G.R. No.

188299 : January 23, 2013

HEIRS OF LUIS A. LUNA and REMEGIO A. LUNA, and LUZ LUNA-SANTOS, as represented by their
Attorneys-in-Fact, AUREA B. LUBIS, Petitioners, v. RUBEN S. AFABLE, TOMAS M. AFABLE,
FLORANTE A. EVANGELISTA, LEOVY S. EVANGELISTA, JAIME M. ILAGAN, ET. AL., Respondents.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

The heirs of Luis A. Luna and Remegio A. Luna, and Luz Luna-Santos (Heirs) are co-owners of a parcel of land
located in Brgy. Guinobatan, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro which was subjected to compulsory acquisition under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Respondents Ruben Afable, Tomas Afable, Florante
Evangelista, Leovy Evangelista, Jaime Ilagan, et al. (Afable, et al.) were identified by the DAR as qualified farmer-
beneficiaries. Hence, Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) were issued to them. The heirs sought the
cancellation of the said CLOAs before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) Calapan City. Their petition was
anchored mainly on the reclassification of the land in question into a light intensity industrial zone pursuant to
Municipal Ordinance No. 21, series of 1981, enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Calapan, thereby excluding the
same from the coverage of the agrarian law. DARAB Calapan City ordered the cancellation of the CLOAs.

Aggrieved, Afable et al. appealed to the DARAB Central Office and the latter ruled in their favour. The heirs
appealed the decision to the Office of the President which ruled that the parcel of land is excluded from the coverage
of CARP.

Then, Afable et al. appealed the Office of the Presidents decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA granted the
appeal. Hence, the heirs appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 21 validly classified the parcel of land from agricultural to
non-agricultural, and therefore, exempt from CARP?

HELD: The land is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

POLITICAL LAW: power of local governments; police power

Local governments have the power to reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural lands. Sec. 345 of RA No. 2264
(The Local Autonomy Act of 1959) specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. By virtue of a zoning
ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define, and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction
into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on the future projection of needs.

The regulation by local legislatures of land use in their respective territorial jurisdiction through zoning and
reclassification is an exercise of police power. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and
residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents
of a locality.

Petition granted. The Decision of the Office of the President is REINSTATED.

JAIME S. PEREZ, both in his G.R. No. 184478
personal and official capacity as
Chief, Marikina Demolition Office, Present:
Petitioner,
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

SPOUSES FORTUNITO L. Promulgated:

MADRONA and YOLANDA B.
PANTE, March 21, 2012
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to set aside the March 31,
2008 Decision[1]and September 10, 2008 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 83675. The CA affirmed in toto the Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 192 granting respondents
prayer for injunction against petitioner.

The antecedents follow:

Respondent-spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are registered

owners of a residential property located in Lot 22, Block 5, France
Street corner Italy Street, Greenheights Subdivision, Phase II, Marikina City and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 169365[4] of the Registry of Deeds of
Marikina. In 1989, respondents built their house thereon and enclosed it with a
concrete fence and steel gate.

In 1999, respondents received the following letter dated May 25, 1999 from
petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Marikina Demolition Office:
Owner Judge F.L. Madrona
Lot 22 B. 5 Phase II
Green Heights[, Concepcion,] Marikina City

G./ Gng. F.L. Madrona[:]

Ito po ay may kinalaman sa bahay/istruktura na inyong itinayo sa (naturang

lugar), Marikina, Kalakhang Maynila.

Bakod umusli sa Bangketa

Ang naturang pagtatayo ng bahay/istruktura ay isang paglabag sa umiiral na

batas/programa na ipatutupad ng Pamahalaang Bayan ng Marikina na nauukol sa:

[] PD 1096
(National Building Code of the Philippines)

[ ] PD 772
(Anti-Squatting Law)

[] Programa sa Kalinisan at Disiplina sa Bangketa

[ ] RA 7279
(Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992)

[ ] PD 296
(Encroachment on rivers, esteros, drainage channels and other
waterways)

[] RA 917 as amended by Section 23, PD. No. 17, DO No. 4

Series of 1987
(Illegally occupied/constructed improvements within the road
right-of-way)

Dahil po dito, kayo ay binibigyan ng taning na Pitong (7) araw simula sa

pagkatanggap ng sulat na ito para kusang alisin ang inyong istruktura. Ang hindi
ninyo pagsunod sa ipinag-uutos na ito ay magbubunsod sa amin upang gumawa
ng kaukulang hakbang na naa[a]yon sa itinatadhana ng Batas.

Sa inyong kaalaman, panuntuan at pagtalima.

 Lubos na gumagalang,

(Sgd.)
JAIME S. PEREZ
Tagapamahala
Marikina Demolition Office[5]

As response, respondent Madrona sent petitioner a three-page letter[6] dated June 8,

1999 stating that the May 25, 1999 letter (1) contained an accusation libelous in
nature as it is condemning him and his property without due process; (2) has no
basis and authority since there is no court order authorizing him to demolish their
structure; (3) cited legal bases which do not expressly give petitioner authority to
demolish; and (4) contained a false accusation since their fence did not in fact
extend to the sidewalk.

On June 9, 1999, respondents received a letter[7] from petitioner requesting them to

provide his office a copy of the relocation survey on the subject
property. Respondents, however, did not oblige because it was as if petitioner was
fishing evidence from them.

More than a year later or on February 28, 2001, petitioner sent another letter[8] with
the same contents as the May 25, 1999 letter but this time giving respondents ten
days from receipt thereof to remove the structure allegedly protruding to the
sidewalk. This prompted respondents to file a complaint[9] for injunction before the
Marikina City RTC on March 12, 2001.

In respondents injunction complaint, they alleged that (1) petitioners letters made it
appear that their fence was encroaching on the sidewalk and directed them to
remove it, otherwise he would take the corresponding action; (2) petitioners threat
of action would be damaging and adverse to respondents and appears real, earnest
and imminent; (3) the removal of their fence, which would include the main gate,
would certainly expose the premises and its occupants to intruders or third persons;
(4) petitioner has no legal authority to demolish structures in private properties and
the laws he cited in his letters do not give him any authority to do so; (5)
respondents enjoy the legal presumption of rightful possession of every inch of
their property; (6) if petitioner accuses them of erroneous possession, he should so
prove only through the proper forum which is the courts; (7) their fence is beside
the sidewalk and the land on which it stands has never been the subject of
acquisition either by negotiation or expropriation from the government; (8)
petitioners intended act of demolition even in the guise of a road right of way has
no factual or legal basis since there is no existing infrastructure project of the
national government or Marikina City government; and (9) petitioners letter and
his intended act of demolition are malicious, unfounded, meant only to harass
respondents in gross violation of their rights and in excess and outside the scope of
his authority, thereby rendering him accountable both in his personal and official
capacity.

Respondents likewise sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)

and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner and all persons acting
under him from doing any act of demolition on their property and that after trial,
the injunction be made permanent. They also prayed for moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.

On March 14, 2001, petitioner was served the corresponding summons.[10]

On March 16, 2001, the RTC issued a TRO against petitioner.[11]

On March 29, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Extension to
File Answer[12] until April 13, 2001. It appears however that petitioners counsel
failed to file an Answer within the extended period requested. Thus, on
motion[13] of respondents, petitioner was declared in default on July 13, 2001.[14]
On July 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default (with Ex-Parte
Motion to Admit Answer and Notice Entry of Appearance).[15] According to
petitioners new counsel, an answer was not filed due to the former counsels
voluminous work load as lone lawyer in the City Legal Office.

On December 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[16] denying the motion to lift the
order of default. Aside from finding that the motion failed to include a notice of
hearing, the RTC also held that the alleged cause of delay is not excusable as
voluminous work load of the counsel cannot justify the disregard of court
processes or failure to abide by the period fixed by the rules and since the delay
consisted not only a few days but over a hundred and three days. Petitioner moved
to reconsider the order but the same was denied by the RTC in its March 6,
2002 Order.[17]

Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari[18] before the CA assailing the
default order. Thus, on April 18, 2002, the RTC issued an order suspending the
proceedings of the injunction case until such time when the Petition for Certiorari
shall have been disposed of with finality.[19]

On August 20, 2002, the CA rendered a decision[20] dismissing the petition

for certiorari for lack of merit. Petitioner moved to reconsider the appellate courts
decision, but the motion was denied by Resolution[21] dated January 30, 2003.

On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order[22] dismissing the

injunction complaint without prejudice. It held that respondents have not instituted
any action before th[e] Court showing that they are still interested in further
prosecuting th[e] case and [i]n accordance with Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court, the Court is constrained to dismiss the complaint for failure of [respondents]
to prosecute their complaint for an unreasonable length of time. However, upon
motion of respondents, the dismissal order was set aside and the complaint was
reinstated by Order[23] dated December 3, 2003. The RTC agreed with the
observation of respondents that it was the court which suspended the proceedings
in the injunction case pending final disposition of the petition for certiorari before
the CA, and when the RTC issued the dismissal order, there was yet no entry of
judgment from the CA and so it cannot be said that the petition was already
disposed of with finality. Respondents were then allowed to present their
evidence ex parte before the branch clerk of court.

On July 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision[24] in favor of

respondents. The fallo of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. As prayed
for, defendant Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Demolition Office of Marikina City, or
any person acting for and in his behalf as well as the successors to his office, is
permanently enjoined from performing any act which would tend to destroy or
demolish the perimeter fence and steel gate of the plaintiffs property situated at
Lot 22, Block 5, France Street corner Italy Street, Phase II, Greenheights
Subdivision, Concepcion, Marikina City.

Defendant is further ordered to pay the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)

Pesos as attorneys fees and Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos for the costs of
suit.[25]

The RTC held that respondents, being lawful owners of the subject property,
are entitled to the peaceful and open possession of every inch of their property and
petitioners threat to demolish the concrete fence around their property is
tantamount to a violation of their rights as property owners who are entitled to
protection under the Constitution and laws. The RTC also ruled that there is no
showing that respondents fence is a nuisance per se and presents an immediate
danger to the communitys welfare, nor is there basis for petitioners claim that the
fence has encroached on the sidewalk as to justify its summary demolition.

Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On March 31, 2008, the
appellate court rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC decision.

Hence this petition based on the following grounds:

 I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE ACTION OF THE LOWER COURT IN
REINSTATING/REVIVING THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE
RESPONDENTS.

II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO PERMANENT INJUNCTION,
THEREBY RESTRAINING THE PETITIONER OR ANYONE ACTING FOR
AND ON HIS BEHALF FROM CARRYING OUT THE THREATENED
DEMOLITION OF THEIR PERIMETER FENCE AND STEEL GATE.

III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE [ERROR] IN
AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT ORDERING THE
PETITIONER TO PAY THE RESPONDENTS THE AMOUNTS OF TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) AS ATTORNEYS FEES AND FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) AS COSTS OF SUIT.[26]

Essentially, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: (1) Did the trial court
err in reinstating the complaint of respondents? (2) Are the requisites for the
issuance of a writ of injunction present? and (3) Is petitioner liable to pay attorneys
fees and costs of suit?

Petitioner argues that there was express admission of negligence by

respondents and therefore, reinstatement of their dismissed complaint was not
justified.

We disagree.

A perusal of the respondents motion for reconsideration[27] of the order of

dismissal reveals that there was no admission of negligence by respondents, either
express or implied. Respondents only contended that (1) they were under the
impression that it would be the RTC which would issue the order to continue the
proceedings once it considers that the petition before the CA had already been
disposed of with finality, and (2) their counsels records do not show that the CA
had already issued an entry of judgment at the time the dismissal order was
issued. They also only stated that they followed up with the CA the issuance of the
entry of judgment but they were just told to wait for its delivery by
mail. Petitioners imputation that respondents expressly admitted negligence is
therefore clearly unfounded.

Additionally, as correctly found by both the RTC and the CA, it did not
appear that respondent lost interest in prosecuting their case nor was their counsel
negligent in handling it. Accordingly, there was no basis for the dismissal order
and reinstatement of respondents complaint was justified.

As to the propriety of the issuance of the writ of injunction, petitioner claims

that the requisites therefor are not present in the instant case. Petitioner contends
that service of a mere notice cannot be construed as an invasion of a right and only
presupposes the giving of an opportunity to be heard before any action could be
taken. He also claims that it is clear from the records of the case that respondents
concrete fence was constructed on a part of the sidewalk in gross violation of
existing laws and ordinance and thus, they do not have absolute right over the
same. According to petitioner, the encroachment is clearly apparent in the Sketch
Plan of the government geodetic engineer as compared to the Location Plan
attached to respondents complaint. He likewise contends that the clearing of the
sidewalks is an infrastructure project of the Marikina City Government and cannot
be restrained by the courts as provided in Presidential Decree No. 1818.[28] Lastly,
petitioner points out that the trial court should not have merely relied on the
testimonies of respondents alleging that his men were already in the subdivision
and destroying properties on other streets to prove that there was urgent necessity
for the issuance of the writ.

We disagree.
 For injunction to issue, two requisites must concur: first, there must be a
right to be protected and second, the acts against which the injunction is to be
directed are violative of said right.[29] Here, the two requisites are clearly present:
there is a right to be protected, that is, respondents right over their concrete fence
which cannot be removed without due process; and the act, the summary
demolition of the concrete fence, against which the injunction is directed, would
violate said right.

If petitioner indeed found respondents fence to have encroached on the

sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after respondents
failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove
respondents supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence. Indeed,
unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial
intervention.[30] Our ruling in Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner,
Inc., on the need for judicial intervention when the nuisance is not a nuisance per
se, is well worth mentioning. In said case, we ruled:
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet
applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons
and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity
(Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the
quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be
injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without
judicial intervention. [Underscoring supplied.]

In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac where the appellant-

municipality similarly argued that the terminal involved therein is a nuisance that
may be abated by the Municipal Council via an ordinance, this Court held: Suffice
it to say that in the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code
(Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed. This appellant failed to do.[31]

Respondents fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the
health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to secure the property of
respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by
respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that respondents fence
indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for
that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its
summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.

Regarding the third issue, petitioner argues that he was just performing his duties
and as public officer, he is entitled to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official functions. Unless there is clear proof that he acted
beyond his authority or in evident malice or bad faith, he contends that he cannot be
held liable for attorneys fees and costs of suit.

Respondents, for their part, counter that the presumption of regularity has been
negated by the fact that despite their reply to the first notice, which put petitioner
on notice that what he was doing was ultra vires, he still reiterated his earlier
demand and threat of demolition. Having been warned by respondents that his acts
were in fact violations of law, petitioner should have been more circumspect in his
actions and should have pursued the proper remedies that were more in consonance
with the dictates of due process.Respondents further pray for moral damages for
the serious anxieties and sleepless nights they suffered and exemplary damages to
serve as an example to other public officials that they should be more circumspect
in the performance of their duties.

We agree with respondents.

As respondents were forced to file a case against petitioner to enjoin the impending
demolition of their property, the award of attorneys fees and costs of suit is
justified. Clearly, respondents wanted to settle the problem on their alleged
encroachment without resorting to court processes when they replied by letter after
receiving petitioners first notice. Petitioner, however, instead of considering the
points raised in respondents reply-letter, required them to submit the relocation
plan as if he wants respondents to prove that they are not encroaching on the
sidewalk even if it was he who made the accusation of violation in the first
place. And when he did not get the proof he was requiring from respondents, he
again sent a notice with a threat of summary demolition. This gave respondents no
other choice but to file an injunction complaint against petitioner to protect their
rights.

With regard to respondents claim for moral damages, this Court rules that
they are entitled thereto in the amount of P10,000.00 pursuant to Article 2217[32] of
the Civil Code. As testified to by respondents, they suffered anxiety and sleepless
nights since they were worried what would happen to their children who were left
by themselves in their Marikina residence while they were in Ormoc City if
petitioner would make real his threat of demolition on their fence.

We likewise hold that respondents are entitled to exemplary damages in the

amount of P5,000.00 to serve as an example to other public officials that they
should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.

WHEREFORE, the March 31, 2008 Decision and September 10, 2008 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 83675 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Demolition Office of
Marikina City is ORDERED to pay respondent Spouses Fortunito L. Madrona and
Yolanda B. Pante moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P5,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199439 April 22, 2014 CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 199439 April 22, 2014

CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE MAGNOLIA R.

ANTONINO-CUSTODIO Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

LEONEN, J.:

NATURE:

This is a special civil action for certiorari filed by the city of General Santos asking to find grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Audit (COA).which affirmed the findings of its
Legal Services Sector in its Opinion No. 2010-021 declaring Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as
illegal.

FACTS:

Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing rules and regulations,
designed "to entice those employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to avail of the
incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement package."6

This contextual background in the passing of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was not contested
by respondent Commission on Audit.

In response to the endorsement of the city audit team leader, respondent Commissions regional
director agreed that the grant lacked legal basis and was contrary to the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) Act. He forwarded the matter to respondent Commissions Office of
General Counsel, Legal Services Sector.

The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021. Respondent Commission on
Audit observed that GenSan SERVES was not based on a law passed by Congress but on
ordinances and resolutions passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Executive
Orders by the city mayor.26 Moreover, nowhere in Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, does it provide a specific power for local government units to
establish an early retirement program.

ISSUE:

WHETHER RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN IT CONSIDERED ORDINANCE NO. 08, SERIES OF 2009, IN THE NATURE
OF AN EARLY RETIREMENT PROGRAM REQUIRING A LAW AUTHORIZING IT FOR ITS
VALIDITY
HELD:

The Court agree with respondent Commission on Audit but only insofar as the invalidity of Section 5
of the ordinance is concerned.

Section 5. GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and PAG-IBIG Benefits Any personnel qualified and approved to receive the incentives of
this program shall be entitled to whatever retirement benefits the GSIS or PAG-IBIG is granting to a
retiring government employee.

Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive an early retirement incentive provided under this
program at the rate of one and one-half (1 1/2) months of the employees latest basic salary for
every year of service in the City Government.9

Section 5 refers to an "early retirement incentive," the amount of which is pegged on the
beneficiarys years of service in the city government. The ordinance provides that only those who
have rendered service to the city government for at least 15 years may apply.75 Consequently, this
provision falls under the definition of a retirement benefit. Applying the definition in Conte, it is a form
of reward for an employees loyalty and service to the city government, and it is intended to help the
employee enjoy the remaining years of his or her life by lessening his or her financial worries.

Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or
retirement plan other than the GSIS for government officers and employees, in order to prevent
the undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. x x x. To ignore this and rule otherwise would
be tantamount to permitting every other government office or agency to put up its own
supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such "financial assistance.71

The Court declares Section 6 on post-retirement incentives as valid.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Commission on Audit decision dated
January 20, 2011 and resolution dated October 17, 2011 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as
Section 6 of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as amended by Ordinance No. 11, series of 2009, is
declared as VALID.

BALACUIT VS CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE

[163 SCRA 182]

where an ordinance penalized movie houses that charged full payment for admission of children between 7-12; An ordinance
prohibiting theater owners to require children below 12 to pay the full price of admission and instead charge only half of the
admission price is unconstitutional. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of business
should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights.

The operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal
council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government.

Thus, an ordinance prohibiting first-run cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as
constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power. Also, an ordinance prohibiting admission of 2 or more persons in the
moviehouses and other amusement places with the use of only 1 ticket is a valid regulatory police measure not only in the
interest of preventing fraud insofar as municipal taxes are concerned but also in accordance with public health, public safety
and the general welfare.

The ordinance here is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The evident purposes of the ordinance is to help
ease the burden of cost on the part of the parent who have shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their
children, as they would for themselves.
PUBLIC CORPORATION CASE DIGESTS || USC LAW BATCH 2013

A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the theater owners
are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not make the theater owners suffer the loss of
earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, there will be difficulty in its
implementation because children over 12 of age could pass off their age as below 12 in order to avail of the benefit of the
ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the city suggest that
birth certificates be exhibited by the moviehouse patrons to prove the age of children. This is not practicable. The
ordinance is unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of the theater owners. Moreover, there is no
discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.

A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of business should not encroach upon the
legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his
property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due
process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what
prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

ZOOMZAT, INC. vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

[G.R. No. 135535, February 14, 2005]

FACTS:

Petitioner Zoomzat, Inc. alleged that on December 20, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City passed Resolution
No. 261 which resolved to express the willingness of the City of Gingoog to allow Zoomzat to install and operate a cable TV
system. Thereupon, petitioner applied for a mayors permit but the same was not acted upon by the mayors office.

On April 6, 1993, respondents enacted Ordinance No. 19 which granted a franchise to Gingoog Spacelink Cable TV, Inc. to
operate a cable television for a period of ten (10) years, subject to automatic renewal.

On July 30, 1993, Zoomzat filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against respondents for violation of Section
3(e), R.A. No. 3019. The complaint alleged that in enacting Ordinance No. 19, the respondents gave unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to Spacelink, to the prejudice of Zoomzat who was a prior grantee-applicant by virtue of Resolution
No. 261.

A criminal information for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, was filed against the respondents before the Sandiganbayan.
However, upon directive by the Sandiganbayan to restudy the instant case, Special Prosecution Officer II Antonio Manzano
recommended the dismissal of the case and the Information withdrawn for lack of probable cause. On further investigation,
Special Prosecution Officer III Victor Pascual also recommended that the case be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

On June 17, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution approving the dismissal of the case and ordering the withdrawal of
the Information against the respondents. On September 9, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not LGUs have the authority to grant the franchise to operate a cable television?

2. Did the petitioners give Spacelink undue or unwarranted advantage and preference because it stifled business
competition?

RULING:

Executive Order No. 205 (REGULATING THE OPERATION OF CABLE ANTENNA TELEVISION (CATV) SYSTEMS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) clearly provides that only the NTC could grant certificates of authority to cable television operators
and issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Likewise, Executive Order No. 436 (PRESCRIBING POLICY
GUIDELINES TO GOVERN THE OPERATIONS OF CABLE TELEVISION IN THE PHILIPPINES) vests with the NTC the regulation and
supervision of cable television industry in the Philippines.

It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises.
PUBLIC CORPORATION CASE DIGESTS || USC LAW BATCH 2013

Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not
extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.

It is undisputed that respondents were not employees of NTC. Instead, they were charged in their official capacity as
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City. As such, they cannot be charged with violation of Section 3(e),
R.A. No. 3019 for enacting Ordinance No. 19 which granted Spacelink a franchise to operate a cable television.

On the second issue, indeed, under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code, the local government unit
can regulate the operation of cable television but only when it encroaches on public properties, such as the use of public
streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions. Beyond these parameters, its acts,
such as the grant of the franchise to Spacelink, would be ultra vires.

Plainly, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City overstepped the bounds of its authority when it usurped the powers
of the NTC with the enactment of Ordinance No. 19. Being a void legislative act, Ordinance No. 19 did not confer any right
nor vest any privilege to Spacelink. As such, petitioner could not claim to have been prejudiced or suffered injury thereby.
Incidentally, petitioners claim of undue injury becomes even more baseless with the finding that Spacelink did not
commence to operate despite the grant to it of a franchise under Ordinance No. 19.

In addition, petitioner could not impute manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence on the part
of the respondents when they enacted Ordinance No. 19. A perfunctory reading of Resolution No. 261 shows that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod did not grant a franchise to it but merely expressed its willingness to allow the petitioner to
install and operate a cable television. Had respondents intended otherwise, they would have couched the resolution in
more concrete, specific and categorical terms. In contrast, Ordinance No. 19 clearly and unequivocally granted a franchise
to Spacelink, specifically stating therein its terms and conditions. Not being a bona fide franchise holder, petitioner could
not claim prior right on the strength of Resolution No. 261.

TAN vs. PEREA, G.R. No. 149743, 2/18/2005FACTS: How many cockpits may be allowed
tooperate in a city or municipality?Comes into play, the traditional power of thenational
government to enact police powermeasures, on one hand, and the vague principleof local
autonomy now enshrined in theConstitution on the other. PD449
(CockfightingLaw of 1974) provided that onlyone cockpit shall be allowed in each city/muni
cipality except that in citiesor municipalities with a population of over100T, two cockpits
may be established,maintained or operated. In 1993, the MunicipalCouncil of Daanbantaya,
Cebu enactedmunicipal ordinances which eventually allowedthe operation of not more than
three cockpitsin the municipality. In 1995, Petitioner(Leonardo Tan) applied for a license
to operatea cockpit. Respondent (Socorro Perena), whowas an existing licensee, filed a
complaint withthe RTC to enjoin. Petitioner from operating hiscockpit citing that the
challenged ordinanceallowing the operation of not more than threecockpitsviolated PD449.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and
upheld Petitioners
franchise reasoning that, while the ordinancemay be in conflict with PD449, any doubt
ininterpretation should be resolved in favor of thegrant of more power to LGUs under the
LGCs
principle of devolution. Court of Appealsreversed the trial
courts decision. Hence,Petitioners appeal to the
SC.RULING: Petition DENIED. For
Petitioner,Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC sufficientlyrepeals Section 5(b) of the
Cockfighting Law,vesting as it does on LGUs the power
andauthority to issue franchises and regulatethe operation and establishment of cockpits i
ntheir respective municipalities, any law to thecontrary
notwithstanding.However, while the Local Government Codeexpressly repealed several
laws, PD449 was notamong them. Section 534(f) of the LGC declaresthat all general and
special laws or decreesinconsistent with the Code are hereby repealedor modified
accordingly, but such clause is notan express repealing clause because it fails toidentify or
designate the acts that are intendedto be repealed. While the sanggunian retainsthe
power to authorize and license theestablishment, operation, and maintenance ofcockpits,
its discretion is limited in that it cannotauthorize more than one cockpit percity or
municipality, unless such cities ormunicipalities have a population of over onehundred
thousand, in which case two cockpitsmay be established. Cockfighting Law arisesfrom a
valid exercise of police powerbythe national government. Of course,
localgovernments are similarly empowered underSection 16 of the Local Government
Code.We do not doubt, however, the ability of thenational government to implement
policepower measures that affect the
subjectsof municipal government, especially if thesubject of regulation is a condition of
universalcharacter irrespective of territorial jurisdictions.Cockfighting is one such
condition. It is atraditionally regulated activity, due to theattendant gambling involved or
maybe even thefact that it essentially consists of two birdskilling each other for public
amusement. Lawshave been enacted restricting the days whencockfights could be held, and
legislation haseven been emphatic that cockfights could notbeheld on holidays celebrating
national honorsuch as Independence Day and Rizal Day. Theobvious thrust of our laws
designating whencockfights could be held is to limit cockfightingand imposing the one-
cockpit-per-municipality
rule is in line with that aim. Cockfighting is avalid matter of police power regulation, as it is
aform of gambling essentiallyantagonistic to the aims of enhancing nationalproductivity and
self-reliance. Limitation onthe number of cockpits in a given municipality isa reasonably
necessary means for theaccomplishment of the purpose of controllingcockfighting, for
clearly more cockpitsequals more cockfights. A municipal ordinancemust not contravene
the Constitution or anystatute, otherwise it is void. Ordinance No. 7unmistakably
contravenes the Cockfighting Lawin allowing three cockpits in Daanbantayan.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs.JAC LINER, INC., respondent
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005
Respondent JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes toand from Lucena City,
assailed City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional onthe ground that these constituted an
invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies.
Ordinance No. 1631 AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL,
INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE ANDMAINTAIN A
COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENAOrdinance No.
1778 AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA
OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS ANDFOR THIS
PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, ANDORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF
1995
The above-mentioned ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years,renewable for
another twenty five years, to Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., itssuccessors or
assigns, for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepneyterminal facility in Lucena
City, to be located outside the city proper, were
professedlyaimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged
to have been caused by theexistence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city.Further,
the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney
terminalswithin Lucena, including those already
existing, and allow the operation of only onecommon terminal located outside the city
proper, the franchise for which was granted topetitioner. The common carriers plying routes to and
from Lucena City are thus compelledto close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of
petitioner.Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected
bythe ordinances.The petitioner via petition for review, sought the wisdom of Supreme Court,
assailing theDecision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted
CityOrdinance Nos. 1631 and 1778

Ruling:
. As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercisedits
police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
publicgenerally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of
theState, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of theobject sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. Otherwisestated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
method.The questioned ordinances having been enacted with
the objective of relieving trafficcongestion in the City of Lucena, involve public interest
warranting the interference of theState. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus
presentBut the ordinances go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would
subjectthe users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly
oppressive, ascorrectly found by the appellate court.Bus terminals
 per se
do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How theoutright proscription against
the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised topetitioner, can be considered as
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, thisCourt has not been enlightened.The true role
of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and libertyso that rights are
exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted withdue deference to rights. As
for petitioners claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven effectivein
easing traffic congestion: Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different fromwhether
it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, whichbears upon its
constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by itseffectiveness,
then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to
beeffective.Hence, Ordinance No. 1631 is valid, having been issued in the exercise of
the policepower of the City Government of Lucena insofar as the grant of franchise to the
LucenaG r a n d C e n t r a l T e r m i n a l , I n c . , t o c o n s t r u c t , f i n a n c e , e s t a b l i s h , o p e r a
t e a n d m a i n t a i n common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena.Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No.
1631 is illegal and ultra vires because it contravenes theprovisions of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
The Local Government Code.City Ordinance No. 1778 is null and void, the same being also an ultra vires act of
the CityGovernment of Lucena arising from an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police
power. Affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition of Lucena Grand CentralTermin
al, Inc.is DENIED by the Supreme Court,

Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject
and lawful means.

Held:

The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the
City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite
for the proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of
whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective
were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein
are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject
the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by
the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and
then to stop it right there.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that
rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to
rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the
constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified
whenever they happen to be effective.
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of
Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the
City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and
MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels,
hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which
was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On
28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the
lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon.
Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City
Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as
it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said
Ordinance is entitled

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION

OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the
following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or

otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499
which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those
specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not
err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and
void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police
power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This
delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general
welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of
such delegated power.

A. The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as

it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of
the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and
the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the
due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of
the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of
argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Councils police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof
were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of
private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable
relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the
prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it
arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se
offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as
a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be
punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se
on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and

other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily
inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their
licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In
other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the
achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on
the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and
property.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can

not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is
intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory
taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies
property. A regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that

government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations
for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave
his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited

establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to wind up
business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate
area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the
area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure of
the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically
confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an
allowed business, the structure which housed the previous business will be
left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes
with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-
Malate area or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well.
The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in
Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning
ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power,
which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be
made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation.
Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may
not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no
support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of
local government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make
possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or
qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are
unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by
which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance
does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community.

The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated

establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns,
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By
definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually
meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting
motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other
similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as
similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial
distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and
operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the
area.

The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also
discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to
banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have
an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is
invalid.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely
empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension

houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of
the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the
general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and
prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such
establishments.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general
welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial
proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated
under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are
injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a
legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a
hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to
the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had
already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area.
The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor
repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or
funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have
force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact
but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.

Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property
rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The
Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its
operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under
the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null
and void.

Petition Denied.

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA.
MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S.
LIM,Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission,
Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels,
Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the
City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any person or
corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less
than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC),

and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and
operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene
and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in
turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.

RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal
liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.
Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private
enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to
operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit
relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be
consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended
that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to
enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and
its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.

Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it

violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise
of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their
business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of
the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to
privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.
Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by
having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective
of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general.

Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police
power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.

The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v
Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common
thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the
singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three
ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including
particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be
described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels
and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been
severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which
the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions

including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than
twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as
conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through
such implements as the general welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been
used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of
the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not
sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align
with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance
should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it
would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were
capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners.
Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived of
availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in
question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to
liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare,

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and

the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into
the personal life of the citizen.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons
of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It
must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck

down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited
and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.
Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in
illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash
rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for
motel rooms and even apartments.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the

extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the
ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the
rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly
restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as
restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice
a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.
 The Facts:
Naguillian Emission Testing Center Inc., filed a petition for
mandamus and damages against Abraham Rimando (petitioner),
the municipal mayor of Naguilian, La Union. In its complaint,
the company alleged that from 2005 to 2007 its business is
located on a land formerly belonging to the national government
which was later certified as an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain by the DENR. On January 18, 2008, it applied
for a renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding
fees, but the petitioner refused to issue a business permit, until
such time that the company executes a contract of lease with the
municipality; the respondent is amenable to signing the contract
but with some revisions, which the petitioner did not accept; no
common ground was reached among the parties, hence the
company filed the petition. The RTC ruled in favour of the
petitioner; ratiocinating that: (a) the Municipality of Naguiian is
the declared owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax
Declaration No. 002-01197; (b) under Section 6A.01 of the
Revenue Code of the Municipality of Naguilian, the
municipality has the right to require the petitioner to sign a
contract of lease because its business operation is being
conducted on a real property owned by the municipality; and (c)
a mayors duty to issue business permits is discretionary in
nature which may not be enforced by a mandamus writ.
On appeal, the CA proceeded to discuss the merits of the case
even though the petition itself is dismissible on the ground of
mootness. It held that the factual milieu of the case justifies
issuance of the writ; the tax declaration in the name of the
municipality was insufficient basis to require the execution of a
contract of lease as a condition sine qua non for the renewal of a
business permit. The CA further observed that Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the municipality
anchored its imposition of rental fees, was void because it failed
to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. It held the mayor
not liable for damages since he acted in the performance of his
duties which are legally protected by the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty; the case against
the mayor also was moot and academic since his term as mayor
expired. Nevertheless, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:
Whether or not the issue had become moot and academic;
Whether or not the issuance of a business permit maybe
compelled thru a petition for mandamus.

The Ruling:
We agree with the CA that the petition for mandamus has
already become moot and academic owing to the expiration of
the period intended to be covered by the business permit.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases
to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination
thereof would be without practical use and value1 or in the
nature of things, cannot be enforced.2 In such cases, there is no
actual substantial relief to which the applicant would be entitled
to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.3 As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case,
or dismiss it on ground of mootness.4
The objective of the petition for mandamus to compel the
petitioner to grant a business permit in favor of respondent
corporation for the period 2008 to 2009 has already been
superseded by the passage of time and the expiration of the
petitioners term as mayor. Verily then, the issue as to whether
or not the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, may be compelled
by a writ of mandamus to release the respondents business
permit ceased to present a justiciable controversy such that any
ruling thereon would serve no practical value. Should the writ be
issued, the petitioner can no longer abide thereby; also, the
effectivity date of the business permit no longer subsists.
While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the
otherwise moot appeal of the respondent, we find that the
decretal portion of its decision was erroneously couched.
The CAs conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject
land and the invalidity of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No.
2007-81, aside from being unsubstantiated by convincing
evidence, can no longer be practically utilized in favor of the
petitioner. Thus, the overriding and decisive factor in the final
disposition of the appeal was its mootness and the CA should
have dismissed the same along with the petition for mandamus
that spawned it.
More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus
to issue a business permit since the exercise of the same is a
delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was
the pronouncement of this Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon.
Villaflor5 where a determination was made on the nature of the
power of a mayor to grant business permits under the Local
Government Code6, viz:
Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section
444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provides, thus:
SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and
its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal
mayor shall: x x x x
3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and
revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of
development plans, program objectives and priorities as
provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those
resources and revenues programmed for agroindustrial
development and country-wide growth and progress, and
relative thereto, shall:
xxxx
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same
for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal
mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which declares:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates
the delegated police power to local governments. Local
government units exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies. Evidently, the Local Government Code of
1991 is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to
issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for
any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. x x x
xxxx
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991,
whereby the power of the respondent mayor to issue license and
permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated
police power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the
exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the
question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is
within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not
of mandamus.7 (Citations omitted)
Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for
mandamus filed by the respondent is incompetent to compel the
exercise of a mayors discretionary duty to issue business
permits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March
30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112152 is
hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
REYES, J.:
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo*, Perez, and Sereno, JJ.,
concur.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 198860, July 23,
2012, ABRAHAM RIMANDO, PETITIONER, VS.
NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER,
INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
ROSEMARIE LLARENAS AND HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS
The Facts:
Naguillian Emission Testing Center Inc., filed a petition for
mandamus and damages against Abraham Rimando (petitioner),
the municipal mayor of Naguilian, La Union. In its complaint,
the company alleged that from 2005 to 2007 its business is
located on a land formerly belonging to the national government
which was later certified as an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain by the DENR. On January 18, 2008, it applied
for a renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding
fees, but the petitioner refused to issue a business permit, until
such time that the company executes a contract of lease with the
municipality; the respondent is amenable to signing the contract
but with some revisions, which the petitioner did not accept; no
common ground was reached among the parties, hence the
company filed the petition. The RTC ruled in favour of the
petitioner; ratiocinating that: (a) the Municipality of Naguiian is
the declared owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax
Declaration No. 002-01197; (b) under Section 6A.01 of the
Revenue Code of the Municipality of Naguilian, the
municipality has the right to require the petitioner to sign a
contract of lease because its business operation is being
conducted on a real property owned by the municipality; and (c)
a mayors duty to issue business permits is discretionary in
nature which may not be enforced by a mandamus writ.
On appeal, the CA proceeded to discuss the merits of the case
even though the petition itself is dismissible on the ground of
mootness. It held that the factual milieu of the case justifies
issuance of the writ; the tax declaration in the name of the
municipality was insufficient basis to require the execution of a
contract of lease as a condition sine qua non for the renewal of a
business permit. The CA further observed that Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the municipality
anchored its imposition of rental fees, was void because it failed
to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. It held the mayor
not liable for damages since he acted in the performance of his
duties which are legally protected by the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty; the case against
the mayor also was moot and academic since his term as mayor
expired. Nevertheless, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:
Whether or not the issue had become moot and academic;
Whether or not the issuance of a business permit maybe
compelled thru a petition for mandamus.

The Ruling:
We agree with the CA that the petition for mandamus has
already become moot and academic owing to the expiration of
the period intended to be covered by the business permit.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases
to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination
thereof would be without practical use and value1 or in the
nature of things, cannot be enforced.2 In such cases, there is no
actual substantial relief to which the applicant would be entitled
to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.3 As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case,
or dismiss it on ground of mootness.4
The objective of the petition for mandamus to compel the
petitioner to grant a business permit in favor of respondent
corporation for the period 2008 to 2009 has already been
superseded by the passage of time and the expiration of the
petitioners term as mayor. Verily then, the issue as to whether
or not the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, may be compelled
by a writ of mandamus to release the respondents business
permit ceased to present a justiciable controversy such that any
ruling thereon would serve no practical value. Should the writ be
issued, the petitioner can no longer abide thereby; also, the
effectivity date of the business permit no longer subsists.
While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the
otherwise moot appeal of the respondent, we find that the
decretal portion of its decision was erroneously couched.
The CAs conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject
land and the invalidity of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No.
2007-81, aside from being unsubstantiated by convincing
evidence, can no longer be practically utilized in favor of the
petitioner. Thus, the overriding and decisive factor in the final
disposition of the appeal was its mootness and the CA should
have dismissed the same along with the petition for mandamus
that spawned it.
More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus
to issue a business permit since the exercise of the same is a
delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was
the pronouncement of this Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon.
Villaflor5 where a determination was made on the nature of the
power of a mayor to grant business permits under the Local
Government Code6, viz:
Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section
444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provides, thus:
SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and
its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal
mayor shall: x x x x
3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and
revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of
development plans, program objectives and priorities as
provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those
resources and revenues programmed for agroindustrial
development and country-wide growth and progress, and
relative thereto, shall:
xxxx
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same
for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal
mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which declares:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates
the delegated police power to local governments. Local
government units exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies. Evidently, the Local Government Code of
1991 is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to
issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for
any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. x x x
xxxx
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991,
whereby the power of the respondent mayor to issue license and
permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated
police power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the
exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the
question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is
within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not
of mandamus.7 (Citations omitted)
Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for
mandamus filed by the respondent is incompetent to compel the
exercise of a mayors discretionary duty to issue business
permits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March
30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112152 is
hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
REYES, J.:
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo*, Perez, and Sereno, JJ.,
concur.

HON. FERNANDO vs. ST. SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE G.R NO. 161107, MARCH 12, 2013

FACTS:
 Respondents St. Scholasticas College (SSC) and St. Scholasticas Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-
Marikina) are educational institutions organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal
offices and business addresses at Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at West Drive, Marikina Heights,
Marikina City, respectively. Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56, 306.
80 square meters, located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located
within the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of Benedictine Order, the formation house of the
novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters. The property enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence
built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities and other
improvements.

On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No.
192 entitled Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in The Municipality of Marikina. Sections 3.1 and 5
of the ordinance are pertinent to the issue at hand, to wit:

Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:

(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1) meter in height.
Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be an open fence type, at least eighty
percent (80%) see-thru;
xxx xxxx xxx
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area
allowance located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious institutions.

On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them
to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and at the same time, to
move it back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park. On April 26, 2000, the
respondents requested for an extension of time to comply with the directive. In response, the petitioners, through
then City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the enforcement of the subject Ordinance. The respondents filed
a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
arguing that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192, asserting that
such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. That demolishing their fence and constructing it 6
meters back would result in the loss of at least 1, 803. 34 square meters, worth about P9, 041, 700.00, along West
Drive, and at least 1, 954. 02 square meters, worth roughly P9, 770, 100. 00, along East Drive. The respondents,
thus, asserted that the implementation of the ordinance on their property would be tantamount to an
appropriation of property without due process of law; and that the petitioners could only appropriate a portion of
their property through eminent domain. They also pointed out that the goal of the provisions to deter lawless
elements and criminality did not exist as the solid concrete walls of the school had served as sufficient protection
for many years.

The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police
power, by virtue of which, they could restrain property rights for the protection of public safety, health, morals or
the promotion of public convenience and general prosperity.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of police power by the City
Government of Marikina.

RULING:

Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The State, through
the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State. This
delegation of police power is embodied in Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A No. 7160), known
as the General Welfare Clause. Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent
exercise of its police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment
of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the
Court the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test. We ourselves have often applied the rational
basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.

Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they are rationally further a
legitimate governmental interest. Applying strict scrutiny test, the focus is on the presence of compelling rather
than substantial governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.

Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994
must be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the Citys purpose. More importantly, it is
oppressive of private rights. Under the rational relationship test, local governments may be considered as having
properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met:

(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
its exercise and

(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
 Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.

Setback Requirement

The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking
space free for use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as
it would also be available for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision
on eminent domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to
preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be
unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property
solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.

80% See-Thru Fence Requirement

For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners must show the reasonable relation
between the purpose of the police power measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights, and those pertaining to private property will not
be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is to discourage, suppress or prevent
the concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts. The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of
crime to ensure public safety and security. The means employed by the petitioners, however, is not reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly oppressive to private rights. The petitioners have
not adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious to this Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide
better protection and a higher level of security, or serve as a more satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid
concrete wall. Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is,
thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to
protect their property. The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue interference with the
respondents rights to property and privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is, thus, also invalid and cannot be
enforced against the respondents.

Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the petitioners
to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, as
amended, on the respondents property in question located in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
G.R. No. 159110 : December 10, 2013

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, Petitioner, v. CITY OF CEBU, T.C. (TITO) SAYSON AND RICARDO
HAPITAN,Respondents.

x---------------x

G.R. No. 159692

BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., and BIENVENIDO DOUGLAS LUKE BRADBURY JABAN,

Petitioners,v. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF CEBU, CITY MAYOR ALVIN GARCIA, SANGUNIANG
PANLUNSOD OF CITY OF CEBU, HON. RENATO V. OSME, AS PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD and CITOM CHAIRMAN ALAN GAVIOLA, AS CITOM CHIEF, CITOM
TRAFFIC ENFORCER E. A. ROMERO, and LITO GILBUENA,Respondents.

BERSAMIN,J.:
FACTS:

On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to
authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking
restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City.

On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke
Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the RTC against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon.
Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon.
Renato V. Osme, and the chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management
(CITOM),seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due
process and for being contrary to law, and damages.

Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying parking
area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents from his office and after less than
10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp. His car was impounded for three
days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City
Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car but such imposition the fine was without any court
hearing and without due process of law. He was also compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00
for the clamping andP1,000.00 for the violation) without any court hearing and final judgment;

That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where there was no sign
prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative and that he was compelled to pay
the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered
by a court of justice.

On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, demanded
the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of theTraffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.

He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk
and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of theanayexterminator, upon
returning outside, his car was towed by the group even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.
The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and
void

The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC
declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 valid.

Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court
via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional.

HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Tests for a valid ordinance

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court restates the tests of a valid
ordinance thusly:

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive;(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted
within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance
with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy).

InMetropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc., G.R. No. 135962, March
27, 2000the Court cogently observed that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It
cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
(emphasis supplied)

In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu.

The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to
enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also
generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of
the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those
forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty
and property.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of
the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the
substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency
with public policy.

The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the
City of Cebu at all times".

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce the
ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving
away.

DENIED.

This is a digest of Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13 February 2008. Other
procedural issues are not discussed.)

Facts:

The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the
City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 that was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila in 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the
reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date
of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called
Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies (the brief history of the Pandacan Oil Terminals is
here).

In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They agreed that the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option. The Sangguniang
Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared
that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting 25 July 2002, which period was
extended up to 30 April 2003.

This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Courts 7 March 2007 Decision. The SC ruled that
respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including Ordinance No. 8027. After the
SC promulgated its Decision, Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the oil companies) and the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the DOE, sought to intervene and ask for a reconsideration of
the decision.
Intervention of the oil companies and the DOE allowed in the interest of justice

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes
a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be
affected by such proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. While the motions to intervene respectively filed by the oil
companies and the DOE were filed out of time, these motions were granted because they presented
novel issues and arguments. DOEs intervention was also allowed considering the
transcendental importance of this case.

Ordinance No. 8119 did not impliedly repeal Ordinance No. 8027

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals the
intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.
Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is
manifest.

There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the provisions in the two acts on the same
subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes
an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the
earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. The oil
companies argue that the situation here falls under the first category.

For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict between the two
ordinances. However, there was no legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. There is no
conflict since both ordinances actually have a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning
classification from industrial to commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial
(Ordinance No. 8119). While it is true that both ordinances relate to the same subject matter, i.e.,
classification of the land use of the area where Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is no intent to
repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable construction must be made to reconcile the
ordinances so that both can be given effect.

Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent general law does not
repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature has
intended by the latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law. The special law must be
taken as intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or provision.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a certain area described therein
(the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law as it
covers the entire city of Manila.

Mandamus lies to compel respondent Mayor to enforce Ordinance No. 8027

The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against respondent in consideration of the
separation of powers of the executive and judiciary. However, while it is true that Courts will not
interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative or executive departments of the government
in the legitimate exercise of its powers, there is an exception to enforce mere ministerial acts
required by law to be performed by some officer thereof. A writ of mandamus is the power to compel
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust
or station.

The oil companies also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to compel
respondent to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, which was to seek relief from the President of the
Philippines through the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) by
virtue of the Presidents power of supervision over local government units. This suggested
process, however, would be unreasonably long, tedious and consequently injurious to the interests
of the local government unit (LGU) and its constituents whose welfare is sought to be protected. A
party need not go first to the DILG in order to compel the enforcement of an ordinance. Besides, the
resort to an original action for mandamus before the SC is undeniably allowed by the Constitution.

Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable. There is no showing that the
Ordinance is unconstitutional.

The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No. 8027

Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its
police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex(the
welfare of the people is the supreme law).

While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be delegated.
Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police
power to local governments. LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council.
Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general welfare of the city.

This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the
city.

The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of police power

As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police
power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a concurrence of lawful
subject and lawful method. It was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning,
ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian
was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in
case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian
reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants
of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such
a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove
these terminals to dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to
determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary for
the protection of such interests. Clearly, the Sanggunian was in the best position to determine the
needs of its constituents.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And
to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or
welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.

The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified
the area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as
a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a
given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. As a
result of the zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present
location will no longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and
residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit
of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected
cannot be said to be unjust.

Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or confiscatory which amounts to taking without
compensation

According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive as it does not only
regulate but also absolutely prohibits them from conducting operations in the City of Manila.
However, the oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other appropriate zones in
Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the businesses and industries in
the zones it established.

The oil companies also argue that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because they have
invested billions of pesos in the depot, and the forced closure will result in huge losses in income
and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities. This argument has no merit. In the exercise of
police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare
which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only when the states power
of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied to some
public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is
noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. The
restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely
the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. In
the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the use or interest therein, hence
there is no compensable taking.

In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other businesses situated in the affected area
remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can be applied to other profitable uses
permitted in the commercial zone.

Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and discriminatory

The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against and singled out the
Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings and
residences that do not comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation
Code.

An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and
substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.

Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the ordinance seeks to prevent is a catastrophic
devastation that will result from a terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not
a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in those areas would
be nothing compared to the damage caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly,
there is a substantial distinction. The enactment of the ordinance which provides for the cessation of
the operations of these terminals removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the
purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not limited to the conditions existing when the
ordinance was enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all
businesses and industries in the area it delineated.

Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA 8479

The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is unconstitutional because it
contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992) and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law
of 1998).

It is true that ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by Congress. However, a
brief survey of decisions where the police power measure of the LGU clashed with national laws
shows that the common dominator is that the national laws were clearly and expressly in conflict with
the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so patent that there was no room
for doubt. This is not the case here. The laws cited merely gave DOE general powers to
establish and administer programs for the exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution,
utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy resources and to encourage
certain practices in the [oil] industry which serve the public interest and are intended to achieve
efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum products. These powers
can be exercised without emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them. When these
ambiguous powers are pitted against the unequivocal power of the LGU to enact police power and
zoning ordinances for the general welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the
latter. Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the Pandacan Terminals are not
categorical, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Manila.

The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under the Constitution. An
entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the
autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of
local governments as mandated by the Constitution. There is no showing how the laws relied upon
by the oil companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila of its power to enact ordinances in the
exercise of its police power and to reclassify the land uses within its jurisdiction.

The DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs

Another reason that militates against the DOEs assertions is that Section 4 of Article X of the
Constitution confines the Presidents power over LGUs to one of general supervision.
Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise the power of control over
them. The President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with the
activities of local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. Accordingly,
the DOE cannot substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the
City of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting
within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.

Ordinance No. 8027 is not invalid for failure to comply with RA 7924 and EO 72

The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are required to be submitted to the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) for review and if found to be in compliance with
its metropolitan physical framework plan and regulations, it shall endorse the same to the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA 7924 and Section 1 of
E.O. 72. They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through this review process, it is
invalid.

The argument is flawed. RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use plans and
zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities. This was only found in its implementing rules which
made a reference to EO 72. EO 72 expressly refers to comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only.
Ordinance No. 8027 is admittedly not a CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very specific
ordinance which reclassified the land use of a defined area in order to prevent the massive effects of
a possible terrorist attack. It is Ordinance No. 8119 which was explicitly formulated as the
Manila [CLUP] and Zoning Ordinance of 2006. CLUPs are the ordinances which should be
submitted to the MMDA for integration in its metropolitan physical framework plan and approved by
the HLURB to ensure that they conform with national guidelines and policies. Moreover, even
assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB ratification are necessary, the oil companies did not
present any evidence to show that these were not complied with. In accordance with the
presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the
absence of proof showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed.

Conclusion

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to
lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious:
life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of police power clashes
with a few individuals right to property, the former should prevail.

Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without
a doubt, there are no impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the
inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their desire for the
relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny and preserve their lives
and safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors warnings of doomsday scenarios and
threats of economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.

Just the same, the Court noted that it is not about to provoke a crisis by ordering the immediate
relocation of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site. The enforcement of a decision, specially
one with far-reaching consequences, should always be within the bounds of reason, in accordance
with a comprehensive and well-coordinated plan, and within a time-frame that complies with the
letter and spirit of our resolution. To this end, the oil companies have no choice but to obey the law.
CASE: Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers v. Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (G.R. Nos. 187836
and 187916)
DATE: 25 November 2014
PONENTE: J. Perez

FACTS

On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by oil companies

(Chevron, Petron and Shell) and Department of Energy for the creation of a Master Plan
to address and minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity of
communities, business and offices to Pandacan oil terminals without affecting security
and reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum products.
On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted Ordinance No. 8027
which reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from
Industrial II to Commercial I.
Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the reclassification were given six (6)
months from the date of effectivity to stop the operation of their businesses. It was later
extended until 30 April 2003.
On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the Supreme Court (SC)
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila an
action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. The same was issued in favor of
Chevron and Shell. Petron, on the other hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August 2004.
On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled An
Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations
of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto.
This designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone.
On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and directed Mayor Atienza
to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It declared that the objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of manila from the catastrophic devastation that will
surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on the 7 March 2007
Decision. The SC later resolved that Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and that it was
not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 as there is no irreconcilable conflict
between them.
SC later on denied with finality the second MR of the oil companies.
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor Lim), the SP
enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under Ordinance No. 8119 was limited
to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium and a Heavy
Industrial Zone where petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly allowed.
Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187. Their contentions
are as follows:
- It is an invalid exercise of police power because it does not promote the general
welfare of the people
 - It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution as well as
health and environment related municipal laws and international conventions and
treaties, such as: Clean Air Act; Environment Code; Toxic and Hazardous Wastes
Law; Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; and Convention on the Rights of the Child
- The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119
when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027
On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al. and the intervenors oil companies
contend that:
- The petitioners have no legal standing to sue whether as citizens, taxpayers or
legislators. They further failed to show that they have suffered any injury or threat
of injury as a result of the act complained of
- The petition should be dismissed outright for failure to properly apply the related
provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate remedy available
- The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC only exercises
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an
ordinance under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
- It is the function of the SP to enact zoning ordinance without prior referral to the
Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals; thus, it may repeal all or part
of zoning ordinance sought to be modified
- There is a valid exercise of police power
On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8283 which essentially amended the
assailed Ordinance to exclude the area where petroleum refineries and oil depots are
located from the Industrial Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor Lim.

ISSUES

1. WON there are violations of environmental laws

2. WON the principle of hierarchy of courts is violated
3. WON the petitioners have legal standing to sue
4. WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the Pandacan Terminals

RULING

1. None. The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied in
Section 2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the procedure in
civil, criminal and special civil actions before the MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs,
and the RTCs involving the enforcement or violations of environmental and other related
laws, rules and regulations such as but not limited to: R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances
and Hazardous Waste Act; R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act; Provisions in C.A. No. 141;
and other existing laws that relate to the conservation, development, preservation,
protection and utilization of the environment and natural resources.

Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are
allegations of violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve as
 collateral attacks that would support the other position of the petitioners the protection
of the right to life, security and safety.

2. No. The SC held that it is true that the petitions should have been filed with the RTC, it
having concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over a special civil action for prohibition, and
original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.

However, the petitions at bar are of transcendental importance warranting a

relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 464 Phil. 375)

3. Yes. The SC referred to their Decision dated 7 March 2007 which ruled that the
petitioners in that case have a legal right to seek the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027
because the subject of the petition concerns a public right, and they, as residents of
Manila, have a direct interest in the implementation of the ordinances of the city.

No different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement of the
assailed ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that concerns a public
right.

In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety of the people is
indisputably a right of utmost importance to the public. Certainly, the petitioners, as
residents of Manila, have the required personal interest to seek relief to protect such right.

4. Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the
continued stay of the oil depots, the SC followed the same line of reasoning used in its 7
March 2007 decision, to wit:

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting a sound
urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the residents
of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents
of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area
defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing,

Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila which
recommended the approval of the ordinance:

(1) The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable
and highly volatile products which include petroleum gas, liquefied
petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil
among others;
 (2) The depot is open to attack through land, water and air;
(3) It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacaang Palace;
and
(4) In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could
spread to the neighboring communities.

The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot
is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which
means that it is a terrorist target. As long as there is such a target in their midst,
the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore becomes necessary to remove
these terminals to dissipate the threat.

The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil
depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of
any convincing reason to persuade the Court that the life, security and safety of the
inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, the SC
holds that the Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional.

For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or
another, no matter how remote it is as perceived by one or some, the SC cannot allow the
right to life be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of
probability have no place in situations where the very life of not just an individual but of
residents of big neighbourhoods is at stake.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

1. Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unconstitutional and invalid with respect to the continued
stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
2. The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is ordered to cease and desist from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8187 and to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of
the Pandacan area
3. The oil companies shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days, submit to
the RTC Manila, Branch 39 an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule,
which relocation shall be completed not later than six (6) months from the date the
required document is submitted.