a single state, for, at a minimum, it can
mean protracted proceedings in both the asylum
state and the demanding state and a forced
transportation in between. In Herras Teehankee vs.
Rovira, the Court observed that bail is
constitutionally available to all persons, even those
against whom no formal charges are filed.
CARPIO, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED;
RIGHT TO BAIL; RIGHT AVAILABLE TO AN ACCUSED IN
DOMESTIC CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS; EXTRADITEE
CANNOT INVOKE RIGHT TO BAIL IN INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION. The right to bail is a constitutional
right available to an accused in domestic criminal
49 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
proceedings except in offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua or higher when evidence of guilt
is strong. An extraditee, however, cannot invoke this
constitutional right in international extradition
because extradition proceedings are not criminal
proceedings. Extradition proceedings are like
deportation and court martial proceedings where
there is no constitutional right to bail.
2. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW;
EXTRADITION; ESSENCE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. In
essence, extradition is police assistance extended
by a state to arrest a person charged with a crime
in another state and surrender him to the authorities
of that state. The power to arrest by the assisting
state is legitimized by a treaty, which has the force
of a statute and forms part of municipal law. The
benefit of extradition is the mutual assistance
between states in criminal law enforcement across
national boundaries. The assisting state acts as an
arresting agent and in some jurisdictions the
extradition process is mainly an executive function.
Even under our extradition treaties, the final
decision whether to extradite or not rests with the
President of the Philippines, not with the courts. Thus
ordinarily an assisting state does not grant bail to
the extraditee whose recourse is to apply for bail
before the court of the state where he is charged
with a crime. The assisting state, however, for equity
considerations may choose to accord bail to the
extraditee. One equity consideration is to put
extraditees in one country in equal footing with
extraditees in the country of the treaty partner.
Another equity consideration is to grant the right to
bail, in carefully limited exceptions, to preserve and
enforce fundamental rights. This rule will not change
the situation for extraditee Mark B. Jimenez in the
instant case because Jimenez has failed to
establish that he is not a flight risk. Having fled the
United States just as he was about to be indicted for
several serious crimes, Jimenez is presumed to be a
flight risk for extradition purposes in this country.
Jimenez has not successfully rebutted this
presumption before the extradition court. Jimenez
has also refused to honor his agreement with the
U.S. Department of Justice, made in August 1998
through his U.S. counsel, to return to the United
States where he faces a maximum prison term of
not less than 100 years if convicted on all counts,
Given his resources, and the gravity of the charges
against him, Jimenez remains a serious flight risk.
YNAREZ-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED;
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; DUE PROCESS IS ESSENTIAL
IN ALL COURT PROCEEDINGS CRIMINAL, CIVIL,
INVESTIGATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE OR SUI GENERIS;
CASE AT BAR. I submit that we must consider the
implications of a ruling that in criminal proceedings,
the constitutional rights of the accused must be
protected, but in case neither criminal nor civil, one
which we call "sui generis," basic freedoms become
irrelevant and non-available. A non-criminal
proceeding, less onerous and repulsive to society
than prosecution for crime, and where the penalty
is only to be brought for trial before the court with
jurisdiction, is stripped of guarantees and
protections given to hard-boiled recidivists pending
arrest and trial. We have denied a prospective
extraditee the right to be informed before trial of
the nature and cause of the charges against him.
Due process is essential in all court proceedings
criminal civil, investigatory, administrative, or even
sui generis, a class the Court uses as an excuse to
justify deprivation of that most elemental of rights,
the right of notice. The Court has ruled that
respondent Mark Jimenez or any other person
sought to be extradited must first be exposed to the
indignity, expense, and anxiety of a public
denunciation in court before he may be informed
of what the requesting State has against him. The
right to notice before trial is denied. The majority
opinion states that a prospective extraditee is not
entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant of
arrest can be issued against him. Worse, he is
denied the right to bail and provisional liberty while
the extradition proceedings are pending. All the
jurisprudence explaining the parameters of the
unreasonable searches and seizures provision of the
Constitution becomes inapplicable. The petition for
extradition and its attachments take the place of
probable cause. The right against unreasonable
search and seizure is available to all persons
including those not charged with any crime. But
now, we create an unusual exception. It is not
available to one who may be seized against his will
for possible extradition to a country where his
innocence or guilt will first be determined. Arrest
and imprisonment will become virtually certain in
extradition proceedings. The only thing required of
the Court is to go over the request for extradition
and its supporting documents. Arrest is virtually
assured because of the absence of notice and
hearing. It is inconceivable that the officials of a
requesting State would be so dense or careless as
to fail to include in the request for extradition a
prima facie showing that the respondent deserves
to be seized and forcibly brought to the foreign
country for trial. According to the majority opinion,
from the forwarded documents, we expect the trial
court to "merely . . . get a good first impression
sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as
regards the arrest and detention of the accused."
This novel doctrine justifying the near certainty of
automatic arrest and detention goes against this
Court's decision, too numerous to mention,
protecting citizens and aliens alike from
unreasonable arrests or seizures. Can we expect
anything other than a "good first impression" to arise
from the mere reading of a request for extradition?
IcDCaT
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO BAIL; SHOULD APPLY TO
PERSONS FACING TRIAL FOR EXTRADITION. The
Court should apply the same principles on the right
to bail found in the Constitution to persons facing
trial for extradition. Thus, all persons; except those
where the probability of flight is clear and present
or the crimes for which extradition is sought are
heinous, shall before judgment in the extradition
proceedings, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be
50 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
where the requesting country is one with which the
Philippines maintains strong ties. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.p:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective
extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before
warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally
important, are they entitled to the right to bail and
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings
are pending? In general, the answer to these two
novel questions is "No." The explanation of and the
reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are
laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the
Orders dated May 23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 42. 3 The first assailed Order set for hearing
petitioner's application for the issuance of a warrant
for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand,
directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same
time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion
of the Order reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the
[Court] finds probable cause against respondent
Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the
arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently
and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court
fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondent's
temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php
1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
"Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately
surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed
to include the name of the respondent in its Hold
Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail
Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking
of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to G.R. No. 139465
entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6
the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note
Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999,
supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809
and accompanied by duly authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B.
Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the
secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to
the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action,
pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition,
Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila,
Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of
Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for
his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however,
assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in
the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court by a
vote of 9-6 dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was
ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant the latter a reasonable period within which to
file a comment and supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 after
three justices changed their votes it reconsidered
and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private
respondent was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. This Resolution has become
final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of
the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001,
the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was
docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The
Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the
subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been
issued in connection with the following charges in
Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to
defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371;
(2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code
Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US
Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in
violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2;
and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation
of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d)
and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent
the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the
issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest"
pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition,
Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which prayed
that petitioner's application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted
the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing
on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner
manifested its reservations on the procedure
51 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in
an extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative
prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for
hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court
below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order,
directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million
pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the
consideration of this Court:
I.
"The public respondent acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under
Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
"The public respondent acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez
to go on provisional liberty because:
'1. An extradition court has no power to authorize
bail, in the absence of any law that provides for
such power.
'2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114
(Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which
[were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for
allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
'3. The presumption is against bail in extradition
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
'4. On the assumption that bail is available in
extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of
discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of
the existence of special circumstances.
'5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in
extradition proceedings, the public respondent
received no evidence of 'special circumstances'
which may justify release on bail.

'6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no
special circumstance exists that will engender a
well-founded belief that he will not flee.
'7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are
ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the
Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
'8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on
May 10, 2001 in the case entitled 'Eduardo T.
Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 17, Manila,' CA- G.R. SP No. 64589, relied
upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had
been recalled before the issuance of the subject
bail orders."' 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will
address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to
notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest
can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail
and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall
take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for
Certiorari arising from petitioner's failure to file a
Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek
relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this
Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five
extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing
of the substantive issues. SDIaCT
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity
of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not
filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition
Court: "(1) the issues were fully considered by such
court after requiring the parties to submit their
respective memoranda and position papers on the
matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration
motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the
assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual
and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief
is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time
would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape
and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are
purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA,
petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if
the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and
such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues
and decides them, the parties would still bring the
matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues
resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding
precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2)
the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17
ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but, the court
below refused to recognize the decision as a
judicial guide and all other courts might likewise
adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there
are pending issues on bail both in the extradition
courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless
52 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
guided by the decision that this Honorable Court
will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in
favor of the potential extraditees and would give
them opportunity to flee and, thus, cause adverse
effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply
with its obligations under existing extradition
treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a
higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court
has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors
imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain
exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of
law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in
case of urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the
Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before availment of the remedy of
certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions
raised are the same as those that have already
been squarely argued and exhaustively passed
upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from being of this
nature, the issues in the present case also involve
pure questions of law that are of public interest.
Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be
dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation
of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
when there are special and important reasons
therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:
"[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary
power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be
observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et al.,
Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and,
Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we have further
stated in Cuaresma:
'. . . . A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition. This is established policy. . . . .'
"Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take
primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
interest of speedy justice and to avoid future
litigations so as to promptly put an end to the
present controversy which, as correctly observed
by petitioners, has sparked national interest
because of the magnitude of the problem created
by the issuance of the assailed resolution.
Moreover, . . . requiring the petitioners to file their
petition first with the Court of Appeals would only
result in a waste of time and money.
"That the Court has the power to set aside its own
rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what
we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
'Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be avoided. Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular
case from their operation whenever the higher
interests of justice so require. In the instant petition,
we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper
procedure that should have been taken by the
parties involved and proceed directly to the merits
of the case.'
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held
as follows:
"This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with
that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and
we entertain direct resort to us in cases where
special and important reasons or exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for
all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance
of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet,
no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates
of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an
interpretation or construction of the treaty and the
law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the
interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain
and give effect to its intent. 25 Since PD 1069 is
intended as a guide for the implementation of
extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of
extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues
raised here.
1 . Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the
Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the
purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the
arrest and the custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29
from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of
international travel, the flight of affluent criminals
from one country to another for the purpose of
committing crime and evading prosecution has
become more frequent. Accordingly, governments
are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals
and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world
community have come to look upon extradition as
53 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
the major effective instrument of international co-
operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the
only regular system that has been devised to return
fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to
try them in accordance with municipal and
international law. 31
"An important practical effect . . . of the recognition
of the principle that criminals should be restored to
a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is
that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad
will be reduced. For to the extent that efficient
means of detection and the threat of punishment
play a significant role in the deterrence of crime
within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence
of effective extradition arrangements and the
consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti
commissi play a corresponding role in the
deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the
consequence of crime. . . . . From an absence of
extradition arrangements flight abroad by the
ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement
and thus indirectly does the commission of crime
itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
"The Philippines also has a national interest to help in
suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to
facilitate the extradition of persons covered by
treaties duly entered [into] by our government.
More and more, crimes are becoming the concern
of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime
prevention are undergoing universalization. One
manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization
is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities
threaten the peace and progress of civilized
countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines
to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its
vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational
crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster
international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot
afford to be an isolationist state. We need to
cooperate with other states in order to improve our
chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2 . The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to
the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that
both parties thereto have examined, and that both
accept and trust, each other's legal system and
judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly
authorized representative's signature on an
extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the
capacity and the willingness of the other state to
protect the basic rights of the person sought to be
extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith
that the accused will be given, upon extradition to
the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in
the criminal proceedings that will take place
therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been
signed, or would have been directly attacked for its
unconstitutionality.
3 . The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal
in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional
rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition
which is sui generis in a class by itself they are
not.
"An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a
criminal proceeding which will call into operation all
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition
does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence
will be adjudged in the court of the state where he
will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional
rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by
an extraditee . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"There are other differences between an extradition
proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while
criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules
of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow
admission of evidence under less stringent
standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to
be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive
may be ordered extradited 'upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case.' Finally, unlike in a
criminal case where judgment becomes executory
upon being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him. The United States
adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary
of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the
equities of the case and the demands of the
nation's foreign relations before making the ultimate
decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the
extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the
guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be
extradited. 37 Such determination during the
extradition proceedings will only result in needless
duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a
measure of international judicial assistance through
which a person charged with or convicted of a
crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim
to try that person. It is not part of the function of the
assisting authorities to enter into questions that are
the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate
purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only
to determine whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether
the person sought is extraditable. 39
54 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
4 . Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government
voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and
our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty
carries the presumption that its implementation will
serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty
promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On
the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations
thereunder paints a bad image of our country
before the world community. Such failure would
discourage other states from entering into treaties
with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges
on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to
comply in good faith with our obligations under the
Treaty. 42 This principle requires that we deliver the
accused to the requesting country if the conditions
precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty,
are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding
government, where it has done all that the treaty
and the law require it to do, is entitled to the
delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper
warrant, and the other government is under
obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly,
the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5 . There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be
flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience 44 of the executive
branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure
that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition
to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the
premise that persons sought to be extradited have
a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings
would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. 45
Prior acts of herein respondent (1) leaving the
requesting state right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in
the requested state despite learning that the
requesting state is seeking his return and that the
crimes he is charged with are bailable eloquently
speak of his aversion to the processes in the
requesting state, as well as his predisposition to
avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to
an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has
demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will
to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him,
given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second
time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by
the RTC informing the accused, a fugitive from
justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed
against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest
gives him notice to escape and to avoid
extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such
procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that
those sought to be extradited including terrorists,
mass murderers and war criminals may invoke it
in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues
that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily
deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without
due process. He further asserts that there is as yet
no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure
prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the
petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo,
the formulation of that procedure is within the
discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of
their arguments. It states:
"SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest,
Hearing, Service of Notices. (1) Immediately
upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of
the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the
accused to appear and to answer the petition on
the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue
a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused
which may be served any where within the
Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that
the immediate arrest and temporary detention of
the accused will best serve the ends of justice.
Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused
after having received the summons fail to answer
within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear
the case or set another date for the hearing
thereof.
"(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the
warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served
each upon the accused and the attorney having
charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan's
act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance
of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1 . On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our
Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to
qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification
would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing
the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails
sending notices to the opposing parties, 46
receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48
and giving them time to prepare and present such
facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a
hearing can no longer be considered "immediate."
The law could not have intended the word as a
mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the
55 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
determination of whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears,"' the law further
conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed
at such early stage. The trial court is not expected
to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out
the true and actual situation, immediately upon the
filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the
material then available to it, the court is expected
merely to get a good first impression a prima
facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention
of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a
Certificate of Authentication among others, were
the following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed
on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage trial
attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of
the Criminal Division of the US Department of
Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices
of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the
crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to
120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted
evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment);
(3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness
[excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of
Angela Byers" and enclosed Statements in two
volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of
Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix"
with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex
MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts]
Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty
Steward" and enclosed Statements in two volumes.
49
It is evident that respondent judge could have
already gotten an impression from these records
adequate for him to make an initial determination
of whether the accused was someone who should
immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the
ends of justice." He could have determined whether
such facts and circumstances existed as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that the extradition request was prima facie
meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded
from these supporting documents that "probable
cause" did exist. In the second questioned Order,
he stated:
"In the instant petition, the documents sent by the
US Government in support of [its] request for
extradition of herein respondent are enough to
convince the Court of the existence of probable
cause to proceed with the hearing against the
extraditee." 50
We stress that the prima facie existence of
probable cause for hearing the petition and, a
priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already
evident from the Petition itself and its supporting
documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding
did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a
hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure
of the accused to answer after receiving the
summons. In connection with the matter of
immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing" is
notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had
the holding of a hearing at that stage been
intended, the law could have easily so provided. It
also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary 52 in nature. Hence, the
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that there is no intention
to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the
entire proceedings.
"It is taken for granted that the contracting parties
intend something reasonable and something not
inconsistent with generally recognized principles of
International Law, nor with previous treaty
obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the
meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable
meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable,
the more reasonable to the less reasonable . . . ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons
sought to be extradited a notice of the request for
their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future
date would give them ample opportunity to
prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty
nor the Law could have intended that
consequence, for the very purpose of both would
have been defeated by the escape of the
accused from the requested state.
2 . On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which
is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or
a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. It provides:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only
the examination under oath or affirmation of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
56 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein,
never was a judge required to go to the extent of
conducting a hearing just for the purpose of
personally determining probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was
that the "judge must have sufficient supporting
documents upon which to make his independent
judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify
the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of
probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically
stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a
hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
"Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of
arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused.
In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo
hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence
on record, judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses. 57 In the present
case, validating the act of respondent judge and
instituting the practice of hearing the accused and
his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant
with the rationale for the entire system. If the
accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily
to present evidence during the prima facie
determination for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, what would stop him from presenting his
entire plethora of defenses at this stage if he so
desires in his effort to negate a prima facie
finding? Such a procedure could convert the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-
blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly
make trial of the main case superfluous. This
scenario is also anathema to the summary nature
of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition
and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify
the adoption of a set of procedures more
protective of the accused. If a different procedure
were called for at all, a more restrictive one not
the opposite would be justified in view of
respondent's demonstrated predisposition to flee.
aDHCAE
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it
wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its
supporting documents, the judge must study them
and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie
finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and
substance, (b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person
sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge
may require the submission of further
documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of
this study and examination, no prima facie finding
58 is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the
discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie
case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the
petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to
escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our
opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve
the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded
as follows:
"Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this
constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all
persons, including those sought to be extradited.
Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones
charged with offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also
alleges the relevance to the present case of
Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which,
insofar as practicable and consistent with the
summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall
also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no
provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the
right to bail to a person who is the subject of an
extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from
Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use
of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision
on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
57 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a
case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the
"right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended"
does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on
bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken to mean that the right is available
even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be
extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. To
stress, extradition proceedings are separate and
distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is
charged. He should apply for bail before the courts
trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.
No Violation
of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti
62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall
be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of
law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the
conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not
amount to a violation of his right to due process. We
iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the
same time, point out that the doctrine does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64
Where the circumstances such as those present
in an extradition case call for it, a subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the present
case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be
heard subsequently, when the extradition court
hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no
violation of his right to due process and
fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no
arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of
his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and
detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured
by (1) the DOJ's filing in court the Petition with its
supporting documents after a determination that
the extradition request meets the requirements of
the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition
judge's independent prima facie determination
that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice
before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and
(3) his opportunity, once he is under the court's
custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-
initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US
government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. But because he left the
jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered
from continuing with the due processes prescribed
under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that
opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of
taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the
government to increase the risk of violating its treaty
obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez
his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes
to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed
immediate deprivation of liberty without the due
process that he had previously shunned pales
against the government's interest in fulfilling its
Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating
with the world community in the suppression of
crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist
in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to
individuals must be carefully balanced against
exigent and palpable government interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for
fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of
facing the consequences of their actions, choose
to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good
policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty
obligations if, through overprotection or excessively
liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited
are able to evade arrest or escape from our
custody. In the absence of any provision in the
Constitution, the law or the treaty expressly
guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition
proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting
them bail, as a general rule, would be a step
towards deterring fugitives from coming to the
Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in
extradition cases falls into place with and gives life
to Article 14 67 of the Treaty, since this practice
would encourage the accused to voluntarily
surrender to the requesting state to cut short their
detention here. Likewise, their detention pending
the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall
into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law
on the summary nature of extradition cases and the
need for their speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the
"No Bail" Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of
right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has
the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of
discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce
58 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that
the right to due process is broad enough to include
the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed,
the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty
or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and
resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its
application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice,
we believe and so hold that, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested or placed under the
custody of the law, bail may be applied for and
granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71
including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by
the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific
statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially
from general principles of justice and fairness, the
applicant bears the burden of proving the above
two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising from the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it
partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst
states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative.
Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise
of this power should be characterized by caution,
so that the vital international and bilateral interests
of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or
compromised. In short, while this Court is ever
protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also
recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the
need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are
special circumstances that are compelling enough
for the Court to grant his request for provisional
release on bail. We have carefully examined these
circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1 . Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent
Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his
detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People
v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
"When the voters of his district elected the accused-
appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action. They did so with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he
could accomplish within the confines of prison. To
give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a
person with full knowledge that he is suffering from
a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any
time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
"In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils
down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
"The Constitution guarantees: '. . . nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of laws.' This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.
"Does being an elective official result in a
substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law?
"The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties
imposed by the 'mandate of the people' are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the
duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of
250 members of the House of Representatives, not
to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a
few of its members. Depending on the exigency of
Government that has to be addressed, the
President or the Supreme Court can also be
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The
importance of a function depends on the need for
its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant
is most compelling under the law of nature. A
doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the
lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A
police officer must maintain peace and order.
Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by law.
"A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,]
wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are
made in favor of or against groups or types of
individuals.
"The Court cannot validate badges of inequality.
The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate
even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert
that their interests are disregarded.
"We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties
of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift
him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
59 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private
respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in
Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the
United States was requesting his extradition. Hence,
his constituents were or should have been prepared
for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention
pending the final resolution of the case. Premises
considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are
constrained to rule against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself a compelling
reason to grant him bail.
2 . Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because
the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be
unfair to confine him during the pendency of the
case. Again we are not convinced. We must
emphasize that extradition cases are summary in
nature. They are resorted to merely to determine
whether the extradition petition and its annexes
conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine
guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended
to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights
available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner
may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings.
This is quite another matter that is not at issue here.
Thus, any further discussion of this point would be
merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of
respondent, with all the more reason would the
grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to
delay by considering it as a special circumstance
for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving
him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also
encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably
delay the extradition proceedings even more. This
we cannot allow.
3 . Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To
support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the
extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled
the country. True, he has not actually fled during
the preliminary stages of the request for his
extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean
that he will not flee as the process moves forward to
its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the
requesting government inching closer and closer.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot
be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and
still be within reach of our government if and when
it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition
for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied
for and granted by the trial court at anytime after
the applicant has been taken into custody and
prior to judgment, even after bail has been
previously denied. In the present case, the
extradition court may continue hearing evidence
on the application for bail, which may be granted
in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition
court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is
a cop-out. The parties in particular, Respondent
Jimenez have been given more than sufficient
opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to
discuss fully and exhaustively private respondent's
claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for
hearing not only petitioner's application for an
arrest warrant, but also private respondent's prayer
for temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC
were memoranda on the arrest, then position
papers on the application for bail, both of which
were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition,
the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda
and the Position Papers of both parties.
Additionally, it has patiently heard their in Oral
Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in
the great majority of cases in this Tribunal.
Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted,
the parties particularly the potential extraditee
have bombarded this Court with additional
pleadings entitled "Manifestations" by both
parties and "Counter-Manifestation" by private
respondent in which the main topic was Mr.
Jimenez's plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious
process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial
court would again hear factual and evidentiary
matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his
voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions,
private respondent has not asked for a remand.
Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely
no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the
inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of
Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments.
Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of
persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court as shown by this Decision and
the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting
Opinions written by the learned justices themselves
has exhaustively deliberated and carefully
passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus,
a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will
only further delay these already very delayed
proceedings, 74 which our Extradition Law requires
to be summary in character. What we need now is
prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary
and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm
decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is
allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a
60 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
case is one of extradition." We believe that this
charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it
to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision
has taken special cognizance of the rights to due
process and fundamental fairness of potential
extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize
and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings
is to determine whether the request expressed in
the petition, supported by its annexes and the
evidence that may be adduced during the hearing
of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty
and Law; and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely
to assist the requesting state in bringing the
accused or the fugitive who has illegally
escaped back to its territory, so that the criminal
process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the
Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the
reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial
system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability
and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights
to the accused in the pending criminal case
therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not
equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an
extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily
available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court's request
to police authorities for the arrest of the accused
who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped
bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the
requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again
if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for
extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
shall make a prima facie finding whether the
petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether
it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and
whether the person sought is extraditable. The
magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to
submit further documentation, or to personally
examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that
a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately
issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and
to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential
extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants
have a history of absconding, they have the
burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and
no danger to the community; and (b) there exist
special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances.
The grounds used by the highest court in the
requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be
considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a
special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is
not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial
discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of
each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to
due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does not always call for a prior opportunity
to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient
due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available
during the hearings on the petition and the answer
is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the
summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of
human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is
also well aware of the limitations of its authority and
of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the
other co-equal and co-independent organs of
government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an
executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations
and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive
Department of government has broad discretion in
its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform
oversight functions and exercise review authority to
prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They
should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due
process" every little step of the way, lest these
summary extradition proceedings become not only
inutile but also sources of international
embarrassment due to our inability to comply in
good faith with a treaty partner's simple request to
return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be
converted into a dubious haven where fugitives
and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify,
mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest
for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be
conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law;
and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to
avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared
NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated
July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to
Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by
private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial
Court of Manila is directed to conduct the
extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate
speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our
Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as
our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
61 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
Austria-Martinez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza and Callejo, Sr., JJ., joins
in the concurring opinion of Justice Carpio.
Bellosillo, J., see Separate Opinion.
Puno, J., see Separate Opinion.
Vitug, J., see Dissenting Opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concur in the separate opinion of
Justice Puno.
Ynares-Santiago, J., see Dissenting Opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., join in the Separate Opinion
of Justice Ynares-Santiago.
Carpio, J., see concurring Opinion.
(Government of the United States of America v.
Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, December 17, 2002)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148571. December 17, 2002.]
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
represented by the Philippines Department of
Justice, petitioners, vs. HON. GUILLERMO G.
PURGANAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 42, and MARK JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO
BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
Before the Court are private respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration dated 10 October 2002,
petitioner's Comment thereon dated 05 November
2002, private respondent's Motion for Leave of
Court to File and to Admit Additional Arguments in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 6, 2002, and Reply (to petitioner's
Comment) dated November 26, 2002.
First, private respondent insists that the Extradition
Court acted properly in granting bail to him. We
have already exhaustively discussed this issue in our
Decision and in the Concurring Opinion of Mr.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio. Thus, we will not belabor
our ruling on this point. Suffice it to say that
petitioner's repeated invocation of the Extradition
Court's grant of bail has not convinced us that he
deserves bail under the exception laid down in our
Decision, namely, "(1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exists special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances
including, as matter of reciprocity, those cited by
the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases
therein."
There has been no clear and convincing showing
as to the absence of flight risk and the non-
endangerment of the community, or as to the
existence of special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances justifying grant of bail.
Second, private respondent claims that our
Decision did not make an express finding of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court.
This is incorrect. On page 24 of our Decision, we
plainly stated: "Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding
did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez." Such grave abuse continued to
characterize the subsequent actions of Judge
Purganan in illegally granting bail to private
respondent. Again, we will not repeat here why
respondent does not deserve temporary liberty. This
point has been already exhaustively taken up in our
Decision and in the Opinions individually written by
the members of the Court.
Further, contrary to Jimenez's claims, the Extradition
Court did not negate the flight risk posed by him. It
did not make a finding on flight risk as it considered
the issue irrelevant, having already determined bail
to be a matter of right. Without making any finding
on flight risk, it found the capacity to flee
subservient to "the benefits that respondent may be
able to deliver to his constituents" despite the
absence from the records of evidence showing the
existence of such benefits.
And in any event, in his Memorandum, private
respondent submitted factual issues i.e.,
existence of special circumstances and absence of
flight risk for the consideration of this Court. He
even reiterated some of those factual submissions in
his Motion for Reconsideration. He is therefore
deemed estopped to claim that this Court cannot,
on certiorari, address factual issues and review and
reverse the factual findings of the Extradition Court.
Third, private respondent's arguments (1) that the
Extradition Court exercised due discretion in its
grant of bail and (2) that our "ruling that bail is not a
matter of right in extradition cases is contrary to
prevailing law and jurisprudence" are neither novel
nor deserving of further rebuttal. Again, they have
been extensively taken up in Decision as well as in
Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions.
Fourth, private respondent argues that allegedly
our Decision violates his due process rights. Again,
we have discussed this matter in our Decision saying
that, in its simplest concept, due process is merely
the opportunity to be heard which opportunity
need not always be a prior one. In point of fact,
private respondent has been given more than
enough opportunity to be heard in this Court as well
as in the Extradition Court. Even his Motion for
Reconsideration has been given all the chances to
persuade by way of allowing "additional
arguments" in his Motion dated November 6, 2002
and Reply. These latter pleadings are normally not
62 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
allowed, but precisely because this Court wanted
to give him more than enough opportunity to be
heard and to argue, we have bent backwards and
admitted these additional pleadings.
Finally, private respondent contends that as a
member of Congress, he is immune from arrest
"arising from offenses punishable by not more than
six (6) years imprisonment," saying that he cannot
be prevented from performing his legislative duties
because his constituents would be disenfranchised.
He perorates that a member of Congress may be
suspended or removed from office only by two
thirds vote of the House of Representatives. TaEIAS
Citing People v. Jalosjos, our Decision (pp. 38-40)
has already debunked the disenfranchisement
argument. Furthermore, our Decision does not in
any manner suspend or remove him from office.
Neither his arrest or detention arising from the
extradition proceeding will constitute his suspension
or removal from office. That is clear enough.
While equal protection and reasonable
classifications are not directly in issue in this case,
we nevertheless stress, paraphrasing Jalosjos, that
respondent's election to the position of
congressman, with the concomitant duty to
discharge legislative functions, does not constitute
a substantial differentiation which warrants placing
him in a classification or category apart from all
other persons confined and deprived of their liberty
pending resolution of their extradition cases. We
reiterate that lawful arrest and temporary
confinement of a potential extraditee are germane
to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
As we have stated, the procedure adopted by the
Extradition Court of first notifying and hearing a
prospective extraditee before the actual issuance
of the warrant for his arrest, is tantamount to giving
notice to flee and avoid extradition. Whether a
candidate for extradition does in fact go into hiding
or not is beside the point. In the final analysis, the
method adopted by the lower court was
completely at loggerheads with the purpose,
object and rationale of the law, and overlooked
the evils to be remedied.
As already suggested in our Decision (p. 32), private
respondent can avoid arrest and detention which
are the consequences of the extradition
proceeding simply by applying for bail before the
courts trying the criminal cases against him in the
USA. He himself has repeatedly told us that the
indictments against him in the United States are
bailable. Furthermore, he is capable, financially
and otherwise, of producing the necessary bail in
the US. Why then has he not done so?
Otherwise stated, Respondent Jimenez has the
actual power to lift his arrest and detention arising
from his extradition by simply and voluntarily going
to and filing bail in the USA.
AT BOTTOM, private respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration presents no new or substantial
arguments which have not been presented in his
prior pleadings and which have not been taken up
in our Decision. His present allegations and
asseverations are mere rehashes of arguments
previously presented to us or are mere restatements
of the Separate and Dissenting Opinions which
were already adequately discussed in our Decision.
In short, private respondent has not given any
compelling reason to warrant a reversal or
modification of our earlier rulings.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Mendoza, Panganiban, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Bellosillo and Puno JJ ., the latter joined by
Quisumbing, J ., reiterate their Separate Opinions.
Vitug and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., both joined by
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J ., filed their Dissenting
Opinions.
(Government of Hongkong Special Administrative
Region v. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 153675. April 19, 2007.]
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO
MUOZ, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila
(presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia,
Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1)
the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan
Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail;
and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the
motion to vacate the said Order of December 20,
2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner.
The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there
is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a
potential extraditee.
The facts are:
63 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines
and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused
and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20,
1997. HESAIT
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the
People's Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the
Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in
violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also
faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy
to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong
Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999,
warrants of arrest were issued against him. If
convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to
fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the
Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ
then forwarded the request to the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the
RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the
provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila
issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested
and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of
habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order
of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest
void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court
a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court
of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a
Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against
private respondent. The Decision became final and
executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999,
petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10,
presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his
part, private respondent filed in the same case a
petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge
Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition
for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law
granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited
himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733.
It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by
respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent
judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
CaDATc
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to
accused's further erosion of civil liberties. The
petition for bail is granted subject to the following
conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the
condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will
further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this
undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor
of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this
Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate
notice and discretion of filing its own motion for
hold departure order before this Court even in
extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to
the nearest office, at any time and day of the
week; and if they further desire, manifest before this
Court to require that all the assets of accused, real
and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with
the condition that if the accused flees from his
undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated
April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
64 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent
maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one's liberty.
HCaIDS
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides
that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in
this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time
that this Court has an occasion to resolve the
question of whether a prospective extraditee may
be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a.
Mario Batacan Crespo, 1 this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:
. . . . As suggested by the use of the word
"conviction," the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41
SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J.,
later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision
on bail will not apply to a case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the
"right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended"
does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes
the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature. ScTIAH
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to
private respondent's case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international
law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th
century, has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human
rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these
universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to
balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the
primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the
recognition that the individual person may properly
be a subject of international law is now taking root.
The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of
international law are limited only to states was
dramatically eroded towards the second half of the
past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials after World War II resulted in the
unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants
for acts characterized as violations of the laws of
war, crimes against peace, and crimes against
humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle,
Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in
the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show
that the individual person is now a valid subject of
international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II,
both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus,
on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all
the other fundamental rights of every person were
proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the
members of the international community. Thus, in
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 2 this Court, in granting
bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution, 3 the principles set forth in that
Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966,
the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which the Philippines signed and ratified.
Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein
65 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due
process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of
the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: "The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right
of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in
the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in
Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the
various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to
life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court's ruling
in Purganan is in order. caADSE
First, we note that the exercise of the State's power
to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings.
Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine, 4 have likewise been
detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would
be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise
of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This
Court has admitted to bail persons who are not
involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has
been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in
detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation
of the Philippines under international conventions to
uphold human rights. HDAaIc
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco 5 is illustrative. In
this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to
secure the necessary certificate of registration was
granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that
the prospective deportee had committed no
crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to
treat him as a person who has committed the most
serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of
the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal
law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied
to deportation proceedings. aEcADH
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons 6 and Chirskoff v.
Commission of Immigration, 7 this Court ruled that
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal
charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As
previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon
the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustaining the detainee's right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see
no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot
be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or
guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to
apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in
the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion
and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069
(The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition"
as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines
with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any
criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the
penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government." aSATHE
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right
of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand
the surrender of one accused or convicted of a
crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him
to the demanding state. 8 It is not a criminal
proceeding. 9 Even if the potential extraditee is a
criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime,
even though such punishment may follow
extradition. 10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence
wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations. 11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or
innocence of the potential extraditee. 12 Nor is it a
full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. 13 Its object is to
prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the
state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment. 14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it
is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of
criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No.
1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section 20
allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to
66 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused,
pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and
that release from provisional arrest "shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if
a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while
ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a
criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding
state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process
of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested
on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the
trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years
without having been convicted of any crime. By
any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental
right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged
deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion
for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however,
should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due
process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly
points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail
arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of
the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is
the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee.
This is based on the assumption that such extraditee
is a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the foregoing, the
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus
probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk
and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda
demands that the Philippines honor its obligations
under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our
foreign relations and defeats the purpose of
extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean
that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee's
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so,
where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions,
to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply
for bail, provided that a certain standard for the
grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the
standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable
doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases
cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed
"clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him,
this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance
of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a
flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court. cITCAa
In this case, there is no showing that private
respondent presented evidence to show that he is
not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is
REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of
"clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial
court should order the cancellation of his bail bond
and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED. CSDTac
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Tinga, Garcia, Velasco,
Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.
RULE 114- Bail
Section 1. Bail defined. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the
law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee
his appearance before any court as required under
the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be
given in the form of corporate surety, property
bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. (1a)
Section 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements.
All kinds of bail are subject to the following
conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon
approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in
force at all stages of the case until promulgation of
67 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 3 _ R i g h t T o B a i l
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed
in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper
court whenever required by the court of these
Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the
trial without justification and despite due notice
shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present
thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in
absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused
to the court for execution of the final judgment.
The original papers shall state the full name and
address of the accused, the amount of the
undertaking and the conditions herein required.
Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six
(6) months showing the face, left and right profiles
of the accused must be attached to the bail. (2a)
Section 3. No release or transfer except on
court order or bail. No person under detention by
legal process shall be released or transferred
except upon order of the court or when he is
admitted to bail. (3a)
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.
All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released
on recognize as prescribed by law or this Rule (a)
before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b)
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)
Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon
by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of
appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original
record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court.
Should the court grant the application, the
accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the
appeal under the same bail subject to the consent
of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to
the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances: (e) Age and health of the accused;

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or (f) Weight of the evidence against the
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime accused;
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal trial;
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification; (h) Forfeiture of other bail;

(c) That he committed the offense while under (i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from
probation, parole, or conditional pardon; justice when arrested; and

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate (j) Pendency of other cases where the
the probability of flight if released on bail; or accused is on bail.

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse
party in either case. (5a)
Section 6. Capital offense defined. A capital
offense is an offense which, under the law existing
at the time of its commission and of the application
for admission to bail, may be punished with death.
(6a)
Section 7. Capital offense of an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
(7a)
Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application.
At the hearing of an application for bail filed by
a person who is in custody for the commission of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden
of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The
evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial,
but upon motion of either party, the court may
recall any witness for additional examination unless
the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to testify. (8a)
Section 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. The
judge who issued the warrant or granted the
application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail
considering primarily, but not limited to, the
following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
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Excessive bail shall not be required. (9a)
Section 10. Corporate surety. Any domestic or
foreign corporation, licensed as a surety in
accordance with law and currently authorized to
act as such, may provide bail by a bond subscribed
jointly by the accused and an officer of the
corporation duly authorized by its board of
directors. (10a)
Section 11. Property bond, how posted. A
property bond is an undertaking constituted as lien
on the real property given as security for the
amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days after the
approval of the bond, the accused shall cause the
annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on
file with the Register of Deeds if the land is
registered, or if unregistered, in the Registration
Book on the space provided therefor, in the Registry
of Deeds for the province or city where the land
lies, and on the corresponding tax declaration in
the office of the provincial, city and municipal
assessor concerned.
Within the same period, the accused shall submit to
the court his compliance and his failure to do so
shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the
property bond and his re-arrest and detention.
(11a)
Section 12. Qualifications of sureties in property
bond. The qualification of sureties in a property
bond shall be as follows:
(a) Each must be a resident owner of real
estate within the Philippines;
(b) Where there is only one surety, his real
estate must be worth at least the amount of the
undertaking;
(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may
justify in an amount less than that expressed in the
undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums
must be equivalent to the whole amount of bail
demanded.
In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount
specified in his own undertaking over and above all
just debts, obligations and properties exempt from
execution. (12a)
Section 13. Justification of sureties. Every
surety shall justify by affidavit taken before the
judge that he possesses the qualifications
prescribed in the preceding section. He shall
describe the property given as security, stating the
nature of his title, its encumbrances, the number
and amount of other bails entered into by him and
still undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court
may examine the sureties upon oath concerning
their sufficiency in such manner as it may deem
proper. No bail shall be approved unless the surety
is qualified. (13a)
Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. The
accused or any person acting in his behalf may
deposit in cash with the nearest collector or internal
revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer
the amount of bail fixed by the court, or
recommended by the prosecutor who investigated
or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper
certificate of deposit and a written undertaking
showing compliance with the requirements of
section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be
discharged from custody. The money deposited
shall be considered as bail and applied to the
payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any,
shall be returned to the accused or to whoever
made the deposit. (14a)
Section 15. Recognizance. Whenever
allowed by law or these Rules, the court may
release a person in custody to his own
recognizance or that of a responsible person. (15a)
Section 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail
or recognizance. No bail shall be required when
the law or these Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period
equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment prescribe for the offense charged, he
shall be released immediately, without prejudice to
the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on
appeal. If the maximum penalty to which the
accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be
released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more
than the minimum of the principal penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, without
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or
any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a
reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the
discretion of the court. (16a)
Section 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the
amount fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability
of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or
municipality. If the accused is arrested in a
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province, city, or municipality other than where the
case is pending, bail may also be filed with any
regional trial court of said place, or if no judge
thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial
judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial
judge therein.
(b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on
recognizance, the application may only be filed in
the court where the case is pending, whether on
preliminary investigation, trial, or on appeal.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet
charged in court may apply for bail with any court
in the province, city, or municipality where he is
held. (17a)
Section 18. Notice of application to prosecutor.
In the application for bail under section 8 of this
Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the
hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit
his recommendation. (18a)
Section 19. Release on bail. The accused
must be discharged upon approval of the bail by
the judge with whom it was filed in accordance
with section 17 of this Rule.
Whenever bail is filed with a court other than where
the case is pending, the judge who accepted the
bail shall forward it, together with the order of
release and other supporting papers, to the court
where the case is pending, which may, for good
reason, require a different one to be filed. (19a)
Section 20. Increase or reduction of bail. After
the accused is admitted to bail, the court may,
upon good cause, either increase or reduce its
amount. When increased, the accused may be
committed to custody if he does not give bail in the
increased amount within a reasonable period. An
accused held to answer a criminal charge, who is
released without bail upon filing of the complaint or
information, may, at any subsequent stage of the
proceedings and whenever a strong showing of
guilt appears to the court, be required to give bail
in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to
custody. (20a)
Section 21. Forfeiture of bond. When the
presence of the accused is required by the court or
these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to
produce him before the court on a given date and
time. If the accused fails to appear in person as
required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the
bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to
produce their principal and to show cause why no
judgment should be rendered against them for the
amount of their bail. Within the said period, the
bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give
the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear
before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be
rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and
severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall
not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the
bondsmen, unless the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)
Section 22. Cancellation of bail. Upon
application of the bondsmen, with due notice to
the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon
surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled
upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the
case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without
prejudice to any liability on the bond. (22a)
Section 23. Arrest of accused out on bail. For
the purpose of surrendering the accused, the
bondsmen may arrest him or, upon written authority
endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking,
cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any
other person of suitable age and discretion.
respective municipalities and submit a report to the
executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction therein.
A monthly report of such visitation shall be
submitted by the executive judges to the Court
Administrator which shall state the total number of
detainees, the names of those held for more than
thirty (30) days, the duration of detention, the crime
charged, the status of the case, the cause for
detention, and other pertinent information. (25a)
Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal
arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation.
An application for or admission to bail shall not
bar the accused from challenging the validity of his
arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor,
or from assailing the regularity or questioning the
absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises them
before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the
matter as early as practicable but not later than
the start of the trial of the case. (n)
http://www.lawphil.net/courts/rules/rc_110-
127_crim.html

An accused released on bail may be re-arrested

without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to
depart from the Philippines without permission of
the court where the case is pending. (23a)

Section 24. No bail after final judgment;

exception. No bail shall be allowed after the
judgment of conviction has become final. If before
such finality, the accused has applies for probation,
he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail.
When no bail was filed or the accused is incapable
of filing one, the court may allow his release on
recognizance to the custody of a responsible
member of the community. In no case shall bail be
allowed after the accused has commenced to
serve sentence. (24a)

Section 25. Court supervision of detainees.

The court shall exercise supervision over all persons
in custody for the purpose of eliminating
unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the
Regional Trial Courts shall conduct monthly personal
inspections of provincial, city, and municipal jails
and their prisoners within their respective
jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the number of
detainees, inquire on their proper accommodation
and health and examine the condition of the jail
facilities. They shall order the segregation of sexes
and of minors from adults, ensure the observance
of the right of detainees to confer privately with
counsel, and strive to eliminate conditions inimical
to the detainees.

In cities and municipalities to be specified by the

Supreme Court, the municipal trial judges or
municipal circuit trial judges shall conduct monthly
personal inspections of the municipal jails in their
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